Another Great Debate The National Interest of The United States

Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States
Author(s): Hans J. Morgenthau

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 961-988
Published by: American Political Science Association
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The American
Political Science Review
VOL. XLVI
ANOTHER
DECEMBER,
1952
NO. 4
"GREAT DEBATE": THE NATIONAL INTEREST

OF THE UNITED STATES
HANS J. MORGENTHAU
University
of Chicago
The controversywhich has arisen on the occasion of Ambassador

Kennan's and my recent publicationsdiffersfromthe great historical
debates on Americanforeignpolicyin two significant
respects.It raises
an issue more fundamentalto the understandingof Americanforeign
policy and of all politics than those with which the previous'"great
debates" were concerned,and it deals with the issue largelyin terms
whichare not conduciveto understanding.
The great debates of the past, such as the one over interventionvs.
neutralityin 1793, expansion vs. the status quo beforethe Mexican
and after the Spanish-AmericanWar, internationalcooperation vs.
isolationin the 'twenties,interventionvs. abstentionin the late 'thirties
-all evolved around clear-cutissues offoreignpolicy.In 1793 you were
in favor of goingto war on the side of France or of remainingneutral.
In the 1840's you approved of the annexationof Texas or you did not.
At the turnof the centuryyou supported overseas expansion or you
were against it. In the 'twentiesyou advocated joining the League of
Nations or stayingout of it. In the late 'thirtiesyou wanted to oppose
the Axis Powers by all means short of war or you wanted to abstain
from intervening.What separates the "utopian" from the "realist"
position cannot be so sharplyexpressedin termsof alternativeforeign
policies.The verysane policiescan be and are beingsupportedby both
schools of thought.What sets them apart is not necessarilya matter
of practical judgment,but of philosophiesand standards of thought.
The issue which the presentdebate raises concernsthe natureof all
politics and, more particularly,of the American traditionin foreign
policy. The historyof modernpoliticalthoughtis the storyof a contest
between two schools whichdifferfundamentallyin theirconceptionof
the nature of man, society,and politics. One believes that a rational
and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract
961

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principles,can be achieved hereand now. It assumes the essentialgoodness and infinitemalleability of human nature and attributes the
failureof the social order to measure up to the rational standards to
lack of knowledgeand understanding,obsolescentsocial institutions,
or the depravityof certainisolated individualsor groups. It trustsin
education, reform,and the sporadic use of forceto remedythese deficiencies.'
The otherschool believes that the world,imperfectas it is fromthe
rational point of view, is the result of forceswhich are inherentin
human nature.To improvethe worldone must workwiththose forces,
not against them. This being inherentlya world of opposinginterests
and of conflictamongthem,moralprinciplescan neverbe fullyrealized,
but at best approximatedthroughthe ever temporarybalancing of
interestsand the ever precarioussettlementof conflicts.This school,
then,sees in a systemof checks and balances a universalprinciplefor
all pluralistsocieties.2It appeals to historicprecedentratherthan to
abstractprinciples,and aims at achievementofthelesserevil ratherthan
of the absolute good.
This conflictbetween two basic conceptionsof man and politics is
at the bottomof the presentcontroversy.It is the same conflictwhich
found its classic expressionin the polemic of Burke against the philosophy of the French Revolution. Given the sad state of political
thoughtin ourtime,it wouldbe vain to expectthe spokesmenofpolitical
realismto speak withthe voice of Burke and the defendersof political
utopianismto measureup to the standardsof Condorcetand Rousseau.
Yet one has a rightto expect that scholars discuss the issue without
resortto invectiveand with properregard for establishedfacts.3
1 This is the ideal type of the utopian position rather than the empirical description of
any particular historic type. In actuality, and this is true particularly of the present, the
utopian position in international affairs is not always consistent with its philosophic
premises.
2 It ought not to need special emphasis that a principle of social conduct, in contrast to
a law of nature, allows of, and even presupposes, conduct in violation of the principle.
Robert W. Tucker, in "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism'" in this
REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 214-224 (March, 1952), has missed this and many other points in his
zeal to find contradictions where there are none.
"This [the realist] doctrine," writes one historian-Frank Tannenbaum, "The
Balance of Power versus the Co6rdinate State," Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 67, p. 173
(June, 1952)-"is confessedly, nay gleefully, amoral. It prides itself upon being realistic
and takes Machiavelli as its great teacher. It is contemptuous of the simple beliefs of
honest men, jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that men may strive for
peace among nations, and looks upon democracy as a hindrance to skilled diplomacy. It
looks with a certain derisive superiority upon the great leaders of this nation from Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
describes them as moralistic and sentimental, and suggests that our models ought to be

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In orderto refutea theorywhichpretendsto be scientific,it is first

necessaryto understandwhat a scientifictheoryis. A scientifictheoryis
an attemptto bringorderand meaningto a mass of phenomenawhich
withoutit would remaindisconnectedand unintelligible.Any one who
disputes the scientificcharacterof such a theoryeithermust produce
a theorysuperiorin these scientificfunctionsto the one attacked or
must, at the very least, demonstratethat the facts as they actually
whichthe theoryhas
are do not lend themselvesto the interpretation
put upon them. When a historiantells us that the balance of power is
not a universalprincipleof politics,domesticand international,that it
was practiced in Europe only for a limited period and never by the
United States, that it ruinedthe statesthat practicedit,' it is incumbent
upon him to tell us how we can dispose by means of theoryof the historic data by which, for instance, David Hume demonstratedthe
universalityofthe balance of powerand Paul Scott Mowrer5and Alfred
Vagts6 its practice by the United States; what Kautilya was writing
about in the fourthcenturyB. C. when he summarized-thetheoretical
and practical traditionof Indian statecraftin termsof the balance of
power;what the Greekcitystates,the Roman republic,and themedieval
Richelieu,Clemenceauand Bismarck.Its adherentsbelieve that internationalwars instead of beingmade by men and supportedby institutionshumanlycontrivedhave their
originin the natureof man himselfand are inevitable."
Anotherhistorian,ArthurSchlesinger,
Jr.,in "Policy and National Interest,"Partisan
Review,Vol. 18, p. 709 (Nov.-Dec., 1951), however,gives AmbassadorKennan a clean
bill of moral health. "But what differentiates,"
he writes,"the Kennan approach from
that of, forexample,the followersof ProfessorHans J. Morgenthauis that he takes the
revelationsofinternationalamoralityin his stride; morethanthat,he comprehends
them
in his understandingof the tragedyof history.Mr. Kennan, in otherwords,is deeply
moral,ratherthan moralistic,like JudgeHull, or immoral,like the boys who have just
discoveredthat politicsinvolvepower.""This dreadfuldoctrine,"we are told (by Tannenbaum,pp. 173-174), "has now won
wide acceptance by teachersand scholarsin the fieldof internationalrelationsand has,
in fact,become the leading themein such circlesin many of our largestuniversities.It
has become the scienceof internationalrelations-and who would quarrelwith science,
especiallywhenit comespackaged in good clear Englishand fromhighsources?But it is
not science.It is, in fact,onlypoor logic based upon falsepremises,and its claimto be a
scienceis onlya bit ofunholyconceit."
It may be remarkedin passingthat to dispose of a scientifictheoryas "fashionable"
or a "fad," as some do withregardto politicalrealism,may reveal somethingabout the
state of mind of the writer,but reveals nothingat all about the scientificvalue of the
theory.
4 Tannenbaum,in the articlecitedabove, and in "The AmericanTraditionin Foreign
Relations," ForeignAffairs,Vol. 30, pp. 31-50 (Oct., 1951).
Our ForeignAffairs(New York, 1924), pp. 246 ff.
B"The United States and the Balance of Power," The Journalof Politics,Vol. 3, pp.
401-449 (Nov., 1941).

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emperorsand popes were doing if they did not apply the principles
of the balance of power; and how the nations which eitherneglected
these principlesor applied themwronglysuffered
political and military
defeatand even extinction,whilethe nationwhichapplied these principles most consistentlyand consciously,that is, Great Britain,enjoyed
unrivalledpower foran unparalleledlengthof time.
The historianwho wishesto replacethe balance of poweras the guiding principleof Americanforeignpolicy with the "humanitarianand
pacific traditions"of the coordinatee'state"7 must firstof all explain
how it has come about that the thirteenoriginalstates expanded into
the full breadth and a good deal of the length of a continent,until
today the strategicfrontiersof the United States.run parallel to the
coastline of Asia and along the River Elbe. If such are the resultsof
policies based upon "humanitarian and pacific traditions,"never in
the historyof the world has virtue been more bountifullyrewarded!
Yet our historianmust explain not only the great sweep of American
expansion,but also the specificforeignpolicies which in theirhistoric
succession make up that sweep. Is it easier to explain.the successive
shiftsof American support from Great Britain to France and back
again fromthe beginningof King George's War in 1744 to the War of
1812 in termsof the "coordinatestate" than in termsof the balance of
power? The same question mightbe asked about the postponementof
the recognitionof the independenceof the Spanish coloniesuntil 1822,
whenthe Floridas had been.acquiredfromSpain and Spain had thereby
been deprivedof the abilityto challengethe United States fromwithin
the hemisphere.The same question mightbe asked about the Monroe
Doctrine itself, about Lincoln's policies toward Great Britain and
France,and about our successivepolicies withregardto Mexico and the
Caribbean. One could go on and pick out at randomany foreignpolicy
pursuedby the United States fromthe beginningto 1919 and one would
hardly finda policy, with the exceptionperhaps of the War of 1812,
which could not be made intelligibleby referenceto the national
interestdefinedin termsof power-political, military,and economicrather than by referenceto the principleof the "coordinate state."
This inevitableoutcomeof such an inquiryis well summarizedin these
words:
Ease and prosperityhave made us wish the whole world to be as happy and
well to do as ourselves;and we have supposed that institutionsand principles
like our own werethe simple prescriptionformakingthem so. And yet, when
7Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Co6rdinate State," (cited above,
note 3), p. 173.

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issues of our own interestarose, we have not been unselfish.We have shown
ourselves kin to all the world,when it came to pushing an advantage. Our
action against Spain in the Floridas, and against Mexico on the coasts of the
Pacific; our attitude toward firstthe Spaniards, and then the French, with
regard to the control of the Mississippi; the unpityingforcewith which we
thrustthe Indians to the wall wherevertheystood in our way, have suited our
professionsof peacefulnessand justice and liberalityno betterthan the aggressions of other nations that were strong and not to be gainsaid. Even Mr.
philanthropistand champion of peaceable and modest government
Jefferson,
thoughhe was, exemplifiedthis double temperof the people he ruled. "Peace
is ourpassion," he had declared; but the passion abated whenhe saw the mouth
ofthe Mississippiabout to pass intothe hands of France. Though he had loved
France and hated England, he did not hesitate then what language to hold.
"There is on the globe," he wroteto Mr. Livingstonat Paris, "one singlespot
the possessorof whichis our naturaland habitualenemy.The day that France
takes possessionofNew Orleansseals the unionoftwo nations,who,in conjunction,can maintainexclusivepossessionofthe sea. From that momentwe must
marryourselvesto the Britishfleetand nation." Our interestsmustmarchforward, altruiststhoughwe are; othernationsmustsee to it that theystand off,
and do not seek to stay us.
This realist appraisal of the Americantraditionin foreignpolicy was

published in 1901 in the AtlanticMonthly.Its author was a professor
of jurisprudenceand political economy at Princetonby the name of
Woodrow Wilson.8
Nothingmoreneeds to be said to demonstratethat factsdo not support a revisionof Americandiplomatichistorywhichtriesto substitute
"humanitarianand pacifisttraditions"and the "coordinatestate" for
power politics and the balance of power as the guiding principleof
American foreignpolicy. What, then, does support it? Three things:
the way American statesmen have spoken about American foreign
policy; the legal fictionof the "coordinatestate"; finally,and foremost,
an emotionalurge to justifyAmericanforeignpolicy in humanitarian,
pacifistterms.
It is elementarythat the characterof a foreignpolicy can be ascertained only throughthe examinationof the political acts performed
and of the foreseeableconsequences of these acts. Thus we can find
out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable
consequencesof theiracts we can surmisewhat theirobjectives might
have been. Yet examinationof the factsis not enough.To give meaning
to the factual raw material of history,we must approach historical
realitywitha kind of rational outline,a map whichsuggeststo us the
* "Democracy and Efficiency," Atlantic Monthly,Vol. 87, pp. 293-294 (March, 1901).

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possible meaningsof history.In other words,we put ourselvesin the

position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign
policy under certain circumstancesand ask ourselves, what are the
rational alternativesfromwhich a statesman may choose who must
meet this problemunder these circumstances,presumingalways that
he acts in a rational manner,and which of these rational alternatives
was this particularstatesman,acting underthese circumstances,likely
to choose? It is the testingof this rationalhypothesisagainstthe actual
facts and their consequences which gives meaning to the facts of
historyand makes the scientificwritingof political historypossible.
In the processof writingthe historyof foreignpolicy the interpretations by statesmenof their own acts, especially if they are made for
public consumption,must needs have a strictlysubsidiaryplace. The
by actors on the political scene is itself,of
public self-interpretation
course, a political act which seeks to present a certain policy to its
presumedsupportersin termsof theirmoral and political folkloreand
to those againstwhichit is directedin termswhichintendto embarrass
and deceive. Such declarationsmay indeedshed lightupon the character
and objectivesofthe policypursuediftheyare consideredin conjunction
with,and in subordinationto, rational hypotheses,actions, and likely
matterto interpretthe American
consequences.Yet it is quite a different
traditionofforeignpolicyin the lightofa collectionofofficialstatements
which, like most such statements,present humanitarianand pacifist
justificationsforthe policiespursued.If anybodyshouldbe bold enough
to writea historyof worldpoliticswithso uncriticala methodhe would
easily and well-nighinevitablybe driven to the conclusionthat from
Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreignpolicies of all nations were
inspiredby the ideals of humanitarianismand pacifism.The absurdity
of the resultis commensuratewiththe defectsof the method.
It is onlyfroma methodwhichaccepts the declarationsof statesmen
as evidence of the characterof the policies pursued,that the principle
of the "coordinate state" receives a semblance of plausibility.Statesmen and internationallawyershave been wont to speak of the "equal
dignity"of all states, regardlessof "wealth, power,size, population or
culture,"9whichI take the principleof the "coordinatestate" to mean.
It is also referredto as the principleof "federalismin internationalrelations."'" As itsprimeexamplesare citedthe relationsamongstthe states
of the Union, the states of the Americansystem,the membersof the
Commonwealthof Nations, and the membersof the Swiss Confederation.If the wholeworldwereorganizedin accordancewiththisprinciple,
9 Tannenbaum,p. 177.
10Ibid.

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as are alreadythesefourpoliticalentities,it is assumedthat the freedom,

dignity,and peace of all nationswould thenbe assured.
There is no need to examine the theoreticaland practical meritsof
the principleof the "coordinate state," because for none of the four
political entities mentioned does the idea of the "coordinate state"
providethe principleofpoliticalorganization.The equality ofthe states
as the political foundationof the United States became obsolescent
when Chief JusticeMarshall's Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity
of the Constitutionin favorof the federalgovernment,and it became
obsolete when the Civil War proved Chief Justice Marshall's point.
The equality of the states survives today only in the shadow and by
virtue of the federal government'spolitical supremacy,and without
the cohesiveforceof that supremacytherewould be no union of equal
states to begin with. That these powers of the federalgovernmentare
limited and qualified by the principleof federalism,that is, by the
constitutionally
grantedpowersofthe states,is quite a different
matter;
it concernsthe distributionof powersbetweenfederalgovernmentand
states withina generalsystemof checksand balances, but has nothing
to do withthe equality of the states as the alleged politicalfoundation
of the American system of government.With the exception of the
equality of senatorial representation,the principleof the equality of
the states is today, as it has been foralmost a century,devoid of political content. It serves only as a principleof regional organization,of
administrative decentralization, and, above all, of constitutional
rhetoric. What it really signifieswas pointed out more than fifty
years ago by W. A. Dunning when he summarizedhis answer to the
question "Are the states equal underthe Constitution?"by sayingthat
"the theoryof equal states fallsto the ground.""
Similarly,the federalismof Switzerlandis the result of a long series
of civil wars,the last one foughta littlemorethan a centuryago, which
establishedthe predominanceof the German-speakingcantons within
the confederation.Here too, it is the existenceof predominantpower,
located in one segmentof the federalsystem,which makes federalism
possible in the firstplace.
By the same token, the unchallengeablesupremacy of the United
States withinthe WesternHemispherehas throughoutbeen the backbone of the system of Americanstates. As long as this supremacyis
secure,thereis, on the one hand, no need forthe United States to assert
it in the political and militarysphere,and, taking it for granted,the
United States can well affordto pursue a policy of the Good Neighbor;
11 William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstructionand Related
Topics (New York, 1931), p. 351.

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and thereis, on the otherhand, no opportunityforthe othermembers

of the systemto challengethat supremacyeffectively.
This is what the
principleof the coordinatee state" amounts to in the WesternHemisphere. Consequently,wheneverthere was even a remote possibility
that the supremacyof the United States mightbe challenged,generally
throughinstigationfromoutside the hemisphere,the United States asserted its superiorpowerwithinthe hemisphereand acted as all states
must act under similarconditions.
Whateverpossibilityforcommonpoliticalactionthereremainsamong
the membersofthe Commonwealthof Nations is the resultof the interests which these membersmay have in common.In other words,the
memberstates may worktogetheror each ofthemmay workwithother
nations,as theirinterestsdictate. Their membershipin the Commonwealth, as the examples of India, South Africa,Australia, and New
Zealand clearlyshow,has no influenceupon thisdecision;that membership is but a faintremembranceof the timeswhen Great Britain could
.securecooperationamong the memberstates on its termsby virtueof
its superiorpower.
What, then, have these four examples of the "coordinate state" in
common which would establish them as a distincttype of interstate
relationship,and what conclusionscan be drawn fromthem for the
organizationof the 'world? The only thing that these four examples
seem to have really in commonis the legal stipulationof the equality
of the membersof the respectivesystemsand this characteristicis not
peculiarto them,but a generalprincipleof internationallaw applicable
to all sovereignstates. In the politicalspheretheyseem to have nothing
in commonat all. What they tend to show, however,is the decisive
importanceof the distributionof political power for the operationof
federal and egalitarianrelationsamong states. The political cohesion
of a federalsystemis the resultof superiorpower located in some part
of it. It is by virtue of its superiorpower that the predominantpart
can affordto grantthe othermembersof the federalsystema measure.
of equality in the non-politicalsphere.These observationsbringus back
to powerpoliticsand the balance of powerto whichthe principleof the
"coordinatestate" was supposed to be the alternative.
In truth, it is not the disinterestedconsiderationof facts which
has given birthto the theoryof the "coordinatestate." That theoryis
rather the response to an emotional urge, and since this emotion is
not peculiarto a particularauthorbut typical of a popular reactionto
the new role which the United States must play in world affairs,it
deservesa briefanalysis.
One of the greatexperiencesof our time"whichhave impressedthem-

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of the UnitedStates
selvesupon the Americanmindis the emergence
as a nationamongothernations,exposedto the same opportunities,
temptations,
risks,and liabilitiesto whichothernationshave been
becomesthemoreshockingifit
traditionally
exposed.This experience
is comparedwiththe expectationwithwhichwe foughtthe Second
WorldWar. We expectedfromthatwara reaffirmation
of the secure,
detached,and independent'
positionin worldaffairs
whichwe had inheritedfromthe FoundingFathersand whichwe had been successful
in preserving
at least to the FirstWorldWar. By avoidingwhatwe
thoughthad beenWilson'smistakes,we expectedto emergefromthat
warifnotmoreindependent,
moresecurethanwe werewhen
certainly
we enteredit. In fact,probablynot evenin the earlydays ofthe Republicwerewe moreexposedto dangerfromabroadthanwe aretoday,
ofactionin takingcareofourinterests
and neverhad we lessfreedom
thanwe have today.
It is naturallyshockingto recognize
thata happychapterin thehistoryofthenationandin one'sownwayoflifehas cometo an end.There
are thosewhoreconcilethemselves
to theinevitable,
albeitwithsorrow
ratherthan withglee,and tryto-applythe lessonsof the past to the
tasksat hand.Thereare otherswhotryto escapefroma disappointing
and threatening
realityintotherealmoffantasy.Threesuchescapist
fantasieshavearisenin ourmidstin responseto thechallenge
ofAmerican worldleadershipand power: the fantasyof needlessAmerican
participation
in war,thefantasyofAmericantreason,and thefantasy
ofAmericaninnocence.
The firstofthesefantasiespresumesthatthepresentpredicament
is
a resultnot of necessitybut offolly,the follyofAmericanstatesmen
who needlesslyintervenedin two worldwars. The second of these
fantasiesattributesthe presentpredicament
to treasonin highplaces
wherebythe fruitsof victorywerehandedto the enemy.The thirdof
thesefantasiesdeniesthatthepredicament
is real and prefers
to think
of it as an intellectual
fraudperpetrated
upon the Americanpeople.
To supportthisfictional
denialoftheactualitiesofthepresent,
it draws
upon a fictional
accountof-thepast. The UnitedStatesdoes not need
to bear at presentthe intellectual,
moral,and politicalburdenswhich
with
go
involvement
in powerpoliticsand the maintenanceof the
balanceofpower;forit has neverbornethemin thepast,neverhaving
been thus involved.The goldenage of past politicalinnocencesheds
its glow upon a but seemingly
less innocentpresentand promisesa
futurein whichall the worldwill followthe exampleof America,
forswear
powerpoliticsand thebalanceofpower,and accepttheprincias exemplified
ple ofthe "coordinate
state."Ourrearmament
program,

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in the AtlanticSecurityPact, we are told,has nothingto do withthe

ofas muchoftheworld
balanceofpowerbut aimsat the"organization
as we can upon the basis of the coordinatestate....
It may prove
impossibleunderpresentconditionsto build such a systemwithout

havingto fighta warwithRussia,butthenat leastwe willbe fighting,
as we did before,forthe thingwe considerworthdefending
withour
Thus a fictionalaccountof the Americanpast,
lives and treasure."'2
begunas an act of uncalled-for
patrioticpiety,issuesin an ideology
fora thirdworldwar.Escape we mustfromtheunfamiliar,
unpleasant,
and dangerous
present,
firstintothepoliticalinnocenceofthepast and
fromthereintotheimmediate
future
ofa thirdworldwar,beyondwhich
innocenceofthemoredistantfuturewill
therevivedand universalized
surelylie.
in foreign
tradition
We havesaid thatto presenttheAmerican
policy
as havingbeen freefromconcernwithpowerpoliticsand the balance
of poweris not warrantedby the factsof Americanhistory.Yet it
mightstillbe argued,and it is actuallybeingargued,that,regardless
of the evidenceof history,
the Americanpeoplewillnot be reconciled
to powerpoliticsand thebalanceofpowerand willsupportonlypolicies
based upon abstractmoralprinciples.Whilein the past the United
Statesmighthave pursuedbalanceofpowerpoliciesand whileit might
be a goodthingifit diddo so again,theAmerican
peoplewillnotstand
forit. Heretheemotionalappealto patrioticpietyis joinedby calculaYet thecase formisrepresenting
American
tionsofpoliticalexpediency.
to gainfromeither.
history
has nothing
in all historiography
Thereis a strongtendency
to glorify
thenational
that tendencytakeson the aspects
past,and in popularpresentations
Even so penetrating
a mindas JohnStuart
ofthe jingoistwhitewash.
ofan essayin whichhe proved,no doubtto
Mill'scoulddeliverhimself
of manyof his Englishreadersbut certainlyof few
the satisfaction
in the affairsof Euroothers,thatGreatBritainhad neverinterfered
in thoseof the Indianstatesonlyfor
pean nationsand had interfered
theirown good.'3Yet it is the measureof a nation'smaturityto be
able to recognizeits past forwhatit actuallyis. Whyshouldwe not
admitthatAmerican
hardheadedand
foreign
policyhas beengenerally
practicalandat timesruthless?
WhyshouldwedenyJefferson's
cunning,
thecrueltywithwhichtheIndianswere
say,in thePugetSoundaffair,
whichthetreatieswiththeIndians
faithlessness
with
treated,.andjthe
werecast aside? We knowthat thisis the way all nationsare when
195-196.
Few Words on Non-Intervention,"Dissertationsand Discussions: Political,
Philosophical,and Historical(London, 1875), pp. 153-178.
12 Tannenbaum,pp.
13
"A

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theirinterestsare at stake-so cruel,so faithless,so cunning.We know

that the United States has refrainedfromseekingdominionsbeyondthe
seas not because it is more virtuousthan other nations, but because
it had the betterpart ofa continentto colonize.
As has been pointed out elsewhereat greaterlength,the man in the
street,unsophisticatedas he is and uninformedas he may be, has a
surergrasp of the essentialsof foreignpolicy and a more maturejudgment of its basic issues than many of the intellectualsand politicians
who pretendto speak forhim and caterto what theyimaginehis prejudices to be. During the recent'war the ideologues of the Atlantic
Charter,the Four Freedoms,and the United Nations were constantly
complainingthat the American soldier did not know what he was
forsome utopian ideal, divorced
fightingfor.Indeed, if he was fighting
fromthe concreteexperiencesand interestsof the country,then the
complaint was well grounded. However, if he was fightingfor the
territorialintegrityof the nation and forits survival as a freecountry
where he could live, think,and act as he pleased, then he had never
any doubt about what he was fightingfor.Ideological rationalizations
and justificationsare indeed the indispensable concomitantsof all
political action. Yet there is somethingunhealthy in a craving for
ideologicalintoxicationand in the inabilityto act and to see meritin
action except under the stimulantof grandioseideas and far-fetched
schemes.Have our intellectualsbecome, like Hamlet, too much beset
by doubt to act and, unlike Hamlet, compelled to still their doubts
by renouncingtheirsense of what is real?'The man in the streethas no
such doubts. It is true that ideologuesand demagoguescan sway him
by appealing to his emotions.But it is also true, as Americanhistory
showsin abundance and as the popularsuccessofAmbassadorKennan's
book demonstrates,that responsible statesmen can guide him by
awakeninghis latentunderstandingof the national interest.
II
Yet what is the national interest?How can we defineit and give it
the contentwhich will make it a'guide for action? This is one of the
relevantquestionsto whichthe currentdebate has givenrise.
It has been frequentlyargued against the realist conception of
foreignpolicy that its key concept, the national interest,does not
provide an acceptable standard for political action. This argumentis
in the main based upon two grounds:the elusivenessofthe conceptand
its susceptibilityto interpretations,
such as limitlessimperialismand
narrownationalism,which are not in keepingwith the Americantradition in foreignpolicy. The argumenthas substance as far as it goes,
but it does not invalidate the usefulnessof the concept.

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The concept of the national interestis similarin two respectsto the

such as the general welfare
"great generalities"of the Constitution,and due process.It containsa residualmeaningwhichis inherentin the
conceptitself,but beyondthese minimumrequirementsits contentcan
run the whole gamut of meaningswhichare logicallycompatiblewith
it. That contentis determinedby the politicaltraditionsand the total
cultural context withinwhich a nation formulatesits foreignpolicy.
The concept of the national interest,then,containstwo elements,one
that is logicallyrequiredand in that-sensenecessary,and one that is
variable and determinedby circumstances.
Any foreignpolicywhichoperatesunderthe standardof the national
interestmust obviouslyhave some referenceto the physical,political,
and culturalentitywhichwe call a nation. In a worldwherea number
of sovereignnationscompetewithand oppose each otherforpower,the
foreignpolicies of all nations must necessarilyreferto their survival
as theirminimumrequirements.Thus all nations do what they cannot
help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity
against encroachmentsby othernations.
It has been suggestedthat this reasoningerects the national state
into the last word in politicsand the national interestinto an absolute
standard forpolitical action. This, however,is not quite the case. The
idea of interestis indeed of the essence of politics and, as such, unaffectedby the circumstancesof time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiencesof ancient Greece, that "identity of
interestis the surest of bonds whetherbetween states or individuals"
was taken up in the nineteenthcenturyby Lord Salisbury's remark
that "the only bond of union that endures" among nationsis "the absence of all clashinginterests."The perennialissue betweenthe realist
and utopian schools of thoughtover the nature of politics,to which
we have referredbefore,mightwell be formulatedin termsof concrete
interestsvs. abstract principles.Yet -whilethe concernof politicswith
interestis perennial,the connectionbetweeninterestand the national
state is a productof history.
The nationalstate itselfis obviouslya productof historyand as such
modes of political organization.
destined to yield in time to different
As long as the worldis politicallyorganizedinto nations,the national
interestis indeed the last word in world politics. When the national
state will have been replaced by anothermode of organization,foreign
policymust then protectthe interestin survival of that new organization. For the benefitof those who insist upon discardingthe national
state and constructingsupranational organizationsby constitutional
fiat,it must be pointed out that these new organizationalformswill

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973
eithercome into being throughconquest or else throughconsentbased

upon the mutual recognitionof the national interestsof the nations
concerned;for no nation will foregoits freedomof action if it has no
reason to expect proportionatebenefitsin compensationfor that loss.
This is true of treatiesconcerningcommerceor fisheriesas it is true of
the great compacts,such as the European Coal and Steel Community,
throughwhich nations try to create supranationalformsof organization. Thus, by an apparentparadox, what is historicallyrelativein the
idea of the national interestcan be overcome'only throughthe promotionin concertofthe nationalinterestofa numberofnations.
The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identityis
the irreducibleminimum,the necessaryelementof its interestsvis-a-vis
other units. Taken in isolation,the determinationof its contentin a
concretesituationis relativelysimple; forit encompassesthe integrity
of its politicalinstitutions,and of its culture.
of the nation's territory,
Thus bipartisanshipin foreignpolicy, especially in times of war, has
been most easily achieved in the promotionof these minimumrequirewith respect
ments of the national interest.'The situation is different
to the variable elementsof the national interest.All the cross currents
of personalities,public opinion, sectional interests,partisan politics,
and politicaland moralfolkwaysare broughtto bear upon theirdetermination. In consequence, the contributionwhich science can make to
this field,as to all fieldsof policy formation,is limited.It can identify
the differentagencies of the governmentwhich contributeto the
determinationof the variable elementsof the national interestand assess their'relativeweight.It can separate the long-rangeobjectives of
foreignpolicy fromthe short-termones which are the means for the
achievementof the formerand can tentativelyestablishtheirrational
relations.Finally, it can analyze the variable elementsof the national
interestin termsof theirlegitimacyand theircompatibilitywith other
nationalvalues and withthe nationalinterestof othernations.We shall
address ourselvesbrieflyto the typicalproblemswithwhichthis analysis must deal.
The legitimacyofthe nationalinterestmustbe determinedin the face
and supranational
ofpossibleusurpationby subnational,other-national,
find
level
we
subnational
On
the
interests.
group interests,represented
particularlyby ethnicand economicgroups,who tend to identifythemselves withthe nationalinterest.CharlesA. Beard has emphasized,however one-sidedly,the extentto whichthe economicinterestsof certain
groups have been presentedas those of the United States.14Group in14 The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1934).

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terests exert, of course, constant pressureupon the conduct of our

foreignpolicy, claimingtheiridentitywith the national interest.It is,
however,doubtfulthat, with the exceptionof a few spectacular cases,
the courseofAmericanforeign
theyhave been successfulin determining
policy. It is much more likely,given the nature of Americandomestic
politics,that Americanforeignpolicy,insofaras it is the object ofpressures by sectionalinterests,will normallybe a compromisebetweendivergentsectional interests.The concept of the national interest,as it
emergesfromthis contestas the actual guide forforeignpolicy,may
well fall shortof what would be rationallyrequiredby the overall interestsof the United States. Yet the concept of the national interest
sectionalinterestsis also
whichemergesfromthis contestof conflicting
more than any particularsectionalinterestor theirsum total. It is, as
it were,the lowest commondenominatorwheresectionalinterestsand
the national interestmeet in an uneasy compromisewhichmay leave
muchto be desiredin view of all the interestsconcerned.
The national interestcan be usurped by other-nationalinterestsin
two typicalways. The case of treasonby individuals,eitherout of convictionor forpay, needsonlyto be mentionedhere;forinsofaras treason
is committedon behalf of a foreigngovernmentratherthan a supranational principle,it is significantforpsychology,sociology,and criminology,but not forthe theoryof politics.The other case, however,is
importantnot onlyforthe theoryofpoliticsbut also forits practice,especiallyin the United States.
National minoritiesin European countries,ethnic groups in the
UnitedStates,ideologicalminoritiesanywheremay identifythemselves,
eitherspontaneouslyor under the directionof the agents of a foreign
government,
withthe interestsofthat foreigngovernmentand may promote theseinterestsunderthe guiseofthe nationalinterestofthe country whose citizensthey happen to be. The activitiesof the GermanAmericanBund in the United States in the 'thirtiesand of Communists
everywhereare cases in point. Yet the issue of the national interestvs.
other-national
interestsmasqueradingas the nationalinteresthas arisen
constantlyin the United States in a less clear-cutfashion.
A countrywhich had been settled by consecutive waves of "forto identifyits own
eigners"was bound to findit particularlydifficult
national interestagainst alleged, seeming,or actual other-nationalinterestsrepresentedby certaingroupsamong its own citizens.Since virtually all citizensof the United States are, as it were, "more or less"
foreign-born,
those who were "less" so have frequentlynot resistedthe
to
temptation use this distinctionas a polemic weapon against latecomerswho happenedto differfromthemin theirconceptionof the na-

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975
tionalinterestof the United States. Frequently,thisrationalizationhas

been dispensed with and a conceptionof foreignpolicy with which a
writerhappened to disagree has been attributedoutrightto foreign
sympathyor influenceor worse. British influenceand interestshave
served as standard argumentsin debates on Americanforeignpolicy.
Madison, in his polemic against Hamilton on the occasion of Washington's NeutralityProclamation of 1793, identifiedthe Federalist position withthat of "the foreigners
and degeneratecitizensamongus, who
hate our republicangovernment,and the Frenchrevolution,"'5and the
accusationmet witha favorableresponsein a majorityof Congressand
of public opinion.However, these traditionalattemptsto discreditdissentingopinionas being influencedby foreigninterestsshould not obscure the real issue, whichis the peculiar vulnerabilityof the national
interestof the United States to usurpationby the interestsof othernations.
The usurpationofthe nationalinterestby supranationalinterestscan
derivein our time fromtwo sources: religiousbodies and international
organizations.The competitionbetween churchand state fordetermination of certaininterestsand policies,domesticand international,has
been an intermittent
issue throughoutthe historyof the national state.
Here, too, the legitimatedefenseofthe nationalinterestagainstusurpationhas frequently,
especiallyin the United States,degeneratedintothe
demagogicstigmatizationofdissentingviewsas beinginspiredby Rome
and, hence,beingincompatiblewiththe nationalinterest.Yet here,too,
the misuse of: the issue for demagogic purposes must be considered
apart fromthe legitimacyofthe issue itself.
The more acute problemarises at the presenttime fromthe importance whichthe public and governmentofficials,
at least in theirpublic
utterances,attributeto the values representedand the policiespursued
by internationalorganizationseitheras alternativesor supplementsto
the values and policiesforwhichthe national governmentstands. It is
frequentlyassertedthat the foreignpolicyof the United States pursues
no objectives apart fromthose of the United Nations, that, in other
words,the foreignpolicyof the United States is actually identicalwith
the policyofthe UnitedNations. This assertioncannotreferto anything
real in actual politicsto supportit. For the constitutionalstructureof
internationalorganizations,such as the United Nations, and theirprocedural practicesmake it impossibleforthem to pursue interestsapart
fromthose of the member-stateswhich dominate theirpolicy-forming
16 "Helvidius, in Answer to Pacificus, on President Washington's Proclamation of
Neutrality," in Lettersand other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867), Vol. 1,
p. 611.

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bodies. The identitybetweenthe interestsofthe UnitedNations and the

United States can only referto the successfulpolicies of the United
States within the United Nations throughwhich the support of the
United Nations is being securedforthe policiesof the United States.16
The assertion,then, is mere polemic,different
fromthe one discussed
in
previously that the identificationof a certainpolicy with a supranational interestdoes not seek to reflectdiscreditupon the former,but
to bestowupon it a dignitywhichthenationalinterestpureand simpleis
supposed to lack.
The real issue in view of the problemthat concernsus here is not
whetherthe so-called interestsof the United Nations, which do not
exist apart fromthe interestsof its most influentialmembers,have
supersededthe nationalinterestof the United States,but forwhat kind
ofintereststhe UnitedStates has securedUnitedNationssupport.While
these interestscannot be United Nations interests,theydo not need to
be national interestseither.Here we are in the presenceof that modern
phenomenonwhichhas been variouslydescribedas "utopianism,""sentimentalism,""moralism," the "legalistic-moralisticapproach." The
commondenominatorofall thesetendenciesin modernpoliticalthought
is the substitutionforthe national interestof a supranationalstandard
ofactionwhichis generallyidentifiedwithan internationalorganization,
such as the United Nations. The national interestis here not being
usurped by sub- or supranational interestswhich,howeverinferiorin
worthto the national interest,are neverthelessreal and worthyof considerationwithintheirpropersphere.What challengesthe national interesthere is a mere figmentof the imagination,a product of wishful
thinkingwhichis postulatedas a valid normforinternationalconduct,
withoutbeingvalid eitherthereor anywhereelse. At thispointwe touch
the core of the present controversybetween utopianism and realism
in internationalaffairs;we shall returnto it later in this paper.
The nationalinterestas such mustbe defendedagainstusurpationby
non-nationalinterests.Yet once that task is accomplished,a rational
ordermustbe establishedamongthe values whichmake up the national
interestand among the resourcesto be committedto them. While the
interestswhicha nation may pursue in its relationwith othernations
are of infinite.variety
and magnitude,the resourceswhichare available
forthe pursuitof such interestsare necessarilylimitedin quantityand
16See, on thispoint,Hans J. Morgenthau,"InternationalOrganizationsand Foreign
A Politicaland CulturalAppraisal, Eleventh
Policy,"in Foundations
ofWorldOrganization:
Symposiumof the Conferenceon Science, Philosophyand Religion, edited by Lyman
Bryson,Louis Finkelstein,Harold D. Lasswell, R. M. MacIver (New York, 1952), pp.
377-383.

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kind. No nation has the resourcesto promoteall desirable objectives

with equal vigor; all nations must thereforeallocate their scarce resuch
sourcesas rationallyas possible.The indispensableprecondition'of
rational allocation is a clear understandingof the distinctionbetween
the necessaryand variable elementsof the national interest.Given the
contentiousmanner in which in democraciesthe variable elementsof
the national interestare generallydetermined,the advocates of an extensive'conceptionof the national interestwill inevitablypresentcertain variable elementsof the national interestas thoughtheirattainment were necessary for the nation's survival. In other words, the
necessaryelementsof the national interesthave a tendencyto swallow
up the variableelementsso that 'inthe end all kindsof objectives,actual
or potential,are justifiedin termsof national survival. Such arguments
have been advanced, for instance, in support of the rearmamentof
WesternGermanyand of the defenseof Formosa. They must be subjected to rational scrutinywhich will determine,howevertentatively,
theirapproximateplace in the scale ofnationalvalues.
The same problempresentsitselfin its extremeformwhen a nation
pursues,or is asked to pursue,objectiveswhichare not onlyunnecessary
for its survival but tend to jeopardize it. Second-ratenations which
dream of playingthe role of great powers,such as Italy and Poland in
the interwarperiod, illustratethis point.-So do great powers which
dream of remakingthe world in their own image and embark upon
world-widecrusades,thus strainingtheirresourcesto exhaustion.Here
scientificanalysis has the urgenttask of pruningdown national objectives to the measure of available resourcesin orderto make theirpursuit compatiblewithnationalsurvival.
Finally, the national interestof a nation whichis consciousnot only
of its own interestsbut also of that of othernationsmust be definedin
termscompatiblewith the latter. In a multinationalworldthis is a requirementofpoliticalmorality;in an age oftotal war it is also one ofthe
conditionsforsurvival.
In connectionwith this problemtwo mutuallyexclusive arguments
have been advanced. On the one hand, it has been argued against the
theoryof internationalpoliticshere presentedthat the concept of the
conceptof enlightened
national interestrevivesthe'eighteenth-century
self-interest,
presumingthat the uniformlyenlightenedpursuitof their
self-interest
by all individuals,as by all nations,will of itselfbe conducive to a peaceful and harmonioussociety. On the other hand, the
point has been made that the pursuitof theirnational interestby all
nations makes war the permanentarbiter of conflictsamong them.
Neitherargumentis welltaken.

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The concept of the national interestpresupposesneithera naturally

harmonious,peacefulworldnorthe inevitabilityofwar as a consequence
of the pursuitby all nationsof theirnationalinterest.Quite to the contrary,it assumes continuousconflictand threatof war,to be minimized
throughthe continuousadjustment of conflictinginterestsby diplomatic action. No such assumptionwould be warrantedif all nationsat
all times conceivedof theirnational interestonly in termsof theirsurvival and, in turn,definedtheirinterestin survival in restrictiveand
rational terms.As it is, theirconceptionof the nationalinterestis subusurpation,and misjudgject to all the hazards of misinterpretation,
ment to whichreferencehas been made above. To minimizethese hazards is the firsttask of a foreignpolicy whichseeks the defenseof the
nationalinterestby peacefulmeans. Its' secondtask is the defenseofthe
national interest,restrictivelyand rationallydefined,against the national interestsof othernationswhichmay or may not be thus defined.
If they're not,it becomesthe task of armed diplomacyto convincethe
nations concernedthat their legitimateinterestshave nothingto fear
froma restrictiveand rationalforeignpolicy and that theirillegitimate
interestshave nothingto gain in the face of armed mightrationallyemployed.
III
We have said beforethat the utopian and realist positionsin international affairsdo not necessarilydifferin the policies they advocate,
but that they part company over theirgeneralphilosophiesof politics
and their way of thinkingabout matterspolitical. It does not follow
that the presentdebate is only of academic interestand withoutpractical significance.Both camps, it is true,may supportthe same policy
reasons. Yet if the reasons are unsound,the soundnessof
for different
the policies supportedby them is a mere coincidence,and these very
same reasonsmay be, and inevitablyare, invokedon otheroccasions in
supportof unsound policies. The nefariousconsequencesoffalsephilosophies and wrongways ofthinkingmay forthe timebeingbe concealed
by the apparent success of policies derivedfromthem. You may go to
war,justifiedby yournation's interests,fora moral purposeand in disregardof considerationsof power; and militaryvictoryseems to satisfy
both yourmoralaspirationsand yournation'sinterests.Yet the manner
in whichyou waged the war, achieved victory,and settled the peace
cannothelpreflecting
yourphilosophyofpoliticsand yourway ofthinking about politicalproblems.If these are in error,you may win victory
on the fieldof battle and still assist in the defeat of both your moral
principlesand the nationalinterestofyourcountry.

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979
Any numberof examplescould illustratethe real yet subtle practical

consequenceswhichfollowfromthe different
positionstaken. We have
chosentwo: collectivesecurityin Korea and the liberationofthe nations
that are captives of Communism.A case forboth policies can be made
fromboth the utopian and realistpositions,but withsignificantdifferences in the emphasisand substanceof the policiespursued.
Collectivesecurityas an abstractprincipleofutopianpoliticsrequires
that all nationscome to the aid ofa victimofaggressionby resistingthe
aggressorwith all means necessaryto frustratehis aims. Once the case
of aggressionis established,the duty to act is unequivocal. Its extent
may be affectedby concernforthe nation's survival; obviouslyno nation will commitoutrightsuicide in the service of collectivesecurity.
But beyond that elemental limitationno considerationof interestor
power, eitherwith regardto the aggressoror his victimor the nation
actingin the latter'sdefense,can qualifythe obligationto act underthe
principleof collectivesecurity.Thus high officialsof our government
have declaredthat we intervenedin Korea not forany narrowinterestof
ours but in supportofthe moral principleof collectivesecurity.
Collectivesecurityas a concreteprincipleof realistpolicy is the ageold maxim, "Hang togetheror hang separately,"in moderndress. It
recognizesthe need for nationA under certaincircumstancesto defend
nation B against attack by nation C. That need is determined,first,by
the interestwhichA has in the territorial
integrityof B and by the relation of that interestto all the otherinterestsof A as well as to the resourcesavailable forthe supportof all those interests.Furthermore,A
must take into account the power whichis at the disposal of aggressor
C forfightingA and B as over against the power available to A and B
forfightingC. The same calculationmust be carriedon concerningthe
power of the likelyallies of C as over against those of A and B. Before
going to war forthe defenseof South Korea in the name of collective
security,an American adherent of political realism would have demandedan answerto thefollowingfourquestions: First,what is our interestin the preservationof the independenceof South Korea; second,
what is our power to defendthat independenceagainst North Korea;
third,what is our powerto defendthat independenceagainst China and
the Soviet Union; and fourth,what are the chancesforpreventingChina
and the Soviet Union fromenteringthe Korean War?
In view of the principleof collectivesecurity,interpretedin utopian
terms,our interventionin Korea was a foregoneconclusion.The interpretationof this principlein realisttermsmightor mightnot, depending upon the concretecircumstancesof interestand power,have led us
to the same conclusion.In the executionof the policy of collectivese-

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ofChineseand
to thepossibility
curitytheutopianhad to be indifferent
to applytheprincipleof
Russianintervention,
exceptforhisresolution
on the side of the
collectivesecurityto anybodywhowouldintervene
could
The realist
oftheinaggressor.
nothelpweighing
thepossibility
in termsofthe
ofa greatpoweron thesideoftheaggressor
tervention
interests
engagedand thepoweravailableon theotherside.17
could not bringitselfto takingresoThe Trumanadministration
or
the
lutelythe utopian
realistposition.It resolvedto intervenein
good measureon utopiangroundsand in spiteof militaryadvice to
it allowedthemilitary
commander
to advanceto theYalu
thecontrary;
oftheriskoftheintervention
ofa greatpoweragainst
Riverindisregard
couldbe carriedoutonlybymeansofa general
whichcollective
security
on the
war,and thenrefusedto pursuethe war withfulleffectiveness
realistgroundsof the risk of a thirdworldwar. Thus Mr. Truman
in 1952is caughtin thesame dilemmafromwhichMr. Baldwincould
extricatehimselfin 1936 on the occasionof the League of Nations
sanctionsagainstItaly's attack upon Ethiopiaonlyat an enormous
loss to Britishprestige.Collectivesecurityas a defenseof the status
quo shortof a generalwar can be effective
onlyagainstsecond-rate
in terms,
powers.Appliedagainsta majorpower,it is a contradiction
forit meansnecessarily
a majorwar. Of thisself-defeating
contradictionMr. Baldwinwas as unawarein the'thirties
as Mr. Trumanseems
in thesecogent
dilemma
to be in 1952.Mr. Churchill
Mr.
Baldwin's
put
terms:"First,the PrimeMinisterhad declaredthat sanctionsmeant
he was resolvedthattheremustbe no war;and thirdly,
war;secondly,
he decideduponsanctions.It was evidently
impossible
to complywith
thesethreeconditions."SimilarlyMr. Trumanhad declaredthat the
effective'prosecution
of'the Korean War meantthe possibilityof a
thirdworldwar; he resolvedthat theremustbe no thirdworldwar;
and he decideduponintervention
in the KoreanWar. Here,too, it is
to complywiththesethreeconditions.
impossible
areinherent
Similarcontradictions
in theproposalswhichwouldsubstituteforthecurrent
ofthe
policyofcontainment
oneoftheliberation
nationspresently
the captivesofRussianCommunism.
This objective
can be compatiblewiththeutopianor realistposition,but thepolicies
designedto secureitwillbe fundamentally
different
according
to whether theyare based upon one or theotherposition.The clearestcase to
17 The differencein these two attitudes is well illustrated by the following passage from
a recent Moon Mullins cartoon. An elderly representative of the utopian school asks little
Kayo:- "Remember the golden rule. Now, supposing that boy slapped you on the right
cheek, what would you do?" Whereupon Kayo replies realistically: "Jest how big a boy
are you supposin'?"

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date for the utopian justificationof such policies has been made by
RepresentativeCharles J. Kersten of Wisconsinwho pointed to these
four"basic defects" of the "negative policy of containmentand negotiated coexistence
It would be immoraland unchristianto negotiatea permanentagreement
withforceswhichby everyreligiouscreed and moralpreceptare evil. It abandons nearlyone-halfofhumanityand the once freenationsof Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia
and China to enslavementof the Communistpolice state.
It is un-Americanbecause it violates the principleof the AmericanDeclaration of Independence,whichproclaimsthe-rightsof all people to freedomand
theirrightand duty to throwofftyranny.
It will lead to all-out World War III because it aligns all the forcesof the
non-Communistworld in militaryoppositionto and against all the forcesof
the Communist world, including the 800,000,000 peoples behind the Iron
Curtain.
The policy of mere containmentis uneconomic and will lead to national
bankruptcy.18
This statementis interestingforits straightforwardness

and because
it combinesin a rathertypical fashionconsiderationsof abstract morality and of expediency. The captive nations must be liberated not
only because their captivityis immoral,unchristian,and un-American,
but also because its continuationwill lead to a thirdworldwar and to
national bankruptcy.To what extent,however,these considerationsof
expediencyare invalidated by theirutopian settingwill become obvious froma comparisonbetweenthe utopian and the realistpositions.
From the utopian point of view there can be no difference
between
the liberationof Esthonia or Czechoslovakia, of Poland or China; the
captivityof any nation,large or small,close or faraway, is a moral outrage which cannot be tolerated. The realist,too, seeks the liberation
ofall captivenationsbecause he realizesthatthe presenceofthe Russian
armies in the heart of Europe and theircooperationwith the Chinese
armiesconstitutethe two main sourcesofthe imbalanceofpowerwhich
threatensour security.-Yetbeforehe formulatesa programof liberation,he will seek answersto a numberof questionssuch as these: While
the United States has a generalinterestin the liberationof all captive
nations,what is the hierarchyofinterestsit has in the liberation,say, of
China, Esthonia, and Hungary?And whilethe Soviet Union has a general interestin keeping all captive nations in that state, what is the
hierarchyof its interestsin keeping,say, Poland, Eastern Germany,
and Bulgaria captive? If we assume,as we muston the historicevidence
18
New York Times, August 14, 1952, p. 1.

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of two centuries,that Russia would nevergive up controlover Poland

withoutbeing compelled by forceof arms, would the objective of the
liberation of Poland justify the ruin of westerncivilization,that of
Poland included,whichwould be the certainresultofa thirdworldwar?
What resourcesdoes theUnited States have at its disposal forthe liberation of all captive nations or some of them? What resourcesdoes the
Soviet Union have at its disposalto keep in captivityall captive nations
or some of them?Are we more likelyto avoid national bankruptcyby
embarkingupon a policyof indiscriminateliberationwith the concomitant certaintyof war or by continuingthe presentpolicy of containment?
It mightbe that in a particularinstancethe policiessuggestedby the
answersto these questions will coincidewith RepresentativeKersten's
proposals,but therecan be no doubt that in its overall character,substance,emphasis,and likelyconsequencesa utopian policyof liberation
differsfundamentallyfroma realist one.
The issue between liberationas a utopian principleof abstract moralityvs. the realist evaluation of the consequenceswhich a policy of
liberationwould have forthe survivalof the nation has arisenbeforein
Americanhistory.Abraham Lincoln was faced with a dilemma similar
to that whichconfrontsus today. Should he make the liberationof the
slaves the ultimatestandardof his policy even at the risk of destroying
the Union,as manyurgedhimto do, or shouldhe subordinatethe moral
principleofuniversalfreedomto considerationsof the nationalinterest?
The answer Lincoln gave to Horace Greeley, a spokesman for the
utopianmoralists,is timelessin its eloquentwisdom."If therebe those,"
he wroteon August22, 1862,
whowouldnotsave theUnionunlesstheycouldat thesametimesave slavery,
I do notagreewiththem.Iftherebe thosewhowouldnotsavetheUnionunless
theycould at the same timedestroyslavery,I do not agreewiththem.My
is to save theUnion,and is noteitherto save
paramount
objectinthisstruggle
or to destroyslavery.If I couldsave the Unionwithoutfreeing
anyslave I
all theslaves,I woulddo it; and
woulddo it,and ifI couldsave it by freeing
ifI couldsave it byfreeing
someandleavingothersaloneI wouldalso do that.
WhatI do aboutslavery,and thecoloredrace,I do-becauseI believeit helps
to save the Union;and whatI forbear,
I forbearbecauseI do notbelieveit
wouldhelpto save theUnion.I shalldo lesswhenever
I shallbelievewhatI am
I shallbelievedoingmore
doinghurtsthecause,and I shalldo morewhenever
willhelpthecause. I shalltryto correcterrorswhenshownto be errors;and
I shalladoptnewviewsso fastas theyshallappearto be trueviews.
I haveherestatedmypurposeaccording
to myviewofofficial
duty;and I
intendno modification
ofmyoft-expressed
personalwishthatall meneverywherecouldbe free.

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983
IV
The foregoingdiscussionoughtto shed additionallight,if this is still
needed,upon the moralmeritsofthe utopian and realistpositions.This
question, more than any other,seems to have agitated the critics of
realismin internationalaffairs.Disregardingthe voluminousevidence,
some ofthemhave picked a fewwordsout oftheircontextto provethat
realismin internationalaffairsis unprincipledand contemptuousof morality.To mentionbut one example,one eminentcriticsummarizesmy
position,whichhe supposes to deny the possibilityof judgingthe conduct of states by moral criteria,in these words: "And one spokesman
finds'a profoundand neglectedtruth,'to use his words,in the dictumof
Hobbes that 'there is neithermoralitynor law outside the state.'"9
These are indeed my words,but not all of them. What I actually said
was this:
and neglected
Thereis a profound
dictum
truthhiddenin Hobbes'sextreme
thatthestatecreatesmorality
as wellas law andthatthereis neither
morality
norlawoutsidethestate.Universalmoralprinciples,
suchas justiceorequality,
are capableofguidingpoliticalactiononlyto theextentthattheyhave been
givenconcrete
contentand havebeenrelatedtopoliticalsituations
bysociety.20
It mustbe obvious fromthispassage and fromall my other writings
on the subject21 that my positionis the exact oppositefromwhat this
criticmakes it out to be. I have always maintainedthat the actions of
states are subject to universalmoral principlesand I have been careful
to differentiate
my positionin this respectfromthat of Hobbes. Five
points basic to my positionmay need to be emphasizedagain.
The firstpoint is what one mightcall the requirementof cosmic hu19 A. H. Feller, "In Defense of International Law and Morality," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, p. 80 (July, 1952).
20 In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign
Policy (New York, 1951), p. 34.
21 See, for instance, "The Machiavellian Utopia," Ethics, Vol. 55, pp. 145-147
(Jan.,
1945); "Ethics and Politics," in Approaches to Group Understanding,Sixth Symposium of
the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and
MacIver (New York, 1947), pp. 319-341; "The Escape from Power in the Western
World," in Conflictsof Power in Modern Culture, Seventh Symposium of the Conference
on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, pp.
1-12; ScientificMan vs. Power Politics (Chicago, 1946), Chaps. 7, 8; "Views of Nuremberg:
Further Analysis of the Trial and Its Importance," America, Vol. 76, pp. 266-267 (Dec.7,
1946); "The Twilight of International Morality," Ethics, Vol. 58, pp. 79-99 (Jan., 1948);
"The Political Science of E. H. Carr," World Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 127-134 (Oct., 1948);
Politics Among Nations (New York, 1948), Ch. 14; "National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National Interest," The American Scholar,
Vol. 18, pp. 207-212 (Spring, 1949); "The Pathology of Power," American Perspective,
Vol. 4, pp. 6-10 (Winter, 1950); "The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy," in The Year
Book of World Affairs,1961 (London, 1951), pp. 12-36.

984
THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
REVIEW
militywith regardto the moral evaluation of the actions of states. To

knowthat states are subjectto the morallaw is one thing;to pretendto
knowwhat is morallyrequiredofstates in a particularsituationis quite
another.The human mindtends naturallyto identifythe particularinterestsof states, as of individuals,withthe moral purposesof the universe.The statesmanin the defenseofthe nation'sinterestsmay, and at
times even must, yield to that tendency;the scholar must resistit at
every turn. For the light-heartedassumptionthat what one's own nation aims at and does is morallygood and that those who oppose that
nation's policies are evil is morallyindefensibleand intellectuallyuntenable and leads in practiceto that distortionofjudgment,born of the
blindnessof crusadingfrenzy,whichhas been the curse of nationsfrom
the beginningof time.
The second point which obviouslyneeds to be made again concerns
of the restraintswhichmoralityimposesupon the acthe effectiveness
tionsofstates.
A discussionofinternational
morality
mustguardagainstthetwoextremes
the influence
eitherof overrating
ofethicsuponinternational
politicsor else
thatstatesmen
and diplomatsare movedby anything
ofdenying
elsebutconofmaterialpower.
siderations
Ontheonehand,thereis thedualerrorofconfounding
themoralruleswhich
to observeas wellas withthose
peopleactuallyobservewiththosetheypretend
whichwritersdeclaretheyoughtto observe....
On the otherhand,thereis the misconception,
usuallyassociatedwiththe
generaldepreciationand moral condemnation
of powerpolitics,discussed
above,thatinternational
politicsis so thoroughly
evilthatit is no use looking
forethicallimitations
ofthe aspirations
forpoweron theinternational
scene.
Yet,ifwe ask ourselves
whatstatesmen
and diplomatsare capableofdoingto
further
thepowerobjectivesoftheirrespective
nationsand whattheyactually
do, we realizethattheydo less thantheyprobablycouldand less thanthey
actuallydid in otherperiodsofhistory.They refuseto considercertainends
and to use certainmeans,eitheraltogether
or undercertainconditions,
not
becausein thelightofexpediency
or unwise,but betheyappearimpractical
causecertainmoralrulesinterpose
an absolutebarrier.
Moralrulesdo notpermitcertainpoliciesto be considered
at all fromthepointofviewofexpediency.
Such ethicalinhibitions
operatein ourtimeon different
levelswithdifferent
effectiveness.
Theirrestraining
function
is mostobviousand mosteffective
in
thesacredness
ofhumanlifeintimesofpeace.22
affirming
In connectionwith this passage we have given a numberof historic
examplesshowingthe influenceof moral principlesupon the conduct of
foreignpolicy.An example taken fromcontemporaryhistorywill illus22
Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations,pp. 174-175.

ANOTHER
GREAT
DEBATE
THE NATIONAL
INTEREST
OF THE U. S.
985
trate the same point. There can be littledoubt that the Soviet Union
could have achieved the objectivesof its foreignpolicyat the end ofthe
Second World War withoutantagonizingthe nations of the West into
that encirclingcoalition which has been the nightmareof Bolshevist
foreignpolicy since 1917. It could-have mitigatedcunningforits own
sake and the use of forcewith persuasion,conciliation,and a trustderived fromthe awarenessof a partial communityofinterestsand would
therebyhave minimizedthe dangersto itselfand the rest of the world
whichare inherentin the objectivesofits policies.Yet the Soviet Union
was precludedfromrelyingupon thesetraditionalmethodsofdiplomacy
by its generalconceptionofhumannature,politics,and morality.In the
general philosophyof Bolshevismthereis no room forhonest dissent,
the recognitionofthe intrinsicworthofdivergentinterests,and genuine
conciliationbetween such interests.On all levels of social interaction
oppositionmust be destroyedby cunningand violence,since it has no
rightto exist,ratherthan be met halfway in view of its intrinsiclegitimacy. This being the general conceptionof the political moralityof
Bolshevism,the foreignpolicyof the Soviet Union is limitedto a much
more narrowchoice of means than the foreignpoliciesof othernations.
The United States, for instance,has been able, in its relationswith
the nations of Latin America,to replace militaryinterventionand dollar diplomacy with the policy of the Good Neighbor. That drastic
changewas made possibleby the generalconceptionofpoliticalmorality
whichhas been prevalentin the United States fromits very inception.
Thd United States is a pluralistsocietywhichpresupposesthe continuing existenceand legitimacyof divergentinterests.These interestsare
locked in a continuingstrugglefor supremacyto be decided by force
only as a last resort,but normallythrougha multitudeof institutional
agencies which are so devised as to allow one or the other interesta
temporaryadvantage but none a permanentsupremacyat the price of
the destructionof the. others. This moralityof pluralism allows the
United States, once it is secure in that minimumof vital intereststo
which we have referredabove, to transferthose principlesof political
moralityto the internationalscene and to deal withdivergentinterests
there with the same methods of genuine compromiseand conciliation
whichare a permanentelementof its domesticpolitical life.
The thirdpoint concernsthe relationsbetweenuniversalmoral principlesand politicalaction.I have always maintainedthattheseuniversal
moral principlescannot be applied to the actions of states in theirabbut that theymust be, as it were,filtered
stractuniversalformulation,
throughthe concretecircumstancesof time and place. The individual
may say for himself:"Fiat justitia, pereatmunrdus";the state has no

986
THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
REVIEW
rightto say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual
and state must judge politicalaction by universalmoralprinciples,such
as that of liberty.Yet whilethe individualhas a moralrightto sacrifice
himselfin defenseofsuch a moralprinciple,the state has no moralright
of libertyget in the
to let its moral disapprobationof the infringement
way ofsuccessfulpoliticalaction,itselfinspiredby the moralprincipleof
national survival.There can be no politicalmoralitywithoutprudence,
that is, withoutconsiderationofthe politicalconsequencesof seemingly
moral action. Classical and medieval philosophyknew this and so did
Lincoln when he said: "I do the verybest I know how, the verybest I
can, and I mean to keep doingso untilthe end. If the end bringsme out
all right,what is said against me won't amount to anything.If the end
bringsme out wrong,ten angels swearingI was rightwould make no
difference."The issue between utopianismand realism,as it bears on
this point, has been put most succinctlyby Edmund Burke, and what
he has to say in the followingpassage about revolution,that is, civil
war, may well be applied mutatismutandisto all war.
Nothing universalcan be rationallyaffirmedon any moral or any political
subject. Pure metaphysicalabstractiondoes not belong to these matters.The
lines of moralityare not like the ideal lines of mathematics.They are broad
and deep as well as long. They admit ofexceptions;theydemandmodifications.
These exceptionsand modificationsare not made by the process of logic-,but
by the rules of prudence.Prudence is not only the firstin rank of the virtues
politicaland moral,but she is the director,the regulator,the standardofthem
all. Metaphysicscannot live withoutdefinition;but Prudence is cautious how
she defines.Our courtscannot be morefearfulin suffering
fictitiouscases to be
broughtbeforethem forelicitingtheir determinationon a point of law than
prudent moralistsare in puttingextremeand hazardous cases of conscience
to define,what
upon emergenciesnot existing.Withoutattempting,therefore,
nevercan be defined,the case of a revolutionin government,
this,I think,may
be safelyaffirmed-thata sore and pressingevil is to be removed,and that a
good, great in its amount and unequivocal in its nature,must be probable almostto a certainty,beforethe inestimablepriceofour own moralsand the wellbeing of a number of our fellow-citizensis paid for a revolution.If ever we
ought to be economistseven to parsimony,it is in the voluntaryproduction
ofevil. Every revolutioncontainsin it somethingofevil.23
23 The Works of The Right Honorable Edmund Burke, 4th ed. (Boston, 1871), Vol. 4, pp.
80-81. Cf. also Burke, "Speech on A Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments,"
May 8, 1780, in Works, Vol. 7, p. 73: "I must see, to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see,
fromtheir operation in the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils which are
inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total result.
The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is, to have but one thing before you; but
he forms the best judgement in all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and
variety of considerations in one view before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle results of all."

ANOTHER iGREAT DEBATE":
THE NATIONAL INTEREST O-VTHE V. S.
987
Fourth,the realistrecognizesthat a moral decision,especiallyin the

political sphere,does not implya simple choice betweena moral principle and a standard of action whichis morallyirrelevantor even outrightimmoral.A moral decisionimpliesalways a choiceamong different
moral principles,one of whichis given precedenceover others.To say
that a political action has no moral purposeis absurd; forpolitical action can be definedas an attemptto realize moral values throughthe
medium of politics, that is, power. The relevant moral question concerns the choice among different
moral values, and it is at this point
that the realist and the utopian part company again. If an American
statesman must choose between the promotionof universal liberty,
which is a moral good, at the risk of Americansecurityand, hence, of
libertyin the United States, and the promotionof Americansecurity
and of libertyin the United States, whichis anothermoral good, to the
detrimentof the promotionof universalliberty,whichchoice oughthe
to make? The utopian will not face the issue squarelyand will deceive
himselfinto believingthat he can achieve both goods at the same time.
The realistwillchoosethe nationalintereston bothmoraland pragmatic
grounds;forifhe does not take care of the nationalinterestnobodyelse
will,and if he puts Americansecurityand libertyin jeopardy the cause
of libertyeverywherewill be impaired.
Finally, the political realist distinguishesbetween his moral sympathies and the political interestswhich he must defend.He will distinguish with Lincoln between his "officialduty" whichis to protectthe
national interestand his "personal wish" whichis to see universalmoral
values realized throughoutthe world.
The issue has been admirably put by Father WilfredParsons of
Catholic Universityin defendingAmbassador Kennan's position:
Mr. Kennan did not say state behavioris not a fitsubject formoraljudgment)
but onlythat it should not sway our realizationof the realitieswithwhichwe
have to deal. Msgr. Koenig continues: "Should we accept power realitiesand
aspirationswithoutfeelingthe obligationofmoraljudgment?"And he appeals to
the presentwriterand other political scientiststo say whetherthis doctrine
agreeswithPope Pius XII's messageson peace.
I am sure that most political scientists,and also Mr. Kennan, would agree
with the Monsignorthat we should not accept those realities"withoutfeeling
the obligationof moral judgment." But there is a difference
betweenfeeling
this obligation (and even expressingit) and allowingthis feelingto sway our
actions in concretenegotiationsthat deal with the national or world common
good. We can still feel and yet deal.
To make my meaning clearer,I understoodMr. Kennan to hold that we
went offthe beam with Woodrow Wilson,when we began to make our moral
disapprobationan essentialpartof our foreignrelations,even sometimesat the

988
THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
REVIEW
expense of our own and the world'scommongood. Logically,such an attitude

would inhibitour dealingwithBritain,France and a host ofcountries.Pius XI,
speaking of Mussolini afterthe Lateran Treaty, said he would deal with the
devil himselfifhe must.Here was moraldisapprobation,but it was not "carried
over into the affairsof states."
This relativeposition,and not the absolute one ofMsgr. Koenig (withwhich
in itselfI agree), is, I think,the issue raised by Mr. Kennan, and it is worth
debating on that basis.24
The contestbetweenutopianismand realismis not tantamountto a

contestbetweenprincipleand expediency,moralityand immorality,althoughsome spokesmenforthe formerwould like to have it that way.
The contestis ratherbetweenone typeofpoliticalmoralityand another
type of political morality,one taking as its standard universal moral
principlesabstractlyformulated,the other weighingthese principles
againstthe moralrequirements'of
concretepoliticalaction,theirrelative
merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to whichtheyare likelyto lead.25
These points are re-emphasizedby the foregoingdiscussion.Which
attitude with regard to collectivesecurityand to the liberationof the
captive nations,the utopian or the realist,is more likely to safeguard
the survivalof the United States in its territorial,
political,and cultural
identityand at the same timeto contributethe mostto the securityand
libertyof othernations?This is the ultimatetest-political and moralby whichutopianismand realismmust be judged.
24.America,Vol. 86, p. 700 (March 29, 1952). See also Algernon Cecil, "The Foreign
Office," in The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919 (New York,
1923), Vol. 3, p. 605, concerning Lord Salisbury: "Always, however, the motive of his
policy was to be found in the political interests as opposed to the political sympathies of
Great Britain; and in this way his treatment of Foreign Affairsis at the opposite policy
from that of Palmerston or Gladstone." Cf. also the general remarks in Alexander H.
Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York, 1949), pp. 155 ff.
25 See, on this point, Shirley R. Letwin, "Rationalism, Principles, and Politics," The
Review of Politics, Vol. 14, pp. 367-393 (July, 1952); L. Susan Stebbing, Ideals and IIlusions (London, 1941); Vernon H. Holloway, Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power
(New York, 1951); and Dorothy Fosdick, "Ethical Standards and Political Strategies,"
Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 57, pp. 214 ff. (1942).


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Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States

Author(s): Hans J. Morgenthau

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

"GREAT DEBATE": THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The controversywhich has arisen on the occasion of Ambassador

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

In orderto refutea theorywhichpretendsto be scientific,it is first

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

This realist appraisal of the Americantraditionin foreignpolicy was

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possible meaningsof history.In other words,we put ourselvesin the

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as are alreadythesefourpoliticalentities,it is assumedthat the freedom,

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and thereis, on the otherhand, no opportunityforthe othermembers

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in the AtlanticSecurityPact, we are told,has nothingto do withthe

as we can upon the basis of the coordinatestate....

impossibleunderpresentconditionsto build such a systemwithout

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theirinterestsare at stake-so cruel,so faithless,so cunning.We know

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The concept of the national interestis similarin two respectsto the

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eithercome into being throughconquest or else throughconsentbased

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terests exert, of course, constant pressureupon the conduct of our

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tionalinterestof the United States. Frequently,thisrationalizationhas

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bodies. The identitybetweenthe interestsofthe UnitedNations and the

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kind. No nation has the resourcesto promoteall desirable objectives

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The concept of the national interestpresupposesneithera naturally

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Any numberof examplescould illustratethe real yet subtle practical

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This statementis interestingforits straightforwardness

New York Times, August 14, 1952, p. 1.

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of two centuries,that Russia would nevergive up controlover Poland

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ANOTHER 'tGREAT DEBATE":

THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE U. S.

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

militywith regardto the moral evaluation of the actions of states. To

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This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

ANOTHER iGREAT DEBATE":

THE NATIONAL INTEREST O-VTHE V. S.

Fourth,the realistrecognizesthat a moral decision,especiallyin the

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

expense of our own and the world'scommongood. Logically,such an attitude

The contestbetweenutopianismand realismis not tantamountto a

This content downloaded from 192.197.128.19 on Mon, 23 Sep 2013 12:41:49 PM

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