Hse Uitm - Chapter 3

Health, Safety and the Environment
CGE653
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Ir. Dr. MOHD SHIRAZ ARIS
HSE
Fundamentals
Principles
Tools
Application/
effects
Fire, Explosion,
Toxicity,
Exposure,
Environmental
impact
HAZID
HAZOP
HIRARC
Measurements/data/learnings
Hazard and Risks
Hazard - a danger or risk?
Hazard - source of potential damage, harm or

adverse health effects/asset losses
Hazard - condition or set of circumstances

presenting a potential for harm
Categories - health and safety (OSHA)
Hazard and Risks
Risk - chance or probability of harm/loss if exposed

to a hazard
Risk assessment - a systematic process of

evaluating the potential risks that may be involved
in a projected activity

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Methodologies
Health, Safety & Environmtn

CGE653
Faculty of Chemical
Engineering
Universiti Teknologi MARA
Hazard = a condition that has the potential to

cause human injury or fatality, damage to
property, damage to the environment or some
combination of these.
Risk = a measure of human injury,
environmental damage, or economic loss in
terms of both the incident likelihood and the
magnitude of the loss or injury.

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Hazard and Risk: Recap From Chapter 1
What are the hazards?

What can go wrong?
What are the chances?
What are the consequences?
Hazard Identification
Risk Assessment

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For each industrial process, the

following questions must be asked:
Hazard Identification and Risk assessment are

sometimes combined into a general category called
hazard evaluation/ hazard analysis.
Can be done at any stage during the initial design
or ongoing operation or process.
The results of a hazard analysis are:
The identification of unacceptable risks and
The selection of means of controlling or eliminating
them

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Introduction
Hazard identification and risk assessment procedure

System Descriptions
Hazards Identification
Accident probability
Accident consequence
Risk determination
Risk and/or
hazard
acceptance
No
Yes
Build and/or operate system
Modify system/
process

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Scenario Identification
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
What are the

Hazards?
What can go
wrong?
How likely it
is?
What are the

consequences?
FOUNDATIONS FOR PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

Historical
Experiences
PHA
Methodology
Knowledge and
Intuition

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Process Hazard Analysis
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Determine types and locations of potential safety problems
Identify corrective measures to improve safety
Preplan emergency actions to be taken if safety controls
fail
It must address
The hazards of the process
Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the
hazards and their interrelationship
Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative
controls, especially those affecting employees
The need to promptly resolve PHA findings and
recommendations.

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PHA allows us to:
Process Hazards Checklists

What-if Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis

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PHA Methodology
It is simply a list of possible problems and areas to

be checked.
The list reminds the reviewer or operator of the
potential problem areas.
Can be used during the design of a process to
identify design hazards, or it can be used before
process operation.
A systematic approach built on the historical
knowledge included in checklist questions.
Applicable to any activity or system, including
equipment issues and human factors issues

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Process Hazard Checklist
Check oil in engine

Check air pressure in tires
Check fluid level in radiator
Check air filter
Check fluid level in windshield
washer tank
Check headlights and taillights
Check exhaust system for leaks
Check fluid levels in brake system
Check gasoline level in tank

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A classic example: automobile checklist
Example of process safety checklist

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Design correct for maximum operating pressure?

Corrosion allowance considered?
Special isolation for hazardous equipment?
Guards for belts, pulleys and gears?
Dikes for any storage tanks?
Construction materials compatible with process
chemicals?
7. Emergency standby equipment needed?
8. Relief valves or rupture disks required?
9. Emergency valves readily accessible?
10. Special explosion proof electrical fixtures required?

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EQUIPMENT DESIGN
Is quick and simple to perform and is easily

understood.
Makes use of existing experience and knowledge
of previous systems.
Helps check compliance with standard practice
and design intention.
Ensures that known hazards are fully explored.

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Advantages of safety checklist
Highly dependent upon the quality of the prepared

checklist.
May not be comprehensive and is likely to miss
some potential problems.
The structure of checklist analysis relies exclusively on
the knowledge built into the checklists to identify
potential problems.
The analysis is likely to overlook potential new
hazards.
Traditionally only provides qualitative information.

Most checklist reviews produce only qualitative results,
with no quantitative estimates of risk-related
characteristics.

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Limitations of safety checklist
What-if analysis is a brainstorming approach

(beginning with what if question) that uses broad,
loosely structured questioning to
postulate potential upsets that may result in accidents
or system performance problems and
ensure that appropriate safeguards against those
problems are in place.
A systematic, but loosely structured, assessment

relying on a team of experts brainstorming to
generate a comprehensive review and to ensure
that appropriate safeguards are in place

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What if Analysis
Typically performed by one or more teams with

diverse backgrounds and experience that
participate in group review meetings of
documentation and field inspections
Applicable to any activity or system
Used as a high-level or detailed risk assessment
technique
Generates qualitative descriptions of potential
problems, in the form of questions and responses,
as well as lists of recommendations for preventing
problems

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What if Analysis
The quality of the evaluation depends on the

quality of the documentation, the training of the
review team leader, and the experience of the
review teams
Generally applicable for almost every type of risk
assessment application, especially those dominated
by relatively simple failure scenarios
Occasionally used alone, but most often used to
supplement other, more structured techniques
(especially checklist analysis)

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What if Analysis
Equipment failures:
What if . the valve leaks?
What if . the alarm malfunction?
What if . the pressure regulator fails?
Human errors:
What if . operator fails to re-start pump?

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Examples of what if analysis
Limitations of what if analysis

The loose structure of what-if analysis relies exclusively on the
knowledge of the participants to identify potential problems.
If the team fails to ask important questions, the analysis is likely
to overlook potentially important weaknesses.
Difficult to audit for thoroughness.
Reviewing a what-if analysis to detect oversights is difficult

because there is no formal structure against which to audit.
Reviews tend to become "mini-what-ifs," trying to stumble upon
oversights by the original team.
Traditionally provides only qualitative

information.
Most what-if reviews produce only qualitative results; they give

no quantitative estimates of risk-related characteristics.
This simplistic approach offers great value for minimal
investment, but it can answer more complicated risk-related
questions only if some degree of quantification is added.

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Likely to miss some potential problems.
FMEA is a qualitative reasoning approach best

suited for reviews of mechanical and electrical
hardware systems.
The FMEA technique
(1) considers how the failure modes of each system

component can result in system performance problems
and
(2) ensures that appropriate safeguards against such
problems are in place.
A quantitative version of FMEA is known as failure

modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA).

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A systematic, highly structured assessment relying

on evaluation of component failure modes and
team experience to generate a comprehensive
review and ensure that appropriate safeguards
against system performance problems are in place
Used as a system-level and component-level risk
assessment technique
Applicable to any well-defined system

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Sometimes performed by an individual working with

system experts through interviews and field
inspections, but also can be performed by an
interdisciplinary team with diverse backgrounds
and experience
A technique that generates qualitative descriptions
of potential performance problems (failure modes,
causes, effects, and safeguards) as well as lists of
recommendations for reducing risks
A technique that can provide quantitative failure
frequency or consequence estimates

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Used primarily for reviews of mechanical and

electrical systems, such as fire suppression systems
and vessel steering and propulsion systems
Used frequently as the basis for defining and
optimizing planned equipment maintenance
because the method systematically focuses directly
and individually on equipment failure modes
Effective for collecting the information needed to
troubleshoot system problems

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Example of FMEA on a heat exchanger
Limitations of FMEA
A traditional FMEA uses potential equipment failures
as the basis for the analysis. All of the questions focus
on how equipment functional failures can occur.
Focus is on single-event initiators of problems.

A traditional FMEA tries to predict the potential
effects of specific equipment failures.
These equipment failures are generally analyzed one
by one, which means that important combinations of
equipment failures may be overlooked.

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Examination of human error is limited.
Limitations of FMEA
A typical FMEA addresses potential external influences
(environmental conditions, system contamination, external
impacts, etc.) only to the extent that these events produce
equipment failures of interest.
External influences that directly affect vessel safety, port safety,
and crew safety are often overlooked in an FMEA if they do not
cause equipment failures.
Results are dependent on the mode of

operation.
The effects of certain equipment failure modes often vary widely,

depending on the mode of system operation.
A single FMEA generally accounts for possible effects of equipment
failures only during one mode of operation or a few closely related
modes of operation.
More than one FMEA may, therefore, be necessary for a system
that has multiple modes of operation.

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Examination of external influences is limited.
Originated in the aerospace industry.

Used extensively in the nuclear power industry.
Becoming more popular in the chemical process
industries.
Provides a traceable, logical, quantitative
representation of causes, consequences and event
combinations.
Top-down approach
Starts with a well-defined event (top event) and
works backwards to identify the causes of the top
event.

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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Logical Functions in FTA
The rectangle is used to represent the

TOP event and any intermediate fault
events in a fault tree.
The TOP event is the accident that is
being analyzed. Intermediate events
are system states or occurrences that
somehow contribute to the accident.

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1. Top Event and Intermediate Events
The circle is used to represent basic

events in a fault tree.
It is the lowest level of resolution in
the fault tree.

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2. Basic Event
The diamond is used to represent

events that cannot be developed
further in the fault tree due to the
lack of suitable information.

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3. Undeveloped Event
Used when the resulting output event

requires the simultaneous
occurrence of all input events.

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4. AND gate
Used when the resulting output event

requires the occurrence of any
individual input event.

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5. OR gate

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Example of FTA Flat Tire

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Example of FTA Hot Water Heater Explodes
The minimal cut sets are the various sets of events

that could lead to the top event.
Some of the minimal cut sets have a higher
probability than others.
For instance, a set involving just two events is
more likely than a set involving three.
The higher probability sets are examined carefully
to determine whether additional safety systems are
required.
AND gate increase the number of events in the cut
sets, whereas OR gates lead to more sets.

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Minimal Cut Sets
Quantitative FTA determines the probability of the

tope event.
Probability versus Reliability
Reliability = 1 Probability
Probabilities are multiplied across an AND gate.
Reliabilities are multiplied across and OR gate.

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Quantitative FTA

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Example of Quantitative FTA
A bottom-up approach
ETA begin with an initiating event and work toward
a final result.
Provide information on how a failure can occur and
the probability of occurrence.
Explore how safeguards and external influences,
called lines of assurance, affect the path of
accident chains.

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Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

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Example of ETA
Company A produce liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from a mixture

ofhydrocarbon gases. LPG is highlyused as afuel in heating
appliances and vehicles. LPG tanks are installed with pressure
controllers and high pressure alarms. The relief valves on top
of the tanks are designed to vent of excess gas in order to
prevent the tanks from rupturing. The high pressure alarms will
alert the operators to take necessary action to bring the plant
back to normal conditions or to shut down the plant. One of the
possible incident scenario is that accidental spilt of hydrocarbons
may ignite and the resulting fire may heat and LPG tank thus
increasing its temperature and pressure.
Construct and event tree analysis and identify four possible
outcomes that may arise from the accidental spillage of
hydrocarbons.

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Example
Level of Assurance
Initiating Event
HP alarm alerts
operator
Operator notice
HP
Relief Valve
operate
Outcome
Operator s/d reactor
Yes
Cont. operation
Yes
S/down
No
Fire from the

accidental
spillage of H/C
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Tank
rupture
(explosion)
Cont. operation
S/down
No
No
No
Explosion
No
Yes
Vapor release
Yes
No
No
S/down
Explosion

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Yes
This technique uses a systematic process to (1)

identify possible deviations from normal
operations and (2) ensure that appropriate
safeguards are in place to help prevent accidents.
a systematic process carried out by a team and
involve brain-storming.
Before a HAZOP is carried out, detailed
information on the process must be available. This
include, process flow diagram (PFD), piping &
instrumentation diagram (P&ID), equipment
specifications, materials of construction, mass &
energy balances.

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HAZOP
HAZOP
NO
MORE
HIGHER
LESS
The guidewords are combined with process

parameters (e.g. speed, flow, pressure etc.) to
systematically consider all credible deviations from
normal conditions. For example:
MORE FLOW
HIGHER TEMPERATURE

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This technique uses special guidewords such as:
HAZOP
Potential
Accident
Deviation 3
NORMAL OPERATION (e.g. normal feed flow rate into a reactor

Deviation 2
Deviation 4
Potential
Accident
Potential
Accident
Guideword + Process Parameter = Deviation

LESS + FLOW
= LESS FLOW
MORE + FLOW
= MORE FLOW

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Deviation 1
Potential
Accident
A node is a specific location in the process in

which the deviations of the process/design
intention are evaluated.
Example might be: separator, heat exchanger, scrubber,
pump, compressor, pipeline, etc.
Design/process intent is how a study node is

expected or required to behave.
For example: A reactor is designed to operate between
300 to 360 C, OR
Cooling water is expected to continuously flow inside a
cooling coil

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Step 1 in HAZOP: Choose a study node

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Step 1 in HAZOP: Choose a study node
Step 2 in HAZOP: Pick a Process Parameter
Flow
Level
Temperature
Pressure
Concentrations
pH
Agitation
State (solid, liquid, or gas)
Volume

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Example:
Guidewords
Meaning
Guidewords
Meaning
NO, NOT, NONE
The complete negation of the

intention
PART OF
Only some of the design

intentions are achieved.
MORE, HIGHER,
GREATER
Quantitative increase
(temperature, flow rate,
heating, reaction).
REVERSE
The logical opposite of
OTHER THAN
Complete substitution
SOONER THAN
Too early or in the wrong

order
LATER THAN
Too late or in the wrong order
WHERE ELSE
In additional locations
LESS, LOWER
AS WELL AS
Quantitative decrease
(temperature, flow rate,
heating reaction)
Intentions are achieved along
with some additional activity,
such as contamination.

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Step 3 in HAZOP: Apply a guideword
Step 3 in HAZOP: Apply a guide word
For example: NO TEMPERATURE; PART OF PRESSURE;

REVERSE PRESSURE
The guide words AS WELL AS, PART OF, and OTHER

THAN can sometimes be conceptually difficult to
apply.
The guide words SOONER THAN, LATER THAN, and
WHERE ELSE applicable to batch processing.

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Some combinations of guide words and process

parameters are meaningless.
Step 4 in HAZOP: Determine possible causes
No reactant in the intermediate storage

Pump breaks down
Line blockage
Line fracture
Isolation valve closed in error
Some Possible Causes of LESS FLOW:
Partial blockage
Defective pump
Density or viscosity changes
Leaking

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Some Possible Causes of NO FLOW:
Increased pumping capacity

Increased suction pressure
Control faults
Running multiple pumps
Some Possible Causes of REVERSE FLOW:
Defective one way (check) valve

Incorrect pressure differential
Pump reversed
Two way flow

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Some Possible Causes of HIGH FLOW:
Outlet isolated or blocked

Faulty level measurement
Inflow or outflow control failure
Pressure surge
Some Possible Causes of LOW LEVEL:
Inlet flow stops

Leak
Control failure
Faulty level measurement

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Some Possible Causes of HIGH LEVEL:
Relief valve isolated

Boiling
Incorrect vent set pressure for vents
Surge problem
Possible Causes of LOW PRESSURE:
Generation of vacuum conditions

Undetected leakage
Gas dissolving in liquid
Restricted pump/compressor line

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Some Possible Causes of HIGH PRESSURE:
Fouled or failed heat exchanger tubes

Cooling water failure
Internal fire
Faulty instrumentation and control
Possible Causes of LOW TEMPERATURE:

Fouled or failed heat exchanger tubes
Loss of heating
Faulty instrumentation and control

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Some Possible Causes of HIGH TEMPERATURE:
CONSEQUENCES may both comprise process hazards and

operability (e.g. shut down) problems.
More CONSEQUENCES may results from one CAUSE.
In turn, one CONSEQUENCE can have several CAUSES.
Consequence of LESS LEVEL in

V-40
V-40 empty leading to pump P-8
running dry

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Step 5 in HAZOP: Evaluate the consequences of

the deviation
Final Step in HAZOP

What?
By whom
By when?
It is at this stage that consequences and associated

safeguards are considered.
Action falls into two groups:
Actions that remove the cause
Actions that mitigate or eliminate the consequences.
RECORD ALL THE INFORMATION !!!!

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Recommend action

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Sample of HAZOP Worksheet
HAZOP - Floatation system

A floatation system is commonly applied to remove oil or impurities in a water
management process line-up. In an offshore produced water process floatation
technology is often installed after the de-oiling hydrocyclone and bulk separation
module to reduce the OIW content from approximately 1000 ppm to 50 ppm. The
technology utilizes field gas in an injection port to generate micro-bubbles which
will then transport oil/emulsion to the liquid surface. A skimming procedure will
need to be carried out to remove the rejects into a sludge stream for subsequent
onshore disposal.
production deck
sludge removal/oil
retrieval
50 ppm
1000 ppm
HC gas
HAZOP - Floatation system

Perform a HAZOP to identify five (5) deviations from a design
intent described above. For each of the deviations, propose the
possible causes, consequences and actions required (if any).
As an additional requirement, you are asked to construct a fault
tree diagram for the top event for fire or explosion in the CFU.
Item
1A
Study node
CFU
Process
Parameters
Deviations
(guide words)
Possible causes
Possible consequences Action required
Flowrate (1)
1B
CFU
Pressure

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Flowrate (2)
Limitations of HAZOP
To apply the HAZOP guidewords effectively and to
address the potential accidents that can result from the
guide word deviations, the analysis team must have
access to detailed design and operational information.
Tedious to apply and time consuming.

Focuses on one-event causes of deviations
The HAZOP process focuses on identifying single
failures that can result in accidents of interest.

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Requires a well-defined system or activity
Risk can be assessed either qualitatively or

quantitatively.
Risk is considered proportional to the expected
losses which can be caused by an event and to the
probability of this event. The harsher the loss and
the more likely the event, the greater the overall
risk.
Risk = (Probability of Accident) x (losses per accident)
Risk = Likelihood x Severity
The probability is normally assessed by the

frequency of the past similar events.

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Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment
Probability of a failure occurrence = 1/10,000
Risk = RM5 million x 10

= RM50,000.00
-4

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Consequence of the failure = RM5 million
We have to decide if the risks are
acceptable.

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We cannot eliminate risk entirely. Every

industrial process has a certain amount of
risk associated with it.
Many regulatory authorities require that risks should be

within acceptable limits and As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP).
To demonstrate that risks are ALARP, one must show that
enough has been done to reduce risks.
In cases where the risks are well-defined, it is sufficient to
show that recognized good practices have been
implemented.
In more complex situations, i.e., where the technology is
new, to demonstrate risks are ALARP, one should show
that all reasonably practicable risk reduction measures
have been implemented.

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What is ALARP?
ALARP
Benchmarking tool
Associates cost of doing

business
Identifies future investments
Positions organizations on a
global scale
Today
PIlot
Risks
ALARP
Tech
Why Risk Assessment is Important?

create awareness of hazards and risks,
identify who may be at risk (employees, cleaners,
visitors, contractors, the public, etc),
determine if existing control measures are adequate or
if more should be done,
prevent injuries or illnesses
prioritize hazards and control measures.

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Risk assessment helps to:
Assessments should be done by a competent team

of individuals who have a good working knowledge
of the workplace.
In general, to do an assessment, you should:
identify hazards
evaluate the likelihood of an injury or illness occurring,
and its severity,
consider normal operational situations as well as nonstandard events such as shutdowns, power outages,
emergencies, etc.,

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How Risk Assessment is Conducted?
How Risk Assessment is Conducted?
the methods and procedures used in the processing,

use, handling or storage of the substance, etc..
the actual and the potential exposure of workers
the measures and procedures necessary to control such
exposure by means of engineering controls, work
practices, and hygiene practices and facilities.
By determining the level of risk associated with the
hazard, the employer and the joint health and safety
committee can decide whether a control program is
required.

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When doing an assessment, you must take into

account:
product information / manufacturer documentation,

health and safety material about the hazard such as
material safety data sheets (MSDSs), or other
manufacturer information,
past experiences (workers, etc),
legislated requirements and/or applicable standards,
industry codes of practice / best practices,
information from reputable organizations,
results of testing (atmospheric, air sampling of
workplace, biological, etc),
the expertise of occupational health and safety
professionals,
information about previous injuries, illnesses, "near
misses", accident reports, etc.

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How Do You Know If a Hazard is Serious?
What options exist to rank or prioritize risks?
Table 2
Risk Assessment by the British Standards Organization
Severity of Harm
Likelihood of Harm
Slightly Harm
Moderately Harm
Extremely Harm
Very unlikely
Very low risk
Very low risk
High risk
Unlikely
Very low risk
Medium risk
Very high risk
Likely
Low risk
High risk
Very high risk
Very likely
Low risk
Very high risk
Very high risk
Note: These categorizations and the resulting asymmetry of the matrix arise from the examples of harm and
likelihood illustrated within the British Standard. Organizations should adjust the design and size of the matrix
to suit their needs.

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One option is to use a table similar to the following

as established by the British Standards Organization:
Very Likely - Typically experienced at least once

every six months by an individual.
Likely - Typically experienced once every five years
by an individual.
Unlikely - Typically experienced once during the
working lifetime of an individual.
Very unlikely - Less than 1% chance of being
experienced by an individual during their working
lifetime.

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Definitions for Likelihood of Harm?
Slightly harmful (e.g., superficial injuries; minor cuts and

bruises; eye irritation from dust; nuisance and irritation; illhealth leading to temporary discomfort)
Moderately harmful (e.g., lacerations; burns; concussion;
serious sprains; minor fractures; deafness; dermatitis;
asthma; work-related upper limb disorders; ill-health)
Extremely harmful (e.g., amputations; major fractures;
poisonings; multiple injuries; fatal injuries; occupational
cancer; other severely life shortening diseases; acute fatal
diseases)

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Definitions for Severity of Harm?
Very low - These risks are considered acceptable.

No further action is necessary other than to ensure
that the controls are maintained.
Low - No additional controls are required unless
they can be implemented at very low cost (in terms
of time, money, and effort). Actions to further reduce
these risks are assigned low priority. Arrangements
should be made to ensure that the controls are
maintained.

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Definition for Risk Level

Consideration should be as to whether the risks can be
lowered, where applicable, to a tolerable level and
preferably to an acceptable level, but the costs of
additional risk reduction measures should be taken into
account.
The risk reduction measures should be implemented
within a defined time period.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that controls
are maintained, particularly if the risk levels area
associated with harmful consequences.

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Medium

Risk reduction measures should be implemented
urgently within a defined time period and it might be
necessary to consider suspending or restricting the
activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until
this has been completed.
Considerable resources might have to be allocated to
additional control measures.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that controls
are maintained, particularly if the risk levels are
associated with extremely harmful consequences and
very harmful consequences.

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High - Substantial efforts should be made to reduce

the risk

Substantial improvements in risk control measures are
necessary so that the risk is reduced to a tolerable or
acceptable level.
The work activity should be halted until risk controls are
implemented that reduces the risk so that it is no longer
very high. If it is not possible to reduce the risk, the work
should remain prohibited.

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Very high - These risk are unacceptable.
Using Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix that is derived from

MIL-STD-882B.
The hazard level consists of one number and one letter.
The number represents the severity of the event.
1: Death, system loss, or irreversible environmental damage;
2: Severe injury, occupational illness, major system damage, or
reversible severe environmental damage;
3: Injury requiring medical attention, illness, system damage,
or mitigatible environmental damage;
4: Possible minor injury, minor system damage, or minimal
environmental damage.

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Another Option
Another Option
A: Expected to occur frequently;

B: Will occur several times in the life of an item;
C: Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item;
D: Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item;
E: So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not
be experienced.

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The letters represent:

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Another Option

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HIRARC

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HIRARC

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HIRARC

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HIRARC

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Health, Safety and the Environment

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

Ir. Dr. MOHD SHIRAZ ARIS

Hazard and Risks

Hazard - a danger or risk?

Hazard - source of potential damage, harm or

Hazard - condition or set of circumstances

Categories - health and safety (OSHA)

Hazard and Risks

Risk - chance or probability of harm/loss if exposed

Risk assessment - a systematic process of

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Hazard = a condition that has the potential to

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Hazard and Risk: Recap From Chapter 1

What are the hazards?

Health, Safety & Environmtn

For each industrial process, the

Hazard Identification and Risk assessment are

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Hazard identification and risk assessment procedure

Build and/or operate system

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

What are the

What are the

FOUNDATIONS FOR PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Process Hazard Analysis

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Health, Safety & Environmtn

PHA allows us to:

Process Hazards Checklists

Health, Safety & Environmtn

It is simply a list of possible problems and areas to

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Process Hazard Checklist

Check oil in engine

Health, Safety & Environmtn

A classic example: automobile checklist

Example of process safety checklist

Design correct for maximum operating pressure?

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Is quick and simple to perform and is easily

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Advantages of safety checklist

Highly dependent upon the quality of the prepared

Traditionally only provides qualitative information.

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Limitations of safety checklist

What-if analysis is a brainstorming approach

A systematic, but loosely structured, assessment

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Typically performed by one or more teams with

Health, Safety & Environmtn

The quality of the evaluation depends on the

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Health, Safety & Environmtn

Examples of what if analysis

Limitations of what if analysis

Difficult to audit for thoroughness.

Reviewing a what-if analysis to detect oversights is difficult

Traditionally provides only qualitative