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DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW


UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

POLITICAL SCIENCE PROJECT


ON

SINO-INDIA RELATIONSHIP

Under the supervision of:

Submitted by:

Dr. Brajesh mishra

GURAV KRISHNA
Roll No. 61
Semester- 1st
Section -A

Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to thank my teacher Dr. BRAJESH MISHRA for giving me such
a golden opportunity to show my skills through this project. The project is a result of
an extensive research study, hard work and labour, that is put into to make it worth
reading.
I wish to acknowledge that in completing this project I had full support of my
friends as well as my teacher. This project would not have been completed without
the help of my universitys Wi-Fi internet connection and library facility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Aim of the Project
Objectives:
History of Relation between both country

Economic Relations
Border disputes
Present Status Of Relationship
Future of Relationship
Brief explanation of each objective
Conclusion
Bibliography

INTRODUCTION
It is often argued that 21st century will be a country of Asian countries, as right from the Industrial Revolution to
the end of the Second World War was a European country. However, the rest of the 20 th century was a European
century. However, the rest of the 20th century was of Americans and the present world order continues to be unipolar era with United States as the sole super power. The contemporary world is waiting for the emergence of a
challenging power to bring US hegemony to an end and redefine the world order. The first decade of 21 st century
stands over. In the contemporary world, the biggest challenge before the major powers of Asia is to arrive at
consensus on key issues otherwise American hegemony will continue to prevail at the global level in particular
and Asia in general.
The 21st century is to witness the emergence of two major powers i.e. China and India. The relation between India
and Peoples Republic of China is known as the Sino- India Relationship. The modern relation between India and
China from 1950s after formation of PRC ( Peoples Republic of China) and India recognise Communist
Government in China as legitimate Government. But the relation between India and China are not good from its
starting Jawaharlal Nehru based his vision of "resurgent Asia" on friendship between the two largest states of
Asia; his vision of an internationalist foreign policy governed by the ethics of the Panchsheel, which he initially

believed was shared by China, came to grief when it became clear that the two countries had a conflict of interest
in Tibet, which had traditionally served as a geographical and political buffer zone, and where India believed it
had inherited special privileges from the British Raj . On this issue Indo-China war was fought in 1962 between
the two countries and eventually China captured the Tibet, later on Chola incident in 1967 and 1987 Sikkim
skirmish worsen the relation. There are media news of infiltration of PLA ( Peoples Liberation Army) of China.
Economic relation between both countries have increase many fold since the 50 s and China has replaced USA
in terms of trade and China is today biggest trading partner of India in foreign trade.

History of Relationship between India and China


It is time for India to realize that Indias great power aspirations cannot be realized without a similar coldblooded realistic assessment of its own strategic interests in an anarchic international system where there are no
permanent friends or enemies only permanent interests.
China and India are two of the worlds oldest civilisations and have co-existed in peace for millenniums. Cultural
and economic relations between China and India date back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a
major trade route between India and China, but is also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India
to East Asia. During the 19th century, China's growing opium trade with the British Raj triggered the Opium
Wars. During World War II, India and China played a crucial role in halting the progress of Imperial Japan.
India and China are referred as the tiger and the talloned dragon in the parlance of folk lorish international
Relations. Sino India, Hindi Chini Bhai was the slogan which rallied the Indians to a false benumbed sense of
security. Neville Maxwell, in his book, Indias China War has narrated the surreptitiousness with which India
earned a defeat for its military and its citizens. Still, with the advent of the age of Neo Liberalism, the notion of
war seems to have become part of history tales and new economic convergence has emerged between India and
China Also, as a conflict in the realm of International Relations, the Indo-China is yet to become as Chindia.
Harking back to history, the Sino Indian trouble began when India was in the domination of the British Empire
and the Buckingham crown. The Britishers and the Westerners since, 1873 have created a Buffer nation State
between India and China which was yet to become a communist nation state which it did become in the year
1949. Also, the British official, McMohan invited the Tibetan officials along with the Chinese delegates led by
Ivan Chen who was fooled into believing that a pro Sino treaty was being signed in Shimla in 1913. History
reflects that, the Peoples Republic of China had been subjugated and humiliated by nearly all the powers of note.
As a result a Fear Psychosis of being attacked from far flung forces even after 1949, has somewhat been
dominant in its policy making structure. India under Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru attempted to implement
the letter and spirit of the Forward Foreign Policy being practiced during the times of all pervaiding British

Empire where the sun never sets. Tibet was the bone of contention for the Indians as the Chinese were weary of
Indian ambitions in that twilight zone. The Indian tacit support to self determination demands of the Tibetans was
a moot concern for the Chinese and they aired it very frequently in the international gatherings. These all were
the causes which led to the first Sino- India war.
In the post-independence period, China preferred to use military power extensively in pursuit of its geopolitical
aims. A confrontationist and belligerent image of China was therefore inevitable. Chinas choice of the military
option in a series of cases confirmed the image of a militarist state willing to use its power to settle issues by
force. Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, the conflicts on the Sino-Soviet borders, the war with India in 1962, Chinas
open espousal of the Pakistani cause during 1965 in what was a purely bilateral conflict, Chinas actions in the
South China Sea, its role in Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos make a very long list of contributive factors compounding
the image. Chinas assistance over decades to sub-national and ethnic groups with ideology funds, and weapons,
retarded the progress of newly independent states in her neighbourhood. Its acquiring of nuclear weapons
capability has evoked admiration but has not reduced concerns about its future employment, given Chinas record
in managing international relations. The image is not made any less adverse by the continuing growth and
modernisation in Chinas military capabilities during the last decade.
The Indian picture over the same period is a contrast in many ways. India was tireless in its support to Chinas
cause in the international arena from the very beginning. Indias attempts to grapple with the enormous task of
nation building, of social and distributive justice, of security against external military and terrorist threats, of
economic development through democratic processes, were monumental in size and in the investments required.
These were not helped by Chinas support through the decades of the 1960s and 1970s to insurgent groups. They
were made positively worse by Chinas assistance programme to Pakistan in nuclear and conventional weapons.
It is ironic that China which willingly embraced the concept of Panchsheel in the 1950s with India and other
newly independent states, discarded its principles so soon and so comprehensively.
Attempts have been made to view the contrasting positions, postures and processes used by China and India
through the lens of cultural history. The ancient cultural contacts between the two nations were through a transfer
of religious thoughts, Intrepid travellers of ancient times carried images of India to China. There is little to
indicate that a reverse flow of images, religious beliefs and learned treatises occurred. There is also inadequate
evidence of images about India and its thoughts and beliefs influencing the policy choices of the ruling elites in
China. It is useful to remember that much of the India-China interaction took place through geographic areas in
the western reaches of ancient India and which no longer form part of India. Trade between India and China
formed a very small part of the totality of their relationship. In military terms, the two nations shared no
commonalities in doctrine and organisational concepts. Perhaps the only shared military experience between
India and China was the Mongol invasions of their territories.
The borders and the frontiers have remained a perennial bone of contention between the twin neighbours of India
and the Peoples Republic of China. The regions of the order of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim have been the
bone of contention and the Chinese stratagem to build a motorable road all the way up to Aksai Chin and the
nuclear hobnobbing with Pakistan has caused a great deal of discomfiture with Pakistan has caused a great deal of
discomfiture with the Indian strategic establishment.
Concerted steps have been initiated by India to strengthen the relationship with China. Some of these are holding
a series of cultural events in 2006 to mark the Year of India-China Friendship, including a photo-exhibition on
India, an Indian Cultural Festival , an Indian Film Festival and a major exhibition of ancient Indian art entitled
Treasures of Ancient India, opening of tourism offices in each others countries. Apart from the over, major
steps have been made to strengthen cooperation in the fields of trade, information technology, industry, finance,

agriculture, water resources, energy, environment, transportation, infrastructure, health, education, media, culture,
tourism, youth affairs and other fields. Both the countries are growing expeditiously in multifarious fields.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to India from 1517 December 2010 at the invitation of Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. He was accompanied by 400 Chinese business leaders, who wished to sign business
deals with Indian companies.[

India and China are two very populous countries with ancient civilisations, friendship
between the two countries has a time-honoured history, which can be dated back 2,000
years, and since the establishment of diplomatic ties between our two countries, in
particular the last ten years, friendship and cooperation has made significant progress.
Premier Wen Jiabao at the Tagore International School, 15th December 2010
In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in Sanya, Hainan, China the two countries agreed to restore defense cooperation and China had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu
and Kashmir. This practice was later stopped, and as a result, defense ties were resumed between the two nations
and joint military drills were expected.
It was reported in February 2012 that India will reach US$100 billion trade with China by 2015. Bilateral trade
between the two countries reached US$73 billion in 2011, making China India's largest trade partner, but slipped
to US$66 billion in 2012.
In the 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi, India, Chinese President Hu Jintao told Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh that "it is China's unswerving policy to develop Sino-Indian friendship, deepen strategic
cooperation and seek common development" and "China hopes to see a peaceful, prosperous and continually
developing India and is committed to building more dynamic China-India relationship". Other topics were
discussed, including border dispute problems and a unified BRICS central bank.

Economic Relation Between India and China


Napoleon famously said, Let China sleep, for when China wakes, she will shake the whole world. This also
applies to India. For almost two hundred years, China and India seemed to follow Napoleons instruction, staying
dormant and serving as arena for rivalry among great powers. China in 1979 and India in 1991 began the process
of coming out of long slumber and world began shaking. China and Indias reawakening is reshaping the global
economic and political landscape. Economic and technological pressures are pushing New Delhi and Beijing

toward a cooperative integration into the world. Growth also means that China and India becomes more assertive,
casting a larger shadow on the region and the world.
If there ever was a race between India and China, it is over. Chinas economy the second largest is three times the
size of Indias and is still growing at a faster rate. China has marched far ahead of India on a whole gamut of
indices-economic, social, military, space, science and technology. The two countries were, by and large, on a par
when they set out on their different development paths sixty years ago. India recognizing the reality, is not aiming
to catch up with China as a global power second to none. The more likely scenario is that China will stay well
ahead of India. But India can still capitalize on its advantages- a vast, growing economy, an attractive political
democracy, a vibrant model of secularism and tolerance, and a special relationship with America. Indias
ambition are compared to China are modest. It simply aims at consolidating its power as a benign regional power
with global influence.
Despite a growing sense of rivalry, India is actually moving closer to China in a certain respect, one that relates to
the two countries entries onto the global stage. India and China are the two oldest civilizations, home to twofifths of the worlds populations with the fastest growing economies are back as claimants to pre-eminence in
Asia and the world. Both see Asias rise on the world stage as bringing about the end of Western dominance.
Trade and commerce has brought India and China closer to each other. China has overtaken the US AS THE
LARGEST TRADING PARTNER OF India. Their bilateral trade has gone beyond 60 billion US dollar. Both
cannot afford to loose each other. Despite numerous problems, Sino-India trade is rising rapidly. Main concern is
huge imbalance in the Sino-India trade. Balance of payment position is highly in favour of China. Moreover,
China is main beneficiary of this imbalanced trade. China is importing mainly cheap natural resources like
minerals from India and exporting value added manufactured products like electronic, engineering goods, heavy
machineries, and consumer products. Indian markets have been flooded with cheap Chinese products and this is
adversely affecting indigenous industries. Moreover, Chinese are not opening their markets in IT (Information
Technology), IT enabled services and pharmaceuticals sectors, where India has edge over the China. On the one
hand Chinese are protecting their markets and on the other hand they are dumping their cheap products into
foreign markets including India. India is loosing by exporting its natural resources to China. More than sixty
percent of Indian export to China is iron-ore. India is finding it difficult to sustain this highly imbalanced bilateral
trade with China.
Chinese investment in India and ban on certain Chinese Telecom companies such as Huawei are other sticky
points. China accused India for carrying out under the table and unfair competition against Chinese
companies. China alleged that twenty-five Chinese were among the twenty-six telecom equipment vendors
blacklisted by India because of security concerns. China demanded that India should provide a fair, open and
transparent investment environment for Chinese companies. Chinese state controlled media accused the Indian
government of raising a big stick against Chinese companies and using under the table measures to get an
unfair advantage over Chinese industry. Chinese media went to the extent of saying, India should realize that it
was unwise and impossible to try to contain the growth of its neighbor. The Global Times, a state controlled
English language newspaper of China, claimed in its editorial that while China respected India as an admirable
Asian neighbor, India has not reciprocated with due respect or trust. Most disputes in recent years have
started with suspicion or hostility on the Indian side, and China was forced to respond, the editorial accused.
New Delhi played down the Chinese media criticism and asserted that the ban was not country-specific, though
the reported black-list contained only one non-Chinese company. Chinese telecom giant Huawei, which is under
the scanner in India, also lost a bid to sell equipment for a major United States mobile operator because of
security concerns in Washington. In 2008 also, Huawei lost a $2.2 billion bid for a U.S. firm on security grounds.
In view of these facts, hysterical Chinese reaction against India is unjustified.

Studies conducted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund show that if China and India
continued their current rate of growth, by 2030 they will become the second and the third largest economies of
the world respectively. China has already become the second largest economy of the world by overtaking
Japanese economy and if it maintained its current rate of growth then by 2040, it will overtake the United States
as well and will become the largest economy of the world. China has compressed the Wests two hundred years of
industrialization into thirty years. China has become the global manufacturing hub and India has become global
back-office. One third of the global population lives in China and India. In the next twenty years by 2030, more
than 92 percent of the global middle class are projected to be in the third world, of which China and India will
account for nearly two-thirds.
Rise of China and India has provided new areas for cooperation. India and China are working together with other
emerging economies to ensure that developing countries must have a greater involvement and say in global
economics and financial matters. The emergence of the G-20 as a significant global financial forum
overshadowing the exclusive club of rich nations G-8, where emerging economies deliberate with the worlds
richest economies and where India and China have major indication of how this Sino-Indian cooperation can
work in the future. India and China worked together in advancing decolonization and independence movements
in the world in the 1950s and now both can work together in restructuring the discriminatory and the West
dominated global economic and financial order.
India and China officially resumed trade in 1978. In 1984, the two sides signed the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
Agreement. India-China bilateral trade which was as low as US$ 2.92 billion in 2000 reached US$ 51.8 billion in
2008, making China Indias largest trading partner in goods, replacing the United States of America. By the end
of 2009, as a result of the world economic downturn, bilateral trade dropped to US$ 43.27 billion (a decline of
16.54%). However, in 2010 bilateral trade reached US$ 61.74 billion, a growth of 43% compared to the same
period last year. India exported goods worth US$ 20.86 billion (+52%) to China and imported goods worth US$
40.88 billion (+38%) from China, resulting in an adverse balance of trade of US$ 20 billion. In 2011, bilateral
trade stood at US$ 73.9 billion (+20%). Indias total exports to China for 2011 were US$ 23.41 billion (+23%)
and Chinas exports to India reached US$ 50.49 billion (+24%). Trade deficit for India for year 2011 stood at
US$ 27.08 billion. Chinas trade with India and the world for year 2012 reflected the trends of the global
economic slowdown, marked by lower consumption and slower growth in trade volumes.
India-China total trade in goods for 2012 stood at US$ 66.57 billion, recording a decline of almost 10%. This
decline in overall bilateral trade can be attributed to decline in both Indias exports to China (@20%) and Indias
imports from China (@5%). Commodity-wise, bilateral trade was dominated by reactors, boilers, machinery, etc.;
electric machinery, sound equipment, etc.; organic chemicals; ores and cotton. Indias exports to China for 2012
reached US$ 18.8 billion, recording a decline of more almost 20% y-o-y whereas imports touched a total of US$
47.75 billion, recording a decline of more than 5% over the figure for 2011. Trade deficit for India for Jan-Oct,
2012 stood at US$ 29 billion.
In 2012, India was the 15th largest trading partner of China with a share of 1.72% in Chinas overall trade,
recording a decline of almost 10% y-o-y; 7th largest export destination for China, comprising a share of 2.33% of
overall Chinese exports and 19th among the countries exporting to China with a share of 1.1% in overall imports
by China.

Border Disputes
Sixty years ago on April 1 , 1950, New Delhi became the first non-socialist country to recognize Maos
Communist China and to go establish formal diplomatic ties with it. But the relation between both the neighbors
get bad due to several border disputes. I am going to mention them one by one
The Britishers and the westerners since, 1873 have created a Buffer nation State between India and the China
which was yet to become a communist nation state which it did become in the year 1949. Also, the British
official, Mc Mohan invited the Tibetan officials along with the Chinese delegates led by Ivan Chen who was
fooled into believing that a pro Sino treaty was being signed in Simla in 1913.The Tibetan delegation was part of
a Diplomatic foul play which began by sequestering the Chinese Delegates in a far off room and a separate draft
of the Treaty was signed by him and all this while the Chinese were under the pleasant impression that they were
partaking of a rightful Treaty which involved their collaboration. The Chinese at the behest of Comrade Mao-TseTung, repudiated the treaty with a strong condemnation so the Tibet Theme was established as an international
flashpoint.
The Chinese as they could not take much of the Indian Idealism in the form of its Forward Policy and the Tibetan
philanthropy, attacked on NEFA ( North Eastern Frontier Agency) to restore their hegemony in the region
populated by snow and Yaks. In 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by
which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was
accepted by China, and the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was popular then.
However, Nehru in 1958, had privately told G. Parthasarathi, the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at
all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon since his
communist background clouded his thinking about China. According to Georgia Tech political analyst John W
Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through
agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that
China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan
religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese
rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News
Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People's LiberatioArmy took an Indian
prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line, and two months later in Aksai Chin,
a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[12]

On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced
China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs on China. The
People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan. Negotiations were restarted
between the nations, but no progress was made.
Before the war, one significant incident set the road to an imminent war. By the year 1959, the whole of China
had been militarized and a vast section of the Peoples Army was deployed along its borders with its neighboring
countries, more than 20,000 kilometers of border with 12 nations. It embarked on a plan of extensive construction
of strategic roads, military bases and air fields in the bordering regions before the conflict. In spite of having any
problem India categorically stated that it had no desire to interfere in the internal matters of Tibet. Even Prime
Minister Nehru in the next few days reiterated this standpoint of Government of India. As the disputes lingered,
the air of mutual trust culminated in a War. The bone of contention hinged on to the disputed territory along the
3,225-km-long Himalayan border. The Chinese contingents entered Indian territory on the unfortunate day of
October 20th, 1962. Nine Indian divisions from the Eastern and Western commands were stationed along the
Himalayan Border with the Peoples Republic of China. They were not up to their full strength, and there was a
glaring want of artillery, tanks, equipment, and even adequate articles of clothing .
New Delhi has become both increasingly aware of its disadvantage and exceedingly suspicious of China's
intentions. India's June 8 announcement that it will deploy two additional army mountain divisions to the
northeastern state of Assam will bring India's troop levels in the region to more than 100,000. The Indian Air
Force, meanwhile, announced it will station two squadrons of advanced Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft in Tezpur, also in
Assam. They will be complemented by three Airborne Warning and Control Systems and the addition or upgrade
of airstrips and advanced landing stations. This is part of a broader effort to bolster India's military and
transportation infrastructure in its neglected northeast.
Upon hearing India's plans, Beijing became irate. The People's Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece that serves
as a window into the thinking of Beijing's insular leadership, published an exceptional broadside against New
Delhi on June 11. It described India's "tough posture" as "dangerous," and asked India to "consider whether or not
it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China." China is not afraid of India, the editorial
taunted, while mocking India for failing to keep pace with China's economic growth. The editorial reminded New
Delhi that Beijing had friends in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal but most importantly, it left no doubt about
Beijing's future position on Arunachal Pradesh: "China won't make any compromises in its border disputes with
India."
This is not the first time China has lost its cool over the border issue. Back in 2006, China's Ambassador to India
ignited a political firestorm when he declared the "whole state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory... we are
claiming all of that. That is our position." Later, on two separate occasions, China denied visas to Indian officials
from Arunachal Pradesh, explaining Chinese citizens didn't require visas to travel to their own country.
Generally coy about its suspicions, India has been turning up the diplomatic heat. Indian officials have been
speaking more openly about their concerns with China of late. A growing chorus in New Delhi is arguing that
India's uniform focus on Pakistan may be exposing it to a threat from the East. Indian officials have also accused
China of supporting the Naxalites, a tenacious and growing band of Maoist insurgents Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh has described as the "greatest threat to [India's] internal security."
China has been applying pressures as well. This March, China broke with Asian tradition and tried to block a $2.9
billion loan to India at the Asian Development Bank, furious that the loan would fund a $60 million floodmanagement program in Arunachal Pradesh. (Last week China was overruled with help from the U.S., and the

loan went through.) Before that, Beijing clumsily attempted to torpedo the U.S.-India nuclear deal from its seat at
the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And of course, China remains an opponent of India's bid to join the United Nations
Security Council and a staunch ally of India's nemesis, Pakistan.

Present Status of Relationship


It is never less than a challenge to attempt to understand the cultural factors which influence a nations conduct in
the international arena. When that nation is China and the subject of introspection is its relations with India, such
an endeavour can at best be fraught with far too many variables. The two have had the longest uninterrupted
existence as nations. Their combined size and population makes them the largest geographical and human
resource mass on the planet. India and China have had cultural, religious and trade links going back centuries in
history. They also came into being as nation states almost simultaneously in this century, They also share a past of
colonial and imperialist subjugation from which freedom had to be won with a major struggle, Paradoxically
enough, the two countries fought a war with each other over disputed frontiers. That conflict episode, the
continuing border dispute between the two countries and Chinas rapid growth in military power, not
unsurprisingly create anxieties about the future relationship. Chinas aggressive foreign policy postures also do
not encourage a benign view of it. There are enough strategic thinkers in India who reckon China to be the major
future threat to India.

At the turn of the millennium, the world is changing through information technology, and economic
interdependence. India and China both realise the need to adapt to these tectonic changes, if they hope to develop
as economically stable and politically lasting entities. The leadership in both states is aware of the need to ensure
the social and economic well-being of their peoples. In that lies real security and stability, the two essential
conditions for development. They realise that autonomous behaviour in internal and external relations is no
longer feasible in international arena. The need to assure neighbours of their interests through confidence
building measures, placing ancient disputes in correct perspective, reaching for consensus instead of conflict
resolution by force are the need of the day. India and China both realise the need for military strength
commensurate with their security and the anxieties of neighbours. The reality after the Cold War is of a world
order based on equity amongst states and constructive engagement through trade and economic development.
Even as some hegemonic and other similar mindsets are still to be seen, the future of inter-state relations is well
set on the course of cooperation. China and India realise the need for cooperation and for moving away from old
animosities through mutual agreements. They have resolved to find solutions to their disputes through
negotiations. Indian initiatives in South Asia and Chinese efforts in finding solutions to its issues of contention
with Russia, Japan, USA and in the Asia Pacific are evidence of their new awareness. In some ways China is
adding a healthy dose of Idealist balance to its policies. India on the other hand is introducing an element of
Realist pragmatism to its policies. They are in the process going beyond the culture constraints of the past.
Kautilya and Sunzi would have both approved of such a reorientation.
In the military perspective, the best way to remove the prospect of war remains the removal of the bone of
contention. There has never been a better time than the present to take cooperation between India and China to
the levels they are capable of reaching. The need of the time is to formally and finally resolve the disputes
between the two giant sized states. The conflicts of the past between China and India were not of nations but
between states following different policies to secure themselves. Now that the two states are in a better
environment of Realist-Idealist mix, specific measures can be looked at. The border dispute should now be
formally and finally settled. This will need accommodation from both sides and that should not be an
insurmountable problem given the new circumstances. The larger issue of weapons rivalry between the two states
and through either of them into the region is another issue which requires urgent attention. If these two vexing
issues are taken in hand, the way ahead in the 21st Century would be free from the compulsions of the past and
pave the way to a stable future. If that is achieved, the military perspective which so dominated the India-China
relations in the last 50 years would be balanced by the larger contexts of economy, trade, and international
cooperation. China and India would then be partners in providing a lead through the principles of Panchsheel and
in moving the world away from military conflicts. It would be a condition which both Kautilya and Sunzi would
have approved.
Thus, relations between the two countries have always been strained given these contentious border and territory
issues and lack of clarity and agreement on the Tibetan region, despite India's recognition of Chinese occupation
of Tibet. The two countries constitute the most populous nations of the world, and in 2028, India is expected to
overtake China. They are also two of the world's most economically intriguing nations, with economies that have
shown tremendous growth and potential. Both also have demonstrated nuclear capability. These, among many
other geo-political and strategic factors, are a cause for concern for much of the world, especially the West that
has begun to lag. Peace between the two nations, and in the South-Asian region is not only a matter of
convenience, it is now a necessity. Therefore, the recent breakdown of relations and Chinese incursion into Indian
territory has raised an alarm calling for a more concerted approach by Indian leaders towards its seemingly
intractable neighbour. China, being the larger nation, and the economic power it is, has fears of encirclement by
other powers, especially the erstwhile global hegemon that is the United States of America. It fears India's
compliance with such a plan, especially given the Indo-American Civilian Nuclear Deal. The need to contain
India is thus more urgent than ever.

Future of Sino-India Relations


The situation as in case of Sino-India relationship is relatively stable. Neither are status quo powers per se, as
both see greater global roles for themselves. They try to expand their respective influence in the region, often at
the others expense. Meetings are held to resolve border issues, making noise that looks like progress, but the
fundamental issues remain. As recently as December, the press reported that the two countries had reached a
common understanding, on the border, but what that understanding consists of has yet to be explained.
Nevertheless, both countries are invested in maintaining the status quo towards each other, as neither country
wishes to escalate beyond their current regional fencing match. For example, despite Chinas close relationship
with Pakistan, the Chinese government has deliberately not used it to antagonize India. On January 11, Beijing
stated that the current tensions in Kashmir are for India and Pakistan to solve by themselves. If China wished to
put pressure on India, this would be an excellent opportunity. Instead the Chinese government is not getting
involved. Stability, it appears, is more important. The most recent development was the Annual Defense Dialogue
between India and China on January 14-15. The two countries agreed to strengthened military ties at these talks,
and there is the possibility of joint military exercises. Such a reaffirmation would be impossible if both countries
did not have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
Despite the lingering distrust between the two nations, it is unlikely that their relations will sour. Neither country
can afford to have the other as an enemy. President Obamas pivot to Asia will continue to put pressure on China,
particularly with the increased presence of US forces in Australia. Combine that with Chinese tensions with Japan
and the election of the arch-nationalist Shinzo Abe as Japans new prime minister, and one plainly sees that China
is hedged in along the Pacific. A truly antagonistic relationship with India would leave China effectively
encircled.
India has too many security problemsterrorism, Kashmir and Pakistanto want China as an enemy. Unlike
Australia or Japan, there also is no reason to assume India would pressure China at the behest of the United
States. While India and the United States are currently on good terms, Indias historical and continuing
attachment to the non-aligned movement makes it unlikely they will place themselves in the pro-America camp.
There are plenty of people in both countries who see the India-China relations as inherently antagonistic.
However, no county has monolithic views on any issue, and fiery rhetoric remains just words until either sides
government acts on it.

At the end of the day, both countries have more pressing problems than each other. They will continue to try to
outmaneuver each other in Asia, and the border will not be resolved in the next decade. But this is the rare case
when both countries benefit from the status quo, and their leaders know it.
Although constraints exist, we still believe there is a positive future for the bilateral relationship, because the two
countries share many common interests in a wide variety of areas. For example, their economic structures are
complementary. Further, China is a manufacturing power and India is a major worldwide player in the service
industry. Both countries face similar problems in domestic economic and social development and can share their
experiences and support each other in approaching these. Regarding security, from Chinas point of view, if China
cannot handle its relationship with India effectively, it will not be able to shape an ideal security environment,
which is crucial for its domestic development. For India, a good relationship with China will not only benefit
Indias development but also be an important way to enhance its international influence.
On the regional level, China and India actively participate in multilateral co-operation processes, such as the freetrade schemes in South-East Asia. Both countries have concluded a free-trade agreement with the Association of
South-East Asian Nations. The recently launched negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership also include them. If concluded by 2015, as intended, this partnership will become one of the worlds
largest free-trade areas. Moreover, both countries recognise that non-traditional security issues in the region, such
as terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, natural disasters and other challenges, can only be tackled through joint
efforts and regional co-operation. One example is the sub-regional co-operation between China, India, Burma and
Bangladesh, which focuses on economic co-operation, as well as non-traditional security issues, such as
narcotics. On a global level, broad common interests exist between China and India, such as reform of
international financial institutions, maintenance of an open international trade system and tackling the challenge
of climate change. As developing countries, China and India can strengthen coordination in global institutions to
protect their national interests. China and Indias strategic partnership has already had a great impact, especially
in dealing with North-South relations. This is why, worldwide, an increasing number of people are beginning to
talk about a possible future for Chindia.

cONCLUSION
Solutions to anyproblem depend on how well the problem is understood. In the context of Sino-Indian dispute,
the 1962 war continues to mar the relationship between India and China. A better understanding of the conflict
would presumably help to de-escalatetensions between the two countries. In this direction, the paper
has explored the academic writings on the topic, and their contribution towards the solution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_War

[2] http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Sino-Indian_War.html

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