A.M. No.

MTJ-07-1663

March 26, 2010

ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South
Cotabato, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who kept properties
owned by the complainant while conducting a preliminary investigation.
The Facts and the Case
On April 8, 2006 complainant Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans (Spelmans), a
Belgian, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, a complaint for
theft and graft and corruption against respondent Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo (Judge Ocampo) of Polomolok, South Cotabato. 1
Spelmans alleged in his affidavit that in 2002 his wife, Annalyn Villan (Villan), filed
a complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio (Rencio) and his wife from whom
Spelmans rented a house in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans claimed,
however, that this complaint was but his wifes scheme for taking out his personal
properties from that house. In the course of the investigation of the complaint,
Judge Ocampo, together with the parties, held an ocular inspection of that rented
house and another one where Spelmans kept some of the personal belongings
of his late mother.

2002, however, after conducting a preliminary investigation in the case, Judge

Ocampo dismissed Villans complaint.
Only in 2006, according to Judge Ocampo, when he received a copy of
Spelmans complaint for grave misconduct did he learn of the couples separation
and his unwitting part in their legal battles. As a last note, Judge Ocampo said
that instead of hurling baseless accusations at him, Spelmans should have
thanked him because he kept his personal properties in good condition.
In a supplemental complaint dated August 30, 20065 Spelmans further alleged
that Judge Ocampo requested him to sign an affidavit which cleared the Judge
and prayed for the dismissal of the administrative complaint. 6
On October 17, 2006 OCA found Judge Ocampo guilty of committing acts of
impropriety and maintaining close affinity with a litigant in violation of Canons 1
and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.7 Since,
under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, a violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge,
punishable either with suspension or fine, the OCA recommended the imposition
of a fine of P5,000.00 on Judge Ocampo with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.8
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not Judge Ocampos taking and keeping of
the personal items belonging to Spelmans but supposedly given to him by the
latters wife for safekeeping constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The Courts Ruling

During the ocular inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique,
including a marble bust of Spelmans mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper
scale of justice. A week later, Judge Ocampo went back and further took six
Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold champagne glasses, and a deer horn
chandelier.2 In the meantime, the Bureau of Immigration happened to detain
Spelmans in Manila and let him free only on January 28, 2003.3
The Ombudsman, Mindanao, referred Spelmans complaint against Judge
Ocampo to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his comment of August
8, 20064 Judge Ocampo denied the charge, pointing out that Spelmans wife,
Villan (the complainant in that theft case), gave him certain household items for
safekeeping before she filed the case of theft against Rencio. On August 28,

The evidence of Spelmans is that his wife, Villan, made it appear that she filed a
complaint for theft against Rencio, the lessor or caretaker of the rented house,
before Judge Ocampos court but that this was a mere ploy. Her true purpose
was to get certain properties belonging to Spelmans from that house. During the
preliminary investigation of the case, Judge Ocampo held an ocular inspection of
the house and another one that also belonged to Spelmans and took some of the
personal properties from these places.
On the other hand, Judge Ocampo insists that Villan gave him the personal items
mentioned by Spelmans for safekeeping before she filed in his court the
complaint for theft against Rencio. This did not influence him, however, since he

eventually ordered the dismissal of that complaint. But this explanation is quite
unsatisfactory.
First. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in Polomolok, South
Cotabato, Spelmans wife, Villan, would entrust to him, a municipal judge, certain
personal items for safekeeping. This is essentially suspect because she would
subsequently file, according to Judge Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items
that Rencio supposedly took from Spelmans houses.
Second. Judge Ocampo does not deny that he conducted an ocular inspection of
the houses that Spelmans used in Polomolok. But the purpose of this ocular
inspection is suspect. Judge Ocampo did not explain what justified it. The charge
was not robbery where he might have an interest in personally looking at where
and how the break-in took place. It was a case of theft where it would be
sufficient for the complainant to simply state in her complaint-affidavit where the
alleged theft took place.1avvphi1
Third. If Judge Ocampo received the pieces of antique from Villan for
safekeeping, this meant that a relation of trust existed between them.
Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every reason to inhibit himself from the case
from the beginning. He of course claims that he dismissed the case against
Rencio eventually but this is no excuse since his ruling could have gone the other
way. Besides, Spelmans claims that the complaint was just a scheme to enable
Villan to steal his personal properties from the two houses. This claim seems
believable given the above circumstances.
Fourth. By his admission, Judge Ocampo returned the items only after four years
when Spelmans already filed a complaint against him. He makes no claim that he
made a previous effort to return those supposedly entrusted items either to Villan
or to Spelmans. His years of possession obviously went beyond mere
safekeeping.
For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampos offense as
falling merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as
amended, which is a less serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules,
punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.9 On the other hand, impropriety is treated as a
light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00 or by censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. 10

Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross

misconduct11 constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically Section 6 of Canon 1,12 Section 1 of Canon 2,13 and Section 1 of
Canon 4.14 From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. 15 He was
not a warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly
would have kept Spelmans properties had the latter not filed a complaint against
him. He was guilty of covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as
an officer of the court16 and tainted the judiciarys integrity. He should be
punished accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo GUILTY of
gross misconduct and IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office
without salary and other benefits for six (6) months. 17He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC

December 10, 2012

AMBASSADOR HARRY C. ANGPING and ATTY. SIXTO

BRILLANTES, Petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO G. ROS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Manila, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint of petitioners Ambassador Harry C. Angping
(Amb. Angping) and Atty. Sixto Brillantes (Atty. Brillantes) filed against
respondent Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Manila, Branch 33. Petitioners charged Judge Ros for the violation of
Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Facts1
Herein petitioner Amb. Angping with his counsel petitioner Atty. Brillantes filed
before this Court a letter-complaint dated June 28, 2010. The petitioners charged
respondent Judge Ros for violating Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

The said letter-complaint emanated from the actions and rulings of Judge Ros
relative to Criminal Case Nos. 10-274696 to 10-274704 entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Julian Camacho and Bernardo Ong," for qualified theft.
Petitioners Amb. Angping and Atty. Brillantes were the representatives of the
Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), the private complainant in the aforesaid
criminal cases. Petitioners alleged that on March 23, 2010, the above cases were
raffled to Branch 33, RTC-Manila. However, on the very same day the said case
was raffled to the respondent judge, the latter issued an order dismissing the
criminal cases for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. After which, the
respondent issued an Order dated April 16, 2010 directing the accused in the
above-cited criminal cases (Julian Camacho and Bernardo Ong) to file within
fifteen (15) days their comment. In the same Order, respondent Judge Ros gave
PSC another fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the accuseds comment
to file a reply and thereafter the motion for reconsideration would be resolved.
On May 26, 2010, the accused filed their comment after several motions for
extension. The petitioners averred that the PSC received its copy of the comment
on June 3, 2010. Thus, the petitioners claimed that they have timely filed their
reply on June 18, 2010 since they were given a period of fifteen (15) days to file
the same. However, on the date petitioners filed their reply, the PSC received
respondent Judge Ros Order dated May 28, 2010, denying the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners asserted that the respondent Judge resolved the
motion for reconsideration without waiting for PSCs reply a direct contravention
of respondents Order dated April 16, 2010 where petitioners were given fifteen
(15) days to file their reply.
The aforesaid incidents started to create reservations in the mind of the
petitioners on the respondent Judges impartiality. They doubted Judge Ros
fairness in handling the aforementioned criminal cases because of the speed at
which he disposed them when they had just been raffled to him. The petitioners
could not believe that he could resolve the cases within the same
day considering that the records thereof are voluminous and that the
criminal cases were raffled to him on the day he issued the order of
dismissal.
Nevertheless, the petitioners continued to respect the respondents order and
sought other legal remedies such as the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
However, when Judge Ros issued the order resolving the motion for
reconsideration after two (2) days from the filing of the comment and without

awaiting for PSCs reply, petitioners were convinced that respondent Judge
Ros acted with partiality and malice. Thus, the petitioners filed the lettercomplaint subject of this administrative case where the petitioners charged
respondent Judge Ros for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In his comment, respondent Judge Ros claimed that he overlooked the directive
in his order which gave the PSC fifteen (15) days to file its reply. He apologized,
and averred that he acted in good faith. He alleged that the oversight was due to
his policy of promptly acting on a motion for reconsideration within thirty (30)
days after it has been submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the speed of the
disposition of the criminal cases, respondent Judge Ros claimed that the PSC
was accorded due process because he had taken into consideration the
petitioners legal arguments in their motion for reconsideration. The respondent
also pointed out that, even if PSCs reply had been taken into account, his
position would remain the same because petitioners did not raise any new
matter. He claimed that PSC merely rebutted the arguments raised in the
comment/objection of the accused in the concerned criminal cases, which
arguments were not even relied upon in his dismissal of the cases.
The respondent denied acting with partiality and malice. He maintained that he
ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same day he had received
them only after a careful evaluation of the evidence on record. He also noted that
the complainants never questioned his ruling before the appellate court. Thus,
respondent Judge Ros prayed for the dismissal of the instant administrative case
against him.
In its recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Ros for lack of merit. The OCA pointed out that, while the
speed at which the respondent Judge rendered the March 23, 2010 Order may
be surprising to those accustomed to court delays, a judge is not precluded from
deciding a case with dispatch. It also found that the respondent Judge issued the
said Order based on his independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of
the case. Furthermore, although there was a lapse in judgment on the part of the
respondent judge when he promulgated the May 28, 2010 Order without waiting
for the petitioners reply, the OCA noted that the petitioners failed to prove that
the respondents action was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. The OCA added that the correctness of the judges evaluation is
judicial in nature, thus, it is not a proper subject of administrative proceedings.
Issue

Whether or not respondent Judge Ros is liable for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Our Ruling
After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant administrative complaint,
this Court partly concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
The respondent was charged with the violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The said canons provide:
Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.
Canon 3 A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence.
From the foregoing provisions, this Court partially agrees with the OCA when it
recommended the dismissal of the present administrative complaint in so far as
the respondents liability under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
concerned. The OCA is correct in its observation that petitioners failed to present
evidence necessary to prove respondents partiality, malice, bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. In Alicia E. Asturias v. Attys. Manuel Serrano and
Emiliano Samson,2 the Court held that a complainant has the burden of proof in
administrative complaints. He must establish his charge by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. In the instant case, petitioners Amb. Angping and Atty.
Brillantes failed to discharge by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence
the onus of proving their charges under Canon 3 against respondent Judge Ros.
Notwithstanding the above findings, this Court is not prepared to concede
respondent Judges liability as to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides: "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities." The failure of the petitioners to present evidence that the
respondent acted with partiality and malice can only negate the allegation
of impropriety, but not the appearance of impropriety. In De la Cruz v. Judge
Bersamira,3 this Court underscored the need to show not only the fact of
propriety but the appearance of propriety itself. It held that the standard of
morality and decency required is exacting so much so that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. The Court
explains thus:

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are
required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official
acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in
the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently,
in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the
Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to
maintain the faith of the people in the administration of justice.
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A judges conduct must
be above reproach. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion. A judges private as well as official conduct must at all
times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach.
In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is
no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.
As we have recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached
or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.
The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion.
As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his

activities. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must

alsoappear to be impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
Viewed vis--vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent
judge violated Rule 1.02, as well as Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3. In this
connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee
Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial
but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that
litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become
meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased
judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness,
impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional
trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners
who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries
between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of
justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach. 4 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
In the instant administrative complaint, while no evidence directly shows partiality
and malice on the respondents action, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the
dispatch by which the respondent Judge dismissed the criminal cases provokes
in the minds of the petitioners doubt in the partiality of the respondent. First,
Judge Ros cannot deny the fact that the Information for Criminal Case Nos. 10274696 to 10-274704 dated February 10, 2010 filed on March 22, 2010 with the
RTC-OCC of Manila against therein accused Camacho and Ong involved nine
(9) counts of Qualified Theft. Thus, the records of these cases were
voluminous. Second, respondent cannot deny the fact that the criminal cases
were raffled to his office only on March 23, 2010 and that he immediately
rendered the questioned Order dismissing the charges against therein accused
on the same day for lack of probable cause. Thus, considering the nine (9)
counts of Qualified Theft, the records at hand, and the speed in arriving at a
decision, the respondent Judge would either appear to have decided with
partiality in favor of the accused or appear to have failed to thoroughly study the
case. Third, granting por arguendo that the dispatch by which he dispensed of
the criminal cases were done in good faith, this Court cannot close its eyes on

the liberality by which the respondent Judge granted several Motions for
Extension of Time to File Comment by therein accused, while the same liberality
was missing when it was the turn of the petitioners to file their reply. After the
accused filed their comment, and even despite the fifteenday period available to
the petitioners, the respondent Judge simply disregarded his earlier Order
directing the petitioners to file their reply and went ahead with the denial of the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. And he denied the Motion for
Reconsideration barely two days after therein accused filed their comment. From
the foregoing, this Court cannot but conclude that there was some semblance of
partiality and malice on the part of the respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge claimed that he had carefully evaluated the evidence on
record before he issued his order dismissing the criminal cases. He asserted that
even if the petitioners reply was considered, his position would not change.
However, because he failed to consider the reply in his evaluation of the criminal
cases, he appeared to have decided without the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. In not waiting for the petitioners reply, the respondent Judge exhibited the
appearance of bias and partiality.
In Borromeo-Garcia v. Pagayatan,5 this Court had the occasion to state:
[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence
and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of
the peoples faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give (sic) human face
to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and
those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must
avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them.6 (Citations omitted)
At the very least, the respondent Judge failed to consider further arguments
which the petitioners might have proffered when he failed to wait for their reply.
Whether or not such argument may justify the reconsideration of the dismissal of
the concerned criminal cases, the respondent Judge is at all times duty bound to
render just, correct and impartial decisions in a manner free of any suspicion as
to his fairness, impartiality or integrity.7
We cannot blame the petitioners if they became suspicious of the action of the
respondent. The manner by which the latter handled the dismissal of the
concerned criminal cases was of such a character that could cause distrust,
especially in the wary eyes of a concerned party-litigant.

In his comment, the respondent Judge apologized for his omission and averred
that he acted in good faith. While we do not belittle the respondent's sincerity, we
cannot simply ignore his lack of prudence. This Court is duty bound to protect
and preserve public confidence in our judicial system. The careless manner at
which he arrived at his March 23, 2010 Order and denied the petitioners' motion
for consideration raised an air of suspicion and an appearance of impropriety in
the proceedings. Verily, in this instance, the respondent Judge failed to live up to
the demand and degree of propriety required of him by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Finally, this Court must emphasize that it is commendable when a judge, by his
dedication to the speedy administration of justice, attempts or causes the
immediate dismissal of a case. Normally, we do not dwell on the question of
propriety of a judge's action if he decides with speed the dismissal of a case
based on lawful grounds. However, apart from the strict observance of proper
procedure, the entire affair should be handled with care and reasonable
sensitivity so as not to unduly offend litigants and destroy the public's confidence
in our justice system. This Court exhorts all judges to act with prudence so as not
to compromise the integrity of court processes and orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the charge against Judge Reynaldo G.
Ros for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
hereby DISMISSED. However, for failing to live up to the degree of propriety
required of him under Canon 2 of the same Code, he is
hereby ADMONISHED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362

February 22, 2011
(formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC)

(P40,000.00) upon notice, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the

same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati

City,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid,
San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Respondent.

Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to explain, within ten (10) days from notice,
why he should not be administratively charged for approving the applications for
bail of the accused and ordering their release in the following Criminal Cases
filed with other courts: Criminal Cases Nos. 1331,1342,1362,1366 and 1368 filed
with the RTC, Branch 59, San Carlos City; 67322, 69055-69058 filed with the
MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City; 67192-67193 filed with the MTCC, Branch 4,
Bacolod City; 72866 filed with the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City; 70249, 82897
to 82903, 831542, 83260 to 83268 filed with the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City;
and 95-17340 filed with the RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City, as reported by
Executive Judge Edgardo G. Garvilles.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-1945-MTJ)
SANCHO E. GUINANAO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid,
San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us are two (2) consolidated cases filed against Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr. as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The first case
involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply with the directives of the Court.
The second case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide a case within
the 90-day reglementary period.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
On September 25, 1998, a complaint was filed against Judge Limsiaco for his
issuance of a Release Order in favor of an accused in a criminal case before
him.1 After considering the evidence, we then found Judge Limsiaco guilty of
ignorance of the law and procedure and of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct. In the decretal portion of our May 6, 2005 Decision, we ruled:
WHEREFORE, Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is found GUILTY of ignorance of
the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand pesos

SO ORDERED.
Judge Limsiaco twice moved for an extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration of the above decision and to comply with the Courts directive
requiring him to submit an explanation. Despite the extension of time given
however, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his motion for reconsideration and the
required explanation.
In the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we issued a show cause resolution for
contempt and required Judge Limsiaco to explain his failure to comply with the
Decision dated May 6, 2005. In the Resolution dated December 12, 2006, after
noting the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply with the Resolution dated January
24, 2006, we resolved to impose a fine in the amount of P1,000.00 against Judge
Limsiaco and to reiterate our earlier directive for him to file an explanation to the
show cause resolution.
On February 1, 2007, Judge Limsiaco filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Explanation wherein he apologized to the Court and
paid the P1,000.00 fine. He cited poor health as the reason for his failure to
comply with the Resolution dated January 24, 2006. On February 6, 2007, we
resolved to grant the motion for extension filed by Judge Limsiaco and gave him
ten (10) days from January 15, 2007 within which to file his explanation.
Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation for the show cause
resolution was ever filed. Per Resolution dated December 15, 2009, we again
required Judge Limsiaco to comply with the show cause resolution within ten (10)
days from receipt under pain of imposing a stiffer penalty. Verification made from

the postmaster showed that a copy of the December 15, 2009 Resolution was
received by Judge Limsiaco on February 1, 2010.
In addition, a Report (as of August 31, 2010) from the Documentation Division,
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) showed that the directives in our
Decision dated May 6, 2005 have not been complied with by Judge Limsiaco.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785
On September 24, 2007, Judge Limsiaco was charged with Delay in the
Disposition of a Case by complainant Sancho E. Guinanao, a plaintiff in an
ejectment case pending before Judge Limsiaco. Guinanao claimed that Judge
Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide the subject ejectment case which had been
submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. The OCA referred the matter
to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment to the administrative
complaint. Under the pain of a show cause order for contempt for failure to heed
the OCA directives to file a comment, Judge Limsiaco informed us that he had
already decided the case on February 4, 2008. Subsequently, we resolved 2 to
declare Judge Limsiaco in contempt and to impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his
continued failure to file the required comment to the administrative complaint.
The records show that Judge Limsiaco paid the P1,000.00 fine but did not submit
the required comment.
Per Resolution dated November 23, 2010, we ordered the consolidation of the
above cases, together with A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, entitled Florenda V. Tobias v.
Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., which case was separately decided on January
19, 2011.
The Courts Ruling
We shall consider in this ruling not merely Judge Limsiacos conduct in
connection with the discharge of judicial functions within his territorial jurisdiction,
but also the performance of his legal duties before this Court as a member of the
bench. We shall then take both matters into account in scrutinizing his conduct
as a judge and in determining whether proper disciplinary measures should be
imposed against him under the circumstances.
A judges duties to the Court
Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of the law, and
more importantly of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the first to follow the
law and weave an example for the others to follow.3 Interestingly, in Julianito M.

Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc., 4 a case where Judge Limsiaco
was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress upon him the
clear import of the directives of the Court, thus:
For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the
accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct,
and may even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The office of
the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. After all, a
resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied
with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only
a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter
lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system.
We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N.
Zoleta5 and emphasized that obedience to our lawful orders and directives
should not be merely selective obedience, but must be full:
[A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative
complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be
construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively.
Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or
allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty
to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will
not tolerate future indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.
As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that Judge Limsiaco failed
to heed the above pronouncements. We observe that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362,
Judge Limsiaco did not fully obey our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the
required comment to our show cause resolution despite several opportunities
given to him by the Court. His disobedience was aggravated by his insincere
representations in his motions for extension of time that he would file the required
comments.
The records also show Judge Limsiacos failure to comply with our decision and
orders. In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his
comment/answer to the charge of irregularity pertaining to his approval of
applications for bail in several criminal cases before him. He also failed to pay
the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his
gross ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. Incidentally, in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his
comment on the verified complaint despite several orders issued by the Court.
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars
issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon
assumption to office. This duty is verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the
discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial
conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which is
fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he
belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule
2.01 which mandates a judge to behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes
no less than clear acts of defiance against the Courts authority. His conduct also
reveals his deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court,
shown by his failure to heed our warnings and directives. Judge Limsiacos
actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions. Moreover, his
conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the
public as well, in placing significance to the Courts directives and the importance
of complying with them.
We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in
the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves
in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding. They should
avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the
Supreme Court.
Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges administratively liable for
failing to comply with our directives and circulars.
In Sinaon, Sr.,6 we penalized a judge for his deliberate failure to comply with our
directive requiring him to file a comment. We disciplined another judge in Noe
Cangco Zarate v. Judge Isauro M. Balderian7 for his refusal to comply with the

Courts resolution requiring him to file a comment on the administrative charge

against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, etc., 8 we dismissed the
judge for his repeated violation of a circular of the Supreme Court. In fact, we
have already reprimanded and warned Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely
heed the Courts directives in Salvador.9
A judges duty to his public office
Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the considerable
delay Judge Limsiaco incurred in deciding the subject ejectment case has been
clearly established by the records and by his own admission. Judge Limsiaco
admitted that he decided the ejectment case only on February 4, 2008. In turn,
the records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanaos claim that the
ejectment case was submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. Thus, it
took Judge Limsiaco more than two (2) years to decide the subject ejectment
case after it was declared submitted for resolution.
The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a
violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct 10 which
mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, Judge
Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within
the reglementary period.11

The Penalty
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the
following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one or more than three months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.12
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Limsiacos
work history which reflects how he performed his judicial functions as a judge.
We observed that there are several administrative cases already decided against
Judge Limsiaco that show his inability to properly discharge his judicial duties.
In Salvador,13 we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having been found guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision, imposing on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning

that a repetition of the same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., 14 we found Judge
Limsiaco guilty of gross misconduct and imposed on him a P20,000.00 fine, with
a warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed in case of the same of
similar act in the future.
In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,15 we resolved to
impose a P20,000.00 fine on Judge Limsiaco for gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
would be dealt with more severely. The Court also resolved in the said case to redocket, as a regular administrative case, the charge for oppression and grave
abuse of authority relative to Judge Limsiacos handling of two criminal
cases.1avvphi1
In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc.,16 we imposed
a P5,000.00 fine, with warning, against Judge Limsiaco for his delay in the
submission of the monthly report of cases and for twice ignoring the OCAs
directive to explain the delay.
Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,
Jr.,17 where Judge Limsiaco was charged with corruption, the Court found him
liable for gross misconduct and imposed a fine in the amount ofP25,000.00.

for his unethical conduct and gross inefficiency in performing his duties as a
member of the bench, we declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, forfeited. Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.
administratively liable for unethical conduct and gross inefficiency under the
provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of
Canon 1, and Section 5 of Canon 6. For these infractions, we DECLARE all his
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, FORFEITED. He is
likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2267
January 19, 2011
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1788-RTJ)
MANSUETA T. RUBIN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,Respondent.
DECISION

Lastly, we also note the existence of two other administrative cases filed against
Judge Limsiaco that are presently pending with the Court. The first case is Mario
B. Tapinco v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,18 where Judge Limsiaco is charged
with grave misconduct, obstruction of justice, and abuse of authority in
connection with his invalid issuance of an order for the provisional release of an
accused. The second case entitled Unauthorized Hearings Conducted by Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et al.,19 is a complaint charging Judge Limsiaco
of violating the Courts Administrative Circular No. 3, dated July 14, 1978 which
prohibits the conduct of hearings in another station without any authority from the
Court.
We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his unworthiness to don the
judicial robes and merits a sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules
and jurisprudence. Under the circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be
dismissed from the service. We, however, note that on May 17, 2009, Judge
Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge Limsiaco has
not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal

BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint, dated June 14, 2003,1 filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Mansueta T. Rubin (complainant) charged Judge Jose Y.
Aguirre, Jr.2 of Graft and Corruption, Betrayal of Public Trust, Grave Abuse of
Authority of a Judge, Manifest Bias and Partiality, and Violation of Judicial
Conduct. In her verified complaint, the complainant alleged:
II
That Complainant is the widow of the late Feliciano Rubin who was appointed as
the Judicial Administrator of the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro Rubin and
Emperatriz Rubin;
III

That Complainant, during the lifetime of her husband, Feliciano Rubin, who is the
aforesaid Judicial Administrator, had witnessed and experienced that her
husband and their family were victims of Graft and Corruption, Grave Injustice
amounting to Violation of the Constitution, Betrayal of Public Trust, Grave
Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Ignorance of Law, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge or Judicial Magistrate, Manifest Bias and Partiality, and
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the part of the respondent Judge
committed during the conduct of the proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 28,
Intestate Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro Rubin and Emperatriz Rubin, and in
Civil Case No. 184, an Annulment of Adoption pending before him, as follows:
A
The respondent Judge, by way of devious schemes and clever
machinations extorted money from the aforesaid Estate by lending
expertise in connivance with other lawyer in pursuing an alleged claim
against the Estate allegedly intended for workers wages as money
claims against the Estate, in a labor case entitled "Constancia Amar, et.
(sic) al. versus Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin," RAB Case Nos.
1092-81 and A-593-81, both consolidated and numbered as 0104-82,
which was then pending and decided by Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio;

The labor case decided by Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy awarded the

claimants in the amount of P205,125.00, which decision was appealed
by Judicial Administrator Feliciano Rubin and was ordered rema[n]ded
and decided by Labor Arbiter Octavio in the consolidated cases with the
reduction of the award in the amount of P62,437.50. The judgment
amount was further reduced after an audit in the amount of P44,000.00.
xxxx
E
That respondent Judge had threatened the Judicial Administrator and
threatened to be cited for contempt if he will not pay the said labor
claims, further threatened to sell the properties if he will not pay the said
labor claims, and likewise threatened that he would order the x x x
properties of the Estate to be sold at public auction if the said claim will
not be paid. x x x x The evident purpose of the respondent Judge was to
cause harassment and anxiety against the then Judicial Administrator
which made his health condition deteriorate so fast that facilitated his
death.
F

That the aforesaid consolidated labor cases were decided and became
final and executory and the judgment was already satisfied and paid for
personally by Dioscoro Rubin when he was still alive in the amount of
P44,000.00 in the form of check which was given to Atty. Corral, counsel
for the claimants, through Atty. Rogelio Necessario, counsel for
Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin x x x.

That Complainants deceased husband who was the Administrator of the

said Estate was forced to pay the amount ordered by the respondent
Judge which was deposited in court but which was ordered released by
the same respondent Judge [b]ecause the money claim ordered to be
paid by respondent Judge had already been paid and satisfied by
Administrator Feliciano Rubin, naturally no recipient would claim the
amount nor anybody can be found from the records of the case or that
no laborer came forward to claim that he had not been paid of his money
claim;

That respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and grave
abuse of authority by ordering the aforesaid Estate to pay P205,125.00
upon a Motion based on a non-existing final or executory decision, which
order was illegal and improper and without any notice and/or hearing
accorded to the Estate through its then Judicial [Administrator] Feliciano
Rubin. x x x x

The respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the law when he ordered
the change of Administrator after the then Judicial Administrator
Feliciano Rubin refused to follow the invalid and unlawful orders of the
respondent Judge, as he ordered his Clerk of Court, Atty. Gregorio A.
Lanaria to act as Special Administrator of the Estate with orders to sell
the properties of the Estate to satisfy the outstanding claim or obligations
of the Estate, which was part of the clever scheme of respondent Judge
to extort money from the Estate x x x.

H
That respondent Judge had extended unwarranted benefit, advantage
and preference to the newly appointed Judicial Administratrix of the
Estate, Aileen Rubin, through his manifest bias and partiality and evident
bad faith towards the late Administrators wife, complainant herein, and
the surviving heirs, especially in his conduct of the proceedings involving
the Estate and the Annulment of Adoption case. Respondent Judge even
appointed Aileen Rubin as Administratrix of the Estate whose legal
personality is still the subject of the Annulment of Adoption case, and
even pronounced that under the eyes of the law Aileen Rubin is the sole
and legal heir of the aforesaid Estate thus prejudging the cases before
him even if the proceedings are still pending;

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the estate of the late spouses
Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin.
Judge Aguirre submitted his own documentary evidence to corroborate his
allegations.8
In its report, the OCA recommended that the case be docketed as a regular
administrative case considering the varying positions taken by the parties, and
considering, too, the failure of Judge Aguirre to explain in his Comment why he
invited Mr. Feliciano Rubin to see him personally in court.
In the Resolution dated March 17, 2004,9 the Court referred the case to Justice
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (Investigating Justice) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

I
That respondent Judge ordered his appointed Administratrix, Aileen
Rubin, to enter into the Estate, and having entered therein, she and her
cohorts ransacked the premises, took out records, personal belongings
of the deceased Feliciano Rubin, then Administrator of the Estate, and
his wife, the complainant herein x x x.3
The complainant submitted documentary evidence to support the above
allegations.4
In his Comment, Judge Aguirre claimed that the complaint contained malicious
and scurrilous allegations that smacked of harassment. The complaint was filed
by the disgruntled complainant who mistakenly believed that she should be
appointed as the Judicial Administratrix of the Estate of the late Spouses
Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin, instead of Aileen Rubin, the adopted child of the
deceased spouses. Judge Aguirre asserted that his appointment of Aileen Rubin
as Special Administratrix was affirmed by the Court of Appeals 5 (CA) and by the
Supreme Court.6
He also asserted that the complainant had confused two labor cases. 7 Only the
amount of P44,000.00 was paid as separation pay in RAB Case No. VI-0104-82.
In RAB Case No. A-593-81, Judge Aguirre issued orders to compel Mr. Feliciano
Rubin, the former Administrator of the Estate of the late Spouses Dioscoro and
Emperatriz Rubin, to pay lawful and valid claims against the estate. Judge
Aguirre emphasized that he had already been penalized by the Supreme Court
for delaying the enforcement of the final and executory decision of the National

The Investigating Justice found that except for the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge and Violation of Judicial Conduct, the other charges
against Judge Aguirre were "bereft of factual and legal basis." 10 The Investigating
Justice found that Judge Aguirre committed an impropriety when he sent a letter
to Mr. Feliciano Rubin "to discuss and to expedite a possible extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Spouses Rubin." 11 The Investigating
Justice explained:
[H]is act of sending a letter to a party litigant for a personal conference, however
motivated, does not validate his action and the damning implications it may
generate to the [J]udiciary this is especially so since the content of said letter can
constitute as an act of fraternizing with party-litigants. It must be emphasized that
in-chambers sessions without the presence of the other party and his counsel
must be avoided. The prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Being a judicial frontliner who has a direct contact with the litigating parties, the respondent judge
should conduct himself beyond reproach. 12
The Investigating Justice ruled that Judge Aguirre violated Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Investigating Justice
recommended that Judge Aguirre be reprimanded with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt more severely.
The Courts Ruling
We find the findings of the Investigating Justice to be well-taken.

First, the complainants claims of alleged devious schemes, clever machinations,

and connivance employed by Judge Aguirre to extort money from the Estate of
the Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin are unsupported by evidence. A
perusal of the documents submitted by both parties shows that the orders issued
by Judge Aguirre to compel Mr. Feliciano Rubin to settle the money claims filed
against the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin in RAB Case
No. A-593-81 were lawful. The orders were issued to enforce a final and
executory decision of the NLRC in the case; we even previously penalized Judge
Aguirre for his failure to promptly act on the motions filed by the laborers in RAB
Case No. A-593-81, for the enforcement of the final NLRC decision. 13

court was prompted by the continued refusal of Mr. Feliciano Rubin to settle the
money claims filed against the estate in RAB Case No. A-593-81. The records
show that Mr. Feliciano Rubin did not obey the several orders issued by Judge
Aguirre to settle the money claims, and that an administrative case was even
filed against Judge Aguirre for his failure to rule on the laborers motion in RAB
Case No. A-593-81.

In addition, the evidence on record also refutes the complainants claim that the
money claims in RAB Case No. A-593-81 had been previously settled. The
records show that what Mr. Feliciano Rubin actually paid was a claim for
separation pay in RAB Case No. VI-0104-82 an illegal dismissal case; the
money claims in RAB Case No. A-593-81 pertained to the payment of wage
differentials.

In Agustin v. Mercado,21 we declared that employees of the court have no

business meeting with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance.
This prohibition is more compelling when it involves a judge who, because of his
position, must strictly adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct; 22 a judge
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 23 As we
explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva:24

Second, we find no evidence supporting the allegation of bias and partiality when
Judge Aguirre appointed Ms. Aileen Rubin as Judicial Administratrix of the estate
of her adopting parents. Notably, the propriety of the order of her appointment by
Judge Aguirre was upheld, on appeal, by the CA in its Decision dated July 19,
200214 and its Resolution dated September 26, 2002,15 and by this Court in its
Resolution of December 11, 2002.16

...[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible
symbol of government especially considering that as opposed to appellate
courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and
the communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an
exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for
the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in
such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. x
x x it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

Third, in Guerrero v. Villamor,17 we held that a judge cannot be held liable for an
erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it.
We also held that for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not
only be erroneous but must be established to have been motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive.18 The complainant failed to prove
any of these circumstances in this case. We find no evidence of corruption or
unlawful motive on the part of Judge Aguirre when he made the said
appointment.
Although the appointment by Judge Aguirre of his branch clerk of court as
Special Administrator for the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz
Rubin was erroneous for having violated a standing Court circular and for being
contrary to existing jurisprudence,19 we find that the appointment was made in
good faith. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another.20 In this regard, Judge Aguirres good faith
is strengthened by evidence showing that the appointment of his branch clerk of

Despite these findings, we find that Judge Aguirre committed an impropriety

when he sent a letter, in his official letterhead, to Mr. Feliciano Rubin to discuss a
matter pending before his own court.

Under the circumstances, Judge Aguirres act was improper considering that he
opened himself to suspicions in handling the case. His action also raised doubts
about his impartiality and about his integrity in performing his judicial function.
We take note that the complained act was committed before the New Code of
Judicial Conduct took effect on June 1, 2004. Under the circumstances, Judge
Aguirre is liable under the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.25 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities." Carrying the same guiding principle is Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which states, "[a] judges official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be
beyond reproach."

In Rosauro v. Kallos,26 we ruled that impropriety constitutes a light charge.

Section 11(C) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court27 provides the following sanctions
if the respondent is found guilty of a light charge:
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00
and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of reprimand with stern
warning.1wphi1 In light of Judge Aguirres death, however, we resolve to
impose a fine of P5,000.00 instead. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the
respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of
administrative liability, save for recognized exceptions.28 None of the exceptions
applies to the present case.29
The P5,000.00 fine shall be taken from the amount of P50,000.00 which we
previously retained/withheld from Judge Aguirres retirement benefits due to the
administrative cases filed against him.30
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. guilty of impropriety, in violation
of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. We hereby impose a fine of P5,000.00 which shall be deducted
from the P50,000.00 withheld from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145

June 18, 2010

JUDGE MONA LISA T. TABORA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, Complainant,
vs.
(Ret.) JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, former Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October
2006 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora
(Judge Tabora), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Fernando City,
La Union, Branch 26, and Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr. (Lacsamana), Officer-inCharge, Branch Clerk of Court (OIC-BCOC) of the same court. Tabisula charged
Judge Tabora with (1) violation of Section 3(e)1of Republic Act No. 30192 (RA
3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1,
Canon 33 and Section 2, Canon 54 of A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC5 or the New Code of
Judicial Conduct; (3) violation of Republic Act No. 6713 6 (RA 6713) or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; and (4)
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, oppression, serious neglect
of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Further,
Tabisula charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections 3(e) 7 and (f)8 of RA
3019; (2) violation of Articles 2269 and 315(3)(c)10 of Act No. 381511 or the
Revised Penal Code; and (3) violation of Sections 5(a),12 (d),13 and (e)14 of RA
6713.
The Facts
In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 6840 entitled "Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank, Inc." for specific
performance with accounting and damages. This case was raffled to the RTC of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 presided by Judge Tabora. Tabisula
narrated that due to the prolonged absence of Judge Tabora caused by a serious
illness, Judge Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge Carbonell), now retired but then
pairing/vice-executive judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch
27, took over and heard the case from the beginning up to its termination.
Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by Judge
Carbonell so she requested from Lacsamana a copy of the decision. However,
despite several requests, Lacsamana allegedly refused to furnish Tabisula with a
copy of the decision upon the instruction of Judge Tabora, who at that time had
already reported back to work. Tabisula sent a Letter-Request dated 24 August
2006 addressed to the RTC asking Judge Tabora to direct Lacsamana to give a
copy of the decision rendered by Judge Carbonell. However, instead of granting

the request, Judge Tabora issued an Order dated 30 August 2006, informing
Tabisula that an Order dated 8 August 2006 was issued by the RTC requiring the
parties to submit their respective memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the
Order. Also, Judge Tabora informed Tabisula that even if the pairing judge was
the one who heard the case from beginning to end, the prerogative of rendering
the decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.
On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse
to Tabisula. Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October 2006 to Judge
Carbonell requesting for a copy of his decision. On 9 October 2006, Judge
Carbonell replied to Tabisulas letter and attached a copy of his decision which
favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and
deliberately changing, altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a
court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction. Tabisula added that this has caused
her undue injury since the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840, Rang-Ay Rural
Bank Inc., represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, was allegedly a relative of
Judge Taboras husband.
Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, and gross inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a copy of the
decision rendered by Judge Carbonell despite several verbal and written
demands.
In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified that his
official designation is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-BCOC by
Judge Tabora on 1 August 2006. Lacsamana explained that Judge Carbonell
handed him a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 6840 on 11 August 2006.
However, that day being a Friday, Lacsamana was able to submit the decision to
Judge Tabora only on the next working day, 14 August 2006. Judge Tabora
informed him to just leave a copy of the decision at her table. From then on,
Lacsamana had no more knowledge of what happened to the decision.
Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisulas Letter dated 24
August 2006 addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana reasoned that he was not
the person in charge of releasing decisions, orders, and other documents relative
to a pending case and it was not within his functions to release a decision without
the presiding judges authority.
Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with the OCA.
Judge Tabora indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May 2006 and was

later diagnosed with a serious illness. Prior to her surgery, she conducted a
hearing in Civil Case No. 6840 on 21 April 2006. However, the same had been
reset due to the absence of Tabisulas counsel.
On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear Civil Case
No. 6840 on the basis of Judge Taboras absence. On 26 May 2006, while Judge
Tabora was on leave, Judge Carbonell proceeded to hear the testimony of the
lone witness for the defendant in the case without first issuing an order granting
the motion filed by Tabisula.
On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on 19 June
2006, Judge Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by the
defendants and issued an Order submitting the case for resolution.
On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records, Judge Tabora
noticed that Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for decision on 19 June
2006 by Judge Carbonell. Since the 90-day period for rendering a decision was
soon to expire, she immediately issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 directing
the parties to submit their respective memorandum.
Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil Case No.
6840 a decision which was received by Lacsamana. On 14 August 2006,
Lacsamana turned over a copy of the decision to Judge Tabora.
After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to Judge Carbonell
and informed him that she issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 requiring the
parties to submit their respective memorandum. Judge Carbonell immediately cut
her off and told her to just recall her earlier order.
Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found out
that Judge Carbonells decision was not in accordance with the facts of the case
and the applicable law and appeared to have unjustly favored Tabisula.
Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the unpromulgated
decision of Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonells decision was never officially
released to any of the parties and did not form part of the records of the case.

Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly furnished
Tabisula with a copy of his decision a month after the decision of Judge Tabora
had already been released to the parties. Also, Tabisulas insistence for the
release of Judge Carbonells decision made her determined to exercise her
judicial independence since such decision would result in a miscarriage of
justice.
Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840 was a
bank, a corporate entity with a distinct personality. She was not disqualified from
sitting in the case since under Section 1, Rule 13715 of the Rules of Court her
husbands relation with the banks representative was remote or way beyond the
6th degree. Thus, the relationship has absolutely no bearing on the outcome of
the case. Judge Tabora prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no sufficient and
factual legal basis to hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana liable for any of the
charges filed by Tabisula. The OCA stated that Judge Tabora, in rendering her
own decision in Civil Case No. 6840, was well within her power to decide the
case since she had full authority over all cases pending in her official station. As
for Lacsamana, the OCA found that he could not be faulted for his failure to
comply with Tabisulas request since he was only obeying the lawful order of
Judge Tabora, his superior. Also, Judge Carbonells decision in Civil Case No.
6840 was not even promulgated and did not form part of the official records of
the case. Thus, there was no "prior existing valid decision."

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1) dismiss the
administrative complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana for lack of merit;
and (2) consider the Comment dated 26 February 2007 of Judge Tabora as a
complaint against Judge Carbonell and require Judge Carbonell to file his
Comment within 10 days from notice.
In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted the facts of
the case as stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26 February 2007
from the time he took over Civil Case No. 6840 until he submitted his decision to
OIC-BCOC Lacsamana. However, he disagreed with Judge Taboras contention
that the decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 6840 was not validly promulgated
and released to the parties. Judge Carbonell maintained that the act of filing the
decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or
promulgation and not its pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.
Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently transpired
after he turned over the records of the case but admitted that after receipt of the
letter-request of Tabisula asking for a copy of his decision, he immediately
responded by furnishing Tabisula with a copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter does not
involve him. The dispute was originally between Tabisula against Judge Tabora
and Lacsamana. The only issue between him and Judge Tabora was a
divergence of legal opinion.

The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of Judge
Carbonell since he overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge for
Branch 26 and has shown unusual interest in the disposition of Civil Case No.
6840.

Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007

on the Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula stated that the Court
erred in dismissing the complaint she filed against Judge Tabora and
Lacsamana.

The OCA recommended that:

In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other employees of the
RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote the OCA and narrated
their negative experience toward a co-employee, Olympia Elena O. DacanayQueddeng (Queddeng), Legal Researcher II of the same court. In the same
letter, they also gave their support in an unrelated administrative complaint filed
by Judge Tabora against Queddeng.

(1) that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as against respondents

Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo V.
Lacsamana for lack of merit;
(2) that the COMMENT of respondent Judge be considered as a
complaint against Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, and that Judge Carbonell
be furnished with a copy of such comment and, be in turn REQUIRED to
COMMENT thereon.

In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation

On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge Carbonell
guilty of simple misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. The OCA reiterated that Judge Carbonell overstepped the
bounds of his authority as pairing judge of Branch 26 when he prepared the
decision in Civil Case No. 6840 and furnished Tabisula with a copy of such
decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell created the impression that he had taken a
special interest in the case.

had already re-assumed her duties, he still issued an Order submitting the case
for resolution on 19 June 2006 and even submitted a written decision to OICBCOC Lacsamana on 11 August 2006.
Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in Section 2,
Canon 318 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:

The OCA recommended that:

(1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 27, 2007 of Mrs.
Caridad S. Tabisula on the Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be
DENIED for lack of merit;
(2) this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from the retirement benefits that he
may receive; and
(3) the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., Court
Sheriff, and seven (7) other employees of RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando City, La Union, against Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng,
Legal Researcher, same court, be DETACHED from the records of this
administrative matter and the same be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union).
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.
The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another branch
in case the presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars issued by the
Court: (1) Circular No. 716 effective 23 September 1974 and (2) Circular No. 199817 effective 18 February 1998.1avvphi1
Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 26, assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840 upon Judge
Taboras leave of absence in May 2006 due to a serious illness. Judge Carbonell
fulfilled his duties by conducting hearings in the said case from May until June
2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work as presiding judge
of Branch 26. However, even though Judge Carbonell knew that Judge Tabora

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision
is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the peoples faith in the
judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the
grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with
the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but
also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them. 19
As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the
conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a matter
of judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by
reasoning that the act of filing a decision with the clerk of court already
constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation. We find this explanation
unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the
subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge
shall take cognizance of all cases until the assumption to duty of the regular
judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and performing her functions in
court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.

Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference in
referring the letter of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch 26
for appropriate action. Instead, Judge Carbonell directly furnished Tabisula with a
copy knowing fully well that she was the plaintiff in the subject case. Judge
Carbonell not only disregarded the functions of the clerk of court as custodian of
court records but also undermined the integrity and confidentiality of the court.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, we find
Judge Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been
defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of
conduct for public officers.20 We adhere to the OCAs recommendation of a fine
of P10,000.00 to be deducted from Judge Carbonells retirement benefits which
have been withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 24 September
2008, which granted the payment of his disability retirement benefits subject to
the withholding of P200,000.00 pending final resolution of the administrative
cases against him.
Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its Report dated 18
September 2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration dated
27 November 2007 filed by Tabisula on this Courts Resolution dated 1 October
2007. We also direct the OCA to detach from the records of this administrative
matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Lacsamana and seven other employees
of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against Queddeng, Legal

Researcher of the same court. The Letter is to be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371
entitled "Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union."
WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November
2007 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find respondent Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, GUILTY of simple misconduct
and FINE him P10,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits which
have been withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 24 September
2008.
We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to detach from the records of
this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana,
Jr. and seven other employees of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City,
La Union, Branch 26, against Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher of
the same court and include the Letter in A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled "Office of
the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal
Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union."
SO ORDERED.