FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 1434. February 23, 1904. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, Defendant-Appellant.
Claudio Gabriel, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION. Testimony by an officer as to a confession made
to him by the accused will not support a conviction of treason, as a confession of this crime, to be effective,
must be made in open court.
2. ID.; ID.; OVERT ACT. The defendant accepted from the self-styled "secretary of war" of the Katipunan
Society a commission as a captain in the "Filipino army," but never made any attempt to act as such: Held,
That the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant, nothing else being done, was not an overt
act of treason within the meaning of the law.

DECISION

McDONOUGH, J. :

The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as follows:

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That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc., levy war against, adhere to and
give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the United States and of the Philippine Islands, in that on or about
August 30, 1902, he accepted a commission in the regular army of the "Filipino republic" and served as a
captain and carried arms in such army and continued in such office and continued to carry arms as aforesaid
between the said dates of August 30, 1902, and November 21, 1902, the said "Filipino republic" being an
attempted government organized by various persons against the authority of the United States Government
and that of the Philippine Islands and having for its object the overthrow by armed insurrection of the
regularly constituted government in said Islands.
The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to imprisonment for a
term of twenty years and to pay a fine of $5,000.
The evidence upon which the court below based this conviction is substantially as follows:

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A constabulary detective testified that he met the defendant in Bacord, city of Manila, November 21, 1902;
that a companion of the witness told him that the defendant was a captain in the Katipunan Society; that
thereupon they detained the defendant and took him aside into a clump of trees where they talked to him
and got him to admit that he was an officer of the Katipunan. The officers took the defendant to his house,
where they searched his trunk and found in it and took away a revolver and a captains commission, under
seals. The following is a copy of this commission:
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"SUPREME PRESIDENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS"

"By reason of the qualifications of Antonio de los Reyes and the good service rendered by him to the
fatherland, the supreme president has seen fit to appoint him captain in the regular army of these Islands.
"It is therefore ordered that all persons render him the corresponding honors and obey all orders which he
may issue for the good of the service.
"K. K., the 30th of August, 1902.

"CENON NIGDAO,
"S. K., Minister of War.
"A. G. DEL ROSARIO,
"S. K., Supreme President.
"To DON ANTONIO DE LOS REYES,
"Appointed Captain in the Regular Army of these Philippine Islands."

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This Constabulary detective further testified that one Cenon Nigdao was a lieutenant-colonel in command of
the whole Katipunan forces, but at that time had been captured and was a prisoner at Pasig.
The witness was asked what this Katipunan Society is, and in reply stated that it is an organization for
forming an independent government for the Philippines, not letting their headquarters or whereabouts be
known to the American Government, and to gain forces and arms by any means they can; sometimes they
use force in securing members.
When asked if he knew any of the armed forces of the society, he said that they made an attack on May 30
upon a Government upon a government force of the United States Army. He said he had not seen the
defendant with the insurgent forces.
Another witness for the prosecution testified that he had been informed of this so-called government known
as the Tagalog republic, or Katipunan, through captured documents; that they had armed forces
approximating 300 men, and that he knew their sales and recognized the seals on Exhibit A, the commission
of the defendant, as those of the organization.
The next witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he was a tailor, 28 years of
age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He identified the signatures on Exhibit A. He states that the
Katipunan is the national party. Its purpose is to defend the rights of the country and to ask of the American
Government the freedom of this country.
He further stated that when he gave this commission to the defendant he told him to keep it, and when the
time came for them to ask for liberty the people could not do him any harm.
The witness named the secretary of the National Party, the minister of the interior, the minister of the state,
minister of war, and minister of justice of the association.
On cross-examination this "secretary of war," who had held office only for one week, testified that he
commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made any use of his commission; that they did not take
up arms because they were here in Manila; and that he was living in the same house with the defendant and
gave him the commission there.
Another witness sworn for the prosecution stated that he was not a member of the Katipunan, but was a
member of the National party ever since he left Bilibid Prison; that the "secretary of war" appointed him a
lieutenant-colonel and he held the commission three months but had no soldiers to command; and that
there was no army when Cenon Nigdao was living at Bacord.
He said he was sent out to Baliuag by one Santiago and stayed there about three months, and when he
found out that there was nothing doing he surrendered himself and one revolver to the president.
If we reject, as we must, the confession of the defendant made to the Constabulary officer, because it was
not made in open court as required by law (sec. 9, act of Congress passed March 8, 1902), we have put
very little in the case upon which to base a charge of treason. Even what there is contradictory. The charge
is that the defendant took arms against the government in the regular army of the "Philippine republic,"
whereas one witness for the prosecution swears that the Katipunan is the treasonable organization, another
says that body is known as the "Tagalog republic," and another, the so-called secretary of war, who
commanded no troops, but to whom the Government presumably gave credit because he testified for the
prosecution, stated that the Katipunan was the "National party" and the object of that party was to obtain
from the United States, by peaceable means, the independence of the Philippine Islands.

The confession of the accused being disposed, the only other question to be considered is whether the
testimony of one witness that he issued to the defendant the captains commission above-mentioned, and
the testimony of another witness that he found this commission in the defendants trunk, is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the statute that "no person in the Philippine Islands shall under the authority of
the United States be convicted of treason . . . unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act . . ."
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There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with this charge than to receive
this commission. On the contrary the "secretary of war" testified that they did not take up arms because
they remained her in Manila.
I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant, nothing else being done,
was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the
highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the community) any ,an can possibly commit, it ought,
therefore, to be the most freely ascertained."
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The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence the playing of the game of government, like children, the
secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and commissions all on paper, for the
purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the vicious should not be dignified by the name of the
treason.
Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing an independent government in
these Islands, with nothing behind them, without arms or soldiers or money, and without the possibility of
success, are simply engaged in deluding themselves and perhaps innocent followers and in filling the cells of
Bilibid Prison.
Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser crimes.
The case of the United States v. Magtibay, 1 recently decided by this court, involved much the same
question as this, and is followed.
The judgment below is therefore reversed and the defendant acquitted, but without prejudice to the
prosecuting authorities to proceed against the defendant for such other crime or crimes as the evidence
discloses. The costs are adjudged de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., disqualified.
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**
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28519

February 17, 1968

RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION

ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on
certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was
charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary
at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to
twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the
custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while
still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the
imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense
with which he was charged evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts
material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the
rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place has jurisdiction to try the case.1As Gomez Orbaneja opines

Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes

en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha
de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno
de pesos plurales resultados.2
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation3 and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated
from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed
upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for,
in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said
that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/feb1968/gr_l-28519_1968.html

***
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HILARIO BRAGANZA AND MARTIN
SALIBIO,Defendants-Appellants.
Felipe Buencamino, for Appellants.
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ARBITRARY DETENTION; PENAL CODE. A public functionary who, except by reason of a crime, detains
a person without authority of law or of general regulations in force in the Islands, is punishable under article
200 of the Penal Code as for an act of arbitrary detention.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

We take the same view of this case as to the guilt of the defendants as that taken by the Attorney-General.
He says in his brief:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"Article 200 of the Penal Code reads:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The public official who, unless it be by reason of a crime, should detain a person without being authorized
to do so by a law, or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines, shall incur the penalty
of a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas if the detention should not have exceeded three (3) days; . . ."
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"At the time when the crime herein was committed the accused were municipal officials, Hilario Braganza
being then a councilor of the municipality of Sagay and Martin Salibio a lieutenant of the barrio of Vito in
said municipality; therefore, they were public officers . . .
"There is no doubt as to the accused having detained Father Feliciano Gomez, inasmuch as, according to the
evidence, they themselves seized him within the church and took him out of it, telling him that he was under
arrest; they made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal
building and there told him that he was under arrest . . . he accused detained Father Gomez, not by reason
of a crime but arbitrarily. He had committed no crime, rather on the contrary, he was the victim of coercion
and other outrages. As a priest of the Roman Church, and the question herein referring also to a Roman
church which he is alleged to be in possession of, he went there to say mass, but a group of Aglipayano
women violently prevented him from carrying out his purpose. No law or regulation of a general character in
force authorizes the accused to commit the act which they committed . . ."
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The judgment of the court below is affirmed, without taking into consideration, however article 11 of the
Penal Code as an extenuating circumstance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., dissenting:

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I think this complaint should be dismissed.

The accused, the consejal and the teniente of the barrio of Vito, having been called to the village chapel to
quell a disturbance, found the partisans of the Roman Catholic and Aglipayano Churches violently disputing
with each other, asserting their respective rights of possession thereto. In this dispute a number of women
took an active part, and when the accused arrived blows were passing and feeling was running very high.
The accused, who were the only officers of the law in the barrio, placed the Roman Catholic priest under
arrest, and took him to the schoolhouse which served as a sort of a village tribunal, and in less than half an
hour after the arrest was made, set him at liberty, upon the verbal recognizance of one of the villagers and
his assurance that the priest would appear before the justice of the peace the next day.
It appears, that later, a number of the participants in the disturbance, including women of both the Catholic
and Aglipayano faith were brought before the justice of the peace and fined, but it does not appear that any
further action was taken against the priest.
It does not appear from the record whose was the property of the chapel, or who had the right of
possession, though both parties laid claim thereto. The priest testified that prior to the day in question, he
had never celebrated mass there, and there are indications in the record that the reason for being there on
that day was to assert his churchs right of property in the chapel by holding a religious service therein. It is
clear, however, from the record that the question as to the possession of this chapel, and the dispute arising
therefrom, was but one incident in the long-drawn-out controversy between the Roman Catholic Church and
the Aglipayano Church over questions of ownership and possession of church property in these Islands.
It does not appear that the accused maltreated the complaining witness in any way, other than by putting
him under arrest, and requiring him to accompany them to the local tribunal.
There is nothing in the record to show whether the accused were adherents of the Roman Catholic or
Aglipayano faith, though from the fact that the wife of the concejal was one of those who sided with the
Aglipayano party it may be suspected that he himself was an adherent of that church.

Under these circumstances, I can not obtain my own consent to join with the majority in declaring that
these officers of the law were guilty of a crime in performing their duty as they saw it.
If the Aglipayano Church had a right to the possession of the chapel, or even if they were actually in
possession thereof, I do not think it will be pretended that these accused did other than their sworn duty in
removing from the scene of the disturbance the priest, who under such circumstances must be recognized
as the chief cause of the disturbance; indeed their conduct, marked as it was by the utmost consideration
for the dignity and sacred office of the offender, would be worthy of the highest commendation, and
evidence of a proper and admirable appreciation of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the law.
There is, as I see it, absolutely nothing in the record upon which to base a finding that the Roman Catholic
Church was in actual possession or had the right to possession of the chapel in question at the time when,
against the resistance of the Aglipayanos at the door, the priest forced his way inside. Surely, in the absence
of proof, the accused should have the benefit of the doubt on this point; especially when it is considered that
at the time when the incident occurred (March 1906) the rights of property and possession in churches,
chapels, and cemeteries in these Islands was a subject of widespread litigation, and many cases pending in
this court leave no room for doubt that de facto the Aglipayano Church had secured possession of more or
less so-called church property in nearly every province in the Islands.
And even granting that the Roman Catholic Church had the right to possession, if it be remembered that this
right as to this particular chapel was vehemently resisted and that its rights in similar cases were gravely
questioned throughout the Islands, and that the record appears to disclose that the Roman Catholic priest
went there on that day for the express purpose of asserting the disputed right, I do not think that these
ignorant village officials should be held criminally responsible for making a mistake as to the rights of the
parties, and found guilty of "arbitrary detention" because they mistakenly believed that the priest, who was
evidently the center of the disturbance, was the creator of that disturbance by his assertion of rights which
the accused officials believed did not exist.
I might be inclined to scrutinize their technical responsibility more searchingly if their conduct evidenced any
malicious tendency to abuse their authority, and to exercise extreme rigor toward the church dignitary
whom they arrested, but, other than the mere act of making the arrest, there is nothing in their conduct to
justify an imputation of improper motives to the accused officials, or to suggest that they were doing
otherwise than honestly endeavoring to quiet the disturbance and perform their official duty to the best of
their ability.
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**
G.R. No. L-27360

February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis,
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police
Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of

the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967,
which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners
in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any
manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing
and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said
case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1
at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau
of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their
cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the
trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo
Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods
contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally
assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and
supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been
misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge
that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police
Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and
that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer
irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their
favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex

parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case
before this Court from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of
the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order
was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the
Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case
No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed,
on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks
and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case,
the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been
paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the
seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and
Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein
petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios
Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were
subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of
Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not
suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining
order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the
case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center
of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a
"Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her
posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods
in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental
opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of

Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January
30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges
due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios
Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the
goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March
13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to
hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they
had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the
present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their
petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in
ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons:
(1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the
case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking
judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its
agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release
of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in
this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue
the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long
before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were
instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in
question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those
goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods
was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and
detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of
Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers
have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited
importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed
before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods

under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that
the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess
and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject
of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a
comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and
receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H
(the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens
and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch
bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320
dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief
were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2,
120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200
dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is
subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said
goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been
formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,

taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same
according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the
Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been
issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De
Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of
Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported
and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an
inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on
October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the
goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the
goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was
involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came
from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had
no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was
not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the
goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had
been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of
seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs
and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to
dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their
motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered
them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy
Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this
Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In
resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of

First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs
authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance
was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure
and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of
the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the
seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were
paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales
thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port
(Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code
(RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues
from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on
customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they
be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are
subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act
1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the
Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia,supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In
the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4,
1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.

Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January
12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was
only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when
the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot
be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,11 and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and
examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause
to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods
in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer
to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This
was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search
and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle.
He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799,
wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it
was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own
and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the
person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast
as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap.
100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815,
above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted
in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter
embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat. 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 1161. Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in
Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition,
and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege
that there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were
detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would
be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched

without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence
in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative,
urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure
without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the
Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure
is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the
slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed
rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is
a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways.
Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which
it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the
goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal
and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this
decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any
manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and

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(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
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