Rosenkrantz Haecceity An Ontological Essay

GARY S.
ROSENKRANTZ
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
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noseikrantz. Cary 5,
HAECCEITY
An Ontological Essay
antoloq,cal assay 1 by Gary S. Ftosenkrantz,

LPhtiospphIcel sTudles serlis 4 w. 671
p.
cq.
IneludeS tIbIlogrepqleal references E. xxx-xxx1 and tndaxatISBN 0-7923-2498-2 (ilk. pspari
I, HOGICCeity (PrtilOgephp
B0395.5.R67 1993
III--dca
I,
I/. Sirle%.
93-27789
ISBN 0-7923-2438-2
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GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HAECCEITY
An Ontological Essay
PREFACE
ix
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINAIRES
1
6
11
16
22
42
53
56
69
CHAPTER 2 - THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
72
72
77
82
93
97
106
124
130
I Metaphysical Explanations
II Qualitatively Indistinguishable Concreta
III Proposed Criteria of Individuation
IV Principles of Evaluation for the Proposed Criteria
V Evaluations of the Proposed Criteria
VI The Haecceity Criterion: Neither Trivial Nor Circular
VII Responses To A Priori Objections to Haecceity
VIII Haecceity: A Metaphysical Explanation of Diversity
CHAPTER 3 - HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

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I Haecceity: An Initial Account

II Qualitative and Nonqualitative Abstracta
III Controversies About Haecceities
IV Modal Concepts
V Cognitive and Linguistic Concepts
VI Haecceities and Individual Essences
VII Varieties of Realism and Anti-Realism
VIII The Concrete/Abstract Distinction
IX Qualitative and Nonqualitative Properties
I The Individuation of NEPs

II The Individuation of Disjoint Objects
III Objections To Unexemplified Haecceities: A Reply
IV The Unity of Metaphysical Modalities
CHAPTER 4 - SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES
I Mereological Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities

II Causal Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities
140
140
146
150
166
168
168
179
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I Haecceities and Acquaintance

II Haecceities and Re-identification
III An Argument for Premise 1 of R
IV An Argument for Premise 2 of R
V Synchronic Versions of R
VI Objections to R and its Analogs: A Rebuttal
VII Divine Cognition and Haecceities
VIII The Objects of Acquaintance
IX Objections to Russellian Objects of Acquaintance: A Response
X Cognitively Inaccessible Haecceities
184
184
191
196
198
204
214
220
225
236
241
INDEX OF NAMES
245
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
247
CHAPTER 5 - ACQUAINTANCE
PREFACE
Philosophical discussions of haecceity or "thisness" give rise to a number of
controversies. One of these controversies concerns whether or not there are
haecceities or "thisnesses". This controversy over the existence of such
attributes is pertinent to a body of contemporary research in metaphysics,
epistemology, and the philosophy of language, including analytic investigations of Identity and Individuation, Modality and Possible Worlds, Propositional Attitudes, De Re Belief, and Names. For example, philosophers who
accept the existence of haecceities have advanced the following claims. (1)
Haecceities provide a criterion of identity across possible worlds for
particulars.' (2) De re necessity can be understood in terms of de dicto
necessity because individuals have haecceities. 2 (3) De re belief can be
analyzed in terms of de dicto belief because individuals have haecceities. 3
(4) A person, S, grasps his own haecceity when he has a piece of selfknowledge expressible in first-person language, and S cannot identify an
external thing, x, unless S uniquely relates x to himself in such a way that
S grasps his own haecceity. 4 (5) In some contexts, haecceities of particulars
are intensions of indexical expressions or proper names.'
Of course, philosophers who deny that particulars have haecceities reject
(1)-(5). Typically, these philosophers argue either that the notion of such a
haecceity is obscure, or that haecceities of this kind are peculiar entities, or
See Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of
Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 5-26.
2 See
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974).
See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle: Open Court,
1976), Chapter 1, and Appendix C.
4 Roderick
Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1, and Appendix C.
See M. Lockwood "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation
(New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating Proper
Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Also see Roderick Chisholm,
Person and Object, Chapter 1; and Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981), pp. 21-22.
ix
PREFACE
PREFACE
that it is metaphysically extravagant to think that particulars have haecceities.'

This book has three goals. First, to vindicate the thesis that particulars
have haecceities. Second, to solve certain metaphysical, epistemological, and
linguistic problems about haecceities. Third, to use premises about
haecceities to justify a rare and very special variety of Extreme Realism
about abstract entities.
Chapter 1 is introductory in nature, and provides the groundwork for
accomplishing the three aforementioned goals. Preliminary discussions of
major topics are coupled with elucidations of key metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic concepts, including the concept of haecceity.
Philosophical analyses of two distinctions which are central to this project
are provided, the first being the distinction between concreta and abstracta,
and the second being the distinction between qualitative abstracta and
nonqualitative abstracta.
Chapter 2 examines the metaphysical problem of explaining the diversity
of individuals at a time, or of providing a criterion of individuation for
particulars, given the possibility of two qualitatively indistinguishable
individuals. It is argued that the solution to this problem implies that
particulars have haecceities.
Chapter 3 provides justification for the controversial claim that there are
unexemplified haecceities which have necessary existence and which could
be exemplified by particulars.
Chapter 4 argues for a somewhat surprising thesis: that we can pick out
or identify some of the aforementioned unexemplified haecceities, and use
definite descriptions of a certain kind to denote or make singular reference
to them.
Chapter 5 advances an epistemological argument which has three
xi
interesting implications. (1) There are some haecceities which no one is

capable of grasping or expressing linguistically, for instance, haecceities of
objects which are incapable of consciousness. (2) In some cases a haecceity
can be grasped or expressed linguistically by one and only one person, for
example, your haecceity can only be grasped or expressed linguistically by
you. (3) There are some haecceities which can be grasped or expressed
linguistically by many persons, for instance, the haecceity of a sharable
characteristic such as Squareness.
Some prefatory remarks about my approach to ontology and the relationship of this approach to the ontological problems dealt with in this essay will
perhaps be helpful to the reader. Although I will defend a form of platonic
realism, my conception of ontology is fundamentally aristotelian in nature.
According to such a conception, ontology is a "first science" which studies
fundamental categories of being or existence, otherwise known as ontological
categories. There are two main branches of ontology: speculative ontology,
and analytic ontology.' Speculative ontology attempts to ascertain what
kinds of entities exist. It asks, for example, whether or not there are
instances of ontological categories such as Substance, Event, Place, Time,
Collection, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number. Analytic ontology,
on the other hand, attempts to give an account of what features various kinds
of entities must have: it seeks to provide conceptual or philosophical
analyses of ontological categories, without commitment as to whether or not
there are instances of those categories.
Accordingly, analytic ontology concerns itself with the nature of the more
fundamental categories of concreta, for example, Substance, Event, Place,
and Time, the nature of the more fundamental categories of abstracta, for
instance, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number, and the nature of any
necessary interrelationships which hold among any of these categories.
Speculative ontology, however, is concerned with whether or not there exist
concreta or abstracta belonging to such categories.
See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer
Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1981), and "Possibility without Haecceity," in Peter A. French, Theodore E.
Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, II, Studies in
Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164. Also see Ernest
Sosa, "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes" in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological
and Semiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.
' This distinction was drawn by D. C. Williams in his Principles of Empirical Realism
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966), p. 74. In a similar vein, Brian Carr
has recently distinguished between categorial description and categorial realism. See Carr's
Metaphysics: An Introduction (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987),
Chapter 1.
xii PREFACE
Problems belonging to each of these branches of ontology shall be

investigated in this essay. I will argue that the notions of Concrete Entity
and Abstract Entity can be analyzed in terms of a hierarchy of ontological
categories related to one another as species and genus. Such an argument
is an instance of analytic ontology. I shall also argue that there are abstract
properties, including both universals and haecceities of concreta. Here we
have a piece of speculative ontology.
Standard arguments given in support of Abstract Property-Realism include
the following. First, sharable properties have been posited on the ground
that they are part of the best explanation of one or more of the following six
phenomena. (1) There being a number of concrete items which are of the
same kind, for instance, numerous particulars which are white. (2) A
person's having the ability to perceive that a number of concrete items are
of the same kind. (3) A predicate's denoting numerous concrete items which
are of the same kind. (4) The existence of a necessary truth such as if
something is red, then it is colored. (5) The fact that there are nonactual
possibilities like there being a purple horse. (6) The existence of logical and
mathematical truths, for example, that all men being mortal is validly
inferable from all men being animals and all animals being mortal, and that
7+5=12, respectively. Second, sharable properties have been postulated on
the ground that there are truths about such properties, for instance, some
shapes are never exemplified, or Honesty is a virtue, whose import cannot
be adequately captured by any nominalistic translation.
For most philosophers, the question of the existence of haecceities arises,
if at all, only after the existence of sharable properties or universals like
Triangularity, Catness, and Redness has been accepted. When confronted by
this question, many philosophers decline to postulate haecceities of concreta,
whether they be "thisnesses" of inanimate entities or ego-centric properties
such as being identical with me. Such a posttilation is often viewed with
deep suspicion because it appears to be unparsimonious, and indeed the
charge of ontological profligacy is one that has been leveled against
Property-Realism of any sort. My own argument is an attempt to show that,
on the contrary, it is necessary to posit haecceities of concrete entities in
order to explicate the state of affairs of two concreta's being diverse at a
time.
PREFACE, xiii
The argument I present entails a radical or "giraffe" realism of properties.

This radical realism not only implies that there are universals or sharable
attributes, but implies that for any concrete entity, a, a has a haecceity, an
irreducibly nonqualitative property or "thisness" of being identical with a.
Haecceities of concrete entities are postulated on the ground that they are
part of the best explanation of two concrete entities' being diverse at a time.
Utilizing the premise that concrete entities have haecceities, I proceed to
argue that there are unexemplified haecceities. According to my argument,
some of these unexemplified haecceities are not equivalent to a conjunction
of exemplified properties, and others of them are equivalent to such a
conjunction. These conclusions are accepted on the ground that they are part
of the best explanation of the fact that the number of individuals which
could exist is greater than the number of individuals which do exist. Finally,
I argue that many nonqualitative haecceities cannot be grasped by any of us,
but that some of these haecceities can be picked out by us. This last
argument has four noteworthy implications. First, a haecceity of an essentially nonconscious being is necessarily ungraspable. Second, an unexemplified haecceity cannot be grasped by us. Third, some unexemplified
haecceities which are equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties
can be picked out by us. Fourth, an unexemplified haecceity which is not
equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties cannot be picked out
by us.
My overall argument implies an extreme realism of properties via an
inference to the best explanation of the diversity of concrete entities. As far
as I am aware, this is a hitherto untraveled route to Property-Realism.
A number of acknowledgements are in order. I am indebted to my
colleague (and erstwhile collaborator on other projects) Joshua Hoffman. He
has helped me in writing this book in a myriad of ways, not least of which
in providing difficult objections for me to attempt to surmount. I would also
like to thank my teacher Roderick Chisholm, who is the source of my
interest in the topic of Haecceity. Many of the leading ideas in this book are
present in an earlier form in my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences,
Brown University, 1976, written under the direction of Roderick Chisholm,
Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. In addition, I would like to express my
gratitude to Arnold Cusmariu for his encouragement and helpful observa-
xiv PREFACE
tions. I benefitted significantly, as well, from the criticisms and suggestions

for improvements proposed by an anonymous referee who reviewed an
earlier draft of this book for Kluwer academic publishers. Thanks are also
due to an anonymous referee who reviewed a manuscript containing some
related material for Cambridge University Press, namely, my and Joshua
Hoffman' s Substance Among Other Categories: A Conceptual Investigation.
Finally, I wish to thank the Research Council of the University of North
Carolina at Greensboro for supporting my work on this project during a
leave in the spring of 1987.
I have incorporated parts of the following articles of mine: "Acquaintance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23; "Nonexistent Possibles
and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127147; "Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische
Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107-119; "On Objects Totally Out Of This World,"
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986), pp. 197-208; with Joshua
Hoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835-853; also with Joshua
Hoffman "J. Rudner Boscovich" and "Mereology" in Robert Audi, ed., The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, forthcoming); "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa,
eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993); and
"Critical Notice: The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by
Edward Wierenga," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991),
pp. 725-728. I would like to thank the editors of Philosophia, Grazer
Philosophische Studien, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Basil
Blackwell, and Cambridge University Press for kindly allowing me to
include this material.
-
Greensboro, North Carolina

1993
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES
"There is a certaine singularitie, interest, and proprietie
in euerie thing."
[1583 Stubbes The Anatomie of Abuses II. 11 (1882)]
That singularity which seemeth so close girt to every
individual creature."
[Beaumont Psyche, or love's mystery XXI. lii (1684)]
I - HAECCEITY: AN INITIAL ACCOUNT

"There was nothing like it in the philosophy of Plato."
(1782 Priestly An History of the Corruptions of Christianity I. I. 93)
What is a haecceity or "thisness"?' Informally speaking, we can say that a

particular haecceity is the property of being identical with a certain entity.
For example, if there are such properties as being identical with me, being
identical with Socrates, and being identical with Gorbachev, then these
properties are haecceities.
If there are haecceities, then I exemplibi the property of being identical
with me, and lack the property of being identical with Socrates. The relation
'The anglicized term haecceity derives from haecceitas, a term coined by Duns Scotus
(1266-1308). Haecceitas is from Latin haecce, haece, fem. of hic this. Thus, the literal
meaning of haecceity is thisness. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first
appearance of the anglicized form in a text is in 1647: "Here club-fisted Logick with all her
Quiddities...nor Scotus with his haeccities was able to dastardize or cow his spirits, but he made
her who first appeard like a Gorgons head, to prove a meer Bugbeare." (Robert Baron, The
Cyprian Academy, Lib. I., p. 6)
CHAPTER
of lacking is the contradictory of the exemplification relation. When it is

said that an entity, x, exemplifies a property what is meant is that x has that
property; and when it is said that x lacks a property what is meant is that x
does not have that property. For instance, when it is said that an object, o,
exemplifies Sphericity, what is meant is that o has the property of being
spherical; and when it is said that o lacks Greenness, what is meant is that
o does not have the property of being green. It seems that we intuitively
grasp what it is for something to have a property, just as it appears that we
intuitively grasp what it is for something to have a part, though in either one
of these two cases we would be hard pressed to provide a conceptual
analysis of what it is that we intuitively grasp.
Certain paradigm or core instances of Propertyhood are sharable qualities,
properties which can be exemplified by a number of things at once, for
example, qualities such as Redness, Squareness, and Catness. So, if at time
t there are three cats Morris, Felix, and Garfield, then at t each of them
exemplifies Catness or has the property of being a cat. On the other hand,
a haecceity is not a sharable quality. For example, it is evident that the
property of being identical with me cannot be exemplified by two things at
once.
It might be suggested that a formal account of haecceity can be provided
in linguistic terms: a haecceity is a property designated by an expression of
the form 'the property of being identical with N', where 'N' is a proper
name or indexical indicator. However, since properties are not linguistic
entities, it seems reasonable to ask for a nonlinguistic account of haecceity.
Notice that my earlier informal characterization of haecceity is nonlinguistic.
This informal characterization suggests that a nonlinguistic account of the
concept of haecceity can be provided by employing existential quantification.
As we shall see, the exact nature of such a nonlinguistic account depends on
whether or not there could be an unexemplified haecceity. 2 According to
some philosophers, an unexemplified haecceity is an impossibility. 3 If these
philosophers are correct, then the concept of haecceity can be defined as
follows.
2
By unexemplified I mean never-exemplified.
3 See
Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.
(Dl) F is a haecceity =df. (3x)(F is the property of being identical with

x.) 4
Unlike the linguistic account of haecceity given earlier, (Dl) is not
formulated in terms of a relationship which a haecceity bears to a linguistic
expression of a certain kind. In this sense, (Dl) provides a nonlinguistic
account of haecceity.
Since a haecceity is a property, and since a property has content, a
haecceity has content. The content of a haecceity is an entity's individuality
or identity, and (Dl) makes it clear in what sense a haecceity has, such a
content.' Because nothing can be identical with more than one thing, there
could not be an entity which exemplifies more than one haecceity.
Plainly, a haecceity cannot be identified with a property such as:
(i) being identical with something, or
(ii) being an x such that (3y)(x=y), or
(iii) being self-identical, or
(iv) being an x such that x is identical with x.
(i)-(iv) are necessarily coinstantiated, but a haecceity is not necessarily
coinstantiated with (i)-(iv). For instance, although whatever exemplifies
In (D1), existential quantification is utilized to define the concept of haecceity. Existential

quantification can be used in this way because a variable bound by an existential quantifier
refers generally to an item without the variable expressing any attribute whatsoever. A variable
of this kind does not express a haecceity of an item, since it makes no reference to anything in
particular. Such a variable cannot be said to express an attribute of existence, since existence
is what is expressed by the quantifier which binds the variable, Nor is there any other attribute
which a variable of this sort could reasonably be thought to express.
(DI) has the following implicit logical structure: necessarily, for any property y, y is a
haecceity if and only if there exists an x such that Ryx, where R is the dyadic relation, _being
the property of being identical with.
5
Compare Johannes Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The
Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1973), p. 588. Scotus characterizes a haecceity as a "positive entity intrinsically

determining a nature to singularity." For a discussion of Scotus's conception of haecceity see
John Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism, A Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns
Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963).
CHAPTER 1
being identical with me exemplifies being identical with something, a thing

other than me exemplifies only the second of these properties.
As I understand the notion of haecceity, a haecceity is an abstract entity.
The distinction between abstracta and concreta seems to be indispensable in
ontology: the debate between realists and anti-realists over the existence of
universals presupposes this distinction.
One traditional position in this debate is that of platonic or extreme
realism. It maintains that attributes such as Triangularity, Horseness, and
Redness exist apart from the mind, and can exist unexemplified: they belong
to a transcendent realm of abstract entities, distinct from spatio-temporal
reality. Less extreme in this respect is aristotelian or moderate realism.
While moderate realism entails that the aforementioned abstracta exist apart
from the mind, it is an immanent realism which holds that such an
On the
abstractum cannot exist unless it is exemplified by a concretum.
other hand, anti-realism implies that there are no abstracta. For instance,
nominalism maintains that only concreta or particulars exist, and hence that
there are no abstract attributes. Conceptualism is a form of anti-realism
which holds that entities like Triangularity, Horseness, and Redness are
mental constructs, concrete mental entities which cannot exist apart from the
mind.
I assume (plausibly, I think) that this very general division between
concreta and abstracta is exhaustive and exclusive: necessarily, every entity
either belongs to the ontological category of the concrete or belongs to the
ontological category of the abstract, and there could not be an entity
belonging to both of these categories. To illustrate the concrete/abstract
distinction, I will give examples of ontological categories which are species
of abstracta and concreta, respectively, together with putative instances of
(for
these ontological categories.' Species of abstracta include Property
example, Redness, Squareness, et cetera), Relation (for instance, Betweenness, Identity, and so on), Proposition (for example, that some animals are
horses, that some animals are unicorns, and so forth), Set (for instance, the
null set, the set of Plato and Aristotle, et cetera), and Number (for example,
6 The
intuitive notion of an ontological category will be discussed further in section VIII
of this chapter.
the number 8, the number 9, et cetera) Species of concreta include

Substance (for instance, material objects and spirits), Event (for example,
utterances and thoughts), Time (for instance, instants and durations), Place
(for example, points and extended regions of space), Limit (for instance,
corners and surfaces), Privation (for example, shadows and holes), Trope
(for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, that particular squareness,
et cetera),' and Collection (for example, the mereological sum of Mars and
Saturn, the mereological sum of Mars, Saturn, and Neptune, and so on.) 8
The intuitive distinction between concreta and abstracta may be difficult to
analyze, but it is serviceable nonetheless. A philosophical analysis of the
concrete/abstract distinction will be offered in section VIII of this chapter.
The term 'trope' as a name for such concrete "properties" is due to D. C. Williams, The
Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966). A
trope such as Aristotle's wisdom would not, of course, itself be wise: it is Aristotle who is wise.
Moreover, Aristotle's wisdom could only be possessed by Aristotle, though other wise
individuals, for example, Socrates, possess a particular wisdom of their own which could not
be possessed by anyone else. Likewise, the particular squareness of a certain object could only
be possessed by that object, and each square object possesses its own particular squareness
which no other square object could possess. Furthermore, the particular squareness of a certain
object shares the spatial location of that object. In addition, it appears that the particular
squareness of a certain object is square, and hence possesses spatial parts. Many modern trope
theorists do not postulate both tropes and universals, and many identify either everyday things,
or substances, with collections of tropes. Examples of trope theorists include D. C. Williams,
G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular," symposium
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122, and Keith
Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
8
The term, `mereological', derives from the Greek liapoc, meaning part. Accordingly,
mereology is the theory of parts, or more specifically, S. Lesniewski's formal theory of parts.
Typically, a mereological theory employs terms such as the following: proper part, improper
part, overlapping (having a part in common), disjoint (not overlapping), mereological product
(the "intersection" of overlapping objects), mereological sum (a collection of parts), mereological
difference, the universal sum, mereological complement, and atom (that which has no proper
parts). Formal mereologies are axiomatic systems. Lesniewski's Mereology and Nelson
Goodman's formal mereology (which he calls the "Calculus of Individuals") are compatible with
Nominalism, i.e., no reference is made to sets, properties, or other abstract entities. Lesniewski
hoped that his Mereology, with its many parallels to set theory, would provide an alternative
to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. Mereological theories of this kind are
collectivistic: they imply that any individuals, no matter how scattered, have a mereological sum
or comprise an object. For an authoritative discussion of the principles of formal mereological
systems see Peter Simons Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
CHAPTER 1
II - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVE

AB STRACTA
"Reason..descendeth from generalles to specialles, & from them
to particulars."
(1594 trans. T. B. La Primaudaye's French Academie II. 162)
There is an intuitive distinction between general and nongeneral abstracta,

for instance, general and nongeneral properties and propositions. The class
of nongeneral properties includes haecceities of concreta, for example, being
identical with Socrates, being identical with Gorbachev, being identical with
me, and so on. It is plausible that there are haecceities of concreta if and
only if there are nongeneral properties which are not haecceities, for
instance, being next to me, being the successor of Gorbachev, and being a
man in that room who is taller than any other man in that room. In
contrast, the following are examples of general properties: being square,
being a property, being self-identical, being identical with something, being
next to someone, being next to a square, and being a square which is larger
than any other square.
To say that an abstract entity is nongeneral is to say that it pertains to a
specific concretum in a certain intimate way, for example, being identical
with Socrates and being next to me pertain to Socrates and me, respectively.
On the other hand, to say that an abstract entity is general is to say that it
does not pertain to a specific concretum in this intimate way, for instance,
being identical with someone and being next to someone do not pertain to a
particular concretum.
Since a haecceity of a general abstract entity does not pertain to a specific
concretum in the relevant sense, such a haecceity is a general property. For
example, the haecceity of Squareness is being identical with Squareness - a
general property. In contrast, some haecceities of abstracta resemble
haecceities of concreta in being nongeneral. A case of a nongeneral
haecceity of an abstractum is a haecceity of a (nongeneral) haecceity of a
concretum, for instance, the property of being identical with the property of
being identical with me. This last case is also a property which pertains to
me.
The distinction between general and nongeneral propositions parallels the
distinction between general and nongeneral properties. The former distinction is illustrated by the following examples.

General Propositions

Someone is white

The tallest man is wise

All men are men
For every metal,

there is a solvent
Nongeneral Propositions
Jones is white
That man is wise
I am a man
The tallest woman
on Earth is black
Notice that a nongeneral proposition pertains to a specific concretum in a

certain intimate way, for instance, I am a man pertains in this way to me.
On the other hand, a general proposition, for example, all men are men, does
not pertain to a specific concretum in this way.
It is not easy to analyze the intuitive distinction between general and
nongeneral abstracta. But even in the absence of an analysis, this distinction
remains useful. An analysis of the distinction between general and
nongeneral properties or propositions will be provided in section IX of this
chapter.
Standardly, a general property is called qualitative, and a nongeneral
property is called nonqualitative. However, this practice is somewhat
misleading. Inasmuch as 'quality' and 'property' are synonyms, a "nonqualitative property" appears to be a contradiction in terms. However, it seems
that 'qualitative' and `nonqualitative' are meant to be understood in the
technical senses of general and nongeneral, respectively. In that case, the
notion of a nonqualitative property appears to be perfectly coherent. So as
to conform with the customary practice of calling a nongeneral property
nonqualitative, ' qualitative' and `nonqualitative' will henceforth be employed
in the aforementioned technical senses.
It is plausible that there are nonqualitative properties just in case there are
nonqualitative propositions. It is no less plausible that there are qualitative
properties if and only if there are qualitative propositions. Finally, it is
plausible that there are qualitative properties just provided that there are
CHAPTER 1
relations which are general or qualitative in character, for instance,

Betweenness, Love, Identity, and Diversity.
Philosophers customarily distinguish relations from relational properties,
for example, properties such as being identical with Squareness, being
identical with Gorbachev, and being next to Gorbachev. However, this
customary practice is somewhat confusing, since properties and relations
differ in their structure. In particular, the exemplification of a relation, R,
consists of an entity's bearing R to one or more entities, whereas the
exemplification of a property, P, by an entity, x, that is, x's having P, does
not consist of x's bearing P to one or more entities. In other words, a
relation's exemplification, unlike a property's, involves more than one term.
This is compatible with the fact that a thing can only bear a reflexive
relation (such as Identity) to itself, since a relation of this kind is 2-termed. 9
The linguistic manifestation of this structural difference between properties
and relations is that the former are expressed by one place predicates, and
the latter are expressed by multi-place predicates. It follows that necessarily,
Property and Relation are mutually exclusive categories. (Thus, a haecceity
is one thing, and the reflexive relation of Identity is quite another.)
Therefore, literally speaking, a relational property is a contradiction in terms.
In this sense, there cannot be a relational property.
However, it seems that if the notion of a "relational property" is
understood in terms of the sort of linguistic expression which designates such
a property, then this notion can be understood in a relevant nonliteral sense.
On a linguistic understanding of this sort, a property, P, is relational if P's
canonical name has the form 'the property of being Fa', where Fxy'
expresses a relation and 'a' is a name of something. Such a linguistic
criterion for a property's being relational does not have the absurd implication that a relational property is a relation, and the notion of a relational
property it introduces is coherent. Thus, the preceding linguistic criterion
appears to be serviceable. According to that criterion, properties such as
being identical with Gorbachev, being next to Gorbachev, and being
9
Some philosophers employ the term 'attribute' to cover both properties and relations. In
the system of classification adopted by these philosophers, my distinction between properties and
relations reappears as the distinction between singulary attributes and nonsingulary attributes.
identical with Squareness count as relational.

My arguments imply that the existence of abstracta of any one of the
three categories, Property, Relation, and Proposition, entails the existence of
abstracta of the other two categories. It is plausible that these entailments
hold because properties, relations, and propositions comprise a family of
abstracta whose members differ from one another in the number of terms
they possess: properties being one-termed, relations being multi-termed, and
propositions being zero-termed. However, there is an objection to my claim
that properties, relations and propositions form such a family.
To begin with, it seems that not only propositions are termless. For
example, it appears that tables are termless. Nevertheless, it would clearly
be erroneous to say that a table is zero-termed. Accordingly, it might be
charged that saying a proposition is zero-termed is equally erroneous. If this
charge is correct, then it undermines my claim that properties, relations, and
propositions form a family of abstracta of the aforementioned sort. In what
follows, I answer this objection by clarifying this claim of mine.
First of all, for each of the three species of abstracta under discussion,
there is a corresponding kind of truth. Corresponding to properties, there is
singular de re truth. Necessarily, if there is such a truth, then it exists in
virtue of an individual's exemplifying a property. For example, it is a truth
about Socrates that he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of Socrates's
exemplifying the property of being wise, a 1-term abstract object. Corresponding to relations, there is relational de re truth. Necessarily, if there is
a truth of this kind, then it exists in virtue of an individual's (or a number
of individuals') entering into a relation. For instance, it is a truth about
Socrates and Plato that the former teaches the latter. This truth exists in
virtue of Socrates's bearing the teaching relation to Plato, a two-term
abstract object. The existence of other relational de re truths entails the
existence of a three-term abstract object, a four-term abstract object, a fiveterm abstract object, and so on. Corresponding to propositions, there is de
dicto truth. Necessarily, if such a truth exists, then it exists in virtue of a
proposition's being true. For example, it is a truth that if a man is wise,
then he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of a proposition's being true,
namely, the proposition that if a man is wise, then he is wise.
Generalizing from singular and relational de re truths, we may infer that
1 0 CHAPTER 1
11
III - CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HAECCEITIES
there being a truth of a certain kind entails that there is an n-term abstract
object appropriate to such a truth. A proposition is the appropriate sort of
abstract object for a de dicto truth. Because the existence of a de dicto truth
entails the existence of a proposition, and because every proposition is a
termless abstract object, there being a de dicto truth entails the existence of
a termless abstract object. Since there being a truth of a certain kind entails
that there is an n-term abstract object appropriate to a truth of that kind, it
follows that a proposition is a zero-term abstract object. The fact that
propositions are zero-termed, properties are 1-termed, and relations are multitermed implies that necessarily, Property, Relation, and Proposition are
mutually exclusive categories.
"Which Infatuation has proceeded from Scholasticks who

have been so intemperate in the use of their words, that
they could not make a rational discourse of anything,
though never so small, but that they must stuff it
with their Quiddities, Entities, Essences, Haecceities,
and the like."
(1678 Cudworth The True Intellectual System of the Universe I. ii. 8. 67)
"Haecceitys, Ecceitys, Petreitys, Quidditys, Identitys...and
whole Cart-loads of Qualitys."
(1711 trans. Werenfels's Discourse of Logomachys, or
controversys, about words vi. 101)
The existence of nonqualitative haecceities is especially controversial. There

are three parties to the controversy, whose positions are as follows. (1)
Nominalism. The existence of haecceities is denied by a nominalist, since
a nominalist denies the existence of properties, whether qualitative or
nonqualitative. (2) Qualitative Realism. A qualitative realist accepts the
existence of properties, but maintains that all properties are qualitative.
Hence, a qualitative realist rejects the existence of haecceities of concrete
entities.' According to such a realist: (i) haecceities of particulars are
peculiar entities, and (ii) if an ontology is rich enough to include particulars,
qualitative properties, qualitative relations, and qualitative propositions, then
it is unnecessary to posit haecceities of particulars within that ontology. (3)
Nonqualitative Realism. According to a nonqualitative realist, there are
haecceities of particulars. Thus, a nonqualitative realist accepts the existence
10
For a defense of Qualitative Realism see Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons:
Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The First
Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), "Possibility without Haecceity," in

P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11, Studies in
Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164, and Ernest Sosa,
"Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological and

Semiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.
CHAPTER 1
of nonqualitative properties. Moreover, it seems that if there are nonqualitative haecceities, then there are qualitative properties, since qualitative
properties are paradigmatic or core instances of Propertyhood. For example,
it appears that if there exists a nonqualitative property such as being identical
with me, then there exist qualitative properties such as being identical with
Observe that the latter proposition is qualitative and says that something is
identical with Redness. It is plausible that there is such a qualitative
proposition if and only if there is the qualitative property of being identical
with Redness. (Likewise, it is plausible that there is the proposition that
(3x)(x=me), namely, the nonqualitative proposition that there exists
something identical with me, just in case there is the nonqualitative property
of being identical with me - a point which a qualitative realist accepts.)
Inasmuch as an argument of the foregoing sort applies to any qualitative
property, it follows that every qualitative property has a qualitative
haecceity." Furthermore, the following metaphysical principle of parity is
intuitively plausible.
12
something, being an entity, being concrete, being a person, being identical

with Personhood, and so forth. Thus, a nonqualitative realist should accept
the existence of both nonqualitative and qualitative properties.
Since the existence of nonqualitative haecceities is rejected by nominalists
and qualitative realists alike, and since the existence of qualitative properties
is rejected only by nominalists, the existence of nonqualitative haecceities is
more controversial than the existence of qualitative properties. And because
the usual attempts to justify Realism only seek to establish Qualitative
Realism, my attempt to justify Nonqualitative Realism is more ambitious
than those attempts.
Qualitative realists often support their rejection of nonqualitative properties
by arguing that a nonqualitative property is odd or peculiar in a way in
which a qualitative property is not. Their argument is based on two
premises. Firstly, a nonqualitative property (unlike a qualitative one) is a
kind of hybrid of an abstractum and a concretum. Secondly, such a hybrid
is strange or unnatural. Therefore, nonqualitative properties are dubious
entities.
But the following considerations counter-balance such an argument.
Suppose that there are qualitative properties, relations, and propositions. In
that case, there is the qualitative proposition that something is red.
However, it is prima facie plausible that this proposition exists if and only
if there is the proposition that there is something identical with Redness. In
other words, it seems that there is the proposition
13
Necessarily, if something has a haecceity, then everything has a haecceity.

It might be objected to this principle of parity that the following picture
of reality is acceptable: there are atoms of being, as well as complexes of
these atoms, but only the former have haecceities.
To set up my reply to this objection, I shall suppose that c is a complex
of atoms, that a is an atom, and that every atom has a haecceity. Since a
has a haecceity, it appears that there is the following true singular existential
proposition about the atom a:
,
(3x)(x=a).
Because parallel considerations apply to every other atom, I conclude that for
each atom, there is a corresponding true proposition of this kind which
asserts the existence of that atom. Moreover, it is intuitively plausible that
if there are such true singular existential propositions about atoms, and there
exist complexes of atoms, then there are also true singular existential
propositions about these complexes. This intuition is backed up by the
following argument. Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning that
propositions have truth-values, possesses modal characteristics, serve as
,
that (3x)(x is red),

just in case there is the proposition
that (3x)(x=Redness).
I1
See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies". On pages 319
and 349 Chisholm concedes that abstracta have haecceities even if concreta do not have them.
CHAPTER I
relata of logical relations, and either have other propositions as logical parts
or are themselves logical parts of other propositions. This being the case,
it is plausible that for propositions of certain sorts, there must be a logically
comprehensive variety of propositions of those sorts. And in particular, it
seems that if for every atom, there is a true singular proposition which
asserts the existence of that atom, and if there exist complexes of atoms, then
qualitative realist's rejection of nonqualitative properties is no less in need

of justification than a nonqualitative realist's acceptance of such properties.
14
there must be a logically comprehensive class of propositions which both

includes the former propositions about atoms, and includes, for every
complex of atoms, a true singular proposition which asserts the existence of
that complex of atoms. It follows that there is the following proposition
about the complex of atoms c:
(3x)(x=c).
Furthermore, it appears that if there is the singular proposition that (3x)(x=c),
then there must be the property of being identical with c - the haecceity of
a certain complex of atoms. Since a parallel argument applies to any other
complex of atoms, I conclude that every complex of atoms has a haecceity.
Therefore, it seems that if atoms have haecceities, then complexes of atoms
must also have haecceities. Consequently, it is not acceptable to picture
reality as containing atoms which have haecceities and complexes of these
atoms which do not have haecceities. I conclude that the foregoing objection
to my principle of parity does not succeed.
More generally, the need for a logically comprehensive range of
propositions makes it natural to suppose that if there is a true singular
proposition asserting the existence of an item in one case, then there is a true
singular proposition asserting the existence of an item in every case. But in
the light of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there is such a singular
proposition, then there exists the haecceity of the item whose existence is
asserted by the singular proposition in question. Thus, it seems that if
something has a haecceity, then everything does. Since qualitative properties
have haecceities, and since there are concreta, it follows that concreta have
haecceities. Therefore, if there are qualitative properties, then there are
nonqualitative properties. Hence, Qualitative Realism is false. Because the
argument for this conclusion has considerable merit, it appears that a
15
16
CHAPTER 1
IV - MODAL CONCEPTS
"There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and
those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary,
and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible."
(1714 Leibniz Monadology 33)
As noted earlier, the controversy over the existence of haecceities is relevant

to much current research on Modalities and Possible Worlds. Moreover, the
concept of haecceity cannot be explored without making use of metaphysical
modalities. Throughout this essay, the modalities employed are metaphysical, unless explicitly stated otherwise. A brief discussion of de re and de
dicto metaphysical modalities is in order.
For the purposes of this discussion, let us suppose that there are a full
range of properties, relations, and propos .ons, including properties and
relations which are unexemplified. In that case, we can characterize de re
and de dicto modalities in terms of abstracta of these kinds. Let us begin
by providing a characterization of de re possibility.
De re possibility is an entity's possibly having some property or an
entity's possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). For example, a
certain quantity of liquid water possibly has the property of being frozen,
and possibly bears the betweenness relation to two other particular material
objects. De re possibility can be used to characterize the notion of an
accidental property.
F-ness is an accidental (contingent) property of x <:=> x exemplifies F-ness,
and x possibly lacks F-ness.
To illustrate, Liquidity is an accidental property of a certain quantity of
water.
De re necessity is an entity's necessarily having some property or an
entity's necessarily bearing some relation to some thing(s). For instance, a
particular quantity of water necessarily has Extension. In other words,
Extension is an essential property of that quantity of water. Similarly, the
17
quantity of water in question necessarily bears the relation of identity to

itself.
The concept of a de re necessary (essential) property can be characterized
in terms of de re possibility as follows.
x necessarily (essentially) exemplifies F-ness t=> (i) x exemplifies F-ness,
and (ii) (x possibly lacks F-ness).
De re impossibility is an entity's not possibly having some property or an
entity's not possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). By way of
illustration, a certain quantity of water does not possibly exemplify
Sphericity and Rectangularity at the same time, and does not possibly bear
the relation of diversity to itself.
De re modalities are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. For
example, these modalities might be understood in the following way. x
possibly exemplifies F-ness just in case (3y)(y-=x & in some possible world
y exemplifies F-ness). F-ness is an accidental property of x just provided
that x exemplifies F-ness & in some possible world x lacks F-ness. x
necessarily exemplifies F-ness if and only if (3y)( -x & y exemplifies F-ness
in every possible world in which y exists). x does not possibly have F-ness
just when (Jy)(y=x & there is no possible world in which y exemplifies Fness).
It should be noted that for each of the foregoing characterizations and
understandings of de re modalities for properties, there is a parallel
characterization and understanding of a corresponding de re modality for
relations. For instance, x necessarily bears a relation R to y <=> (i) x bears
R to y, and (ii) (x possibly fails to bear R to y); and a necessarily bears a
relation R to b if and only if (ay)(Bz)(y=a & z=- b & y bears R to z in every
possible world in which y exists).
A de re modality is a relation that holds between an item and some
property, or among a number of items and some relation. On the other
hand, the de dicto modalities of metaphysical possibility, necessity,
impossibility, and contingency are properties of propositions. Intuitively
speaking, a possible proposition is one which could be true, a necessary
proposition is one which must be true, an impossible proposition is one
-
18
CHAPTER 1
which could not be true, and a contingent proposition is one which could be
true and could be false. For example, the proposition that all ravens are
black is possible, the proposition that whatever is red is colored is necessary,
the proposition that a spherical cube exists is impossible, the proposition that
a cat exists is a contingent truth, and the proposition that no cat exists is a
contingent falsehood.
A proposition, p, is necessary just provided that the negation of p is not
possible. In formal terms, Op 74--- 0p. In addition, Op ss 0p.
Furthermore, p is impossible if and only if Op. Finally, p is contingent just
when Op & 0p.
De ditto modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds. A
possible proposition is one which is true in some possible world. A
necessary proposition is one which is true in all possible worlds. An
impossible proposition is one which fails to be true in any possible world.
A contingent proposition is one which is true in some, but not every,
possible world.
Next, let us consider certain existential modal concepts. To begin, a
contingent being is an existent which could fail to exist. Such a being has
contingent existence. On the other hand, a necessary being is an entity
which must exist. A being of this kind has necessary existence. Thus, x is
a contingent being just when x is an existent which is not a necessary being,
and x is a necessary being just provided that x is an existent which is not a
contingent being. In other words: x is a contingent being (or has contingent
existence) if and only if (3y)(y=x & y is not a necessary being (or does not
have necessary existence)); and x is a necessary being (or has necessary existence) when and only when (3y) (r-x & y is not a contingent being (or does
not have contingent existence)). It might be said, following customary
practice, that (i) something has necessary existence just in case it exists in
all possible worlds, and (ii) something has contingent existence just when it
exists in the actual world, but fails to exist in some other possible world.
Typical concreta are contingent beings. Indeed, since the thesis that every
concretum is a contingent being is not implausible, a treatment of modal
concepts should not explicitly contradict this thesis. On the other hand, my
treatment of modal notions in Chapter 3 generates an argument that abstracta
such as properties and propositions are necessary beings.
19
(D1) is an adequate definition of the concept of haecceity only if every

haecceity is exemplified. However, there might, exist an unexemplified
haecceity which could be exemplified by a concretum. After all, it seems
that there are cases in which the existence of a concretum is possible even
though the concretum in question never exists. Let us call a possible
concretum that never exists a nonexistent possible (a NEP).
It might be said that x is NEP if and only if x is a concrete individual
which exists only in possible worlds other than the actual world. In what
follows, I describe various kinds of NEPs, and construct a definition of the
concept of haecceity that is compatible with the existence of unexemplified
haecceities.
There are three kinds of NEP: a NEP is either a mereological product, a
causal product, or else is mereologically and causally disjoint.' (1) A
mereological product is a nonexistent possible material object which would
be created by the assembly or arrangement of some bits of matter, for
example, a material object which would be created if certain material objects
were attached to one another in a particular way, when such attachment
never occurs. (2) A causal product is a NEP which would be produced by
some particular(s) under a nomologically possible circumstance, for instance,
an organism which would result from a certain sperm fertilizing a certain
egg under specified conditions, when such an episode of fertilization never
transpires. (3) A NEP which is neither a mereological product nor a causal
product is mereologically and causally disjoint. For example, it appears that
a merely possible spirit or soul is a disjoint object. A spirit is an individual
substance which is spatially unlocated or unextended and capable of consciousness: perhaps no spirit ever exists, but it seems that possibly, there are
spirits. Another example of a disjoint object is provided by the following
case. It seems that possibly, there exists an electron, e, in addition to all of
,
12
I employ the term 'disjoint' in this connection for two reasons. Firstly, in formal
mereological theories, to say that x and y are disjoint is to say that x and y have no part in
common. Similarly, a disjoint object (in my sense), existing in some other possible world,
either has no part in common with any actual material object, or else has a proper part which
has no part in common with any actual material object. Secondly, in an another (archaic) sense,
`disjoint' means disconnected. However, a disjoint possible (in my sense) is causally
disconnected from actual entities: it cannot be produced by such entities.
20
CHAPTER 1
the electrons that ever actually exist. In other words, there exists a set, S,
which has every electron as a member, and it is plausible that S could
coexist with an electron, e, which is not a member of S. It appears that such
a merely possible electron, e, is a disjoint object.
The foregoing remarks presuppose that electrons are necessarily indivisible
fundamental particles. If this presupposition is mistaken, then we can
replace the foregoing occurrences of 'electron' with another term which
signifies a kind of possible essentially indivisible fundamental particle, for
instance, Toscovichian point-particle having no proper parts'."
Let us return to the matter of the definition of haecceity. Although some
philosophers are skeptical of the existence of unexemplified haecceities
which could be exemplified by concreta, I have noted that there might be
such haecceities. On the other hand, it seems that there could not be a
necessarily unexemplified haecceity: there couldn't be the property of being
identical with a certain thing when this property is not possibly had by
anything. Since there could not be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity,
every unexemplified haecceity is possibly exemplified. The following
revised version of (D1) allows for the existence of unexemplified haecceities.
13 Rudjer Josip Boskovic (1711-1787), or Roger Boscovich, is best known for his A Theory
of Natural Philosophy Reduced to a Single Law of the Actions Existing in Nature. This work
attempts to explain all physical phenomena in terms of the attractions and repulsions of pointparticles (puncta) which are indistinguishable in their intrinsic qualitative properties. According
to Boscovich's single law, puncta at a certain distance attract, until upon approaching one
another they reach a point at which they repel, and eventually reach equilibrium. Thus,
Boscovich defends a form of dynamism, or the theory that nature is to be understood in terms
of force and not mass (where forces are functions of time and distance). By dispensing with
extended substance, Boscovich avoided epistemological difficulties facing Locke's natural
philosophy and anticipated developments in modern physics. Among those influenced by
Boscovich were Kant (who defended a version of dynamism), Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell,
and Lord Kelvin.
Boscovich's theory has proved to be empirically inadequate to account for phenomena such
as light. A philosophical difficulty for Boscovich's puncta, which are physical substances, arises
out of their zero-dimensionality. It is plausible that any power must have a basis in an object's
intrinsic properties, and puncta appear to lack such support for their powers. However, it is
extensional properties which puncta lack, and Boscovich could argue that the categorial property
of being an unextended spatial substance provides the needed basis.
21
(D2) F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that: (ax)(F is the property

of being identical with x.)
It should be noted that (D2) characterizes the concept of haecceity in terms
of de re metaphysical possibility.
Three controversial claims about modality and haecceity are defended in
Chapter 3. The first of these claims is that for any x, if x is a possible
world, then x can be identified with an abstract entity which has necessary
existence and which involves haecceities of concreta. The second claim is
that there are unexemplified haecceities which correspond to NEPs, even in
the case of NEPs which are mereologically and causally disjoint: 4 The
third claim is that metaphysical modalities exhibit a kind of unity or
interdependence explicable in terms of haecceities. This sort of unity or
interdependence among metaphysical modalities has three components. (i)
For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dicto modal
concept. (ii) For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de re
modal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingent
existence can be understood in terms of either de re or de dicto metaphysical
modal concepts.
Finally, in Chapter 4 it is argued that we can pick out certain unexemplifled haecceities which correspond to mereological or causal products, and use
definite descriptions to denote these unexemplified haecceities.
14
An unexemplified haecceity, H, corresponds to a nonexistent possible, i, if and only if

H is necessarily such that it is exemplified if and only if i exemplifies it.
r
22
CHAPTER 1
V - COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS

"As the hand is apt to take hold of all instruments; so is this
power or facultie apt to apprehend the formes of all things,
from whence grow the vniuersals."
(1606 Bryskett A Discourse of Civill Life 124)
"As these qualities or modes are only identified with the thing
by a mental attribution, they are called attributes."
[1838 Sir W. Hamilton Logic v. 1. 77 (1866)]
If there are properties, relations, and propositions, then people intellectually

grasp or comprehend the content of some of them, and can use linguistic
terms to express some of them. Some basic cognitive and linguistic issues
about haecceity concern our grasping and linguistically expressing haecceities. In order to facilitate discussion of these issues I shall characterize the
relevant concepts of grasping and linguistic expression, and describe their
interrelationship.
A person's (S's) grasping a property, relation, or proposition, P, is a direct
cognitive relation which S bears to P: necessarily, if at time t S grasps P,
then S does not do so by virtue of his grasping anything else at t, for
example, a property, relation, or proposition other than P." It seems that
if we grasp some properties, relations, and propositions, then we can grasp
what it is for a conscious being to grasp a property, relation, or proposition,
even if we are unable to provide a conceptual analysis of what it is for a
person to grasp something.
. An individual may come to grasp a property or relation through a process
of abstraction. Such a process of abstraction can be partly understood in
terms of the following moderate empiricist principle. I6
(P1) If P is a qualitative experiential or perceptual property which is possibly exemplified, then P may be grasped by a person, S, as a result
of either (i) S's having one or more experiences or perceptions of
some instance(s) of P, or (ii) S's having one or more experiences or
perceptions of some instance(s) of another qualitative experiential or
perceptual property, Q, such that: Q is possibly exemplified, and necessarily, (Vx)(Vy)(if x has P & y has Q, then x and y are similar with
respect to x's having P and y's having Q).
According to clause (i) of this principle, S may abstract P from his
experiences of particulars which exemplify P. For example, as a result of
perceiving a square thing, or a number of square things, a person, S, may
come to know what it is for a thing to be square, and thus, S may be said to
grasp the property of being square. However, according to clause (ii) of
(P1), for S to grasp a property, P, as a result of having perceived a number
of particulars, the particulars need not exemplify P. These particulars need
only provide a semblance or an appearance of an actual or possible instance
of P. Such a semblance or appearance, X, does not exemplify P, but is
similar to an actual or possible instance of P. For this reason, it may seem
to S that X is an instance of P or X may suggest an instance of P to S. For
example, if a thing which appears square is examined under a microscope,
then it is revealed that the sides of the object are not straight, but are
somewhat jagged. However, S may come to grasp the property of being
square as a result of perceiving such an object with the naked eye because,
so perceived, an object of this kind provides a good semblance or likeness
of a square. For similar reasons, S may come to grasp the property of being
square as a result of perceiving an inexactly constructed figure which closely
resembles a square, but does not literally appear square to S. It is plausible
that if there are properties, then people can grasp some of them in the ways
described above. If we can grasp properties in these ways, then we have
innate capacities to form concepts in response to certain similarity classes of
t5 This is compatible with the moderate empiricist view that a person's grasping
P at a time
tl may result in his grasping Q at a later time t2 if P and Q are diverse but similar properties.
16
My understanding of this process of abstraction is patterned after Roderick Chisholm's

understanding of "intuitive induction" in The Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1966), Chapter 5. Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "The Nature of Geometry," American
Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1981), pp. 101-110, and "Some Reflections on Perception and A
23
Priori Knowledge," Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 355-362.
24
CHAPTER 1
experiential stimuli. It is extremely plausible that we possess such

capacities."
A second way in which a person, S, may come to grasp a property is this.
(P2) If S grasps a property, P, and S grasps another property Q, and there
is the conjunctive property (P &Q), the disjunctive property (PvQ),
or the negative property P, then S may come to grasp (P&Q),
(PvQ), or P as a result of S's conjoining, disjoining, or negating

his concepts of P or Q.
For instance, if S grasps the property of being a horse, and S grasps the
property of being horned, and there is such a property as being a horned
horse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of S's
conjoining his concepts of being a horse and being horned. Similarly, if S
grasps the property of being a horse, and there is such a property as being
a nonhorse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of his
negating his concept of a horse." Conversely, if S grasps a conjunctive,
disjunctive, or negative property, then this entails that S grasps each of the
conjuncts or disjuncts of that property, or its negand.
There is another role which grasping plays within a theory of properties.
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there are properties. In that
P
" Radical Empiricism rejects (P1) in favor of a principle such as the following one. If
is an experiential property which is possibly exemplified by a mental state of person, S, then S
may come to grasp P as a result of S's introspectively experiencing one or more of S's mental
states which are instances of P. Rationalism employs the distinction between a person's
grasping a property in an occurrent sense, e.g., a person's attributing or contemplating a
property, and a person's grasping a property in a dispositional sense, e.g., a person's having the
ability to attribute or contemplate a property. According to Rationalism, a person has innate
grasp of a property, and this
ideas: in some cases a person is born with a dispositional
disposition is not a result of his experiences. If, as a moderate empiricist believes, a person has
an innate capacity to-grasp-a-property-in-response-to-his-having-experiences-of-certaM-sorts, then
it does not follow that he is born with a dispositional grasp of a property. This is because one
can have a capacity to do something without having the ability to do that thing, if experience
is needed in order to cultivate that capacity. For example, I have the capacity to play the violin,
but not the ability.
,
18 Note
that the principle illustrated by these examples, i.e., (P2), is endorsed by radical
empiricists, moderate empiricists, as well as rationalists.
25
case, we can grasp many of them. Moreover, grasping a property is a direct

cognitive relation between the grasper and what he grasps. Thus, it seems
that we can discern properties via our intuitions about what properties we
grasp. Although such a process of property-discernment is not infallible, it
is highly reliable. Moreover, one's graspings, as well as one's intuitions
about them, are directly accessible to one by means of introspection. Thus,
the discernment of properties can be understood along internalist lines as
follows. If there are attributes, and if a person attentively thinks that he
grasps some attribute, then that person is prima facie justified in thinking
that there is such an attribute. For instance, if there are properties, and if I
attentively think that I grasp being square, or being a horned horse, or being
a cat, or being stretchable, or being red, then I am justified in believing that
there is such a property. To defeat a justification of this kind, evidence that
I do not grasp what I think I grasp is required.
D. M. Armstrong has advocated an externalist account of propertydetection which differs from my picture of property-discernment, and which
might be thought to threaten it. His account entails the moderate realist
thesis that all properties are exemplified. In Armstrong's view, questions
about which properties exist are to be settled by "total science," which
includes philosophy as a minor component, but which is mainly empirical
scientific research. 19 He argues that unexemplified properties are transcendent platonic entities which cannot be objects of empirical scientific research.
It appears that if there are unexemplified attributes, then we can investigate
some of them only through either a priori or philosophical research.
However, my argument for Extreme Realism will be based on considerations
which are independent of any claims about property-discernment or the
grasping of properties. Rather, these considerations depend upon claims
about the best account of particulars' being diverse at a time, and the best
account of the possibility of particulars which never exist in fact. Thus, my
defense of Extreme Realism does not beg any questions about propertydetection which might be at issue between an Armstrongian and myself. So,
if my philosophical argument for Extreme Realism succeeds, then the
19
See D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1980).
26
existence of unexemplified properties is justified and all forms of Moderate

Realism are undermined. Since an Armstrongian account of propertydetection implies Moderate Realism, if my argument in this book is justified,
then an Armstrongian account of property-detection is unwarranted, and does
not threaten my contention that we can identify attributes via our intuitions
about what attributes we grasp.

Under what conditions are we justified in believing that an individual
grasps a property? The following epistemic principle concerning a person's
grasping a property is acceptable.
(PG) If at time t it is plausible for Si that F-ness exists, and at t it is plausible for Si that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si
can infer that it is prima facie plausible (for SI) that S2 grasps Fness at t. 2
For example, it is plausible for me that Sheree believes that something is
square. (I suppress temporal indices for ease of exposition.) Hence, if it is
also plausible for me that Squareness exists, then I can infer that it is prima
facie plausible for me that Sheree grasps Squareness. By the same token, if
it is plausible for me that there is the property of being identical with
Gorbachev, then I am able to infer that it is prima facie plausible for me that
Raisa grasps this haecceity, since it is also plausible for me that Raisa
believes that someone is identical with Gorbachev. However, prima facie
plausibility does not entail truth, and such plausibility might be defeated by
contrary evidence. Hence, the foregoing premises do not entail that Raisa
grasps Gorbachev's haecceity.
The following two examples illustrate the defeasibility of the justification
(PG) provides for the claim that S grasps F-ness. Suppose at time tl it is
plausible for us both that Redness exists, and that at tl Jones believes that
something is red. In that case, (PG) enables us to infer that at tl it is prima
facie plausible for us that Jones grasps Redness at tl. Still, even if Redness
exists, it doesn't necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps Redness. After

. .
In this principle F' i s a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriate
predicate.
20
CHAPTER 1
27
all, it is possible that at t it seems to us that Jones has the belief in question,
when he does not. For example, consider the following scenario. First, at
tl we observe that Jones is facing a red apple with his eyes open, and is
uttering the sentence 'The apple is red'. Second, at tl we have a justified
false belief that Jones is sighted. Third, we subsequently discover at t2 that
Jones is congenitally blind. Surely, in some possible cases of this kind, at
tl it is plausible for us that at tl Jones believes that something is red, but at
t2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not grasp (phenomenal) Redness
at tl. Hence, the prima facie plausibility which (PG) confers upon the claim
that Jones grasps Redness at tl has been defeated.
Alternatively, suppose at tl it is plausible for us both that the property of
being non-self-exemplifying exists, and that at tl Jones (truly) believes that
Redness is non-self-exemplifying. Then (PG) enables us to infer that at tl
it is prima facie plausible for us that Jones grasps being non-selfexempling at tl. Nevertheless, even if at tl Jones has this belief, it does
not necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps the property of being non-selfexemplifying. For although at tl it is plausible for us that the property of
being non-self-exemplifying exists, there could not be such a property. 21
Hence, at tl Jones does not grasp the property of being non-selfexemplifying, despite the fact that at tl Jones believes that something is nonself-exemplifying. Thus, possibly, at tl it is plausible for us that at tl Jones
has this belief, but at t2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not grasp
the property of being non-self-exemplifying at tl. Therefore, the prima facie
plausibility which (PG) confers upon the claim that Jones grasps being nonself-exempl i ing at tl has been defeated.
Consider the following principle concerning a person's coming to grasp
a haecceity.
21
The proof parallels Russell's demonstration that there is no such set as the set of all sets
which are not members of themselves. The property of being non-self-exemplifying must either
exemplify itself or not exemplify itself. The former entails that this property is non-selfexemplifying; and the latter entails that this property is self-exemplifying. It follows that the
property in question must both exemplify itself and not exemplify itself. Therefore, it is
impossible that there be such a property. Nevertheless, given the intemalist principle of
property-detection defended earlier, it seems possible that there be individuals who are ignorant
of this proof, and who are justified in thinking that there is a property of this kind.
CHAPTER 1
28
(P3) A person, S, may grasp a haecceity, 11, as a result of S's having one
or more experiences or perceptions of an instance of H.
(P3) is a moderate empiricist principle. It suggests that numerous individuals
grasp Gorbachev's haecceity as a result of their abstracting it from their
perceptions of Gorbachev. (P3) is not an unattractive principle. After all,
(P3) is analogous to (P1), and (P1) is highly plausible. Nonetheless, in
Chapter 5 an argument will be provided which implies the falsity of (P3).
The notions of a person's grasping a property and a person's making use
of a linguistic term to express a property are connected. When I say that a
person, S, makes use of a linguistic term, T, to express a property, P, what
I mean is that a particular usage of T at a certain time expresses P in S's
idiolect. A person, S, uses a linguistic term to express a property, P, only
if S grasps P; and in typical cases, if S grasps P, then S can use a linguistic
term to express P. For instance, S uses a linguistic term to express
Squareness only if S grasps Squareness; and typically, if S grasps Squareness, then S can use a linguistic term to express Squareness, for example, the
linguistic term 'square'. Likewise, S uses a linguistic term to express
Gorbachev's haecceity only if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity; and in typical
cases, if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity, then S can use a linguistic term to
express this haecceity, for instance, the linguistic term 'Gorbachev' or
ìdentical with Gorbachev'.
Some further distinctions can now be drawn. First of all, there is a
distinction between a person's grasping a property and a person's identifying
a property by description. This distinction is reminiscent of Russell's
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description." The following case shows how a person can identify a property by
description without grasping that property.
Case (1): Due to a genetic defect, Jones's visual cortex is dysfunctional.
Such a defect always produces congenital blindness. As a result, Jones is
never capable of having a visual experience. Because of these circum-
Bertrand Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic

and Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174, and The Problems of
Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Chap. 5.
22 See
29
stances, Jones is never capable of grasping (phenomenal) Redness.

Nevertheless, Jones has a sighted acquaintance Smith with whom he has
frequent conversations. Such conversations can occur because Jones has a
full range of nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mental
states which enable Jones to both grasp a wide range of nonvisual properties,
and adequately justify a wide range of true nonvisual beliefs. In particular,
Jones knows that
(3x)(x is the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs by
Smith in his conversations with Jones).
Jones grasps the requisite properties and relations for his having this piece
of propositional knowledge, for example, the properties of being an apple,
being a stop sign, and being a property, the relation, x being said of y, and
so forth. After all, a person can grasp these properties and relations based
upon his nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mental states.
In addition, as a matter of fact
Redness=the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs by
Smith in his conversations with Jones.
Hence, although Jones is incapable of grasping Redness, he manages to
identify Redness by description - as the property most frequently said of
apples and stop signs by Smith in his conversations with Jones.
A person's (S's) identifying a property, P, by description is an indirect
cognitive relation which S bears to P. If S indirectly cognizes P, then S
identifies P by virtue of his grasping some attribute, Q, other than P, such
that P exemplifies Q.
Furthermore, S's using a linguistic term to express a property, P, must be
distinguished from S's using a linguistic term to designate or make singular
reference to P, since S can refer to P by using a name or a definite
description which designates or denotes P without S's using a linguistic term
which expresses, P. For instance, possibly, in Case (1) Jones uses the
definite description 'the perceptual property most frequently attributed to
apples by my friends' to denote Redness, and Jones fixes the reference of the
30
name 'Redness' by using this definite description. In that event, Jones uses
`Redness' to designate Redness. Still, since Jones is never capable of
grasping Redness, and since S uses a linguistic term to express P only if S
grasps P, Jones is never capable of using a linguistic term to express
Redness.
Thus, the distinction between a person's using a linguistic term to express

a property and a person's using a linguistic term to designate or make
singular reference to a property parallels the distinction between a person's
grasping a property and a person's identifying a property by description.
Both of these distinctions apply to haecceities. Generally speaking, if an
entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S, can designate x by using an
indexical name or a proper name, then S can designate H by using a name
of the form 'being identical with N', where 'N' is either an indexical name
of x, for instance, 'me', 'this', or 'that', or a proper name of x, for example,
`Gorbachev', 'Socrates', or 'Squareness'. By way of illustration, suppose
that you, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness have haecceities. Further
suppose that you use the names 'I', , 'Gorbachev', and 'Squareness' to
designate yourself, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness, respectively. In
that case, we may assume that you can designate these haecceities by using
the names 'being identical with T, 'being identical with this', 'being
identical with Gorbachev', and 'being identical with Squareness', respectively."
23 It
CHAPTER 1
also seems that one can refer to a haecceity by means of using a definite description.
For example, it can be said that the haecceity of the man in front of me is the property of being
identical with the man in front of me, provided that the definite description 'the man in front
of me' is used referentially rather than attributively. For an account of the distinction between
referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions see Keith Donnellan, "Reference and
Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 281-304, and "Proper Names and
Identifying Descriptions," Synthese, 21 (1970), pp. 335-358.
It should also be noted that some philosophers employ an alternative mode of expression
in which haecceities are designated by expressions such as 'being me', 'being I', 'being this',
`being Socrates', `Socrateity', and so forth. See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), and Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle:
Open Court, 1976). Also note the following passage from Boethius: "For were it permitted to
fabricate a name. I would call that certain quality, singular and incommunicable to any other
subsistent, by its fabricated name, so that the form of what is proposed would become clearer.
For let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality
31
However, even if an entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S,

designates H by using a name of the form 'being identical with N', where
`N' is either an indexical indicator or proper name of x, this does not entail
that S is capable of either grasping H or using a linguistic term to express
H. After all, if x has a haecceity, then in some possible situations S
descriptively identifies x's haecceity in much the same way as Jones
descriptively identifies a color in Case (1). For instance, suppose that I
never have the capability to grasp this table's haecceity. Still, I might
identify this table's haecceity by description. For example, on the assumption that this table is the only table within a yard of me, I might identify this
table's haecceity by my knowing that (3x)(x is the haecceity of the table
within a yard of me). Similarly, suppose that I never have the capability
to use a linguistic term to express Gorbachev's haecceity because I am never
capable of grasping that haecceity. Nonetheless, I might name Gorbachev's
haecceity with a linguistic term of the form 'being identical with N', where
`N' is a proper or indexical name of Gorbachev. To illustrate, on the
assumption that Gorbachev is the current president of the U.S.S.R., I might
name Gorbachev's haecceity by my fixing the reference of the name 'being
identical with Gorbachev' with the description 'the haecceity of the current
president of the U.S.S.R.'
The distinction I have drawn between grasping a property and descriptively identifying it parallels two other distinctions: (i) the de dicto belief/de
.
`Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'.
Therefore, this Platonity is one man's alone, and this not just anyone's but Plato's. For 'Plato'
points out a one and definite substance, and property, that cannot come together in another."
(Librium de Interpretation edito secunda, PL 64, 462d - 464c) Quoted in Alvin Plantinga,
"The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 129-138, and
Hector Neri Castafieda, "Individuation and non Identity: A New Look," American Philosophical
Quarterly, 12 (1975), pp. 135-136.
Finally, observe that depending on the context, tokens of a single name-type can designate
-
diverse entities of different kinds, e.g., one Morris is a human and another Morris is a cat.
Hence, a token of a name-type which designates a haecceity in one context might fail to
designate a haecceity in another context. If Felicia Ackermann's theory of names is correct,
then in some contexts tokens of the name-types 'being identical with Socrates' and 'being
identical with this' designate unanalyzable nondescriptive properties which are not haecceities.
See her "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979), pp. 55-69.
32
CHAPTER 1
re belief distinction, and (ii) the direct de re belief/indirect de re belief

distinction. Given the existence of a strongly realistic or platonistic domain
of propositions, relations, and properties, it appears that (i) and (ii) can be
characterized in terms of psychological relationships a person bears to
properties, relations, or propositions. For instance, take a typical case of de
re belief:
Socrates is believed by Plato to be wise.
Such a de re belief seems to be a triadic relation holding among a person
(the attributor), a property (the property attributed), and a thing (the
attributee). Thus, Socrates's being believed by Plato to be wise appears to
be identifiable with Plato's attribution of Wisdom to Socrates. A de re
belief appears (generally speaking) to be a person's attributing a property (or
a relation) to some item(s). Observe that if a person, S, attributes a property
(or relation) to some item(s), then S grasps that property or relation.
Compare a case of de dicto belief:
Pythagoras believes that all equilateral triangles are equiangular.
In this case, what Pythagoras believes is the proposition that all equilateral
triangles are equiangular. In general, a de dicto belief seems to be a dyadic
cognitive relationship holding between a person (the believer) and a
proposition (the thing believed). Notice that if a person believes a
proposition, then he grasps that proposition.
Let us apply the notions of de re and de dicto belief to Case (1). In Case
(1), Jones identifies Redness by description. It can be argued plausibly that
Jones's making this identification implies that Redness is believed by Jones
to be a property, that is, (3x)(x-Redness & x is believed by Jones to be a
property). Nonetheless, because Jones does not grasp Redness, Jones does
not grasp the proposition which a sighted person believes when a sighted
person believes that Redness is a property. Therefore, Jones does not believe
this proposition, or equivalently, (Jones believes that (3x)(x---- Redness & x
is a property)). Compare this situation and the following possible
case.
33
Case (2): Based on trustworthy testimony, Jones knows that the man in his
kitchen is a philosopher. In addition, it is true that
the man in Jones's kitchen=the redhead in Jones's kitchen.
Yet, due to Jones's blindness,
'(Jones believes (3x)(x --the redhead in his kitchen & x is a philosopher)).
Still, it can be plausibly argued that in these circumstances
(ax)(x=the redhead in Jones's kitchen & x is believed by Jones to be a
philosopher). 24
Jones's cognitive relationship to a concrete entity in Case (2) is analogous
to Jones's cognitive relationship to an abstract entity in Case (1): in each
case the cognitive relationship is indirect.
If entities have haecceities, then a propositional conception of direct de re
belief or strict de re belief can be defined in terms of de dicto belief as
follows.2 5
24
Most writers on the topic of de re belief concur on this point. In other words, most of
these writers agree that one's descriptively identifying an individual is sufficient for one's
having a de re belief with respect to that individual. For example, see David Kaplan,
"Quantifying In," Synthese, 27 (1968), pp. 178-214, Ernest Sosa, "Propositional Attitudes De
Dicta and De Re," The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 883-896, and Roderick Chisholm,
"Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re'," Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976), pp. 1-20.
Like these writers, I am unaware of any compelling reason to limit the objects of de re belief
to either objects of perceptual acquaintance or objects of Russellian direct acquaintance such as
oneself, one's own mental states, and universals.
25
Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person, and Ernest Sosa, "Propositions and
Indexical Attitudes". They develop qualitative realist positions on the nature of cognitive
attitudes de dicto and de re. Chisholm and Sosa argue that we can understand these cognitive
attitudes in terms of a person's standing in cognitive relationships to qualitative attributes or
qualitative propositions, and they specifically tailor their views to avoid the implication that
there are nonqualitative properties and propositions. However, aside from these similarities,
Chisholm's and Sosa's positions are quite different.
34
CHAPTER 1
S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,

being identical with N, & (ii) S believes that something which is N is F,
and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and Fness. 26
For example, suppose that a sighted person, S, has a true de ditto belief that
(3x)(x=Redness & x is a property). In believing this, S grasps the conjunction of the haecceity of Redness and Propertyhood. It follows that S directly
attributes Propertyhood to Redness. On the other hand, a propositional belief
which S has about x is an indirect attribution of F-ness to x by S if and only
if S's propositional belief about x is an attribution of F-ness to x by S, but
in making this attribution S does not grasp the conjunction of x's haecceity
and F-ness. For instance, suppose that (ax)(x=Redness & x is believed by
Jones to be a property) as in Case (1). In a situation of this kind, Jones's
attribution of Propertyhood to Redness is a propositional belief, but Jones
does not grasp the haecceity of Redness. Thus, Jones indirectly attributes
Propertyhood to Redness. Similarly, suppose that the redhead in Jones's
kitchen is believed by Jones to be a philosopher as in Case (2). In such a
situation Jones indirectly attributes the property of being a philosopher to
that redhead, since in making this propositional attribution, Jones does not
grasp the haecceity of the redhead in his kitchen.
There are obvious differences between direct de re belief and Russellian
knowledge by acquaintance, although in some sense both are direct de re
cognitive attitudes. According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is
logically independent of knowledge of truths, and a person is acquainted
with numerous multiply exemplifiable attributes, his own states of mind, and
(probably) himself. A different conception of "knowledge by acquaintance"
is advocated in Chapter 5. I argue that a person, S, is acquainted with an
item, x, just in case S has a certain kind of direct de re knowledge about x,
26 'N' and 'F" are schematic letters which should be replaced with appropriate linguistic
expressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the
second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Note that substitution of a name 'N'
for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'
is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's
haecceity.
35
where the definition of the notion of direct de re knowledge parallels that of

the concept of direct de re belief. Thus, I understand "acquaintance" as a
kind of propositional knowledge. Hence, unlike acquaintance in Russell's
sense, acquaintance in my sense is logically dependent upon knowledge of
truths.
A person cannot have a direct de re belief about an entity, x, unless he
grasps a conjunctive property one of whose conjuncts is x's haecceity. Since
a person cannot grasp a conjunctive property without grasping each of its
conjuncts, and since direct de re knowledge requires direct de re belief, a
person cannot have direct de re belief about x, or direct de re knowledge
about x, unless he grasps x's haecceity. Accordingly, in order to ascertain
the objects of direct de re knowledge and belief, we need to determine which
haecceities can be grasped by, a person.
An answer to this question is defended in Chapter 5. This answer has two
parts. (i) For any person S, S is incapable of grasping a haecceity of a
physical object or person other than S (nor is S capable of grasping the
haecceity of any other particular outside of the circle of his own ideas).
Since some particulars located in the external world relative to S are
inanimate, and therefore incapable of grasping a property, a corollary of (i)
is that some haecceities of particulars are such that no one is capable of
grasping them. (ii) Each of us can grasp his own haecceity, haecceities of
some of his own mental states, and haecceities of some abstract entities. (i)
and (ii) imply that the entities whose haecceities a person can grasp and
Russellian objects of direct acquaintance are substantially one and the
same. 27
Because a person, S, cannot have a direct de re belief about an item, x,
unless S grasps x's haecceity, (i) and (ii) together entail that a person, S, is
incapable of directly attributing a property to a particular in the external
world relative to S, and that each of us can directly attribute properties to
himself, some of his own mental states, and some abstract entities. In
addition, (i) and (ii) have certain linguistic implications. Inasmuch as S uses
a linguistic term to express a property only if S grasps that property, (i)
27
See Bertrand Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," and The Problems of Philosophy,
Chapter 5.
36
CHAPTER 1
implies that S is incapable of using an indexical name or a proper name, N,

to express the haecceity of a physical object or person other than S (nor is
S capable of using N to express the haecceity of a particular located in the
external world relative to S). 28 Since if S grasps a property, then in typical
cases S can use a linguistic term to express that property, (ii) implies that if
S uses N to designate himself, some of his mental states, or certain abstract

entities, then typically S can use N to express the haecceity of such an entity.
A related application of the haecceity notion in the cognitive field
concerns psychological attitudes expressible in terms of first-person language,
for example, my belief that I am alive. Consider a possible scenario of the
following sort. 29
Upon awakening on the battlefield amidst a tangle of bodies, I glimpse a
scratched leg extending from underneath a tarpaulin. Because there are
many similar looking legs sticking out from underneath the tarpaulin, I am
unaware of the fact that it is my leg which I see. I have a perceptual belief
that this person's leg is scratched, but I do not believe that my leg is
scratched, even though that person is identical with me."
In the case described above, (3x)(x=me & x is perceptually believed by x
to have a scratched leg). Hence, where being F is an attribute, my being
believed by myself to be F is not a logically sufficient condition for my
believing that I am F, even when the former de re belief is perceptual. Nor
M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference," in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and

(New
York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating
Individuation
Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Lockwood is committed
to the view that people use proper names of material objects or persons other than themselves
to express haecceities of such material objects or persons.
28 Compare
29 As far as I know, cases of this kind were first proposed by Hector-Neri Castafteda. See
his " 'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio, VII (1966), pp. 130-157, and
his "The Phenomeno-logic of the I," Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses fur Philosophie,
Vol. III (University of Vienna, 1969), pp. 260-266.
Person and
30 This example is an adaptation of one used by Roderick Chisholm. See his
p.
37.
In
variations
upon
this
case,
I
see
myself
in
a
mirror,
but
fail
to
recognize
Object,
myself, either because I glimpse myself from an odd angle, or because unbeknownst to me my
appearance has totally changed, or because I am suffering from amnesia and I do not recall what
I look like.
37
is my having some de re perceptual belief a logically necessary condition for

my believing that I am F. After all, I could believe that I am thinking even
when I am in a state of complete sensory deprivation, lacking any visual,
tactual, auditory, gustatory, or olfactory experiences, and therefore not
having any de re perceptual belief. What is it, then, for an individual to
have a self-attributional belief which is expressible in first-person language?
In other words, what is it for a person to self-ascribe a feature?
An argument presented in Chapter 5 leads to what seems to be a plausible
answer to this question. In Chapter 5, I shall argue both that (a) each of us
can introspectively grasp his own haecceity, and (b) sensory perception does
not enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of an object that he perceives.
Given (a) and (b), haecceities can be used to explain how a person could
have a perceptual belief about himself without his making a corresponding
self-ascription. In that case, the idea that a self-ascription is a belief wherein
the believer grasps his own haecceity is an extremely attractive one. In
particular, an analysis of the concept of self-ascription along the following
lines looks plausible.
First, we formulate an analysis of what it is for me to believe that I am F.
,
I believe that I am F =ff. (i) I exemplify the haecceity, being identical

with N, and (ii) I believe that something which is N is F, and in believing
this I grasp the conjunction of my haecceity and the property of
being F.'
A parallel analysis applies to each of us, and a corresponding account of
what it is for any person to have such a belief about himself can be stated
as follows.
31,
N and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to be replaced with suitable linguistic
second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Observe that substituting a name 'N'
for the schematic letter 'IV' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'
is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates
S's
haecceity.
38
S believes that he himself is F =df. (i) S exemplifies the haecceity, being

identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which is N is F, and
in believing this S grasps the conjunction of S's haecceity and the property
of being F. 32
The phenomenon of self-ascription suggests that the concept of haecceity
has an important role to play in elucidating the nature of our belief and
knowledge of external things. To see this, consider the following thesis of
the indispensability of first-person reference, a thesis which is suggested by
Descartes's closing argument in the Second Meditation. 33 According to this
thesis, a person cannot have a piece of knowledge, K1, about an external
thing unless he has another piece of knowledge, K2, about himself which can
be expressed in first-person language. This thesis seems to be true. It
appears that a person, S, cannot have knowledge about an external thing, x,
unless there is a cognitive, psychological, or referential way of being related
to an item, such that S knows that he is related to something in that way,
where S's knowledge can be expressed in first-person language. For
instance, it seems that I cannot have perceptual knowledge that this is red,
unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I see something
red, 34 I cannot have knowledge by description that the first president of the
32 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with suitable linguistic
second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Notice that replacing the schematic
letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N'
is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates S's
haecceity.
33
Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. This thesis is also suggested by the
following remarks about demonstrative reference made by Stuart Hampshire. "The pronoun 'I',
and the first person singular form in general is more than just one more demonstrative device
in language, parallel and on the same level with 'this' and 'that', and with the other personal
pronouns. The first person singular is the nucleus on which the other referential devices
depend...The final point of reference, by which a statement is attached to reality, is the speaker's
reference to himself, as one thing, and one person, among others." Thought and Action (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1959), p. 87.
34 It
CHAPTER I
might be objected that there could be a young child who has visual knowledge about
an external object, x, e.g., knowledge that this is red, where x=this, but who does not know that
he sees something red. But what reason is there for thinking that there could be such a child?
39
United States of America was a great general, unless I have some such
knowledge about myself as that I think that someone was the first president
of the United States of America, and I cannot know that Bill Clinton came
from Arkansas, unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I
refer to somebody as 'Bill Clinton', respectively.
Given the indispensability of first-person reference, it can be argued
plausibly that there is a sense in which our knowledge of ourselves is more
basic than our knowledge of external things. To set up this argument,
consider the following possible case.
I fall victim to an extreme form of amnesia in which I forget, irretrievably, everything I knew about particular things, while retaining mastery of
a wide range of general concepts. In addition, at the onset of my amnesia
I am in a state of total sensory deprivation, and remain so for an hour. If
I were in circumstances of this kind, then for an hour I would not have any
knowledge about an external thing. But during this hour I could have
knowledge about myself, because I could be in such circumstances and have
introspective knowledge that I am thinking. 35
It follows that a person can have knowledge expressible in first-person
language about himself without his having knowledge about an external
thing Since a person cannot have knowledge of an external thing unless he
has knowledge expressible in first-person language about himself, we can
conclude that an individual's knowledge of an external thing is asymmetrically dependent upon his having knowledge about himself expressible in
first-person language. That is, a person can have such knowledge about
himself without his having knowledge of an external thing, but a person
cannot have knowledge of an external thing without his having knowledge
of this kind about himself. Hence, there is a sense in which self-knowledge
is more basic than knowledge of an external thing, and a sense in which
The rationale might be that possibly, a child, S, possesses the visual knowledge in question, but
cannot articulate the sentence 'I see something red'. But this hardly provides a decisive reason
for concluding that S would be ignorant of the fact that he sees something red. It may well be
the case that S's inability to articulate this sentence is due to linguistic incompetence, and that
S does know that he sees something red.
35
51-64.
Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "Cognition and Identifying Reference," Auslegung, 6 (1978), pp.
40
CHAPTER 1
first-person reference is prior to reference to an external thing. Thus, if the

object of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language is a proposition which involves the believer's haecceity, then it follows that a person, S,
cannot have knowledge of an external thing, x, unless S knows a proposition
which involves his own haecceity. If a person cannot have knowledge of an
external thing unless he knows such a proposition, then haecceities of

thinking subjects play a fundamental role in epistemology and the philosophy
of mind.
At any rate, a large portion of a person's belief and knowledge about
external things can be expressed in terms of first-person language. For
example, in virtue of my knowing that the thing appearing at the center of
my field of vision is purple, where x=the thing appearing at the center of my
field of vision, x is known by me to be purple; and in virtue of my knowing
that the first president of the country in which I reside was a great general,
where George Washington=the first president of the country in which I
reside, George Washington is known by me to have been a great general.
Hence, if the notion of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language
can be understood in terms of the concept of haecceity, then a person, S,
often picks out or identifies an external thing, x, by uniquely relating x to
himself in such a way that S grasps his own haecceity. Therefore, if the
concept of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language can be
understood in terms of the notion of haecceity, then the notion of haecceity
has a large role to play in the elucidation of the nature of our thought about
external things.
Influenced by Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance and
description, Roderick Chisholm has given the concept of haecceity an even
larger role in explicating the nature of our thought about external things.'
Chisholm's theory implies that necessarily, a person's knowledge about an
external thing, x, is knowledge by description about x. His theory also
entails that necessarily, in having knowledge by description about x, a
person, S, uniquely relates x to himself in such a way that S grasps his own
haecceity. According to the account Chisholm has developed, S may identify
a first external thing, x, by uniquely relating it to himself, S may identify a
second external thing, y, by uniquely relating it to x, S may identify a third

external thing, z, by uniquely relating it to y, and so on. For instance, I can
identify the United States of America as the country a portion of whose land
I see beneath my feet, Abraham Lincoln as the president who freed those
enslaved in this country, and Mary Todd Lincoln as the wife of Abraham
Lincoln, and so forth. In addition, Chisholm argued that a person's body of
knowledge about external things is a network of such sequences of
identifications, where each sequence in the network is noncircular and such
that it has the person's identification of himself as its first member. If this
argument is sound, then a person's body of knowledge about external things
is ultimately anchored by his identification of a nonexternal thing, namely,
himself. Furthermore, based upon his analysis of de re belief in terms of de
ditto belief (an analysis which presupposes that concreta have haecceities)
Chisholm has held that necessarily, if S has a belief about an external thing
x, then S has knowledge about x. 37 If all of these Chisholmian positions are
correct, then a person's self, as known to that person through his haecceity,
is an archimedean point of reference upon which all of that person's thought
about external things depends.
37
36 Roderick
Chisholm, Person and Object.
41
See Roderick Chisholm, "Knowledge and Belief: `De Otero' and `De Re''.
42
CHAPTER 1
43
version of (D3) allows for (but doesn't logically entail) the existence of
unexemplified individual essences, inasmuch as it only requires that an
individual essence be possibly essential to an entity and necessarily repugnant
to any other entity.
VI - HAECCEITIES AND INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES

"This is why, Monsieur, it seems to me, that I ought to
regard as involved in my individual concept only what is of
such a nature that I would no longer be myself if it were
(D4) E is an individual essence =df. E is possibly such that: (3x)(x necessarily exemplifies E, and E is necessarily such that (3y)(y#x &
y exemplifies E)).
not in me, while on the other hand, everything which is of
such a nature that it might either happen to me or not happen to me without my ceasing to be myself, should not be
considered as involved in my individual concept..."
(Arnauld to Leibniz, May 13, 1686)
The concepts of haecceity and individual essence are closely related, an

individual essence of an entity, e, being an essential property of e which
could not be had by anything other than e As noted earlier, it has been
maintained that there couldn't be an unexemplified haecceity. In a similar
vein, some philosophers hold that an unexemplified individual essence is an
impossibility. Provided that these philosophers are correct, the concept of
an individual essence can be formally defined in the following manner,
(D3) E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x necessarily exemplifies E,
E is necessarily such that (3y) (y-Ax & y exemplifies E.))
and
If de re modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds along the

lines indicated earlier, then (D3) can be reformulated in terms of possible
worlds. In particular:
E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x exemplifies E in every possible
world in which x exists, and in no possible world is E exemplified by
something other than x.)
But it is not obvious that every individual essence is exemplified. After
all, there might be an unexemplified individual essence which could be
exemplified by a particular. However, just as it appears that there could not
be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity, it appears that there could not be
a necessarily unexemplified individual essence. Thus, I shall assume that
every individual essence is possibly exemplified. The following amended
For example, suppose that Socrates has a haecceity, namely, being identical
with Socrates. Call this haecceity H. Clearly, H satisfies (D4), since H is
possibly such that: (3x)(xSocrates and x necessarily exemplifies H, and H
is necessarily such that (3y)(y#x & y exemplifies H)). 38 Thus, H is an
individual essence. Inasmuch as an argument of this kind applies to every
haecceity, every haecceity is an individual essence.' However, I argue
below that some individual essences are not haecceities.
To begin, consider a property which everything has necessarily, for
instance, being such that whatever is red is colored. A characteristic of this
sort is a universal essential property. A conjunction of a haecceity and a
universal essential property is an individual essence, for example, being
identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12 (PI), being identical with
Aristotle and such that 7+6=13 (P2), being identical with Aristotle and such
38
A nominalist or a qualitative realist rejects the existence of H. Nevertheless, both

Nominalism and Qualitative Realism are least formally consistent with the following thesis:
Socrates is essentially identical with Socrates, and Socrates is necessarily diverse from any entity
other than Socrates. That is: (3x)(x=Socrates & x is necessarily identical with x & y)(y#x >
x is necessarily not identical with y) ).
39
Compare the following passage from Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On the Four
Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages,
p. 589. "And if you ask, 'What is this individual being from which individual difference is
taken? Is it not matter, or form, or the composite?' I reply that every quidditative entity,
whether partial or total of any kind, is of itself indifferent, as quidditative entity, to this entity
and that one...just as being "this" does not belong to it, so the opposite is not repugnant to it
from its own character. And just as the composite insofar as it is a nature does not include the
being by which it is "this", so neither does matter insofar as it is a nature, nor form. Therefore,
this being is not matter, nor form, nor the composite, insofar as any of these is a nature..."
From this passage, it seems that Scotus would regard a haecceity as an individual essence.
44
CHAPTER 1
that 7+7=14 (P3), and so on. Assuming a conjunctive property's conjuncts

are proper parts of that conjunctive property, it follows that Aristotle's
haecceity is a proper part of P1, P2, P3, et cetera. Because it is impossible
for something to be a proper part of itself, Aristotle's haecceity and P1, P2,
P3, and so forth, are diverse. Hence, there are conjunctive individual
essences which are not haecceities. Since a parallel argument applies to
every haecceity, on the assumption that every entity has a haecceity, every
entity has a conjunctive individual essence other than its haecceity.
Although this argument is not implausible, it depends on the assumption that
the conjuncts of a conjunctive property are proper parts of that property.
A second argument which is plausible and which does not rely on this
assumption goes as follows. For any properties P and Q, if P is possibly
such that P has an attribute, A, or bears a relation, R, to something, z, (at a
time) when Q does not have A or bear R to z, then P#Q. 4 Given that
Aristotle has a haecceity, it seems possible that Aristotle grasps this
haecceity by being aware of himself. Since it is possible that at some time
Aristotle is aware of himself and mathematically unsophisticated, it appears
possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp
either PI (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that
7+5=12), P2 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that
7+6=13), or P3 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that
7+7=14), and so on. Hence, Aristotle's haecceity is diverse from P1, P2,
P3, and so forth. Parallel arguments imply that P1, P2, P3, et cetera, are
diverse from one another. Consequently, Aristotle has indefinitely many
individual essences, only one of which is a haecceity. An argument of this
kind applies to any haecceity exemplified by a person. Such an argument
also applies to any haecceity of an abstract entity which could be grasped.
Therefore, a person or an abstract entity of this kind has innumerable
individual essences, only one of which is a haecceity.
40 This principle follows assuming the appropriate versions of the principles of The
Diversity of The Dissimilar and The Necessity of Identity. According to the first principle,
necessarily, for any x & y, and any time t, if at t x has an attribute A, or stands in a relation R
then x^y. According
to something z, and at t y lacks A, or y is such that it does not bear R to z,
to the second principle, for any x & y, if x is identical with y, then x is necessarily identical with
y.
45
There are variants upon my first two arguments for saying that some
individual essences of concrete things are not haecceities. These variants
parallel the original arguments, and are at least as plausible as them, but are
formulated in terms of different.universal essential properties. For example,
instead of constructing individual essences by conjoining Aristotle's
haecceity with properties like being such that 7+5=12, being such that
7+6=13, and being such that 7+7=14, individual essences can be constructed
by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with logically complex conditional
properties such as (a) being colored if red, (b) being shaped if octagonal, and
(c) being an animal if a cat. Like my second argument, these variants
maintain that it is possible for Aristotle to grasp his haecceity without his
grasping the conjunction of that haecceity and some universal essential
property. It is just as plausible that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity,
and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with either (a), (b), or (c),
as it was that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity, and fails to grasp
either P1, P2, or P3 (as defined above).
Alternatively, an individual essence which is not a haecceity can be
constructed by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with a universal essential
property such as being self-identical. Such a variant upon my second
argument relies upon the following sub-argument in order to justify the
premise that possibly, at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails
to grasp the conjunction of that haecceity with being self-identical. First,
Aristotle's haecceity pertains to a specific concretum, namely, Aristotle. In
contrast, being self-identical is a wholly general property of which Aristotle
is a particular instance. But, surely, in most cases an individual could grasp
a property which pertains to a specific concretum before he grasps a wholly
general property of which that concretum is an instance. After all, one's
awareness of what is specific and concrete generally precedes, and causally
contributes to, one's awareness of what is general. Furthermore, being selfidentical has a reflexive character which Aristotle's haecceity lacks. Hence,
given that Aristotle could grasp his own haecceity, it seems possible that at
some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp being selfidentical. Moreover, Aristotle cannot grasp the conjunction of his haecceity
with being self-identical, unless he grasps both conjuncts of such a
conjunction. Thus, it appears possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his
46
CHAPTER 1
haecceity and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with being selfidentical.
Another cogent reason for drawing such a conclusion here (as well as in
the previous parallel cases) is that possibly, Aristotle suffers from a
psychological disability which allows him to grasp each of the relevant
conjuncts, but not their conjunction.
Additionally, it seems that Concreteness and Personhood are nonuniversal

essential characteristics of Aristotle, and hence that the conjunction of either
of these two characteristics and Aristotle's haecceity is an individual essence
of Aristotle. It can be argued plausibly along lines parallel to those above
(except that this parallel argument has nothing in it corresponding to the
point about reflexivity in the earlier argument) that Aristotle could grasp his
haecceity without grasping either of the two conjunctions in question, and
that such conjunctions are individual essences which are not haecceities.
A further argument is also worth considering. If it can be assumed that
numbers exist, then it can be argued plausibly that a number has indefinitely
many qualitative individual essences other than its haecceity. For example,
if 2 exists, then 2's haecceity is the property of being identical with 2. But
consider a qualitative individual essence of 2 such as being the even prime
(Al), being the square root of 4 (A2), being the cube root of 8 (A3), and so
on ad infinitum. Notice that possibly, 2's haecceity is grasped by a person
at a time at which Al, A2, A3, et cetera, are not grasped by that person.
Thus, an argument of the sort used in the preceding case implies that the
qualitative individual essences, Al, A2, A3, and so forth, and 2's haecceity
are diverse. In addition, parallel arguments imply that Al, A2, A3, and so
on, are diverse from one another. Hence, 2 has indefinitely many qualitative
individual essences other than its haecceity. For any number n, a parallel
argument implies that n has indefinitely many qualitative individual essences
other than its haecceity.
Interestingly, haecceities and individual essences seem to diverge not only
when logical or mathematical properties are involved, but also in the case of
phenomenal qualities. For example, it can be argued plausibly that certain
colors have individual essences which are not haecceities. Consider the color
Orange. The haecceity of this color is the property of being identical with
Orange. However, Orange has the following individual essence:
47
(El) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red and
Yellow, x is other than these colors, x is similar to Red, equally
similar to Yellow, and more similar to Red or Yellow than is any
fourth color.
The fact that (El) and the following individual essence are necessarily
coinstantiated helps clarify the sense in which these colors are similar.
(E2) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red and
Yellow, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily such that:
at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similar in
color to an instance of Red, equally similar in color to an instance of
Yellow, and more similar in color to an instance of Red or Yellow
than is an instance of any fourth color.
The notion of a color being at the level of generality of Red and Yellow is
explicated below. Firstly, a color, Cl, is a variety of a color, C2, just
provided that (i) O (Vx)(x has Cl > x has C2), and (ii) 0 (3x)(x has C2 &
x lacks C1). For instance, if something has Crimson, then it has Red, but
possibly something has Red and lacks Crimson. Secondly, a color C is at
the level of generality of Red and Yellow if and only if C is a color which
is not a variety of another color. For example, Scarlet and Crimson are
varieties of Red, but Red is not a variety of another color. A color which
is not a variety of another color may be said to be a highest species of color.
We can now see why it is plausible that (E2) is an individual essence of
Orange which is other than Orange's haecceity. Notice that possibly, a
person has visual experiences of red and yellow, but never has a visual
experience of orange. It seems possible that such a person grasps (E2)
without grasping Orange. Thus, it appears that possibly, a person grasps
(E2) without grasping the haecceity of Orange. Inasmuch as (E2) is an
individual essence of Orange, it seems possible that a person grasps an
individual essence of Orange without grasping Orange's haecceity.
Moreover, it is possible that a person grasps the haecceity of Orange without

grasping (E2), since (E2) is much more complex than this haecceity.
Employing a pattern of argument introduced above, we can see that these
CHAPTER 1
possibilities make it plausible that (E2) is an individual essence of Orange

which is other than Orange's haecceity.
Parallel reasoning leads to the conclusion that Red has the following
individual essence other than its haecceity.
addition, it is possible that a person has visual experiences of black, lacks a

visual experience of white, and has tactual experiences of hot and cold. It
seems that possibly, a person of this sort grasps Blackness and Opposition
without grasping Whiteness. Hence, it appears possible that a person grasps
(E4) without grasping Whiteness's haecceity. Utilizing a by now familiar
pattern of argument, we can see that these possibilities make it plausible that
(E4) is an individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness's
haecceity.
A parallel argument shows that
48
(E3)being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Yellow

and Orange, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily such
that: at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similar
in color to an instance of Orange, equally similar in color to an
instance of Orange as is an instance of Yellow, and more similar in
color to an instance of Orange than is an instance of any color other
than x with the exception of Yellow.
Next, consider the nonchromatic colors Blackness and Whiteness. The
haecceity of Whiteness is being identical with Whiteness. In addition,
Whiteness seems to have the following individual essence:
(E4) being the opposite of Blackness.
If there are negative properties, then some pairs of properties are formal
contradictories, for example, being white and being nonwhite, being
triangular and being nontriangular, and so on. Other pairs of properties are
contraries, for instance, being white and being green. Contraries are not
coinstantiable, but are not formally contradictory. Finally, some contraries
are opposites, for example, Whiteness and Blackness, Hotness and Coldness,
Smoothness and Roughness, et cetera. All opposites are contraries, but not
all contraries are opposites. For instance, being triangular has no opposite,
though it has contraries, for example, being square, being circular, being
hexagonal, and so forth.
We are now in a position to see why it is plausible that (E4) is an
individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness's haecceity.
Observe that possibly, a person has visual experiences of white, but lacks a
visual experience of black. It seems possible that such a person grasps
Whiteness without grasping Blackness. Consequently, it appears possible
that a person grasps the haecceity of Whiteness without grasping (E4). In
49
(E5) being the opposite of Whiteness,

an individual essence of Blackness, is other than the haecceity of Blackness
(being identical with Blackness).
Ernest Sosa has argued forcefully that if property A is the philosophical
analysis of property B, then A=B, although it may (misleadingly) appear that
possibly, somebody grasps B without grasping A.`" However, I will show
that for each of the earlier sorts of cases in which it seems that possibly,
someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences, there is
a case of that sort in which neither one of two coinstantiated individual
essences can be plausibly regarded as an analysis of the other. If I am right,
then Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim that possibly, someone
grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences.
In the case of individual essences such as being identical with Aristotle,
being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12, being identical with
Aristotle and colored i f red, being identical with Aristotle and self-identical,
and so on, it is clear that none of these properties is an analysis of any of the
others: none of these properties explicates or explains any of the others in
the way required by a philosophical analysis. Parallel remarks apply to a
pair of individual essences such as being identical with 2 and being the
square root of 4.
Turning to our pairs of individual essences of colors, I shall argue that
either being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2), or being
41
See Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710.
CHAPTER 1
identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3), and either being identical with
Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4), or being identical with Blackness is not
analyzable as (E5). To begin with, suppose for the sake of a reductio that
being identical with Whiteness is analyzable as (E4), and being identical with
Blackness is analyzable as (E5). In that case, being white is analyzable as
requirement for a philosophical analysis.' I conclude that none of these

examples is an authentic analysis.
Similarly, it is evident that if (E2) is analyzable as being identical with
Orange or (E3) is analyzable as being identical with Red, then a philosophical analysis can have an analysandum of greater logical complexity than its
analysans. Since we have ruled out the possibility of such a philosophical
analysis, neither of these cases is a genuine analysis.
In sum, either being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2) and
vice-versa, or being identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3) and viceversa; and either being identical with Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4) and
vice-versa, or being identical with Blackness is not analyzable as (E5) and
vice-versa. We have seen that for each of the earlier sorts of cases in which
it seems that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated
individual essences, there is a case of that sort in which neither one of two
coinstantiated individual essences can be plausibly regarded as an analysis
of the other. Hence, Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim that
possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences.
Let us take stock for a moment. In the light of the foregoing arguments,
two things are plausible. First, if there are haecceities, then some entities
have a plurality of individual essences. Second, if there are haecceities, then
some individual essences are not haecceities. 44 Of course, if an entity has
50
being the opposite of black, and being black is analyzable as being the
opposite of white. But any attempt to analyze Whiteness in terms of
Blackness while analyzing Blackness in terms of Whiteness is viciously
circular. Hence, each of these pairs of supposed analyses contains at least
one member which is not a genuine analysis.
Likewise, assume for the purposes of a reductio that being identical with
Orange is analyzable as (E2), and being identical with Red is analyzable as
(E3). Surely, then, being orange is analyzable in terms of being yellow and
being red, and being red is analyzable in terms of being yellow and being
orange. However, any effort to analyze being orange in terms of being red
while analyzing being red in terms of being orange is viciously circular.
Therefore, at least one member of each of these pairs of supposed analyses
is not a bona fide analysis.
Moreover, in what follows I will argue that (E2), (E3), (E4), and (E5) are
not analyzable as being identical with Orange, being identical with Red,
being identical with Whiteness, and being identical with Blackness,
respectively.
Suppose for the sake of a reductio that either (E4) is analyzable as being
identical with Whiteness or (E5) is analyzable as being identical with
Blackness. In that event, either being the opposite of white is analyzable as
being black or being the opposite of black is analyzable as being white. In
either case,' we have a philosophical analysis whose analysans is less
complex, logically speaking, than its analysandum. However, according to
Sosa's conception of philosophical analysis, the analysans must be of greater
logical complexity than the analysandum. 42 Moreover, this is a plausible
42
0n Sosa's view, an analysis resolves a complex attribute, A, into more basic components,
viz., A's logical parts. His view implies that in an analysis the analysans must involve a logical
complex, e.g., a conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc. This requirement does not seem to be
satisfied if one either seeks to analyze (E4) as being identical with Whiteness or seeks to analyze
(E5) as being identical with Blackness.
51
43
Note that this requirement implies that being identical with Aristotle and such that
7+5=12 cannot be analyzed as being identical with Aristotle and being the square root of 4
cannot be analyzed as being identical with 2. This confirms some of the conclusions reached
earlier about these and other similar examples.
44 Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object; and Alvin Piantinga, "World and
Essence," Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), pp. 380-386. According to their definitions of the
term `haecceity', 'haecceity' means individual essence. Thus, given their definitions, the
sentence 'All individual essences are haecceities' is trivially true. The truth of this sentence
appears to be incompatible with my contention that some individual essences are not haecceities.
However, I am not convinced that this appearance of incompatibility is more than a mere
appearance, since I suspect that Chisholm and Plantinga introduce 'haecceity' as a technical
term. If my suspicions are correct, then Chisholm's and Plantinga's definitions of 'haecceity'
are stipulative, and do not reflect a substantive thesis about haecceities and individual essences.
In any case, since my sense of haecceity is legitimate, and since it seems that some individual
essences are not haecceities in that sense, it is a significant drawback of Chisholm's and
Plantinga's definitions of 'haecceity' that on these definitions the sentence 'Some individual
CHAPTER 1
52
a plurality of individual essences, then these essences are necessarily
coexemplified.' Hence, it seems (as has oft been argued) that necessary
coexemplification is not sufficient for property identity.
If for any property A and any property B the necessary coexemplification
of A and B is sufficient for A's being identical with B, then property identity
is coarse grained. Otherwise, property identity is fine grained. In the light
of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there are haecceities, then
property identity is fine grained.
Finally, note that no more than one of any plurality of coexemplified
individual essences is a haecceity: the coexemplification of individual
essences does not imply the coexemplification of haecceities.
45
P1 is necessarily
A property PI and a property P2 are necessarily coexemplified =df.
such that for any x, x has P1 if and only if x has P2.
53
VII - VARIETIES OF REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM

"In some shape or other, Nominalism and Realism
still divide between them the empire of thought."
(1864 Burton The Scot Abroad II. i. 16)
Since haecceities are properties, the existence, of haecceities entails Realism,

the doctrine that properties exist. Of course, if there are properties, then a
property cannot be eliminated in favor of an entity of another kind or
ontological category, for instance, a concept, a linguistic expression, an
event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, or a set. 46
However, Realism may be either Robust or Anemic. According to Anemic
Realism, properties exist, but a property is reducible to or identifiable with
a concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, a set,
or the like." For example, one variety of Anemic Realism maintains that
properties can be identified with concepts, a kind of mind-dependent
concrete entity, for instance, the property of Horseness=the concept of
Horseness, the property of Unicornicity= the concept of Unicornicity, and so
forth. On the other hand, Robust Realism says that properties exist, and
Propertyhood is a fundamental ontological category. Propertyhood is a
fundamental ontological category just in case a property is not reducible to
or identifiable with a concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, a
collection, a relation, a set, or the like. Note that on my understanding of
what it is for Propertyhood to be a fundamental ontological category,
Propertyhood's having this status is consistent with the nonexistence of
properties or with a property's being eliminable in favor of an entity of
another kind or ontological category.
Such eliminability of properties entails Anti-Realism, the doctrine that
properties do not exist. Traditionally, Anti-Realism takes one of two forms.
Nominalism denies that there are properties, maintaining that a property is
46
essences are not haecceities' is trivially false.
1f an entity, e, is eliminated in favor of e*, then e fails to exist.
471f an entity, e, is reduced to or identified with an entity, e*, then necessarily, e exists if
and only if e* exists.
54
CHAPTER 1
a nonconcrete entity and only concrete entities exist. Thus, Nominalism

implies that neither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornicity exists. Conceptualism adds to Nominalism the claim that there are
concepts, and that a putative reference to a property can be replaced with a
reference to a concept. In other words, Conceptualism is the thesis that
properties can be eliminated in favor of concepts. For instance, although
neither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornicity exists,
concepts of Horseness and Unicornicity exist.
Let us now return to a consideration of Robust Realism. A standard
defense of Robust Realism is based on an argument in favor of the existence
of qualitative properties. In Chapter 2, I will provide a nonstandard defense
of Robust Realism, one which is based on an argument in favor of the
existence of nonqualitative properties.
There are two traditional varieties of Robust Realism: Extreme Realism
and Moderate Realism. According to Moderate Realism, every property is
exemplified, for example, Horseness exists, but not Unicornicity. On the
other hand, Extreme Realism maintains that some properties are exemplified
and some are not, for instance, Horseness and Unicornicity, respectively.
Two opposing forms of Extreme Realism may be distinguished.
According to Weak Extreme Realism, every unexemplified property can be
identified with a logical complex of exemplified properties. For example,
the unexemplified property of being a horned horse is a conjunction of two
exemplified properties, namely, being horned and being a horse. Weak
Extreme Realism would seem to be a cross between Extreme Realism and
Moderate Realism. In contrast, Strong Extreme Realism maintains that some
unexemplified properties cannot be identified with logical complexes of
exemplified properties.
In Chapter 3 I argue that (i) Strong Extreme Realism is true on the
grounds that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which
correspond to mereologically and causally disjoint NEPs and which cannot
be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties. Furthermore,
I argue in Chapter 5 that (ii) it is impossible that anyone grasps or picks out
an unexemplified haecceity of this kind, and (iii) some of these unexemplified haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. (i)-(iii) entails Radical Realism,
a form of Extreme Realism holding that there are unexemplified properties
55
which cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties

and which are mind-independent in the strong sense of (ii)-(iii). 48
Notice that if the existence of a property entails that there is a conscious
being who can grasp or pick out that property, then there is a sense in which
a property is mind-dependent. However, although Strong Extreme Realism
entails that a property cannot be identified with a concept, this form of
Realism is consistent with the claim that the existence of a property entails
that God grasps or picks out that property. In contrast, since Radical
Realism asserts that some properties are mind-independent in the strong
sense of (ii)-(iii), Radical Realism is not consistent with this claim. Hence,
Radical Realism is a higher grade of Realism than Strong Extreme Realism.
If my argument in this book succeeds, then Radical Realism is justified.
48
The reader may find it useful to compare these positions on the ontological status of
properties with the related traditional responses to the problem of universals described in Section
II of this chapter. A relevant and up-to-date overview of various positions on the ontological
status of properties is provided in H. Burkhardt and 13. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics
and Ontology, 2 vols. (Munich: Philosophia, Verlag, 1991). The following handbook entries
are especially relevant: Attribute (pp. 65 70), Abstract/Concrete, (pp. 4 5),
Conceptualism (pp.
168-174), Metaphysics VI: Systematic Metaphysics (548-553),
Nominalism (pp. 618 619), and
Universals (pp. 921-553).
-
56
CHAPTER 1
VIII - THE CONCRETE/ABSTRACT DISTINCTION

"Logicians in almost every age have endeavoured to frame schemes
of classification in which things should be arranged according to
their real nature. To these the name of Categories-has been given."
Outline of the Laws of Thought 97)
(1849
Abp. Thomson
Realists and antirealists presuppose an intuitive distinction between abstracta

and concreta in their debates about the problem of universals and the
ontological status of properties. In order to remind ourselves of the data for
this distinction, let us look once again at examples which illustrate the
distinction. Examples of abstracta are Triangularity (a property), Diversity
(a relation), there being horses (a proposition), my singleton set, and the
number 7. Examples of concreta are a stone (a material substance), God (a
disembodied spiritual substance), Hurricane Carol (an event), instants and
seconds (times), points and expanses of space (places), the particular
squareness of a certain item (a trope), the sum of Venus and Pluto (a
collection), the Earth's surface (a limit), and shadows and gaps (privations).
It is desirable that a philosophical analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction
allow for the possibility of entities of any intelligible sorts, given some
plausible view about the nature, existence conditions, and interrelationships
of entities of those sorts. This desideratum seems to require allowing for the
possibility of entities of the aforementioned kinds. Six attempts have been
made to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction.
(1) Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially located or spatially related to
something.
(2) Unlike abstracta, concreta are capable of moving or undergoing
intrinsic change.
(3) Concreta have contingent existence, whereas abstracta have necessary
existence.
(4) Unlike concreta, abstracta are exemplifiable.
(5) Unlike concreta, abstracta are (intellectually) graspable.
(6) Unlike abstracta, concreta can be causes or effects.
(1) is inadequate because a disembodied spirit is concrete but neither
spatially located nor spatially related to something. Alternatively, we might
57
amend (1) to read as follows. (1') Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially
or temporally located, or spatially or temporally related to something.
Arguably, it is necessary that a soul is temporally located or enters into
temporal relations. Still, (1') is flawed: properties are abstract, but it seems
that some properties enter into temporal relations, for example, Wakefulness
is exemplified by Aristotle at one time and not at another. Although some
philosophers claim that abstracta are outside of time, this claim is problematic, since as the example of Wakefulness and Aristotle implies, abstracta
undergo relational change. An entity's being temporal does not imply that
it undergoes nonrelational change, for instance, a sphere which does not
undergo nonrelational change and which other spheres orbit is in time.
(2) is inadequate because points and instants are concrete but incapable of
either moving or undergoing intrinsic change.
(3) is subject to three complaints or difficulties. Firstly, a being such as
the theistic God is concrete yet has necessary existence. Secondly, according
to Aristotelian Realism a property cannot exist unexemplified. Aristotelian
Realism implies that some properties are abstract yet have contingent
existence. Thirdly, sets of ordinary concreta are abstract but seem to have
contingent existence.
(4) is objectionable because sets, propositions, and properties such as
being a spherical cube are abstract but could not be exemplified.
(5) is unsatisfactory because it seems that abstracta of certain kinds could
not be grasped, for instance, sets of concreta or haecceities which can be
exemplified by necessarily nonconscious material substances.'
(6) is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. According to one camp,
causes and effects are concrete events.' On this view, (6) has the absurd
implication that substances are nonconcrete. One reply is that substances
(but not abstracta) can be involved in causal relations. But, if causes and
effects are concrete events, then it is hard to fathom the sense of "involve-
49
For an argument that such haecceities are ungraspable see Chapter 5, section X.
50
See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in

Honor of C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234,
"Causal Relations,"
Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967),
Nous, IV (1970), pp. 25-32.
pp. 691-703, and "Events as Particulars,"
CHAPTER 1
58
ment" intended. For according to an event ontology, an event's occurring

does not entail that a substance exists, and an event is not a substances's
exemplifying a property at a time or the like. Moreover, since causal
relations hold in virtue of laws correlating properties of things, in a sense
abstracta are involved in causal relations. Finally, there is evidence that
facts or the like can be causes or effects, but facts are abstracta. 51
Below, I attempt to devise an adequate analysis of the concrete/abstract
distinction.' The basic idea of my analysis is that an entity is abstract or
concrete in virtue of meeting certain conditions qua being an instance of the
ontological category to which it belongs. This notion of an ontological
category needs to be explained, since every entity is of many different kinds
or categories of varying degrees or levels of generality or specificity. Thus,
to develop my analysis I must specify the degree of generality of the
ontological categories I have in mind. This is a kind of generality problem
51 These observations provide a reply to the following argument. (1) An abstract entity
cannot enter into causal relations. (2) We have knowledge about an entity only if that entity
enters into causal relations. Therefore, (3) We cannot have knowledge about an abstract entity.
In the light of those observations, it would seem that either (1) or (2) is false. That is, either
(1) is false because facts or the like are abstract and can enter into causal relations, or (2) is
false for either of the following two reasons. (i) We have knowledge about material substances
which cannot enter into causal relations. (ii) Although abstracta cannot enter into causal
relations, there is a sense in which abstracta are involved in causal relations, and we can have
knowledge about an entity if it is involved in causal relations in that sense. Compare Jaegwon
Kim, "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," Philosophical Studies,
40 (1981), pp. 339-354.
52 It
seems that a consideration of difficulties such as the foregoing ones have led some
philosophers to doubt whether there is such a ""-g as the concrete/abstract distinction at all.
For example, in "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," p. 348,
Jaegwon Kim wrote as follows. "The force of saying that something is 'abstract' or 'platonic'
has never been made clear. One sense sometimes attached to 'abstract' is that of 'eternal'; an
abstract object in this sense neither comes into being nor perishes. Another closely related sense
is that of not being in space and time. Abstract entities in this sense are atemporal and
nonspatial: they lack location in space-time. A third sense is that of 'necessary'; abstract entities
in this sense are said to 'exist necessarily'. It is by no means obvious that these three senses
are equivalent: for example, one traditional concept of God makes him abstract in the first and
third sense but not in the second." Kim's skepticism about the very existence of the
concrete/abstract distinction will prove to be unwarranted if I succeed in providing a
philosophical analysis of this distinction, and in arguing that this analysis is adequate to the
intuitions philosophers have had about how the distinction applies to particular cases.
59
(of which there are many examples in philosophy). I shall provide a solution
to this problem by giving informal and formal accounts of the appropriate
degree of generality of an ontological category or kind of entity.
As I have indicated, ontological categories are of different levels of
generality, and are related to one another as species and genus. Thus, these
categories constitute a system of classification which reflects these logical
relations. In what follows, I will (i) characterize this system, and (ii)
analyze a level of generality (which I shall call level C) within this system
which is crucial to my attempt to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction.
Step 1
A category, Cl, and a category, C2, are equivalent just provided that Cl
and C2 are necessarily coinstantiated; Cl is instantiable if and only if Cl is
possibly instantiated; and Cl subsumes C2 just in case Cl and C2 are such
that necessarily, any instance of C2 is an instance of Cl, and possibly, some
instance of Cl is not an instance of C2. For example, being an event and
being an occurrence are equivalent categories. Any two equivalent
categories are at the same level of generality. On the other hand, if A
subsumes B, then A is at a higher level of generality than B For instance,
being an abstract entity subsumes being a property. Notice that in this
technical or logician's sense of subsumption a noninstantiable category is
subsumed by any instantiable category, and a category that must be
universally instantiated subsumes any category that need not be universally
instantiated.
Step 2
There is an intuitive notion of a hierarchy of levels of generality among
ontological categories." At the highest level (level A) is the category of
being an entity which everything instantiates and which is therefore a kind
of limiting case. At a lower level (level B) are the categories of Concreteness and Abstractness. At a yet lower level (level C) are the categories
which are the various types of concreta and abstracta, just provided that
these categories are instantiable. Below, I list typical or core categories that
53
See Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance,"
853.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835
60
CHAPTER 1
are at level C on the foregoing proviso."

List L: Property, Relation, Proposition, Event, Time, Place, Trope,
Collection, Limit, and Privation.
Seemingly, some categories at C level are not on L, for example, Substance
and Set. At a level of generality lower than C (call it level D) are those
instantiable ontological categories which are the various types of the
categories at level C. For instance, at level D we find types of Substance,
for example, Material Object, or Spirit; types of Event, for instance, Material
Event, or Spiritual Event; types of Limit, for example, Surface, or Line, or
Instant; and types of Privation, for instance, Shadow, or Hole. More specific
types are at lower levels of generality.
Figure 1
Level C
Level D
Concrete
Abstract
Level B
Property Relation Proposition
(Al) There are at least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of

concreta at level C (at least one of which is on L), and there are at
least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of abstracta at level
C (at least one of which is on L.)
I employ intuitive conceptions of the categories on L, and presuppose
(plausibly, I think) that not every instance (actual or possible) of a category
on L is identifiable with an instance of another ontological category. (The
irreducibility of a category on L that this implies is consistent with the
eliminability of an entity of such a category in favor of an entity of another
ontological category.) If the foregoing presupposition is mistaken, then the
categories that make it so should be removed from L. The only limitation
I place on this process of removal is that (Al) be true, and that whatever
categories satisfy (Al) be compatible with the above presupposition.
Step 3
(D1) A category Cl is at level C =df either (i) Cl is on L, and Cl is
instantiable, or (ii) [(a) Cl is not on L, and Cl does not subsume an
instantiable category on L, and no category on L subsumes Cl, and
(b) there is no category C2 which satisfies the conditions in
(ii)(a) and which subsumes C/1 55
Entity
Level A
61
Event Time Place Substance Limit Col ection Privation Trope
Material Object Spirit
Observe that by a 'category' I mean an ontological category in an intuitive

sense, paradigm cases of which include Property,. Relation, Proposition, Set,
Substance, Event, Time, Place, Trope, Collection, Limit, and Privation.
Such categories are the more general or more fundamental kinds of being.
A system of classification which is comprised of such categories and which
is applicable to all possible kinds of beings helps clarify the nature of reality.
Although the intuitive concept of a genuine ontological kind may be hard to
analyze, it is necessary to use this notion both in the study of ontology in
general, and in the framing of a particular ontology - enterprises involved in
Presumably,
55
54 Compare Aristotle, Categoriae, in J. L. Ackrill trans., Aristotle's Categories and De

Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
That CI is instantiable if it is not on L is ensured by the condition in (ii)(a) that no

L subsumes Cl, because (as noted earlier) a noninstantiable category is subsumed
by an instantiable one, and because (A 1) implies that some category on L is instantiable.
category on
CHAPTER 1
any attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the world. While

all categories are properties, some properties are not categories, for example,
Redness, Squareness, Bachelorhood, and (the disjunctive property of) being
a substance or a surface.' A property which is not an ontological category
ipso facto fails to satisfy (D1).
As noted earlier, the categories of being a substance and being a set are
not on L but are at level C (assuming they are instantiable and irreducible).
A category of this kind satisfies (D1) by virtue of satisfying clause (ii) of
(D1). This clause has two parts (a) and (b). Let us see why being a
substance and being a set (if they are instantiable and irreducible) satisfy
both of these parts. First of all, the category of Substance (Set) satisfies
(ii)(a) because it is not on L and neither subsumes nor is subsumed by a
category on L. In aristotelian terms, the category of Substance (Set) is
neither a genus nor a species of a category on L. In addition, the category
of Substance (Set) appears to satisfy clause (ii)(b), since it seems that every
category that subsumes Substance (Set) also subsumes an instantiable
category on L. For instance, given (Al), being concrete is a category that
subsumes Substance, and being abstract is a category that subsumes Set.
Moreover, given (Al), being concrete subsumes some instantiable category

on L, that is, being a time, or being a place, or being an event, and so forth,
and being abstract subsumes some instantiable category on L, namely, being
a property, or being a relation, or being a proposition, and so on. It seems
that parallel considerations apply to, any category that subsumes Substance
(Set)."
62
Figure
Above C level
Level C
Below C level
Concrete
Substance (off L) Event Time Place... (on L)
Material Object Material Event
Figure 3
Above C level
56
Do Contingent Being and Necessary Being count as ontological categories? If the

Contingent Being/Necessary Being distinction is necessarily coextensive with the Concrete/Abstract distinction, then perhaps they do. On the other hand, it has often been maintained
that there is a concrete being that has necessary existence, e.g., the theistic God. If so, then
some substances, e.g., tables, are contingent beings and some are necessary beings. It has also
been held that there are sets of ordinary concrete objects which are abstract and have contingent
existence. If so, then some sets are contingent beings and some, e.g., the null set, are necessary
beings. In that case, even though Substance and Set are ontological categories, neither
Substance nor Set is subsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being. However, a
classificatory system of ontological categories is a hierarchial system of genera and species in
which every ontological category is a genus or species. If the universal category, Entity, were
to be divided into Contingent Being and Necessary Being, and neither Substance nor Set were
subsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being, then neither Substance nor Set would
be an ontological category which is either a genus or a species in the classificatory system in
question. This is contrary to my assumption that Substance and Set are such categories. Hence,
a classificatory system of the sort required has not been provided, and the modal categories of
Necessary Being and Contingent Being are not genuine ontological kinds or categories.
Analogously, assuming that Lion is a biological kind, a proper biological system of classification
would not divide living things into two kingdoms Female and Nonfemale, since in that case
Lion would not appear as a genus or species in the classificatory hierarchy: only Female Lion
and Nonfemale Lion would so appear.
63
Level C
Abstract
\
Set (off L) Property Relation Proposition... (on L)
57Thus, my account of a level C category in terms of L and (DI) generates a "list" of

categories of being that is open-ended. In other words, (DI) is logically compatible with two
things. Firstly, that there are one or more level C categories which are not on L. Secondly, that
one or more of the categories on L are not at level C (because they are not instantiable). Hence,
(DI) differs from Aristotle's list of the categories of being, which has afixed membership. (See
Aristotle, Categoriae, Chapter 4.) My general approach to the theory of categories is compatible
with Brian Carr's account of the "metaphysical enterprise of categorial description" in his
Metaphysics: An Introduction
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987),

Chapter 1. On page 9, Carr states that such a descriptive enterprise "seeks to spell out the
fundamental features of our thought and talk about reality, assuming neither the adequacy or
otherwise of such categories to reality in itself nor the fixed or changing nature of that thought
and talk."
CHAPTER 1
64
It should also be observed that a category C* not on L which is at a

higher level than C both fails to satisfy (i) of (D1), and fails to satisfy (ii)(a)
of (D1) (because C* subsumes some instantiable category on L). Thus, such
a category C* does not meet (D1). (An example is the category of being
concrete.) Furthermore, a category C* (at a level lower than C) that is subsumed by a level C category on L fails to satisfy both (i) of (Dl) (inasmuch
as C* either will not be on L or else will not be instantiable) and (ii)(a) of
(D1) (because C* is subsumed by some instantiable category on L). Hence,
a category C* of this kind does not satisfy (Dl). (An example might be the
category of being a material event). In addition, a category C* (at a level
lower than C) that is subsumed by a level C category not on L both fails to
meet (i) of (D1) (since C* will not be on L) and fails to meet (ii)(b) of (D1).
Therefore, such a category C* does not satisfy (D1). (An example might be
the category of being a material object.) 58
58
Since (D1) presupposes (A1), which implies that there are at least two instantiable
categories of abstracta at level C, a nominalist might object to (D1), arguing that no category
of abstractum is instantiable. As I have implied, I framed (D1) in as ontologically neutral a
fashion as possible. Nevertheless, an altemative to (D1) can be framed which is compatible
with Nominalism. In that case, the category of being concrete would be necessarily coextensive
with the category of being an entity, and categories of concreta such as Substance, Time, Place,
etc., would be at the second level (level B). (Al) would be replaced with (A1*): there are at
least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of concreta at level B (at least one of which is
on L). A formal account of a category's being at level B would then parallel the account I
provide of a category's being at level C in (DI), where the term, 'level C', is replaced with the
term, 'level B'. Similarly, if an extreme platonist were to object to (DI) on the ground that no
category of concretum is instantiable, (D1) could be revised in order to satisfy such a critic
along lines parallel to the foregoing.
Although I refer to various ontological categories, which I regard as abstracta, if the
nominalist program were to be successful, it would have the resources to paraphrase all such
references in nominalistic terms, including any references of these sorts which involve
attributions of a metaphysical modality, de dicto or de re. For the purposes of my theory of
categories, I do not rule out the possibility of the nominalist program being successful.
However, since I argue in this book that a form of Property-Realism is correct, I do not take
seriously the claim that no category of abstractum is instantiable when formulating my analysis
of Concreteness in (D2) below. If no category of abstractum is instantiable, then my analysis
of Concreteness in (D2) can be amended by replacing the term 'level C' with the term 'level
B'.
65
Step 4
(D2) x is concrete =df x instantiates a level C category which possibly has
an instance having spatial or temporal parts.
(D3) x is abstract =df. x is nonconcrete. 59
My analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction incorporates the classical
notion that this distinction can be understood in terms of spatiality and
temporality. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that this analysis
adequately handles the problem cases presented earlier.
To begin with, notice that a disembodied spirit instantiates the level C
category of Substance. Likewise, for a necessary being such as the theistic
God. However, the category of Substance possibly has an instance having
spatial parts, that is, a complex material substance. Hence, a disembodied
spirit, or the theistic God, satisfies (D2): it instantiates a level C category
which possibly has an instance having spatial parts. Thus, (D2) has the
welcome implication that a disembodied spirit, or the theistic God, is a
concretum. (D2) has this welcome implication even if God is a soul who
has necessary existence and who is neither spatially located nor spatially
related to anything.
A point instantiates the level C category of Place, and an instant
instantiates the level C category of Time. Yet, the former category possibly
has an instance having spatial parts, for example, some expanse of space, and
the latter category possibly has an instance having temporal parts, for
instance, some period of time. Thus, (D2) has the happy consequence that
59
As (D3) illustrates, Abstractness can be explicated in wholly negative terms, inasmuch

as the concrete/abstract distinction is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Notice that a categorial
division of this kind is possible only at level B. No intelligible ontological category below level
B can be explicated in wholly negative terms. Attempting to explicate such a category, x, in
wholly negative terms is, after all, not to distinguish x from other categories which are at the
same level of generality as x and which can also be described in those negative terms. To
explicate such a category and to distinguish it from other categories at the same level of
generality, one must sufficiently characterize the positive nature of that category. Of course,
these considerations do not apply to an explication of Abstractness, since it is at level B, and
Concreteness is the only other category at level B.
66
CHAPTER 1
points and instants are concreta. (D2) has this happy consequence despite
the fact that points and instants are incapable of either motion or intrinsic
change.
Notice that the level C categories of Property and Trope could not be
coinstantiated. Unlike the category of Trope, the category of Property does
not possibly have an instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A
property does not satisfy (D2): it does not instantiate a level C category
which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. Therefore,
a property is not a concrete entity. Hence, (D3) has the desired result that
a property is an abstract entity. (D3) has this desired result with respect to
a property, P, even if P has contingent existence, P is necessarily unexemplified, P is necessarily ungraspable, P is temporally located, or P enters into
temporal relations.
Analogously to the level C categories of Property and Trope, the level C
categories of Proposition and Event could not be coinstantiated. Unlike the
category of Event, the category of Proposition does not possibly have an
instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A proposition does not meet
(32): it does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an
instance having spatial or temporal parts. Consequently, a proposition is not
a concrete entity. Thus, (D3) has the desirable outcome that a proposition
is an abstract entity. (D3) has this desirable outcome despite the fact that a
proposition cannot be exemplified.
Finally, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated by something
having spatial or temporal parts. This follows from the fact that a set cannot
have parts. Aside from any elements a set may have, a set has no parts.
For example, the empty set has no parts. Although a set can have elements,
it is demonstrable that an element of a set is not a part of that set. It is
axiomatic that the relation of proper parthood is transitive: necessarily, if x
is part of y, and y is part of z, then x is part of z. But the relation of
elementhood is not transitive: for example, x is an element of {x}, {x} is an
element of {{x} }, but x is not an element of {{x}}. Therefore, Elementhood
cannot be identified with Parthood. Since aside from its elements a set has
no parts, a set cannot have parts. Hence, unlike the level C category of
Collection, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated by
something having spatial or temporal parts. A set does not satisfy (D2): it
67
does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an instance having
spatial or temporal parts. Therefore, a set is not a concrete entity.
Consequently, (D3) has the desired result that a set is an abstract entity.'
(D3) has this desired result with respect to a set, S, even if S has contingent
existence, S is necessarily unexemplified, or S is necessarily ungraspable.
I shall conclude by answering a possible criticism of (D2) and (D3). It
might be objected that (D2)'s account of Concreteness is viciously circular,
on the ground that (D2) employs the notion of a level C ontological
category, while my intuitive characterization of an ontological category's
being at level C makes use of the level B distinction between Concreteness
and Abstractness. However, although this is true of my intuitive characterization of what it is for an ontological category to be at level C, my formal
account of this notion in no way utilizes the level B notions of Abstractness
or Concreteness. My formal account captures the notion of a level C
category solely in terms of certain logical relationships that such a category
60
In his Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), David Lewis argues that the
singleton subsets of a set, s, are parts of s (though not spatial or temporal parts), and s is the
mereological sum of those singletons. Unlike the elementhood relation, the subset relation is
transitive. Yet, it is not clear that Lewis employs the standard notion of a set that I employ: he
is explicitly skeptical about its intelligibility. If this notion is unintelligible, then my category,
Set, is noninstantiable. Moreover, Lewis's view of the natures of sums and sets is incompatible
with my classificatory system of ontic categories. He permits the mereological addition of any
two entities (even assuming that there are both concreta and abstracta), but I cannot, because
I uphold the concrete/abstract distinction as exhaustive and exclusive, and because the sum of
a concretum and an (equally complex) abstractum, e.g., the sum of a point and a (simple)
property, respectively, has an equal claim both to be concrete and to be abstract. Unless Lewis's
conceptions of sumhood and sethood fit into an altemative system of ontic classification which
is at least as good as the one that I have pic s cuted, these Lewisian claims about sums and sets
can reasonably be rejected. I would argue that there is no such alternative system.
Penelope Maddy, in her Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), in
contradistinction to Lewis, denies that sets of concreta are abstracta. However, Maddy operates
with an inadequate understanding of abstractness. She accepts the view that abstractness can
be identified with not being in space and time, a view whose inadequacy follows from a
criticism presented earlier. In particular, souls would not be in space and time, but they would
not be abstract entities. Moreover, her substantive thesis that a set of concreta is located in
space and time is formally consistent with my claim that a set of concreta is an abstract entity
which lacks spatial or temporal parts, since an entity's being located in space and time does not
entail that it has spatial or temporal parts, as illustrated by the possible case of a spatially and
temporally located point-particle which lacks both spatial parts and temporal parts.

CHAPTER 1
must bear to my core list L of categories. Hence, (D2) is not conceptually

circular in the way alleged, and the criticism under discussion is unsound. 61
IX - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVE

PROPERTIES
68
69
"These conceptions are either of particulars, viz., individual things,

or of generals."
[1773 Monboddo Of the Origins and Progress of Language I. i. 5
(1774)]
The distinction between qualitative and nonqualitative properties or

propositions is often explained in linguistic terms. For example, a nonqualitative property is characterized as a property which is expressed by a
predicate manufactured with the help of a proper name or indexical indicator
designating a concrete object, and a qualitative property is characterized as
a property which is expressed by a predicate which is free of any such
singular term.
Such a linguistic account is not wholly satisfactory. This is because an
account of this kind characterizes a distinction among nonlinguistic entities,
for instance, properties, by appealing to linguistic criteria. A deeper account
of such a distinction characterizes it in terms of nonlinguistic criteria. A
preliminary formulation of such an account is given below.
(Dl) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative
(i) there is a
haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii)
P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P grasps H.
(D2) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative
tative.
6I This section is based on my article "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa,
eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
P is not nonquali-
Let us consider an objection to this initial formulation of my account. It

might be argued that there are qualitative properties or propositions of
infinite length, for example, ones which involve infinitely many conjuncts
or disjuncts, and that an infinitely long qualitative property or proposition
could not be grasped. According to this objection, since anything whatever
follows from an impossibility, and since someone's grasping P is an
impossibility, anything whatsoever necessarily follows from someone's
70
CHAPTER 1
grasping P. Hence, a qualitative property or proposition, P, which could not

be grasped trivially satisfies both clauses of (Dl): (i) there is a haecceity, H,
which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such
that whoever grasps P grasps H. 62 In that case, (Dl) mistakenly implies
that P is a nonqualitative property or proposition, and (Dl) does not provide
a logically sufficient condition of a property's or proposition's being
nonqualitative.
There are two replies to this objection. First, even if there is a qualitative
property or proposition, P, of infinite length which none of us could grasp,
it appears possible that there be a conscious being who has infinitely many
ideas and who grasps P. 63 In that case, the objection under discussion does
not undermine either (Di) or (D2).
Second, the preceding objection asks us to suppose that there are
properties or propositions of infinite length. It seems that there is an
intuitive notion of length applicable to a property or proposition. After all,
it appears that there is a generic concept of length, species of which include
spatial length, temporal length, and logical length. The concept of logical
length stands to the concepts of spatial or temporal length as the concept of
a logical part stands to the concepts of a spatial or a temporal part. Just as
there is the aforementioned generic concept of length, there is a generic
concept of parthood whose species are spatial, temporal, and logical
parthood. Examples of Logical Parthood include abstracta which are
conjuncts, disjuncts, or negands of other abstracta. Since the generic
conceptions of parthood and length are comparable, and since the former
conception seems to be legitimate, I conclude that the latter conception is
also legitimate. When it is said that a property or proposition is finitely or
infinitely long, the operative notion is that of logical length. Even if there
are necessarily ungraspable qualitative properties or propositions of infinite
length, it seems that we can capture the distinction between qualitative and
nonqualitative properties or propositions along the following lines.
(D3) A property or proposition, P, of finite length is nonqualitative
=df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a
concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such that whoever grasps
P grasps H.
(D4) A property or proposition, P, of infinite length is nonqualitative
=df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by
a concretum, and (ii) P has a finite stretch, F, which is necessarily
such that whoever grasps F grasps H.
(D5) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative =df. P is either a
nonqualitative property or proposition of finite length, or a nonqualitative property or proposition of infinite length.
(D6) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative =df. P is not nonqualitative.'
621t also follows that a nonqualitative property or proposition which could not be grasped
trivially satisfies (Dl). (In Chapter 5, section X, I will argue that there are such nonqualitative
properties.) However, unlike a qualitative property's satisfying (D1), this consequence is
welcome!
63
Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person. Chisholm implies that all abstracta are
qualitative, and that some abstracta are worlds or infinitely long conjunctive propositions. Since
Chisholm maintains that every proposition could be conceived by someone, Chisholm is
committed to the view that there are infinitely long qualitative propositions which are possibly
grasped by someone.
71
64
Compare the account of the qualitative/nonqualitative distinction in Gary Rosenkrantz,

"The Pure and The Impure," Logique et Analyse, 88 (1979), pp. 515-523.
THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
CHAPTER 2
"In Peter, James, and John, you may observe in
each a Certain collection of Stature, Figure,
Color, and other peculiar Properties, by which
they are known asunder, distinguished from all
other Men, and if I may say so, individuated."
[from Berkeley Alciphron, or the minute philosopher VII 5 (1732)]
"Of course, if provision is made only for his
general humanity, and not for what makes him
hic or ille, not for his haecceity as the schoolmen
used to say, a man will have cause to complain."
(Journal of Education I Nov. 1890 629/1)
I - METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATIONS
"Metaphysics, even bad metaphysics, really rests
on observations...and the only reason that this is
not universally recognized is that it rests upon
the kinds of phenomena with which every
man's experience is so saturated that he usually
pays no particular attention to them."
[1898 C. Peirce Collected Papers Vol. 6 2 (1935)]
A standard argument in favor of Realism about abstracta posits the existence

of a property in order to explain why several particulars are of the same
kind. For example:
Argument A
(Al) A number of particulars are red.
(A2) There is something about these particulars in virtue of which all of
them are red.
72
73
(A3) This something can only be their Redness, that is, each of them
having the property of being red.
Therefore,
(A4) Redness exists.
A is an argument from experience. Based upon our everyday experiences,
we learn that a number of particulars are of the same kind or have some
similarity. For instance, as a result of my having certain visual experiences
I am justified in believing that an apple, a scarf, and a book are red, that
Rover, Fido, and Spot are dogs, and that these three sticks appear bent.
Thus, (Al) is a logical consequence of the empirically justified proposition
that an apple, a scarf and a book are red. That a number of particulars
have Redness is hypothesized as the best explanation of (Al). In other
words, it is argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful at
explaining (Al) than the hypothesis in question, acceptance of this hypothesis is warranted. Thus, the argument is justified partly by an inference to the
best explanation.
Arguments of this kind imply that there are universals or sharable
qualitative properties, for example, being red, being a dog, and being bent
in appearance. If such arguments are sound, then a number of particulars'
being red is best accounted for by those particulars' having Redness, a
number of particulars' being dogs is best explained by these particulars'
having Dogness, a number of particulars' appearing bent is best accounted
for by those particulars' having the property of appearing bent, and so forth.
In an explanation of this kind, traditionally known as a formal cause, the
explanans provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of the
explanandum. For instance, a number of particulars' having Redness is a
logically necessary and sufficient condition of their being red. Moreover, in
an explanation of this sort the explanans provides a philosophical analysis
of the explanandum, for example, a number of particulars' being red can be
analyzed as their having Redness.
It should be noted that to analyze a concept, C, is to explicate C, that is,
to enhance one's understanding of C by explaining what it is for something
to be an instance of C. In an analysis, in addition to the analysans and the
,Z4
74
CHAPTER 2
analysandum's being necessarily equivalent, the analysans provides a certain

kind of explanation of the analysandum.
Most philosophers who reject the existence of abstracta admit that (Al)
is well justified by experience. For this reason, most nominalists find
themselves compelled to hold either (a) that (Al) is a brute fact that has no
explanation, or (b) that there is an alternative explanation of (Al) which is
superior to the realist's account. According to (a), the fact that a number of
particulars are red is unanalyzable; whereas according to (b), this fact can be
analyzed without recourse to an abstract entity.
But it is not generally recognized that Realism about abstracta can be
supported by an argument that posits the existence of a property in order to
explain the diversity of particulars at a time. However, if the similarity of
particulars might stand in need of explanation, then so might the diversity
of particulars. Specifically, compare Argument A and the following:
Argument B
(B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse.
(B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from
y at t.
(B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks
at t.
Therefore,
(B4) A property exists.
As with A, B is an argument from experience. The diversity or discreteness of particulars at a time is no less salient a feature of our everyday
experience than their likeness or similarity. For instance, I can see that
presently Rover and Fido are diverse individuals. Likewise, for this apple
and that scarf, this stick and that stick, and so forth. Thus, (B1) is a logical
consequence of certain empirically justified propositions, for example, that
currently Rover and Fido are diverse particulars.
Clearly, if at a time, t, a particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, then
in being diverse from y at t x is related to y at t. Hence, in seeking to
explain x's being diverse from y at t, it is something relational whose
explanation we are seeking.
That particulars which are diverse at a time are individuated by their
75
properties is hypothesized as the best explanation of (B1). In other words,

it is, argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful at
explaining (B1) than the hypothesis in question, belief in this hypothesis is
justified. Therefore, as with the argument in favor of the existence of
abstracta based on similarity, the argument in favor of the existence of
abstracta based on diversity is justified partly by an inference to the best
explanation.
If such an argument is sound, then the diversity of a particular, x, from a
particular, y, at a time t is best explained by there being some property, F,
such that: (i) at t x has F, and (ii) at t y lacks F. Such an explanation
provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of x's being diverse
from y at a time. Thus, an explanation of this kind provides a philosophical
analysis of the diversity of x and y at a time. In particular, the explanation
of the diversity of x and y at a time offered in (B3) entails that x is the only
particular which has F at t, and that it is this which individuates x at t.
The problem of accounting for the diversity of particulars at a time is
traditionally known as the problem of individuation.' To solve this problem
one must discover an appropriate principium individuationis or criterion of
individuation. An appropriate principle or criterion of individuation provides
an analysis of the diversity of particulars at time which is a logically
necessary and sufficient explanation for the diversity of particulars at a
time.' In aristotelian terminology, a criterion of individuation provides a
'For a historical introduction to this problem see Jorge Gracia, Introduction to the Problem
of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984). Compare
Gracia's Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1988).
2
For example, Duns Scotus wrote as follows. "I first explain what I understand by
individuation, whether numerical unity or through singularity: not, indeed the indeterminate
unity according to which anything in a species is called one in number, but a unity demarcated
as 'this', so that...it is impossible for an individual to be divided into subject parts. And what
is sought is the reason for this impossibility. So I say that it is impossible for an individual not
to be a 'this', demarcated by this singularity; and it is not the cause of singularity in general
which is sought, but of this specially demarcated singularity, namely, as it is determinately
`this'." See The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) in
Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 588.
CHAPTER 2
formal cause of the diversity of particulars at a time. 3

Most philosophers who deny the existence of abstracta allow that (B1) is
sufficiently warranted by experience. Therefore, most nominalists find
themselves forced to maintain either: (i) that (B1) is a brute fact that has no
explanation, or (ii) that there is an alternative explanation of (B1) which is
superior to the realist's account. According to (i), the diversity of particulars
at a time is unanalyzable; whereas according to (ii), the diversity of
particulars at a time is analyzable without appeal to an abstract entity.
Independently of any case for Realism about abstracta based on similarity,
I shall argue that the case for Realism about abstracta based on diversity is
a success. As we shall see, an argument for Realism which infers the
existence of a property as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars
at a time implies that there are haecceities of particulars.
II - QUALITATIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE
CONCRETA
76
77
"They agree indeed so much...that their specificality is swallowed up in their

general likeness."
[1756 J. Clubbe Miscellaneous Tracts, Physiognomy 1. 20 (1770)]
Apparently, in the actual world no two particulars have the same qualitative
properties, counting both those that are intrinsic, for instance, being a sphere,
and those that are relational, for example, being next to a sphere. Hence, as
long as we confine ourselves to the actual world, it seems that particulars can
be distinguished from one another by differences in their qualitative
properties. Some philosophers go further, arguing that it is impossible for
there to be two particulars having the same qualitative properties. Leibniz,
for instance, argued that any two entities must differ qualitatively!' Most
philosophers now reject "Leibniz's Law" and allow for the possibility of two
qualitatively indistinguishable concreta. 5 Two individuals of this kind
would exist at the same times, and at any given time of their existence,
would have the same qualitative properties. In a classic example, Max Black
considers a possible universe consisting of two spherical objects, x and y (in
a Euclidean space), which are exactly alike in all intrinsic qualitative
respects. 6 Throughout their existence, x and y are composed of the same
kind of stuff arranged in the same way, have the same shape, size, mass,
color, and so forth. Obviously, x and y would have the same intrinsic
Leibniz based his argument on Theism and the principle of sufficient reason. God could
not create two qualitatively indiscernible spheres x and y, since there would not be a logically
sufficient reason for God's positioning x in some place rather than y, and vice-versa. In my
judgement, Theism is subject to doubt, and the principle of sufficient reason should not be
3
1 am concerned exclusively with the concept of such a formal criterion of individuation.

This concept should not be confused with the notion of an epistemic principle of individuation.
A formal criterion of individuation specifies a condition which is logically necessary and
sufficient for diversity, and which may (but need not) be experientially accessible. On the other
hand, an epistemic principle of individuation specifies an experientially accessible factor which
can rationally justify a belief in diversity, and which may (but need not) be logically necessary
or sufficient for diversity.
accepted. In this book, I shall not presuppose either of them.

5 "Leibniz's Law" can be formulated as follows. Necessarily, for any x andy, and any time
t, at t x=y for any property P, x has P at t y has P at t. `P' ranges over qualitative
properties, including intrinsic and relational ones.

6 See
Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," in M. Loux, ed., Universals and
Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 204-216.
78
qualitative properties. But would x and y have the same relational

qualitative properties? It might seem that they would, since each of them
would have the property of being next to a sphere, and so forth. Nevertheless, this has been questioned. Ernest Sosa, for example, has argued that
given a choice of the point of origin for a spatial coordinate system, there
is a qualitative difference between positive and negative directions in that
system. ? (Although the choice of the point of origin is an arbitrary one,
Sosa would argue that this qualitative difference remains regardless of the
point chosen.) If Sosa is right, then each of the relational qualitative
properties, being at a finite distance from a sphere in a positive direction,
and being at a finite distance from a sphere in a negative direction, is had

by only one of the two spheres. In that case, Max Black's two spheres do
not have the same qualitative properties after all. Be that as it may, there
are two variations on Max Black's example which succeed in showing that
there could be two individuals with the same qualitative properties. In the
first variant, noted by Sosa, instead of just two spheres with the same
intrinsic qualitative properties, we suppose infinitely many such spheres,
equally spaced, whose centers lie on a single straight line. In the second
variant, we suppose just two spheres with the same intrinsic qualitative
properties, but instead of a Euclidean space, we suppose a Riemannian or
spherical space having a finite radius, and position the spheres so they are
equidistant from one another in all directions.
There are two other (more controversial) examples that might be put
forward to illustrate the possibility of two particulars having the same
qualitative properties. The first example presupposes that there could be
"immaterial" or "ghostly" spatial objects. 8 These objects would be spatially
located, mobile, and would have chApe, volume, color, and perhaps other
qualities. However, they would lack impenetrability or inertial mass, the
possession of which is often thought to be a necessary condition of
something's being a material substance. Hence, two objects of this kind can
7
See Ernest Sosa, "Subjects Among Other Things," Philosophical Perspectives, 1,
Metaphysics (1987), pp. 155-187.
8
CHAPTER 2
See John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.
140-141.
79
move towards each other, then totally interpenetrate, and then move away
from each other, more specifically, they can pass through one another. Thus,
two such objects can occupy the same place at the same time. According to
this example, possibly, there is a universe consisting of two objects of this
sort which occupy the same places at the same times and which at those
times have the same intrinsic qualitative properties. Surely, these two
objects have the same qualitative properties, including relational ones.' The
second example presupposes that there could be either nonspatial Cartesian
spirits or nonspatial Humean impressions,' and maintains that possibly,
there is a universe consisting of two nonspatial spirits or two nonspatial
impressions, x and y, such that: throughout their existence, x and y have the
same intrinsic qualitative properties, for instance, the same intrinsic
qualitative mental features or experiential characteristics. Clearly, x and y
have the same qualitative properties, including those which are relational.
In the light of the foregoing examples, it is highly plausible that there
could be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. However, Ian
Hacking claims that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not there
could be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars." He argues that
natural laws and theories of space and time are intimately interconnected,
and these theories are underdetermined by empirical evidence. According
to Hacking's argument, the descriptions 'at t the universe is a highly curved
Riemannian space containing just one sphere' and 'at t the universe is a
Euclidean space containing two spheres with the same qualitative properties'
are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe. Hacking infers that
no possible world must be described as containing two objects having the
same qualitative properties. For Hacking, the alternative description we
Actually, according to a current physical theory some fundamental particles exhibit a

phenomenon known as transparency: under certain conditions two fundamental particles of a
certain kind can "pass through" one another, occupying for a moment the very same place.
10
See Rea Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations II and VI. Compare
David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford, 1888), Part IV, Section V,
p. 233. Nonspatial Humean impressions seem to be either nonspatial concrete events or
nonspatial tropes.
"
Ian Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp.
249-256.
80
CHAPTER 2
choose to apply to a possible universe is largely a matter of taste, and if we

wish, we can adopt a meta-principle to the effect that no possible universe
should be described as containing two objects having the same qualitative
properties. As Hacking says, such a meta-principle
is not true in each possible world. It is true
about possible worlds. It is a meta-principle
about possible descriptions.
Hacking's argument depends on his contention that the two aforementioned descriptions are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe.
But this contention is unintelligible. No possible universe is such that both
of these descriptions apply to it. The first of these descriptions applies to a
possible world with a Riemannian space containing only one sphere, and the
second of these descriptions applies to another possible world with a
Euclidean space that contains two spheres. Consequently, Hacking's
argument should be rejected. Thus, we are entitled to assume that there
could be two particulars which have the same qualitative properties. I2
Since an adequate criterion of individuation for particulars provides
logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the diversity of particulars
at a time, this criterion must apply not merely to actual cases of particulars
which are diverse at a time, but to all possible cases. Hence, a criterion of
individuation must be adequate to the possibility of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, at least in the case of the two Max Black variants. Of
course, if the more controversial examples of qualitatively indistinguishable
particulars are possible, then a criterion of individuation must be adequate
to those examples too. With respect to each of the kinds of entity involved
in these examples, namely, spatial objects which can literally interpenetrate
one another, nonspatial spirits, or nonspatial Humean impressions, one can
question whether it is possible for there to be entities of that kind. In each
81
instance, it seems that an affirmative answer to such a question implies the

possibility of the corresponding example of two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. Are entities of the three kinds in question possible? They
appear to be. In any case, the burden of proof is on those who believe that
entities of these kinds are impossible. They need to provide good reasons
for thinking that entities of these kinds are unintelligible. Joshua Hoffman
and I have replied to arguments purporting to show that nonspatial spirits are
unintelligible. Hence, there is some reason to require that a criterion of
individuation be adequate to the more controversial 'examples. Even if we
ought to suspend judgement on the possibility of these examples, all other
things being equal, a proposed criterion of individuation which is compatible
with their possibility is epistemically preferable to a proposal which is not.
Nevertheless, in arguing for my solution to the problem of individuation, I
will follow the most conservative course I can with respect to these
controversial examples. I shall not reject competing proposals on the ground
that they cannot accommodate these controversial cases, but I will require
that my own proposal adequately handles them. This course is more than
fair to the opposition.
Furthermore, although I shall presuppose that there could be particulars,
I will remain neutral about what kinds of particulars there could be. More
specifically, I shall allow not only for the possibility of substances (for
example, material objects and spirits), but also concrete events, places, and
tropes (these latter being concreta such as the particular wisdom of Socrates
or that particular redness). Max Black's example and its variants envision
the possibility of two spherical material objects which are qualitatively
indistinguishable. It should be noted that these examples can be reinterpreted or reformulated in terms of the possibility of two spherical places,
events, or tropes that are qualitatively indistinguishable.
12
For an argument in support of the assumption that there could be two qualitatively
indistinguishable particulars, and criticisms of Hacking's attack on this assumption see Robert
Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp.
5-26. Additional criticisms of Hacking may be found in Ronald Hoy, "Inquiry, Intrinsic
Properties, and The Identity of Indiscernibles," Synthese, 61 (1984), pp. 275-297, which I draw
on in my own discussion of Hacking.
13
Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffinan, "Are Souls Unintelligible?" Philosophical
Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212.
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82
III - PROPOSED CRITERIA OF INDIVIDUATION

All things counter, original, spare, strange; whatever is
fickle, freckled (who knows how?)..."
(1877 G. M. Hopkins Pied Beawy)
According to a qualitative criterion of individuation, a particular is

individuated at a time by a qualitative property it has at that time. In formal
terms:
(P0) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There
exists a qualitative property Q such that: (i) at t x exemplifies Q, and
(ii) at t y does not exemplify Q.
(P0) is an implication of Leibniz's view that qualitatively indiscernible
particulars are identical?' (P0) fails to provide a logically necessary
condition for the diversity of particulars at a time, since it is possible that at
a time two particulars have the same qualitative properties. Hence, (P0)
should be rejected. Thus, the demand for a criterion of individuation seems
to rest on something like the following three premises.
(i) There could be two particulars, each of which have the same qualitative
properties.
(ii) For each of these particulars, there would be some fact about it that
accounts for or explains its diversity from any other particular.
(iii) In the case of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, this fact can
only be that each particular has either a nonqualitative property, or has
a relationship to some other particular, that any other particular lacks
83
x or y to a third entity z, whereas a nonontological response does not make

such an attempt. I call a response of the former sort ontological because the
attempt it makes to explain the diversity of x and y is ontologically
committed to the existence of a third entity. On the other hand, I call a
response of the latter sort nonontological because it does not attempt to
explain the diversity of x and y by postulating the existence of any third
entity: such a response has no ontological implications beyond the existence
of x and y. An ontological response accepts premises (i), (ii), and (iii) stated
above, but a nonontological response rejects either premise (ii) or (iii).
According to a nonontological response, the diversity of x and y either has
no explanation or can be explained without relating x or y to a third entity
z.
The failed attempt to provide a qualitative criterion of individuation in
(P0) is an example of an ontological response, since it seeks to explain the
diversity of x and y by relating x and y to a third entity z, namely, a
qualitative property. In this case, x and y are related to z by the relations of
exemplification and its complement, respectively.
Other than a qualitative criterion, there are ten types of responses to the
problem of individuation that need to be considered. Of these, eight are
ontological responses, and two are nonontological responses.
The first of the ontological responses is a material criterion. According to
such a criterion, a particular is individuated at a time by the quantity or
portion of stuff which constitutes it at that time, for example, a portion of
material stuff such as iron, wood, water, or air. Put formally:
exists a quantity of stuff S such that: (i) at t x is constituted by S, and
(ii) at t y is not constituted by S.'
15
In very general terms, there are two sorts of responses to the problem of
individuation: an ontological response, and a nonontological response. An
ontological response attempts to explain the diversity of x and y by relating
14
See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, section 8.
Why is the material criterion formulated as it is, rather than as follows? (P1') At time
t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a quantity of stuff Si and a
quantity of stuff S2, such that: (i) at t x is composed of SI, and (ii) at t y is composed of S2,
and (iii) S/#S2. (P1) has two advantages over (P1'). Firstly, (P1) is more economical than
(P1'). Parallel considerations apply to (P0) and to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5), (P6), and (P8) below.
Secondly, (P1') seems vulnerable to a charge of vicious conceptual circularity to which (P1) is
immune: since a quantity of stuff composing a particular is itself a particular, it appears that
clause (iii) of (P1') employs the very concept that (P1') attempts to explicate, viz., the concept
CHAPTER 2
84
85
(P1) resembles the thomistic view that a body is individuated at a time by

its quantity of matter at that time."
A second ontological response is a substratum criterion. A substratum is
a propertyless or "bare" particular. According to substratum theory, any
ordinary particular, that is, one which has certain properties, consists of a
time by the place it occupies at that time."

The fourth ontological response is a mereological criterion. According to
a criterion of this kind, concrete entities are individuated at a time by the
parts they have at that time. More piecisely:
bare particular combined with those properties. The notion of a substratum
(P4) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular); =df. There

exists a particular P such that: (i) at t P is a proper part of x, and (ii)
at t y does not have P as a proper part.
is similar to the notion of formless matter suggested to some by Aristotle's

form/matter distinction. According to a substratum criterion, a particular is
individuated at a time by the substratum which supports it at that time. In
precise terms:
exists a substratum S such that: (i) at t x is supported by S, and (ii)
at t y is not supported by S.
Gustav Bergmann and Edwin Allaire are examples of philosophers who seem
to accept a substratum or bare particular criterion."
A third ontological response is a locational criterion. According to such
a criterion, a concrete entity is individuated at a time by the place which it
occupies at that time. Specifically:
exists a place L such that: (i) at t x occupies L, and (ii) at t y does not
occupy L.
(P3) recalls the traditional view, defended by contemporary philosophers
such as Keith Campbell, that an individual substance is individuated at a
of the diversity of particulars at a time. Parallel considerations apply to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5),
and (P7) below.
16
See St. Thomas Aquinas, Concerning Being and Essence, George G. Leckie, trans.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 3-38.
17
Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: University

of Wisconsin Press, 1967), and Edwin Allaire, "Bare Particulars" in M. Loux, ed., Universals
and Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 235-244.
I do not know of a philosopher who defends a mereological criterion.

The fifth ontological response is a causal criterion. According to such a
criterion, particulars are individuated at a time by their causes or effects.
Formally stated:
(P5) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Either (i)
there exists a particular z such that: (a) at t z is a cause of x, and (b)
at t z is not a cause of y, or (ii) there exists a particular z such that:
(a) at t z is an effect of x, and (b) at t z is not an effect of y.
(P5) reminds us of Donald Davidson's view that a concrete event El is
identical with a concrete event E2 if and only if El and E2 have the same
causes and effects.' 9 (P5) is also similar to a related view of William
Mann's that a trope TI is identical with a trope T2 just provided that TI and
T2 have the same causes and effects? ) According to Davidson, concrete
events are the relata of the causal relation. However, Mann holds that tropes
are relata of the causal relation. Others have thought that substances are
18 Keith
Campbell, Body and Mind (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 44-45.
19Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in Honor

of C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234.
20 See William Mann, "Epistemology Supernaturalized," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985),
436 456. Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Necessity, Contingency, and Mann," Faith and
Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 457-463, and William Mann, "Keeping Epistemology Supernaturalized: A Reply To Rosenkrantz," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 464-468.
pp.
CHAPTER 2
relata of the causal relation.'

The sixth ontological response is a tropal criterion. According to a
criterion of this kind, particulars are individuated at a time by the concrete
"properties" or tropes they possess at that time. In formal terms:
(P7) is reminiscent of a thesis that seems to have been held by Jack Meiland:
that it is spatial relations between bodies which individuate them.'
Here, is another example of a relational criterion: At time t, a particular x
is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x bears to y the relation of u being
possibly such that u has a property, P, at a time t* and v lacks P at t". 24
The final ontological response is a haecceity criterion, often attributed to
Duns Scotus. According to a criterion of this kind, a particular is individuated at a time by a haecceity it has at that time. Namely:
86

exists a trope T such that: (i) at t x possesses T, and (ii) at t y does
not possess T.
A tropal criterion appears to have been endorsed by G. F. Stout. 22
The seventh ontological response is a relational criterion. According to
a criterion of individuation of this sort, particulars are diverse at a time
because one bears a qualitative relation to the other at that time. Such a
relation is irreflexive: it is a relation which nothing can bear to itself.
Otherwise, the criterion does not provide a logically sufficient condition for
the diversity of particulars at a time, and should be rejected for that reason.
Examples of relations which appear to be irreflexive include x being to the
left of y, x being spatially apart from y, and x being a soul which couldn't
be directly aware of a mental state of a soul y. A relational criterion might
be formulated in this way:
(P7) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x
bears the relation of spatial apartness to y.
' For example, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II,
Chap XXII. According to Locke: "Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the
substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes; and
the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas [qualities] which are
introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects." Compare George
Berkeley's use of the related notion that there are agent causes, i.e., spiritual substances which
are efficient or active causes. See Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,
Second and Third Dialogues.
22 See G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular,"
symposium in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122. On
Stout, see Maria van der Schaar, G. F. Stout's Theory of udgement and Proposition (University
of Leiden, 1991), especially pp. 120-122, and p. 164..
87
(P8) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y = df. There

exists a haecceity H such that: (i) at t x exemplifies II, and (ii) at t
y does not exemplify H.
Compare (P8) and the following proposal.
(PW) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There
exists a nonqualitative property N such that: (i) at t x exemplifies N,
and (ii) at t y does not exemplify N.
Apparently, there are philosophers who would prefer (P8') to (P8). Such
philosophers either doubt or deny the existence of nonqualitative haecceities,
but nonetheless believe that a particular is individuated by its having a
nonqualitative property other than a haecceity. A nonqualitative property of
this kind might be a relational property such as being in that place, or being
to the left of that sphere, or being diverse from that sphere, or being
possibly to the left of that sphere, or being capable of direct awareness of
a mental state of mine.
However, there is good reason to think that (P8') is not preferable to (P8),
as the following argument shows.
23
See Jack Meiland, "Do Relations Individuate?" in M. Loux, ed., Universals and
Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 258-263.
24 Ù ,
and
are (of course) variable letters.
CHAPTER 2
88
(1) Necessarily, a property is nonqualitative if and only if it pertains to a

particular.
Given our understandings of the notions of a nonqualitative property and of
a property's pertaining to a particular, it is obvious that (1) is true.
(2) Necessarily, there is a nonqualitative property which pertains to
a particular, x, if and only if there is a haecceity which could be had
by x.
For example, surely, if there is a nonqualitative relational property such as
being next to Jones, then there is a nonqualitative relational property such as
being identical with Jones, and vice-versa. As examples of this kind
indicate, (2) is highly plausible.
(3) Necessarily, if there is a haecceity which could be had by a particular,
then every particular has a haecceity.
(3) is extremely plausible: considerations of parity, deriving from a need for
logical generality, seem to demand that if there is a haecceity exemplified by
a particular, or which can be exemplified by a particular, then every
particular exemplifies a haecceity. If H is a haecceity which is, or could be,
exemplified by a particular, then there must be a true singular existential
proposition of the form `0(3x)(x=a)' which asserts the possibility of there
being something which is identical with the particular in question. As I have
argued, Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning that propositions
have truth-values, logical entailments, modal features, and so forth.' In
that case, considerations of logical comprehensiveness like those discussed
earlier seem to require that if there is a true singular existential proposition
asserting the possibility of a particular's existence in one case, then there
must be a true singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of a
particular's existence in every case. But it appears that if there is a true
singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of there being
25
See Chapter 1, section III.
89
something which is identical with a certain particular, then there must be a

haecceity, a property of the form 'being identical with a', which could be
exemplified by the particular in question. Thus, it seems that necessarily, if
there is a haecceity which could be had by a particular, then every particular
has a haecceity.
(4) Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a haecceity, then x has a nonqualitative property.
Since it is evident that a particular's haecceity is a nonqualitative property,
it is clear that (4) is true. (1), (2), and (3) together entail that
Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property, then x has a
haecceity.
The latter entailment and (4) together imply that
(5) Necessarily, a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property if and only
if x has a haecceity.
Since (5) entails that (P8) and (P8') are necessarily equivalent, we should
conclude that (P8') commits us to the existence of nonqualitative haecceities,
just as (P8) does. Consequently, if one doubts the existence of nonqualitative haecceities, then this doubt should not lead one to prefer (P8') to (P8).
Rather, it should lead one to doubt both (P8') and (P8). As far as I can see,
(P8') is not preferable to (P8), and in any case the question of which one of
them is preferable is unimportant. For the sake of convenience, I shall
concentrate on (P8) rather than (P8').
The remaining two responses to the problem of individuation are
nonontological. The first of these nonontological responses is a nonontological criterion. According to such a criterion, the diversity of concrete
entities x and y at a time is analyzed or explained in terms of x's being
irreflexively related to y in some manner. It is required that the manner in
which x is related to y be irreflexive for reasons paralleling those which
require that the relation used in a relational criterion be irreflexive. A
90
CHAPTER 2
nonontological criterion might be formulated in this fashion:

(P9) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is
spatially apart from y.
Notice that a nonontological criterion, unlike an ontological criterion, does
not individuate a particular x from a particular y by relating x to a third
entity z. 26 Since (P9) does not individuate a particular x from a particular
y by relating x to a property, relation, or any other sort of abstract entity,
(P9) is compatible with Nominalism.
The second nonontological response to the problem of individuation is that
there is no criterion of individuation. According to this response, the
diversity of particulars at a time is primitive or unanalyzable. In other
words, the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact, that is to say, a
fact that has no explanation?'
Material, substratum, locational, mereological, causal, tropal, relational,
and haecceity criteria qualify as ontological responses, because they attempt
to explain the diversity of particulars x and y by relating x and y to a third
entity z. For instance, on a material criterion, x and y are individuated by
relating them to another particular, namely, the quantity of stuff constituting
x. In this case, the relevant relationships are those of constitution and its
complement. On a substratum criterion, x and y are individuated by relating
them to another particular - the substratum of x. Here the relationships in
question are those of support and its complement. On a locational criterion,
x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular, namely, the
place x occupies. In this instance, the relationships involved are those of
occupation and its complement. On a mereological criterion, x and y are
individuated by relating them to another particular - a proper part of x. In
two other examples of nonontological criteria: (1) At time t, a particular x is

diverse from a particular y at t, x is not spatially coincident with y; and (2) At time t, a
particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is possibly such that (i) x occupies a place,
p, at some time, 0, and (ii) y does not occupy p at t*.
26 Compare
27 See
Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles". Black seems to argue that particulars
have no criterion of individuation.
91
this case, the relevant relationships are those of being a proper part and its
complement. On a causal criterion, x and y are individuated by relating
them to another particular, namely, a cause or an effect of x. Here it is the
relationships of cause and effect and their corresponding complementary
relationships which are brought into play. On a tropal criterion, x and y are
individuated by relating them to another particular - a trope of x. In this

instance, the relationships in question are those of possession and its
complement. On a relational criterion, x and y are individuated by relating
them to another entity, an abstractum, namely, a qualitative irreflexive
relation. In this case, the pertinent relationships are those of bearing and its
complement. On a haecceity criterion, x and y are individuated by relating
them to (another) entity which is abstract - a haecceity had by x. Here it is

the relationships of exemplification and its complement that are involved.
On the other hand, both a nonontological criterion, and the claim that there
is no criterion of individuation, are nonontological responses, because these
replies do not seek to explain the diversity of x and y by relating x or y to
a third entity z. Finally, it should be noted that a material, substratum,
locational, mereological, causal, or tropal criterion, as well as a nonontological response, is consistent with Nominalism, whereas a qualitative,
relational, or haecceity criterion presupposes Realism.
What of the reply that the diversity of particulars at a time has no
explanation? As a rule, when an explanation of X is requested, we are
entitled to assume that there is some way in which X can be explained,
unless we are given a good reason for supposing otherwise. Therefore, we
are entitled to assume that there is some way in which the diversity of
particulars at a time can be explained, unless we are given a good reason for
supposing otherwise. In other words, there is a prima facie presumption in
favor of (B2). This prima facie presumption is defeated if a cogent
argument is presented which implies that there is no adequate account of the
diversity of particulars at a time. The claim that the diversity of particulars
at a time is a brute fact is acceptable only if all available explanations of the
diversity of particulars at a time are undermined.
In what follows, I shall argue that a haecceity criterion ought to be

accepted as the result of an inference to the best explanation, on the grounds
92

CHAPTER 2
that there are decisive objections to all of the other criteria, and no
successful objection to a haecceity criterion.
93
IV - PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION FOR THE
PROPOSED CRITERIA
"That is to prove the same by the same, or else to argue circularly."
(1651 Baxter Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Church Membership
and Baptism 35)
I begin by setting forth principles for evaluating the preceding proposals for
a criterion of individuation. Those proposals seek to provide a formal
principle of individuation for entities belonging to a certain very general
ontological category - the category of Particular or Concretum. Since a
criterion of individuation for concreta is an analysis of the diversity of
concreta at a time, a proposed criterion of individuation for concreta is
inadequate if it possesses any of the following five defects.
(1) The proposal fails to provide a logically necessary condition of the
diversity of concreta at a time.
(2) The proposal fails to provide a logically sufficient condition of the
diversity of concreta at a time.
(3) The proposal is conceptually circular. Such conceptual circularity
occurs just when there is an attempt to analyze a concept in terms of itself:
a purported analysis, A, of a concept, X, is conceptually circular if and only
if X is employed in A's analysans. For example, the following proposed
analysis is (obviously) conceptually circular:
A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is diverse from
y at t,
Given that an analysans, 1 , could be grasped, it is plausible that a concept,
X, is employed in Y just in case necessarily, if a person, S, grasps Y, then S
grasps X. Since an analysis provides a certain kind of explanation of what
is analyzed, and since it is impossible that something help explain itself, it
is impossible that an explanation be circular. Consequently, conceptually
circular analyses are viciously circular. It follows that a purported analysis
7
of the diversity of particulars at a time suffers from vicious conceptual
circularity of the sort in question if and only if it employs the concept of the
94
CHAPTER 2
diversity of particulars at a time in its analysans.

(4) The proposal exhibits familial triviality. A purported analysis, A, of
a concept, X, suffers from familial triviality just when A's analysans employs
another concept Y such that X and Y belong to a family of logically
interrelated concepts whose members stand equally in need of analysis. Two
concepts belong to such a family only if a logically necessary and sufficient

condition for either concept can be stated by employing just the other
concept and logical notions. For instance, the concepts of de dicto
possibility, necessity, and impossibility form a family of this kind. Thus, it
is trivial to propose an analysis of one of these modal concepts in which
another one of these modal concepts is employed in the analysans.
Likewise, the notions of the diversity of particulars at a time and the identity
of particulars at a time form a family of logically interrelated concepts
whose members stand equally in need of analysis. Accordingly, a
particular's (x's) being nonidentical with a particular, y, at t is logically
necessary and sufficient for x's being diverse from y at t, and x's being
nondiverse from y at t is logically necessary and sufficient for x's being
identical with y at t. Therefore, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity of
particulars at a time in which the concept of the identity of particulars at a
time is employed in A's analysans is trivial. For instance, the analysis
proposed below is trivial:
A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is not identical
with y at t.
(5) The proposal presupposes circular individuation. For any ontological
category, C, an attempted explication, E, of the diversity at a time of
instances of C presupposes circular individuation if in every possible case E
seeks to explain two instances' of C being diverse (x and y's being diverse)
at any time, t, by relating x (or y) to another entity, z, which is an instance
of C at t, in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entails
that x#z (or y#z). In particular, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity of
concreta at a time has this defect if in every possible case A seeks to explain
two concreta x and y's being diverse at t by relating x or y to another
concretum z existing at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so
95
related entails that x#z (or y#z). In what follows, I give a formal statement
of conditions under which a proposed analysis of the diversity of particulars
at a time presupposes circular individuation, and explain why an analysis of
the diversity of particulars (x and y) at a time, t, cannot presuppose circular
individuation. A proposed analysis, A, of x's being diverse from y at t
presupposes circular individuation if A meets the following three conditions.
(CI) (i) It is possible that A's analysandum and A's analysans are
jointly satisfied, and (ii) Where being a G is a category, either A
has the structure: (S1) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular,
y, at t =df. There is a G, z, such that (i) x is related in way R to z at
t, and (ii) y is not related in way R to z at t, or A has the structure:
(S2) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df at t,
x is related in way R to y, and (iii) When A has structure (S1), it
is necessarily true that if A's analysandum and A's analysans are
satisfied, then z is a particular which is diverse from x (or y) at t;
and when A has structure (S2), it is necessarily true that if
A's analysandum and A's analysans are satisfied, then y is a
particular which is diverse from x at t.
Let me explain why an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time
cannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI). To begin with,
suppose that A is a proposed analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time
which satisfies (CI). In that case, A entails that if x and y are particulars,
then x is individuated from y by virtue of x's being related in a certain way
to something, z, at t (clause (ii) of (CI)), and z is a particular other than x
(clause (iii) of (CI)). If there are particulars, and if A explicates their
diversity at a time, then it follows that one particular is individuated from
another by virtue of a particular's being related in a certain way to another
particular which exists at that time. Specifically, when A has structure (Si),
a particular, x, is individuated from another particular, y, by virtue of x's
being related in a certain way at t to a third particular, z, and when A has
structure (S2), a particular, x, is individuated from a particular, y, by virtue
of x's being related in a certain way at t to y. However, p by virtue of q
entails that q helps to explain p. For example, if the car moves down the
CHAPTER 2
road by virtue of the car's wheels rotating, then this entails that the car's
wheels rotating helps to explain why the car moves down the road.
Therefore, if A is an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time, then
a particular's being related in a certain way to another particular at a time
helps to explain why a particular is diverse from a particular at a time. But
V - EVALUATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CRITERIA
96
this consequence is an impossibility. That a particular is related in a certain

way at a time to another particular could not help to explain the diversity of
particulars at a time, since any such attempt to explain the diversity of
particulars at a time seeks to explain a fact in terms of itself - something
which is viciously circular. This means that A's being an analysis of the
diversity of particulars at a time implies an impossibility. Since whatever
implies an impossibility is itself impossible, A could not be an analysis of
the diversity of particulars at a time. Hence, an analysis of the diversity of
particulars at a time cannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in
(CI).
It should be noted that a proposed criterion of individuation for particulars
can presuppose circular individuation without satisfying (CI). As we have
seen, a proposal which is an instance of (CI) is ruled out because a
particular's being related to another particular at a time could not help to
explain (in every case) the diversity of particulars at a time. Thus, a
proposal which implies that such a thing could help to explain (in every
case) the diversity of particulars at a time is inadequate. A proposal, X, is
inadequate for this reason if X meets two conditions. First, X's
analysandum and analysans could be jointly satisfied. Second, X's
analysans is a disjunction or conjunction one of whose disjuncts or
conjuncts is the analysans of a proposal which is an instance of (CI). A
proposal presupposes circular individuation if it either satisfies (CI) or is
a disjunctive or conjunctive proposal of the sort described above.
97
You dispute in a circle as all Logicians know."

(1647 H. More A Platonicall Song of the Soul
I. II. lxxx)
We now possess the tools to evaluate (P1)-(P9). I will argue that (P1)-(P7)
and (P9) do not provide a satisfactory criterion of individuation for
particulars, but that (P8) does provide such a criterion. Crucial to my
argument is the claim that (CI) militates against (Pi)-(P7) and (P9), but not
against (P8).
To begin with, note that most of our proposals for a criterion of
individuation for particulars have structure (Si), namely, (P1)-(P4), (P6), and
(P8). (P5) can also be grouped together with these, since its analysans is a
disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals which have structure
(S1). On the other hand, relational and nonontological criteria such as (P7)
and (P9) have structure (S2).
For the sake of argument, I grant that (P1)-(P9) satisfy clause (i) of (CI).
That is, I grant that in each of (P1)-(P9) the analysandum and the analysans
could be jointly met. The purpose of clause (i) of (CI) is to prevent a
proposal whose analysandum and analysans are not jointly satisfiable from
trivially satisfying (CI). Henceforth, we may ignore this clause of (CI).
Let us first consider relational and nonontological criteria, for example,
(P7) and (P9). Because proposals of these kinds have structure (S2), they
satisfy clause (ii) of (CI). In addition, since such a proposal's analysans
consists of a particular, x, that is irreflexively related to a particular, y, such
an analysans necessitates that x and y are diverse. Hence, proposals of these
sorts meet the requirements of clause (iii) of (CI) for proposals which have
structure (S2). Because relational and nonontological criteria satisfy all of
(CD's clauses, criteria of this kind presuppose circular individuation.'
28
If a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to an

irreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope, then
a criticism of the same kind applies to the modified criterion, as such a concrete "relation" is
also irreflexive.
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CHAPTER 2
The remaining proposals for a criterion of individuation are ontological in

character, that is, (P1)-(P6) and (P8). I aim to show that (P1)-(P6)
presuppose circular individuation, whereas the haecceity criterion, (P8), does
not presuppose circular individuation, and is otherwise unobjectionable. As
we shall see, my argument also generates counter-examples to a number of
these proposals. Based on these considerations, (P8) will be inferred as the
best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time.

With regard to (P1), it is necessarily true that a quantity of stuff which
constitutes a particular is itself a particular. Because (P1) covers anything
belonging to the category of particulars, it follows that such a quantity of
stuff itself falls under the scope of (P1). Therefore, inasmuch as (P1)
proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of stuff that
constitutes x, (P1) raises the specter of a quantity of stuff's constituting a
particular and this quantity of stuff's being itself constituted by a quantity of
stuff. Since the relevant relation of constitution can only hold between a
quantity of stuff and an object which is not a quantity of stuff, for instance,
as when a quantity of bronze constitutes a statue, such a state of affairs is
absurd. On the one hand, there could not be a quantity of stuff which is
constituted by another quantity of stuff. On the other hand, it is impossible
that there be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by itself Although we
may assume that there could be a quantity of stuff which is identical with
itself this is a quite different matter.

Because there could not be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by a
quantity of stuff, any two particulars which are quantities of stuff fail to
meet (P1)'s requirement that each of these particulars be constituted by a
quantity of stuff. Since there could be particulars, and since (P1) proposes
that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of matter which constitutes
x, it follows that (P1) fails to provide a logically necessary condition of the
diversity of particulars at a time.
It can now be argued that (P1) satisfies (CI). Because (P1) has structure
(S1), (P1) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'quantity of matter' being
substituted for `G'. We can demonstrate that (P1) satisfies clause (iii) of
(CI) by examining clause (i) of (P1). Clause (i) of (P1) says that at t a
quantity of stuff S constitutes a particular x. There are two crucial points
which relate to clause (i) of (P1) and which are based on the foregoing
99
critique of (P1). First, it is impossible that a quantity of stuff constitutes

itself Second, it is a necessary truth that if a quantity of stuff constitutes a
particular, then that quantity of stuff is a particular. Given these two points,
it is evident that clause (i) of (P1) necessitates that S is a particular which
is other than x. Therefore, it clear that (P1) satisfies the part of clause (iii)
of (CI) covering proposals having structure (Si). Inasmuch as (P1) satisfies
all of the clauses of (CI), (P1) presupposes circular individuation.
As we shall see below, similar arguments apply to (P2)-(P6). With
respect to (P2), it is a necessary truth that a substratum of a particular is
itself a particular. Due to the fact that (P2) covers anything which is a
particular, it follows that such a bare particular falls under the scope of (P2).
Hence, since (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a
substratum that supports x, (P2) confronts us with the strange prospect of a
substratum's supporting a particular and this substratum being itself
supported by a substratum. But such a state of affairs is incoherent. An
ordinary particular is alleged to be some sort of combination of a substratum
and properties. However, since a substratum is "bare", it seems that there
could not be a substratum which is itself some sort of combination of a
substratum and properties. Thus, there could neither be a substratum which
is supported by another substratum, nor be a substratum which is supported
by itself While some philosophers are willing to assume that there could be
a substratum which is identical with itself, this is something altogether
different.
Since there could not be a substratum which is supported by a substratum,
any, two particulars which are substrata fail to satisfy (P2)'s requirement that
each of them be supported by a substratum. Because there could be
particulars, and because (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by
a substratum which supports x, it follows that (P2) does not provide a
logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time.
I am now prepared to argue that (P2) satisfies (CI). Since (P2) has
structure (Si), (P2) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'substratum' being
substituted for 'G'. It can be shown that (P2) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) by
examining clause (i) of (P2). Clause (i) of (P2) says that at t a substratum
S supports a particular x. There are two key observations which relate to
clause (i) of (P2) and which derive from the preceding criticism of (P2).
Thron yliopis to
100
CHAPTER 2
First, it is impossible that a substratum supports itself. Second, it is

necessarily true that if a substratum supports a particular, then that
substratum is a particular. Given these two observations, it is clear that
clause (i) of (P2) entails that S is a particular which is diverse from x.
Thus, it is evident that (P2) meets the requirements which clause (iii) of (CI)
prescribes for proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P2) satisfies all
of (CI)'s clauses, (P2) presupposes circular individuation.
Moving on to (P3), it is necessarily true that a place occupied by a
particular is itself a particular. As (P3) covers every particular, we should
conclude that such a place falls within the scope of (P3). Thus, since (P3)
proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place which x occupies,
(P3) raises the bizarre prospect of a particular's occupying a place and this
place itself occupying a place. However, since the relevant relation of
spatial occupation can only hold between a nonplace and a place, for
example, as when a body or an event is in a place, a state of affairs of this
kind is absurd. For one thing, there could not be a place which occupies
another place. For another, it is impossible that there be a place which
occupies itself Although it may be assumed that there could be a place
which is identical with itself, this is a very different affair. It is also true
that every place is either a proper or improper part of some place, and stands
in spatial relations to other places, for example, relations of distance. But
these facts certainly do not imply that a place occupies (or is in) a place.
Inasmuch as there could not be a place which occupies a place, any two
particulars which are places do not meet (P3)'s requirement that each of
these particulars occupy a place. Since there could be particulars, and since
(P3) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place that x occupies,
we should conclude that (P3) fails to give a logically necessary condition of
the diversity of particulars at a time.
Now I am ready to argue that (P3) satisfies (CI). Because (P3) has
structure (S1), (P3) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'place' being substituted
for 'G' . We can see that (P3) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) through an
examination of clause (i) of (P3). Clause (i) of (P3) says that at t a
particular x occupies a place L. There are two crucial points which relate to
clause (i) of (P3) and which derive from the foregoing counter-example to
(P3). First, it is impossible that a place occupies itself. Second, it is a
101
necessary truth that if a place is occupied by a particular, then that place is

a particular. Given these two points, it is evident that clause (i) of (P3)
necessitates that L is a particular which is other than x. Consequently, it is
plain that (P3) satisfies the part of clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposals
having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P3) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI),
(P3) presupposes circular individuation.
The argument that (P4) satisfies (CI) is straightforward. Since (P4) has
structure (S1), (P4) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'particular' being
substituted for ' G' . We can verify that (P4) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) if we
examine clause (i) of (P4). Clause (i) of (P4) says that at t a particular P is
a proper part of a particular x. But it is impossible that a particular be a
proper part of itself. Hence, clause (i) of (P4) necessitates that P is a
particular which is other than x. Therefore, (P4) satisfies the conditions in
clause (iii) of (CI) pertaining to proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch
as (P4) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P4) presupposes circular
individuation.
Notice that (P5) is the only one of our proposals whose analysans consists
of a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals. Specifically, the
first disjunct of (P5)'s analysans concerns causes, and the other disjunct of
(P5)'s analysans concerns effects. There is a rather direct argument that the
proposals corresponding to (P5)'s first and second disjuncts satisfy (CI).
Because these proposals have structure (S1), they satisfy clause (ii) of (CI),
with 'particular' being substituted for ' G' in each case. We can confirm that
these two proposals satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) by examining clause (a) of
(P5)'s first disjunct and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Clause (a) of
(P5)'s first disjunct says that at t a particular z is a cause of a particular x,
and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct says that at t a particular z is an
effect of a particular x. However, it is impossible that a particular be a
cause (effect) of itself. Therefore, clause (a) of (P5)'s first disjunct necessitates that z is a particular which is diverse from x, and likewise for clause
(a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Hence, the proposals corresponding to (P5)'s
first and second disjuncts meet the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI) covering
proposals having structure (S 1). Since the proposals corresponding to (P5)'s
first and second disjuncts satisfy all of the clauses of (CI), these proposals
presuppose circular individuation. But if a proposal, X, presupposes circular
,
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CHAPTER 2
individuation, then so does a proposal, Y, meeting the following two

conditions. First, Y's analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable.
Second, Y's analysans is a disjunction of X's analysans and the analytical
portion(s) of one or more other proposals. Because (P5) is a proposal
whose analysans is a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals
which presuppose circular individuation, and because the analysandum and
analysans of (P5) are jointly satisfiable, (13 5) presupposes circular individuation.
Finally, let us consider the reasons for thinking that (P6) satisfies (CI).
According to a theory of tropes, a trope is a "property" or "relation" that is
a concrete individual, for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, or that
particular squareness. If a concrete individual, x, possesses a trope, T, then
either (i) in an intuitive sense T is in x, or (ii) T is a proper part of x. For
example, either (i) the particular wisdom of Socrates is in Socrates in
something like the way Aristotle seems to have thought, or (ii) the particular
wisdom of Socrates is a proper part of Socrates, as maintained by those
philosophers who identify Socrates with a complex of tropes. However, it
is impossible for a concrete individual to be in itself in the intuitive sense in
question. (Of course, it is possible for a concrete individual to be identical
with itself, but that is an altogether different case.) Nor is it possible for a
concrete individual to be a proper part of itself. Hence, it is impossible that
a trope possesses itself. Furthermore, it is a necessary truth that a trope
possessed by a particular is itself a particular. Since clause (i) of (P6) says
that at t a particular x has a trope T, we should conclude that clause (i) of
(P6) entails that T is a particular which is other than x. Because (P6) has
structure (S1), (P6) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'trope' being substituted
for 'G' , and it follows that (P6) meets the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI)
covering proposals having structure (S 1). Inasmuch as (P6) satisfies all of
the clauses of (CI), (P6) presupposes circular individuation.'
Since (P8) has structure (S1), (P8) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with
`haecceity' being substituted for 'G' . But (P8) fails to satisfy the conditions
THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 103
in clause (iii) of (CI) which pertain to proposals having structure (Si). We

can appreciate (P8)'s failure to satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) if we study clause
(i) of (P8). Clause (i) of (P8) says that at t a particular x exemplifies a
haecceity H. However, a particular's haecceity is an abstract entity, and so
not a particular. Therefore, clause (i) of (P8) does not necessitate that H is
a particular which is other than x. Hence, (P8) does not meet the requirements of clause (iii) of (CI) for a proposal having structure (S1). Consequently, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI).
The moral of this story is that an attempt to individuate a particular qua
particular by relating it to another particular commits us to circular
individuation as specified in (CI), whereas trying to individuate a particular
qua particular by relating it to an abstract entity does not commit us to such
circular individuation. Analogously, an attempt to analyze the concept of the
diversity of particulars in terms of itself is conceptually circular, but trying
to analyze this concept in terms of the concept of the diversity of abstract
objects is not circular in this way. For example, it is conceptually circular
to claim that particulars x and y are rendered diverse at t by x and y's having
different particulars as proper parts at t, whereas it is not conceptually
circular in this way to claim that x and y are rendered diverse at t by x and
y's having different properties at t.
The fact that (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified
in (CI) is not (P8)'s only advantage. For one thing, on the assumption that
particulars have haecceities, there is no good reason to doubt that (P8)
provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition for the diversity of
particulars at a time. Indeed, (P8) can even accommodate the possibility of
the following sorts of particulars, which are exotic or whose possibility is
controversial: nonspatial souls, nonspatial Humean impressions, spatial
objects which literally interpenetrate one another, Boscovichian pointparticles, and random quantum events which have no causes or effects. In
contrast, criteria such as (P3), (P7), and (P9) which rely on spatial factors
cannot accommodate the possibility of nonspatial particulars, either souls or
Humean impressions, or spatial objects which literally interpenetrate one
.
another; a mereological criterion such as (P4) cannot accommodate the

29 If
a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to an

irreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope or
concrete "relation", then the modified criterion does not escape this sort of criticism, as it is
impossible that a trope be related to something by itself.
possibility of simple objects such as nonspatial souls or Boscovichian pointparticles; and a causal criterion such as (P5) cannot accommodate the
104
CHAPTER 2
possibility of random quantum events which have no causes or effects. Note

that if particulars of these kinds are possible, then (P3), (P7), (P9), (P4), and
(P5), respectively, fail to provide a logically necessary condition of the
diversity of particulars at a time."
Although an entity's haecceity is a relational property, an entity's intrinsic
nature includes its haecceity.' After all, the haecceity of an entity does not
pertain to anything other than that entity. Indeed, for every complex object,
x, there are relational properties of x which pertain to entities other than x
and which are components of x's intrinsic nature, namely, relational
properties of the form 'having y as a proper part'. Thus, in typical cases
some of the properties included within an entity's intrinsic nature are
relational. No matter how tempting it might be to do so, it would be wrong
to declare an entity's intrinsic nature nonrelational by definition.
Since an individual's intrinsic nature includes the haecceity of that thing,
(P8)'s explanation of an individual's (x's) being diverse from an individual,
y, in terms of the haecceity of x explains x's being diverse from y in terms
30
Recall that a recent theory in physics implies that two fundamental particles having the
same intrinsic qualitative properties can wholly coincide in space. As noted earlier, if this
theory is correct, then there is a possible world consisting of two spatially coincident particles
of this kind which have the same qualitative properties. Thus, premises drawn from empirical
science arguably lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities. In a similar
vein, on some interpretations of certain quantum mechanical theories, fundamental particles can
move in a spatially discontinuous manner. If fundamental particles can "leap" through space
in this way, then the most popular criterion of the identity over time of particles is mistaken,
that of spatio-temporal continuity. For an argument that such a criterion of identity through
time is mistaken (even if it is supplemented with causal constraints on temporal stages being
stages of the same body), see my and Joshua Hoffinan's Substance Among Other Categories:
A Conceptual Investigation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 5,
Section 9. That spatio-temporal continuity together with these causal constraints fails to furnish
a criterion of identity through time for fundamental particles suggests that haecceities are needed
to provide this criterion. Thus, there are reasons to suspect that theoretical developments in
empirical science lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities.
31 AII I mean by the intrinsic nature of a thing is the conjunction of all of a thing's intrinsic
properties, and an intrinsic nature of a thing is simply any intrinsic property of a thing. An
intuitively plausible example of an intrinsic property of some item is the property of being
square. An example of a nonintrinsic property of some item is the relational property of being
between a rock and a tree.
105
of an intrinsic nature of x. 32 But explaining x and y's being related in way,

W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is a natural mode of
explanation in cases of a certain kind. For instance, if a is related to b by
a's being taller than b, then a's being related to b in this way is explained
by certain facts about the intrinsic natures of a and b, say, that a is 6 feet
tall and b is 5 feet tall. A dyadic relation, R, holding between x and y may
be said to be supervenient if R could not cease to hold between x and y
(while x and y continue to exist) without there being a change in the intrinsic
nature of x or y. Clearly, being taller than is a supervenient relation. On
the other hand, distance is not a supervenient relation. However, diversity
qualifies as an (extreme case) of a supervenient relation: if diversity holds
between x and y, then it could not cease to hold between them (while they
continue to exist) without x and y's becoming identical, a most radical
change in their intrinsic natures! Furthermore, explaining x and y's being
related in way, W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is a
natural explanatory pattern when x and y's being related in way. W supervenes upon an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both). In addition, we have seen
that an entity's intrinsic nature includes its haecceity. It follows that (P8)'s
explanation of x's being diverse from y in terms of the haecceity of x is a
natural one.
321t
should be noted that since a haecceity is an individual essence, such an intrinsic nature
of x is also essential to x.
CHAPTER 2
VI - THE HAECCEITY CRITERION: NEITHER TRIVIAL

NOR CIRCULAR
particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself at a time.

In addition,
(C3) The diversity of particulars at a time cannot be analyzed in this
way, since any attempt to do so suffers from (familial) triviality.
Therefore,
(C4) A particular is not. individuated by its having a haecceity.
106
"This he explodes as a circle, and so derides it."

(1659 South. Sermons Preached Upon General
Occasions 1. 101)
"The triflingnes of this discourse, is much too
much enlarged."
[1581 Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie (Arb.) 71]
Despite (P8)'s advantages, some philosophers have rejected it on the ground

that it is trivial. Such a charge is based on the following argument, whose
first premise admits of several variations.
Argument C
(C1) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical
with a, and to say that a has this property is to say that a is identical
with a. 33
Consequently,
(C2)' If a particular is individuated by its having a haecceity, then the
diversity of particulars at a time can be analyzed in terms of a
33 For example, see Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," p. 206. Actually, Black's
protagonist claims that "All that you mean (my italics) when you say 'a has the property of
being identical with a' is that a is a." According to this claim, to say a has the property of
being identical with a is to say a is a, and vice-versa. However, notice that in some cases to
say p is to say q, and vice-versa, and in other cases, to say p is to say q, but not vice-versa. For
example, to say that something is green and round is to say that something is green and round,
and vice-versa, whereas to say that something is green and round is to say that something is
green, but not vice-versa. (Seemingly, if it is possible that someone says p, then to say p is to
say q just in case a person's saying p necessitates his saying q.) In (C1), it is claimed that to
say a has the property of being identical with a is to say a is a, but the converse is not claimed.
Hence, Black's protagonist's claim is stronger than the corresponding claim in (Cl). Moreover,
Black's protagonist's claim appears to be false, since to say that a has the property of being
identical with a is to say that something has a property, whereas to say that a is a is not to say
that something has a property. Clearly, though, this is no reason to reject the corresponding
claim in (C1). Furthermore, it is just as plausible that the latter claim implies (C2) as it is that
Black's protagonist's claim implies (C2). For these reasons, Argument C is the formulation of
choice for this sort of triviality objection.
107
My reply to Argument C begins with the observation that in (C1) the

expression 'to say that a is identical with a' is ambiguous. This expression
refers to either a relational statement that a is identical with a, or an
attributional statement that a is identical with a. The statement referred to
is relational if and only if that statement ascribes to a the qualitative
reflexive relation _ being identical with_, and the statement referred to is
attributional just in case that statement ascribes to a the nonqualitative
property (haecceity) of being identical with a. Since a haecceity, a so-called
relational property, is not a dyadic relation or two-termed abstract entity, like
Identity, but is rather a property, an abstract entity with but a single term,
the attributional statement that a is a cannot be identified with the relational
statement that a is a. More specifically, to make the attributional statement
that a is a is not to say what is said by making the relational statement that
a is a, and to make the relational statement that a is a is not to say what is
said by making the attributional statement that a is a. Nevertheless, either
an attributional statement or a relational statement can be made by uttering
the sentence à is identical with a'. Finally, there are parallel distinctions
which can be drawn between a relational thought (or belief) that a is a and
an attributional thought (or belief) that a is a.
Accordingly, if in (Cl) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a'
picks out an attributional statement, then (Cl) seems true, but adequate
reason has not been provided to believe that (C1) implies (C2); and if in
(C1) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a' picks out a relational
statement, then although (Cl) entails (C2), (C1) is false. Either way, we do
not have adequate reason to think that C is sound. Thus, Argument C does
not give us a good reason to believe that (P8) is trivial.
So, although it is trivial to propose analyzing the relation of diversity for
particulars in terms of a particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself,
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analyzing the former relation in terms of a particular's having a certain kind

of property might not be trivial in this way. The analysis of particulars'
being diverse at a time proposed in (P8) commits us only to there being an
analysis of the latter sort, as (P8)'s analysandum consists of a particular's
(x's) being related to a particular, y, by x's being diverse from y, and (P8)'s
analysans consists of x's having a certain property which y lacks.
In the following four variants of Argument C, (C1) is revised, but (C2)
and (C3) remain unchanged. According to the first variation, (C1) is
replaced with
(Cla) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical
with a, and this property is identical with the ordered pair of a and
the identity relation.
Is (Cla) acceptable?' A number of considerations speak against (Cla).
First of all, a haecceity is a property and an ordered pair is a set. Yet, it is
intuitively plausible that Property and Set are nonoverlapping categories of
abstracta. Hence, it seems that (C1 a) is false. In other words, it can be
argued plausibly that the identification of a haecceity with an ordered pair
is an example of a Rylean category mistake. Moreover, the following related
line of reasoning implies that (C1 a) is false. Necessarily, a haecceity is a
property which can be exemplified, but it is impossible that a set (an ordered
pair) be exemplified; and necessarily, an ordered pair is a set which has
elements, but it is impossible that a property (haecceity) has elements. For
these reasons, it is a necessary truth that a haecceity and an ordered pair
have different characteristics. It follows that there could not be a haecceity
which is identical with an ordered pair of the identity relation and an object.
Thus, (Cla) should be rejected, along with the corresponding revised version
34 According
to some philosophers, a haecceity may be represented (in a model) by the

ordered pair of the identity relation and an object. For example, see Felicia Ackermann, "Proper
Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies, 35
(1979), pp. 55-69. However, a haecceity's being represented in a model by such an ordered pair
does not imply that a haecceity can be identified with an ordered pair of this kind. After all,
a thing can be used in a model to represent something other than itself: what is represented
depends upon the intended interpretation of the model.
109
of Argument C.
The second variation on Argument C replaces (C1) with
(Clb) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical
with a, and this property is identical with a collection (sum) of a
and the identity relation.
It would appear that (C1 b) is unacceptable. For one thing, (Clb) is untrue
if Property and Collection are nonoverlapping ontological categories, and it
is intuitively plausible that this is so. Moreover, the following related
argument entails that (Clb) is untrue. Necessarily, a haecceity is an abstract
entity, and an abstract entity does not have a particular as a part. Thus, a
nonqualitative haecceity does not have a particular as a part. However,
necessarily, a collection of a particular, a, and the identity relation, has a
particular as a part. It follows that necessarily, a nonqualitative haecceity
and a collection of a particular and the identity relation have different
properties. Hence, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with a
collection (sum) of the identity relation and a particular. Therefore, (Clb)
and the corresponding version of Argument C ought to be rejected.
According to the third variation on Argument C, (C1) is replaced with
(Clc) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical
with a, and this property is identical with the property of being an
x such that x is identical with a.
A proponent of this variant presupposes that the phrase 'x is identical with
a' as it occurs in (C1 c) ascribes the qualitative dyadic relation of identity.
Should we accept (Cl c)? One argument which supports (Cl c) is based
on the following two premises.
(a) The property of being identical with a and the property of being an x
such that x is identical with a are necessarily coinstantiated.
(b) If a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, then
A=B.
110
(b) represents a coarse grained view of property identity, and there is good
reason to reject such a view in favor of a fine grained view of property
identity. A fine grained view can be justified by appealing to the fact that
sometimes a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, but
it is nevertheless possible that a person grasps A without his grasping B. For
example, Trilaterality and Triangularity are necessarily coinstantiated, but a

person could grasp either without his grasping the other. In other words,
there could be a person who has the concept of a three sided closed plane
figure, but lacks the concept of a three angled closed plane figure, and
conversely. However, for any properties, x and y, if x is possibly such that
x has a certain property or bears a certain relation to a particular thing, when
y does not, then x#y. 35 It follows that Trilaterality and Triangularity are
different properties despite their necessary coinstantiation. Hence, property
identity is a fine grained affair. 36
According to Ernest Sosa, two properties can seem to differ in their
cognitive content, and yet be identical, if one of them is an analysis of the
other.' But this argument does not suggest that TrilateralityTriangularity.
After all, it is intuitively plausible that being a trilateral is not an analysis
of being a triangle, and vice-versa.
This intuition is supported by two arguments. First of all, if A is an
analysis of B, then A explains B. Since A explains B entails '-(B explains A),
if A is an analysis of B, then B is not an analysis of A. 38 However, the
claims that something is a triangle because it is a trilateral, and that
something is a trilateral because it is a triangle, appear to be epistemically
on a par. If one of these claims is more plausible than the other, then either
35
See Chapter 1, section VI.
36
For a defense of the claim that property identity is fine grained see Roderick Chisholm,
Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 117-120.
37
Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710. See
the discussion of Sosa's "Classical Analysis" in Chapter 1, section VI.
38
CHAPTER 2
(A explains B) entails (B explains A) whenever the sense in which it is said that A

explains B is the same as the sense in which it is said that B explains A - which is the case in
the example at hand.
111
(i) X is a closed plane figure with three straight sides because X is a

closed plane figure with three angles having straight sides,
is epistemically preferable to its converse, or vice-versa. But (i) is not
epistemically preferable to (i)'s converse, and (i)'s converse is not epistemically preferable to (i).
Second of all, Sosa's view implies that an analysis resolves a complex
attribute, A, into more fundamental structural units, namely, A's logical parts.
Two implications of such a view should be noted. (1) In an analysis, the
analysandum is a term, 7', which is neither conjunctive, disjunctive, nor
negative, but which represents a complex concept or attribute, P, involving
a conjunction or disjunction of factors, or a negation of a factor, et cetera.
(2) The complex, P, is represented in the analysandum as the simple, T,
because our initial grasp of P does not reveal P's conceptual or logical
complexity, inasmuch as we initially grasped P from a nonreflective intuitive
perspective. Thus, for Sosa, in an analysis, the analysandum is a nonconjunctive, nondisjunctive, and nonnegative term which is analyzed by a
complex term in the analysans which is conjunctive, disjunctive, negative,
and so forth. It is easy to see that this requirement is not met if one sets out
to analyze Triangularity as Trilaterality, or vice-versa. The terms representing these properties are either both noncomplex or both complex, and either
way Sosa's requirement is not satisfied. For these reasons, it is implausible
that Triangularity is analyzable as Trilaterality, and vice-versa. Thus, Sosa's
views on property identity do not suggest that Triangularity is identical with
Trilaterality. 39
Yet another way of justifying a fine grained view of property identity is
by appealing to the fact that sometimes a property A and a property B are
necessarily coinstantiated, but A involves an abstract object that B does not
involve.' If A involves an abstractum that B does not involve, then A and
,
39
From what he says in "Classical Analysis" there is reason to think that Sosa would concur
in this judgement.
40
A graspable property or proposition, P, involves a property, proposition, or relation, Q,

just in case P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P, grasps Q. On the other hand, if there
is a nongraspable property or proposition, P1, which shares a generic logical structure, K, with
112
CHAPTER 2
B differ in their intrinsic nature. For example, Trilaterality and Triangularity

are necessarily coinstantiated, but each involves an abstractum which the
other does not involve. In particular, the former involves the property of
being three-sided, whereas the latter does not, and the latter involves the
property of being three-angled, whereas the former does not. However, if
a property X involves a property, Z, and a property Y does not involve Z,
then X#Y, since if x has a certain attribute or bears a certain relation to a
particular thing, when y does not, then x#y. Hence, Trilaterality and
Triangularity are different characteristics, despite their necessary coinstantiation. Therefore, property identity is fine grained.
I am now prepared to argue that there is no reason to think that the variant
of Argument C based on (C1 c) is sound. In the first place, suppose for the
sake of argument that a person, S, could grasp the property of being identical
with a. In that case, it seems that S could grasp the former property without
S's grasping the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. That
is, it seems metaphysically possible that S has the relatively uncomplicated
concept of being identical with a without S's having the more sophisticated
concept of being an x such that x is identical with a, since the latter concept,
but not the former one, is a concept of being an x such that x is related in
a certain way to a. Utilizing a by now familiar pattern of argument, we may
conclude that the property of being identical with a and the property of
being an x such that x is identical with a seem not to be identical with one
another.
Furthermore, the property of being identical with a and the somewhat
gerrymandered property of being an x such that x is identical with a appear
to differ in their intrinsic logical structure. In particular, these properties
seem to involve different abstract objects: the latter property appears to
involve the dyadic relation of identity, but the former property seems not to
involve this relation. Employing a pattern of argument utilized earlier, it
again follows that being identical with a and being an x such that x is
a graspable property or proposition, P2, then it seems clear that PI involves abstracta of the
same kind as P2 involves. If an abstractum, Al, involves an abstractum, A2, then Al's
involving A2 is an intrinsic feature of Al. For example, in virtue of their internal structure, a
conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative property or proposition, P1, involves another property or
proposition, P2, which is a conjunct, disjunct, or negand of Pl.
113
identical with a appear to be different properties.

Since being identical with a and being an x such that x is identical with
a seem to be diverse based on the criteria of grasping and involvement,
(C1 c) appears to be false. It seems that these two properties are identical
only if either the former property is analyzable as the latter property, or viceversa. However, it does not appear to be true that something's being an x
such that x is identical with a is a philosophical analysis of something's
being identical with a. For one thing, this putative analysis does not seem
to have the required explanatory power: it may be trivial. After all,
something's being an x such that x is identical with a hardly seems to
explicate what it is for something to be identical with a. In addition, a
putative explication of this kind does not analyze the property of being
identical with a into logical parts, for instance, conjuncts, disjuncts, or the
like. Finally, a property such as being an x such that x is identical with a
appears to be in some sense a jury-rigged property which is less fundamental
than the property of being identical with a. Thus, it seems incongruous to
suppose that the property of being identical with a is analyzable as the
property of being an x such that x is identical with a. For all of the above
reasons, it does not appear to be true that the property of being identical with
a is analyzable as the property of being an x such that x is identical with a.
Accordingly, let us ask whether the latter property is analyzable as the
former one. The claim that the property of being an x such that x is
identical with a is analyzable as the property of 11 eing identical with a is also
open to question. This is because such a propos d analysis does not analyze
the former property into logical parts of the aforementioned sort. Thus, it
may be true that the necessary equivalence of being identical with a and
being an x such that x is identical with a is a mere equivalence, so that
neither one of these properties is an analysis of the other. If this is true,
then this state of affairs parallels the one which holds (I have argued) in the
case of Trilaterality and Triangularity. On the other hand, if the property of
being identical with a is a philosophical analysis of the property of being an
x such that x is identical with a, then the former property explicates the latter
one. In that case, although (Cl c) is true, we have been given no reason to
think that (Cl c) implies (C2). For all of the preceding reasons, I conclude
that there is no justification for believing that the variant of Argument C
1 14
CHAPTER 2
based on (Cie) is sound.'

As we have seen, the property of being identical with a is not a mereological compound, or an ordered set, of the relation of Identity and the object
a. Nor, as I have argued, is this property plausibly identified with a property
like being an x such that x is identical with a. Nevertheless, it might be
claimed that the property of being identical with a is a logical offshoot of
Identity and a, and has Identity and a as logical constituents or ingredients.

(By the way, this objection has the .consequence that the existence of the
property of being identical with a logically entails the existence of Identity
and a.) Accordingly, the fourth and final variation upon Argument C
replaces (Cl) with
(Cid) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical
with a, and this property has a and the relation of Identity as logical
constituents.
An advocate of (Cid) maintains that the idea behind this premise can be
understood from the fregean perspectives of linguistic expression, sense, and
reference. From the perspective of linguistic expression, a name such as
`being identical with a' is created from the predicate `_is identical with_'
by "plugging in" two names 'a' and 'bo' to produce the sentence 'a is
identical with b', "plucking out" 'a', and nominalizing the result. From the
perspective of sense, it is impossible to grasp the sense of 'being identical
with a' without grasping the senses of the identity predicate and the name
à'. From the perspective of reference, the compound relational property of
being identical with a derives from a's being "plugged" into the right hand
variable position in the relation, _being identical with_, resulting in the
monadic attribute _being identical with a. 42
41
If (Clc) is amended so that it proposes that the property of being identical with a=the
property of being an x such that x bears Identity to a, then an argument of the same kind
applies.
42This objection is based upon a criticism raised by an anonymous reviewer for Cambridge
University Press. Edward Zalta has used the term "plugging" to refer to a putative logical
analog of the linguistic operation of partially saturating a multi-place predicate with a name.
See Zalta's Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
115
In my reply, I consider the perspectives of expression, sense, and reference

in turn. In the first instance, the fact that a property-designating expression
has a certain structure does not provide a conclusive reason for thinking that
the property it designates has constituents corresponding to each of the parts
of that expression. Consider, for example, the expression 'being a believer
in Santa Claus'. This expression has the same general structure as 'being
identical with a'. Are we to conclude that Santa Claus is a constituent of a
compound property whose other constituent is the relation x being a believer
in y? It seems not. Since a property is not a linguistic entity, the determinants of a property's logical ingredients are to be found at a level deeper
than the superficial one of property-designating expressions and their
linguistic form. Accordingly, let us proceed, first, to the level at which
senses are grasped, and second, to the level of reference, which are such
(apparently progressively) deeper levels.
The crucial question about grasping is whether or not it is possible for a
person to grasp a's haecceity, being identical with a, prior to his grasping
the sense of the identity predicate, the two-term relation of Identity. As the
following discussion makes clear, it seems that this is possible. The
distinction I drew between the relational thought or belief that a is a and the
attributional thought or belief that a is a can be used to help us understand
such a possibility. If a person has an attributional belief that a is a, then he
attributes to a the property of being identical with a - a's haecceity. On the
other hand, if a person has a relational belief that a is a, then he relates a to
itself by attributing a two-place reflexive relation of Identity to a. Therefore,
it is possible that a person has an attributional thought that a is a without his
having a relational thought that a is a, and it is possible that a person has a
relational thought that a is a without his having an attributional thought that
a is a. Thus, it appears that to have an attributional thought that a is a is
not to have a thought of the reflexive two-place relation of Identity in which
one relates a to itself by attributing that relation. Rather, having the former
thought is having a thought of the property of being identical with a, and
attributing that property to a. Hence, it seems possible that at a time t a
person attributes a's nonqualitative haecceity to a without thereby grasping
1983).
CHAPTER 2
116
the qualitative reflexive relation of x being identical with y. Once this is

admitted, there is no reason whatsoever for saying that necessarily, such a
person grasps the Identity relation at a time earlier than t. Surely, there
could be a being whose first beliefs, including his initial beliefs about the
identity of things, consist of property-attributions, and who makes his first
relation attribution at a later date. (Indeed, this might be true in our own
-
case.) Such an individual's initial grasping of "identity" would occur within

the context of some attributional belief in which he attributes a haecceity to
something, for example, himself. At that point, the individual would not yet
have grasped the two-place reflexive relation of Identity, and would not yet
have had a relational thought in which he attributes this relation to
something. I conclude that from the perspective of the grasping of senses,
there is reason to believe that the Identity relation is not a logical ingredient
of (and is not involved in) a haecceity.
Finally, from the perspective of reference, it is of questionable coherence
to say that the property of being identical with a derives from a's being
"plugged" into the "right hand" variable position of the Identity relation.
How does a, a concrete entity, "plug into" the Identity relation, an abstract
entity? "Plugging" is not any intuitive or familiar relation which holds
between properties or relations and concreta. Since one place in a dyadic
relation can be "plugged" without "plugging" the other place, it is possible
for a relation to be "plugged" without its being exemplified. Thus,
"plugging" is not an exemplification relation of the sort that relations bear
to concreta. If the relevant conception of "plugging" is not to be a mystery,
an explanation of this conception is needed. But it is problematic whether
such an explanation is available. Furthermore, the notion that an abstract
entity has a concrete entity as a logical constituent or ingredient appears to
be unintelligible. To appreciate the difficulty of conceiving of a haecceity
as a relational property having Identity and an object as logical constituents,
consider the following argument.
(1) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a property.
(2) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is an abstract entity.
(3) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is a one-place or
monadic attribute.
117
Consequently,
(4) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a one-place or
monadic abstract entity.
Furthermore,
(5) Necessarily, for any x, if x is an abstract entity which consists
(logically speaking) of a two-place relation one of whose places is
"plugged" by an item, then x is a two-place abstract entity.
Therefore,
(6) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x does not consist,
logically speaking, of a two-place relation one of whose places is
"plugged" by an item.
We can now see that (a), (b), and (c), below, should be distinguished from
one another:
(a) _being identical with_ (Identity has two places, both of which are
"unplugged"),
(b) _being identical with a (A haecceity is a property and has one place),
and
(c) _being identical with a (Since this putative entity has two places
[one of which is "plugged" by a], it is not a property).
According to my argument, if Identity and a are logical constituents of the
property of being identical with a, then (b) is identical with (c). Since, as
I have argued, this implies a contradiction, I conclude that Identity and a are
not logical constituents of the property of being identical with a. For this
reason, it appears that the claim that a haecceity, is a relational property
having Identity and an object as logical ingredients is untenable. The
conception of haecceity embodied in this claim seems to be ill-conceived, or
of dubious coherence, for a haecceity which satisfies this conception
apparently exemplifies contradictory features characteristic of abstract entities
belonging to different ontological categories, that of Property and Relation.
For the preceding reasons, I believe that this conception of haecceity
involves a category mistake: a categorial confusion between a property and
a relation. Given such a conception, haecceities are fantastical and
CHAPTER 2
118
monstrous entities which seem even less intelligible than the singing and
dancing teapot depicted in Disney's animated film version of Beauty and the
Beast.' Now that we understand the serious problems faced by the idea
that a concretum's haecceity has Identity and a concretum as logical
constituents, it is clear that (Cid) and the corresponding version of Argument
C should be rejected.
It might be countered that although a partly "plugged" relation being
identical with a cannot be identified with a haecceity, a haecceity somehow
emerges from a partially "plugged" relation. In that case, a haecceity is
dependent upon a partly "plugged" relation, and perhaps a nonqualitative
haecceity is "constituted" by an object and such a relation in some sense.
However, a notion of an entity's emerging from another more basic entity
naturally arises in a domain of a certain kind. In particular, such a domain
has members which either (i) have spatial or temporal parts, or (ii) can
undergo a change in their intrinsic properties. For example, arguably, an ice
cube emerges from, and is in some sense constituted by, a quantity of water,
and arguably, a spherical surface emerges from, and is in some sense
dependent upon, a spherical object. In the first of these examples, the idea
seems to be twofold: (a) an ice cube cannot exist without a quantity of
water, but a quantity of water can exist without an ice cube, and (b) the
melting of the ice cube necessitates its destruction, but typically, the quantity
of water continues to exist after the ice cube melts. In the second of the
foregoing examples, the idea appears to be that a spherical surface is
somehow parasitical upon a spherical object. Whatever one might make of
such notions of emergence, they appear to be meaningless in a domain
whose members are immutable, that is to say, incapable of undergoing a
change in their intrinsic properties, and whose members have neither spatial
nor temporal parts. Yet, since haecceities are abstract properties, they belong
to a domain of this latter sort. 44 Therefore, the notion that a haecceity
somehow emerges out of a partly "plugged" relation seems to be senseless.
In the light of the foregoing arguments, there is no reason to think that a
119
viable explanation of a haecceity's derivation from Identity and an object is

available. The notion that haecceities are somehow "compounded" out of
Identity and objects can now be seen to be a rather implausible one. Why
is this notion as widely accepted as it is? A reasonable hypothesis is that the
notion results from a common tendency to conflate characteristics of a
property-designating linguistic expression and characteristics of the property
it designates.' More exactly, in the case of haecceities, there appears to
be a confusion of the features of a haecceity-designating linguistic expression, compounded out of the identity predicate and a name of an object, and
the features of the haecceity it designates. As we have seen, although a
haecceity is designated by a compound expression of this kind, the notion
that a haecceity is itself a compound of Identity and an object seems to be
groundless. Another possible source of the idea that an abstract object, in
this case a nonqualitative haecceity, is "built" or "constructed" by "combining" an object and a relation, is the notion that abstract properties are mental
constructs. However, this idea is incoherent: since a mental construct is a
concrete entity, namely, a mental state or the like, an abstractum cannot be
identified with such an entity.
A final objection can be stated as follows. In my definition of the concept
of haecceity given in Chapter 1, section IV, there is quantification into the
object-place of expressions for haecceities. According to this definition,
F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that (3x)(F is the property of
being identical with x).
But, the objection goes, "if a haecceity is not logically compounded of
Identity and an object, then we should not be able to quantib, into the objectplace in the compound predicate: it should be an inviolable logical unit."'
Hence, a haecceity is logically compounded of Identity and an object.
45
43
Cf. Chapter 1, section II, where it is argued that a "relational property" cannot be
identified with a relation, and that the sense in which such a property is "relational" can be
understood in terms of the sort of linguistic expressions which designate such properties.
44
1 quote an anonymous reviewer who read an earlier version of this book for Cambridge
University Press.
Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans.

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 97, 282.
See the discussion of these characteristics of abstracta in Chapter 1, section VIII.
46
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120
However, there is no reason to accept this argument, unless there is a true

general principle to the effect that whenever there is quantification into the
object-place of a compound predicate which is part of a referential
expression, the value of the quantified variable is a constituent of the referent
of that referential expression. Unfortunately for this objection, this general
principle is subject to a wide range of counter-examples of the following
sort.
(1) Suppose that Hillary=the wife of Bill. Then,
(3x)(3y)(x=Hillary & y=Bill & x is the wife of y).
But, it is false that Bill is a constituent of Hillary.
(2) The number 8-=the predecessor of the number 9. Hence,
(ax)(3y)(x=the number 8 & y=the number 9 & x is the predecessor of y).
Yet, it seems incoherent to say that the number 8 has the number 9 as a
constituent.
(3) Let S=the surface of the Earth. In that case,
(3x)(3y)(x=S & y=the Earth & x=the surface of y).
Surely, though, it is absurd to suppose that the surface of the Earth has the
Earth as a constituent.
(4) Finally, suppose that e=that event which is Jones's falling. In
consequence,
(3x)(3y)(x=e & y=Jones & x=the falling of y).
However, this consequence does not seem to provide us with a good reason
for rejecting Donald Davidson's view that an event does not have an object
as a constituent. 47 However, the aforementioned consequence should
47
See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," and "Events as Particulars," Nous,
IV (1970), pp. 25-32.
121
provide us with such a reason if it is true, as a general principle, that

whenever there is quantification into the object-place of a compound
predicate which is part of a referential expression, the value of the quantified
variable is a constituent of the referent of that referential expression. Hence,
it seems that this general principle is false.
Given the foregoing counter-examples to the general principle in question,
this principle should be rejected. Once this is recognized, we have no reason
to accept the proposition that if we can quantify into the object-place of
expressions for haecceities, then a haecceity has an object as a constituent.
Thus, we have not been presented with any evidence that my quantification
into the object-place of expressions for haecceities implies that a haecceity
has an object as a constituent. I conclude that the objection under discussion
is without merit.
Having surveyed a wide range of arguments which purport to imply that
(P8) suffers from familial triviality, and having found all of these arguments
deficient, I infer that there is no reason to believe that (P8) is guilty of this
charge.
Does (P8) suffer from vicious conceptual circularity? (P8) is viciously
circular just in case (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the diversity of
particulars at a time. Since the concept of this relation does not appear to
be employed in (P8)'s analysans, (P8) does not appear to be viciously
circular. (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the relation of diversity
for particulars only if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates his
having the concept of the relation of diversity for particulars. However, it
appears to be metaphysically possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysans
without his having the concept of the dyadic relation of diversity for
particulars. It might be objected that if a person grasps (P8)'s analysans,
then he must have some sort of general or singular conception of a
particular's (x's) being diverse from a particular y. I am not sure that this
premise is true, but it might be. In any case, the premise may be granted.
For it is possible that when a person has some sort of general or singular
notion of x's being diverse from y, this notion is attributional, and either
ascribes a concept of the nonqualitative property of being diverse from y to
x, or ascribes a concept of the qualitative property of being diverse from
something to x. Furthermore, there could be an individual who has an
CHAPTER 2
attributional conception of x's being diverse from y, but lacks a relational

conception of x's being diverse from y. Unlike ourselves, an individual of
this kind would fail to grasp the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars.
Hence, even if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates his having
some sort of general or singular concept of x's being diverse from y, it is
nevertheless possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysans without his
having a concept of the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars.
Therefore, it seems that (P8) does not suffer from vicious conceptual
circularity.
To recapitulate, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as
specified in (CI), and does not suffer from either familial triviality or vicious
conceptual circularity. As far as I can tell, the superficially plausible charge
that (P8) is in some sense trivial or circular is unjustified.
Let us take stock. As we have seen, proposal (P0) does not provide a
logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time,
proposals (P1)-(P4), (P6), (P7), and (P9) presuppose circular individuation
as delineated in (CI), and proposal (P5) presupposes circular individuation,
since (P5)'s analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and (P5)'s
analysans is a disjunction of the analytical parts of proposals which meet
(CI). Recall that a proposal, X, presupposes circular individuation if X
meets two conditions. Firstly, X's analysandum and analysans are jointly
satisfiable. Secondly, X's analysans has as a disjunct or conjunct the
analysans of a proposal which meets (CI). Therefore, if a proposal's
analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and the proposal's
analysans has one or more of the analytical parts of (P1)-(P7) or (P9) as a
disjunct or conjunct, then the proposal in question presupposes circular
individuation.
It follows that among all of the aforementioned proposals, including any
of these disjunctive or conjunctive ones, only (P8) is viable. As far as I can
see, the range of proposals reviewed is comprehensive enough that there is
no need for us to consider any other proposals. It is arguable that if none
of these proposals provides a criterion of individuation for particulars, then
the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact. 48 Thus, it seems that
(P8) can be inferred as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars at

a time, unless there is a plausible a priori objection to the possibility of
nonqualitative haecceities. Accordingly, the next order of business is to
address a priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities.
122
48
This seems to be Max Black's position in "The Identity of Indiscemibles".
123
124
CHAPTER 2
VII - RESPONSES TO A PRIORI OBJECTIONS TO

HAECCEITY
"Every attribute is what the ancients called an universal."
(1785 Reid
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 440)
"Quality is used as the generical name of every thing in objects,

for which a seperate notation is required."
[1829 JAS. Mill
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind

xiv. II. 60 (1869)]
A priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities imply that

a haecceity, an abstract property, has a feature which is incompatible with
Propertyhood or Abstractness. Given my arguments in favor of the existence
of nonqualitative haecceities, if these objections to the intelligibility of
nonqualitative haecceities can be answered, then the conclusion that
particulars have haecceities is warranted.
The first of these objections infers the impossibility of a particular's
having a haecceity from two premises.
(1) The haecceity of a concretum, x, is an abstract entity which consists
of two parts: the identity relation, and x, respectively.
(2) It is impossible that an abstractum has a concretum as a part.
An objection of this kind is unsuccessful for the following reasons. First
of all, how are we to understand (1)'s implication that an abstract entity and
a concretum are parts which together comprise the nonqualitative haecceity
of that concretum? Surely, they are not spatial or temporal parts of such an
abstract entity. Nor are they conjuncts, disjuncts, or any other sort of logical
part of a nonqualitative haecceity. It seems that the haecceity, H, of a
concretum, x, has x as a part only if H is some sort of collection or sum of
THE PROBLEM OF
INDIVIDUATION
125
the identity relation and x. 49 However, if (2) is true, then we should infer
that a collection which has a concretum as a part is not an abstract entity.
Because a haecceity is an abstract entity, it follows that the haecceity of a
concretum, x, cannot be identified with a collection of the identity relation
and x. Hence, if (2) is true, then (1) is false. Furthermore, since (2) is quite
plausible, it seems that (1) is false. For the foregoing reasons, the first of
these objections is unsound.
The response might be to revise (1) and (2) as follows.
(1') Although the haecceity of a concretum, x, does not have x as a part,
there is a sense in which such an abstract entity intimately involves x.
(2') It is impossible that an abstract entity involves a concretum in such
a sense.
A weakness of this revised objection is that it is unclear in what sense the
haecceity of a concretum is supposed to "intimately involve" that concretum.
For this reason, it is problematic whether (1') is true. Perhaps there is a
sense of Constituenthood which differs from Parthood or Elementhood, and
which is the intended sense of "intimate involvement" in this objection.
However, if the haecceity, H, of a concretum, x, has x as a constituent, then
x must be a proper constituent of H, otherwise H would be identical with x,
which is obviously absurd. But if something has one proper constituent, then
it must have another. If a concretum, x, is a proper constituent of the
haecceity of x, then what other proper constituent does x's haecceity possess?
My reply to the contention that it, is viciously circular or trivial to analyze
the diversity of concreta at a time in terms of their haecceities seems to
imply that such a haecceity does not have the identity relation and a
concretum as proper constituents, and does not involve the relation of
identity. However, it appears that if a haecceity of a concretum, x, has
proper constituents, then x and the identity relation are among them. Hence,
49
Note that such a collection is not a set, since it is possible that a set have elements, but
not parts. The relation of proper parthood is transitive and irreflexive, whereas the relation of
elementhood is not transitive and (on some views) not irreflexive.
CHAPTER 2
126
it seems that a concretum x is not a proper constituent of the haecceity of x,

and (1') is false if Constituenthood is the intended sense of "intimate
involvement" in (1').
Because a haecceity, H, of a concretum, a, that is, being identical with a,
appears to have neither the identity relation nor a as an element, part, or
constituent, and because H seems not to involve the identity relation, it is
appropriate to designate such a haecceity with a hyphenated expression such

as 'identity-with-a', as Alvin Plantinga has done."
The objection based on (1') and (2') may also be unsound due to the
falsity of (2'). After all, possible abstracta include sets of concreta, and
they intimately involve concreta in the sense that they have concreta as
elements (though not as parts or constituents.)
In a somewhat similar vein, Chisholm has argued against the possibility
of nonqualitative haecceities based on two premises. 51
(1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then an individual's conceiving P does
not entail his conceiving of a particular concretum.
(2) Necessarily, if an individual conceives the haecceity of a concretum,
then by conceiving this property he conceives of a particular concretum.
According to (1), Qualitativeness is a logically necessary condition of
Propertyhood, and according to (2), the haecceity of a concretum is
nonqualitative. Although (2) is true, why should we accept (1)? After all,
the haecceity of a concretum seems to have a feature which is a logically
sufficient condition of Propertyhood, namely, being monadic and exempli-
127
fiable. 52 Thus, there is no reason to accept (1), and Chisholm's objection

does not succeed.
A similar objection deduces the impossibility of a concretum's having a
haecceity from the two premises stated below.
(1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then P is possibly exemplified by
something, x, and P is possibly exemplified by something, y, which
is not identical with x.
(2) Necessarily, the haecceity of a concretum is a property which could
not be exemplified by something other than that concretum.
(1) advances the thesis that a logically necessary condition of Propertyhood

is that a property be capable of exemplification by different things. But
there is no good reason to accept this thesis, since, as noted above, a
haecceity appears to have a feature which is a logically sufficient condition
of Propertyhood, that is, being monadic and exemplifiable, despite the fact
that a haecceity is not capable of being exemplified by different things.
Furthermore, it seems that there are properties which are possibly exemplified by something and not possibly exemplified by anything else, for
example, being even and prime, being the successor of 1, and being identical
with 2, which appear to be possibly exemplified by the number 2 and not
possibly exemplified by any other thing. Thus, the first premise of the
objection under discussion seems to be false.
Alternatively, the impossibility of there being a particular which has
contingent existence and which has a haecceity might be inferred from the
following two premises.
(1) The haecceity of a concrete contingent being is an abstract entity
which has contingent existence.
50
See Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15

(1978), pp. 129-138.
51
Roderick Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,

1981), pp. 7-8.
52
Notice that property exemplification and tropal possession are different relations,
inasmuch as it is possible that an abstract entity bears the former, but not the latter, to a
concretum.
128
CHAPTER 2
(2) It is impossible that an abstract entity has contingent existence.

However, it is not obvious that (1) is true, and I shall argue later that
haecceities of concrete contingent beings have necessary existence. In any
case, for present purposes it suffices to point out that (2) seems to be false.
For it appears possible that there be an abstract entity which has contingent
existence, for instance, a set of contingent concreta which exists if and only
if its elements exist.
Another sort of objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities
goes as follows. The haecceity of a concretum is supposed to be a property,
but such a haecceity has a diaphanous quality indicative of its lack of
content. Since a property must have some content, there could not be a
nonqualitative haecceity.
My reply is that the content of a concretum's haecceity is a concretum's
individuality or identity in a sense which is quite fundamental. Some
philosophers may be led to think that nonqualitative haecceities are
contentless by their inability to grasp the content of certain nonqualitative
haecceities. Nevertheless, whether a nonqualitative haecceity has content,
and whether that content is graspable by someone, would seem to be
different questions.
A related objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities is based
on the following two premises.
(1) If concreta have haecceities, then there could be a property, namely,
some concretum's haecceity, which is necessarily ungraspable.
(2) Necessarily, a property is possibly grasped.
I am prepared to grant that (1) is true. As we shall see later, it can be
argued plausibly that there are haecceities which can be exemplified by
necessarily unconscious material substances and which could not be grasped
by anyone.
Is there a good reason to accept (2)? Of course, if there are properties,
then we grasp some of them. Yet, our grasping some properties does not
entail that every property is graspable. On the other hand, if properties can
THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION 129
be identified with ideas or concepts, then (2) is true. However, the

contention that properties are identifiable with such mental entities is
unintelligible. After all, a property is an abstract entity and mental entities
of this kind are concrete, and no entity can be both abstract and concrete.
(In contrast, the thesis that properties are eliminable in favor of ideas or
concepts is intelligible.) It might be argued that an omniscient being is
possible, and that this possibility entails (2). But must an omniscient being
grasp every property, or could a being be omniscient and fail to grasp a
property provided that this property couldn't be grasped by anyone? If the
former, then how do we know that an omniscient being is possible, given (1)
and (2) above? If the latter, then the possibility of an omniscient being does
not entail (2). Either way, the premise that an omniscient being is possible
does not provide a good reason to accept (2). In addition, even if some
haecceity is necessarily ungraspable, we have seen that it nonetheless has a
characteristic which appears to be a logically sufficient condition of
Propertyhood, namely, being monadic and exemplifiable. As far as I can
see, there is no reason to accept (2), and the objection under discussion is
unsuccessful.
130
CHAPTER 2
VIII - HAECCEITY: A METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION

OF DIVERSITY
That form which specifies the matter is more powerful
than other forms."
(1750 trans. Leonardus's Mirror of Stones 59)
Since it appears that a priori objections to the existence of nonqualitative

haecceities can be answered, we are entitled to infer the existence of
nonqualitative haecceities as a plausible hypothesis which helps to explain
the diversity of particulars at a time. At this point, let us return to the
argument concerning the diversity of particulars with which we began.
Argument B
(B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse.
(B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from
y at t.
(B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks
at t.
Therefore,
(B4) A property exists.
Our acceptance of (B1) is justified on empirical grounds. In addition, we are
entitled to assume that (B2) is true, unless we are given good reason for
supposing otherwise. It is arguable that this prima facie presumption in
favor of (B2) is defeated if we have good evidence that all available
accounts of the diversity of particulars at a time are inadequate. But I have
tried to show that such evidence is lacking. If (P8) is warranted, then so is
(B3), and the property referred to in (B3) and (B4) is a nonqualitative
haecceity. Since (B) is valid, and since (P8) is inferable as the best
explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time, (B) is a plausible
argument for Realism about properties.
It might be charged that a scotistic ontology which posits nonqualitative
haecceities is over-inflated. An ontology of this kind is a full-blown realism
of qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as of nonqualitative properties and propositions. After all, if there are nonqualitative
131
haecceities, then there are also abstract entities of these other sorts.'
However, to say that such a version of Realism is over-stuffed is to say that
it multiplies entities beyond necessity, thereby violating Ockham's Razor.
Hence, if my argument that nonqualitative haecceities are needed as part of
the best explanation of the diversity of individuals at a time is successful,
and if we are justified in believing that the existence of haecceities implies
the existence of abstract entities of the other aforementioned kinds, then a
full-blown realism is required if there is to be an explanation of particulars'
being diverse from one another. In this case, an ockhamist cannot justifiably
dismiss nonqualitative haecceities either on the ground that their postulation
is unparsimonious, or on the ground that the overall-ontology to which they
belong is over-inflated. Moreover, if the ockhamist claims that nonqualitative haecceities do not provide an acceptable solution to the problem of
individuation, then he ought to either give a reason for thinking that some
other proposal offers a superior solution or else explain why my proposed
solution in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is defective.
A possible worry about the adequacy of my proposed solution arises as
follows. It appears that our notion of concreta's being diverse is
conceptually prior to our notion of a concretum's having a haecceity. That
is, it seems that we acquire the former notion before we acquire the latter
one. This might be thought to constitute a reason for doubting that
concreta's being diverse can be analyzed or explicated in terms of something's having a haecceity. But it is not such a reason. For as Aristotle
recognized in the Physics, our preanalytic or prescientific ideas about things
are epistemically prior to the first principles which are discovered through
analytical inquiry and which explain the nature of things.' Similarly, our
prescientific idea of light is conceptually prior'to the notion of a photon, but
the fundamental laws which explain the nature of light tell us that light is a
stream of photons. Thus, it is to be expected that if a concretum's having
a haecceity can be used to explain why concreta are diverse, then our notion
of concreta's being diverse is conceptually, prior to our notion of a
concretum's having a haecceity.
,
53 See
Chapter 1, sections II and III.
54 Aristotle,
Physics, Book I, Ch. 1, 184a-184b.
132
CHAPTER 2
Surely, if concreta have haecceities, then abstracta have them as wel1. 55

Since it seems that concreta have haecceities, it appears that abstracta have
them too. However, for any x, x is either concrete or abstract. I conclude
that every entity has a haecceity.
Does this imply that the diversity of abstracta at a time is analyzable?'
I do not believe so. First of all, an analysis of the diversity of entities which
instantiate some category, say, being abstract, at a time, t, analyzes the
diversity of entities belonging to that category at t by relating them to
entities which instantiate some category at t, either the category of being
concrete or the category of being abstract. But, for any ontological
category, C, an attempted analysis, A, of the diversity of two instances of C
at t presupposes circular individuation if A implies that possibly (there are
two entities x and y belonging to C at t, and the diversity of x and y at t can
only be explained by relating x (or ),) to another (third) entity, z, belonging
to C at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entails
that x#y (or y#z), z's being diverse from some fourth instance of C at t can
only be explained by relating z (or that fourth instance) to a fifth instance of
C at t in such a manner that z and that fifth instance's (or the fourth instance
55
This premise can be defended as follows. As we have seen, it seems that if concreta
have haecceities, then there are abstracta, including properties and propositions, both qualitative
and nonqualitative. Moreover, as I argued in Chapter 1, section III, Proposition is a category
of logical entity, i.e., propositions have truth-values, logical entailments, modal properties, and
so on. Therefore, it is plausible that if there is a proposition, then for certain kinds of
propositions, there must be a logically comprehensive variety of propositions of those kinds.
Specifically, it is intuitively plausible that if there are abstracta of the aforementioned sorts, and
A is an abstract entity, then there is the proposition that (3x)(x=A). But this proposition says
that some:'-g is identical with A. It is plausible that if there is a proposition of this kind, then
there is the property of being identical with A. Hence, it seems that if concreta have haecceities,
then abstracta have haecceities. Notice that this conclusion is based upon a need for logical
generality: it has not been argued that haecceities of abstracta are needed in order to explain the
diversity of abstracta. In fact, i shall argue in the text below that haecceities of abstracta
cannot help to explain the diversity of abstracta.
56
According to some philosophers, abstracta are outside of time. If these philosophers are
correct, then abstracta are not diverse at a time. In that case, the only kind of diversity which
abstracta can have is timeless diversity, and the question in the text should be replaced with 'Is
there an analysis of the timeless diversity of abstracta?' However, the claim that abstracta are
outside of time is problematic, since it seems that properties, relations, and propositions undergo
relational change, e.g., Sobriety is exemplified by Socrates at one moment and not at another.
133
and the fifth instance's) being so related entails that they are diverse, the
fifth instance's being diverse from some sixth instance of C at t can only be
explained by relating this fifth instance (or the sixth instance) to a seventh
instance of C at t in such a fashion that the fifth instance and the seventh
instance's (or the sixth instance and the seventh instance's) being so related
'entails their diversity, and so on ad infinitum). The inadmissibly circular
character of an attempted analysis of this kind is analogous to that found in
the earlier attempt to analyze or explain the diversity of concreta at a time
by relating one concretum to another concretum. In other words, such an
attempt to explain why an instance of an ontic category, C, is diverse from
another instance of C by relating an instance of C to another instance of C
is viciously circular. Thus, any proposed analysis which presupposes such
circular individuation is fatally flawed, including one which attempts to
analyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to
abstracta. 57 However, the attempts to analyze the diversity of abstracta at
a time by relating abstracta to abstracta which need concern us presuppose
circular individuation of this very sort. For example, it might be proposed
that:
(AB) At time t, an abstractum A is diverse from an abstractum B =df.
There exists a property P such that: (i) at t A exemplifies P, and (ii)
at t B does not exemplify P.
57
Note that conditions or criteria such as those we usually employ to differentiate one
property from another cannot be used to construct an analysis or explanation of the diversity of
properties at a time. For example, at t, property A 1#A2 if at t, Al and A2 are not necessarily
coinstantiated; and at I, property A 1#A2 if at t, AI is possibly grasped without A2's being
grasped. Such conditions, or criteria involving them, distinguish Al and A2 by irreflexively
relating AI to ,42: they distinguish abstracta (properties) from one another by relating abstracta
(properties) to other abstracta (properties) in such a way that these abstracta's (properties')
being so related entails their diversity. Consequently, such conditions or criteria presuppose
circular individuation. Thus, criteria or conditions of this sort cannot provide an analysis or
explanation of the diversity of properties at a time. Nonetheless, conditions or criteria of this
kind have an epistemic utility: they can provide intellectual justification for the claim that
certain properties are diverse. Parallel remarks apply to abstracta such as propositions and
relations, and the criteria we customarily employ to differentiate them. See footnote 3 in this
chapter for a discussion of the distinction between formal criteria and epistemic principles of
individuation.
134
CHAPTER 2
But in some possible circumstances, two abstracta, for instance, the

properties Red and Round, can be distinguished from one another only in
terms of (second-order) properties they exemplify which are other than Red
and Round, for example, being a color and being identical with Red (Red's
haecceity), these two (second-order) properties can be distinguished from one
another only in terms of (third-order) properties they exemplify which are
other than the second-order properties in question, the preceding two (thirdorder) properties can be distinguished from one another only in terms of
(fourth-order) properties they exemplify which are other than the aforementioned third-order properties, and so on ad infinitum." Consequently, (AB)
implies that the diversity (at a time) of a pair of n-order abstracta in such
a possible hierarchical series can only be explained by using the relation of
Exemplification to relate an n-order abstractum to an (n+1)-order property
it exemplifies, for instance, its haecceity. Because (AB) implies that such
explanations are possible, and because an abstractum's (A's) exemplifying
a second (or higher)-order property, P, entails the diversity of A and P (with
P itself being an abstractum), (AB) violates the prohibition on circular
individuation formulated above.' It follows that the diversity of abstracta
58
Presumably, Red and Round are not self-exemplifying: they are first-order properties,
properties which could only be exemplified by concreta. On the other hand, a second-order
property is one which could only be exemplified by a first-order property, a third-order property
is one which could only be exemplified by a second-order property, and so forth.
59 Observe that although my argument for this conclusion resembles the earlier argument,
based on (CI), which rules out circular individuation in the case of concreta, these arguments
are not completely parallel. Because the exemplification relation seems not to be irretlexive,
in constructing the present argument it was necessary to diverge somewhat from the pattern of
the earlier argument. As a result of the apparent nonirreflexivity of exemplification, there
appears to be a possible case in which a property A exemplifies A, and some other property, B,
does not exemplify A. For example, possibly, the property of being grasped by someone has
the property of being grasped by someone, and some other property, say, being red, does not
have the property of being grasped by someone. Hence, (AB)'s analysans seems not to entail
that P is an abstract entity which is other than A. Notice that my argument for the conclusion
that a proposal such as (AB) is inadmissibly circular does not imply that there is such an
entailment, unlike an argument for this conclusion based on a principle which parallels (CI) and
which results from replacing each occurrence of 'particular' in (CI) with an occurrence of
àbstractum'.
135
at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta.

Second of all, since we have analyzed the diversity of concreta at a time
by relating concreta to abstracta, we cannot also analyze the diversity of
abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, on pain of vicious
circularity. 60 Hence, the diversity of abstracta at a time cannot be analyzed
by relating abstracta to concreta. And it was shown above that the diversity
of abstracta at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta.
However, it appears that every entity is either abstract or concrete.
Therefore, it seems that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyzable brute fact.
As we have seen, an attempt to both analyze the diversity of concreta at
a time by relating concreta to abstracta, and analyze the diversity of
abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, is viciously circular.
But even aside from this point, there appears to be no way to analyze the
diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time by relating qualitative abstracta
to concreta. Qualitative abstracta are related to concreta by the converse of
Exemplification, namely, being exemplified by. It seems that there is no
relation between abstracta and concreta which is any more useful than this
converse relation for analyzing the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a
time. Yet, a qualitative property's (P Ps) being exemplified by a concretum,
x, at a time t and a qualitative property's (P2's) not being exemplified by x
at t, is not a logically necessary condition of the diversity of P1 and P2 at
t, since a concretum can exemplify two qualitative properties at once. On
the other hand, a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of property such that a
concretum could only exemplify one property of that kind at a time. Thus,
a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of abstract entity whose diversity at a
time might be analyzable by using the converse of exemplification to relate
abstracta to concreta. Specifically, the following analysis might be
proposed.
60 The
general principle at work here can be stated as follows. Where being F and being
G are diverse ontological categories, attempting to both analyze the diversity of Fs at a time by
relating Fs to Gs, and analyze the diversity of Gs at a time by relating Gs to Fs, is viciously
circular.
136
(H) A nonqualitative haecceity, HI is diverse from a nonqualitative

haecceity, H2, at a time t =df. there is a concretum x such that (i)
HI is exemplified by x at t, and (ii) H2 is not exemplified by x at
t.
,
Of course, it is viciously circular to try to analyze the diversity of nonqualitative haecceities at a time by relating them to concreta as in (H), while
trying to analyze the diversity of concreta at a time by relating them to
nonqualitative haecceities as in (P8). Thus, if (P8) is accepted as an
analysis, then (H) should be rejected as an analysis; and if (H) is accepted
as an analysis, then (P8) should be rejected as an analysis. Therefore, we
have two options, we can either
(1)
CHAPTER 2
accept (P8) as an analysis, and reject (H) as an analysis,
137
qualitative abstracta and concreta as lacking a principle of individuation, and

distinguishes them from certain nonqualitative abstracta which have a
principle of individuation. In other words, (02)'s distinction not only fails
to correspond to the core concrete/abstract division, but in lumping together
qualitative abstracta and concreta it seems not to correspond to any intelligible classificatory system of ontological categories.
For these reasons, (01)'s account of diversity at a time in (P8) provides
a greater degree of systematization and explanatory coherence, and so is a
better explanation, than (02)'s account of diversity at a time in (H).
Consequently, (01) or. (P8) is intellectually preferable to (02) or (H).
I conclude that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyzable
brute fact, unlike the diversity of concreta at a time 6 1 There being such
a brute fact is incompatible with the claim that for every ontological
category, there must be a principle of individuation for entities of that
category. My argument that concreta have a principle of individuation is not
based on such an assumption, but rather on an inference to the best
explanation: it is based on the idea that an analysis of the diversity of
concreta at a time in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is the best of all
available explanations of their diversity at a time.
But on the assumption that the ontological categories of the abstract and
the concrete are fundamental, it might seem to be somewhat of an anomaly
that there is no explanation of the diversity of abstracta, when there is an
explanation of the diversity of concreta. However, if abstracta are
ontologically prior to concreta, then this is not an anomaly. After all, if
entities of one kind are ontologically prior to entities of another kind, then
it is natural to explain the diversity of entities of the second kind in terms
,
Of
(2)
accept (H) as an analysis, and reject (P8) as an analysis.
Is there any reason to prefer one of these options to the other? The
following considerations count decisively in favor of option (01). If we take
option (02), then although we might be able to explain the diversity of
nonqualitative abstracta at a time, we cannot explain either the diversity of
concreta at a time or the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time. On the
other hand, if we select option (01), then we can explain the diversity of
concreta at a time, but not the diversity of abstracta at a time. The point
which tips the balance decidedly in favor of option (01) concerns the way
in which the explanations put forward by (01) and (02) correspond to an
adequate classificatory scheme of ontological categories. According to (01),
concreta have a principle of individuation, and abstracta lack one: a
distinction neatly corresponding to the core ontological division between the
categories of the concrete and the abstract. In this sense, the distinction in
question is a natural and intuitive one. In contrast, (02)'s distinction
between those entities which have and those entities which lack a principle
of individuation is gerrymandered and unintuitive: it lumps together
61
The extreme realism of properties that I defend in this book entails that abstracta lack
spatial location. Even if moderate realism can be used to defend the idea that abstract properties
are spatially located where they are exemplified, there could be coexemplified properties which
are spatially coincident. Consequently, spatio-temporal location cannot be a principle of
individuation for abstracta. However, as the numerical diversity of abstracta is a brute fact,
abstracta have no need of a principle of individuation. Thus, the fact that spatio-temporal
location cannot serve as a principle of individuation for abstracta is of no comfort to a
nominalist. Nor does the fact that the numerical diversity of abstracta is inexplicable give the
nominalist grounds for complaint, since my argument implies that the numerical diversity of
concreta is inexplicable unless there are abstracta, viz., nonqualitative haecceities.
138
CHAPTER 2
of entities of the first kind, and it is not anomalous if the diversity of entities
of the second kind is explicable, and the diversity of entities of the first kind
is an inexplicable brute fact. In what follows, I describe my reasons for
thinking that abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta.
To begin with, consider the traditional view that abstracta are necessary
beings, whereas concreta are contingent beings. If this view is correct, then
abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta: necessarily, if there are
concreta, then there are abstracta, but possibly, there are abstracta and no
concreta. Moreover, in the next chapter I argue that if there are nonqualitative properties, then properties, relations, and propositions, whether
qualitative or nonqualitative, have necessary existence. If we suppose that
abstracta of these kinds have necessary existence, then concreta are
asymmetrically dependent upon abstracta, even if some abstracta have
contingent existence or some concreta have necessary existence. In the
relevant sense of asymmetrical dependence, an entity which instantiates an
ontic category, Cl, is asymmetrically dependent upon an entity which
instantiates an ontic category, C2, just in case there being an instance, i,, of
Cl entails that i, bears a certain relation to an instance of C2, and there
being an instance, i2 , of C2 does not entail that i2 bears the converse relation
to an instance of Cl. Supposing that abstracta of the aforementioned kinds
have necessary existence, concreta are asymmetrically dependent upon
abstracta in the foregoing sense. For in that case, necessarily, if x
instantiates the ontic category of being concrete, then x bears a relation to
something which instantiates the ontic category of being abstract, but
possibly, there is something which instantiates the latter ontic category and
which does not bear the converse relation to something which instantiates the
former ontic category. For example, if we assume that properties, relations,
and propositions, whether qualitative or nonqualitative, have necessary
existence, then necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x exemplifies
properties, but possibly, there is a property which is not exemplified by a
concretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then there are propositions
which are true of x, but possibly, there is a proposition which isn't true of
a concretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x enters into
relations, for example, Exemplification, but possibly, there is a relation, R,
such that no concretum enters into R; and necessarily, if there is a concre-
139
turn, x, then there is a set of which x is an element, but possibly, there are
sets, for instance, the null set, which do not have a concretum as an element.
If the existence of nonqualitative haecceities implies that abstracta are
ontologically prior to concreta in the way indicated, then there is nothing
anomalous about concreta's having a principle of individuation and
abstracta 's lacking one.' An upcoming argument implies that the existence of nonqualitative haecceities has this very consequence.
The time has come for a summary of the implications of my arguments
for the existence and nature of properties. Firstly, there are nonqualitative
haecceities. Secondly, a nonqualitative haecceity is a property, a kind of
abstractum. Thirdly, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with an
abstractum of another category such as a relation, a proposition, or a set.
Hence, it would appear that there are properties, and that Propertyhood is a
fundamental ontological category. In other words, it would seem that Robust
Realism is true.
Since the diversity of abstracta is unanalyzable, it clearly follows that the diversity of
62 Since
entities in general is unanalyzable. Of course, this conclusion is compatible with my claim that
the diversity of concreta is analyzable.
NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS
CHAPTER 3
HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE
INDIVIDUALS
"Conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nor
did, nor will exist."
(1785 T. Reid Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man iv. i. Wks.
368/1)
"I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent."
[Jowett The Dialogues of Plato (ed. 2) I. 230 (1875)]
I - THE INDIVIDUATION OF NEPS

"Essence, in its primary signification, means the principle of individuation, the inmost principle of the possibility of anything, as
that particular thing."
[from Coleridge Biographia Literaria 175 (1817)]
I have argued that there are nonqualitative haecceities,' and that if this is the
case, then there is a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties
and propositions.' I conclude that there exists a full range of qualitative and
nonqualitative properties and propositions. It seems that if there are
abstracta of these kinds, then metaphysical possibility can be understood in
terms of them. Therefore, it appears that metaphysical possibility can be
understood in terms of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and
propositions. In particular, it is highly plausible that a possibility or possible
world is identifiable with an abstractum, that is, a proposition or property,
or conjunction of them.' Using a term coined by Alvin Plantinga, the view

which endorses such an identification will be called Modal Realism. 4 I shall
argue that the postulation of unexemplified nonqunlitative haecceities is
justified because Modal Realism requires the existence of such properties.
To begin with, recall that there is a distinction between NEPs which are
mereological or causal products and NEPs which are mereologically and
causally disjoint.' For example, consider two particular steel blocks which
are never joined in a certain fashion to create a third material object, but
which could be joined in that fashion to create such a material object. A
possible material object which would be created if the two blocks were
joined in some manner is both a mereological and a causal product. A
mereological or causal product is a NEP which is connected to concrete
existence in the sense that it either would be created by the assembly or
arrangement of certain objects, or would be produced by certain items under
some nomologically possible circumstance. On the other hand, since a
mereologically and causally disjoint NEP is neither a mereological nor a
3 For instance, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1974). Notice that any property, proposition, or state of affairs which can be identified with a
possible world or universe must be very large and "maximal" or suitably complete. For an
account of possible worlds as possible complete states of affairs see Alvin Plantinga,
"Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals" in M. Loux, ed., The Possible and The Actual
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 147. According to Plantinga: "A pair of states of
affairs S and S' may be so related that it is not possible that both obtain, in which case S
precludes S'; and if it is impossible that S obtain and S' not obtain, then S includes 5... Still
further, a state of affairs S may be such that for any state of affairs S, S either includes or
precludes S', in which case S is maximal. Now we may say that a possible world is just a
maximal possible state of affairs." On Plantinga's conception of a possible world, the maximal
possible state of affairs which obtains is the actual world, and a maximal possible state of affairs
which does not obtain is a possible world which is merely possible. To allow for the fact that
some states of affairs, for example, Socrates's drinking, occur at some time, but not others,
Plantinga revises his account in the following way. A temporally invariant state of affairs is one
that necessarily, either always occurs or never occurs. A possible world is a possible state of
affairs which is temporally invariant and maximal with respect to temporally invariant states of
affairs. See Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile" in James Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, eds.,
Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 90-91.
'See Chapter 2.
See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.
See Chapter 1, section IV.
See Chapter 1, section II.
140
141
142
causal product, such a NEP is not connected to concrete existence in this

sense. It is intuitively plausible that some NEPs neither would be created by
assembling or arranging actual bits of matter, nor would be produced by
actual items under a nomologically possible circumstance, including either
some nonexistent possible spirits or material things which do not have a part
or constituent present in the actual world.' Thus, it seems that some NEPs
are mereologically and causally disjoint, including some nonexistent possible
fundamental particles, some nonexistent possible nonfundamental material
objects, and/or nonexistent possible spirits.
I will argue that for each NEP there is a property which individuates that
NEP. But what exactly is meant by saying that a property individuates a
NEP? A large number of philosophers would find the notion of a property's
individuating a nonexistent possible concretum to be a rather perplexing
one. It is therefore crucial that this notion be precisely characterized. I
define the concept of a property's individuating a NEP as follows.
(D1) A property, P, individuates a NEP =df. (i) in some possible world
there is an individual i which exemplifies P, i exemplifies P in every
possible world in which i exists, and i does not exist in the actual
world, and (ii) For any possible worlds W1 and W2, if in W1 there is
an object o i that exemplifies P, and in W2 there is an object 02 that
exemplifies P, then o1o 2 . 7
Assume that a property P satisfies (Dl). In that case, if we consider the
totality of possible objects, actual as well as merely possible, we can see that
6 Note
that since a spirit is unlocated or unextended, it is a simple, as is a Boscovichian
point-particle. Cf. Chapter 1, section IV.

7 Compare
CHAPTER 3
Gary Rosenkrantz, "Nonexistent Possibles And Their Individuation," Grazer

Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147. In that article, I implied that (DI) would be
necessary and sufficient for a property's individuating a' NEP even without the inclusion of the
phrase ì exemplifies P in every possible world in which i exists' in clause (i) of (Dl). This
still seems to me to be the case, but for the broader purposes of this book it will prove useful
to have a formulation of (Dl) that includes this phrase in clause (i). There are a number of
alternative equivalent formulations of (D1), and the question of which one of them is to be
preferred (if any) is of no great importance.
143
one and only one of them could exemplify P, and this possible object is a
NEP. Thus, P individuates a specific NEP. However, suppose a property
P is such that if in some possible world W, P is exemplified by an object o h
then in some possible world W2 P is exemplified by an object 02 diverse
from 0 1 . In that instance, P does not meet (D1), for either P is not
exemplified by a NEP (clause (i) of (Dl) is not satisfied by P), or P is
exemplified both by a possible object 0, in WI and by another possible
object o2 in W2 (clause (ii) of (D1) is not met by P). Because of this, P fails
to single out a specific NEP from among the totality of possible objects, both
actual and merely possible. Therefore, P does not individuate a NEP.
According to (D1), P individuates a NEP if and only if P is an unexemplified individual essence which is possibly exemplified by a concretum. Since
all unexemplified haecceities which are exemplifiable by concreta are
individual essences of this sort, (DI) implies that such an unexemplified
haecceity individuates a NEP. On the other hand, it seems that some
individual essences are not haecceities Thus, if NEPs are individuated by
unexemplified individual essences, it is not obvious that these unexemplified
individual essences are haecceities. However, I shall argue that NEPs are
individuated by unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities.
The first order of business is to show that Modal Realism requires NEPs
to be individuated by unexemplified individual essences. To begin with, it
is a datum that possibly, there exist objects which never exist in fact. In
other words, surely, in one possible world or another there exist objects
which do not exist in the actual world. Notice that this datum doesn't pick
out a specific possible object. Rather, it uses a kind of quantification to talk
about NEPs in purely general terms. However, there being a general
possibility of this kind entails that there are specific possibilities which are
instances of that general possibility. That is, there being such a general
possibility presupposes the possible existence of specific objects which do
not exist in fact, or the existence in some possible world of specific objects
which do not exist in the actual world.
Bearing this in mind, let o be a nonexistent possible, an object which does
not exist, but which exists in some nonactual possible world W. Thus, the
8 See
Chapter 1, section VI.
144
CHAPTER 3
singular proposition about o that it exists is true in W. Call this proposition

T. Recall that Modal Realism maintains that a possible world is an abstract
entity. Accordingly, since W is a nonactual possible world, Modal Realism
entails that W is a false or an unexemplified abstract entity, that is, either a
complete conjunctive proposition with some contingently false conjuncts, one
of which is T, or a complete conjunctive property with some contingently
unexemplified conjuncts. In that case, inasmuch as there exists a full range
of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions, there is such
a proposition as T. However, since T is a singular proposition about o to the
effect that it exists, either (i) in some sense o itself is involved in T, or else
(ii) T involves a property, P, 9 which can go proxy for o in the sense that o
exemplifies P in some possible world, o exemplifies P in every possible
world in which o exists, and in no possible world is there an object diverse
from o that exemplifies P. Such a property, P, is an unexemplified
individual essence which could be exemplified by o. With respect to
disjunct (ii) above, notice, firstly, that the proposition that there exists a
thing which exemplifies P is necessarily equivalent to T, and secondly, that
P satisfies (D1) and hence individuates o. Thus, a property P of this kind
might be able to serve as a proxy for o in T.
For the purposes of a reductio, let us suppose that there does not exist an
individual essence which individuates o. That is, there is no property which
satisfies (D1). In this case, for any property, P, either P is not exemplified
by o in W, or P is exemplified by an object other than o in some possible
world. Plainly, this implies that there does not exist anything which can go
proxy for o in T. Moreover, since o is nonexistent, there is obviously no
sense in which T involves o itself. But, as I have argued, T either involves
o itself or involves something which can go proxy for o. Hence, there is no
such proposition as T. However, as argued above, on the modal realist view
that a possible world is an abstract entity, if T is true in some possible
world, then there is such a proposition as T. Consequently, there is no
possible world in which T is true. So, there is no nonactual possible world
W in which o exists, a result which contradicts our assumption that o is a
For an elucidation of the notion of a proposition's involving a property see Chapter 2,

section VI, footnote 40.
145
NEP. Thus, o's being a NEP is incompatible with the conjunction of Modal
Realism and the claim that there is no property which individuates o: Modal
Realism implies that for each NEP, there is an individual essence which
individuates that NEP.
CHAPTER 3
146
II - THE INDIVIDUATION OF DISJOINT OBJECTS

"Of all the infinite Number of Possibles."
(1754 Edwards Freedom of Will 11. iii. 46)
I shall now argue that there isn't anything which individuates disjoint NEPs,
unless disjoint NEPs are individuated by unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceities.
To begin, take any possible physical object or person whose existence or
nonexistence is a contingent matter. As we have seen, it is intuitively
plausible that for each such individual, there could be another object
composed of numerically different stuff which is an exact double of it.
Two such possible objects are numerically distinct but are indiscernible in
their intrinsic qualitative properties throughout their histories. That is, at
each moment of their existence they would be of the same kind, have the
same color, shape, weight, size, internal structure, mental states, and so on.
Thus, the following assumption is justified. For any physical object or
person, o p which has contingent existence in a possible world, W1 , there is
a possible world, W2, in which there is an object, 0 2 , such that: 02 is other
than op 0 2 is made up of numerically different stuff than o / , and 0 2 and o,
are twins in the sense that for any time t, o, has the same intrinsic qualitative
properties at t in W2 as 0 / has at t in W,. Since it is plausible that 0 / could
have such a twin 0 2 , considerations of parity make it plausible that 02 could
have a twin o3 which is other than op o 3 could have a twin 0, other than 0,
and 0 2 , and so forth. For parallel reasons, it is equally plausible that if o / is
a disjoint object, then ever so many of o,'s possible twins are also disjoint.
Furthermore, in some possible world W3 02 exists, o, never exists, and 0 2
occupies each space-time position that o, occupies in W,. In addition, o l
could fail to exist and have its place taken in this way by a twin 0 2 , while
everything else in W3 is the same as it is in W, - with the only possible
exception being the existence of either parts of 0 2 , things in 0 2 's causal
ancestry, descendants of such ancestors, or parts of these ancestors or
10
147
descendants.. Let us say that things which stand in relation to an object in

the ways in which things of the latter four kinds stand in relation to 02 are
mereologically or causally related to that object. It follows that in some
possible world W3 things are exactly as they are in W1 with the exception
that neither 0 / nor a thing mereologically or causally related to 0 / ever exists,
and their places are taken by twins. For example, suppose that in 1{ 7, o l is
a material object which is created by the assembly of its right and left halves
at a certain point in time. Then there is a possible world W3 such that: for
any time t, a twin of 0 / is spatially located at t in W3 where 0, is located at
t in W1 , a twin of 0,'s right half is positioned at t in W3 where 0,'s right half
is positioned at t in W similarly for o l 's left half, and so on - with o, and
each thing mereologically or causally related to o, having a twin occupy each
one of its spatio-temporal positions. For any physical object or person, 0,,
which has contingent existence in a possible world W 1 , there is a possible
world W3 of the kind described. And a world W3 of this sort can involve
any of the many possible twins of both 0 1 and each of the things mereologically or causally related to op Hence, for each world W1 , there are many
such worlds W3.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that there does not exist an
unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of a disjoint object. In that case, the
foregoing line of reasoning implies that there are worlds W 1 and W3 , and
diverse twin disjoint objects o, in W1 and o, in W3 such that o, in PV/ and
0 2 in W3 are alike in all respects, with the only possible exception being that
02 has different disjoint things mereologically or causally related to it in W3
than o l has mereologically or causally related to it in Wp " However, we
I I ignore so-called world-indexed properties, whose existence was defended by Alvin

Plantinga in The Nature of Necessity. Among such properties are those of the form 'being the
so & so in W, where W' designates a specific possible world. Plantinga's theory implies that
if a property of this form is instantiable, e.g., the property of being the first president of the U.
S. A. in the actual world, then it is an individual essence. Still, a world-indexed property stands
in need of analysis in terms of a maximal conjunctive proposition which is identical with the
indexed world and which involves non-world-indexed individual essences of all entities in the
indexed world. In other words, any attempt to individuate a NEP with a world-indexed property
presupposes that the NEP in question is individuated by a non-world-indexed individual essence.
Because my argument in the text is designed to show that all relevant properties which are not
world-indexed fail to individuate a disjoint object, there is no need to consider world-indexed
CHAPTER 3
have seen that there can be a nonqualitative relational property which

pertains to a concretum only if there are nonqualitative haecceities of
concreta.' It follows that there can be a nonqualitative mereological or
causal relational property which pertains to a disjoint object only if there are
nonqualitative unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects.
Thus, our assumption that there are no such haecceities implies that there are
no relational properties of these kinds. Consequently, on this assumption o,
in W1 and its diverse twin r)2 in W3 are alike in every respect whatsoever,
whether qualitative or nonqualitative. This means that for any property P,
if P is exemplified by o, in WI , then P is also exemplified by a diverse
object o) 2 in W3. Hence, P fails to satisfy (D1). Therefore, P doesn't
individuate a disjoint object. It follows that there is not anything which
individuates a disjoint object.
We can now argue as follows. Modal Realism implies that for every
NEP, there is a property which individuates that NEP. And the intuition that
some NEPs are disjoint presents us with a datum about what is possible with
which Modal Realism should be compatible. Moreover, as we have seen,
there exists something which individuates a disjoint object if and only if
there exists an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates
that disjoint object. Hence, Modal Realism implies that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities of disjoint objects. Since Modal Realism is
quite plausible, the claim that there are unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceities which individuate disjoint objects is plausible too.
My argument for this conclusion entails that an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is equivalent to a
conjunction of other properties only if at least one of the properties in that
conjunction is a nonqualitative mereological or causal relational property
which pertains to a disjoint object. Since such a relational property is
unexemplified, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates
a disjoint object is not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties.
Notice that although my earlier analysis of the diversity of particulars at
a time implies there are exemplified nonqualitative haecceities, this analysis
does not entail there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. The

argument I gave for Robust Realism is based upon the need for this
analysis. However, in the light of our latest results, we can see that there
is a need for unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate
disjoint objects. Since it seems that there are unexemplified properties, we
can infer that Extreme Realism is true. Moreover, inasmuch as an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is not
equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties, we are entitled to
conclude that Strong Extreme Realism is true.
Because in the actual world there exists such an unexemplified haecceity,
H, which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object, o, and
because it seems that in every possible world it is true that possibly, o exists,
considerations of parity dictate that H exists in every possible world, W, in
which o cannot be either assembled out of or produced by what exists in W.
And obviously, if H exists in every such world W, then H exists in every
possible world, W, in which o can be either assembled out of or produced
by what exists in W. Thus, it seems that H exists in every possible world
or has necessary existence. Certainly, if there are haecceities of this kind,
then there are also unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate mereological or causal products and which possess necessary existence.
Inasmuch as there are haecceities of the former sort, there are haecceities of
the latter sort. Since a NEP is either a mereological or causal product, or
else is disjoint, and since an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity
individuates a NEP, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity either
individuates a mereological or causal product, or individuates a disjoint
object. It follows that all unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities have
necessary existence. Moreover, surely, if unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceities possess necessary existence, then exemplified nonqualitative
haecceities possess necessary existence as well. Hence, haecceities of the
latter kind have necessary existence. In sum, every nonqualitative haecceity
has necessary existence, including those which are exemplified and those
which are not.
148
properties in the text.

12
13
See Chapter 2.
149
150
CHAPTER 3
III - OBJECTIONS TO UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES:

A REPLY
"For you will not find thought without what is, in relation
to which it is uttered; for there is not, nor shall be, anything else besides what is..."
(from Parmenides The Way of Truth)
"Every Concept must denote some existing object, - existing
that is, either really or potentially."
[Bowen A Treatise on Logic IV. 61 (1864)]
Among those philosophers who think that concreta exemplify nonqualitative

haecceities, there are some who would deny that there are unexemplified
nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects." A principal
objection to the existence of such unexemplified haecceities is based upon
the following principle of haecceity dependence.
(HD) The existence of a haecceity, being identical with a, either entails
the existence of a or entails the existence of objects whose assembly
would result in a's creation.
Evidently, (HD) is incompatible with the existence of an unexemplified
haecceity which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object.
Given the not implausible assumption that material objects or persons, and
their parts, have contingent existence, (HD) implies that a haecceity of a
material object or person has contingent existence. This entails that such a
haecceity does not exist in every possible world.
In what follows, I argue that (HD) should be rejected, and defend my
argument against a number of possible rejoinders. To start with, consider
14
0ne such philosopher is Robert Adams. See his "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49
(1981), pp. 3-41. For a response to Adams see Alvin Plantinga, "On Existentialism,"
Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 1-20. My argument in this section is a descendant of an
argument in Chapter 9 of my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences (Brown University,
1976).
151
argument (A) below.

(1) Haecceities are properties.
(2) Properties have necessary existence.
Therefore,
(3) Haecceities have necessary existence.
Given the not implausible assumption that material objects, persons, and their
parts have contingent existence, (HD) and (A) conflict. On this assumption,
(HD) implies that the haecceity of a material object or person has contingent
existence, whereas (A) implies, that haecceities have necessary existence.
Clearly, (A) is logically valid, and (A)'s first premise is true given my
definition of the concept of haecceity. However, is there a good reason to
accept (A)'s second premise? According to a position I shall call Bifurcated
Realism, defended by philosophers such as Robert Adams, nonqualitative
properties or propositions, unlike qualitative ones, have contingent existence.' Hence, Bifurcated Realism entails that (A)'s second premise is
false. Bifurcated Realism gives a nonuniform account of the nature of
abstracta: nonqualitative abstracta have contingent existence, and qualitative
abstracta have necessary existence. The conflicting claim that properties,
relations, and propositions have necessary existence will be called Platonic
Realism. Platonic Realism entails the truth of (A)' s second premise,
although it is consistent with the falsity of (A)'s first premise. Finally,
Platonic Haecceitism is the thesis that qualitative properties, relations, and
propositions, as well as nonqualitative properties and propositions, have
necessary existence. Platonic Haecceitism entails that both of (A)'s premises
are true.
What is the bifurcated realist's reason for thinking that qualitative
properties and propositions have necessary existence? Presumably, he has
something like the following reason. There are qualitative propositions
which are necessary truths, for example, if something is square, then it is
square, Squareness is a shape, if something is red, then it is colored, and so
forth. These qualitative necessary propositions are true in all possible
15
See Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness".
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CHAPTER 3
worlds. Hence, these propositions, as well as the qualitative properties they

involve, exist in all possible worlds or have necessary existence.
But the platonic haecceitist can invoke a parallel argument which implies
that nonqualitative properties and propositions have necessary existence. For
example, the nonqualitative proposition
(1) if I exist, then I exist
appears to be a necessary truth. Thus, it seems that (1), as well as the
nonqualitative haecceity (1) involves, have necessary existence.
It might be thought that (1)'s being a necessary truth implies that / have
necessary existence. But (1)'s being a necessary truth appears not to have
this (absurd) implication. In particular, because (1) is a material conditional,
and because a material conditional with a false antecedent is true, it seems
that (1) would be true if its antecedent were false, that is to say, if it were
false that I exist. Hence, it appears that (1) does not imply that I exist.
Thus, it seems that (1)'s being a necessary truth does not have the absurd
consequence that I have necessary existence. Moreover, since (1)'s being a
necessary truth implies that (1) has necessary existence, (1)'s having
necessary existence also appears not to have this absurd implication.
To the claim that (1) is a necessary truth, the bifurcated realist would
reply that although (1) is not a necessary truth, (1) has a feature easily
confused with necessary truth. In particular, he would correctly note that (1)
is essentially true: that (1) has the characteristic of being necessarily such
that it is true or being true in every possible world in which it exists. (1)'s
essential truth is compatible with (1)'s failing to exist in those possible
worlds in which I fail to exist. Therefore, (1)'s essential truth is consistent
with (1)'s not being true in all possible worlds. However, when a bifurcated
realist asserts that a qualitative proposition is a necessary truth, his assertion
is subject to a moderate realist reply which parallels the bifurcated realist's
answer to the platonic haecceitist. To see this, consider the following three
claims about the property of being red which a moderate realist would
probably accept. First, Redness exists. Second, Redness exists if and only
if a concretum exemplifies Redness or a concretum is red (a moderate realist
maintains that every property is exemplified). Third, possibly, there does not
153
exist a red concretum. These three claims together imply. that Redness has
contingent existence. Thus, a moderate realist may well hold that the
qualitative proposition
(2) if something is red, then it is red
has contingent existence, on the ground that (2) exists only if a red
concretum exists. After all, (2) does not exist unless Redness exists, and
Redness has contingent existence. It follows that (2) is not a necessary truth
which is true in all possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which a
red concretum does not exist, and (2) isn't true in those worlds. In contrast,
a bifurcated realist would claim that (2) is a necessary truth. To this claim,
our moderate realist would reply that although (2) is not a necessary truth,
(2) has a characteristic easily confused with necessary truth. Specifically, he
would correctly note that (2) is essentially true: (2) is true in every possible
world in which (2) exists. However, if (2) isn't a necessary truth, then no
proposition is a necessary truth. Thus, Moderate Realism implies that there
are no necessary truths, only essential ones.
Bifurcated Realism can regard (2) as a necessary truth only if it discounts
the moderate realist's claim that (2) is merely essentially true. But then it
would seem that a bifurcated realist is not justified in rejecting (1)'s
necessary truth in favor of (1)'s essential truth. Thus, the bifurcated realist's
claim that every necessary proposition is qualitative is questionable. In other
words, there might be a nonqualitative proposition which is necessary. And
since a necessary proposition has necessary existence, there might be a
nonqualitative proposition which has necessary existence. Hence, the
bifurcated realist's claim that every nonqualitative proposition has contingent
existence is problematic. Moreover, nonqualitative propositions involve
nonqualitative properties, and if abstracta of the former sort have necessary
existence, then abstracta of the latter sort have necessary existence. Consequently, the bifurcated realist's contention that nonqualitative properties have
contingent existence is problematic as well. For these reasons, the bifurcated
realist's rejection of Platonic Haecceitism should be regarded with suspicion.
Yet, Moderate Realism implies that a haecceity cannot exist unless it is
exemplified: a concretum's haecceity cannot exist unless that concretum
CHAPTER 3
154
exists. Thus, Moderate Realism entails (HD), just as Bifurcated Realism

does.
In attempting to show that (HD) ought to be rejected, I shall argue that
Bifurcated Realism as well as Moderate Realism merit rejection (in that
order). To begin this task, compare (HD) and the following principle of
qualitative property dependence.
155
Notice that if W is an empty world, then every red concretum which exists
in a possible world other than W is mereologically and causally disjoint
relative to W.' 8 This suggests that
Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum
is epistemically on a par with

(QD) The existence of a qualitative property, being F, either entails that
an F exists or entails that a concretum exists.
I will try to establish that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. If I am.
right, then (HD) and (QD) are equally plausible or implausible, and they
stand or fall together.
Let us make the not implausible assumption that a concretum has
contingent existence. It is desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysical topics be compatible with this assumption. I6 Given our assumption,
(QD) implies that the property of being red fails to exist in some possible
world, for instance, a possible world in which there is not a red thing, or a
possible world in which there is not a concretum. Of course, the property
of being red exists in other possible worlds in which there are red concreta.
Hence, if (QD) is true, then the property of being red has contingent
existence. Observe that necessarily, (QD) is true just provided that a firstorder qualitative property, for example, being red, does not exist in an
"empty world", namely, a possible world in which there does not exist a
concretum."
On the other hand, Platonic Realism or Bifurcated Realism implies that a
qualitative property such as Redness has necessary existence, or exists in all
possible worlds, even in an empty one. Therefore, both Platonic Realism
and Bifurcated Realism reject (QD). (QD) expresses an aristotelian or
moderate realist view of the existence conditions of qualitative properties.
16 may also be desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysical topics be compatible
It
with the claim that some concretum has necessary existence.
17
A first-order property is a property which could only be exemplified by a concrete entity.
the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, and

objects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had never
existed.
After all, in each case (i) there is nothing which could exemplify the
property in question, and (ii) there are no things whose assembly would
create an instance of the property in question. Still, there is a certain
dissimilarity between Redness and a nonqualitative haecceity. So it might
be thought that (i) and (ii) are more damaging to the idea that a concretum's
haecceity exists independently of any concretum, than they are to the idea
that Redness exists independently of any concretum. The dissimilarity I have
in mind is that the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, pertains to x,
whereas a qualitative property such as Redness does not pertain to a
particular concretum. 19 Nevertheless, because Redness could only be
exemplified by red concreta, Redness appertains generally to red concreta.
Therefore, in the final analysis (i) and (ii) appear no more damaging to the
idea that a concretum's haecceity exists independently of any concretum,
than they are to the idea that Redness exists independently of any concretum.
Thus,
18
The notion of a concretum's being disjoint relative to a possible world can be defined
in two steps as follows. A concretum, x, is a mereological or causal product relative to a world
W =df. (i) x does not exist in W and (ii) in W, either x would be created by the assembly or
arrangement of some bits of matter which exist in W, or x would be produced by some
particular(s) which exist in W under a nomologically possible circumstance. A concretum, x,
is disjoint relative to a world W =df. (i) x does not exist in W, and (ii) x is not a mereological
or causal product relative to W, and (iii) x exists in some possible world.
19
See Chapter 1, section 11.
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CHAPTER 3
Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum

seems to be epistemically on a par with
the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, and

objects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had never
existed
Finally, an argument of this kind applies to any qualitative property. For
these reasons, it seems that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par.
Since (HD) and (QD) appear to be equally plausible or implausible, the
claim that
there does not exist an unexemplified haecceity of a disjoint object,
and the claim that
Redness does not exist in an empty world,
seem to stand or fall together.
Because Bifurcated Realism rejects (QD) and accepts (HD), and because
(QD) and (HD) appear to be epistemically on a par, Bifurcated Realism
seems to be untenable. Moreover, given the bifurcated realist or platonic
realist position that qualitative properties have necessary existence, (QD)
should be rejected. Inasmuch as (HD) and (QD) appear to be epistemically
on a par, it seems that (HD) ought to be rejected as well. Hence, (HD)
cannot be used to provide a plausible defense of Bifurcated Realism.
As we have seen, (HD) is plausible only if the aristotelian view expressed
in (QD) is plausible. Consequently, if (QD) is implausible, then (HD)
cannot be used to justify either the claim that there are no unexemplified
haecceities which individuate disjoint objects, or the claim that a haecceity
of a material object or person has contingent existence.
A bifurcated realist would probably respond by trying to refute the crucial
claim that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. In making such a
157
response, he argues that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. A bifurcated

realist might argue, firstly, that nonqualitative haecceities have a peculiar
feature, F*, which qualitative properties lack, and secondly, that since
properties of these two sorts differ in this way, (HD) is plausible and (QD)
is not. F* is either the property of having a concretum as a part, element,
or constituent, or the property of having a name of a concretum as a part, or
the property of essentially making singular reference to a concretum. Let F*
be identified with any one of these properties. If a nonqualitative haecceity
has F*, then a haecceity which individuates a disjoint object either has a
disjoint concretum as a part, element, or constituent, or has a name of a
disjoint concretum as a part, or essentially makes singular reference to a
disjoint concretum. A bifurcated realist can argue plausibly that a NEP
which is mereologically and causally disjoint is not a part, an element, or a
constituent of anything, is, not named by anything, and is not an object of
singular reference. Thus, if it is plausible that a nonqualitative haecceity has
F*, then (HD) appears to be true. In that case, it seems that there does not
exist an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. On
the other hand, a bifurcated realist can plausibly maintain that a qualitative
property does not have F*. Consequently, there is no good argument
concerning qualitative properties which parallels the foregoing argument
about nonqualitative haecceities and which implies (QD). Thus, (HD) and
(QD) are not epistemically on par: (HD) appears to be true and (QD) does
not. This counter-attack makes the crucial assumption that a nonqualitative
haecceity has F*. In what follows, I argue that since this assumption is
mistaken, the counter-attack is unsuccessful.
Firstly, I have already argued that a nonqualitative haecceity does not have
a concretum as a part, element, or constituent, otherwise such haecceities
would not provide a nontrivial criterion of individuation for concreta. 2
Secondly, a name is a linguistic item and a property is not.. Perhaps some
linguistic items have a name as a part, for example, the predicate 'is identical
with Smith', which has the name 'Smith' as a part; but it is absurd to
suppose that a property, for instance, a nonqualitative haecceity, has a name
20
See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII, where I defend the thesis that haecceities provide an
adequate criterion of individuation for concreta.
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CHAPTER 3
as a part. Therefore, a concretum's nonqualitative haecceity does not have

a name of that concretum. as a part.
Finally, the idea that a nonqualitative haecceity makes singular reference
to a concretum is problematic. It seems that the only things which can refer
(in a primary sense of the term) are either conscious beings or linguistic
expressions. A linguistic item such as a name may be said to make singular
reference to a concretum, but in normal circumstances it is incongruous to
suppose that a property or a nonqualitative haecceity refers to something.
Therefore, we should not assume that a nonqualitative haecceity essentially
makes singular reference to an object. 21
The foregoing line of reasoning shows that a nonqualitative haecceity
lacks F* on any of the three interpretations of F*. Since the preceding
counter-attack on my position assumes that a nonqualitative haecceity has F*
on one of these interpretations, this counter-attack does not succeed.
Nonetheless, it can be argued plausibly that nonqualitative haecceities
essentially have a function resembling reference. Let us call this function
"quasi-reference". It seems that the nonqualitative haecceity, H, of a
concretum, x, quasi-refers to x in virtue of H's being necessarily such that
H is exemplified if and only if x exists. Similarly, since H is exemplified
by x in every possible world in which x exists, and since in no possible
world is H exemplified by an entity other than x, in a strict sense H
individuates x. It follows that in a manner of speaking H quasi-refers to x.
Such quasi-reference resembles singular reference, that is, the sort of
reference that holds between a name or a definite description and its unique
referent. Let quasi-reference of this kind be called quasi-singular reference.
These reflections on quasi-singular reference suggest a new defense of the
bifurcated realist's claim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not.
According to this latest defense, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarily
makes quasi-singular reference to a concretum, whereas a qualitative property
does not essentially make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. The
21 Perhaps
a person could stipulate that a certain nonqualitative haecceity is to serve as a

proper name of some concretum. However, in such an unusual case this haecceity would
accidentally be a name of that concretum. Thus, the haecceity in question would not essentially
be a name of some concretum. The most that such an unusual case shows is that it is possible
for a property to be used as a symbol or a linguistic expression.
159
bifurcated realist needs to establish that if a nonqualitative haecceity and a

qualitative property differ in this way, then (HD) is plausible and (QD) is
not. He attempts to establish this by means of the following argument.
First of all, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarily makes quasi-singular
reference to a concretum. For this reason, an unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceity which individuates a disjoint object makes quasi-singular reference
to a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causally
disjoint. Yet, there couldn't be anything that makes quasi-singular reference
to a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causally
disjoint. It follows that (HD) is true and a nonqualitative haecceity couldn't
make quasi-singular reference to such a merely possible concretum. Hence,
there does not exist an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which
individuates a disjoint object. On the other hand, a qualitative property does
not necessarily make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. Consequently,
there is no good argument concerning qualitative properties which parallels
the foregoing argument about nonqualitative haecceities and which implies
(QD). Hence, (HD) and (QD) are not epistemically on a par: (HD) is
plausible and (QD) is not.
I argue below that this defense of Bifurcated Realism is no more
successful than the earlier ones. In the first place, singular reference is not
the only kind of reference: there is also denotational reference, the sort of
reference that holds between a general term and its extension, that is, each
of the items which satisfies the general term. For example, the general term
`dog' denotes each dog, that is to say, Rover, Fido, Spot, and so on. It can
be argued cogently that a first-order qualitative property necessarily quasirefers to a concretum in a manner which resembles a general term's
reference to each of the items in its extension. Let quasi-reference of this
kind be called quasi-denotational reference. The argument that a qualitative
property makes quasi-denotational reference to a concretum goes as follows.
A first-order qualitative property, being F, is necessarily such that it is
exemplified if and only if it is exemplified by an F. Since being F is
exemplified by an F in every possible world in which an F exists, and in no
possible world is being F exemplified by a non-F, it appears that being F
necessarily has a function which resembles the denotational reference of a
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CHAPTER 3
general term 'F' to Fs. Notice that this argument for saying that
(QQ-DR) a qualitative property essentially makes quasi-denotational
reference to concreta,
161
(HQ-SR*) In the actual world, there is an unexemplified haecceity

which individuates a disjoint object, o, and this haecceity
makes quasi-singular reference to a possible concretum
which does not exist in the actual world and which is disjoint
relative to the actual world, namely, o.
is parallel to the bifurcated realist's argument for saying that

(HQ-SR) a nonqualitative haecceity essentially makes quasi-singular
reference to a concretum.
Quasi-denotational and quasi-singular reference are quite analogous: the
former occurs in virtue of there being a property which could only be
exemplified by things of a certain kind, and the latter occurs in virtue of
there being a property which could only be exemplified by a certain thing.
I conclude that (QQ-DR) and (HQ-SR) are epistemically on a par.
Therefore, since the bifurcated realist accepts (HQ-SR), he should accept
(QQ-DR). However, I argue below that the bifurcated realist's acceptance
of (QQ-DR) commits him to the possibility of certain cases of quasidenotational reference, cases whose possibility is no more plausible than the
cases of quasi-singular reference to disjoint objects which the bifurcated
realist finds impossible.
To start with, notice that a bifurcated realist supposes that a first-order
qualitative property exists in an empty world. If this supposition and (QQDR) are true, then
(QQ-DR*) In an empty world, W, there is a first-order qualitative
property, being F, and this unexemplified property makes
quasi-denotational reference to possible concreta which do not
exist in W and which are disjoint relative to W, namely, each
F in a possible world other than W.
Because a bifurcated realist should accept (QQ-DR), it follows that a
bifurcated realist ought to accept (QQ-DR*). On the other hand, recall that
a bifurcated realist would deny the possibility of
If there exists an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint

object, and (HQ-SR) is the case, then (HQ-SR*) is true. Notice that (HQSR*) and (QQ-DR*) are analogous: each implies there is an unexemplified
property, P, in a possible world, W*, such that P quasi-refers to a concretum
which is mereologically and causally disjoint relative to W*. Given the
analogy between (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*), the bifurcated realist's denial of
the possibility of (HQ-SR*) does not square with his commitment to (QQDR*).
The incongruity of the bifurcated realist's position is brought into sharper
focus by the following example which illustrates (QQ-DR*). In (QQ-DR*),
let being F=being concrete. In actuality, there are concreta. Of course, this
implies that concreta are possible. But even if there were never any
concreta, concreta would be possible. Notice, that being, a concretum is a
qualitative property, and according to Bifurcated Realism such a property has
necessary existence. Assuming this, (QQ-DR*) implies that if, counter to
fact, there were never a concretum, then there would be an unexemplified
qualitative property, being a concretum, which would make quasidenotational reference to every possible concretum, each of which is
mereologically and causally disjoint relative to the counter-factual situation
in question. Moreover, since we may assume that in some possible situation
there is never a concretum, it follows that in such a situation an unexemplified qualitative property, being a concretum, makes quasi-denotational
reference to each of the possible concreta which exist in every other possible
situation. But if such quasi-denotational reference is possible, then isn't
quasi-singular reference to a disjoint object possible too? Thus, it seems that
there could be an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which makes quasisingular reference to an object which is mereologically and causally disjoint.
Furthermore, it appears that if there exists an unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceity, H, which individuates a disjoint object, o, then H makes quasi-
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CHAPTER 3
singular reference to o. Because the bifurcated realist's argument for the

claim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not, implies that such quasi-singular
reference is impossible, his argument seems to be unsound.
In the light of the foregoing argument, we can see that the bifurcated
realist's hybrid of Extreme or Platonic Realism and Moderate or Aristotelian
Realism is an unstable union. Accordingly, Bifurcated Realism ought to be
rejected. With the demise of Bifurcated Realism, there are only two other
views which need to be considered. (1) Moderate Realism, a view which
implies that qualitative properties have contingent existence, and (2) Platonic
Realism, a view which implies that qualitative properties have necessary
existence.
However, there is good reason to accept the platonic idea that qualitative
properties have necessary existence. In the first place, we may assume that
possibly, no concretum ever exists. Thus, we may suppose that in some
possible world there does not exist a concretum. Ex hypothesi, in a world
of this kind it is true that there does not exist a concretum. Surely, given
Modal Realism, 22 and given that qualitative propositions or properties exist,
it follows that in a world devoid of concreta there exists either the
qualitative property of Concreteness or the qualitative proposition a
concretum does not exist. Moreover, it is plausible that necessarily, there are
qualitative propositions only if there are qualitative properties. Hence, in a
world devoid of concreta the qualitative property of Concreteness exists, a
property involved in the qualitative proposition that a concretum does not
exist. Therefore, Concreteness exists in a world in which no concretum
exists, and the moderate realist's (QD) is false. Certainly, if Concreteness
exists in a world of this sort, then it also exists in a world in which there is
a concretum. It follows that Concreteness exists whether or not a concretum
ever exists. This means that Concreteness exists in every possible world or
has necessary existence. Parallel arguments show that every qualitative
property has necessary existence. Hence, Moderate Realism should be
rejected in favor of Platonic Realism. Consequently, (QQ-DR*) should be
accepted. Furthermore, in the preceding section I argued that there are
unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects, while in this
22
Modal Realism was defended in section I of this chapter.
163
section I argued that such a haecceity makes quasi-singular reference to a

disjoint object provided that (QQ-DR*) is true. I conclude that (HD) which cannot be upheld by an appeal to either Bifurcated Realism or
Moderate Realism - ought to be rejected, and that (HQ-SR*) should be
accepted. Since (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*) jointly entail Platonic Haecceitism ), Platonic Haecceitism ought to be accepted. That is, we should accept
the idea that qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as
nonqualitative properties and propositions, have necessary existence.
Let us consider a final reply available to the moderate realist. The
moderate realist might appeal to a parmenidean argument to justify his
rejection of (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*).
,
(1) If a property, P, makes quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) reference

to a NEP, then quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) reference is a
relation which could hold between two terms, one of which exists and
the other of which fails to exist.

(2) It is impossible for a relation to hold between two terms, one of which
exists and the other of which fails to exist.
Therefore,
(3) It is impossible for a property, P, to make quasi-singular (quasidenotational) reference to a NEP.
But there is no reason to think that the first premise of this argument is
true. If an unexemplified haecceity, H, makes quasi-singular reference to a
NEP, a, then it can be denied that H's quasi-singular reference to a is a
relation H bears to a. Instead, it can be said that H's quasi-singular
reference to a is a property of H. In particular, if H is the property of being
identical with a, then Hs quasi-singular reference to a consists in H's having
the nonqualitative property of being only possibly exemplified by a.
Similarly, if a property, F-ness, makes quasi-denotational reference to
nonexistent possible Fs, then it can be said that this property's quasidenotational reference to Fs is not a relation holding between F-ness and
those Fs. Instead, we can say that this property's quasi-denotational
reference to Fs is a property of F-ness. Specifically, F-ness's quasidenotational reference to Fs consists in F-ness's having the property of being
164
CHAPTER 3
only possibly exemplified by an F. Moreover, there is no more reason to

think that the properties of being only exemplifiable by a and being only
exemplifiable by an F contain or involve a relation,' or have a relation as
a part or constituent, than there is to think that the property, being identical
with a, contains or involves a relation, or has a relation as a part or
constituent. But as we've seen, being identical with a neither contains or

involves a relation, nor has a relation as a part or constituent. 24 Hence, the
properties of being only exemplifiable by a and being only exemplifiable by
an F neither contain nor involve a relation, nor have a relation as a part or
constituent. Thus, the first premise of the parmenidean argument should not
be accepted, and the attempt to use this argument to justify Moderate
Realism does not succeed.
There is one other somewhat different objection to the existence of
unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. It goes as follows.' The claim
that
(1) there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities,
implies that
(2) there are nonexistent possible concreta.
Inasmuch as (2) is self-contradictory, (1) is false.
However, (2) is ambiguous between two readings. On one of these
23
The concept of a property's involving a relation is explained in Chapter 2, section VI,

footnote 40.
24
See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII.
This objection is suggested by the following remark from John Pollock's paper "Thinking
about an Object" in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds.,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1980), p. 498. "Propositions have been supposed to be abstract entities having
necessary existence, but if a de re proposition can only be entertained by a single individual,
it is at least plausible to suppose that its existence is contingent upon the existence of that
individual. To suppose otherwise smacks of talk of 'merely possible objects,' which I at least
find repugnant."
165
readings, (2) says that there exists a nonexistent possible concretum something which is an absurdity. But on that reading (1) does not imply (2):
because an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity is neither nonexistent nor
concrete, there being such a haecceity does not imply that there exists a
nonexistent possible concretum. On the other reading, (2) is just a somewhat
misleading way of saying that there are cases in which the existence of a
concretum is possible even though the concretum in question never exists,
or of saying that in some possible world there exists a concretum which does
not exist in the actual world. On that reading, (1) seems to imply (2), but
(2) appears to be true. Since (2) cannot be derived on the first reading, and
since (2) is not self-contradictory on the second reading, the foregoing
objection fails to show that there are no unexemplified nonqualitative
haecceities.
In sum, none of the foregoing objections undercut Platonic Haecceitism.
As far as I can see at present, there is no reason to abandon the idea that
there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint
objects and which have necessary existence.
166
CHAPTER 3
IV - THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICAL MODALITIES

"Man loves the Universal, the Unchangeable, the Unitary."
[a 1842 Channing The Perfect Life 64 (1888)]
167
attributions of de re necessity.
(D4) x has necessary existence a (i) there is a haecceity, H, and (ii)
x exemplifies H, and (iii) H is necessarily such that it is exemplified.
Because properties, relations, and propositions have necessary existence, and

because everything has a haecceity, 26 there is a kind of unity or interdependence among metaphysical modalities. This unity or interdependence is
demonstrated in the following series of definitions. These definitions show
that attributions of de re necessity and de dicto necessity are intertranslatable,
and that attributions of necessary existence are translatable into attributions
of either de re necessity or de dicto necessity.
(D4) demonstrates that attributions of necessary existence are translatable

into attributions of de re necessity (in conjunction with the use of other
nonmodal concepts).
(D1) H is an exemplified-haecceity =df. (3x)(H is the property of being

identical with x).
(D5) shows how attributions of necessary existence can be translated into

attributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodal
concepts).
Moreover, attributions of de dicto necessity and other cognate de dicto
metaphysical modal notions are intertranslatable. 39 In addition, attributions
of de re necessity and other cognate de re metaphysical modal notions are
intertranslatable. 3 Furthermore, attributions of necessary existence and
contingent existence are intertranslatable. 31 Three consequences follow. (i)
For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de re modal
concept. (ii) For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dicto
modal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingent
existence can be understood in terms of either de dicto or de re modal
concepts.
(D2)x is necessarily F <=> (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity, being

identical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii) the
proposition that whatever is N is F is necessary.'
(D2) demonstrates that attributions of de re necessity can be translated into
attributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodal
concepts).
(D3) The proposition, p, is necessary a p is necessarily such that it is
true.
(D3) shows how attributions of de dicto necessity can be translated into
26
See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.
definition is schematic, and the letters 'F' and 'N' should be replaced with an
appropriate predicate and name, respectively. Note that substitution of a name 'N' for the
schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a
name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.
27 This
(D5) x has necessary existence a (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity,

being identical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii)
the proposition that N exists is necessary. 28
28
This definition is schematic, and the letter 'N' ought to be replaced with an appropriate
name. Observe that replacing the schematic letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in the
satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical
with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.
29
30
31
SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES
CHAPTER 4
SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED
HAECCEITIES
"The conversion...of these innate potentialities into actual
existences."
[from Huxley Hume iii. 85 (1879)]
"What is and will be latent is little better than nonexistent."
[Sir T. Browne Christian Morals 75 (1716)]
I - MEREOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF
UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES
"Particularize a few drops of the sea, by filling a glasse full
of them; then that glasse-full is distinguished from all the rest
of the watery Bulke."
[1643 Digby Observations upon Religio Medici 84 (1644)]
169
to my argument were also answered in that chapter,' there seems to be no

barrier remaining to the acceptance of Strong Extreme Realism. Accordingly, in the arguments to follow I assume that Strong Extreme Realism is
true, and hence that no form of Moderate Realism is correct.
Supposing, then, that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities
which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, it would be most surprising
to discover that we can grasp any of these haecceities. 3 After all, it is
questionable whether any of us can even grasp an exemplified haecceity of
an external concretum. However, even if I lack the ability to grasp the
haecceity of the pen in my hand, I can nonetheless pick out this haecceity by
description, for example, as the haecceity of the pen in my hand.' Of
course, in this case, unlike the first, the haecceity in question is exemplified,
and it would be rather surprising to learn that we can pick out certain
unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities by description. Nevertheless, I shall
argue that there are cases in which we can use a definite description to pick
out or denote an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of a mereological
or causal product.'
Let us begin with a discussion of the notion of a piece (or mass) of
matter. Roughly speaking, by a piece of matter I mean a number of bits of
matter attached or bonded together to form a complex material object. 6 A
,
"Let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate,
these little atoms cohere."
(1690 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.
See Chapter 3, section III.
3 Our
inability to grasp such an unexemplified haecceity will be demonstrated in Chapter
5.
xxiii. 26)
In the preceding chapter, I argued that there are unexemplified nonqualitative

haecceities which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, including both
nonexistent possible concreta which are mereologically and causally disjoint,
and nonexistent possible concreta which are mereological or causal
products.' As noted earlier, this line of reasoning implies that Strong
Extreme Realism is true. Since bifurcated and moderate realist objections
'See Chapter 3, section II.
168
That I have this ability even if I am unable to grasp the pen's haecceity was shown in
Chapter 1, section V. That I am unable to grasp the haecceity of an external concrete thing will
be established in Chapter 5.
The distinction between grasping a property and identifying a property by description is
discussed in Chapter 1, section V.
6
It seems that if two objects x and y bond with one another to form a complex material
object at a time t, then at t there must be a definite distance d such that if x were farther than
d from y at t, then x and y would not bond with one another. However, physicists tell us that
x and y never actually touch because of repulsive forces between fundamental particles.
However, notice that the assumption that d>0 does not entail there is no distance d of the sort
that appears to be required. For example, there might well be a precise positive distance (or a
definite spatial region) at which (or within which) the forces which bind x and y together and
170
piece of matter of this sort is a kind of community of material parts. There

is a sense in which such an assemblage can be identified or differentiated in
terms of its parts. That an assemblage of this sort can be identified or
differentiated in this way seems implicit in the very meaning of a sortal or
count term like 'piece of matter' or 'mass of matter'. More specifically,
given the sense of such a sortal or count term the following argument
appears plausible. Suppose that in some possible world W there is a piece
of matter m. If in W or some other possible world there is a piece of matter,
m', which does not have one of the fundamental particles composing m in
W as an attached part, then m ' is diverse from m. And if in W or some
other possible world there is a piece of matter, x, which is composed of the
same parts as m is in W, then x is identical with m. The foregoing argument
is highly plausible based in purely a priori or intuitive grounds, and I know
of no good counter-argument.'
The thesis of mereological essentialism endorsed above can be interpreted
in at least two ways, one strict, and one loose. The strict interpretation or
strict essentialism can be formulated as follows: (i) if in some possible world
there is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same parts joined
together in every possible world in which m exists; and (ii) for any possible
worlds W & W2, if in W1 there is a piece of matter o composed of certain
parts, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 0 2 composed of the same parts,
then 0 1 =02 . On this interpretation the term 'part' is understood in a strict
sense, as illustrated in the following example. There are two pieces of
matter x and y, and x is composed of a right half r and a left half 1. If x and
y are joined with their surfaces and edges aligned in a certain way, then a
piece of matter is assembled which has an object made up of r and y as a
part. However, if x and y are joined with their boundaries aligned in a
the repulsive forces which keep x and y apart come into a sort of balance or dynamic
equilibrium, and it would be plausible to identify d with this distance (or with the maximum
width of the region in question). I shall understand the attachment or bonding of two pieces of
matter x and y, or the joining of a surface or edge of x to a surface or edge of y, in such a way
that it is compatible with, but does not require, x's literally touching y.
7
CHAPTER 4
Further support for the conclusion of this argument can be found in Roderick Chisholm's
Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 145-158.
171
different way, then a piece of matter is assembled which does not have an
object made up of r and y as a part, but has an object made up of 1 and y as
a part. Hence, clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that the piece of
matter assembled in the first instance is not identical with the piece of matter
assembled in the second instance. I call a piece of matter to which strict
essentialism is applicable a strict mereological assembly (an SMA). Given
the foregoing explanation of the term 'part', we can see that clauses (i) and
(ii) of strict essentialism together entail that if there is an SMA in some
possible world, the (arrangement of) parts of this SMA is both essential to
it and necessarily repugnant to any other possible SMA.
A less strict interpretation or loose essentialism was apparently held by
John Locke.' According to this interpretation, (i) if in some possible world
there is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same fundamental
particles attached to one another or bonded together in every possible world
in which m exists; and (ii) for any possible worlds WI & W2, if in W1 there
is a piece of matter o i composed of certain fundamental particles, and in W2
there is a piece of matter 02 composed of the same fundamental particles,
then 0 1 =02 , regardless of the arrangement of the fundamental particles
composing o i or 02 . A piece of matter of this sort retains its identity even
though its fundamental particles have been rearranged. Thus, I call a piece
of matter to which loose essentialism is applicable a plastic mereological
assembly (PMA).
The formulation of loose essentialism stated above presupposes that a

body is ultimately composed of indivisible particles. It should be noted that
loose essentialism can be formulated independently of this presupposition.
Let the mereological sum of all of a piece of matter's parts be called the
piece of matter's sum. Loose essentialism can then be stated like this: (i) if
in some possible world there is a piece of matter, m, then m consists of the
same sum of parts joined together in every possible world in which m exists;
and (ii) for any possible worlds W, & W2, if in W there is a piece of matter
o i having a certain sum, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 02 having the
same sum, then 0 1 =0 2 .
See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII,
Section 4.
CHAPTER 4
There seems to be a sense in which strict and loose essentialism are each
true of some type of physical entity or other. As a first step towards seeing
this, consider the following thesis. When a complex material object is in a
place, p, at a time, t, there are at least two spatially coincident entities in p
at t: an SMA and a PMA. Since SMAs and PMAs have different identity
criteria (strict and loose essentialism, respectively), an SMA and a PMA are
diverse objects of different kinds. And there is no reason why two such
objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time.
Moreover, the thesis that some SMAs and PMAs are diverse objects which
are spatially coincident at a given time appears to be just as plausible as
another view which it is reasonable to accept, namely, the view that when
a bronze statue occupies a place, p, at a time, t, there are at least two items
which spatially coincide in p at t: the statue, and a piece of matter. These
items are diverse either because (i) when some such piece of matter is
melted into a blob, a piece of matter which was spatially coincident with the
statue survives the melting, but the statue thereby ceases to be, or because
(ii) when a tiny bit of bronze is chipped off the edge of the statue, the statue
continues to exist after this alteration, but a piece of matter which was
spatially coincident with that statue thereby perishes. Cases such as (i) and
(ii) above lead me to conclude that a statue, a table, a ship, a tree, et cetera,
and a spatially coincident piece of matter are diverse entities of different
kinds. Because this conclusion is justified, and because the thesis that SMAs
and PMAs are diverse objects sometimes located in the same place at the
same time is equally plausible, our acceptance of this latter thesis is
warranted.
Furthermore, cases like (i) and (ii) above illustrate the fact that neither
strict nor loose essentialism is true of an object such as a statue, a ship, and
so on. Hence, the identity criteria that apply to SMAs and PMAs do not
apply to statues and the like. Analogous reasoning explains how it is that
a piece of matter and the sum of that piece of matter's material parts can be
in the same place at once. For pieces of matter and sums have different
identity criteria. Thus, a piece of matter made up of two bodies x and y is
not identical with the sum of x and y. The latter exists if x and y exist and
they are unjoined. But the former does not exist under these conditions - it
exists only if x and y are joined. In other words, pieces of matter cannot
survive disassembly, whereas a sum of objects exists both when those objects
are joined and when they are not.
It should now be clear that there is a significant sense in which each of
the identity criteria I have mentioned is applicable to some physical item,
either an SMA, a PMA, an ens successivurn like a ship, or a sum. What we
have in all such cases are physical items distinguished from one another by
their characteristic identity criteria. Of course, one could raise issues about
the ultimate ontological status of such physical items. One could ask, for
example, if in the final analysis they (or some of them) are genuine
substances, dependent entities, or logical constructions. But issues of this
kind are not easy to resolve, and detailed discussion of them falls outside the
scope of this book. For the purpose of my argument, I shall assume
(plausibly, I believe) that either SMAs or PMAs exist.
Below, I argue that a person can pick out or refer to an unexemplified
haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA or PMA by using a definite
description that denotes this unexemplified haecceity. To begin, it seems
that there are physical items which could be assembled but never are. For
example, it is likely that the PMA spatially coincident with my kitchen sink
at time t is never joined to the PMA spatially coincident with the bookcase
in my living room at t. Even more probable is the claim that the SMAs
spatially coincident with these two PMAs are never assembled. Yet more
likely is the claim that these SMAs are never assembled with their boundaries
aligned in a certain way that is possible. Since innumerable claims of these
kinds are probable, the following things are quite plausible. First, there are
many cases of PMAs that are never joined but could be. Likewise for SMAs.
Finally, there are numerous instances in which SMAs could be assembled
with their surfaces and edges aligned in a particular way, but never are.
Given these assumptions, it is not difficult to show that a person can use a
definite description to denote the unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent
possible SMA. To see this, consider a situation like Case (1) below.
There exist two SMAs a and b. a and b are congruent cubical pieces of
steel. f is one of a's faces, and g is one of the edges along / fl is one of
b's faces, and gi is one of the edges along f,. In fact a and b are never
attached to one another. But it is possible for a and b to be attached to one
another to form an SMA as specified in the following definite description:
172
173
CHAPTER 4
`the x such that x is an SMA, a is half of x, b is half of x, and the halves of

x are attached so that every part off is joined to some part off,, and every
part of g is joined to some part of gl . 9 Let us call this description Da.
Now, consider the following definite description:
It is clear from the foregoing description of Case (1) that in some possible
world there exists an individual, i, which satisfies the condition in Da.
Clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that i exists in a possible world only
if in that world i is composed of a and b joined together. Since by
hypothesis a and b are in fact never joined, i does not exist in the actual
world. Thus, such an individual i is a nonexistent possible.
Furthermore, assume that in a possible world WI there exists an object 01
satisfying the condition in Da, and in a possible world W2 there exists an
object 0 2 satisfying the same condition. Thus, in W1 there is an SMA o
composed of the SMAs a and b joined in the exact way specified in Da, and
in W2 there is an SMA 0 2 made up of the SMAs a and b joined in the precise
fashion delineated in Da. Moreover, clause (i) of strict essentialism implies
that an SMA (such as a or b) consists of the same parts joined together in
every possible world in which it exists. Consequently, in WI 0 1 is an SMA
composed of the same parts as an SMA 0 1 is composed of in W2 . This
consequence and clause (ii) of strict essentialism together imply that 0 1 =0 2 .
Hence, one and only one possible entity could satisfy the condition in Da,
and this possible concrete entity is an SMA which does not exist. Moreover,
as argued in the preceding chapter, a nonexistent possible concretum is
individuated by an unexemplified haecceity. Furthermore, corresponding to
a given nonexistent possible individual, there is but one such haecceity."
It follows that there is one and only one haecceity which meets the condition
in Da*, and it is an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA.
Therefore, Da* denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible
SMA. Da* picks out this unexemplified haecceity by specifying a definite
way in which certain actual objects could be joined to form the only possible
object that could exemplify this haecceity. Clearly, there are innumerable
similar descriptions, each of which denotes a different unexemplified
haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. Such descriptions pick out these
unexemplified haecceities by specifying different ways in which various
physical items, including macroscopic things and any microscopic or basic
174
'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an

SMA, y, if and only if one half of y=a, the other half of y=b, and the
halves of y are attached in such a way that every part off is joined
to some part off! , and every part of g is joined to some part of g1 '.
Let this definite description be called Da*. 1
A representation of an SMA satisfying the condition in Da
The letters a , b , f , etc., are schematic, and are to be replaced with names of particular
actual items of the appropriate sorts. Thus, we do not really have a definite description here,
just a definite description form. Nonetheless, to avoid awkwardness I shall speak of this form
as if it were a definite description - and likewise in other parallel cases later on.
10
Da* specifies that a certain seven-term relation necessarily holds of x and the other six
things named in Da*. Thus, the metaphysical necessity involved here is de re. Parallel remarks
apply to the other similar definite descriptions constructed below. See Chapter 1, section IV for
a discussion of attributions of de re necessary properties and relations to things.
Suppose it is insisted on Russellian grounds, or the like, that 'a', 'b', etc., be replaced by
definite descriptions such as 'the object in the right half of my field of vision', 'the object in
the left half of my field of vision', etc. Such a Russellian assumption is not incompatible with
Da* specifying the desired condition. This is because in Da* the terms 'a', '6', etc., fall within
the scope of a de re necessity operator. The context thereby created in Da* is one that is with
respect to x and the objects designated by 'a', 'b', etc., regardless of the way in which these
singular terms designate their referents. Consequently, Da* and other parallel descriptions
specify the desired conditions regardless of the mode of designation of the referents of singular
terms like 'a', 'b', etc. Thus, it is not necessary to assume either that 'a', 'b', etc., connote
individual essences or that these singular terms are logically proper names or rigid designators.
In other words, "rigid reference" does not require the use of rigid designators, but only the use
of de re modal operators.
175
physical items composing such things, could be assembled or arranged.
11
That there couldn't be an entity which has two haecceities was established in Chapter 1,
section I.
76
CHAPTER 4
But what if the boundaries or positions of physical items are ontologically

vague? Such items have no precise corners, edges, and surfaces, or no exact
locations. One might question the coherence of such an idea, but putting this
aside, let us see what it entails. Apparently, it follows that in some sense
items have approximate boundaries. But this seems to imply only that there
are descriptions which denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent
possible SMAs by specifying various ways in which certain actual physical
items could be joined or configured in terms of such approximate boundaries
or positions.
In any event, there are descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities
of NEPs without specifying a boundary of an object or a particular way in
which things could be arranged, for example, a description like
`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by
a PMA, y, if and only if y's sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's
sum'.
Call this description Db *, and let the description 'the x such that x is a PMA
whose sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's sum' be called Db. To
see that Db * denotes, recall the argument which shows that descriptions like
Da* pick out unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs. An
analogous argument in which we speak of the sum of a possible PMA and
presuppose loose essentialism, instead of talking about the parts of a possible
SMA and presupposing strict essentialism, implies that descriptions like Db*
denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs.
I have argued that unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs
are denoted by descriptions specifying ways in which various physical items
could be attached or configured. But do we ever produce a description of
this kind, and determine with respect to it, that it denotes such an unexemplified haecceity? If we can ascertain the true boundaries of a physical item,
then perhaps the answer is yes. But it seems that the most accurate
measurements we can make are trustworthy only within a certain limited
range. For example, as an object is examined under progressively stronger
microscopes, this object appears to have different boundaries. Furthermore,
microscopes and all other measuring instruments are inherently limited in
177
their resolving power and are subject to experimental error. Consequently,

if an item's boundaries or position are of a precise nature, then it seems that
we cannot ascertain them.
However, suppose that the boundaries of a physical item are ontically
vague or approximate in character. In that case, since our best measurements
are authoritative insofar as they are regarded as highly accurate approximations, there appears to be a better chance of our having the ability to
determine the true boundaries of a physical item. Of course, all of the issues
raised by these reflections cannot be settled here. But let us see what
follows if we cannot determine the true boundaries or position of a physical
item, inasmuch as there is a good chance that this is the case.
It follows that there is no description (such as Da* or the like) specifying
a definite way in which particular physical items could be joined or
arranged, such that we can determine with respect to it, that it denotes an
unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible S'MA. But this is
compatible with our knowing that there is some such description which
denotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind. Indeed, since a physical
item has boundaries (or if it is a point-particle position only), it is quite
plausible to suppose that there are innumerable denoting descriptions of this
sort. And although there being such denoting descriptions is compatible with
no one ever producing one, the claim that we never employ such a
description appears unwarranted. If we happen to use one of these
descriptions, then we have denoted an unexemplified haecceity of a
nonexistent possible SMA even if we do not know that we have. For
example, we can produce one of these descriptions under such conditions of
ignorance if we measure the boundaries of certain things as accurately as
technologically possible and correctly conjecture the boundaries of these
things based on those measurements.
On the other hand, issues about boundaries are irrelevant when it comes
to the denotation of an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible
PMA. As we have seen, Db * picks out an unexemplified haecceity of this
type, and it does not specify a boundary or position of a thing. Because of
this, doubts raised about our abilities to ascertain an item's boundaries or
position do not discredit either the claim that we use descriptions like Db *
to denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs, or the
178
CHAPTER 4
claim that we have good reason to believe in particular cases of this kind
that we have employed a description which accomplishes this. And given
my arguments, these two claims are plausible.
179
II - CAUSAL DESCRIPTIONS OF UNEXEMPLIFIED

HAECCEITIES
"A causall definition geuen by the Cause efficient."
(1570 Billingsley The Elements of Geometrie of..
Euclid XI. def. xii. 316)
There also seem to be descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities of

nonexistent possible SMAs by specifying laws of nature and initial conditions, rather than by literally specifying arrangements of objects. To see this,
consider a situation like Case (2) below.
In room r at time t there exist two pieces of clay d and e. d and e are six
inches apart at t. d has been loaded onto a catapult like device, and if at t
I were to press a button, then d would be shot towards e in a particular way
w, that is, with a specific force and direction. d could be propelled towards
e, but in fact it never is. If at t d were pushed towards e in way w, then this
would result in a piece of clay (mostly or completely made up of stuff that
came from d) being joined to another piece of clay (mostly or completely
made of stuff that came from e). In this manner, an SMA (mostly or
completely made up of stuff that came from d or e) would be assembled at
t+1. Given the circumstances, just one SMA would satisfy the following
condition at t+1:
(1*) being the largest and most massive SMA assembled in room r at
t+1. 12
In addition, there are certain conditions obtaining at t such that: if at t d
were pushed in way w, then these conditions would be causally relevant both
to their being just one SMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and to such an SMA's
being composed of certain parts - in the strict sense of the term 'part'. Let
these conditions be called C, and call the laws of nature L. Included in C
12 (1*) is compatible with the fact that if two pieces of clay were joined, numerous SMAs
would be formed, many of which would be unarticulated and nested inside of others.
CHAPTER 4
are the positions of d and e, their temperatures, their masses, their degrees
of hardness, the external forces acting on d and e, and so forth. The
conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), is physically contingent
and logically contingent, and logically implies both that there is just one
SMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and that such an SMA is composed of particular
actual bits of matter m 1 , m2 , m,, et cetera, joined together in a specific way
R, in other words, attached along certain of their boundaries. Finally, it is
possible for m 1 , m 2 , m3 , and so on, to be joined in way R, but in fact m l , m 2 ,
m 3 , and so forth, are never joined.
Let us now consider the following two descriptions. Firstly: 'the x such
that x is an SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in way
w at t and L & C obtain'. Call this description Dc. Secondly:
together imply that certain actual bits of matter would be joined in a specific
fashion to assemble a definite object. However, to employ a description
such as Dc* one need not be in a position to enumerate the laws and
conditions in question. It is enough to pick out these laws and conditions in
the way that I did when I described Case (2). That is, it is sufficient to pick
them out as L and C, where the reference of 'L' and 'C' is fixed with the aid
of descriptions like 'the laws of nature' and 'the relevant conditions'.
Furthermore, a person, S, can use Dc* to denote an unexemplified haecceity
even if certain microscopic particles that did not come from d or e would be
parts of the SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in way
w at t and L & C obtain, and certain microscopic particles that came from
d or e would not be parts of that possible SMA, and S is ignorant of these
things. Clearly, then, being in a position to pick out an unexemplified
haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA by picking out laws of nature and
initial conditions does not require being in a position to literally specify the
parts that would be had by that possible SMA. Nor does it require being in
a position to specify how those parts would be arranged.
Hence, the doubts raised earlier concerning our ability to ascertain an
object's exact boundaries or position do not discredit either the claim that we
18 0
`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an

SMA, y, just in case y satisfies (1*) at t+/ if d is pushed in way Wat t &
L and C obtain'.
Call this description Dc*. In the light of the aforementioned implications of
the conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), we can see that it
is a necessary truth that the condition specified by Dc is satisfied by an
object if and only if this object is the SMA composed of m i , m 2 , m 3 , et
cetera, joined together in way R or attached along certain of their boundaries.
Hence, Dc is necessarily equivalent to a description which literally describes
a particular arrangement of particular bits of matter to form an SMA. In
other words, Dc is equivalent to some description similar to Da. Moreover,
the bits of matter under discussion are never joined, but these bits could be
joined in the way in question. Hence, an argument based upon strict
essentialism which is parallel to the one used to establish that Da* denotes
an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA, shows that Dc*
denotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind.
Notice that unlike Da*, a description like Dc* does not pick out an
unexemplified haecceity by literally specifying the (arrangement of) parts of
the only possible object which could have this unexemplified haecceity.
Rather, such a description denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a
nonexistent possible SMA by specifying laws and initial conditions which
13
181
It might be objected that some form of indeterminism is true which implies that there are
no laws and circumstances which logically determine the exact composition of an object. If so,
then there are no situations like Case (2), and a description like Dc fails to denote an
unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA because two or more possible SMAs
satisfy the condition on x in Dc. However, this objection is quite problematic. For it may be
that determinism is true. Or perhaps determinism is false, but the form of determinism required
by the objection is not true. In any case, there being descriptions which denote an unexemplified haecceity by specifying laws and initial conditions is compatible with the claim that the
laws are probabilistic or nondeterministic. To see this, consider the following hypothesis.
Whenever a series of events would result in an object's being assembled, the laws of nature, L*,
and the initial conditions together imply that a number of assemblies could result, i.e., each has
a nonzero probability less than 1. This supposition is compatible with the claim that L* and the
initial conditions assign a probability to one of these possible assemblies which they do not
assign to any other one of them, and this possible assembly is never actualized. If this claim
is correct, then an unexemplified haecceity is denoted by a description identifying the probability
of the possible assembly in question given L* and certain initial conditions, e.g., a description
of the form 'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an SMA, y, just
in case y is the thing which most probably satisfies (1*) at t+ I if d is pushed in way w at t &
L* and C obtain'.
182
CHAPTER 4
use descriptions making reference to laws and initial conditions to pick out
unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMA s, or the claim that we
have good reason to believe in particular cases of this kind that we have
employed a description which accomplishes this. And given my arguments,
these two claims are not implausible. Analogous arguments show that it is
at least equally plausible to suppose that corresponding claims are true of
certain descriptions which denote the haecceities of nonexistent possible

PMAs by referring to laws and initial conditions. In this latter sort of case,
the laws and conditions in question need only determine the sum of matter
that would compose a nonexistent possible PMA, and not the way in which
its parts would be arranged.
Let us now take stock. There are two sorts of descriptions that denote
unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities of mereological or causal products,
that is, mereological ones like Da*, Db*, et cetera, and causal ones such as
Dc*, and in some cases we can use descriptions of these sorts to denote
unexemplified haecceities of this kind, and apparently have good reason to
believe that we have done so."
183
In the light of my argument, we can see that Russell's account of the

singular reference of definite descriptions is compatible with a person's
picking out an unexemplified haecceity. Russell's account implies that there
are occasions on which a person picks out an item, x, even though he never
identifies x either by direct/ostensive means or in virtue of a causal
connection between himself and x. On Russell's account, an actual object
is sometimes an item of this kind, whereas on my account an unexemplified
haecceity of a NEP (a mereological or causal product) is sometimes such an
item. But on either account, when a person, 5, picks out such an item, x, he
accomplishes this (typically) by uniquely describing x in terms of one or
more existing items he has identified. For the purposes of my argument, I
leave open the way in which S identifies such an actual item, for instance,
whether it is by direct/ostensive means, an identifying description, or in
virtue of a causal connection between S and that item.'
14
Suppose for the sake of argument that some possible tables, ships, trees, and persons are
mereological products, and neither strict nor loose essentialism is true of such products. Are
unexemplified haecceities of products of these and similar kinds denoted by descriptions?
Our supposition is consistent with the claim that for any mereological product, o, o has the
same original composition in every possible world in which o exists, and there is no possible
world in which o has the same original composition as does a diverse physical object of the
same kind in another possible world. If this claim is correct, then there is a description that
denotes o's unexemplified haecceity by specifying a way in which certain actual objects could
be arranged or assembled to originally compose o, e.g., 'the haecceity , x, which is necessarily
such that x is exemplified by a table, y, if and only if y is initially made up of a and b joined
in way R*'.
Alternatively, suppose either that an atom which is originally part of o in one world is not
originally part of o in another world in which o exists, or that the objects which originally
compose o are aligned (at the time of o's origin) in a slightly different manner in one world
than they are in another world. This is compatible with o's being such that in every world in
which it exists it is originally composed of at least 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a and
b joined in way R*. If o's identity involves such a "threshold" of 99% or some other high
percentage of such parts, then the unexemplified haecceity of o is denoted by a description like
`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by a table, y, just in case y is
originally composed of 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a and b joined in way R*'
On the other hand, suppose that none of the matter which originally composes o in a world,
W originally composes o in another world, W in which o exists, and that o in 11/1 and a
diverse physical object of the same kind in W2 (made of the matter composing o in W1 ) are
mereologically indistinguishable from one another throughout their histories in W, and W 2 . It
then follows that o's unexemplified haecceity cannot be denoted by a mereological or causal
description of the sort I have constructed. However, it is not clear that this sort of extreme
mereological inessentialism is true of mereological products like pieces of matter, tables, ships,
etc.
15
Elsewhere I have argued that mereological and causal descriptions such as Da, Db, and
Dc make a kind of singular reference to nonexistent possible concreta, viz., certain mereological
and causal products. In contrast, my current argument is not that there is a kind of singular
reference to nonentities of a certain sort, but rather that some singular terms denote unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities - which are abstract entities. See Gary Rosenkrantz, "Nonexistent
Possibles and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147; and
"Reference, Intentionality, and Nonexistent Entities," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 163171. Compare Roderick Chisholm "Monads, Nonexistent Individuals, and. Possible Worlds:
Reply to Rosenkrantz," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 173-175; and Gary Rosenkrantz,
"On Objects Totally Out of This World," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986),
pp. 197-208.
ACQUAINTANCE
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
"The phenomenon or sign of the being or of the thatness which itself
ever eludes us."
[E. B. Bax Outlooks From The New Standpoint III. 183 (1891)]
"But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence,
cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else.
Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative.
Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute...
There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by
intuition and not by simple analysis. It is...our self which endures...
an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is
possible."
(1903 Bergson An Introduction To Metaphysics)
I - HAECCEITIES AND ACQUAINTANCE

"There are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge of things and knowledge of truths."
[1902 Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy V. 46 (1943)]
Russell drew a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and

knowledge by description.' He regarded the former as a kind of direct
awareness of an item, and the latter as a kind of indirect knowledge of an
item. Russell maintained that unlike knowledge by description, knowledge
by acquaintance is logically independent of all knowledge of truths. He also
held that an individual is acquainted with his own sense-data, various
'See Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,"

Mysticism and Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1917), pp. 209-232, and "On the Nature of
Acquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174.
184
185
abstract entities, and (in all likelihood) himself, but not with physical objects
or persons other than himself. 2
I shall argue that there is a conception of acquaintance other than Russell's
which is definable in terms of a person's grasping a haecceity. Although
similar to Russell's conception of acquaintance in some ways, my conception
of acquaintance differs from Russell's in a crucial respect, since according
to my conception a person's being acquainted with an item entails that he
knows a truth about that item. Nevertheless, my argument is Russellian in
spirit. Utilizing my sense of acquaintance, I will argue that an individual is
acquainted with himself, certain of his own mental states, and some abstract
entities, but not with physical objects or persons other than himself.
However, my argument for this claim will be quite different from any which
Russell offered. 3
The following definition will help me to explain the way in which
Russellian acquaintance and acquaintance in my sense are similar. Let us
say that an identifying property is a characteristic which is possibly had by
something, but not possibly had by more than one thing at a time. 4
Haecceities are identifying properties, but so are other characteristics such
as being the oldest man, being the president of the U.S.A., being the even
prime number, and being the thing I perceive. The distinction between an
identifying property of this kind and a haecceity is analogous to the
distinction between two kinds of singular terms: those that are definite
descriptions, for instance, 'the oldest man', and those that are indexical
indicators or proper names that do not function as concealed definite
See Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press,
1950), Chapter 5.
3
1 was not the first to suggest a parallel between Russell's views and Haecceitism. See
David Kaplan, "How to Russell a Frege-Church," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp.
716-729. Kaplan believes that there is a metaphysical parallel in that both Russell and the
haecceitist accept the existence of singular propositions about individuals. In contrast, I discern
an epistemological parallel concerning the objects of direct acquaintance.
4
Here I borrow from Roderick Chisholm. I define an identifying property in the same way
as he defines an individual concept. See Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp.
23-52.
186
ACQUAINTANCE 187
CHAPTER 5
descriptions, for example, T. 5 Hence, there is an analogy between a

haecceity and such an indicator or name.
I have argued that if entities have haecceities, then there is a propositional
conception of direct or strict de re belief which is definable in terms of the
notion of haecceity. 6 I have also argued that every entity has a haecceity.'
Based on these arguments, I infer that there is such a propositional
conception of direct de re belief. This strict conception of de re belief can
be defined as follows.
(DI) S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,
being identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which is
N is F, and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and F-ness. 8
There is a corresponding conception of direct or strict de re knowledge,
definable in the manner below. 9
1 presuppose a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions or singular terms of the form

`The so and so'. According to such an analysis, a proposition expressed by a sentence of the
form 'The so and so is F', e.g., 'The oldest man is wise', is analyzable as (i) There exists at
least one so and so, and (ii) there exists at most one so and so, and (iii) whatever is a so and
so is F.
6
7
See Chapter 1, section V.

See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.
8 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with an appropriate name and
predicative expression, respectively. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called
is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Replacement
of the schematic letter 'N' by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic
definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with 'N' (formed from 'N')
designates x's haecceity.
9
1n the definition which follows, 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to be
replaced with appropriate linguistic expressions. In clause (ii) of this definition, the first
occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called
is of predication. Substitution of a name 'N' for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the
satisfaction of this schematic definition only when 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being
identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.
(D2) x is directly known by S to be F =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity,

being identical with N, and (ii) S knows that something which is N
is F, and in knowing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity
and F-ness.
Finally, the concept of haecceity can be used to define an intuitive notion of
knowledge by acquaintance, that is, a direct cognitive relation between a
person and an object. The conception of knowledge by acquaintance I have
in mind is definable in the following way. 19
(D3) S is acquainted with x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, being
identical with N, and (ii) S knows that there is something that is N,
and in knowing this S grasps x's haecceity."
Suppose that a person, S, has direct de re belief or knowledge about an
item, x, as in (D1) or (D2), or is acquainted with x as in (D3). In that event,
S's belief or knowledge about x involves his attributing x's haecceity to x,
and thereby involves his grasping the haecceity of x. Such belief or
knowledge about x is as direct or unmediated as propositional belief or
knowledge of an item could be.
As we have seen, there is an analogy between a haecceity and an
indexical indicator or proper name which does not function as a concealed
definite description. Moreover, a person can express his thought when he
grasps x's haecceity just provided that he uses an indexical indicator or name
to designate x, and this indicator or name does not function as a concealed
definite description. An exactly parallel remark applies to a person's ability
10
Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, pp. 23-52. He argues, in a somewhat
similar vein, that a person individuates a particular per se when he grasps its haecceity.
Chisholm argues forcefully against this view in The First Person (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1981).
11
The letter 'N' is schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate nominative expression.
In clause (ii), the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity. Replacing the
schematic letter 'Ar by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only
if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's
haecceity.
88
CHAPTER 5
to express his thought if he has Russellian acquaintance with x. For these

reasons, Russellian acquaintance and the kind of acquaintance defined in
(D3) are analogous. On the other hand, while Russell holds the controversial
view that knowledge by acquaintance is logically independent of all
knowledge of truths, clause (ii) of (D3) ensures that if a person is acquainted
with an item, then this logically entails that he knows some truth about that
item.
A person, S, is acquainted with an item, x, only if S grasps the haecceity
of x. Hence, if it is impossible for S to grasp the haecceity of x, then it is
impossible for S to be acquainted with x. Duns Scotus wondered whether
it is possible for any of us to grasp a haecceity. He wrote as follows.
I concede that a singular is intrinsically intelligible on its side. But if it is not intrinsically
intelligible to some intellect, for instance, ours, at least this is not an impossibility on the
part of the singular, just as it is not on the part of the sun that to see at night is impossible,
but rather on the part of the eye. I2
However, there is some reason to think that each of us grasps his own
haecceity as well as the haecceities of numerous physical objects and persons
in his environment. This follows from a principle deemed acceptable earlier,
namely, (PG). 13
(PG) If at time t it is plausible for SI that F-ness exists, and at t it is plausible for SI that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si can
infer that it is prima facie plausible (for Si) that S2 grasps F-ness
at t."
Given my earlier arguments, it is plausible for me that everything has a
haecceity, including myself. Thus, I am justified in believing that my
12
Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections)
in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 589.
13
14
1n this principle '' is a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriate

predicate expression.
ACQUAINTANCE
189
haecceity exists. In other words, it is plausible for me that there exists the
property of being identical with me. Inasmuch as it is also plausible for me
that I believe that something is identical with me, (PG) enables me to
conclude that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that I grasp my haecceity.
(I ignore temporal indices here for the sake of simplicity.) Moreover, I can
argue in a parallel fashion with respect to each of us. For instance, it is
plausible for me both that the property of being identical with Clinton exists,
and that Clinton believes that someone is identical with Clinton. Thus, I am
in a position to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of us
grasps his own haecceity.
Alternatively, suppose that I make a demonstrative perceptual identification of a physical object or person, x, that is to say, I perceptually identify
x as this. It is plausible for me that everything has a haecceity, including
this. Therefore, I am warranted in believing that the haecceity of this exists.
In other words, it is (now) plausible for me that there exists the property of
being identical with this. Since it is also (now) plausible for me that I have
the perceptual belief, there is something that it is identical with this, it
follows via (PG) that I can (now) infer that it is prima facie plausible (for
me) that I grasp x's haecceity. Based on parallel arguments, I am in a
position to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of us
grasps the haecceities of many physical objects and persons in his environment. However, this prima facie plausibility could be overridden or defeated
(at a later time) by a suitably strong counter-argument. I shall present such
a counter-argument: an argument which shows that none of us grasps the
haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. Nor will I stop
there. I shall argue further that it is impossible for anyone to grasp the
haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, and hence that
it is impossible for a person to be acquainted with such an object.
Russell held the view that perceiving a physical object or person does not
provide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it. Russell's
argument for this view presupposes the questionable doctrine that sense-data
are a 'veil' cutting a person off from acquaintance with the external world.
Other arguments advanced in favor of Russell's view rest on controversial
claims of Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology, for example, that
perceptual beliefs are uncertain, or that such beliefs can only be inferentially
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
justified. I will argue that perceiving a physical object or person does not
provide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it in the sense of
acquaintance defined in (D3), but my argument shall not presuppose any of
the questionable or controversial epistemological claims mentioned above.
II - HAECCEITIES AND RE-IDENTIFICATION
190
191
"A matter of deduction and inference."

(1736 Bp. Butler The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed II. vi. 36)
What does it mean to say that perception of a physical object or person is

an avenue for acquaintance with it? Suppose I perceive a single object.
During such a perceptual episode I can identify the thing I perceive as this.
Alternatively, I can baptize the object. For example, we may assume that
I name the thing I perceive Adam. My perceiving the object enables me to
be acquainted with it just in case both of the following things are true. (i)
In the circumstances described above, if I identify the object by means of
knowing that the thing I perceive is this, then I know that there is something
that is this, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of being
identical with this Hence, I'm acquainted with the object (ii) In the
circumstances described above, if I identify the object by means of knowing
that the thing I perceive is Adam, then I know that there is something that
is Adam, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of being identical
with Adam. Consequently, I am acquainted with the object. The point in
distinguishing (i) and (ii) is to allow for the possibility that haecceities can
be expressed by either indexical indicators or proper names. Of course,
although in the preceding example I am the perceiver, remarks parallel to the
foregoing ones apply to any perceiver.
Philosophical reflection raises doubts about whether sense-perception is an
avenue for acquaintance with objects. For example, consider these remarks
made by Scotus.
Sincere truth is not grasped by the senses in such wise as to enable them to perceive the
immutability of the truth they apprehend, or for this matter, the immutability itself of the
object; for the senses perceive present objects only as long as these are present...even
supposing that I should have the object A uninterruptedly in my presence, and that I should
gaze upon it without intermission, so that my vision would retain the same grade of sharpness
throughout the whole process, I would still be unable to perceive the immutability of A, for
at each moment of my vision I would perceive the object precisely as it is constituted at that
192
CHAPTER 5
same moment... 15
It is sufficiently clear from this passage that Scotus is not a skeptic about
sense-perception: he presumes that we have perceptual knowledge of external
objects. Nevertheless, it is evident that Scotus finds sense-perception
wanting in some respects. Similarly, while I assume that we have perceptual

knowledge of external things, I will argue that an individual's perception of
a physical object or person fails to provide him with an avenue for acquaintance with it. Moreover, my argument for thinking that perception fails to
provide such an avenue is related to Scotus's reasons for regarding
perception as wanting in some respects. To see this, compare Scotus's
remarks in the passage quoted above to the following preliminary version of
my argument.
1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to be
acquainted with it, then he has the ability to identify an object x he
presently perceives with an object y he perceived earlier, by grasping
the haecceities of x and y, comparing them, and seeing that they are the
same.
t5
Duns Scotus, Metaphysics I, q. 4, n. 23; VII, 65a. Quoted by Peter C. Vier in Evidence
and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan
Institute, 1951), pp. 154-155. Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, p. 34.
Chisholm observes that "If today I individuate something per se as being that thing and if
tomorrow I individuate something per se as being that thing, I may well have picked out two
different things; whereas if today I individuate something per se as being identical with me and
if tomorrow I individuate something per se as being identical with me, then I will have picked
out one and the same thing." In his endnote 24, on the passage just quoted, Chisholm alludes
to an earlier version of the argument I will present in the text. This argument originated in my
doctoral dissertation, Individual Essences (Brown University, 1976). Also compare Frederick
Copleston's account of De Anima (imputed by many to Scotus) in A History of Philosophy
(New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1985), Volume II, p. 493. Copelston remarks: "If two
material things were deprived of all difference of accidents (of place, colour, shape, etc.), neither
sense nor intellect could distinguish them from one another, even though their 'singularities'
(Scotus's haecceitas) remained, and this shows that we have, in our present state, no clear and
complete knowledge of the singularity of a thing." For a general discussion of Scotus's views
on sense-perception and epistemology, as well as their influence, see Katherine Tachau, Vision
and Certitude In The Age Of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, And The Foundation Of Semantics,
1250-1345 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).
ACQUAINTANCE
193
2. None of us has such an ability.

Therefore,
3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to be
acquainted with it.
Before attempting to demonstrate the cogency of this argument, I shall
restate it by revising the premises in certain ways, and providing a precise
meaning for these revised premises. In particular, the restated argument will
employ the notion of (i) a person's re-identifying an object from one
perceptual situation to another, and (ii) the kind of inference a person
performs if he identifies an object he presently perceives with an object he
perceived earlier by grasping the haecceity of the object. In what follows,
I shall attempt to clarify these ideas.
If I assert that the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at ti (t, >
t1 ), then I am making a re-identification claim. A person S re-identifies an
object from one perceptual situation to another if and only if S knows that
the thing he perceives at t2 is the thing he perceived at t1 , where there is a
time between t1 and t2 at which S does not perceive this object. For
example, suppose that t1 t2 , and t3 are particular times (t3 > t, > t1 ). If I
know that the thing I perceive at t3 is the thing I perceived at t1 , and at 1,1
do not perceive this object, then I have re-identified an object from one
perceptual situation to another.
It is important to emphasize that the inference a person performs if he
re-identifies an object from one perceptual situation to another by grasping
its haecceity is a deductive inference. In what follows, I will characterize the
premises from which such a person deduces a re-identification claim, and
indicate the kind of deduction he performs.
The premises in the deduction are statements which are singular perceptual
observation reports of the form 'The thing I perceive at t is IV', where 't'
designates a particular time, where 'IV' is either the indicator 'this' or a
proper name with which the observer baptizes an object when he perceives
it, and where 'I' refers to the observer. Let such a statement be called a
perceptual observation statement (POS). Here is an example of a POS: 'The
thing I perceive at t1 is this'.
Suppose that perceiving an object acquaints me with it. Given this
,
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
supposition, if I know a POS or a statement of the form 'The thing I

perceive at t is N', then I grasp the haecceity of an object, namely, a
property of the form 'being identical with N', and hence I am acquainted
with that object. This is implied by what was said about my perceiving an
object in the first paragraph of this section.
If I know a POS, then I attribute an identifying property to an object, for
example, being the thing I perceive at t,. Such an identifying property can
be had by at most one item throughout all of time. I call an identifying
property of this kind a fixed property, and I define this notion as follows.
perceived at t2 is the thing I perceive at t3 , and if I also know that the thing
I perceived at t, is the thing I perceive at t3 , then I can deduce that the thing
I perceived at t2 is the thing I perceived at t,. I call a simple deduction in
accord with (Al) an SD.
Since a haecceity is a fixed property, SD is the kind of deduction an
individual performs if he re-identifies an object from one perceptual situation
to another by using its haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim from
POSs. In particular, the deduction goes like this. Where being identical
with N is the haecceity of an object: I know that the thing I perceive at t2 is
N, and I also recall that the thing I perceived at t, is N. Since being
identical with N is a fixed property, I can deduce that the thing I perceive
at t2 is the thing I perceived at t, by performing SD in accord with (Al).
We are now prepared to reformulate our original argument. Let the ability
to re-identify a physical object or person from one perceptual situation to
another by using its haecceity to perform SD from presently known and
remembered POSs be called A.
194
F is a fixed property =df. F is an identifying property such that: it is

impossible that (ax)(3y)(30(1 1 )(x*y & x has F at time t & y has F at time
t').
The identifying property, being the thing I perceive, is not a fixed property.
On the other hand, the property of being the thing I perceive at t,, and
similar temporally indexed properties involving t2 , t3 , or any other particular
time, are fixed properties. Another kind of fixed property is a haecceity.
The notion of a fixed property can be used to explicate the notion of a reidentification claim broadly understood. The statement that the G is the F
is a re-identification claim if and only if (i) being F is a fixed property, (ii)
being G is a fixed property, (iii) 0(x)(Gx --> Fx), and (iv) E1(x)(Fx Gx). 16
If a person uses a haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim from POSs,
then he is reasoning in accord with the following axiom concerning fixed
properties.
(Al) For any fixed properties F, G, and H, if the thing that has G has F,
and the thing that has H has F, then the thing that has G has H.
(Al) is a necessary truth, and a person can perform simple deductive

inferences in accord with it. For example, if I know that the thing I
16
The letters 'F' and `G' are schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate predicate
expression.
195
1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to be

acquainted with it, then he has A.
2. None of us has A.
Therefore,
3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to be
acquainted with it.
Call this revised argument R.
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III - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 1 OF R

It follows by easy and irrefragable deduction."
(1789 Belsham Essays, Philosophical, Historical,
and Literary I. i. 4)
Imagine that c is both the thing I perceive at t1 and the thing I perceive at
t2 , where t2 is a minute later than 1'1 , and there is a time between ti and t, at
which I do not perceive c. Suppose that during these perceptual episodes I
either identify c as this, or bestow a proper name upon c. Further suppose
that during each perceptual episode I know a POS containing an indexical
indicator or proper name designating c. In other words, what I know at t,
is
the thing I perceive at t 1 is N (call this statement p),
and what I know at t, is
the thing I perceive at t, is N (call this statement q).
p and q are schematic and the POSs known result from replacing occurrences
of 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name.
Assume for the sake of argument that perceiving c acquaints me with it.
Then my knowing p at t1 acquaints me with c. That is, by knowing p at t 1
I know that there is something that is N, and I thereby grasp the haecceity
of c - the property of being identical with N. Furthermore, my knowing q
at t, acquaints me with c. Thus, I grasp the haecceity of c by knowing q at
t2 . These conclusions follow from what was said about my knowing a POS
in section II. Notice that my argument here presupposes that perceptions of
c which occur at different times under similar conditions have an equal claim
to be an avenue for acquaintance with c.
Because I have the ability to remember things I knew a short time ago, we
may assume that at t, I remember what I knew at ti when I knew p. It
follows that at t, I remember (and hence know)
ACQUAINTANCE
197
the thing I perceived at t, is N (call this statement r).

By my knowing r at t2 I grasp the haecceity of c, and in so doing I'm
acquainted with c. My argument here presupposes that if I grasp the
haecceity of c, then I have the ability to remember that haecceity.
Notice that if I know q and I know r, then I have the ability to know (q
& r). Since I know both q and r, we may assume that at t2 I know (q & r).
The haecceity of c, namely, being identical with N, is a fixed property.
Hence, by (Al) it is a trivial deductive consequence of (q & r) that
the thing I perceive at t, is the thing I perceived at t 1 (call this re-identification claim s).
As I have the ability to perform simple deductive inferences, we may assume
that at t2 I deduce s from (q & r) by performing SD in accord with (Al). At
this point I know s because I have deduced it from (q & r). Thus, I have
exercised A by using c's haecceity to perform SD from the conjunction of
the presently known POS q and the remembered POS r. Hence, if
perceiving c acquaints me with it, then I have A. Inasmuch as an argument
of this kind applies equally well to any of us, we should conclude that
premise 1 of R is true."
17
0f course, there are persons, e.g., amnesiacs and idiots, who lack either the ability to
remember or the ability to perform deductions. However, since a person who possesses these
abilities is in at least as good a position to be acquainted with an object as one who lacks them,
this fact is compatible with my argument for premise 1 of R.
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IV - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 2 OF R

"A joyful mother of two goodly sons....the one so like the other
As could not be distinguished but by names."
(1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act I Scene I)
"These two Antipholus', these two so like...I know not which is

which."
(1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act 5 Scene I)
"You must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration."
(1734 Berkeley The Analyst 19)
In this section I argue that A is an extraordinary epistemic ability which none

of us possesses. My argument will involve an analysis of certain kinds of
evidence available for re-identification claims.
Reports of observed similarities in the sensory properties of material
objects justify re-identification claims about such objects. By sensory
properties I mean shapes, sizes, colors, odors, tastes, sounds, temperatures,
textures, degrees of bulk and hardness, and properties which fix, or partially
fix, the spatial location of an object (and do no more). Let us consider a
representative case in which observed similarities in sensory properties
provide evidence for a re identification claim. Let the property of being
spherical & 2 inches in diameter & orange & fuzzy & soft & cold & sweet
& at place p be called being EP. Suppose I know that the thing I perceive at
t2 is (ID and the thing I perceived at t 1 was 43, where there is a time between
ti and t2 at which I do not perceive the thing I perceived at tp My
knowledge of this similarity in sensory properties provides me with prima
facie evidence for the re-identification claim, the thing I perceive at t2 is the
thing I perceived at tp This prima facie evidence is normally defeated if I
have reason to believe that there is another object in the vicinity at the time
which has the same qualitative sensory properties as the thing I perceive at
t2 , for example, an exact look-alike.
In the case described above the statement 'the thing I perceive at t2 is 4.
& the thing I perceived at t1 was justifies the re-identification claim 'the
thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at t; . However, the former
-
ACQUAINTANCE
199
statement does not logically entail the latter claim, and the justificatory
relationship between them is a nondeductive or inductive one. In general,
the justificatory relationship between statements asserting the existence of
observed similarities in sensory properties and re-identification claims is an
inductive (nondeductive) one.'
The following discussion brings out the character of certain typical
grounds for re-identification claims which do not consist solely in observations of similarities in sensory properties. Suppose that at t1 I perceive a
single object. I then fall asleep for an hour. At t2 I wake up and perceive
a solitary object in the same place. Let the claim, the thing I perceive at t2
is the thing I perceived at t1 , be called m. If at t2, I know that the object I
perceived an hour ago has been locked in a bank vault for the past hour,
then I can justify m by arguing that under the circumstances it is causally
impossible that the object I perceived an hour ago has been replaced by
another object. Or suppose I know that the object I perceived an hour ago
was the item in the top draw of my desk, and that such an item's being
replaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrence in the past. Then
I can justify m by arguing that in the circumstances it is improbable that the
object I perceived an hour ago has been replaced by another object. Or
imagine that when I awake I notice that the thing I perceive is a pool of
water, and I recall that the thing I perceived an hour ago was a hunk of ice.
In this event, I can justify m by arguing that it is the best explanation of
what I have observed. Finally, imagine that someone assures me that there
has been just one object there all along. Then I can justify m by appealing
to his testimony on this matter. Thus, each of the following procedures can
be employed in the justification of re-identification claims: observations of
similarities in sensory properties, causal reasoning, enumerative induction,
inferences to the best explanation, appeals to testimony, and similar inductive
techniques. I call such procedures inductive methods, and any evidence
provided by such methods inductive evidence. The discussion above
provides a representative sampling of the ways in which inductive methods
18
Compare John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1974), Chapter 6. Pollock argues that justifying a re-identification claim ultimately
requires an appeal to observations of similarities in sensory properties which inductively confirm
some re-identification claim.
200
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ACQUAINTANCE
can be used to justify a re-identification claim, doubtless it is true that these

methods can be used to justify such claims in a variety of other ways.
We are now in a position to show that none of us has A. My strategy for
showing this involves doing two things: (a) Specifying circumstances which
are logically sufficient for anyone's exercising A if he possesses such an
ability; and (b) Showing that if any one of us is in such circumstances, then
this does not logically entail that he exercises A. (a) and (b) together imply
that none of us has A.
1 will accomplish (a) by describing a situation which may obtain under
typical conditions, and involves circumstances logically sufficient for
anyone's re-identifying a particular object from one perceptual situation to
another by exercising A if he possesses such an ability. Such circumstances
are optimally favorable for the exercise of A. I9 An individual S (who may
be any one of us) is in this situation. I will accomplish (b) by showing,
first, that it is possible for S to be in this situation and have inadequate
inductive evidence for re-identifying the object in question, and second, that
if this possibility is realized, then S does not re-identify this object. The
situation to which I refer is described below.
Situation (1): S knows that there are two objects which have the same
qualitative sensory properties in the vicinity because he observes his friend
Mo displaying two such objects. Then Mo puts both of these objects behind
his back where S cannot perceive them. Following this, at 1, Mo displays a
single one of these objects (call this object o). At t1 o is the thing S
perceives, and S either identifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o.
Then Mo puts o behind his back where S cannot perceive it. A minute later
at t2 Mo displays o again. At 12 o is the thing S perceives, and S either
identifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o. From his perceptions
at 1 1 and t2 , S knows POSs containing indexicals or proper names which
designate o. In other words, what S knows at t, is
201
the thing he perceives at t 1 is N (call this statement pi ),

and what S knows at t2 is
the thing he perceives at 1 2 is N (call this statement q 1 ).
p1 and q1 are schematic and the POSs known by S result from replacing
occurrences of 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t2
S remembers what he knew at t1 when he knew p 1 . Hence, at t2 S remembers
the thing he perceived at t 1 is N (call this statement r1 ).
At t, S knows (q 1 & 1. 1 ). At t, S meets the following condition. For any
statements p and q, if he knows p, and p trivially entails q, then if he
attempts to deduce q from p he succeeds in performing this deduction. A
person who meets this condition will be said to be logically accomplished.
Finally, at t2 S attempts to deduce the following statement from (q 1 & r 1 ) by
performing SD:
the thing he perceives at 12 is the thing he perceived at t, (call this re
identification claim s1 ).
19
0f course, one who possesses an ability may fail in an attempt to exercise it. However,
this can occur only if one is not in optimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of that
ability. Hence, if a person possesses A, then this does not entail that he exercises A whenever
he attempts to do so. However, if a person possesses A and attempts to exercise A when in
optimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of A, then this entails that he exercises A.
Initially, one should notice four things about Situation (1). (i) S is
logically accomplished. (ii) S knows (q, & r1 ). (iii) Given the nature of A,
if S possesses A, then (q1 & r1) trivially entails s 1 . (iv) S attempts to deduce
s 1 from (q1 & r 1 ) by performing SD. (i)-(iv) together imply that necessarily,
if S has A, then in situation (1) he deduces s1 from (q1 & r 1 ). Given the
nature of A, we should conclude that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1)
S is in circumstances which are logically sufficient for his re-identifying o
from one perceptual situation to another by exercising A. To say that S is
in such circumstances is equivalent to saying that if S has A, then he is in
circumstances which logically entail that he both knows s, and deduces s 1
from (q1 & r1 ) by exercising A. Finally, notice that Situation (1) may obtain
under typical conditions. In sum, by describing Situation (1) I have
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CHAPTER 5
accomplished (a).
In what follows I accomplish (b). Remember that in Situation (1) the two
objects involved have the same qualitative sensory properties, for example,
they look exactly alike, they feel exactly alike, and so on. Moreover, it is
possible that in Situation (1) at t2 S has inadequate inductive evidence for
Let us suppose that this is actually the case. I will argue that given this
supposition, S does not re-identify o from one perceptual situation to another
in Situation (1). In other words, I shall argue that if at t2 S lacks adequate
inductive evidence for s 1 , then in Situation (1) he does not know s l , and he
does not deduce si from (q1 & r 1 ). To begin, notice that in Situation (1), the
evidence provided for s i by S's observations of similarities in sensory
properties is defeated by S's knowledge that there is a "look-alike" in the
vicinity. And since we are supposing that S has inadequate inductive
evidence for s i , it is also true that he is not justified in believing that in the
circumstances it is causally impossible that the thing he perceived at t1 has
been replaced by another object during the interval between t1 and t2 . For
the same reason, he is not justified in believing that in such circumstances
an object's being replaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrence
in the past, and he lacks adequate testimonial evidence for s i . Similar
remarks apply to the other kinds of relevant inductive evidence which S
lacks. If as supposed, S has inadequate inductive evidence for s1 in Situation
(1), then the hypothesis that the thing he perceives at t2 and the thing he
perceived at t 1 are different objects which look like one another, is
compatible with everything S knows. That is, without additional information
he does not know whether he has perceived the same object at t1 and t2 or
diverse "look-alikes". It follows, first, that in Situation (1) S does not know
s1 because he has inadequate inductive evidence, and second, that in
Situation (1) S does not deduce s from (q, & r 1 ). But it has already been
shown that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1) S is in circumstances which
logically entail that he both knows s 1 , and deduces s, from (q, & rd.
Consequently, S lacks A. Since the above argument holds equally well at
any time during S's life, it follows that S never possesses A. Thus premise
2 of R is true. Now that both premises of R have been demonstrated, we
should conclude that perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint
ACQUAINTANCE
203
any of us with it.'
tuatton
(1) is a case in which o has a "look-alike" in the vicinity, and in certain
Si
circumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from one perceptual situation to another
because he has inadequate inductive evidence for a re-identification claim. Analogous cases can
20
also be used in my argument. For example, a case in which o radically changes its sensory
properties, and in certain circumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from one
perceptual situation to another because he lacks adequate inductive evidence for a re-
identification claim.
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CHAPTER 5
V - SYNCHRONIC VERSIONS OFR

"Perceiving is a general term for hearing, seeing, tasting,
touching, smelling."
[1762 Kames Elements of Criticism 475 (1833)]
"The same material thing....can be present to our senses in
many different ways...."
[1932 H. H. Price Perception 145 (1964)]
Some philosophers have argued that physical objects and persons consist of
a sequence of temporal slices, each slice being an essentially ephemeral and
nonrecurrable particular. It is impossible for such ephemera to be reidentified from one perceptual situation to another. This means that a
person's being acquainted with a temporal slice does not imply that he is
able to re-identify it from one perceptual situation to another. Hence, the
strategy employed in R cannot be used to show that a person's perceiving an
object does not acquaint him with its present temporal slice. However, I
shall argue that considerations similar to those employed in defense of R
imply that an individual's perceiving a physical object or person, x, neither
acquaints him with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints him with x. These
considerations concern a person's perceiving a single object by means of two
sensory modes at once, for instance, simultaneously touching an object with
both your right and left hands.
We should affirm the following principle of parity concerning sensory
modes (call it the principle of equal treatment): if two observations of an
item, x, 0, and 02 , are alike in all relevant cognitive respects, then the
hypothesis that 0, provides an avenue for acquaintance with x is on a par
with the hypothesis that 02 provides an avenue for acquaintance with x. For
example, the following sensory modes have an equal claim to be an avenue
for acquaintance with an item: seeing it with the naked eye, seeing it with
the aid of eyeglasses, seeing it through a periscope, and seeing it via its
reflection in a mirror. Furthermore: (i) glimpses of an item taken from
different vantage points have an equal claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with that item, and (ii) looking at an item with both eyes, looking at
it with the right eye, and looking at it with the left eye, have an equal claim
ACQUAINTANCE
205
to be an avenue for acquaintance with that item. Points analogous to the

ones made concerning sight in (i) and (ii) also hold for the other four senses.
It is also plausible to suppose that each of the five senses has an equal claim
to be an avenue for acquaintance with objects. If so, then if one sense is not
such an avenue, none of them is. But there is an objection to this. If one
sees or touches an object, then one is aware of a definite boundary between
that object and the rest of the world. But this is not true of, perceiving an
object with one of the other three senses. Because of this, sight and touch
are superior to the other three senses as avenues for acquaintance. Whether
or not this objection succeeds, it seems safe to say that if seeing or touching
an item does not provide an avenue for acquaintance with it, then neither
does perceiving it with one of the other three senses.
A case in which a person simultaneously has two distinct visual perceptions of a single object can be used to show that seeing an item does not
acquaint one with it. As a first step towards describing such a case, imagine
a device consisting of two long, straight, hollow ocular tubes mounted so
that a person can look through them in the same way as he looks through
binoculars. The tubes can be adjusted so that they are either parallel or skew
to one another. Call such a device a binocularscope, and imagine that an
individual is looking through one. The tubes may either be positioned so
that each of his eyes sees a different object, or be positioned so that each of
his eyes sees the same object. In appropriate circumstances, the former
situation causes him to have two distinct simultaneous visual perceptions of
different objects; and the latter situation causes him to have two distinct
simultaneous visual perceptions of a single object. Moreover, if he is in the
former situation and sees a pair of look-alikes, then his visual experiences
are qualitatively indistinguishable from the ones he has in the latter situation.
Hence, in the latter situation a person is seeing a single object, but without
additional information he literally does not know whether he is seeing one
object or a pair of look-alikes.
The following case in which I observe an object through a binocularscope
can be used to show that my seeing a physical object or person, x, neither
acquaints me with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints me with x.
Case (1): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objects
having the same qualitative sensory properties which are within the
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ACQUAINTANCE
CHAPTER 5
immediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon take me into the
room and allow me to see at least one of these objects. Mo attaches my
eyes to the ocular tubes of a binocularscope. However, since the ends of the
tubes have been covered with black paper I do not see anything. While I
cannot see, Mo brings me into the room and adjusts the binocularscope so
that if he removes the blinders then I see just one object, but have two
distinct visual perceptions of it. Then Mo removes the blinders, and at t1 I
have two distinct visual perceptions of a single object. Let the object I am
seeing (or a temporal slice of it at ti ) be called d. Under these conditions,
d is both the thing I see with my right eye at t1 , and the thing I see with my
left eye at t 1 . At t1 , based on each one of my visual perceptions of d, I
either identify d as this or bestow a proper name upon d. In other words,
at t1 I know that
the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is N (call this observation statement
P2),
and at t1 I also know that
the thing I see with my left eye at t 1 is N (call this observation statement
q2).
p2 and q 2 are schematic, and the statements I know result from replacing
occurrences of 'IV' with the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t1 I am
logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q2), and I attempt to deduce the
following claim from (p2 & q 2) by performing SD:
the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is the thing I see with my left eye
at t1 (call this identity claim r2).
Finally, I neither remove my eyes from the binocularscope, nor perceive any
of the objects around me in any other way.
Now let us see how Case (1) can be used to show that my seeing d does
not acquaint me with it. Suppose that my seeing d acquaints me with it.
207
Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (1) each of my
two visual perceptions of d acquaints me with it. Thus, at t, I am acquainted
with d both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2 . That is, at t l I know that
there is something that is N both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2 . Hence,
at t1 I grasp the haecceity of d, namely, being, identical with N, both by
knowing p 2 and by knowing q2 . Therefore, an argument analogous to the
one for premise 1 of R has the following consequence.' If my seeing d
acquaints me it, then in Case (1) I have the ability to come to , know r2 by
using the haecceity of d to deduce r2 from (p2 & q 2) through performing SD
in accord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A'. I shall argue below
that in Case (1) I lack A', and hence that my seeing d does not acquaint me
with it.
First of all, if I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances that are
logically sufficient for my exercising it I am logically accomplished, I know
(p2 & q 2), and I attempt to deduce r2 from (1,2 & q 2) by performing SD. This
is true because given the nature of A', what was said of A in the next to last
paragraph of section IV holds analogously for A'. In what follows, I
demonstrate that my being in Case (1) is not logically sufficient for my
exercising A', and hence that I lack A'. I will accomplish this by showing,
first, that it is possible for me to be in Case (1) and have inadequate
inductive evidence for r2 , and second, that if this possibility is realized then
in Case (1) I do not exercise A'.
To begin, an identity claim like r2 can be justified by employing inductive
methods. For example, I am using such methods if I justify r2 by inferring
it from premises like these: when I have had two visual perceptions of
objects which look exactly alike, I have usually had two perceptions of the
same object; when I put my finger down near the open end of one tube of
the binocularscope this is accompanied by my having two perceptions of an
object having a finger looking exactly like mine next to it; someone tells me
21
This analogous argument differs from the one for premise 1 of R in just two noteworthy
respects. Since this analogous argument concerns cases in which someone has two perceptions
of an item at once: (i) it applies to temporal slices, and (ii) it does not presuppose that if
someone grasps a haecceity, then he has the ability to remember that haecceity. Neither (i) nor
(ii) is true of the argument for premise 1 of R, because in the cases relevant to this argument
a person has perceptions of an item at different times.
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ACQUAINTANCE
CHAPTER 5
that I am seeing just one object, and so on. In Case (1), any evidence
provided by the first premise I mentioned is defeated by my knowledge that
there is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. Now, it is possible that in Case
(1) at t, I have inadequate inductive evidence for r2 . Let us suppose that this
is actually the case. Given this supposition, the hypothesis that I see two
things which look exactly alike, is compatible with everything I know. That
is, without additional information I do not know whether I am seeing one
object or a pair of look-alikes. Hence, in Case (1) I do not know r2 because
I have inadequate inductive evidence, and I do not deduce r2 from (p2 & q2).
Since to exercise A' is to come to know r2 by deducing it from (p2 & q 2), it
follows that in Case (1) I do not exercise A'. But it was shown earlier that
if I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances which logically entail
that I exercise it. Consequently, I lack A'. Notice that my argument for this
conclusion is analogous to the one for premise 2 of R. Since I have already
shown that if my seeing d acquaints me with it, then in Case (1) I possess
A', we should conclude that my seeing d does not acquaint me with it. Of
course, the same argument applies equally well to any of us at any time.
Therefore, an individual's seeing a physical object or person neither
acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices.
It might be thought that this argument is needlessly elaborate. Specifically,
one might think that the conclusion of this argument can be established
based on not much more than Cartesian epistemology, and that my
introduction of the binocularscope is unnecessary. In response, I remind the
reader that my argument does not assume the requisite controversial claims
of Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology: that perceptual beliefs are
uncertain, and that such beliefs can only be inferentially justified. Rather,
the assumption of my argument is that one's identification of an object from
one perceptual mode to another depends upon an inductive connection
between perceptual premises and the identification. This latter assumption
is much less controversial than the two aforementioned claims of foundationalist epistemology.
Case (1) is a situation of the following kind: I perceive a single object, but
in certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or two
because I lack adequate inductive evidence for an identity claim. In a case
of this kind I may have two simultaneous perceptions of a single object with
209
a particular sense, for example, two simultaneous visual perceptions of an

object, two simultaneous tactual perceptions of an object, two simultaneous
auditory perceptions of an object, and so on. If there is such a case, and we
spell out the details in a way analogous to the details in Case (1), then it can
be used to show that perceiving an object with a particular sense does not
acquaint one with it. For each one of the remaining four senses, this can be
shown by means of an argument parallel to the one based on Case (1). For
example, the view that a person's touching an object acquaints him with it
can be refuted with the help of the following analog of Case (1).
Case (2): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objects
having the same qualitative sensory properties which are within the
immediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon lead me into the
room and allow me to touch at least one of these objects. However, since
I have been blindfolded I do not see anything. While I am blindfolded, Mo
brings me into the, room, and at t1 he puts the tip of my right index finger
on the right side of an object, and puts the tip of my left index finger on the
left side of the same object. Let the object I am touching (or a temporal
slice of it at t1 ) be called e. Under the circumstances, e is both the thing I
touch with my right index finger at t1 and the thing I touch with my left
index finger at t 1 . I have two distinct simultaneous tactual perceptions of e,
and based on each one of them, at t1 I either identify e as this or bestow a
proper name upon e. Thus, I have the following items of perceptual
knowledge concerning e: at t1 I know that
the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement
p3),
and at t, I also know that
the thing I touch with my left index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement
q3).
Occurrences of 'IV' in these schemas are replaced by either 'this' or a proper
name. At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p3 & q 3), and I attempt
to deduce the following claim from (p3 & q 3) by performing SD:
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the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is the thing I touch with
my left index finger at t 1 (call this identity claim r3).
Finally, I do not perceive any of the objects around me in any other way.
Let me explain how Case (2) can be employed to demonstrate that my
touching e does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that touching e acquaints
me with it. Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (2)
each of my tactual perceptions of e acquaints me with it. Hence, arguments
like those based on Case (1) imply that if my touching e acquaints me with
it, then in Case (2) I have the ability to come to know r3 by using the
haecceity of e to deduce r3 from (Th & q3 ) via the performance of SD in
accord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A". I shall argue below that
in Case (2) I lack A", and hence that my touching e does not acquaint me
with it.
First of all, if I possess A", then in Case (2) I am in circumstances which
are logically sufficient for my exercising it, that is, I am logically accomplished, I know (113 & q3), and I attempt to deduce r3 from (p3 & q 3) by
performing SD. This is true because given the nature of A", what was said
of A' in the argument based on Case (1) holds analogously for A". Another
analogy with Case (1) is that as with r2 , inductive methods can be used to
justify an identity claim like r3 . For instance, I am employing such methods
if I infer r3 from premises like these: when I have had two tactual perceptions of objects which feel alike, I have usually had two perceptions of the
same object; when I press against the right side of the thing I am touching
with my right index finger I feel an equal pressure against my left index
finger; someone tells me that I am touching just one object, and so on. In
Case (2), any evidence provided by the first premise I mentioned is defeated
by my knowledge that there are two objects in the vicinity which feel the
same. Moreover, it is possible that in Case (2) at t i , I have inadequate
inductive evidence for r3 . If in Case (2) I lack adequate inductive evidence
for r3 , then I do not know r3 and without additional information I do not
know whether I am touching the opposite ends of one object or two different
objects which feel alike. Consequently, arguments like those based on Case
(1) imply that in Case (2) I lack A". Since I have already shown that if my
touching e acquaints me with it, then in Case (2) I possess A", it follows that
ACQUAINTANCE 211
my touching e does not acquaint me with it. Thus, there is an argument

based on Case (2), parallel to the one based on Case (1), which implies that
an individual's touching a physical object or person neither acquaints him
with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices.
One might think that for my argument to succeed I need to show that a
person's simultaneously seeing and touching an object does not acquaint him
with it. A case which can be used to show this can be constructed by
combining (1) and (2) in the following way.
Case (3): As I am looking through the binocularscope at d (and having
two distinct visual perceptions of d), Mo puts my fingers in contact with d
in the same way as he puts them in contact with e in Case (2). I have two
distinct and simultaneous joint visual/tactual perceptions of d. d is both the
thing I see with my right eye at t1 and the thing I touch with my right index
finger at t1 , and d is both the thing I see with my left eye at t1 and the thing
I touch with my left index finger at t1 . From my perceptions, at t1 I know
p2 and I know q2 . At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q 2), and
I attempt to deduce r2 from (p2 & q 2) by performing SD. Finally, I neither
remove my eyes from the binocularscope nor perceive any of the objects
around me in any other way.
Let us see how Case (3) can be utilized to establish that my simultaneously seeing and touching d does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that
my perceiving d acquaints me with it. Then the principle of equal treatment
implies that in Case (3) each of my joint visual/tactual perceptions of d
acquaints me with it. Hence, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply
that if simultaneously seeing and touching d acquaints me with it, then in
Case (3) I possess A'. I will argue below that in Case (3) I lack A', and
consequently that perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it.
First of all, observe that it is possible that in Case (3) I have inadequate
inductive evidence for r2 . And just as in Case (1), if this is actually the case
then in Case (3) I do not know r2 , and without additional information I do
not know whether I see a single object or a pair of look-alikes. For this
reason, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that in Case (3) I lack
A'. Since I have already shown that if my simultaneously seeing and
touching d acquaints me with it, then in Case (3) I possess A', it follows that
my perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it. Hence, there is
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an argument based on Case (3), parallel to the one based on Case (1), which
implies that an individual's simultaneously seeing and touching a physical
object or person neither acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one
of its temporal slices.'
There are arguments, parallel to the ones I have advanced to show that a
persons's seeing or touching a physical item, x, does not acquaint him with
x, which show that a person is not acquainted with x either by perceiving x
with one of the other three senses, or by simultaneously perceiving x with
any combination of the five senses. Such arguments may involve analogs
of Case (1), Case (2), and Case (3), in which a person listens to an object by
using earphones attached to each ear, smells an object by using tubes
attached to each nostril, tastes an object with each side of his tongue, and so
forth.
Strategies like the ones I have developed in this chapter can also be used
to show that a person's perceiving an object does not acquaint him with a
nonsubstantial physical entity such as an object's surface or a temporal slice
of an object's surface. In other words, entities of these kinds can either be
perceived at different times or be perceived by two modes of perception at
once, and arguments parallel to R, or its synchronic analogs, apply to them.
ACQUAINTANCE
213
Because these parallel arguments are substantially the same as those already
discussed, I forego any further discussion of them here.
Each of us can identify a particular physical object or person other than
himself in a variety of ways, for example, by perceiving it, by reading about
it, and so on. None of these ways has a better claim to be an avenue for
acquaintance with it than perceiving it. Consequently, since I have shown
that perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint any of us with
it, it follows that none of us is acquainted with a physical object or person
other than himself. Analogous arguments imply that none of us is acquainted with items of the following kinds: temporal slices of physical
objects or persons other than himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporal
slices of such surfaces.
Surely, if any one of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or
person other than himself, then he thereby does so when he knows a
perceptual observation statement about an object of this kind. But as we
have seen, when one of us knows such a POS, he does not thereby grasp the
haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. It follows that
none of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other than
himself. 23 For parallel reasons, none of us ever grasps haecceities of items
of the following kinds: temporal slices of physical objects or persons other
than himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporal slices of such surfaces.
22
Below, I describe three analogs of (1), (2), and (3) whose details can be spelled out in
a way parallel to the details in (1), (2), and (3). If these details are provided, then there are
arguments based on these analogs which are parallel to the ones based on (1), (2), and (3), and
have the same conclusions.
(1') At t, I know that there is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. At t, I have two distinct
simultaneous visual perceptions of a thing because I look at a thing which is in front of me and
at the same time look at that thing either through a periscope or via its reflections in a number
of mirrors.
(2') At t, I know that an object in the vicinity has been broken in half, and thus that there
are now two objects there instead of one. At t, I perceive a single object and notice its right
and left halves. But I do not perceive the middle portion of this object because it is covered.
(3') At t, I know that there are two objects in the vicinity which are not joined together to
form a single object. I also know that if I were to perceive these objects, then they would
appear to be a single object either because they are an imperceptible distance from one another,
or because they are in contact but not joined. At 1, I perceive a single object by looking at it
and/or touching it, or by enclosing it in my hand.
(1), (2), (3), and their analogs, are cases of the following kind: I perceive a single object,
but in certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or two because I have
inadequate inductive evidence for an identity claim.
23
Clearly, since none of us can grasp a haecceity exemplified by a material object or person
other than himself, none of us can grasp a haecceity which is unexemplified (and so other than
one's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified, then it would be exemplified by a
material object or person.
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VI - OBJECTIONS TO R AND ITS ANALOGS:

A REBUTTAL
"There is a reality that is external and yet given immediately
to the mind. Common sense is right on this point, as against
the idealism and realism of the philosophers."

(1903 Bergson An Introduction to Metaphysics)
"We can always easily convert an hypothetical syllogism of one
form into another, the modus ponens into the modus tollens."
[a 1856 Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics & Logic I. 344 (1860)]
A possible objection to R goes as follows. R's conclusion is that none of us

grasps the haecceity of an external object. However, as we have seen, it is
prima facie plausible that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external
object. Since R is a logically valid argument whose conclusion is incompatible with something which is prima facie plausible, it is likely that R has a
false premise. In particular, it is probable that perception enables us to be
acquainted with physical objects, but either none of us can recall a
proposition involving the haecceity of an external object, or none of us can
know a conjunction of two propositions which involves such a haecceity.
In other words, it is likely that premise 1 of R is false.
My reply is this. In the first place, the prima facie plausibility of the
claim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object is based on
(PG), a principle which makes the plausibility of this claim dependent upon
the plausibility of the claim that external objects have haecceities. However,
it is obvious that if external objects do not have haecceities, then none of us
grasps the haecceity of an external object. Hence, (PG) does not make the
claim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object any more
plausible than the claim that external objects have haecceities. But the latter
claim is based on highly theoretical considerations such as those advanced
in Chapter 2. Although considerations of this sort make the claim that
external objects have haecceities plausible, this claim seems less plausible
than the claim that each of us can recollect things he has recently learned,
and can know conjunctive propositions. After all, it is evident that humans
ACQUAINTANCE
215
have these epistemic abilities. Furthermore, it appears that each of us can

recall propositions involving his own haecceity, or haecceities of certain
abstract entities, and in many cases can know a conjunction of two such
propositions. For example, it seems that I can recall that the color I was
thinking of a moment ago is Redness, and, that I can know both that I recall
this and that the color I am now thinking of is. Redness. Thus, it is difficult
to believe that if perception enables us to be acquainted with physical
objects, then none of us is able to recall a proposition which involves a
haecceity of an external object, or know a conjunction of two such
propositions. For these reasons, when forced to choose between accepting
R's conclusion that none of us is acquainted with an external object, and
rejecting R's presupposition that each of us has the epistemic abilities in
question, we should choose the former. Hence, this objection to R does not
succeed.
But a naive haecceitist would assert that when he perceives an external
object he has a self-evident intuition that he grasps the haecceity of that
object. Presumably, if a naive haecceitist grasps a haecceity of an external
object in this way, then he can know that he grasps this haecceity. Thus, a
naive haecceitist might argue that since he knows he grasps the haecceity of
an external object, he knows some premise of R is false. Such a naive
haecceitist rejects R on the ground that he knows its conclusion is false.
However, I do not have a self-evident intuition that when I perceive an
external object I grasp the haecceity of that object. For this reason, I do not
attach any credibility to the naive haecceitist's claim to know that R has a
false conclusion. It would appear that if a person's perception of an external
object is the occasion for his having a self-evident intuition of his grasping
the haecceity of that object, then he has such an intuition in virtue of an
innate epistemic ability. Surely, such an epistemic ability would be
possessed by all human perceivers. But, since I am a human perceiver and
I lack a self-evident intuition of my perceptually grasping the haecceity of
an external object, I conclude that it is not likely that the naive haecceitist
has a self-evident intuition of his perceptually grasping the haecceity of an
external object. Thus, I find the naive haecceitist's objection to R unacceptable.
However, one might object to R and its synchronic analogs on the basis

CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
of a theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism. Such a theory has three

components. (1) Any one of us, S, frequently grasps the haecceity of an
external object, x, when he perceives x at different times or by means of
different sensory modes. (2) Each of these episodes of perceptual acquaintance is characterized by a different cognitive perspective which determines
a unique way in which either x's haecceity is grasped by S at a particular
time or x's haecceity is grasped by S via a particular sensory mode. (3) Just
as S's re-identification of an object from one perceptual situation to another
can only be inferentially justified by using inductive methods, S cannot
inferentially justify the claim that the haecceity he grasps from one of these
cognitive perspectives is identical with the haecceity he grasps from another
one of these cognitive perspectives except by employing inductive methods.
Sophisticated perceptual haecceitism is a rather unintuitive theory: there
is simply no intuition that for each perceptual occasion or sensory mode
there is a corresponding unique cognitive perspective of the sort required.
Furthermore, if there were such cognitive perspectives, then it is likely that
their existence would be reflected in the structure of our language or in our
linguistic practices. Since there is nothing in these linguistic phenomena to
suggest that there are perspectives of this kind, it seems that there are no
such perspectives. In the light of the foregoing observations, we can see that
the theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism preserves the idea that we
grasp haecceities of external objects only by postulating an infinite number
of apparently ineffable cognitive perspectives. Surely, such a theory is
unacceptable.
Before considering the next objection, notice that my defense of premise
1 of R presupposes that in a case of a certain sort, if I know a nonqualitative
proposition ((p & q) & (p & q) > r), and I believe r as a result of deducing
r from ((p & q) & (p & q) > r), then I know r. Recall that in a case of this
sort, (p & q) involves a haecceity of a physical object or person, I deduce
r from (p & q) via SD in virtue of (Al), and by knowing r I re-identify the
physical object or person in question from one perceptual situation to
another.
It might be urged against premise 1 of R that knowledge is not closed
under logical deduction: there could be a case in which I know a proposition
(a & (a b)), I believe b as a result of deducing b from (a & (a > b)),
but I do not know b. My argument for premise 1 of R might be rejected on

the ground that deductive closure does not apply in cases relevant to an
assessment of this premise.
I am inclined to regard the principle that knowledge is closed under
logical deduction as something I know a priori. According to this principle,
it is a necessary truth that for any person, S, if S knows a proposition (a &
(a --> b)) and S believes b as a result of his deducing b from (a & (a > b)),
then S knows b. Thus, I view putative counter-examples to deductive
closure with suspicion. Furthermore, even if genuine counter-examples exist,
deductive closure usually applies in cases of knowledge. Finally, deductive
closure seems to apply in all of the relevant parallel cases in which a person
knows a proposition involving his own haecceity or a haecceity of an
abstract entity. For these reasons, we may assume that deductive closure
applies in the cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R, until we are
given good reason to suppose otherwise.
One could try to provide such a reason by drawing a parallel with the
following argument. According to philosophers such as Robert Nozick,
accepting the existence of failures of deductive closure is the price we must
pay in order to avoid skepticism about external objects.' For example, I
know that
216
217
(a) I am in Greensboro,
entails
(b) (I am a brain in a vat on a spaceship in the Andromeda galaxy).
Nevertheless, Nozick would hold that although I know (a), I am not in a
position to know (b). If I am not in a position to know (b), then I am
ignorant of (a) and skepticism about external objects ensues, unless there is
a failure of deductive closure.
Nozick assumes that skepticism about external objects is an extremely
24
See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981), pp. 167-288.
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CHAPTER 5
undesirable conclusion, and that accepting failures of deductive closure is a

reasonable price to pay for avoiding that conclusion. He argues that
deductive closure fails to apply when a person does not track the proposition
he deduces. On Nozick's conception of tracking, a person tracks a
proposition, p, just in case (i) ifp were false, then S wouldn't believe p, and
(ii) if p were true, then S would believe p. Apparently, if (b) were false,
that is, if I were a brain in a vat, then I would nonetheless believe (b), in
other words, I would think that I was not a brain in a vat. It follows that in
the case under discussion (b) violates (i). This means I do not track (b).
According to Nozick, it is my failure to track (b) which explains why there
is a failure of deductive closure when I infer (b) from [(a) & [(a) --> (b)]].
But notice that in cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R I do
track the re-identification claim r. In particular, (i) if r were false, then I
wouldn't believe r: I would grasp different haecceities (belonging to diverse
objects) at t1 and t2 , and so I would not think that the thing I perceive at t2
the thing I perceived at t1 ; and (ii) if r were true, then I would grasp the
same haecceity (belonging to the same object) at t1 and t2 , and so I would
think that the thing I perceive at t 2=the thing I perceived at t2 . 25
According to one of Nozick's rules, S's deductive inference of a from b
(which is known) yields knowledge that a on this condition: if a were false,
then S wouldn't believe b (or S wouldn't infer a from b). Nozick would say
that in the case at hand my deduction of r from my knowledge that ((p & q)
& (p & q) ---> r) yields knowledge of r if this rule is satisfied: if r were
false, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q) & (p & q) ----> r) (or I wouldn't infer
r from ((p & g) & (p & q) r). It isn't difficult to see that Nozick's rule
is satisfied in this case. Firstly, if r were false, then I would fail to believe
either p or q. After all, p and q involve the haecceity of the same object,
but if r were false, then either my belief that p or my belief that q would be
25
See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 179-185. Nozick refines his account
of tracking in order to deal with various problem cases, primarily ones in which either a
different method of acquiring knowledge is utilized in a close counter-factual situation or
multiple methods of acquiring knowledge are employed. But none of Nozick's refinements have
any effect on my verdict in the case under discussion. In this case only a single method is
involved, and in my assessment of the relevant counter-factuals I hold the method of acquiring
knowledge fixed, as Nozick requires.
ACQUAINTANCE
219
replaced by a belief in another proposition which involves the haecceity of

a different object. Hence, if r were false, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q)
& (p & q) r). Secondly, it was shown above that if r were false, then I
wouldn't believe r. It follows that if r were false, then I wouldn't infer r
from ((p & q) & (p & q) -> r). For these reasons, Nozick's rule for the
transmission of knowledge from the premises of a proof to its conclusion is
satisfied in the case under consideration. I conclude that the sort of failure
of deductive closure postulated by Nozick does not include failures of
closure in deducing r from ((p & q) & (p & q) r) in cases relevant to an
assessment of premise 1 of R.
Still, it might be argued along Nozickian lines that accepting failures of
deductive closure for propositions involving the haecceities of external
objects is the price we must pay for sustaining the belief that we grasp
haecceities of external objects. But despite the analogy between such an
argument and Nozick's, there are two reasons why these arguments are not
comparable in plausibility. First of all, our belief that we have knowledge
about external objects possesses greater prima facie plausibility than the
belief that we grasp haecceities of external objects. In this connection,
notice that a person's having knowledge of an external object does not entail
his grasping a haecceity of such an object, since a person can have indirect
knowledge of an external object. Second of all, sustaining the belief that we
grasp haecceities of external objects is of far less importance to us than
sustaining the belief that we have knowledge of external objects. Even if
accepting the occurrence of certain failures of deductive closure is a
reasonable price to pay for sustaining the latter belief, it seems that accepting
the occurrence of failures of deductive closure in cases which are relevant
to an assessment of premise 1 of R is too high a price to pay for sustaining
the former belief.
On a final note, observe that replies parallel to those given in defense of
R in this section can be used in defense of R's synchronic analogs.
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VII - DIVINE COGNITION AND HAECCEITIES

"To distinguish well between Knowables and Unknowables."
(1725 Watts Logick: Or the Right Use of Reason in the
Enquiry After Truth I. vi. I)
Although I have argued that none of us ever grasps the haecceity of a

physical object or person other than himself, I have yet to argue that a
person's grasping the haecceity of a physical object or person other than
himself is an impossibility. Edward Wierenga is an example of a philosopher who believes it is possible for someone to grasp the haecceity of a
person other than himself. 26 Although Wierenga concedes it is plausible
that none of us can grasp the haecceity of a person other than himself, he
maintains there is no reason to deny that God grasps the haecceities of
persons other than himself. I will argue that Wierenga's position is
untenable, and that a person's grasping the haecceity of a physical object or
person other than himself is an impossibility.
To start with, where P is a person, it is at least frequently true that P's
bearing a cognitive attitude to a particular, x, is P's bearing a cognitive
attitude to a state of x, where a state of x is either x's being characterized in
some way or x's being related in a certain way to one or more items.
Likewise, it is at least often true that P's bearing a maximally direct
cognitive attitude to x is P's bearing a maximally direct cognitive attitude to
a state of x.
It seems that P grasps the haecceity or nonqualitative "thisness" of x only
if at some time P bears a maximally direct cognitive attitude to x that
enables P to grasp x's haecceity. Apparently, the most direct cognitive
attitude P bears to a physical object or person other than himself is a
perceptual one. Consequently, it seems that P does not grasp the haecceity
of a physical object or person other than himself unless at some time P has
26
Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1989). Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Critical Notice: The
Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by Edward Wierenga," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 725-728.
ACQUAINTANCE
221
a perception of a physical object or person, x, which enables P to grasp x's

haecceity. However, the following considerations make it plausible that P
has no perception of this kind.
As we have already learned, if P's perceiving x enables P to grasp x's
haecceity, then P has the ability to identify x from one perceptual occasion
or mode to another by means of a deductive inference from perceptual
premises, without P's justification for this identification depending upon an
inductive connection between the perceptual premises and the identification.
Since none of us has this ability, perception does not enable any of us to
grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person. Is divine perception
superior to our own in this respect? We may assume that God perceives an
object, an event, or a qualitative attribute that we fail to perceive, for
example, an electron, a radio wave, or a transpectral color. But it seems that
such a superhuman perception would no more reveal the haecceity of an
individual thing than would a human perception. However, it might be
argued that a divine perception is more direct than a human perception.
After all, a human perception is causally mediated by physical states of a
sense-organ and the nervous system, but if an omniscient spirit such as God
has a perception, then there is no need to suppose that this perception is
mediated by a physical state. For this reason, it appears that a state, 0, of
a physical object or nondivine person, x, would directly cause God to have
an internal perceptual state of 0, whereas 0 can at best cause a human
perceiver to have an internal perceptual state of 0 via a causal chain of
intermediary states. It might then be inferred that God would have a
perception of 0 which is more direct than a human perception of 0. Be
that as it may, I shall argue that this perceptual awareness which God would
have of 0 is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude, for it is not as direct
as the introspective awareness which God would have of one of his own
internal perceptual states.
I begin by clarifying the notions of an internal perceptual or experiential
state and God's introspective awareness of such a state. An internal
perceptual or experiential state is either an individual's having a percept, for
instance, my having a blue sense-datum, or an individual's being characterized in some experiential psychological way, for example, my being
appeared to bluely. For any perceiver, P, and any state, 0, of a physical
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ACQUAINTANCE 223
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object or person, x, if P has a perception of 0, then P has this perception

because P is in a certain internal perceptual or experiential state which is
caused by 0. It follows that God's perceptual awareness of a state, 0, of
a physical object or nondivine person is causally mediated by another state,
namely, an internal perceptual state of God.
However, necessarily, a person's awareness of a physical or mental state,
0, of a particular, x, is an instance of a maximally direct cognitive attitude
just provided that 0 directly causes that person's awareness of 0, that is,
0 is directly impressed upon his consciousness in virtue of 0 causing his
awareness of 0 without the causal mediation of any other state. Surely, if
God is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual or
experiential states, 0, then God's introspective awareness of 0 is an
instance of a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Clearly, when an
individual is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual or
experiential states, X, this awareness is not via his awareness of some other
perceptual or experiential state which is caused by X. Moreover, if the
individual engaged in introspection is an omniscient spirit such as God, then
such an awareness is not causally mediated by any other sort of state, for
example, a brain state. It follows that God's introspective awareness of one
of his own internal perceptual states is not causally mediated by any
intervening state. In contrast, we have seen that God's perceptual awareness
of a state, 0, of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is causally
mediated by another state, namely, an internal perceptual state of God.
Hence, the perceptual awareness that God has of a state of a physical object
or nondivine person is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude: such
perceptual awareness is not as direct as God's introspective awareness of one
of his own internal perceptual states.' Moreover, an omniscient God's
perceptual awareness of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is an
instance of a maximally direct cognitive relation only if an omniscient God's
perceptual awareness of a state of x is a maximally direct cognitive relation.
Thus, divine perception of things or their states, like human perception of
such items, is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Since a person

grasps the haecceity of a particular, x, only if at some time he bears a
maximally direct cognitive attitude to x that enables him to grasp x's
haecceity, perception does not enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of a
physical object or person. No means other than perception is available for
grasping the haecceity of an external physical object or person. For the
foregoing reasons, it seems that God, along with the rest of us, cannot grasp
the haecceity of a material object or person other than himself. Since even
God would be unable to grasp such a haecceity, I conclude that it is
impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity of this kind.' Thus, there could
not be an omniscient being, in the sense of a being who knows (and
therefore grasps) every true proposition.'
In what follows, I answer three possible objections to the preceding
argument. According to the first objection, God has a nonperceptual way of
experiencing a physical object or person other than himself, and this form
of divine experience is more direct than any perception God could have of
such a thing But what could the nature of such a divine experience
conceivably be? Of course, there are nonperceptual modes of awareness: a
person can experience himself and his own mental states introspectively, and
a person can be aware of some abstract entities in an intellectual manner.
However, this argument is of no help in understanding how God could
nonperceptually experience a physical object or person other than himself,
since it is impossible that a person has either introspective awareness, or the
relevant kind of intellectual awareness, of a physical object or person other
than himself. Indeed, it seems that we cannot conceive of a nonperceptual
experience of an external thing. Thus, acceptance of the response under
discussion entails acceptance of an incomprehensible mystery. Such an
28
Clearly, since it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity instantiated by material

object or person other than himself, it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity which is
unexemplified (and thus other than one's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified,
then it would be exemplified by a material object or person.
29
27
1 assume that physical objects or persons other than God are not identifiable with divine
ideas or mental states, or sets or collections of such, items of which God is introspectively
aware.
For an opposing view, see Jonathan Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All Knowing God
(New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 26-71. However, my argument is compatible with the
claim that (i) there is an omniscient being, and (ii) omniscience does not require knowledge of
every true proposition.
.
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
irrational belief is out of place in a proper philosophical argument.

The second objection contends that God has innate ideas of nonqualitative
haecceities of physical objects and persons other than himself. 3 I answer
this as follows. It is difficult enough to conceive of a person, S, who has an
innate idea of a qualitative property such as Pain or Pleasure, or (phenomenal) Redness or Greenness, which is possibly an intrinsic characteristic of
S. But it is more difficult yet to conceive of a person, S, who has an innate
idea of a nonqualitative haecceity of a physical object or person other than
himself, a characteristic which is necessarily repugnant to S. Thus, it does
not appear possible that God has an innate idea of a nonqualitative haecceity
of such an external thing.
According to the third objection, God grasps a nonqualitative haecceity,
H, of a physical object or person other than himself by abstracting H from
his own nonqualitative haecceity or the nonqualitative haecceities of his own
mental states. But it seems that no first-order nonqualitative haecceity, H,
bears a similarity to other first-order nonqualitative haecceities which would
enable a person to abstract H from these other haecceities. Furthermore, an
abstractive process of the sort in question can occur only if there is such a
similarity. Therefore, it appears that God couldn't grasp a nonqualitative
haecceity, H, of a physical object or person other than himself via the
abstractive process envisioned by this third objection.
VIII - THE OBJECTS OF ACQUAINTANCE
224
225
"The Sight of the Mind differs very much from the Sight
of the Body."
(1735 Bolingbroke A Dissertation Upon Parties 135)
In his early writings Russell was inclined to believe that a person is

acquainted with himself, his own sense-data, and certain abstract entities. In
this section I argue that it is plausible that each of us is acquainted (in my
sense) with himself, some of his own mental states, and a variety of abstract
entities.
Since sense-perception does not acquaint any of us with physical objects
or persons, none of us is acquainted either with his body or with himself by
means of sensory perception. However, it may be argued that a person is
acquainted with himself by nonsensory means, namely, introspection?'
Typically, if a person has an item of self-knowledge, then he uses the
idiom of the first-person to express what he knows. Bearing this in mind,
let us consider the following case.
Case (4): At t1 I know that
the thing I am thinking of at t, is me.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. Upon awakening at
6, I know that
the thing I am thinking of at t 2 is me (call this statement q 4).

At t2 I remember (and hence know) that
the thing I was thinking of at t, is me (call this statement r4).

31
30
For a person, S, to have an innate idea of F-ness is for S to have an innate ability to
classify something as an F, an ability S does not have because of some perception S has of an
F. See Chapter 1, section V, and particularly footnote 17.
For example, see Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1. He argues that each
of us grasps his own haecceity when he knows that he has a self-presenting state. Compare The
First Person, in which Chisholm attacks the position he held in Person and Object on this
matter.
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Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I_know (q, & r), and I attempt to

deduce the following claim from (q, & r,):
the thing I am thinking of at t 2 is the thing I was thinking of at t i (call
this re-identification claim s4).
Notice that because (q, & r) trivially entails s, in Case (4) I come to
know 54 by deducing it from (q, & r). If I perform this deduction by using
my haecceity to perform SD, then I am acquainted with myself. Is there an
argument like R which shows that in Case (4) I do not perform this
deduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (4), if at
t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s 4 , then I do not deduce 5 4 from (q,
& r). But in Case (4), it seems that when I deduce s from (q, & r,) I am
relying only on introspection and my memory of what I introspected, neither
of which involves any inductive methods. Thus, as far as I can see at
present, in Case (4) I deduce s from (q, & r4) even if I have inadequate
inductive evidence for 54 . For this reason, it appears that strategies similar
to those employed in defense of R cannot be used to construct a sound
parallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with himself.
Observe that a case in which I lack memory knowledge of r, cannot be
used to construct a parallel argument of this kind, since such a parallel
argument requires that I fail to come to know 5, by deducing it from (q, &
r4) in a case in which I possess memory knowledge of r.
For example, suppose I forget r. In that case, I do not come to know 54
by deducing it from (q, & r), since I do not know r,. However, because I
do not have the requisite memory knowledge of r, this does not suggest
there is a good argument parallel to R which implies I am not acquainted
with myself.
Alternatively, imagine that an extraterrestrial with a duplication machine
is in the neighborhood. He sneaks up on people while they are asleep and
duplicates them. A duplicate has the same apparent memories as the
original, at least to the extent that this is possible. I have just learned of the
extraterrestrial's activities, and I am worried that I am a freshly created
duplicate. As it happens, I am not. In such a case, it seems that I would not
come to know s, by deducing it from (q, & r). But this is because my
ACQUAINTANCE
227
knowledge of the activities of the extraterrestrial defeats the justification of

my memory belief in r,. Thus, once again the requirement that I have
memory knowledge of r, is not met.
What of my freshly created duplicate? He too fails to have the required
memory knowledge: he does not remember that the thing he was thinking of
at a certain earlier time is himself: since he was just created, none of his
apparent memories are true. Moreover, even if my duplicate soon acquires
some true apparent memories, so long as he does not have more true
apparent memories than false ones, and remains unable to detect the falsity
of his mistaken apparent memories, he continues, it seems, to be in no
position to possess the requisite memory knowledge. Hence, cases of these
kinds do not suggest there is a good argument parallel to R which implies
that a person is not acquainted with himself.
Turning to the case of sense-data, they can be thought of as essentially
fleeting and nonrepeatable particulars. In that case, it is impossible for a
sense-datum to be re-identified. Given this conception of sense-data, an
argument like R cannot be used to refute the thesis that a person is
acquainted with his own sense-data. Moreover, it is impossible for there to
be two simultaneous introspective experiences of a single sense-datum. It
follows that an argument like the one brought to bear on temporal slices of
physical objects in the preceding section cannot be used to discredit the
claim that a person is acquainted with his own sense-data.
Similar considerations apply to the claim that if a person, S, knows, at a
moment t, that the time at which something is happening is now, then at t
S is acquainted with t. 32 Notice that a person can have an awareness of t
as now only at t. Hence, no argument like R can be used to refute the thesis
that S is acquainted with t. Furthermore, it appears that a person cannot be
aware of t as now by means of two modes of awareness at once. Thus, it
seems that no argument like R's synchronic analogs can be used to discredit
32
Compare Ernest Sosa, The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?" The Journal
of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 26-42.
228
CHAPTER 5
the thesis that S is acquainted with t. 33

Finally, let us look at a representative case in which a person is aware of
an abstract entity, for instance, a property.
Case (5): At t, I know that
the color I am aware of at t, is Red.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, and
I know that
the color I am aware of at t2 is Red (call this statement g5).

At t2 I remember that
the color I was aware of at t, is Red (call this statement r5).

Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q5 & r5), and I attempt to
deduce the following claim from (q 5 & r5):
the color I am aware of at t 2 is the color I was aware of at ti (call this

re-identification claim s5).
Notice that since (q5 & r5) trivially entails s5 , in Case (5) I come to know
s5 by deducing it from (g,& r 5). If I perform this deduction by using the
haecceity of Red to perform SD, then I am acquainted with this color. Is
there an argument like R which shows that in Case (5) I do not perform this
deduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (5), if at
ACQUAINTANCE
229
t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s5 , then I do not deduce s5 from (q5
& 1.5). But in Case (5), it seems that when I deduce s5 from (g, & r5) I am
relying only on my grasping the property of being identical with Red and my
remembering my grasping this property, neither of which involves any
inductive methods. Thus as far as I can tell, in Case (5) I deduce ,s5 from
(q 5 & r5) even if I have inadequate inductive evidence for s5 . For this
reason, it appears that strategies similar to those used in defense of R cannot
be employed to construct a sound parallel argument which implies that none
of us is acquainted with an abstract entity.
As we saw above, in Cases (4) and (5) a person seems to epistemically
justify re-identification claims about himself or an abstract entity on
noninductive grounds, whereas none of us ever justifies a re-identification
claim about a physical object or person other than himself on, such grounds.
Notice that this epistemological asymmetry is explicable on the hypothesis
that a person grasps his own haecceity, or the haecceities of some abstracta,
but does not grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than
himself. According to such an explanation, in Case 4 [Case 5] I justify s4
[55] by using a haecceity to deduce 5 4 [5.5] from (p & q 4) [(p 5 & q 5)] via SD;
whereas none of us ever utilizes a deductive method of this kind to justify
a re-identification claim about a physical object or person other than himself.
The fact that the epistemological asymmetry in question is explicable on the
aforementioned hypothesis is a point in favor of that hypothesis.
As shown earlier, the claim that we grasp our own haecceities is prima
facie plausible?' Moreover, arguments like R do not defeat the plausibility
of this claim. Furthermore, we have seen that the claim that a person grasps
his own haecceity has a certain explanatory utility?' Hence, until there is
good reason to think otherwise, it is quite plausible to think that we grasp
our own haecceities.
I have , argued that the existence of abstracta is plausible, including the
33
0n the other hand, it is clear that an argument parallel to R does yield the conclusion that
nobody has direct knowledge of a place when he identifies it as here. For relevant, historically
important, material on the identification of bodies, souls; places, times, and other concreta see
Franz Brentano, Theory of Categories, Roderick Chisholm and Norbert Guterman, trans. (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Compare Brentano's Philosophical Investigations on Space,
Time and the Continuum, Barry Smith, trans. (London: Croom Helm, 1988). Here Brentano
maintains that a time, a place, or a soul is individuated by its "individual peculiarity," but that
none of us can grasp such a differentia individualis.
34
35
See section I of this chapter, and also Chapter 1, section V.
The claim in question not only affords an explanation of the aforementioned

epistemological asymmetry, it yields an analysis of a person's self-ascription of a property. For
an argument in support of the latter point, and a description of other possible explanatory roles
of the haecceity notion in the cognitive area see Chapter 1, section V.
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existence of haecceities of abstracta. For example, it appears that both

Redness and being identical with Redness exist, the latter property being the
former property's haecceity. And since it seems that a person believes there
is something which is identical with Redness, (PG) makes it prima facie
plausible that a person grasps the haecceity of Redness. Furthermore, it
appears that there is no argument resembling R which defeats this prima
facie plausibility. Thus, until we have good reason to believe otherwise, the
claim that we grasp the haecceity of Redness is plausible. Since parallel
considerations apply to numerous other properties, as well as to numerous
relations and propositions, it is prima facie plausible that we grasp haecceities of abstracta of these sorts.
When it comes to the question of whether any of us grasps the haecceity
of an item, x, there is a difference between a case in which x is a person or
an abstract entity and a case in which x is a sense-datum or a time. The
difference is this: I have argued that abstracta exist, and it is evident that
persons exist, but I have not argued that sense-data or times exist, and it is
not clear that the existence of sense-data or times is acceptable. However,
unless it is plausible that sense-data or times exist, there is no haecceity, H,
exemplifiable by a sense-datum or time of which we can plausibly say that
it exists. But given the structure of (PG), (PG) can make it prima facie
plausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times only if there
is such a haecceity H. Hence, I doubt that (PG) can make it prima facie
plausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times. Accordingly, I do not claim that we are acquainted with items of either of these two
sorts.
However, it appears that whether or not sense-data or times exist, a
person's momentary occurrent mental states exist. For example, presently
there is a momentary state my thinking that I see something red, 5 seconds
earlier there was a momentary state my feeling sad, and 5 seconds later there
will be a momentary state my being appeared to greenly. Clearly, arguments
like those based on (PG) which make it prima facie plausible that we grasp
our own haecceities and haecceities of certain abstract entities, make it prima
facie plausible that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own momentary
occurrent mental states. Below, I try to show that there is no argument like
R or its synchronic analogs which defeats this prima facie plausibility.
ACQUAINTANCE
231
To begin with, there are two conceptions of a momentary occurrent mental

state: necessarily, either (i) such a state is nonrepeatable and cannot be
introspectively experienced at two different times, or (ii) such a state is
repeatable and capable of being introspectively experienced at two different
times. In the first case, if a momentary state, x, is earlier or later than a
momentary state, y, then x is diverse from y. In the second case, a
momentary state x's being F exists if and only if x has the property of being
F. Only in the latter case is it possible for a person to re-identify one of his
own momentary occurrent mental states. But it appears that in this latter
case each of us can re-identify such a mental state in a way analogous to
which I re-identify myself or an abstract entity in Case (4) or (5). Consider,
for instance, the following state of affairs.
Case (6): At t1 I know that
the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared to
redly.
Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, and
I know that
the state I am introspectively experiencing at t2 is my being appeared to
redly (call this statement g6).
At t2 I remember that
the state I was introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared to
redly (call this statement r6).
Finally, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q 6 & r6), and I attempt

to deduce the following claim from (q 6 & r6):
the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 2 is the state I was
introspectively experiencing at t, (call this re-identification claim s6).
Notice that because (q 6 & r6) trivially entails s6, in Case (6) I come to
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know s6 by deducing it from (q6 & r6). If I perform this deduction by using
the haecceity of my being appeared to redly to perform SD, then I am
acquainted with this state. Is there an argument like R which shows that in
Case (6) I do not perform this deduction in this way? There is such an
argument only if in Case (6), if at t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for
s6, then I do not deduce s6 from (q 6 & r6). But in Case (6), it seems that
when I deduce s6 from (q 6 & r6) I am relying only on my introspecting that
I am being appeared to redly, my grasping the property of being identical
with my being appeared to redly, and my remembering my grasping this
property, none of which involves any inductive methods. Thus as far as I
can tell, in Case (6) I deduce s6 from (q 6 & r) even if I have inadequate
inductive evidence for s 6 . For this reason, it appears that strategies similar
to those used in defense of R cannot be employed to construct a sound
parallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with one of his
own repeatable momentary occurrent mental states. On the other hand, if
a momentary occurrent mental state is nonrepeatable, then it also follows
that there is no argument resembling R which discredits the thesis that we
are acquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states.
Hence, it seems that there is no argument like R which defeats the prima
facie plausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of our
own momentary occurrent mental states. In addition, it appears impossible
for a mental state to be introspectively experienced by means of two modes
of awareness at once. Consequently, it seems that there is no argument
resembling a synchronic analog of R which undermines the thesis that we are
acquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states.
Therefore, it appears that no argument of this kind defeats the prima facie
plausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own
momentary occurrent mental states.
The key cognitive and linguistic implications of my argument can now be
summarized. First of all, it seems that if a person grasps the haecceities of
certain entities, then he is acquainted with these entities. Of course, in my
sense of acquaintance the converse is obviously true. Hence, it appears that
an individual grasps the haecceities of certain entities just provided that he
is acquainted with those entities. Similarly, one of us can have direct de re
propositional belief or knowledge about an item, x, if and only if he grasps
ACQUAINTANCE
233
the haecceity of x. Likewise, one of us can use a proper name or indexical

indicator to express the haecceity of item, x, just in case he grasps the
haecceity of x. However, it seems that we can grasp our own haecceities,
haecceities of some of our own mental states, and haecceities of certain
abstract entities. Three consequences follow. Firstly, there is reason to think
that each of us is acquainted with items of these kinds. Secondly, it appears
that we can have direct de re propositional belief or knowledge with respect
to such items. Thirdly, it seems that each of us can use a proper name or
indexical indicator to express haecceities of items of these sorts. For
example, apparently, I can use `Rosenkrantz' or 'I' to express my haecceity;
I can use 'this' to express the haecceity of some of my mental states; and I
can use 'Redness' to express the haecceity of Redness.
But it is impossible for anyone to grasp the haecceity of a physical object
or person other than himself, or the haecceity of a surface of such a thing,
or the haecceity of a temporal slice of a particular of any of these kinds.
Three consequences ensue. First, no one can ever be acquainted with such
a particular. Second, no one can ever have direct de re propositional belief
or knowledge about a particular of this kind: our propositional de re belief
or knowledge about a particular of this sort is indirect. Third, no one can
ever use a proper name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of
such a particular. 36 Thus, any version of the causal theory of reference or
36
According to Roderick Chisholm's view in Person and Object, when I introspectively
identify myself as 'I', I grasp my haecceity or individual essence, viz., the property of being
identical with me; but when I perceptually identify an external object as 'that thing' I do not
grasp the haecceity of that object. Alvin Plantinga criticized Chisholm's position in "De
Essentia," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 101-121. Plantinga rejects Chisholm's
argument for the claim that we do not grasp haecceities of external objects, and then seems to
reject the claim itself. I cite some of Plantinga's critical remarks below. In interpreting those
remarks, three things should be kept in mind. Firstly, Plantinga is attacking the foregoing
Chisholmian view. Secondly, Plantinga is using the term 'essence' as a synonym for
Chisholm's term `haecceity'. Finally, Plantinga is assuming (for the sake of argument) that
Chisholm is right when he says a thing has just one haecceity or individual essence. In
reference to Chisholm's argument, Plantinga says the following. "These considerations,
therefore, do nothing to show that the phrases 'that person' and 'that thing' don't typically
express or intend essences. And isn't that the natural account to give of those phrases? Suppose
I refer to Zwier as that person: surely he couldn't have existed but lacked the property of being
that person, i.e., the property expressed on that occasion by 'that person'; and surely no, one
distinct from him could have been that person. So when I use the phrase to refer to Zwier, it
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the semantics of direct reference which implies that we can employ a proper
name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of a particular of this
type is mistaken. 37
Three additional linguistic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there are
some haecceities which no one is capable of grasping or linguistically
expressing, for example, haecceities of nonsentient physical objects.

Secondly, in some cases a haecceity can be grasped or expressed linguistically by one and only one person, for instance, haecceities of certain persons
and mental states. Finally, there are some haecceities which can be grasped
or expressed linguistically by many people, for instance, haecceities of
abstracta such as Redness and Squareness. 38
We have seen that a person can be acquainted with (or can grasp the
haecceities of) certain nonexternal items and first-order qualitative properties,
but that no one can be acquainted with (or can grasp the haecceities of)
external things and their spatio-temporal slices. Surely, if any one of us can
grasp a haecceity, H, of a concretum or first-order qualitative property, then
he can grasp a higher-order property, If, which is the haecceity of H, and
no one can grasp If unless he can grasp H. For example, I can grasp the
first-order property of Identity-with-me by thinking that something is
identical with me, if and only if I can grasp the second-order property of
Identity-with-Identity-with-me by thinking that something is identical with
Identity-with-me. Likewise, I can grasp the second-order property of
Identity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Redness,
expresses an essence; and when I use it to refer to someone else it expresses a different essence just as the word 'I', when you use it expresses an essence, and a different essence from the one
it expresses when I use it." (p. 106) "Phrases like 'that person' do indeed express essences, so
that if I know such a proposition as that person is elegantly attired, I know a proposition
entailing someone else's essence." (p. 107) From what Plantinga says in "De Essentia," he
appears to be committed to the view that we grasp haecceities of physical objects and persons
other than ourselves, and use indexical indicators to express those haecceities.
37
For example, see M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and
Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating
Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498.
38 Earlier versions of arguments supporting these conclusions can be found in my articles
"Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107119, and "Acquaintance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23.
ACQUAINTANCE
235
just provided that I can grasp the third-order property of Identity-withIdentity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Identitywith-Redness. Since a person can be acquainted with an item just in case
he can grasp that item's haecceity, it follows that a person can be acquainted
both with haecceities of the indicated nonexternal items (including himself
and some of his own states of mind) and with haecceities of some first-order
properties, but that no one can be acquainted with either haecceities of
physical objects or persons other than himself or haecceities of spatiotemporal slices of such external things. Hence, any one of us can have
direct de re propositional belief (or knowledge) with, respect to haecceities
of the nonexternal items and abstracta in question, but a person cannot have
this sort of belief or knowledge with respect to haecceities of the relevant
external entities. Similarly, it follows that each one of us can use proper
names or indexical indicators to express the haecceities of haecceities of the
former nonexternal items and abstracta, but a person cannot use names or
indicators of this kind to express the haecceities of haecceities of the latter
external entities.
ACQUAINTANCE
CHAPTER 5
236
IX - OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELLIAN OBJECTS OF

ACQUAINTANCE: A RESPONSE
"Each man is at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite."
[a 1901 F. W. H. Myers Human Personality I. p. xxvi (1903)]
It might be objected that an argument resembling a synchronic analog of R

refutes the claim that a person is acquainted with himself. According to this
argument, a person can have a divided consciousness: a single person can
have two centers of consciousness at once, each with its own introspective
experiences. However, it is not obvious that there could be such a person.
On the other hand, there are two sorts of cases in which a person, S, might
have a divided consciousness: (i) S has a multiple personality disorder, and
(ii) S's right and left brain hemispheres are no longer connected by the
corpus callosum. 39 I shall argue that S's having a divided consciousness
does not lead to an argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and
which militates against a person's being acquainted with himself.
To begin with, notice that a person's (S's) perceiving an object, x, by two
modes of perception at once can be used show that S's perceiving x does not
acquaint S with x only if S compares his two perceptual experiences of x, or
more precisely, S knows a conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts
correspond to his two pieces of demonstrative perceptual knowledge about
x. Likewise, there could be a plausible argument which resembles a
synchronic analog of R and which implies that S is not acquainted with
himself only if possibly, at t S has two introspective experiences of himself,
and at t S compares these two experiences, or more exactly, at t S knows a
conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts correspond to the two pieces of
39
It should be noted that in split brain cases only one side of the brain exhibits linguistic
competence, suggesting (though not proving) that there is only one center of consciousness in
the person. Furthermore, the typical case of multiple personalities is one in which the
personalities surface diachronically, suggesting that there is only one center of consciousness in
the person at a time. It would be bizarre to suppose that two such personalities manifest
themselves synchronically, e.g., one by speaking, and the other by writing. Nonetheless, such
a phenomenon is conceivable.
237
introspective knowledge he has about himself at t. But suppose for the sake
of argument that at t S has two separate centers of consciousness, and at t
each of these centers of consciousness has a separate introspective experience
of S. Since these introspective experiences belong to different centers of
consciousness, at t S does not compare the two introspective experiences in
question: at t S does not know a conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts
correspond to the two pieces of introspective knowledge under discussion.
Consequently, such a case of divided consciousness does not generate an
argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which discredits the
claim that a person is acquainted with himself.
Likewise, if at t S has two centers of consciousness, and there is a mental
state, M, or a property, P, such that each of these centers of consciousness
either introspects M, or grasps P, or is aware of t as now, then at t S does
not know the relevant conjunction of propositions about M, P, or t. Hence,
a case of divided consciousness cannot be used to construct an argument
which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which militates against our
being acquainted with some of our own mental states, certain properties, or
times.
Although I contend each of us can grasp his own haecceity, some
philosophers sincerely avow that when they reflect upon themselves it seems
to them they fail to find such a property." Yet others have the opposite
intuition. An eloquent evocation of this opposing intuition may be found in
the notebooks of the English poet Gerard Manley Hopkins.'" Hopkins wrote
as follows: 42
40
For example, see Jaegwon Kim, "Critical Notice: The First Person: An Essay on
Reference and Intentionality by Roderick Chisholm," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 46 (1986), pp. 488. Kim writes that "Chisholm is surely right about this: I have no
idea what my own "me-ness" is like. There is no sense of 'conceive' that I can even faintly
understand in which I think I can conceive this me-ness."
41
Incidentally, Hopkins was an admirer of Duns Scotus, finding him "Of realty the rarestveined unraveller; a not. Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece." See Hopkins's poem Duns
Scotus's Oxford (1879).
42
The Notebooks And Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Humphry House, ed. (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 309-310.
238
CHAPTER 5
When I consider my self being, my consciousness and my feeling of myself, that taste of
myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale
or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable
by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it be
to be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch,
distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it,
except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this only
multiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. But
to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my
own being. The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of being
able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it.
One may dwell on this further. We say that any two things however unlike are in
something like. This is the one exception: when I compare my self, my being-myself,
with anything else whatever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff me with blank
unlikeness; so that my knowledge of it, which is so intense, is from itself alone, they in
no way help me to understand it. And even those things with which I in some sort identify
myself, as my country or family, and those things which I own and call mine, as my clothes
and so on, all presupposes the stricter sense of self and me and mine and are from that
derivative.43
It would be fair to say that when Hopkins reflects upon himself it seems
Compare the poet and the philosophers: Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, and H. D. Lewis.
"Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is present
to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded...and says 'I have been
wounded', he must use the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense
of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment'..." Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: .A Logical
Inquiry," Mind, 65 (1956), p. 398. "The word 'I' names a different person from case to case,
and does so by way of an ever altering meaning. What its meaning is at the moment, can be
gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it.
If we read the word without knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless, but it is at
least estranged from its normal sense... In solitary speech the meaning of 'I' is essentially
realized in the immediate idea of one's own personality... Each man has his own I-presentation
(and with it his individual notion of I), and that is why the word's meaning differs from person
to person." Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970),
pp. 315-316 (Investigation I, Section 26). "When I lose my memory I am no longer aware of
who I am - in one sense, namely that I do not remember my name, where I live, what I have
been doing in the past and so on. I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outside
observer would place me on the basis of what is known about me. But I do all the same
recognize myself as the unique person I am. It is particulars of my past history and situation
that I cannot recover. In a more basic sense I have no doubt who I am - I am myself, the being
I expressly recognize myself to be in a way which is not possible for knowledge of any other."
H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 235.
ACQUAINTANCE
239
to him that he finds his haecceity! Nevertheless, to base the claim that we
grasp our own haecceities on intuitions like those of Hopkins invites a
deadlock with those philosophers who have opposing intuitions. Since these
conflicting intuitions epistemically counter-balance one another, I set them
both aside.
In the following passage, Chisholm gives reasons for doubting that any of
us ever grasps his own haecceity.
It seems doubtful that I can ever be said...to grasp my individual essence or haecceity. If I
were to grasp it, shouldn't I also be able to single out its various marks? I can single out
some of the marks of my individual essence - if I have one. Thus it may include various
universal essential properties (for example, being red or non-red, or being a musician if
a violinist). And perhaps I can single out certain non-universal essential properties (for
example, being an individual thing and beings person). But if I can grasp my individual
essence, then I ought to be able to single out in it those features that are unique to it. If
being identical with me is my individual essence and being identical with you is yours,
then, presumably, each analyzes into personhood and something else as well - one
something in my case and another in yours - but I haven't the faintest idea what this
something else might be as
I am puzzled by the argument in the preceding passage. On the one hand,

if my haecceity is a simple unanalyzable property, then my haecceity is not
analyzable into personhood and something else. In that case, Chisholm's
assumption that if I have a haecceity, then it is analyzable into personhood
and something else is mistaken. On the other hand, if my haecceity is
analyzable into personhood and something else, then why should I be
expected to have an idea of what this something else might be? After all,
I might reasonably believe that knowledge is analyzable as justified true
belief and something else, and yet have no idea of what this something else
might be. Thus, Chisholm makes an unwarranted assumption: that if my
haecceity is analyzable into personhood and something else, then I have an
idea of what this something else might be. Nor is it clear why we should
accept Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is analyzable, then it is
analyzable into personhood and something else. Let us grant that being a
"Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische
Studien, 7/8 (1979), p. 322.
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
person is logically necessary for being identical with me. Still, consider the
following parallel case. On the assumption that knowledge is analyzable as
justified true belief of a certain sort, the fact that grasping a proposition is
logically necessary for knowing a proposition does not seem to imply that
propositional knowledge is analyzable in terms of grasping a proposition and
something else. Hence, Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is
analyzable, then it is analyzable into personhood and something else does not
seem to be justified. If my haecceity is analyzable, then perhaps it can only
be analyzed in some other way. For example, if my haecceity is analyzable,
and if I am identical with a complex material object, then perhaps my
haecceity can be analyzed wholly in terms of the haecceities of my parts
(given principles of mereological essentialism stated earlier which Chisholm
would accept') For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Chisholm's
doubts about our grasping our own haecceities are unfounded.
X - COGNITIVELY INACCESSIBLE HAECCEITIES
240
241
"The Unknowableness of Real Essences."

(1697 J. Sergeant Solid Philosophy Asserted
Against the Fancies of the Ideists 301)
My argument implies that any individual, S, whose awareness of a physical

object or person other than himself depends upon his perceptual experiences
could not be intimately enough acquainted with such an object or person to
grasp its haecceity. But, clearly, if S could not grasp the haecceity of a
perceptual object of this kind, then S could not grasp an unexemplified
haecceity which individuates a NEP that (of course) he lacks perceptual
acquaintance with. In other words, an individual who is able to grasp such
an unexemplified haecceity can be directly aware of a physical object or
person other than himself without his having a perceptual experience of that
physical object or person. However; it appears that an awareness of this
kind is impossible. Thus, it is plausible that there couldn't be anyone who
grasps a haecceity which individuates a NEP. Hence, it seems impossible
that there be someone who grasps a haecceity which individuates a disjoint
object.'
However, it is possible that a person picks out a property by description
even though he is incapable of grasping that property.' Thus, it is still an
open question whether there could be someone who picks out an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. In what follows, I argue
that it is impossible for a person to pick out or make singular reference to
such a haecceity.
To make this argument as strong as possible, I shall understand the
descriptive identification of an item in a most liberal fashion: S picks out an
item, x, by description just when S truly believes that something is F, where
46
This is compatible with the fact that some unexemplified haecceities which individuate
disjoint objects are possibly grasped, e.g., an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a
disjoint person is possibly exemplified by a person who grasps that haecceity.
45
47
See Chapter 4, section 1.
CHAPTER 5
ACQUAINTANCE
the property of being F is an identifying property exemplified by x. Surely,

if we are capable of picking out a property, P, which nobody is ever capable
of grasping, then this entails that at some time someone is capable of picking
out P by description. Moreover, necessarily, someone is capable of picking
out P by description only if someone is capable of grasping an identifying
property which P exemplifies.
As we saw earlier, there couldn't be anyone who grasps a haecceity, H,
which is never exemplified and which individuates a disjoint object. This
implies the impossibility of someone's grasping a nonqualitative relational
property which pertains to a disjoint object. Moreover, an earlier argument
implies that a disjoint object, 0 1 , which could exemplify H is individuated
only by such a relational property." Similarly, H is necessarily coinstantiated with a property, P, only if P is a relational property of this kind. After
all, H could only be instantiated by o 1 , and o f in a possible world, WI , has
a disjoint twin 02 in a possible world, W3, where o 2 in WI and 0 2 in W3 differ
from one another (apart frorti I 's and o 2 's haecceities) only to the extent
that 0 2 and 02 are mereologically or causally related to different disjoint
objects in WI and W3, respectively. The fact that His necessarily coinstantiated with a property, P, only if P is a nonqualitative relational property
which pertains to a disjoint object, together with the fact that it is impossible
for anyone to grasp an unexemplified property such as H, implies that every
identifying property exemplified by H is a relational property of the
aforementioned sort. Because it is impossible for anyone to grasp a property
of this sort, there couldn't be an identifying property had by an unexemplified haecceity like H which anyone is capable of grasping. Moreover,
necessarily, someone is capable of picking out a property, P, by description
only if someone is capable of grasping an identifying property which P
exemplifies. It follows that it is impossible for anyone to pick out an
unexemplified property such as H by description. As it is also impossible
for anyone to grasp an unexemplified property of this kind, we should
conclude that there couldn't be an individual who picks out such a

property.' Likewise, singular reference to an unexemplified property like
H is impossible: there couldn't be a definite description, name, or indexical
indicator which refers to an unexemplified property of this sort.
In addition, if there is a haecceity, H, which could only be exemplified by
a nonconscious physical object, then H could not be grasped by anything
which exemplifies H. Since it is impossible that a person grasps the
haecceity of a physical object other than himself, H could not be grasped by
anyone who does not exemplify H. Thus, there couldn't be anybody who
grasps H. It appears that there are such necessarily ungraspable haecceities.
After all, it seems that possibly, some physical objects are nonconscious in
virtue of certain natural laws. Stones and electrons might be examples of
such objects. It also appears that possibly, there are objects of this sort
which are essentially subsumed under the natural laws in question. Thus, it
seems that there could be essentially nonconscious physical objects. Since
there are haecceities which could be exemplified by objects of this kind, it
appears that certain haecceities could only be exemplified by nonconscious
physical objects. Inasmuch as such a haecceity, H, could neither be grasped
by an object which exemplifies H, nor be grasped by anything else, it seems
that some haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. Perhaps some haecceities
exemplified by physical objects are of this sort. In any case, it appears that
certain unexemplified haecteities which individuate disjoint physical objects
are of this kind."
242
243
49
This is compatible with the fact that a haecceity of this kind is possibly picked out by
someone. Such a haecceity, H, is never exemplified and individuates a disjoint object. Yet, H
is possibly such that H is exemplified and somebody picks out or makes singular reference to
H by description, e.g., as the haecceity exemplified by the object I see on the left.
50
Compare Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal
Reductionism," Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics (1987), p. 190, and footnote 3, p.
226. According to Plantinga, "Every proposition is such that it is possibly believed or possibly
disbelieved or both." As he notes in this connection, "According to the classical theist, every
proposition is in fact (and, indeed, necessarily) believed or disbelieved - by God, who is a
necessary being and essentially omniscient." Plantinga makes clear that he is committed to the
48
existence of propositions involving nonqualitative haecceities. Such a proposition cannot be

grasped without grasping a nonqualitative haecceity. However, given my understanding of what
it is to grasp a proposition, believing a proposition requires grasping that proposition. I
244
CHAPTER 5
A summary of the implications of my argument for Realism about abstract

entities is in order. Robust Realism is justified: my argument that particulars
have haecceities implies that there are properties and that Propertyhood is a
fundamental ontological category.' Strong Extreme Realism is warranted:
there seem to be unexemplified properties which cannot be identified with
logical complexes of exemplified properties, namely, haecceities which
individuate disjoint objects.' Finally, Radical Realism is justified: it is
impossible for anyone to grasp or pick out a haecceity which individuates a
disjoint object, and some of these haecceities appear to be necessarily
ungraspable. If I am right, then we are warranted in accepting a view which
is the very apotheosis and quintessence of Property-Realism.
conclude that Plantinga's views about these matters imply that every nonqualitative haecceity
is graspable. Likewise, for the Chisholm of Person and Object, see pp. 117-120.
5t
See Chapter 2.
52
See Chapter 3.
INDEX OF NAMES
Channing, William E. 166

Chisholm, Roderick M. ix, x, xiii, 11, 13,
22, 30, 33, 36, 40, 41, 51, 70, 110, 126,
127, 170, 183, 185, 187, 192, 225, 228,
233, 237, 239, 240, 244
Church, Alonzo 185
Clubbe, John 77
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 140
Copelston, Frederick 192
Cudworth, Ralph 11
Cusmariu, Arnold xiii
Davidson, Donald 57, 85, 120
Descartes, Rene 38, 79
Digby, Sir Kenelm 168
Donnellan, Keith 30
Duns Scotus, Johannes 1, 3, 43, 75, 87,
188, 191, 192, 237
Edwards, Jonathan 146
Faraday, James 20
Frege, Gottlob 185, 238
French, Peter A. x, 11, 164
Goodman, Nelson 5
Gracia, Jorge 75
Guterman, Norbert 228
Hacking, Ian 79, 80
Hamilton, Sir William 22, 214
Hampshire, Stuart 38
Hempel, Carl G. 57, 85
Hoffman, Joshua xiii, xiv, 59, 81, 104
Hopkins, Gerard Manley 82, 237-239
House, Humphry 237
Hoy, Ronald 80
Hume, David 79, 168
Husserl, Edmund 238
Ackermann, Felicia 31, 108

Ackrill, J. L. 60
Adams, Robert ix, 2, 80, 150, 151
Allaire, Edwin 84
Anscombe, G. E. M. 118
Aquinas, St. Thomas 84
Aristotle 60, 63, 84, 102, 131
Armstrong, D. M. 25
Arnauld, A. 42
Audi, Robert xiv
Baron, Robert 1
Box, E. Belfort 184
Baxter, Richard 93
Beaumont, Joseph 1
Belsharn, William 196
Bergmann, Gustav 84
Bergson, Henri 184, 214
Berkeley, George 72, 86, 198
Billingsley, Sir Henry 179
Black, Max 77, 78, 80, 90, 106, 122
Boethius 30
Boler, ;John 3
Bolingbroke, Viscount Henry St John 225
Bowen, Frank Charles 150
Boscovich, Roger xiv, 20
Brentano, Franz Clemens 84, 228
Browne, Sir Thomas 168
Bryskett, Lodovick 22
Burkhardt, H. 55
Burton, John Hill 53
Butler, Bishop Joseph 191
Campbell, Keith 5, 85
Carr, Brian xi, 63
Castafieda, Hector-Neri 31, 36
245
246
INDEX OF NAMES
Huxley, Thomas H. 168

Hyman, Arthur 3, 43, 75, 188
Jowett, Benjamin 140
Kames, Lord Henry Home 204
Kaplan, David 33, 185
Kant, Immanuel 20
Kelvin, Lord William Thomson 20
Kim, Jaegwon xiv, 58, 68, 237
Kvanvig, Jonathan 223
Leckie, George G. 84
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 16, 42, 77, 82
Leonardus, Camillus 130
Lesniewski, S. 5
Lewis, David 67
Lewis, H. D. 238
Locke, John 20, 86, 168, 171
Lockwood, Michael ix, 36, 234
Loux, Michael 77, 84, 87, 141
Maddy, Penelope 67
Mann, William 85
Marsh, Robert C. 28, 184
Maxwell, James Clerk 20
Meiland, Jack 87
Meinong, Alexius 84
Mill, James 124
Monboddo, James Burnett 69
More, Henry 97
Munitz, Milton ix, 36, 234
Myers, Frederic W. H. 236
Nozick, Robert 217-219
Ockham 192
Parmenides 150
Parret, Herman x, 11
Peirce, Charles Sanders 3, 72
Plantinga, Alvin ix, 30, 31, 51, 126, 141,
147, 150, 233,'234, 243
Plato 1
Pollock, Jonathan 78, 164, 199
Price, H. H. 204
Priestly, Joseph 1
Primaudaye, Pierre De La 6
Reid, Thomas 124, 140
Rescher, Nicholas 57, 85
Rosenkrantz, Gary xiv, 22, 39, 59, 71, 81,
85, 104, 142, 150, 183, 192, 220, 234
Russell, Bertrand 27, 28, 34, 35, 40, 183185, 188, 189, 225
Salmon, Nathan ix
Selby-Bigge, L. A. 79
Sergeant, John 241
Shakespeare, William 198
Sidney, Sir Philip 106
Simons, Peter 5
Smith, Barry 55, 228
Sosa, Ernest x, xiii, xiv, 11, 33, 49, 50, 68,
78, 110, 111, 227
South, Robert 106
Stout, G. F. 5, 86
Stubbes, Philip I
Tachau, Katherine 192
T. B. 6
Tomberlin, James 141
Thomson, Archbishop William 56
Uehling, Theodore E. x, 11, 164'
Van Inwagen, Peter 141
Van Cleve, James xiii
van der Schaar, Maria 86
Vier, Peter C. 192
Walsh, James 3, 43, 75, 188
Watts, Isaac 220
Werenfels, Samuel 11
Wettstein, Howard K. x, 11, 164
Wierenga, Edward xiv, 220
Williams, D. C. xi, 5
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 118
Zalta, Edward 114
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Abstract entities x-xiii, 117, 228-230

de re beliefs about 31-33, 233-235
descriptive identification of 28-31
grasping of 22-37
individuation of 132-139
qualitative and nonqualitative Ch. 1,
sect. IX
Abstraction 22-24,-28,224
Accidental properties 16, 17
Acquaintance 28, 33-36, 40-41, 220-223,
Ch. 5
and abstracta 22, 28, 33-35, 185, 228230, 233-235, 237
and one's body 225, 228
and one's mental states 33-35, 185, 230235, 237
and oneself 34, 37, 40-41, 185, 188, 189,
225-227, 229, 233-240
and physical objects and persons other
than oneself 35, 37, 40, 41, 185,
188, 189-224, 228, 229, 233-235
and places 228
and sense-data 184, 227, 230
and souls 228
and surfaces of external objects 212-213,
233-235
and temporal slices of physical objects
and persons 233-235, 204-209, 211213
and temporal slices of surfaces 213, 234,
235
and times 227, 228, 230, 237
Actual world 19, 161, 165
Amenesia 36, 39, 197, 238
Analysis x, xi, 5, 43, 49-51, 73-76,

110, 111, 113, 130, 239, 240
Anti-realism 4, Ch. 1, sect. VII
Atemporality 17, 57, 58, 132
Atoms 5, 13, 14
Attributes ix, 1-4, 9, 25, 26, 34, 36, 44, 50,
55, 116 see properties
Attribution
direct 186
indirect 34
self- 36-41, 229
Baptism 191, 193
Belief 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40 189, 208, 219
de dicta ix, 32-34, 41
de re ix, 32-38, 40, 41, 186, 232, 233,
235
direct de re 32-35, 186, 187, 232, 233,
235
indirect de re 32, 34, 233
Bonding 169-171
Boscovichian point-particles 20, 103, 142
Boundaries 173, 176, 177, 180, 205
Brute fact 74, 90, 91, 122, 135, 137, 138
Categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1, sect. VIII,

108, 109, 117, 132, 133, 137, 138
Category mistake 108, 117, 118
Causal products 19, 141, 142, 149, 155,
168, 182, 183
Causal theory of reference 233, 234
Cause and effect 57, 58, 85, 86, 91, 103,
104, 146, 147, Ch. 4, sect. II, 221,
222
247
248
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
agent cause 86
efficient cause 86, 179
formal cause 76
Change 56, 57, 66, 118, 132, 203
Circular individuation 94-103, 122, 132136
Collections xi, 5, 53, 60, 66, 109, 124,
125, 222
Collectivism 5
Colors xii, 46-51, 215, 228, 229
Conceptual circularity 50, 67, 68, 83, 93,
94, 103, 121, 122, 125
Conceptualism 4, 54, 55
Concepts (ideas, mental constructs) 24, 53,
55, 70, 119, 129
Concrete/abstract distinction x, xi, xii, 12,
55, Ch. 1, sect. VIII, 129, 135-139
Concrete entities ix, x, xi, 93
individuation of Ch. 2
Conjuncts 24, 34, 35, 37, 50, 69, 96, 111113, 122, 124, 141, 144, 147, 148,
197, 201, 206, 209, 211, 214, 215,
236, 237
Constituents 114-121, 118, 125, 126, 157
Contingent propositions 17, 18
Contingent existence 18, 21, 57, 62, 127,
128, 138, 150, 156
Contradictories 48
Contraries 48
Corpus callosum 236
Deductive closure (of knowledge) 216-219
Definite descriptions x, 21, 29-31, 158,
169, 173-183, 185-187, 243
causal Ch. 4, sect. I
mereological Ch. 4, sect. II
Descriptive identification 28-35, 40, 169,
173, 177, 181--185, 241-243
Determinism 181
Disjuncts 24, 50, 62, 69, 96, 101, 102,
111-113, 122, 124
Diversity at a time (explanation of) x, xiii,
Ch. 2, 157
Diversity of the dissimilar 44

Divine cognition Ch. 5, sect. VII
Dynamism 20
Edges 173, 174
Electrons 20, 221
Elements 66, 67, 108, 125, 126, 128, 139,
157
Elimination 53, 54, 61, 129
Emergence 118
Entities 59, 60, 64, 62, 139
Epistemic principles 25-27, 188, 189
Epistemology ix
Essential properties 16, 17, Ch. 1, sects. VI
and VI
Euclidean space 77, 79, 80
Events xi, 5, 53, 57-60, 63, 66, 79, 81, 85,
103, 120
Exemplification 1, 2, 12, 83, 91, 127, 134,
135, 138
Explanation x, xii, xiii, 73, 75, 91, 123,
131, 133, 137
Expression
linguistic expressions 2, 3, 8, 22, 28-31,
35, 36, 53, 114, 115, 119-121, 158
a term's expressing a property ix, xi, 8,
22, 28-31, 35, 36, 233-235
Externalism 25
Faces 173, 174
Facts 58
Familial triviality 94, 106-108, 121, 122,
125, 157
First-person language ix, 36-41, 225, 235
First science xi
Foundationalism 189, 208
Fundamental laws 131
Fundamental particles 20, 79, 104, 142,
169-171, 175
Geometry 22
Genus xii, 59, 62
God 56-58, 62, 65, 77, 220-224, 243
Grasping ix, xi, x, 2, 22-32, 34-37, 44-49,

56, 57, Ch. 1, sect. IX, 110-116,
128, 129, 188, 189, Ch. 5
passim
Haecceities ix, et passim

as abstract entities 4, 91, 107, 109, 118,
119, Ch. 2, sect. VII, 103, 134, 139
of abstract entities 6, 7,;13, 132, 134,
228, 230, 233-235
and acquaintance Ch. 5
defmition of xiii, 3, 20, 21
versus individual essences Ch. 1, sect. VI
and introspection Ch. 5, sects. VIII and
IX
and nonqualiative properties &
propositions Ch. 1, sect II
as a principle of individuation for
concreta Ch. 2
and re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VII
and sense-perception Ch. 5, sects. II-VII
unexemplified haecceities andnonexistent
possible individuals Ch. 3, Ch. 4
Haecceitism 185
naive 215
platonic 151-153, 163, 165
sophisticated perceptual 216
Holes 5, 60
Idealism 214, 222, 241
Identification ix, 40, 41, Ch. 5, 213
Identifying property 185
Identity of Indiscernibles 77, 79, 80, 82
Identity ix, 17, 44, 104, Ch. 2, sect. VI,
124-126
Immutability 57, 166
Impossibility 17, 18, 69
Impressions 79, 80, 103
Indeterminism 181
Individual concept 185
Individual essence Ch. I, sect. VI
Individuation ix, x
of abstract entities 137-139
249
of concrete entities Ch. II passim

the problem of 74-76
causal criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97, 98,
101-104
epistemic, criterion of 76
formal criterion of 76
haecceity criterion of 87, 90-92, 97, 98,
102-105
locational criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97, 98,
100, 101, 103, 104
material criterion of 83, 84, 90, 91, 97-99
mereological criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97,
98, 101, 103, 104
nonontological criterion of 89-91, 97,
103, 104
qualitative criterion of 82, 83, 91, 142145
relational criterion of 86, 87, 90, 91, 97,
103, 104
substratum criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97-100
tropal criterion of 86, 90, 91, 97, 98, 102
Individuals see concrete .entities
Inductive methods of re-identification 198200, 202, 203, 207, 208, 210, 226,
229, 232
Innate ideas 24, 224
Instantiability 59-64, 67
Intellectual awareness 223
Internalism 25, 27, 40, 41
Interpenetrating physical objects 78, 79,
103, 104
Intrinsic nature or, property 79, 104, 105,
112, 224
Introspection 24, 25, 39, 222, 223, 231,
225, 226
Intuitive induction 22
Knowledge 239, 240
by acquaintance 28, 33-35, Ch. 5, 40

by description 28, 28, 38, 40, 176, 177,
184
de ditto 34
de re 34, 35, 38-41, 186, 187, 232, 233
250
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
direct de re 34, 35, 186, 187, 232, 233,

235
indirect de re 184, 219
intellectual 223
introspective 222, 223, 225-227, 231,
232, 236, 237
perceptual 38, 39, 191-202, 206, 207,
209-211, 213, 215 -219, 221-223,
225
memory 195-197, 201, 207, 214-215,
225-229, 231, 232
self- ix, 38, 39-41, 59, 225
Leibniz's Law 77
Length 70, 71
Light 20, 131
Limits 5, 60
Logic xii, 1, 46
Mass 20, 78
Mathematics xii, 46
Mereology xiv, 5
Mereological
assemblies 169-177, 179-182
essentialism 170, 171, 175, 176, 180, 240
inessentialism 183
products 19, 21, 141, 149, 155, 168, 182,
183
sums 5, 109, 114
Mereologically and causally disjoint objects
19-21, 54, 141, 142, Ch. 3, sects. II
and III, 155, 159-161, 168, 241-243
Modalities ix, Ch. 1, sect. N, Ch. 3, sect.
N, Chs. 3 and 4 passim
Modal Realism 141, 143-145, 148, 162
Moderate empiricism 22, 24, 28
Multiple personality disorder 236
Names ix, 2, 29, 30, 31, 36, 69, 157, 158,
174, 185-187, 191, 200, 201, 206,
209, 233-235, 243,
Necessity
de dicto ix, 17, 18, 94, 166, 167
de re ix, 16, 17, 166, 167, 174

Necessary
being 18, 62
equivalence 3, 47, 52, 59, 62, 64, 74,
109-113
existence x, 18, 21, 58, 128, 138, 149,
151, 154, 162, 165-167
property 16, 17
proposition 17, 18
Negation 24, 48, 50, 111, 112
Negative definitions 65
Nominalism xii, 4, 11, 12, 25, 43, 53-55,
64, 76, 90, 91, 137
Nonexistent possible individuals (NEPs)
xiii, 19-21, Ch. 3, sects. I and II,
Ch. 4, 168, 169, 173-183, 241-243
Nonqualitative properties x, Ch. 1, sects. II,
HI, and IX
Nonqualitative propositions x,,Ch. 1, sects.
II and IX
Numbers xi, 4, 5, 46, 120
Ockham's Razor 131

Omniscience 129, 221-223, 243
Ontology xi, xii, 61, 62, 130
Ontological categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1,
sect. VIII
Opposites 48-50
Parmenidean argument 163
Particulars see concrete entities
Parts 2, 5, 14, 19, 44, 50, 65-67, 70, 104,
109, 113, 118, 124-126, 146, 147,
157, 158, Ch. 4, 170, 171, 179, 181,
240
Photons 131
Places xi, 5, 60, 63-65, 81, 228
Plugging 114, 116-118
Point-particles 20, 67, 142, 177
Points 5, 56, 57, 66, 67
Possibility 16-18, 21
Possible proposition 18
Possible worlds ix, 16-18, 21, 42, 70, 140-
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
144, 147, Ch. 3, Ch. 4
Privations 5, 56, 60, 61
Probability 173, 181
Properties xi, 1-4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 8, 12, 2236, Ch. 1, sect. VII, 60, 62, 63, 66,
67, 108, 117, 124, 126, 127, 133,
139, 163, 164, 244, et passim
ego-centric xii
intrinsic 77-79
nonqualitative Ch. 1, sect. II, 54
qualitative x, Ch. 1, sect. II, 54, 77
relational 8, 9, 78, 79, 87, 88, 104, 107,
114, 116-118, 242
unexemplified x, xiii, 2, 16, 19-21, 25,
26, 42, 43, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67, 138,
139, 143-149, Ch. 3, sect. III, Ch. 4,
169, 173, 175-178, 213, 223, 241244
world-indexed 147
Propositions xi, 4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 11-14,
16, 22, 32, 60, 63, 66, Ch. 1, sect.
IX, 88, 132, 133, 139, 220, 230
Qualitative
properties x, 46, 77, Ch. 1, sects. H, ILL
and IX
relations x, 8-10
propositions Ch. 1, sects. II and IX
Qualitatively indistinguishable
individuals x, 20, Ch. 2, sect. II, 104
Quantification 2, 3, 119-121, 143
Quantum mechanics 103, 104
Radical empiricism 24
Rationalism 24
Realism 214
Realism (Property-Realism) xii, xiii, 12,
24, 26, 32;64, 72, 74, 76, 91, 130,
131
anemic 53
bifurcated 151-154, 156, 157, 159-163,
168
moderate (or aristotelian) 4, 25, 26, 54,
57, 137, 152-154, 156, 162-16

168, 169
nonqualitative 11, 12, 15
platonic or extreme x, xi, xiii, 4, 25:32,
54, 55, 137, 149, 151, 152, 154,
156, 162, 244
qualitative 11-15, 33, 43
robust 53, 54, 139, 149, 244
strong 32
strong extreme 54, 55, 149, 168, 169,
244
weak extreme 54
Reductive identification 53, 61, 62, 129,
139
Reference x, 29-31, 38, 114-116, 157-159,
168, 169, 173, 175-183, 241, 243
Relations xi, 4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 22, 32, 53,
60, 63, 86, 89, 91, 97, 105, 107-110,
114-119, 121, 122, 133, 139, 163,
164
Re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VII
Riemannian space 78, 80
Rigid designators 174
Self-ascription see self-attribution
Self-evidence 215
Semantics of direct reference 233-234
Sense 114, 115
Sense-data 184, 189, 225, 227, 230
Sense-perception 36-40, 189-225, 236, 241
Sets 4, 5, 53, 57, 56, 60-62, 66, 108, 114,
125, 126, 128, 139, 222
Shadows 60
Similarity 23, 73-75, 198, 199, 202, 203,
205, 212, 224
Souls (spirits) 5, 19, 56, 60, 65, 67, 79, 80,
81, 86, 103, 142, 222, 228
Spatial discontinuity 104
Spatio-temporal continuity 104
Species xii, 4, 5, 47, 59, 62, 70, 75
States 9, 33, 34, 146, 220-222, 225, 230235
Substances xi, 5, 19, 20, 56-58, 60, 62,65,
252
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
81, 84, 86 173

Subsumption 59, 61, 62
Sufficient Reason (Principle of) 77
Sums 5, 67, 114, 124, 171-173, 176
Supervenience 105
Surfaces 5, 56, 60, 62, 118, 120, 173, 212,
213, 233-235
Translation xii
Transparency 79
Tropes 5, 53, 56, 60, 61, 66, 79, 81, 85,
97, 127
Truth 9
de dicto 9, 10
de re 9, 10
Temporal slices 104, 204-209, 211-213,

227, 233-235
Thatness see haecceity
Thisness see haecceity
Times 4, 5, 20, 60, 63-65, 227, 228, 230,
237
Universal essential properties 43-46, 239

Universals xii, 4, 5, 22, 33, 55, 56, 73
Vagueness 177
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES

Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer
Editor:
KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona

Board of Consulting Editors:
Jonathan Bennett, Allan Gibbard, Robert Stalnaker, and Robert G. Turnbull

1. JAY F. ROSENBERG, Linguistic Representation, 1974.
/ WILFRID SELLARS, Essays in Philosophy and Its History, 1974.
3. DICKINSON S. MILLER, Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare. Selected
Essays and Chapters from Six Decades. Edited with an Introduction by Lloyd D.
Easton, 1975.
4. KEITH LEHRER (ed.), Analysis and. Metaphysics. Essays in Honor of R. M.
Chisholm. 1975.
5. CARL GINET, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 1975.
6. PETER H. HARE and EDWARD H. MADDEN, Causing, Perceiving and
Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse, 1975.
7. HECTOR-NERI CASTAREDA, Thinking and Doing. The Philosophical
Foundations of Institutions, 1975.
8. JOHN L. POLLOCK, Subjunctive Reasoning, 1976.
9. BRUCE AUNE, Reason and Action, 1977.
10. GEORGE SCHLESINGER, Religion and Scientific Method, 1977.
11. YIRMIAHU YOVEL (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Papers presented
at the first Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974, 1978.
12. JOSEPH C. PITT, The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions,
1978.
13. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN and JAEGWON KIM, Values and Morals. Essays in
Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, 1978.
14. MICHAEL,J. LOUX, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, 1978.
15. ERNEST SOSA (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher: Discussion and
Replies, 1979.
16. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. .Essays in the
Philosophy of Law, 1979.
17. GEORGE S. PAPPAS, Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, 1979.
18. JAMES W. CORNMAN, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, 1980.
19. PETER VAN INWAGEN, Time and Cause. Essays presented to Richard Taylor,
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Rosenkrantz Haecceity An Ontological Essay

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Rosenkrantz Haecceity An Ontological Essay

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GARY S.

Library or Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

antoloq,cal assay 1 by Gary S. Ftosenkrantz,

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporales

Printed on acid-free paper

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

All Rights Reserved

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINAIRES

CHAPTER 2 - THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

I Haecceity: An Initial Account

I The Individuation of NEPs

I Mereological Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities

I Haecceities and Acquaintance

Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1, and Appendix C.

University Press, 1981), pp. 21-22.

that it is metaphysically extravagant to think that particulars have haecceities.'

interesting implications. (1) There are some haecceities which no one is

Problems belonging to each of these branches of ontology shall be

The argument I present entails a radical or "giraffe" realism of properties.

tions. I benefitted significantly, as well, from the criticisms and suggestions

Greensboro, North Carolina

I - HAECCEITY: AN INITIAL ACCOUNT

What is a haecceity or "thisness"?' Informally speaking, we can say that a

of lacking is the contradictory of the exemplification relation. When it is

By unexemplified I mean never-exemplified.

Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.

(Dl) F is a haecceity =df. (3x)(F is the property of being identical with

In (D1), existential quantification is utilized to define the concept of haecceity. Existential

Hackett, 1973), p. 588. Scotus characterizes a haecceity as a "positive entity intrinsically

being identical with me exemplifies being identical with something, a thing

intuitive notion of an ontological category will be discussed further in section VIII

the number 8, the number 9, et cetera) Species of concreta include

II - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVE

There is an intuitive distinction between general and nongeneral abstracta,

Notice that a nongeneral proposition pertains to a specific concretum in a

relations which are general or qualitative in character, for instance,

identical with Squareness count as relational.

III - CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HAECCEITIES

"Which Infatuation has proceeded from Scholasticks who

The existence of nonqualitative haecceities is especially controversial. There

Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), "Possibility without Haecceity," in

"Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological and

something, being an entity, being concrete, being a person, being identical

Necessarily, if something has a haecceity, then everything has a haecceity.

that (3x)(x is red),

qualitative realist's rejection of nonqualitative properties is no less in need

there must be a logically comprehensive class of propositions which both

As noted earlier, the controversy over the existence of haecceities is relevant

quantity of water in question necessarily bears the relation of identity to

(D1) is an adequate definition of the concept of haecceity only if every

(D2) F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that: (ax)(F is the property

An unexemplified haecceity, H, corresponds to a nonexistent possible, i, if and only if

V - COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS

If there are properties, relations, and propositions, then people intellectually

My understanding of this process of abstraction is patterned after Roderick Chisholm's

Priori Knowledge," Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 355-362.

experiential stimuli. It is extremely plausible that we possess such

or the negative property P, then S may come to grasp (P&Q),

(PvQ), or P as a result of S's conjoining, disjoining, or negating

case, we can grasp many of them. Moreover, grasping a property is a direct

See D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge