Lapid vs CA

GR 142261June 29, 2000

Facts:Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with
alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for allegedly having conspired among themselves in
demanding & collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a
control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand,
gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance
authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such
collection.The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for
misconduct, which meted out the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay
pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).The DILG
implemented the said Ombudsman decision.Proceeding from the premise
that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued
that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG for
prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
Issue:WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively
liable for misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension
without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held:Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.The Rules of
Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar
provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the
respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section
27of R.A. 6770.The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those
listed as final and unappealable. The legal maxim inclusion unius est
exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these
statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said section are
not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed,
such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision.A judgment becomes final and executory

by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right
to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these
decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these
judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.The general rule
is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it
has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an
exception to this general rule.There is no general legal principle that
mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately
executory.Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of
the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal,
the law expressly so provides.Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be
interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award,
judgment,final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.final order
or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.Petitioner was charged
administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of
the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over
the other. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the
Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.It is suffice
to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No.
07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory.

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of
the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and
an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,
and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to

possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his abovementioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with
authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People
vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of
the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts
rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of
the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability
would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant
may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to
be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did
not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed
to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of
the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially

malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related
to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative
measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into
the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute
the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential
Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence
of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was
either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon
outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS
MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found
among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or
events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated
therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will

avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious

consequence

Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent
Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners
opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place
within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall
may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its
general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The
spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus,
interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will
unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election
rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court
assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An
interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular
local election
in a recall proceeding
Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the

other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute
must be read according
to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which the Court
cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than
fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the
letter that killeth but
in the spirit that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74
construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject
of a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be
considered a regular election,
as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government
Code. It would be more
in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe
regular local election as
one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become
moot and academic,
as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were
seven months away.
Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining
the recall election,
was made permanent.

US. v. Hart
Case No. 159
G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)
FACTS:
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act
No. 519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or

gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible

means
of support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts,
separated by the
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying
through the
country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart
and the other
Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the
portion of
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted
that the phrase
without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of
the said
portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.
ISSUE:
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD:
The construction of a statute should be based upon
something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a
meaning which is
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an
additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in
the statute as thus
punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not
conclusive and the
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the
act the
e ff e c t i n t e n d e d b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , d i s r e g a r d i n g
s u p e r fl u o u s a n d i n c o r r e c t
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as
defendant had,
visible means of support and that the absence of such was
necessary for the
conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling
houses, defendants
are acquitted.