William M. Schmalfeldt, Sr.

,
Plaintiff,

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY,

MARYLAND

v.
William John Joseph Hoge, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 13-C-15-102498 OT

DEFENDANT HOGES REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO THE

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOCKET NO. 8/1)

COMES NOW Defendant William John Joseph Hoge and replies to Plaintiffs
opposition to Mr. Hoges Motion to Dismiss the above captioned matter for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Maryland Rule
2-322(b)(2). In reply Mr. Hoge states as follows:

PLAINTIFF ADMITS HIS COMPLAINT IS NOT WELL-PLEADED

Plaintiff states that he is not under any defendant-imposed obligation to lay

out each and every element of his case[.] Opposition at 2. This is tantamount to
an admission that he has failed to allege the elements necessary to survive a motion
to dismiss. Even without that admission, it is clear that Plaintiff does not
understand what he is obliged to do under the Maryland Rules.

As noted in the Motion to Dismiss (MTD), Plaintiffs Complaint is a jumbled

mess which does not lay out the elements of any of the torts he allegedly suffered.
His Opposition does not show how he has complied with the Maryland Rules or even
make reference to them. Indeed, given his referrals to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (and outdated case law interpreting them) in his Opposition, it seems
that Plaintiff is unsure of which court he has brought the instant lawsuit.
His misunderstanding of his duties at this point in this litigation is further
exemplified by his statement that Plaintiff has not made any conclusory
allegations. All allegations include the basis of law on which they were made.
Opposition at 4. He clearly misunderstands that the term refers to conclusory
allegations of fact. Moreover, his assertion that has not made conclusory
allegations is obviously false on the face of his Complaint.
Plaintiffs assertion that he does not have to lay out the elements of his case
is nonsense. He has a duty to present a well-pleaded complaint
for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to declare
the law arising upon these facts, and to apprise the opposite party
of what is meant to be proved, in order to give him an opportunity
to answer or traverse it.
Read Drug v. Colwill Constr., 250 Md. 406, 414 (1968). The Court of Appeals has
also said,
The well-pleaded facts setting forth the cause of action must be
pleaded with sufficient specificity; bald assertions and conclusory
statements by the pleader will not suffice.
2

RRC v. BAA, 413 Md. 638, 994 A.2d 430, 434 (2010).
Instead of properly pleading his case, Plaintiffs Complaint and Opposition
wander off to extraneous topics such as attempts to address comments made on Mr.
Hoges blog. Opposition at 3, 9.
Thus, at the most basic level Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The instant lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to Md.
Rule 2-322(b)(2).

THE ENTIRE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS

FAILED TO ALLEGE ANY DAMAGES OR DEMONSTRATE MALICE

Plaintiff does not deny that he failed to plead any damages in his Complaint.
He tries to work around that failure by making new allegations in his Opposition.
Even if those allegations were not improper, they are still too speculative to survive
a motion to dismiss. Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty, and may
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture. Dynacorp Ltd. v. Aramtel Ltd., 208
Md.App. 403, 56 A.3d 631, 685 (2012). Plaintiffs Opposition is littered with
speculation: Who can tell how many books Plaintiff would have sold were it not for
the defamation [?] (Opposition at 17.) He obviously has no idea how many he
might have sold. He is equally speculative about how many CDs he has failed to

sell (Id.) or how many speaking engagements he has not been offered (Id. at 18.).
Such speculation is not a valid pleading of damages. Plaintiff has not alleged the
existence of a shred of evidence showing any loss proximately caused by any act by
Mr. Hoge.
Plaintiff also attempts to get around his failure to properly plead damages by
relying on the doctrine of defamation per se. Even if Plaintiff had properly alleged
that Mr. Hoge had falsely accused him of a crime (and he has not), under Shapiro v.
Massengill, 105 Md.App. 743, n. 10 (1995), Plaintiff must allege actual malice in
order to be entitled to a presumption of harm to his reputation or to damages. He
has failed to do so.
Plaintiff seems to believe that all he has to do is prove that Mr. Hoge does not
like him in order to prove malice. He is wrong. The actual malice standard has
nothing to do with bad motive or ill will or malice in the ordinary sense of the
term. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551 n. 8 (4th Cir. 1994).
Malice in the sense of ill-will [is] an insufficient basis for overcoming a
conditional privilege or for awarding punitive damages in any defamation action.
Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 138-139, 387 A.2d. 1133-1134 (1978). Plaintiff
quotes a law review articlewhich he mischaracterizes as Maryland Court of
Appeals decision (Opposition at 5)stating that the law of defamation would not
necessarily be changed by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323 (1974). That

prediction, while reasonable when it was published, has not withstood the test of
time. The Court of Appeals was quite clear in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch:
In a series of opinions after New York Times Co. and Gertz, this
Court substantially changed the Maryland common law regarding
defamation actions even in areas where the changes were not
mandated by the First Amendment and Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. See particularly Jacron Sales Co. v.
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688.
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 702 A. 2d 230, 246 (1997), footnote omitted.
The Court of Appeals continued,
Furthermore, we held that in all defamation actions, neither
presumed nor punitive damages may be recovered unless [the
plaintiff] establishes liability under the more demanding New York
Times standard of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. 276 Md. at 601, 350 A.2d at 700.
Id. Thus, the New York Times standard requiring a showing of actual malice is a
part of a well-pleaded defamation claim. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-280 (1964).
Plaintiff has not only failed to plead malice, he has demonstrated that he
does not even know what the term means in relation to defamation law.
Given Plaintiffs complete failure to allege damages or malice necessary for a
presumption of damages alone, the instant lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to
Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2).

THE CLAIMS OF DEFAMATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF

FAILED TO PLEAD WITH SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY

Plaintiff never specifies the who/what/when/where/how of his claims. None of

Mr. Hoges statements cited are quoted with sufficient length or context to allow the
Court to determine if they might be actionable. This renders the allegations
deficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., Brown v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., No. 12CV-1817 at *5 (D.Md. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing Maryland state defamation claims
because they contain no specific description of the content of the alleged
statements, nor when and how they were communicated).
Thus, the defamation claims should be dismissed pursuant to Md. Rule
2-322(b)(2).

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PLEADED THAT MR. HOGE ENGAGED IN DEFAMATION

WITH REGARD TO ACCUSATIONS OF EXTORTION

In addition to the deficiencies mentioned above, Plaintiff has not adequately

pleaded that Mr. Hoge defamed him by alleged accusations of extortion.
It is obvious on the face of Plaintiffs email included in his Opposition (at 7, 8)
that a reasonable person could interpret that email as a do this or else threat.
The Plaintiff quotes himself as writing, Now, you can make it easy or you can make

it harder and more expensive. Id. Even without the context of Plaintiffs phone
calls to NASA1 about alleged copyright infringement by Mr. Hoge, Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown threats, and repeated attempts to
induce Mr. Hoge provide the true identity of Paul Krendler, these words can quite
reasonably interpreted as an extortionate threat. It is Plaintiffs duty to prove that
Mr. Hoges words were false (See Telnikoff, supra.), but through his own pleading he
has shown that Mr. Hoges words were true.
Plaintiff seems to believe that any reference to the email characterizing it as
extortionate is defamatory because that is an accusation of a crime. That idea is
contradicted by the Supreme Courts ruling in Greenbelt Publishing v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6 (1970). In that case, which was an appeal from the Maryland Court of
Appeals, Greenbelt Publishing was accused of defamation for referring to a persons
political position as being equivalent to blackmail. The Court rejected the view
that accusing a person of blackmail was automatically a reference to the crime of
extortion but recognized instead that the term was used in the more colloquial
sense. The fact is such rhetorical hyperbole, (Id. at 14.) is an everyday part of
normal conversation and is not an event justifying litigation.
Thus, any claim that Mr. Hoge defamed Plaintiff with any alleged accusation
of extortion should be dismissed.

Mr. Hoge is an engineering contractor at Goddard Space Flight Center.

7

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PLEADED THAT MR. HOGE ENGAGED IN DEFAMATION

WITH REGARD TO ACCUSATIONS OF OBSCENITY

To begin, Plaintiff admits that Mr. Hoge is entitled to his opinion that the
image in question is obscene.
Therefore, referring to my work as obscene is a matter of Mr.
Hoges opinion. And if Mr. Hoge wishes to apply 1973 and 1974
standards to obscenity, well thats his right.
Opposition at 6. If Mr. Hoge is entitled to the opinion that the image is obscene,
then he is entitled to express that opinion, contrary to what the Plaintiff seems to
think. For that reason alone, the Plaintiff has given away any claim that Mr. Hoge
defamed him by allegedly calling some of his work obscene.
For instance, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 375 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), Justice Potter
Stewart famously struggled to define obscenity in his concurring opinion, admitting
it may be indefinable. He went on to write: I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know
it when I see it. Id. Courts have regularly held that statements that are loosely
definable or variously interpretable cannot support a claim for defamation.
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir., 1984); see also Henry v. National
Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists, 836 F.Supp. 1204, 1215 (D.Md., 1993) (applying
Ollman to Maryland state law) and Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2nd Cir., 1976)
8

(holding that terms such as fascist and totalitarian cannot be defined precisely
enough to allow for a defamation claim). If the alleged defamatory term cannot be
defined precisely, it cannot be proven true or false. If a Supreme Court justice has
such difficulty defining obscenity in the criminal law, then defining the term as
used in ordinary discourse with precision is impossible. Therefore, whether a work
is obscene or not is an opinion, privileged under the First Amendment, and
expression that opinion cannot give rise to a claim for defamation.
However, the image in question is very likely to meet the Miller test for
obscenity. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). In recognition of the courts
decorum, a heavily censored version of the image is attached as Exhibit A.2 By the
use of Photoshop or some similar program, Plaintiffs original image depicts a
younger version of Mr. Hoge in an apparently homoerotic photograph. Mr. Hoge is
surrounded by several naked men, placed in a manner and with a caption
suggesting Mr. Hoge was about engage in fellatio with all of them. Thus, far from
being a soft-R image as the Plaintiff has misleadingly told this court (Opposition
at 6.), the image is very likely to be considered obscene. Certainly, Mr. Hoges
opinion that it is obscene is entirely reasonable.
The Court should note from Exhibit A that Plaintiff described the image as
obscene. Mr. Hoge published Plaintiffs statement verbatim. Since Plaintiffs

An uncensored version can be provided at hearing.

9

original publication of the image, Mr. Hoge has continued to use Plaintiffs original
characterization both in public commentary and in court filings. Plaintiff is
essentially making the assertion that accurately quoting him is defamatory.
For all these reason, any claim that Mr. Hoge defamed Plaintiff with any
alleged accusation of obscenity should be dismissed.

PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTED THAT HE HAS A HISTORY OF ALTERING DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff claims that Mr. Hoge defamed him by claiming he had a

history of altering documents. Opposition at 6. While Mr. Hoge has no
obligation to prove these allegations true, the Plaintiff has helpfully provided
such proof in his opposition. He admits that he altered a document, but
claims he did so without intent to deceive. Id. at 6, 7. While Plaintiffs public
statement accompanying the presentation of this altered document can be
understood as sarcastically indicating that it was genuine, his intent is
beside the point. He admits that he alter a document. Thus, he admits that
what Mr. Hoge wrote is truenegating the element of falsity.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff has altered the documents attached as
exhibits to his Complaint and his Oppositon. This is obvious on the face of
them. For example, documents have notations added, and extracts are

10

presented as if they are complete documents. This is a further demonstration

that the Plaintiff has a habit of altering documents.
Thus, any claim that Mr. Hoge defamed the Plaintiff by allegedly
stating that the Plaintiff has altered documents should be dismissed.

PLAINTIFF SUPPORTS HIS DMCA TAKEDOWN CLAIM WITH ALTERED DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff complains that Mr. Hoge has defamed him by referring to the
takedown notice as bogus. Under the requirements of 17 U.S.C. 512, someone
filing a DMCA takedown notice must swear under penalty of perjury that he is the
owner of the copyrighted material or the owners authorized agent. In the case of
the NASA material, Plaintiff was neither. He did not have standing to file the
notice. The notice was, in fact, bogus.
Plaintiffs alteration of the email sent by WordPress, the Internet hosting
provider for Hogewash!, to Mr. Hoge informing him of the DMCA takedown notice
can be seen by comparing the version shown in Exhibit G of the Complaint with the
version shown in Exhibit B of the MTD. The list of NASA documents taken down
by WordPress because of Plaintiffs DMCA notice has been deleted from the alleged
email from WordPress shown in Plaintiffs exhibit. Also, none of the boxed-in text

11

shown in the email Plaintiff claims he sent to WordPress appears in the actual
email received from WordPress as shown in the MTD exhibit.
Plaintiffs allegation that the takedown notice forwarded to Mr. Hoge by
WordPress contained the boxed-in text is conclusory at best. Given Plaintiffs
admitted history of altering documents, it is reasonable to suspect that the alleged
email shown in Plaintiffs Exhibit G is a forgery. That assumption is supported by
the fact that WordPress never contacted Mr. Hoge about any of the items listed in
the boxed-in text and never disabled access to them as required under the DMCA.
Only the NASA material was affected. Certainly, the suggestion that Mr. Hoge
deleted any part of the email sent by WordPress has no evidentiary basis.
Plaintiffs claim related to the DMCA takedown incident is not entitled to a
presumption of truth, and Plaintiff lacked standing to file the notice in the first
place. Thus, the instant lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to Md. Rule
2-322(b)(2).

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY PLEADED FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY

Under Maryland Law, the tort of false light invasion of privacy is defined as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if

12

(a) the false light in which the other person was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.
Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical, 106 Md.App. 470, 513-514 (1995).
Plaintiffs claims for false light fail for much the same reasons why his claims for
defamation fail. First, he has failed to properly allege damages, and there is no
such thing as false light per se. Second, he has failed to allege that Mr. Hoge had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matterthe same legal standard as constitutional malice. In other words, for the
same reason he is not entitled to a presumption of damage under Shapiro, the
Plaintiff cannot make out a claim for false light. Therefore, any claims for false
light should be dismissed.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY PLEADED MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

As noted in the MTD, Plaintiff does not actually allege malicious prosecution
in his Complaint. Additionally, Mr. Hoge notes that the alleged actions referenced
in paragraphs 31 through 43 were the subject of an amended counterclaim filed by

13

Plaintiff against Mr. Hoge on 5 June, 2014, as a part of a copyright lawsuit.3 On 15

August, 2014, Plaintiffs counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice. See Exhibit
B. Thus, even if Plaintiff were to amend his Complaint to plead malicious
prosecution, he would be barred by res judicata from making any claim based on
those actions.
As to any subsequent alleged acts, Plaintiff has not shown that Mr. Hoge (1)
intentionally instituted or caused to be instituted civil or criminal proceeding
against him (2) with no probable cause and that (3) was dismissed in his favor.
Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 693 (1978). He has failed to do so. For example,
the 2014 peace order petition was not dismissed in his favor. Also, the pending
charge for failure to comply with that order was filed by the Carroll County Sheriffs
Office and not by Mr. Hoge. Since the charge is still pending, it has not been
dismissed in Plaintiffs favor.
There is nothing in Plaintiffs Opposition that explains how the Complaint
adequately pleads a case of malicious prosecution. Thus, the instant lawsuit should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2).

Plaintiffs counterclaims in the copyright lawsuit are available on PACER from the
U. S. District Court for the District Maryland. The case number is 14-CV-01683ELH and the docket number is ECF No. 8. The counterclaims begin at paragraph
46.
3

14

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROPERLY PLEADED INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

As noted in the MTD, Plaintiff has not alleged which particular intentional or
reckless act(s) by Mr. Hoge might have been the cause of any emotional distress
Plaintiff may have suffered. He has not properly alleged which of such acts were
extreme or outrageous. He hasnt shown any actual connection between any act by
Mr. Hoge and Plaintiffs supposed distress, and he has offered no evidence that his
alleged distress was severe. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977).
There is nothing in Plaintiffs Opposition that explains how the Complaint
adequately pleads intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, the instant
lawsuit should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2).

PLAINTIFF IS ENGAGED IN VEXATIOUS LITIGATION

Plaintiff has filed multiple unsuccessful lawsuits against Mr. Hoge over the
past year in retaliation for Mr. Hoges attempts to have peace orders or copyrights
enforced against Plaintiff.
On 20 May, 2014, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit styled Schmalfeld v. Hoge, et al. in
the U. S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Case No. 14-CV-01685-CCB).
15

The suit sought monetary damages and injunctive relief for claims of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process, defamation and libel, harassment and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Plaintiff withdrew his
lawsuit on 22 May, 2014, two days after it was filed.
On 3 June, 2014, Plaintiff filed counterclaims in a copyright lawsuit Mr. Hoge
had filed is U. S. District Court (Hoge v. Schmalfeldt, Case No. 14-CV-01683-ELH).
The counterclaims varied over time, but the amended counterclaims settled on
malicious prosecution and abuse of process, defamation and libel, harassment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Plaintiff sought
$3,000,000 in damages and injunctive relief.4 On 14 August, 2014, Mr. Hoge and
Plaintiff reached a settlement which required that Plaintiff remove all infringing
materials from the Internet, books, or other media. On 15 August, 2014, the
counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice. Exhibit B.
On 2 February, 2015, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in U. S. District Court (Case
No. 15-CV-00315-RDB) styled Schmalfeldt v. Johnson, et al. This suit sought
monetary damages and injunctive relief for claims of libel (per se), false light
invasion of privacy, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, obstruction of justice,
unlawful interference with business relationships, conspiracy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and punitive damages. The case was dismissed on
The email referenced in the DMCA incident supra was related to this copyright
case.
4

16

18February, 2015, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The instant lawsuit is an
attempt by Plaintiff to carry this failed federal action forward.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in the instant suit, and it is clear from his
previous suits and counterclaims and his current filings that he lacks the requisite
legal knowledge to do so effectively. Further, there is evidence that Plaintiff suffers
from dementia. See Exhibit C at 2. Given his antipathy for the defendants in his
various civil actions, it is likely that he will continue to vex them with further
lawsuits. Plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed pro se in any matter before this
Court. The next time he wants to file a lawsuit, he should have to convince
someone, a lawyer or a judge, of the merits of his case before the case is filed.
The common law, the Courts inherent powers, and Md. Rule 15-502(b) give
this Court the authority to issue a pre-filing order. See Riffin v. Cir. Ct. of Balt. Co.,
et al., 190 Md.App. 11, 985 A.2d 612, 622 (2010). The Court should do so and
prohibit Plaintiff from proceeding pro se in any matter without the pre-approval of a
Judge.

17

CONCLUSION

Taken together, Plaintiffs Complaint and Opposition to the MTD dont add
up to a viable lawsuit. Even after one slogs through the extraneous material, it is
simply not possible to find proper allegations of all the elements of any tort.
WHEREFORE Mr. Hoge asks the Court
i.

to DISMISS with prejudice the instant lawsuit for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2),
ii.

to ORDER that the Clerk SHALL NOT accept for filing any paper filed by

Plaintiff acting pro se without prior clearance from a Judge of this Court,
and
iii.

for such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Date: 30 March, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

William John Joseph Hoge, pro se

20 Ridge Road
Westminster, Maryland 21157
(410) 596-2854
himself@wjjhoge.com

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of March, 2015, I mailed a copy of this filing to
William M. Schmalfeldt via First Class U. S. Mail.

William John Joseph Hoge

VERIFICATION
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and that all exhibits attached are
true and correct copies of the originals except where redactions are noted.

William John Joseph Hoge

19

Exhibit A
Obscene Image Posted on the Internet by Plaintiff
Extract from Oh. CUTIE Pie, Eh? Downloaded from http://www.patriotombudsman.com/2013/07/oh-cutie-pie-eh/index.html/ on 26 July, 2013.
Portions of the image have been blurred.

20

redacted

21

Exhibit B
Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Counterclaims

22

Case 1:14-cv-01683-ELH Document 50 Filed 08/15/14 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM JOHN JOSEPH HOGE
Plaintiff

*
*

vs.

Civil Action No. ELH-14-01683

*

WILLIAM M. SCHMALFELDT
Defendant

*
******
SETTLEMENT ORDER
(LOCAL RULE 111)

This Court has been advised by the parties that the above action has been settled,
including all counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims, if any. Accordingly, pursuant to
Local Rule 111 it is ORDERED that:
This action is hereby dismissed and each party is to bear its own costs unless otherwise
agreed, in which event the costs shall be adjusted between the parties in accordance with their
agreement. The entry of this Order is without prejudice to the right of a party to move for good
cause within 30 days to reopen this action if settlement is not consummated. If no party moves
to reopen, the dismissal shall be with prejudice.

Date: August 15, 2014

/s/
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

23

Exhibit C
Plaintiffs Letter to U. S. District Judge Paul Grimm

24

Case 8:13-cv-03059-PWG Document 63 Filed 02/14/14 Page 1 of 3

February 12, 2014

The Hon. Judge Paul W. Grimm
USDistrict Court for the District of Maryland
Greenbelt Division
6500 Cherrywood Lane
Greenbelt, MD20770
RE:8:13-cv-03059-PWG Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club et al
Your Honor:
My name is Bill Schmalfeldt. Since 1977, I have been involved in journalism in one
form or another. I am a member of the Society of Professional Journalists and the
National Society of Newspaper Columnists. I've written about everything from mass
catastrophes, on-the-scene reports on the deaths of celebrities, to light, feature
articles and satirical opinion. I am proud of my craft and have been well rewarded
and awarded. I was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 2000, and by 2011 my
disease had progressed to the point where I had to retire from a comfortable
position as a GS-13 Writer/Editor at the National Institutes of Health.
Although I am not a party in the above-referenced lawsuit, I must take exception to
what defendant WJJHoge III wrote about me in his "Defendant Hoge's Reply to
'Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Hoge's Two Latest Filings'" entered into the
docket on Feb. 10.
In his responses and replies, Mr. Kimberlin has taken care to leave my name out of
the fray when referring to "a reporter" who has been subjected to 366 charges of
harassment, electronic mail harassment, illegal access to a computer and violation of
a peace order filed against me by Defendant Hoge since February 2013, all of which
have been dropped by the Carroll County State's Attorney. Mr. Hoge, however, in his
eagerness to further smear and besmirch what is left of my reputation as a
journalist after a year of sustained attack by Mr. Hoge, defendant McCain,defendant
Akbar, defendant Walker and others, felt it necessary to identify me by name in his
recent filing. Moreso, he felt it was important to his case to identify me as an
"adjudicated harasser" who Mr. Hoge finally secured a peace order against on his
third try. He secured this peace order in Carroll County, although I live in Howard
County. After two district court judges turned him down, he got a circuit court judge
who admitted on the stand that he has no idea what "the Twitter" is or what it does
to agree that blocking a person on Twitter was as difficult as disabling Internet
functionality or changing a phone number. The same judge disregarded the opinion
of the state attorney general and the federal court in their USv. Cassidy ruling when
he granted Mr. Hoge's motion to extend the peace order another six months in
December.

25

Case 8:13-cv-03059-PWG Document 63 Filed 02/14/14 Page 2 of 3

He did not file in Howard County because of his efforts in April 2013 as leader of an
"Everybody Blog About/Call the Howard County State's Attorney Day" right wing
blog meme. Defendant Hoge and Defendant Walker were "upset" that Howard
County refused to file new charges against Mr. Kimberlin for being in the courthouse
at the same time as Mr. Walker was seeking to have new charges filed against me, in
which he was also unsuccessful. Hundreds of right wing bloggers tied up the office
phone of the Howard County State's Attorney as a result, which would explain why
he might be hesitant to bring charges against someone in Howard County.
He refers to me as an "associate" of Mr. Kimberlin. While it is true that Mr. Kimberlin
and I have become friends over the past year, we only met as a result of Mr. Hoge's
sustained campaign of harassment against me. Defendant Hoge describes me as a
"public relations mouthpiece" for Mr. Kimberlin when that could not be further from
the truth. In fact, at a recent court-approved mediation between myself and Mr.
Hoge, I again restated that I was happy to tell both sides of the story in this lawsuit,
but that I need the other side to respond with more than taunts, insults and/or
silence. Defendant Hoge claims that I have "often published factual claims made by
Plaintiff of the details of his court papers before they have been served on any
Defendant or have appeared on PACER."While I cannot answer to whether or not I
have published anything before papers were served on one defendant or another,
given the propensity for several of the defendants in this case to undertake
Herculean measures to avoid being served, I can state to the best of my knowledge
that I have never published details of a filing before they appeared on PACER.
Defendant Hoge has been engaged in a systematic attack on me since I first began
investigating Defendant Akbar's misrepresentation of Defendant National Bloggers
Club's self-claimed SOl(c)3 status. As a person with Parkinson's disease, I react very
negatively to stress. This is a fact known to Defendant Hoge, one he uses to his
advantage. He understands that by continuing to smear me in the attempt to injure
the Plaintiff or damage his claim, that each subsequent charge makes my
Parkinson's disease worse. Parkinson's is a progressive neurological disorder. It
always gets worse. Nothing can make it improve. But it is proven that stress does, in
fact, irreversibly cause the downward progression of the disease to accelerate.
When I first became involved in this matter as a reporter, and when I was first
dragged into court by Mr. Hoge for the "crime" of reporting facts, I was largely able
to walk unassisted. Now I am wheelchair bound. There are other outward and notquite-so-visible signs of increased degeneration, including the onset of early
Parkinson's disease dementia.
I mention this, your honor, as Defendant Hoge has attempted to extort me by
threatening to include me in this lawsuit somehow if I "try his patience" any further,
knowing that such a legal adventure would further accelerate the damage done by
Parkinson's and hasten the approach of the imminent end.

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Case 8:13-cv-03059-PWG Document 63 Filed 02/14/14 Page 3 of 3

Your honor needs to be aware of the nature of these people, the harm they are
willing to do. and the price in the suffering of others they are willing to pay to
destroy the Plaintiff in this case.
Respectfully,

William M.Schmalfeldt
6636 Washington Blvd. Lot 71
Elkridge, MD 21075
410-206-9637

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