PHI269 Midterm

M ASON K ELLER
Wabash College
March 25, 2015

Part One
Prompt
Our consideration of views in the philosophy of mathematics has centered on the following three major areas.
Ontology: What are mathematical objects? What makes mathematical statements true?
Epistemology: How do we know anything about mathematical objects?
How do we know that mathematical statements are true?
Applicability: How does mathematics apply to the physical world?
For each of the following four philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Frege),
(a) explain how they answer these questions, and (b) articulate an objection
to the account you describe in part (a).

Plato
Plato considers mathematical objects to be abstract objects independent from
ourselves. I hesitate to describe them as forms instead of objects; there is one
perfect form of the colour white, but there are many equally perfect circles.
In this way, mathematical objects are beneath forms in terms of abstractness.
Indeed, Plato gives us this in the analogy of the divided line. However, I also
think that Plato would agree that a wheel instantiates the idea or form of a
circle.
Now, in order to elaborate on how we know about the relationships or
theorems between these objects, one must first tackle the topic of anamnesis.
As presented in the Meno, anamnesis is the theory that all mathematical relationships are fixed and already existent: one recalls them from pre-incarnation
experiences with the objects themselves. Mathematical proof, that is, deductive
reasoning, is merely an aid to this recollection, and a means to convince us
that we are remembering correctly. Despite this, I think the modern position
of mathematical Platonism is that we know theorems by means of deductive
reasoning about the objective qualities of these intelligible objects. That said,
modern views do not retroactively change what Plato himself put forward.
To answer Wigners question about why mathematics is unreasonably effective at modeling the material world, one must consider in more detail the
theory of the forms. Consider that physical objects are imperfect reflections
or instantiations of the intelligible objects. In this way, it makes sense that
mathematical relationships model the physical world. In Platos view, it would
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almost be more appropriate to say that the physical world is a model of the
mathematical world, and not vice-versa.
I would personally prefer it if the Platonist thesis were true; it wraps everything up in a nice little bow. However, the glaring objection to Platonism is
that there is no objective evidence for the existence of forms. It is not a logical
position to take. Moreover, as a mathematician, not a philosopher or aesthete,
beauty is in parsimony. To presuppose the existence another world of intelligible objects, past lives, trans-incarnation recollection, and some mechanism by
which intelligible objects are instantiated imperfectly is, to be gentle, an awful
lot. If there is no means by which to come to know the forms objectively, then
Platonism is more of a religion then not. Indeed, I liken it to Gnosticism: one can
only learn the knowledge necessary for salvation personally and miraculously.
One can only claim the forms existence through similar epiphany.

Aristotle
Aristotle presents a more empirical thesis about mathematics. His claim is
that mathematical objects are merely physical objects, or at least direct abstractions from physical objects. In this view, many questions one might ask . A
mathematician would certainly desire to show that, say, "four divides twelve" is
always a true statement. But to Aristotle, this is a contingent truth: we might
conceive of a world wherein there are no groups of twelve. Then, to Aristotle, it
would be illegitimate to reason about the "universal" twelve. This is because in
Aristotelian logic, "four divides twelve" implies that there is "four" and there is
"twelve." But in the world just conceived, there is no "twelve."
Kline tells us by way of reference to Aristotles Posterior Analytics that Aristotle thought mathematical statements were true by means of deductive logic
from axioms. However, Aristotles view is a posteriori in that these axioms are
known to be true by means of "our infallible intuition." In contrast to Plato,
physical experience is necessary in order to intuit these principles.
If mathematical objects exist only as objects of the physical world it means
that their relationships should readily apply to the physical world. I will make
special contrast against Plato, since their answers sound so similar, and I find
them to be far apart in the mind. Plato wants that there are perfect objects
with perfect relationships, and imperfect reflected objects with imperfect relationships. Aristotle wants that there are only physical objects and physical
relationships. Mathematics merely separates away irrelevant characteristics of
those objects, and in this way does not lose any applicability. Indeed, I think that
Aristotle would agree that if one could separate the relevant from the irrelevant
perfectly, one could mathematically derive formulae that predict perfectly. Error
for Plato is due to systemic flaw in the physical. For Aristotle, error arises from
flaws in our art.
I touched upon my central objection to this philosophy above, namely that
it is highly unsatisfying to only know contingent truths. That is to say, it is
inherently less satisfying than knowing eternal truths. Moreover, the view
breaks down when applied to the very abstract. I have in the past advocated
the sensualist thesis: "there is not anything in mind, which hasnt been in the

sensations," at least in regard to the subjective (see my Intuition and Sensualism

in The Wabash Commentary: Soul and the City). But it is objective that there are
topologies wherein a sequence can converge into more than one point. How can
this originate from the senses? There is no way to perceive such a space, indeed,
that sequences converge to at most one point is a necessary property to all
models that fit physicality. Is such a space not a mathematical object, because it
does not result from a separation of qualities from an object? Is it illegitimate to
posit about? Affirmative answers to these questions are incredibly dissatisfying
to the mathematician, but the Aristotelian view seems to mandate those same
answers.

Kant
Kants central claim is that mathematics is a body of synthetic a priori knowledge. That is to say, it is a body of truths which are necessary but not contained
within the initial suppositions. Kant views mathematical objects as a conceptualist. That is to say, to him, they reside in the mind. Frege describes Kants claim
about ontology to be psychological. This is because Kant has the position that
the world we perceive is perceived precisely because of the human mind. That
is to say that space, distance, and form are concepts imposed on raw sensory
data from a world that is ultimately unknowable. Moreover, Kant tells us that
this perception is consistent across all human minds and that we cannot help
but sense space as Euclidean. This tells us why Kant wants to believe that
mathematical truths are necessary. Kant supports his claim about the synthetic
nature of mathematical truths by way of example. He gives us the example of
5 + 7 = 12, and instructs us to observe that 12 is not contained within any of
the ideas that make up 5 + 7 = 12.
The psychological thesis wraps up the epistemological questions and Wigners
question of effectiveness very neatly. We know our a priori geometrical truths
because it is not, and cannot, be conceivable to us that construction upon the
object in question changes the properties of the object in question, rather it is a
property of the mind mode of formatting sensory data that makes the properties
of any given triangle invariant under additional constructions. This knowledge
of geometry is then a necessary feature of space. From this it is easy to see why
empirical laws, describing space and being formulated in the language of mathematics, are useful and accurate: the mathematical nature of these relationships
is built into space itself.
One particular objection to Kants view is presented in greater detail in Part
Two of this exam. For completeness here, I present an abbreviated form. The
central thrust of the issue is that human psychology is more vast than Kant
ever assumed. Really, claims made from his so called "infallible intuition" are
contingent. Said another way, even things such as arithmetic and geometry are
contingent upon the mind of each man. Then they cannot be a priori, so the view
is inconsistent.

Frege
Frege was a logicist. That is to say, Frege believed that all of mathematics
is reducible to logic. Then it certainly makes sense to ask instead questions
about the ontology and epistemology of Freges logical system. Bostock tells
us that Frege was a realist in a Platonic way, but swiftly moves on. Frege in
his The Thought: A Logical Inquiry shows that he believes thoughts, like the
Pythagorean Theorem, to be distinct from ideas, which Frege characterises as
sense-impressions, decisions, moods, and imaginative creations. Frege then
distinguishes how his ideas are different from physical objects that belong to
what he calls the "outer world." Finally, he uses these distinctions to show that
thoughts cannot be ideas. I provide his conclusion, which shows his realist
position:
"A third realm must be recognized. What belongs to this corresponds
with ideas, in that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but with
things. in that it needs no bearer to the contents of whose consciousness to belong. Thus the thought, for example, which we expressed
in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, true independently of
whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no bearer. It is not true
for the first time when it is discovered, but is like a planet which,
already before anyone has seen it, has been in interaction with other
planets."
Frege also holds, of course, that we know about these objects by reasoning
logically.
Frege claims in 106 his The Foundations of Arithmetic that "a number asserts something objective of a concept." While not objects in and of themselves,
concepts contain objects, and so number can at least tell us about the relationships between objects. This means precisely that it is reasonable to expect that
numbers are good models for the world; a model is only a set of relationships.
My central objection to Frege is to his ontic claims. They remind me strongly
of Platonism, and in that regard some of the objection to Plato that I rendered
above apply. Another concern is that Freges project is to base arithmetic on
logic, but simple truths of arithmetic like 2 + 2 = 4 are, in a way, more obvious
than some of his rules of logic. Shouldnt we, for certaintys sake, base our art
off the most obvious principles?

Part 2
Prompt
Mathematical developments, primarily but not exclusively in the 19th
century, complicated the philosophy of mathematics considerably. Please
choose one such development, and explain how it posed a problem for the
views of Plato, Aristotle, or Kant that you discussed in Part One. This part
can correctly be addressed in approximately 500 words.

Non-Euclidean geometries are geometries in which Euclids parallel line

postulate, or an equivalent, is negated. For ease, consider the equivalent axiom
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due to Playfair: "In a plane, given a line and a point not on it, at most one
line parallel to the given line can be drawn through the point." The two nonEuclidean geometries arise out of the negation. Supposing that there are no
parallels yields the elliptic or spherical geometry. Supposing there are at least
two parallels gives the hyperbolic or "saddle" geometry. Certain theorems are
invariant between geometries, but there are many that are not.
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries was disastrous to the Kantian
view of mathematics. Kant tells us that Newtonian mechanics and Euclidean
geometry are truths, created by our minds imposition of form on a reality that
is ultimately unknowable. Moreover, Kant tells us that we cannot possibly
perceive differently. But we now know that it is not possible to tell with the
senses the true geometry of the space that we perceive. However, I believe
that it would be very easy to generate humans who perceive only spherical
geometry! Consider the Little Prince of Antoine de Saint-Exupery, a little boy
who lives on an extremely small asteroid. Would not the little prince perceive
only spherical geometry? He would certainly find that a straight line always
meets itself, that a triangle can have more than 2 radians of interior angle
measure, and the concept of parallelism would have never occurred to him.
Kant assumes geometry is a priori. But if man can impose two different
perceptions of space on reality, each resulting in different judgments, then
geometry must be a posteriori. To use Bostocks example, there may well also be
men who conceive "7 + 5 = many." Then arithmetical truths are also a posteriori.
Now though, we have exhausted Kants list of examples, and he seems to have
no proof that there exists mathematical knowledge that is synthetic a priori.
I am not sure as to sufficiency, but I know that Kant considers universality
or non-contingency a necessary quality for a priori truths. Above, I showed how
his examples are really contingent, so they must be synthetic a posteriori. Now,
I believe that Kant can attempt to rebut in two ways. The first is that he can
encapsulate the perception which the person imposes into the judgment. This
surely makes the judgment a priori. However, now the predicate is part of the
subject. To refer to an earlier example, now the judgment "7 + 5 = many" is
encapsulated as part of the imposed perception. Then we are again at analytic
a priori, which will not do for Kant. The other rebuttal is to claim that the
results which are invariant under these three geometries are synthetic a priori
and mathematics, but that the others are a posteriori and not mathematics. But
such a claim would be, at least to me, a "no true Scotsman" argument.

Part 3
Prompt
In light of your answers to Parts One and Two, please explain how you
think we should understand the ontology, epistemology, and applicability
of mathematics. (An acceptable answer here is that you have no idea how
we should understand these things. But if this is your answer, you must
explain why you have no idea!) This part can correctly be addressed in
approximately 500-800 words.

I personally subscribe to the belief that there are no real, unique mathematical
objects. For example, I would say that "2" is a symbol, which interacts with other
symbols using predefined rules. Assigning interpretation to "2" is pointless.
In this way, I view mathematics as a kind of game. You begin with a set of
symbols, a set of rules as to how those symbols interact, and possibly rules for
how to generate new symbols. A statement is true with respect to the game if
the starting symbols can be manipulated, using the rules, to form the statement.
So really mathematics is the study of these systems, or the playing of these
games.
"Is statement xyz true?" is a malformed question. To me, the truth of any
statement is dependent on the system in which it is set. Is this disastrous with
respect to the certainty which Kline seems to value so dearly? It most assuredly
is, but I would claim that "certainty" is irrelevant. There is a certain kind of
aesthetic beauty and pride associated with playing the game, and besides, if
one encapsulates the whole system when uttering a proposition, then one has
certainty anyway (the so called if-then-ism or paraphrase nominalism). By the
former point what I mean to say is that, for example, in the ZFC game I believe
that one can create both statements and series of manipulations that are of real
beauty and elegance. This alone makes the game worth playing. Elsewise one
embraces the thesis that any art as a whole is a pointless pursuit. Moreover,
playing these games is an interesting pursuit and diversion in and of itself. If
the game happens to be played in a system that models the physical well, then
that is a happy coincidence for the physicists to savour. That however, is no
reason to play only in those systems.
I do not think that applicability is the ultimate end which justifies mathematics. In this way, I suppose I have circumvented all three of the questions of
applicability, ontology, and epistemology with rather shallow answers. But these
questions are really philosophical questions. I believe that I have given a view
that is deep with respect to mathematics and metamathematics, in that it allows
the largest number of systems to be examined using mathematical thought. One
possible objection is that my view sounds a lot like logicism. However, the
thesis of logicism is that all mathematics can be reduced to propositions based
on the self-evident axioms of logic. I, however, believe that axioms are what
you make of them. Their measure of self-evidency only adds to the beauty of a
proof for an non-obvious statement, but self-evidency is not necessary in and of
itself. Moreover, I do not believe that logic has any relationship to these symbol
games except inasmuch as many of the games incorporate the rules of logic into
their rules for symbol manipulation.
As a whole, I find my position a more generalized version of Hilberts
position, in that I do accept the rules of the game as arbitrarily stipulated
constructions. Practically, I do not keep these concepts in the front of my head
as I do mathematics. In that way, I suppose my position is at least one part
apathy. I am not convinced that this is a bad thing, though; it allows me to
remain busy and open-minded. Indeed, I think the phrase, "Thats absurd,
you cannot possibly consider this" to be the biggest taboo in mathematics.
Empirically, one can observe that the constructivists and finitists are all but
faded away from the mainstream. I am altogether unsure where this position

lies in the realm of philosophy of mathematics, but it is the only one that I have
considered that I find satisfactory.