2001 Dienstag Niet Dion Pessimism PDF

Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism
Author(s): Joshua Foa Dienstag

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 923-937
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Vol. 95, No. 4 December2001
Pessimism
Nietzsche's
Dionysian
JOSHUA FOA DIENSTAG Universityof Virginia
As
to
a systemof thought,
pessimismis oftenassumedto be too deterministicor self-contradictory
withstandseriousscrutiny.I examineNietzsche'suse of the term"Dionysian
pessimism"to describe
his own philosophyin orderto challengethesepresumptions.Nietzschewas quite criticalof the
pessimisticphilosopherspopularin his day, but he nonethelessconsideredhis own workto be a kind of
butas a philosophicalone. Nietzsche's
pessimism,whichhe meantnot as a psychologicalcharacterization
Dionysianpessimismis a perspectiveon life that can draw sustenance,ratherthan recoil,from the
disenchantedworldleftto us afterthedemiseof metaphysics.WhereasSchopenhauer
advocated
disordered,
Nietzsche
that
a
maintained
new
could
be
the
resignation,
groundfor activity
found apartfrom narratives
Nietzsche'sphilosophy,
of reasonandprogress.Dionysianpessimismis an answerto thosewhocharacterize
andpessimismmoregenerally,as passiveor suicidalmodesof thought.
Thattherestill couldbe an altogetherdifferentkindof

andvisionbelongsto me
pessimism,...thispremonition
as inseparablefrom me, as my propriumand ipsissiof thefuture-forit comes!
mum.... I callthispessimism
I see it coming!-Dionysian
pessimism.
-The GayScience
ical thought possible (Koselleck 1985; Pocock 1975).

Although this new sense of time did not, of course,
produce a philosophy by itself, it did provide an
underlyingintellectualstructurethat allowednew ideas
to be built atop it, and it made those ideas feel more
plausiblewhen once proposed.It has been said many
s it possibleto drawa positiveconclusionfrom times that the idea of progressis somethingmodem.
pessimism,or is suchan attitudesimplya confusion One could offer manyqualificationsto this platitude,2
or a contradictionin terms?It is often maintained but I will accept its generalvalidityand simplypoint
that pessimismcannotbe taken seriouslyas a philoso- out that the change in European time-consciousness
did not authorizeonly the idea of progress.Pessimism,
phy because it leads nowhere, that is, it leads to
too, is one of its progeny,the hidden twin of progress
or
One
could
that
the
hopelessness resignation.1
reply
consequencesof a philosophycannotaffectits truthor in modem politicalthought.
Whatis surprisingin standardintellectualhistoriesis
falsehood.We cannotrejectpessimismbecausewe do
not like where it takes us. On the contrary,we should how rapidlythe idea of linearityis assimilatedto the
idea of progress,as if progressand stasis are the only
be on guardagainstany tendencyto suppressa line of
two choicesavailableto politicalphilosophy.The word
its
because
conclusion
us.
the
Yet,
thought
repels
eminentlylogical qualityof this reply may deflect our pessimismcame into widespreaduse only in the nineteenth century, but it clearly names a persistent
attention from another and more satisfyingsort of
that
in
one
defends
as
thought or set of thoughtsthat has recurredoften in
response,
pessimism particular
social
and politicaltheory since the Enlightenmentin
to
We
must
opposed disagreeablethoughtsgenerally.
tandem
with its opposite.Both termsappearonly after
not simplygrantthat pessimismleads to a posture of
the
thoughtsthey reflect are alreadyin play. Leibniz
resignation.The epigraphfromNietzschesuggeststhat
and
another result from pessimismis possible or, indeed, firstused "optimum"as a correlateto "maximum"
"minimum"in his Theodiceeof 1710 (1985). French
that there is anothersort of pessimismaltogether,the
conclusionsof whichdo not lead inevitablyto despair. writers then began to refer to his doctrine as one of
Like the idea of progressand the various philoso- optimisme.The term apparentlycrosses into English
phies to which it gave rise, pessimism is a modern with the popularityof Voltaire'sCandideou l'Optimisme
of 1759 (1992).
phenomenon. As many historians have noted, the
The firstknownprintedappearanceof "pessimism"
linear sense of historical time that emerged in the
in
Englishfollowed a few decades later, althoughthe
early-modernperiod made entirelynew sorts of politcontext seems to indicatethat the termwas alreadyin
use.3Philosophically,however,the emergenceof pesJoshua Foa Dienstag is Associate Professorand Associate Chair,
simismmay be dated to 1750 (1964) and the appearDepartmentof Governmentand ForeignAffairs,P.O. Box 400787,
Universityof Virginia,Charlottesville,VA, 22904-4787(jfdienstag ance of Rousseau'sDiscourseon theArtsand Sciences,
with its characterizationof modem man as a moral
@virginia.edu).
Earlier versions were presented at the annual meeting of the
degenerate. Rousseau's ideas were seconded, in the
AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationand the PrincetonPolitical
nineteenthcentury,in such works as Leopardi's
early
PhilosophyColloquium.I thankall the respondentsandparticipants
at those occasionsfor theirhelpfulcomments.Thanksare also due to
Matthew Goldfeder, Amy Gutmann, George Kateb, Jennifer
Mnookin,AlexanderNehamas,BernardReginster,and the referees
and editorof thisjournalfor theirresponsesto variousdrafts.I also
thank the Universityof Virginiaand NorthwesternUniversityfor
researchsupportthat made the writingpossible.
I See, for example,BertrandRussell's
(1945, 753-9) brief dismissal
of Schopenhauer.
The most commonqualificationis the claimthat moderntheories

of progressare merely a secularizedversion of earlier Christian
theologiesof hope. The classictext is L6with1949. This argument
has met with strong criticismsfrom, among others, Blumenberg
(1983) and Pocock(1975).AlthoughI cannotaddressthis debatein
detail, I shouldnote that I find these criticismslargelypersuasive.
2
See pessimism in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary.
923
Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism
December2001
MoralEssays([1827] 1983),but pessimismachievedits pessimismof both Hartmannand Schopenhauerled

briefperiodof genuinepopularitythroughthe workof
directlyto nihilism.Indeed,the very popularityof this
Schopenhauer,whose Parergaand Paralipomenawent form of pessimismin the late nineteenthcenturywas
one reason Nietzsche believed nihilism would soon
through many editions after its initial publicationin
1851 (1942). Thereafter,although never a dominant enjoy a temporarydominanceof Europeansociety.
Intermixedwith his critique,however,is an account
school in politicaltheory,pessimismwas a well-recognized positionfor at least severalgenerations.4
of anotherkind of pessimism.Nietzscheviewed it as
distinct from the popular one and called it "that
Whatshouldbe clear,even fromthis briefhistory,is
that pessimismwas originallyviewedas a theoryrather courageouspessimismthat is ... the wayto 'myself,'to
than (as we often think of it today) a psychological my task"(AOM,Preface,4). Thisalternativegrewboth
of the pre-SocraticGreeks(as he
disposition.Rousseau'scomplicatedstory of material fromthe "pessimism"
in
Birth
with
for
called
it
The
ethical
devolution,
of Tragedy)and from Schopendevelopment coinciding
human
but
a
deal
of
hauer's
contained
psychology
philosophy, Nietzschedistinguishedsharply
great
example,
betweenwhathe frequentlycalled"mypessimism"and
but neither implied nor was meant to engender a
those that precededit. Ultimately,he gave his alternadepressiveoutlook. With Schopenhauer,the story is
more complicated.As the author of such lines as "If tive the name "Dionysianpessimism"(GS 370).7What
the immediate and direct purpose of our life is not exactlyNietzschemeant by this term and what appeal
it may still have is the aim of this essay to discover.In
sufferingthen our existenceis the most ill-adaptedto
its purposein the world"(Schopenhauer1970,41), he
part, this is a projectof disentanglement,since Nietzindeed recommendedwithdrawalfrom materialpur- sche made many references to "pessimism"without
suits. But his reasonsfor doing so were largelymeta- alwaysindicatingwhich varietyhe was talkingabout.
physical,and he expectedthat sucha withdrawalwould Whenthese referencesareviewedas a whole,however,
sharplylimit humanunhappiness.In any case, it is our clear patterns begin to emerge. Indeed, Nietzsche
very moderntendencyto projecta philosophicalposi- speaksof manytypesof pessimism,"theunclearword,"
tion onto people who are simplydepressedthat leads only one of which he can embrace(KGW8.1.129;see
us to confuse philosophicalwith psychologicalpessi- WP 38).
mism. The question of the implicationsof pessimism
"Pessimism,"by itself, is not a very specificterm to
cannot be settled by studyingthe effects of unhappi- Nietzsche, and this is not surprising.The late nineness;they need to be addressedat the theoreticallevel teenth centurywas the one period in whichpessimism
at which they arose.5Happinessand unhappinessare enjoyedwide respectability,if not allegiance,in popuuniversal phenomena, whereas pessimism, like the lar and intellectualdiscussions.8The termwas used by
theoriesof progressto whichit is opposed,is a modern and applied to a wide spectrum of authors in an
indiscriminateway. Nietzsche's notes in the 1880s
idea.
Nietzsche'srelationshipto the pessimistswho pre- contain severallists of the varioustypes of pessimism.
Whetherhe composedthese lists simplyto distinguish
ceded him was hardlyone of uniformcelebration.He
called Rousseau a "moral tarantula,"and although amongthe possiblevarietiesor becausehe plannedto
writeaboutthemin sequenceis unclear.One list reads,
initially inspired by Schopenhauer'sphilosophy, he
eventuallydissociatedhimselffrom its systematiccon- in part: "Russian pessimism. Tolstoi, Dostoevsky /
clusions (but retaineda respect for its criticalspirit). aesthetic pessimisml'art pour l'art 'description'/ roNietzschewas also unkindtowardthe pessimistspop- mantic and antiromanticpessimism/ epistemological
/ anarular in the Germanyof his day, especiallyEduardvon pessimism./ Schopenhauer."Phenomenalism."
Hartmann,who held the chairof philosophyin Berlin; chistic pessimism,"and so on, down to an entry for
Nietzsche called him "completely abysmal" (BGE "moralisticpessimism,"whichNietzscheidentifieswith
himself (KGW8.2.73-4).9
204).6As discussedbelow, Nietzschebelievedthat the
Nietzsche did not address all these varieties of
In the nineteenthcentury,examplesare Eduardvon Hartmannand
then HyppoliteTaine; in the twentieth,Weber, Adorno, Camus,
Cioran,and so on. Relaxingone's definitionsa bit permitsa much
longer list (includingsuch figuresas Freud,Heidegger,Unamuno,
andSartre)to be generated.I cannottakeup herethe questionof the
properboundariesof pessimisticthinking.A simpledefinitionmight
be: those who acceptmodem notionsof temporalitybut who reject
the idea of progress.See the "GreekPessimism"sectionbelow.
5 Thishas not stoppedinterpretersfromattributingSchopenhauer's
pessimism,for example,to an unhappychildhood.See the introduction by Hollingdaleto Schopenhauer1970.
6 Nietzsche referenceswill use the followingsystem:AC = The
Anti-Christ(1968);AOM = AssortedOpinionsand Maxims(1986);
BGE = BeyondGoodand Evil (1966a);BT = TheBirthof Tragedy
4
(1967b); D = Daybreak (1982); EH = Ecce Homo (1967a); HH =
Human, All-too-Human(1986); GS = The Gay Science (1974);

GM = On theGenealogyof Morals(1967a);PTG = Philosophyin the
(1966b);
TragicAge of Greeks(1962);Z = ThusSpokeZarathustra
TI = Twilightof the Idols (1967a); UM = UntimelyMeditations
(1984); and WP = The Willto Power (1967c). Numbersrefer to
Nietzsche'snumberedsectionsor, if therearenone,to pagenumbers

Kritische
in the editionslistedin the references.For KGW= Werke:
Gesamtausgabe
(1967d),numbersrefer to volume,book, and page.
All translationsfromthis last are my own responsibility,althoughI
often drawon those in WP and otherpublishedversionswhenthese
exist.All emphasesare originalunlessotherwisenoted.
7 Nietzschealso occasionallyspoke of "the pessimismof strength"
(KGW8.2.133),which,as we shall see, has a parallelbut not quite
identicalmeaning.
8 One interestingaccountof this, with manyuseful citationsto the
contemporaryliterature,appearsin Dale 1989,chaps.9-10.
9 A versionof thisjottingappearsin TheWillto Poweras "aphorism"
82. The editorsinserteda varietyof punctuationmarksin orderto
clarifyand associatevariouslines with one another;all this punctuation is suppositional,and some of it appearsmistaken(apartfrom
the obvious awkwardnessinvolvedin pretendingthat a list is an
aphorism).In Nietzsche'snotebook,but not in WP,the note goes on
to list othertopicsthatapparentlyare to be consideredrelated,such
as "nationalism
/ industrialcompetition/ science."To the best of my
924

pessimismin depth,butwhen he did considerthem, he
was usually careful to distinguish them from their
relatives.From his perspective,what they had in common was theirpracticeof rejectionand denigrationor,
in his vocabulary,"no-saying."But the object and
means of no-sayingwere far more importantto Nietzsche thanthe negativityitself.After anothersuchlist of
pessimisms ("of sensibility,..,.of 'unfree will',.., .of
doubt"),he sets out a clarification:"Whatmustnot be
confusedwith all this:pleasurein sayingNo and doing
No out of a tremendousstrengthand tension derived
from sayingYes... the Dionysianin will, spirit,taste"
(WP 1020).Dionysianpessimism,then, althoughit too
is a no-sayingand relatedto the others,is explicitlyset
off from them. For Nietzsche it is a philosophyof
personal conduct,a suggestionof how to managethe
humanconditionand cope with the basic problemsof
existence.Farfrombeinga psychologicaldisposition,it
is a set of practices intended to guide an individual
throughthe chaotic and disenchantedworld in which
we find ourselves.
A great deal has been writtenon the "artof living"
that Nietzsche prescribesas a kind of substitutefor
ethics.10This literaturepoints us in the rightdirection
but misses somethingcrucialby ignoringNietzsche's
self-characterization
as a kind of pessimist.The implications of that label will be exploredbelow, but they
can be prefacedas follows:Pessimismhas a particular
understandingof the burdensof the humancondition
that these interpretershave not fully acknowledged.
For Nietzsche, the time-boundcharacterof our existence forms the basic problematic(and sets limits to
the possibilities)of anylife-practicethat he can recommend.
Nietzsche'sDionysianpessimismis a crystallization
of ideasthat takesplace relativelylate in his philosophical growth,but the term had many precursorsin his
earlier periods. It is best understoodby tracing the
development of Nietzsche's thoughts on pessimism
and,relatedly,the processbywhichhe disentangledhis
own thinkingfrom that of Schopenhauer.11
Nietzsche
began by quoting Schopenhaueruncritically,but he
ended by proclaiminghis views to be the opposite of
knowledge, Nietzsche does not refer to his own pessimism as
"moralistic" elsewhere.
10 The
phrase "art of living" is from Hadot (1995, 272), who used it
as a description of the intended goal of ancient philosophy, "an
exercise practiced at each instant." See also Nehamas (1985, 1998),
who applies the phrase to Nietzsche, as well as Thiele 1992, Strong
1988, Rorty 1989, Orlie 1997, and Connolly 1991. Foucault (1986)
credits Hadot for inspiring his Nietzschean search for "techniques of
the self' in ancient texts, but Hadot (1995, 206-13) politely declines
to equate his interpretation with that of Foucault. This whole strand
of interpretation is strongly criticized by those who believe Nietzsche
meant to offer philosophical truths (although very novel ones) in the
traditional meaning of that term. See, e.g., Appel 1999, Berkowitz,
Clark 1990, and Leiter 1994. I cannot address this controversy in any
detail, but my interpretation demonstrates an affinity with (and
perhaps presents further evidence for) the view of the first group.
11I cannot
accept the view that Nietzsche's writings, from first to last,
are all of a piece. In exploring the early writings, I attempt to identify
themes that, although they have rivals at the time, later become
dominant. I accept, in broad outline at least, the division of Nietzsche's work into an early, middle, and late period as proposed by
Warren 1988.
Vol. 95, No. 4

Schopenhauer's,although he still called Dionysian
WhileNietzscheis more
pessimismhis "quintessence."
often labeled a nihilist than a pessimist,the crime of
incitingresignationor apathyis one he is often charged
with along with such acknowledged pessimists as
Schopenhauer.If this chargeturnsout to be false, then
it mustchangeour opinionof both Nietzsche'spolitical
theory and pessimismmore generally.
Properly understood, pessimism is not simply an
important element of Nietzsche's philosophy but a
traditionwhose strengthand relevancehas been overlooked. In the righthands,pessimismcan be-and has
been-an energizingand even a liberatingphilosophy.
It does indeedaskus to limitandeliminatesome of our
hopes and expectations,but it can also provide the
means to navigatethe bounded universeit describes.
An entire literature,both scholarly and popular, is
devoted to blamingpessimismfor whateverspiritual
crisisis thoughtto occupyus at the moment.12Indeed,
it is such a flexible term of abuse that it has readily
been applied to almost every criticalsocial theory of
the twentieth century.Existentialism,critical theory,
and postmodernismare regularlylabeled pessimistic,
as if doingso were enoughto discreditthem.The term
is more appropriatein some of these cases thanothers,
but some thought should be given to why the label
functionsso well as a gesture of dismissal.
Criticsoften mistakea depictionof the world for a
choice about our future, as if philosophersrejoice at
the decline or decay they describe. This is akin to
deridingscientistswho warnof globalwarmingbecause
their models give apocalypticpredictions.Is it sensible
to assumethat the scientistswant their predictionsto
come true? If the pessimistsare right, it is the world
that threatensus, not the writerswho describeit. Yet,
ratherthan addressthe threatsto happinessthat the
worlddailyprovides,criticsof pessimismfocus instead
on the bearersof ill tidingsand hope that,in dismissing
them, they will eliminate the message as well. Yet,
despitethe instantunpopularitythey accrue,pessimists
keep appearing-I suspect because the world keeps
deliveringthe bad news.Ratherthanblamepessimism,
perhapswe shouldstudyit. Ratherthan hide from the
ugliness of the world, perhaps we should learn to
withstandit. Nietzschetook it as his task to find a way
to live with the conclusionsat which he had arrived,
and to live well, sometimes even joyfully. One can
debate the degree to which he succeeded,but understandinghis pessimismmust reorientour approachto
all those pessimismsthat followed in his wake.
GREEK PESSIMISM
Nietzschefirstwroteof pessimismandits connectionto
the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy.Although it was
certainlyanachronisticto applythe termto the ancient

Greeks (the word did not exist before the early nineteenth century),his use of it here explainsa great deal
12
Some recent representative titles are Enemies of Hope: A Critique
of ContemporaryPessimism (Tallis 1999) and The Future and Its
Enemies (Postrel 1998).
925

about its meaningin his later work.Its appearancein
this earlyworkmaybe thoughtto be due principallyto
the influenceof Schopenhauer,but the Greekversion
Nietzsche claims to identify is in many ways distinct
fromSchopenhauer's.13
In retrospect,Nietzscherecognized this. In the "Attemptat a Self-Criticism,"
which
he added to the book upon its republication,he
lamentedthat he had "obscuredand spoiledDionysian
premonitions with Schopenhauerian formulations"
(BT, "ASC,"6).14 But this retrospectivejudgmentdid
not, as might be expected, lead him to alter the
characterizationof the pre-SocraticGreeks as pessimists. That was not the "Schopenhauerianformulation" he had in mind. Indeed, in the 1886 edition he
added the subtitle "Hellenismand Pessimism"to the
workandemphasizedin his new introductionthatwhat
he still approvedof in the book was its examinationof
"the good, severe will of the older Greeks to pessimism" and its contrastwith the "optimism"initiated
aroundthe time of Socrates(BT, "ASC,"4).
The mistakethat the new introductionidentifiesis
the confusionof Greek pessimismwith the Schopenhauerianvariety.The Dionysianpessimismof which
Nietzsche had a premonitionthroughhis exploration
of the Greekswas obscuredat firstby his equationof it
with Schopenhauer'sphilosophy. Later, the ancient
Greekswere still viewed as pessimistsbut were simply
anotherkind,as was Nietzschehimself.In TheBirthof
in fact,we havean earlyversionof Nietzsche's
Tragedy,
own pessimism.Greek pessimismis not the same as
that of Schopenhaueror Nietzsche,but it is an instructive model, both to Nietzsche,who called it "the only
parableand parallelin historyfor my own innermost
experience"(EH, "BT,"2), andto us in our attemptto
understandhis later attachmentto this term.
December2001
that the pre-Socraticspossessedand that later generations firstdenied, then forgot. Socratesis the agent of
this change because his philosophyis essentiallyopti-
mistic (BT 14).15
In the periodin whichhe wrote TheBirth,Nietzsche

did not thinkof optimismand pessimismas two equal,
if opposite,ways of looking at the world, as we might
today;rather"pessimism... is older and more original
than optimism"(KGW 4.1.208). Pessimismis the domain of the Ionian philosophers who preceded
Socratesand whose teachingswe possess only in fragments. Instead of trying to construct a systematic,
orderingphilosophy,as Socratesand Platowere to do,
the pre-Socraticsgraspedthe chaotic and disordered
natureof the worldand only attemptedto cope with it
insofar as that was possible:"Pessimismis the consequence of knowledge of the absolute illogic of the
world-order"(KGW 3.3.74).
In some notes from this period, Nietzsche first
attributesto Democritusthe doctrinethat "the world
[is]withoutmoraland aestheticmeaning"andcallsthis
idea "the pessimismof accidents"(KGW 3.4.151). In
Philosophy in the TragicAge of the Greeks, a posthu-
explainnot only the appearanceof Greek tragedybut

also its disappearance,at least in its traditionalform,
after Euripides.As is well known,Nietzsche hypothesizes that Socrates'introduction(and Plato's furtherance) of a rationalisticphilosophydestroyedthe preexistingculturalgroundsfor Greektragedy(BT 12-5).
Whatdid Socratesdestroy,and how was this possible?
Why,in anycase, shoulda philosopherhavethe power
to affectthe theater?The answerlies in the pessimism
that Nietzsche associateswith the pre-Socraticphilosophers and his belief that their ideas reflected the
originalcharacterof early Greek culture."Tragedyis
mouslypublishedessaywrittenat aboutthe same time

as TheBirth,he likens Anaximanderto Schopenhauer
and calls him "the first philosophicalauthor of the
ancients."He goes on to describeAnaximanderas a
"truepessimist"andquoteshis onlyextantfragmentto
justifythe label:"Wherethe sourceof thingsis, to that
place they must also pass away,accordingto necessity,
for they must pay penance and be judged for their
injustices,in accordancewith the ordinanceof Time"
(PTG 4; see KGW 3.2.312).16The comparisonwith
Schopenhauerfollows directlyin Nietzsche'stext and
emphasizesthe moralqualityin both of their philosophies;bothview "allcoming-to-beas thoughit were an
illegitimateemancipationfrom eternalbeing, a wrong
for whichdestructionis the only penance"(PTG 4; see
Cartwright1998, 122). As discussedbelow, Nietzsche
laterdistinguishedbetweenSchopenhauer'smoralizing
pessimismand that of the Greeks.
In otherwords,the pre-Socratics,as Nietzscheinterpreted them, graspedthe animatingprincipleof pessimism as I have describedit elsewhere(Dienstag1999,
85-6): Time is an unshakableburdenfor humanbeings
because it leads to the ultimate destruction of all
things-and this fate belies anyprincipleof orderthat
may, on the surface, appear to guide the course of
the outlet of mystic-pessimistic knowledge" (KGW

3.3.73). Pessimism was the philosophical basis for the
plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. This was the wisdom
events.'" Of course, whether any of the pre-Socratics

would have put things this way is debatable (although
Heraclitus, in particular, is certainly often understood
13 That Schopenhauer strongly influenced Nietzsche is generally

uncontested by scholars, but the degree and timing of that influence
are matters of considerable debate. For example, Kaufmann (in
Nietzsche 1967b, 60n.) believes Nietzsche had already "broken loose
from Schopenhauer" in The Birth of Tragedy, whereas Nehamas
(1985, 42) believes it is precisely on the issue of tragedy that "the
influence of Schopenhauer became dominant." Janaway (1998, 22),
in a judicious formulation, maintains that "the Schopenhauerian
system hovers eerily in the background, unasserted but indispensable." My article cannot settle this debate but may make a useful
contribution to it.
14 The Birth
of Tragedywas published in 1872 and reissued in 1886.
15 A parallel analysis, but without the emphasis on pessimism, is

offered in Strong 1988, 152ff.
16 This is a translation of Nietzsche's German translation of the
Greek original, which he slightly adapted to suit his own understanding. A standard English translation of the pre-Socratics renders
Anaximander's fragment thus: "And the source of coming-to-be for
existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens 'according
to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for
their injustice according to the assessment of Time"' (Kirk, Raven,
and Schofield 1983, 118).
17For an alternate account of pessimism see Pauen 1997. For some
conceptual analysis, see Bailey 1988.
The task that The Birth of Tragedyset itself was to
926

in this fashion). What is importantis that Nietzsche
understoodthem to be doing so, that he understood
the root of pessimismto be, as he later wrote, "timesickness[Zeit-Krankheit]"
(KGW7.2.51).
Nietzscheconsideredtragedyto be the outgrowthof
this view of the world as somethingconstantlyin flux,
constantlyin the process of becoming and, thus, constantlyin the processof destroying.The ravagesof time
could not be cured or compensatedthroughtragedy,
only understood:"Tragedy... is in its essence pessimistic. Existence is in itself somethingvery terrible,
man somethingvery foolish"(KGW3.2.38).Nietzsche
resists the conclusion, popular since Aristotle, that
tragedyoffers some kind of purificationof the emotions generated by the terrible truths of the human
condition (TI, "What I Owe," 5; WP 851). He also
rejects the idea that tragedies contain some sort of
moral lesson meant to instructus in ethical behavior.
Instead,he argues,tragedysimplyservesto laybarefor
us the horriblesituationof human existence that the
pre-Socraticphilosophersdescribe, a situation from
which our mindswould otherwiseflee:
The hero of tragedydoes not prove himself..,.in a
struggleagainstfate,justas littledoeshe sufferwhathe
deserves.Rather,blindandwithcoveredhead,he fallsto
his ruin:andhis desolatebutnobleburdenwithwhichhe
remainsstandingin thepresenceof thiswell-known
world
of terrorspressesitselflike a thornin our soul (KGW
3.2.38).
The tragic outlook is thus generated from a base of
pessimisticknowledge.It recommendsno cure for the
pains of existence, only a public recognitionof their
depth and power.
Fromthe beginning,too, this view is associatedwith
the Dionysian,"the mother of the mysteries,tragedy,
pessimism"(KGW 3.3.309).The Athenianpublictheatrical festivals were known as the Dionysia, and
Nietzsche goes so far as to claim the existence of a
tradition"that Greek tragedyin its earliest form had
for its sole theme the sufferingsof Dionysus"(BT 10).18
Dionysus,in Nietzsche'saccount(whichhere certainly
parallelsSchopenhauer'saccountof the humancondition), suffers the prototypical agonies of existence
inflictedby time. He is severed from the eternal flux
and individuated,then tornto pieces and reunitedwith
the whole:
This view of thingsalreadyprovidesus with all the
elementsof a profoundandpessimistic
viewof theworld,
together with the mysterydoctrineof tragedy:the funda-
mentalknowledgeof the onenessof everything

existent,
theconception
astheprimalcauseof evil,
of individuation
andof artasthejoyoushopethatthespellof individuation
may be brokenin auguryof a restoredoneness (BT 10).
Dionysiansufferingis essentiallyhumansuffering.In
tragedy,this is indicatedby a connectionbetween the
variouselementsinvolvedin the publicperformanceof
the drama. The tragic hero simply personifies the
18Nietzsche calls this tradition "undisputed," which seems doubtful.
Again, however, the accuracy of his construal of the philological
literature and traditions is less important than how these were
related to his own views.
Vol. 95, No. 4

"Dionysianstate" of the chorus as a whole (BT 10).
The chorus is "the mirror-imagein which the Dionysian man contemplateshimself' and also "a vision of
the Dionysian mass of spectators" (BT 8). Actor,
chorus,andpublicare all connectedin tragedythrough
their Dionysiancharacter(see Strong1988,165). Each
is a fragmenttorn from the whole. Nietzsche is here
critiquingbut also reconstitutingthe traditionalphilological stance that the chorus represents the Greek
public.Althoughhe sharplyattacksthe originalproponents of this view, he in fact proposes not to reject it
but to modify it. What he truly dislikes about the
associationin its originalform is the implicationthat
the connection between Athenian performers and
spectatorsis somehowreflectedin contemporary(i.e.,
nineteenth-century)relationshipsbetween artists and
their public. He will only accept the connection of
citizens and chorus on the condition that the Greek
public is understood as a unique phenomenon, a
"Dionysianthrong,"thatis, as a publicalreadyinfected
with the pessimistic wisdom of the pre-Socratics.19
Because modern audiencesno longer share this outlook, comparisonsof the modernsto the Greeksare,to
Nietzsche,specious.
Against this accountof pessimismand tragedyas a
kind of Dionysian wisdom, Nietzsche counterposes
Socraticphilosophy,whose characteristicfeature now
appearsto be its optimism.20 Even while proclaiming
its ignorance,Socratic inquiryrejects the pessimistic
idea that inquiry, like every human activity,is ultimatelydoomed:"Forwho could mistakethe optimistic
element in the nature of dialectic,which celebratesa
triumphwith every conclusion..,.the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must
graduallyovergrowits Dionysianregionsand impel it
necessarilyto self-destruction"(BT 14). Socratesdoes
not promiseeternalhappiness,but he does affirmboth
that virtue resultsin happinessand that virtue can be
taught;happinessis theoreticallywithinthe graspof all
(BT 15).21 He denies that there is anythingultimately
mysteriousaboutlife or inevitableaboutsuffering:"By
contrastwith this practicalpessimism,Socratesis the
prototypeof the theoreticaloptimistwho, withhis faith
that the natureof things can be fathomed,ascribesto
19 Nietzsche identifies A.W. Schlegel as the originator of the other
view; although he proclaims that he gives Schlegel's formulation "a
deeper sense," he certainly also exaggerates his own distance from
contemporary German thought about the Greeks.
20 My brief account of tragedy obviously underplays the role of the
Apollonian as a contrast to the Dionysian. I do not suggest that the
Apollonian is unimportant in The Birth. In the context of this
discussion, however, it is less salient, since it is the Dionysian element
of tragedy that is particularly linked to pessimism, and that is the
element to which Socrates is particularlysupposed to object: "This is
the new opposition: the Dionysian and the Socratic" (BT 12).
21
Throughout The Birth of Tragedy,Nietzsche's characterizations of
Socrates are given without reference to their source; here it seems
clear that he has in mind the conclusions of Socrates in Plato's
Gorgias, Protagoras, and Republic that true happiness can only come
from virtue and that virtue is equivalent to knowledge. This picture
is common enough, but it is far from the only one possible; an
opposite view could perhaps be constructed from the Socrates of the
Meno, who concludes that virtue cannot be taught.
927

knowledgeand insight the power of a panacea"(BT
15).
NotwithstandingSocrates'fate at the hands of his

fellow citizens, Nietzsche has no doubt that this approach,developed by Plato, was ultimatelyvictorious
in its strugglewith tragedy:"Optimisticdialecticdrives
musicout of tragedywith the scourgeof its syllogisms"
(BT 14). Just as the pessimismof an older generation
of Greeksexplainsthe originof tragedy,so the Socratic
turnin Greekphilosophyexplainsits demise.Whenthe
population adopted the optimistic perspective, the
cultural context for tragedy evaporated (see Strong
1988, 161). From Nietzsche's perspective, this was
anythingbut a theoreticaladvance.Greek pessimism
may havebeen somewhatsoporificin its consequences
(see below), but it had a fundamentalhonesty that
Socratic-Platonicphilosophylacks. This point, in particular,is reemphasizedin the laterintroductionto The
Birth.Pessimismis today,as in Nietzsche'stime, commonly associatedwith ideas of culturaldecay, but he
takes the Greek experienceto indicate preciselythe
opposite:
Is pessimismnecessarilya sign of decline... as it once was
in Indiaandnowis, to all appearances,

amongus, "modIstherea pessimism
ofstrength?
ern"menandEuropeans?
... And again:thatof whichtragedydied,the Socratismof
the dialectics,frugality,
andcheerfulness
of the
morality,
theoretical
man--hownow?mightnotthisverySocratism
be a signof decline.... Is the resolveto be so scientific
abouteverything
perhapsa kindof fearof, anescapefrom,
A subtlelastresortagainst-truth
pessimism?
(BT,"ASC,"
1)?
The Greeksof Socrates'generationcould no longer
bear to live with the brutal truths of the human
conditionand sought refuge in an optimisticphilosophy.To Nietzschethiswas "morallyspeaking,a sort of
cowardice... amorallyspeaking,a ruse"(BT, "ASC,"
1). Either way, it was an active self-deception that
made life more tolerable but less genuine. It was a
retreat from a real look at the abyss to a pleasing
fantasy of progress and happiness. Thus, Nietzsche
concludes, the optimists are the true harbingersof
culturaldecline.Whatelse can we call theirweakening
of resolvein comparisonwith the stanceof the earlier
Greeks? Nietzsche's attack on Socrates and Plato is
often taken to be a defense of irrationalism,but from
his perspectiveit is they who retreat from an honest
assessment of the world. The pessimistic vision of the
world as fundamentally disordered, untamable, unfair,
and destructive is the "truth" against which they close
their eyes and retreat to a cave.
If this was Greek pessimism, and if it was in some
sense Dionysian, then what separates it from Nietzsche's own later pessimism? We are dealing here
only with matters of degree, but the differences are real
enough (a fuller answer will be given below). Ultimately, the "Dionysian man" of The Birth is likened by
Nietzsche to Hamlet-both
are paralyzed by the
knowledge of "the eternal nature of things." Both, that
is, have gained an understanding of the primordial
chaos of the world, next to which their own efforts will
December2001
alwaysamountto nothing.Both, therefore,draw the
conclusionthat actingis pointless:
TheDionysianmanresembles
Hamlet:bothoncelooked
trulyinto the essenceof things,theyhavegainedknowledge,andnauseainhibitsaction;fortheiractioncouldnot
intheeternalnatureof things;theyfeelit
changeanything
to beridiculous
orhumiliating
thattheyshouldbe askedto
set righta worldthat is out of joint. Knowledgekills
action;... true knowledge,an insight into the horrible
truth,outweighs
anymotiveforaction,bothinHamletand
in the Dionysianman(BT7).
The pessimismof the Greeks resulted in a quiescence that tragedy,rather than purging,encouraged
and strengthened.22
This Schopenhauerianconclusion
that pessimismmust issue in resignationis reversedin
Nietzsche's later thought. Ultimately, for Nietzsche,
the combinationof the Dionysianand the pessimistic
served to stimulate activityrather than passivity.In
some notes for Ecce Homo, he wrote of The Birth that
it contained, in embryonicform, "the conception of

pessimism,a pessimismof strength,a classicalpessimism ...The antithesis of classical pessimismis romantic pessimism... e.g., the pessimismof Schopenhauer"(KGW8.3.21).Althoughit is truethatTheBirth
held manyof the elementsof Nietzsche'slateraccount
of pessimism,this statementprobablyexaggeratesits
distance from Schopenhauer(see Janaway1998, 24).
After all, in the first edition Nietzschemaintainsthat
the Greeks derivedsome sort of "metaphysicalcomfort" from tragedy;later, in rejectingthat conclusion,
he suggests"youought to learn the art of this-worldly
comfort first;you ought to learn to laugh, my young
friends,if you are hell-benton remainingpessimists"
(BT, "ASC," 7).23Ultimately, then, Nietzsche's Diony-
sian pessimism stimulates action. But how can the

elements of Greek pessimismbe recombinedto draw
the conclusiondirectlyopposite that of TheBirth?
PESSIMISMAND NIHILISM
It will be helpful at this point to locate Nietzsche's
objectionsto the pessimismof his day, especiallythat
of Schopenhauerand Hartmann.AlthoughNietzsche
consideredthe latter to be a comicallysimplisticversion of the former,his mockeryof it is instructive,for
it reveals a great deal about what he takes popular
Germanpessimismto be.
NietzschejudgedHartmann'spessimismto be a kind
of reverse utilitarianism. That is, Hartmann posed the
question of life as if it were a simple cost-benefit
analysis: "Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or
utilitarianism or eudaemonism: all these modes of
Again it can be objected that this account ignores the Apollonian
element of tragedy, which allowed the Greeks to put a mask of
"cheerfulness" over these conclusions (BT 8). But this point should
not be overstated. The Apollonian elements do not, in Nietzsche's
account, cause the Greeks to forget Dionysian insights; they are
simply a means for avoiding suicide. They do not fundamentally alter
the posture of resignation but, rather, redirect its effects.
23 Maudemarie Clark (1998, 45) characterizes The Birth as "an
attempt to save Schopenhauer's metaphysics by showing how to
avoid Schopenhauer's own inconsistency."
22
928

Vol. 95, No. 4
expenses, this was only one element of his argument

and, to Nietzsche,a minorone, even if it was emphasized by successorssuch as Hartmann.24
Schopenhauerhad, in Nietzsche's view, made a
moral judgment against life and not merely an economiccalculationin its disfavor.Schopenhauer,unlike
Hartmann,recognizedthe fundamentaldisorderof the
worldfirstidentified,in a differentway,by the Greeks.
This, to Nietzsche,was Schopenhauer'sgreat advance
on all philosophysince Plato. It should have led him
back to something like the tragic view of the preSocratics,but insteadhe drewa judgmentagainstsuch
a world, based on a moral standard.25That is, he
attemptedto accountsuch a chaos generically"evil,"
but could only do so based on an imagined "good"
stability,a timelessworld of Being, againstwhich our
transient,everydayworld could be measured.
it is itself a
today!... I despisethispessimismof sensibility:
Giventhesetwoinsights,thatbecominghasno goaland
life.I shallneverpermitsuch
signof deeplyimpoverished
all becomingthereis no grandunityin
a meager[one]asHartmann
to speakof his"philosophical thatunderneath
whichthe individual
couldimmersehimselfcompletely
as
pessimism"
(WP701;see WP789).
inanelementof supreme
to pass
value,anescaperemains:
Nietzsche's objection was not that Hartmannpersentenceon thiswholeworldof becomingas a deception
formed his calculationincorrectly.Nietzsche certainly
andto inventa worldbeyondit, a trueworld(WP12;see
WP6, 9, 11).
did not maintain that life was or would be justified
when pleasuresoutweighedpains (see KGW 4.2.414).
This is the pessimismthat leads to nihilism. It is
Aside from its sheer simplemindedness,what conin the sense that it rejects the optimism
demnsthis approachis the impossibilityof makingsuch pessimistic
inherent in the idea of an ordered universe.On this
a calculation.We lack the necessarymeasuring-stick.
Schopenhauerremains, to Nietzsche, a great
Hartmannassumesthat it is possible to stand outside point,
critic of the nineteenth-centurysocial philosophiesof
life as a whole and, as it were, tote up its pluses and
whether of the liberal-Englishor Hegelianminuses. This is inconceivable,in Nietzsche's view: progress,
German varieties-and certainly is a stimulant to
There is no perspectivesub specie aetemitatisfrom Nietzsche'sown
to the pre-Socratics.
rapproachement
whichto makesuchan assessment,andthe worlditself, But ratherthan embrace
the naturalchaos, as Greek
as the pre-Socraticsrecognized,is in a constantstate of
did, Schopenhauerdevisedone finalstrategyto
transformation,or becoming,which rendersany such tragedy
it
at
bay, namely,to sit in judgmentand deem it
keep
calculationstransientand useless.
bad. This, to Nietzsche, is somethingworthyof being
is of equivalent
thesumof
valueeverymoment;
Becoming
called nihilism, and it is much more serious than
its valuesalwaysremainsthe same;in otherwords,it has Hartmann'scalculationthat for most individualstheir
no valueat all,for anythingagainstwhichto measureit,
quantaof pain exceeds their quantaof pleasure.It is
and in relationto whichthe word"value"wouldhave instead
a judgmentagainstthe worldas a whole,a wish
meaning,is lacking.Thetotalvalueof the worldcannotbe
that
not exist. Schopenhauer'spessimismis
it
would
evaluated;
consequently
pessimismbelongs moreseverebecauseit cannot
philosophical
be cured,even in theory,
comical
among
things(WP708).
the
amount
of
pleasure in the world.
The world as a whole cannot be said to have any by increasing
life in its very nature is somethingworthyof
Instead,
particularvalue, and it cannotbe said to have a higher rejection.Schopenhauer'spessimismendorsesthe wis(or lower)value at one time ratherthanat another.We
dom of Silenus:"Not to be born is best,"and for man
can never say that things are getting better or worse "thenextbest
thingby far is to go back/ backwherehe
overall,or that the world as a whole is of high or low came from, quicklyas he can."26
value. At best, we might say that, taken as a whole,
Ultimately,this strategycan be met with the objecthings get neither better nor worse, since whatever tion Nietzsche raises to Hartmann:No observation
exists is alwaysin a processof transformation.
24 This
Nietzsche found Hartmann'spessimism comicalpoint has been overlookedby severalcommentatorson the
ratherlike an infantwho rejectsthe worldthe moment relationshipbetweenSchopenhauerand Nietzsche.Soll (1988, 113;
its milk goes missing-and did not worry that many 1998, 83ff.),for instance,seems to assumethat it is the surplus-ofargumentthat defines Schopenhauerand links him to Niwould be convincedby it. Or, if they came to espouse pain
etzsche. Cartwright(1998, 136) calls Schopenhauera "quasi-hedosuch a view, it would not be because the arguments nist"but admitsthat Nietzscheis not.
were persuasivebut because, as decadents,they were 25 There is strong evidence for this interpretation.For example,
alreadyinclinedto this position-like the later Greeks Schopenhauer(1970,49) wrote:"Nothingis morecertainthanthat,
speaking,it is the grievoussin of the worldwhichgivesrise
(see TI, "Problemof Socrates,"2). Nietzsche'sreaction generally
to the manifoldandgreatsuferingof theworld;wherebyis meantnot
to Schopenhauer was quite different. Although any physical-empirical
connexionbut a metaphysicalone."
Schopenhauerhad made the famous analogybetween 26 Sophocles,Oedipusat Colonus,lines 1388-91 (1982, 358). Nietzschediscusses"the terriblewisdomof Silenus"in BT 3 and 4.
life and a business whose receipts did not match its
thoughtwhich assess the value of things accordingto

pleasureandpain ... [are]naiveties"(BGE 225). They
are naive because they take reports of pleasure and
pain at face value and becausethey neverimaginethat
something other than simple pleasures could be a
justificationof life. Findingthe painsof life to outweigh
the pleasures,Hartmanndraws the "logical"conclusion that life itself is best rejected.To Nietzsche, this
entire way of thinkingis absurdand hardlymeritsthe
title of "philosophy";Hartmann'spessimismis really
no more than a mathematicalsummationof peoples'
feelings.
"Thesumof displeasure
outweighsthe sumof pleasure;
consequentlyit wouldbe better if the worlddid not
thatrationally
exist"-"Theworldis something
shouldnot
existbecauseit causesthefeelingsubjectmoredispleasure
thanpleasure"-chatter
of thissortcallsitselfpessimism
929

December2001
point exists from which to make such a judgment.

Furthermore,there is no evidence for such a "true"
world, only our "psychologicalneed" for it to exist.
Nietzsche makes these objectionsbut then goes farther: Schopenhauerdid not, in the end, have the
courageof his own convictions:"a pessimist,a worlddenier and God-denier,who comes to a halt before
morality-who affirmsmoralityand plays the flute [a
pastime of Schopenhauer's],affirmslaede neminem
[harm no one] morality:what? is that actually-a
pessimist"(BGE 186)? In other words,Schopenhauer
betrayedthe logical outcome of his own pessimismat
the last possiblemomentby rejectingthe implications
of his ontologysolely on a moralbasis, and an unverifiablemoralbasis at that (see Higgins 1998, 167ff.).
At least for Socrates, optimismwas based on the
idea that the world had an order;when this idea was
abandoned,the Socraticmoralityshould have disappearedas well. But Schopenhauerdeniedthe resultsof
his own ontology.That he soughtto preservemorality
with a transcendentalprojectionwas transparentlya
failure of nerve-and one with severe consequences.
When moralityno longerclaimsto have a basis of any
kind in the real world of events, it is free to condemn
that worldin toto, to develop into genuine philosophical suicidalism.Although Nietzsche saw the roots of
this sort of thinkingstretchingback to Socrates'final
request that his debt to Asclepiusbe paid, it was not
until Schopenhauercompletely uncoupled morality
from ontology that this tendencycould fully develop
(TI, "The Problemof Socrates").Nihilism,at least of
this variety,is pessimismmixedwith moralityin a kind
of devil'scocktail.27
This is the basis for Nietzsche'srepeatedclaimthat,
rather than rejecting Schopenhauer'spessimism, he
"deepened"it and "firstreally experiencedit" (WP
463). Whereas Schopenhauermixed up and adulterated his pessimism with morality, Nietzsche takes
himselfto be purifyingpessimismof the imperfections
that Schopenhauer,its moderninventor,introducedto
it (see BGE 56). In the introductionto the second
volume of Human, All-too-Human,written in 1886,
as Educator
Nietzschelooks backon his Schopenhauer
and explicitlytracesthis development:"I then went on
to give expressionto my reverencefor my firstand only
educator, the great Arthur Schopenhauer... I
was.., .already deep in the midst of moral skepticism
and destructiveanalysis,thatis to sayin thecritiqueand
ralitywithinwhichit has been encased.28The attackon

Schopenhaueris thus,in spirit,an act of loyalty.And it
leaves Nietzsche free to "experience"pessimismin a
way unavailableto Schopenhauer-unavailablein fact
to any philosopherin the West ever since Socrates
poisoned Greekpessimismby his introductionof optimistic morality.
If this means confrontingthe terrorthat Schopenhauer, and the pre-Socratic Greeks, found in the
prospectof a world of flux and becoming,Nietzsche's
perspectiveat least offers the advantageof not succumbingto a nihilismthat rejectslife as a whole (see
Soll 1998,101ff.).Pessimismrecognizesthat"becoming
aims at nothingand achievesnothing,"and pessimism
does not sit injudgmentof thiscondition(WP 12). What
is the result? "The innocenceof becomingrestored"
(TI, "Four Great Errors,"8).29 This idea Nietzsche
considers "a tremendousrestorative"(WP 765) just
becausewe are releasedfromthe burdenthat morality
imposeson us. Moralitycausesus to judge the worldas
a whole (an impossibility)and to judge it negatively(a
mistakepredicatedon an impossibility):"Insofaras we
believein moralitywe passsentenceon existence"(WP
6), we "findexistence a misfortune"(KGW 7.1.192).
Along withthe terror,there is also "a greatliberation"
involvedin pessimism(TI, "FGE,"8). We no longer
give credence to the world-hatredand self-hatred
boundup with morality.The burdenof its judgmentis
removed.
But are we not then returned to the Hamlet-like
impotence of the pre-Socratics?Perhapsnot. To the
innocence of becoming,Nietzsche now believes there
will be two broad categories of response, which he
characterizesas arisingout of "strength"and "weakness";these indicatea capacity(or lack of capacity)to
toleratethe meaninglessof life. Thosewho cannotbear
this sort of existence,who requirean ultimatemeaning
to life, end up once again as nihilists,althoughin a
psychologicalrather than a moralistic sense: "One
grants the reality of becoming as the only reality,
forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to
afterworldsandfalse divinities-but cannotendurethis
worldalthoughone does not wantto denyit" (WP 12).
This sort of pessimism does result in despair and
resignation,and "theweak perishof it" (WP 37). This
is what Schopenhauer'sposition, strippedof its illusions of a thing-in-itself,would amountto.
Yet, it is a mistake to believe that human beings
need such premanufacturedmeanings,for there is a
likewise the intensifying of pessimism as understood
hitherto"(AOM, Preface, 1; see also WP 463). That pessimismof strengthas well. "It is a measureof the
critiqueis rooted in a moralskepticism:Schopenhauer degree of strengthof will to what extent one can do
relies on moral categoriesin passinga finaljudgment
on the world, and Nietzsche rejects these categories. 28 On Schopenhauer's self-consciously unoriginal morality, see BGE
But the critiqueis likewisean intensificationbecauseit 29186.
This translation makes it appear as if Nietzsche is replacing one
liberatesSchopenhauer'spessimism(whichis, afterall, moral
judgment about the world (i.e., that it is "guilty")with another
his originalcontribution)from the commonplacemo- (that it is "innocent"). But the word Nietzsche uses is "unschuld,"the
Perhaps this is one example Nietzsche had in mind when he wrote
of "the hidden history of philosophy, the psychology of its great
names," that "Error is cowardice-every achievement of knowledge
is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself' (WP 1041).
See also WP 382.
27
opposite in everyday speech of "schuld"or "guilty."Unschuld can be

felicitously translated as "innocent," but the more literal translation
is "not guilty" or "lacking guilt." Nietzsche's use of it here does not
reverse the moral judgment but, insofar as possible, removes it
entirely. To say that Becoming is unschuld is to adopt an agnostic
position as to its moral worth and, moreover, to suggest that such a
valuation is, in itself, inappropriate.
930
Vol. 95, No. 4
without meaning in things, to what extent one can

endure to live in a meaninglessworld because one
organizesa smallportionof it oneself' (WP 585). It is
one thingto knowthatthereis no naturalor God-given
meaningto the world as a whole or to life as a whole.
But, from that point, to make "theinferencethat there
is no meaningat all"is a "tremendousgeneralization,"
one that Nietzsche considers"pathological"(WP 13).
Sucha generalizationrepresentsan absolutedisfaithin
humanity,a presumptionthat humanscan create no
meaningother thanthatwhichthey are given,whichin
itself is as withoutfoundationas the earlierbelief in a
naturalmoral order to the world.30The alternativeto
this is based on the humancapacityto createmeanings
of a temporarynaturein our own cornerof the cosmos.
The lack of an overallnaturalmeaningin the universe
is no argument that adequate meaning cannot be
generated by individuals.Nietzsche may have made
this faultygeneralizationat the time he wrote TheBirth
of Tragedy,but he abandonsit in his later work.
Aphorism370 of The Gay Scienceencapsulatesthis
transformation.Nietzsche describeshis initial attraction to "philosophicalpessimism"(Schopenhauer)and
"Germanmusic" (Wagner) as based on a misunderstanding.What appearedto him at first as a cultural
"earthquake"emerging from a Dionysian "over-fullness of life" was in fact the productof "the impoverishment of life," which Nietzsche now labels "romanticism." Romanticism only simulates something
revolutionary;its radicalismis feigned.It seeks "above
all mildness, peacefulness, and goodness in thought
and deed ... also logic, the conceptualunderstandability of existence... in short,a certainwarmnarrowness
that keeps away fear and encloses one in optimistic
horizons." Just as Wagner began his career as a
partisanof the 1848 revolutionsbut ended as a unctuous courtier to German princes, so Schopenhauer
began with a seeming rejection of Socraticoptimism
but, in the finalanalysis,retreatedto it. This "romantic
pessimism"is thus "an altogetherdifferentkind"from
Nietzsche'sown,whichhe nameshere for the firsttime
as "Dionysianpessimism."
Thattherestillcouldbe an altogetherdifferentkindof
andvisionbelongsto me
pessimism,...thispremonition
because the latter is too pessimistic,but because he is

not pessimisticenough.
Soil (1988,116)andHiggins(1998,174),amongmanyothers,tend
to view the differencebetween the two alternativesas a matterof
temperament,so that the choice for strengthor weaknessis either
something inborn and unalterableor a radical choice with no
philosophicalbasis. I think the passagesquoted above make clear
thatthis is not the case. Everyphilosophicalchoice,for Nietzsche,is
in some respecta matterof character,but it is clear that these two
positionsare separatedby ideas, not just moods.
31 In the foreword,Nietzschelikensthe hammerto "a tuning-fork"

withwhichhe soundsout the hollownessof idols. But this does not
of the workas "adeclarationof
squarewell withhis characterization
war"and does not, in anycase, help us understandthe natureof the
hammer.The finalsection is entitled"TheHammerSpeaks"but is
simplya shortquotationfrom ThusSpokeZarathustra.
Perhapsthe
hammer is Zarathustrahimself? But this only further begs the
question.
THE PESSIMISMOF STRENGTH
By a process of elimination, we have come some

distance closer to understandingthe pessimism of
whichNietzschecould approve,but it remainsto give a
more detailedaccountof it. Certainly,his pessimismis
a kind of no-saying,a rejectionof traditionalmorality.
But he emphasizes the activity involved in such a
no-sayingand considersit, by itself, to be something
valuable.The alternativetitle Nietzschegaveone of his
final books is perhaps a good startingpoint. How to
Philosophizewitha Hammeris the second name given
to Twilightof theIdols.Throughoutthe book, however,
there is little referenceto this "hammer,"and readers
are often left wonderingjust what it is.31In his notes
Nietzsche repeatedlyrefers to pessimismas a kind of
"hammer,"one used to break down and break apart
traditionalways of thinking(e.g., WP 132, 1055).This
destructionis healthyandrecuperativeon its own,even
apart from some rebuilding that may come: "The
hammer:a teachingwhich through setting loose the
death-seekingpessimismbringsabout an extractionof
the most vital"(KGW 8.1.108).
What does it mean to wield the pessimism of
strengthas a tool? In the firstplace,of course,it means
to attackexistingmoralities,"to teach destructiveways
of thinking"(KGW 7.3.210).In this task,pessimismis
an all-purposeinstrumentbecause it attacksthe basis
of all moralities,not just some of them. By denyingthe
existence of any natural order to the universe and
emphasizing the continuous flow of becoming and
time, pessimismis as criticalof utilitarianmoralityas it
is of the Christianor Kantianvariety.But its effect is
not simply a critical one. Even if destruction is a
necessary prelude, that is not the end in itself. A
hammeralso can be used to put somethingtogetherindeed, it is one of the few tools to possess this dual
property. Likewise, pessimism "in the hand of the
strongestbecomes simply a hammer and instrument
with whichone can make oneself a new pair of wings"
(KGW 8.1.109).
as inseparablefrom me, as my propriumand ipsissiWingsof whatsort?Here lies the differencebetween
mum... I callthispessimism
of the future-forit comes! Nietzsche's
pessimism and previous ones. Even the
I see it coming!-Dionysian
pessimism.
past pessimismsNietzscheadmired,such as that of the
Romanticism,althoughit was Nietzsche'sown starting Greeks, came to an end with the destructionof illupoint, turns out to be a kind of sham pessimism,and sions. In his account,the pre-Socraticsevokedan ethos
Nietzsche here declares his independence from it.
of virtualparalysis.As does Buddhism,they taughtone
Unadulterated pessimism is only now coming into to be at peace with the world'schaosbut not to seek to
alter it. In a long note entitled "Critiqueof previous
existence; only when it does can we fullyappreciateits
promise and dangers.Nietzsche rejectsSchopenhauer pessimism,"Nietzscheoutlines his alternative:
(althoughgratefulfor the educationhe provided),not
30
931

December2001
Our pessimism:the world does not have the value we
thoughtit had .... Initialresult:it seems worthless [sic];
... simplyin thissense arewe pessimists;namely,withthe
will to admitthisrevaluationto ourselvesunreservedlyand
not to tell ourselves the same old story, not to lie to
ourselves.
That is preciselyhow we find the pathosthat impelsus
to seek new values.In sum:the world mightbe far more
valuablethanwe used to believe;.. . whilewe thoughtwe
accordedit the highest interpretation,we may not even
have given our humanexistence a moderatelyfair value
(KGW8.1.248).
Nietzsche is treading a delicate line, since, as we have
seen, he also says it is a mistake to impute to the world
any overarching value. But this does not mean we
should cease to value anything at all. Schopenhauer's
philosophy tends toward that nihilistic conclusion,
which Nietzsche wants to resist. Pessimism as such
need not lead there. Rather, the withdrawal of an
overarching account of the world's value impels one to
seek "new values" (note the plural). No single one of
these can replace the old value system, but separately
they may give us more reasons to continue living than
can any overarching Meaning of Life. Christian morality and its offshoots seek to overcome thoughts of
suicide with one ultimate duty, or ultimate happiness.
Nietzsche's pessimism advises each of us individually to
cobble together a meaning for life out of lesser goals
with the ultimate result that, when these are gathered
together, "the world might be far more valuable than
we used to believe."
Nietzsche's inspiration here, as in so many other
matters, is the example of a certain kind of art. His
praise of art is not the romantic idea that it puts us in
touch with great truths.32 Rather, art represents the
organization of a small portion of an otherwise meaningless world that gives purpose to an individual existence (WP 585). It is the attempt to impose a temporary form on the inevitable transformation of the
world; since the world must acquire some sort of
particular form in its metamorphoses, art is "repeating
in miniature, as it were, the tendency of the whole"
(WP 617)-but by an effort of will. Art is not an
attempt to fight the pattern of existence but an effort to
shape that pattern into something recognizable, "to
realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming-that joy
which also encompasses joy in destruction"(TI, "What
I Owe," 5). The creativity of artists is, in essence,
"gratitude for their existence" (WP 852).
When art assumes this shape, it becomes "the great
seduction to life, the great stimulant to life" (WP 853).
This is not to say, however, that such art must be
"uplifting" in the conventional sense. Since joy in
destruction may be a stimulant to life, even depictions
of the most miserable things may be included: "The
His praise of art is not indiscriminate. He goes to great lengths to
distinguish the sort of art he has in mind from that produced by the
"artists of decadence" and "romanticism in art" (Wagner is always
his chief example), which proceeds from "an impoverishment of life"
and ends in "hatred of the ill-constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged... one who, as it were, revenges himself on all things by
forcing his own image, the image of his torture, on them, branding
them with it" (WP 852, GS 370).
32
things they display are ugly: but that they display them
comes from their pleasure in the ugly .... How liberating is Dostoevsky" (WP 821)! Nietzsche does not
mean, of course, that we should all be artists, but we
should approach our lives as artists do their work. If we
can understand why an artist who knows that art is
devoid of metaphysical value still wants to paint pictures, then we can understand why Nietzsche thinks
pessimism can result in a creative pathos. A better
example might be the situation of an architect: Any
sane architect must know that no building lasts forever.
Built in opposition to nature (as to some extent every
human structure must be), it will be attacked by nature
(by wind, water, and so on) the moment it is completed.
Whatever the purpose for which the structure is designed, that purpose will someday be superceded.
However beautiful it may seem when erected, it will
someday, to another set of eyes, appear ugly. Yet,
knowing all this, architects pursue their craft. Knowing
that the universe will ultimately not tolerate their work,
they continue to organize a small portion of that same
universe for local purposes.
The lack of order in the universe can also fuel
nihilism, as Nietzsche is well aware. Unlike the nihilist,
the pessimist does not just reveal the tragic character of
existence but achieves a degree of equanimity about it.
This aspect of pessimism often comes across as indifference to the suffering of others. Indeed, at times
Nietzsche verges on expressing such indifference, but in
the end he does something rather different. He advises,
instead, that we not look to nature or God to express a
horror of suffering on our behalf and that we not
imagine that such suffering is any less "natural" than
happiness:
The benefit consists in the contemplationof nature's
magnificentindifferenceto good and evil. No justice in
history,no goodnessin nature:that is whythe pessimist,if
he is an artist,goes in historicisto those placeswhere the
absenceof justiceis revealedwithsplendidnaivete... and
also in nature,to those placeswhereher evil and indifferent characteris not disguised(WP 850).
The view that pessimism leads to resignation usually
includes the notion that it promotes a disinterest in the
workings of the world. Nietzsche suggests just the
opposite. Pessimism is an invitation to a new critical
investigation of nature and history, even those elements of life that we consider ugly and evil.
One effect of this situation is that when we look at
the world once again-without the grey-colored glasses
of morality-we may see things differently. We may
now find ourselves curious about that which, for millennia, we were taught to shun. Indeed, Nietzsche sees
curiosity about what has been considered evil to be one
of pessimism's greatest benefits. This does not mean we
will simply celebrate what we once abhorred. Rather,
we will seek it out on its own terms and come to our
own fresh evaluation of it, and this goes for what was
once called "good" as well:
Let us dwell a moment on this symptom of highest
culture-I call it the pessimismof strength.Manno longer
needs a "justificationof ills"; "justification"is precisely
932

what he abhors:he enjoysillspur, cru;he finds senseless
illsthemostinteresting.
If he formerly
hadneedof a god,
he nowtakesdelightin a worlddisorderwithoutGod,a
worldof chance,to whoseessencebelongtheterrible,the
Insucha stateit is precisely
theseductive.
the
ambiguous,
(WP1019).
goodthatneeds"justifying"
Nietzscheis quite clear that what we previouslycalled
good may well find a justification,but not "justification" in its previous sense: "If he in praxi advocates
preservationof virtue, he does it for reasons that
recognizein virtuea subtlety,a cunning,a form of lust
for gain and power"(ibid.).
The pessimismof strengthinvolvesthe use of pessimismas a hammer-as a philosophicaltechnology-to
destroy and to build. Pessimismis both a critiqueof
existingmoralitiesand an instrumentin the construction of an alternativeapart from morality.Far from
endingin despairand resignation,Nietzscheconsiders
the moment when "my type of pessimism"appears,
"the great noon,... [the] great point of departure"
(WP 134). Pessimism may not be the end of the
journey,but all roadsto the futurelead throughit, and
it may be necessaryto remain pessimisticfor "a few
millennia"(KGW7.3.210).Canwe saymore aboutthis
alternative? In particular,what is Dionysian pessimism?
DIONYSIANPESSIMISM
It is probablytrue that Nietzschewas less interestedin
assigningcontentto these hypotheticalnewvaluesthan
in demonstratingthat they should exist. One note on
"the pessimismof the energetic"emphasizesthat "the
'to what end?' after a terriblestruggle[is] ... itself a
victory"(KGW8.2.62).The simpledesireto formulate
new goals after overcomingearliermoralitiesis something to be celebrated. Although Nietzsche speaks
often of a revaluationof values, he never providesa
new set to replace the old. Indeed, given his wellknown sentimentthat "a will to a system is a lack of
integrity"(TI, "Maxims,"26) and his radicallyindividualistic belief that the formulationof new values is
somethingeach of us shouldundertakeon our own (Z
1:22),it would be unfairto expect this from him. Still,
we are not left simply with the imperiouslyvague
injunctionto "createnewvalues."Dionysianpessimism
is not itself a value system,but it is an ethos that sheds
some lighton whatit mightbe like to live a good life in
the era followingthe deathof God. This pessimismis a
sort of art of living.It is a life-practicethat Nietzsche
recommends,althoughnot for everyone.
Some sense of whatNietzschemeantby Dionysianis
given in TheBirthof Tragedy,but the use of this word
continuedto evolve (althoughhe often wrote as if all
the later meaningswere implicitin the earlierones). If
Dionysianpessimismis the one "no"thatevolvesout of
"yes,"then it is importantto knowwhat one is approving with a Dionysian"yes."Fromthe varioustexts and
notes that bear on this question,the answerseems to
be somethingon the orderof "life as a whole"or "the
worldas it is andwill alwaysbe." But, as Nietzschewas
fond of pointingout with regardto Hartmann,there is
Vol. 95, No. 4

reallyno perspectivefromwhichto viewlife as a whole
(whetherto deny or affirmit), so such an assent can
only be a kind of gamble or risk-taking.It is an
affirmationin the dark,an approvalgivenin ignorance.
Above all, it is a decision to welcome the unknown
future and accept the unseen past ratherthan cling to
a familiarpresent (Z 2:20). All pessimismsconclude
that the universehas no order and human historyno
progress;the Dionysianvarietyis the only one that can
find somethingto like about this situation:
Mynewwayto "yes."Mynewversionof pessimismas a
voluntaryquestfor fearfuland questionable
aspectsof
beings... A pessimistsuchas thatcouldin thatwaylead
to a Dionysian
to theworldasit is:as a wishfor
yes-saying
its absolutereturnandeternity:
withwhicha newidealof
andsensibility
wouldbe given(KGW8.2.121).
philosophy
The phrase"fearfuland questionable,"whichrecurs
frequentlyin Nietzsche'stexts, is carefullychosen to
indicatewhatis at issue.33The aspectsof existencethat
we have the greatest difficultygraspingand affirming
are not the cruel and disgusting;they are those whose
existenceis so threateningto oursense of orderthatwe
haveheretoforedeniedtheirverybeing,so thatinitially
we find them "questionable"or "dubious."Which are
these? In Twilightof the Idols, Nietzscheridicules"the
almost laughablepovertyof instinctdisplayedby German philologistswheneverthey approachthe Dionysian."Why laughable?Because these philologistscannot recognizewhat is, so to speak, right under their
noses. The "Dionysian mysteries" are simply "the
mysteriesof sexuality... the sexualsymbolwas to the
Greeks the symbol venerable as such, the intrinsic
profoundmeaning of all antiquepiety" (TI, "WhatI
Owe," 4; see Higgins 1998, 170ff.).The absurdityof
post-Socraticphilosophyis ultimatelydemonstratedin
its attitudestowardsex andthe body.Whatoughtto be
the most obviousand immediatesource of knowledge
and pleasureis not merelyobscuredbut almostentirely
obliterated.Crueltymay be condemned by morality,
but at least it is acknowledged;sexualityis eliminated
from view througha process of "moralcastrationism"
(WP 204, 383).
Sexuality,not cruelty,representsthatpartof life with
whichit is most difficultto come to terms.It is the most
difficultnot because it is inherentlyshameful("It was
only Christianity... which made of sexuality somethingimpure":TI, "WhatI Owe,"4). The difficultylies
in affirmingthe necessity for pain and sufferingthat
accompaniesany growth.That is, it involvesadmitting
that we ourselves(and not just the world) are essentially flux and change.With its constantdissolutionof
boundaries,sexualityis more threateningto the optimist than is the human tendency to cruelty. This
violation of self-simultaneously painful and pleasurable-is the simplestand best evidence that our own
natureis as unstableand tumultuousas that of the rest
of the universeand, therefore,that no calculationof
33Furchtbaren und fragwiirdigen also can be translated as "terrible
and doubtful."For otheruses of thisterm,see, for example,WP852,

GS 370. The phrasealwaysrefersto those thingswhichthe pessimist
can bear the sightof but otherscannot.
933
December2001
our best interest can ever be permanent.The Diony- trulypowerlessagainstsuffering,as Schopenhauersugsian is "the triumphantYes to life beyond death and gests, why not just withdraw?To this question, Nietzschecannotgive the sortof answerthatprovidesany
change; true life as collective continuation of life
can
come
at
comfort.He cannot offer any unrebutablereason for
But
this
only
throughprocreation"(ibid.).
the cost of suffering,as the price to be paid for preferringaffirmationoverdenial.In a worldof flux,no
continuousrebirth:"In the teachingof the mysteries, such "reason" can permanentlyexist. This is why
pain is sanctified:the 'painsof childbirth'sanctifypain Nietzsche refers to strength-not because the strong
in general-all becomingand growing,all that guaran- surviveand the weak die, but becausethose who affirm
tees the future,postulatespain... All this is contained have the strengthto controltheir disgustlong enough
in the word Dionysus"(ibid.). In Christianmorality, to give themselvesa local reason to live.
The Dionysian "yes" is not a matter of taking a
the pains of childbirthare the Curse of Eve, and
sadistic pleasure in the sufferingof others. It is a
sexualitythe sin which enables and stands for sin in
general;it is this symbolism(and this generalization) decision to value the future over the present. To be
which Nietzscheurges us to reverse.The Dionysianis
glad that the world is one of becoming rather than
not simplysexuality(Nietzsche is not Freud);rather, being meansto be gladthatthingsare alwayschanging,
that the future is alwayscoming, and the present is
the repressionof sexualityrepresentsthe repressionof
the "fearfuland questionable"as such. Acceptingthe
alwayspassingaway.It means detachmentfromwhatever exists at present, which inevitably appears as
aside
the
of
these
of
goal
things, setting
necessity
callousnesstowardothers: "Dionysianwisdom.Joy in
happinessas theultimateaimof a humanlife,is whatthe
the destructionof the most noble and at the sightof its
Dionysian"yes"requires.
This does not mean that happinessmust disappear progressiveruin:in realityjoy in whatis comingand lies
from humanlife. Settingit aside as the finalgoal does in thefuture,whichtriumphsoverexistingthings,however
not meanbanishingit altogether.But if happinessis to good" (WP 417, second emphasisadded).This is what
be found, it can only be on these new terms. We can Nietzschehad in mindby suchphrasesas "amorfati"or
only take our pleasuresin an acceptanceof this chaotic eternalrecurrence.He is not sayingthatwe mustrelive
and, we now know, painful condition. Pleasure and the pastagainandagain;rather,thispatternof destrucpaincannotbe separated,as the utilitarianor simplistic tion and creation is unalterableand must be borne
(WP 1041).And it cannotbe withstoodthroughfaithin
pessimistscontendwith theireffortssimplyto seek one
and avoid the other. Destructionmust be known and progress.We must learn to hope in the absenceof an
expectationof progress.If this soundsalmostnonsenacknowledgedas partof anythingcreativeor good. The
true embrace of becoming at the expense of being sical to the modernear, perhapsit is becausewe have
meansto takepleasurein the sufferingthataccompanies been told for so long that progressis the rationalthing
to hope for.
the demiseof whateveris.
The difference between the false pessimism of
Thejoyof Beingis onlypossibleasthejoyof appearance[.] Schopenhauerand Nietzsche'sversionis explicitlyoutof
Thejoyof becomingis onlypossiblein the destruction
in their respective
lined in Zarathustraas a
the actualityof "Beings,"the beautifulvisions,in the attitudestowardour fatedifference
In the twenof
temporality.
also
of illusions.
Inthedestruction
annihilation
pessimistic
tieth section of the second book, titled "On Redempas
its
climax
of beautifulillusions,Dionysian
joy appears
tion," Nietzsche traces two approachesto our time4).
(KGW8.1.114;see alsoEH,"Destiny,"
bound condition.First, he describesthe preachingof
This is something we have great difficultydoing. "madness."But madnessspeaksas Nietzscheonce did
Nietzscheknew such an idea would sound dreadfulto
himself,by citing the aphorismof Anaximander-in a
most. It is not enough to withdrawour condemnation slightlyalteredform to bringout what Nietzsche now
of suffering.It is not enough to retreatto an agnostic considersits vengefulness:"'Everythingpasses away;
shrugand agree to coexistwith "necessary"suffering. thereforeeverythingdeservesto pass away.And this,
That would equate to being agnosticabout life itself. too, is justice, this law of time that it must devourits
Instead, we must approve it. That is why Nietzsche children.'Thus preachedmadness"(Z 2:20). Madness
depicts the idea of eternal recurrenceas something continues to speak more directly in the voice of
proposedby a "demon"andthe "greatestweight"upon Schopenhauer,whose solutionto the problemof time
one's conscience (GS 341). To will the eternal recur- is to withdrawfrom the life of the will insofar as is
rence is to will endless suffering. Why should we
humanlypossible."Canthere be redemptionif there is
eternaljustice?Alas, the stoneIt wascannotbe moved:
sanction suffering,even our own, much less that of
others?
all punishmentsmust be eternal,too .... No deed can
If Nietzsche's reply is simply "because it is an be annihilated:... This, this is what is eternal in the
unalterablepartof life,"then we are temptedto return punishmentcalled existence,that existencemust eterto the position of Schopenhauer.Indeed, perhapswe
nally become deed and guilt again. Unless the will
now can see the attractionsof that position most shouldat last redeemitself, andwillingshouldbecome
not willing."To Nietzsche,this attitudeof resignation
clearly. Why not reject this life we are offered, as
towardour place in time can only be called madness,
Schopenhauersuggests, if to endorse it means to
endorse endless and unalterablesuffering?Nothing the productof "the spiritof revenge"or "thewill's ill
requiresus to participatein the sufferingof others.Our will against time." It moves too quickly from the
every moral instinct rebels at the thought. If we are inescapabilityof time to the idea that it enslavesus.
934

Second, Nietzsche contrasts this false redemption
with a better one: Our temporalityconditionsus but
does not imprisonus: "I led you awayfrom all these
fables when I taughtyou, 'The will is a creator.'All 'it
was' is a fragment,a riddle,a dreadfulaccident-until
the creativewill saysto it, 'ButthusI willedit."'Rather
than hate backward,as it were, Nietzschesuggeststhat
we look forward.If the present is the result of an
unalterablepast, it is also the sourceof a veryalterable
future:"I walk amongmen as amongthe fragmentsof
the future-that futurewhichI envisage."Insteadof a
false redemptionthat is essentiallyan abandonmentof
society, the true pessimist(pessimisticstill because he
accepts our time-boundcondition and all it entails)
sees an opportunity,whereas the false sees only a
conclusion:"Toredeemthosewho livedin the past and
to re-create all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'-that
alone should I call redemption."Schopenhauer'sromanticpessimismacknowledgesthe power of the past
but not the open horizonof the future. It is madness
because it seems to be based on a hostilityto existence
that Nietzsche ultimatelyfinds inexplicableexcept as
self-hatred.Temporalityis not just a limitationbut a
source of potential. The redemption of the past to
which Nietzschelooks forwardmaybe unlikely,but at
least it is not an impossibility.His pessimismallowsfor
possibilities.
Dionysianpessimismmay be "fearfuland questionable," but the alternativeis worse. In a famous note
Nietzsche embodiesthe two choices as "Dionysusand
the Crucified":"It is not a differencein regardto their
martyrdom,"that is, in whether the two personifications of differentlife-practicessufferand die, "it is a
differencein the meaningof it" (WP 1052). In other
words, it is not a questionof how death and suffering
can be minimized;in a pessimisticview, the greater
portioncannotbe avoided."Theproblemis that of the
meaningof suffering:whethera Christianmeaningor a
tragic meaning." We are only given the choice of
acceptingthis life as a whole or rejectingit as a whole.34
There are more than two possiblemeaningsfor suffering, and we can surelystruggleto alter those elements
of life withinour purview,but we will stillbe facedwith
the largerquestionwhen we cannot pick and choose.
One alternativeis to rejectlife as a whole:"Thegod on
the cross is a curse on life, a signpostto seek redemption fromlife."The otheris to embracelife, with all the
sufferingentailed, both for ourselves and for others:
"Dionysuscut to pieces is a promiseof life: it will be
eternally reborn and return again from destruction"
(ibid.).If one acceptsthe pessimisticassessmentof the
worldas a place of chaos and dissonance,one faces the
choice of retreatingfrom it or embracingit and trying
to "leta harmonysoundforthfromeveryconflict"(WP
852).
34 This is perhaps what Camus ([1955] 1983, 3) had in mind when he
wrote: "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and
that is suicide." See Cartwright 1998, 149.
Vol. 95, No. 4
THE FUTUREOF DIONYSIANPESSIMISM

The commonplaceunderstandingthat pessimismmust
lead to hopelessnessand resignationis unjustified.35
In
Dionysianpessimism,Nietzsche creates an alternative
that is as ruthlessly skeptical toward all ideas of
progressas is Schopenhauer'spessimismbut does not
issue in despair(see Janaway1998,25). It looks toward
the future,not with the expectationthat better things
are foreordained,but with a hope founded only on
takingjoy in the constantprocessesof transformation
and destructionthat markout the humancondition.
The belief that pessimismmust lead to resignation
makes one of two errors:Either it mistakesSchopenhauer's variant (or Wagner's or Buddha's) for the
whole of pessimism,or it sees no other possible response to the realization that we live in a tragic,
disordered, immoral world. Why is it commonly
thoughtthat humanbeingsmustbe disappointedat the
prospectof a world in constantflux and chaos, where
no moral order can be sustained?The answeris the
assumptionthat humanbeings are creaturesof order,
that we are discomposedby chaos. To Nietzsche,we
are no different from the world to which we are
condemned;we are not islands of being in a sea of
becomingbut are constantlytransformingand developing.He envisionsa "Dionysianworldof the eternally
self-creating,the eternally self-destroying.., without
goal... Do you want a name for this world?... This
worldis thewilltopower-and nothingbesides!And you
yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing
besides!"(WP 1067).36To restore "the innocence of
becoming"to the worldmeanslikewiseto restoreit to
ourselves and to face this chaotic world not as a
creaturealien to it or fallen from it but as part of that
which we find most threatening.Those who believe
pessimismleads to resignationsee humansas "weak"
creatureswho must have transcendentalmeaningsin
order to survive.But pessimistsneed not believe that
the demise of traditionalbeliefs must lead to aimlessness and suicide.It is ratherthose who fear pessimism,
or fear the repeal of traditionalmoralities,that maintain this.
What does it mean to go through life with no
expectationsor, more precisely,with an expectationof
35The conceptof resignationhas recentlybeen elaboratedbyDumm
(1998), who finds affirmativepossibilities that deserve consideration.
But I use the term in the widely accepted sense of despair or
purposeful withdrawal from activity.
36 TObe sure, there is something paradoxical about this formulation.
To imagine ourselves as will normally would imply our will has some
object. Yet, if there are no permanent objects, only an eternal flux,
including ourselves, then how is this possible? The paradox is not
eliminated but mitigated in light of Nietzsche's critique of our
subject-object grammar and his related critique of our ideas of
causality. In GS 370, Nietzsche explicitly links these to the emergence
of Dionysian pessimism. The seeming strangeness of what he proposes emerges as much from our ordinary grammar of "will" as it
does from the propositions themselves. In this passage it seems clear
that Nietzsche gives us an inaccurate shorthand "name" for what he
describes only because we, his readers, demand it. Nietzsche's
critique of causality is especially vivid in his discussion of dreams (see
GS 22, 112; TI, "Four Great Errors," 4; WP 479; and Dienstag 1997,
96-100).
935

nothing?To be sure, one is deflected from a certain
kind of global ambition.The desire whollyto remake
the worldin one's image,in whatevermanner,mustbe
set aside once it is realizedthat the worldwill hold no
imageat all for verylong.37Yet, Nietzschesaysnothing
thatwoulddeter one fromseekingto organize"a small
portionof it oneself' (WP 585), whichdoes not mean
cultivatingone's own gardenso much as knowingthe
limits to one's actions, however ambitious.Furthermore, there is a kind of freedom to be gained when
one's existence is detached from the narrative of
progress:freedomfrom the past. If humanhistoryis a
narrative of progress, then one's fate is already
scripted,in a sense, by what has come before; one is
nothing more than "an angryspectatorof all that is
past" (Z 2:20). Pessimism,by freeing us from this
script,simultaneouslyfrees us fromenslavementto the
past.
The destructionof all thingsby time is not a judgment of their worth, as Anaximandermaintained,but
simplya conditionof life and an opportunityto charta
personal course free of "the stone It was."Nietzsche
concludes, as a kind of modern version of Greek
that"thebelief in time is good for one's
"cheerfulness,"
health (pessimists after all)" (KGW 7.1.390). The
constanttransformationremindsus thatour fate is not
set. We have at least a role in determiningit. The
burdenof the past is thuslessened,and the prospectof
the futurebrightens."Thetrustin life is gone:life itself
has become a problem.Yet one shouldnot jumpto the
conclusion that this necessarilymakes one gloomy.
Even love of life is still possible, only one loves
differently"(GS, "Preface,"3). Instead of being a
creatureof the past,one canbe "abridgeto the future"
(Z 2:20).Insteadof valuingoneself for being part of a
long chain of progress,one can value the fresh start
that one makes of oneself. Instead of searchingfor
transcendentalmeanings, one can "give the earth a
meaning,a humanmeaning"(Z 1:22.2).
Such a techniquewill not be to everyone'staste nor
within the ability of all. It is best suited to those
Nietzsche calls "the most moderate":"those who do
not requireanyextremearticlesof faith;those who not
only concede but love a fair amountof accidentsand
nonsense;those who can think of man with a considerable reductionof his value withoutbecomingsmall
and weak on that account"(WP 55). These are the
humanshe considers"the strongest"-not those who
can destroythe most, but those who can withstandthe
most destructionwithoutgivingway to pity and resignation.
CONCLUSION
A curiousfact aboutNietzsche'swritingson pessimism
emergesfromthe quotationsin the precedingsections.
Nietzschewroteon the topicthroughouthis career,but
there is a remarkableconcentrationon the topic in the
37 Such a desire is permitted so long as one does not regret the
fleeting character of the remaking (which obviously would alter the
nature of the project).
December2001
series of introductionsprepared in 1886 for all his
pre-Zarathustra
writings,whichwere then in the process of being republished.It is almost as if, looking
backover the developmentof his thought,he identifies
a guidingprincipleunseenhithertoin its entirety,even
by himself, and desires to reemphasizeit. He draws
togetherhis variousposes into a unifiedattitude.Read
together,these introductions(to TheBirthof Tragedy,
Assorted
Human,All-too-Human,
UntimelyMeditations,
Opinionsand Maxims,and Daybreak)describea pessimismthat "hasno fear of the fearfuland questionable
that characterizesall existence":
Thishasbeenmypessimistic
fromthe beginperspective
is itnot?a perspective
thateven
ning-a novelperspective,
todayis still novelandstrange?To thisverymomentI
continueto adhereto it and,if youwillbelieveme,justas
muchfor myselfas, occasionally
at least, againstmyself... Doyouwantmetoprovethisto you?Butwhatelse
doesthislongpreface-prove(AOM,"Preface,"
7)?38
It wouldbe a mistaketo tryto understandDionysian
pessimismby setting it against, say, utilitarianismor
Kantianethics and viewing it as a moral theory that
prescribesa certainideal set of behaviorsand attempts
to justifythem to an audienceof rationaldisputants.It
is insteadboth a descriptionof the irrationalworld in
whichwe find ourselvesand a prescriptionfor coping
with that situation.Nietzsche neither appeals to nor
promisesrationalityand happinessin his attemptsto
defend his stance. It is better to consider Dionysian
pessimismas an attitudeand a practicethat can guide
us through the world, "a remedy and an aid in the
service of growingand strugglinglife" (GS 370). This
does not mean that the self is the sole object of
philosophyor action,but it underscoresthe idea that
we mustrecognizethose limitsof the humancondition
that optimistshave been loath to acknowledge.Rather
than suggestresignation,this pessimismencouragesus
to act while seekingto avoid the hubrisso commonto
more systemicphilosophies.
38Nietzsche is
playing on the meaning of beweisen (prove). The root
weisen means "show," so that beweisen can mean "show" in an
intransitive sense, that is, to "show oneself."
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Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism

Author(s): Joshua Foa Dienstag

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.155 on Fri, 7 Jun 2013 17:40:20 PM

Vol. 95, No. 4 December2001

Thattherestill couldbe an altogetherdifferentkindof

ical thought possible (Koselleck 1985; Pocock 1975).

The most commonqualificationis the claimthat moderntheories

See pessimism in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary.

MoralEssays([1827] 1983),but pessimismachievedits pessimismof both Hartmannand Schopenhauerled

(1967b); D = Daybreak (1982); EH = Ecce Homo (1967a); HH =

Human, All-too-Human(1986); GS = The Gay Science (1974);

Nietzsche'snumberedsectionsor, if therearenone,to pagenumbers

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.155 on Fri, 7 Jun 2013 17:40:20 PM

Vol. 95, No. 4

certainlyanachronisticto applythe termto the ancient

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mistic (BT 14).15

In the periodin whichhe wrote TheBirth,Nietzsche

Philosophy in the TragicAge of the Greeks, a posthu-

explainnot only the appearanceof Greek tragedybut

mouslypublishedessaywrittenat aboutthe same time

the outlet of mystic-pessimistic knowledge" (KGW

events.'" Of course, whether any of the pre-Socratics

13 That Schopenhauer strongly influenced Nietzsche is generally

15 A parallel analysis, but without the emphasis on pessimism, is

The task that The Birth of Tragedyset itself was to

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mentalknowledgeof the onenessof everything

may be brokenin auguryof a restoredoneness (BT 10).

Vol. 95, No. 4

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NotwithstandingSocrates'fate at the hands of his

in Indiaandnowis, to all appearances,

it contained, in embryonicform, "the conception of

sian pessimism stimulates action. But how can the

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Vol. 95, No. 4

expenses, this was only one element of his argument

thoughtwhich assess the value of things accordingto

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point exists from which to make such a judgment.

ralitywithinwhichit has been encased.28The attackon

opposite in everyday speech of "schuld"or "guilty."Unschuld can be

Vol. 95, No. 4

without meaning in things, to what extent one can

because the latter is too pessimistic,but because he is

31 In the foreword,Nietzschelikensthe hammerto "a tuning-fork"

THE PESSIMISMOF STRENGTH

By a process of elimination, we have come some

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This content downloaded from 200.130.19.155 on Fri, 7 Jun 2013 17:40:20 PM

Vol. 95, No. 4

and doubtful."For otheruses of thisterm,see, for example,WP852,

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Vol. 95, No. 4

THE FUTUREOF DIONYSIANPESSIMISM

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This content downloaded from 200.130.19.155 on Fri, 7 Jun 2013 17:40:20 PM

Vol. 95, No. 4

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