The Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898 - The British Empire

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CORNELL
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LONDO N,
W.C.
THE CAMPAIGN
1897-1898
IN TIRAH
Genf.ral Sir William Lockhart, G.C. B.
Commander
I!
Ph,'!o,:^raf<h
by Hassan
K. C.S.I.
of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.
Frontispiece.
Cornell University
Library
The
tine
original of
tiiis
book
is in
Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright
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the United States on the use of the
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http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028659575
THE
CAMPAIGN
IN
TIRAH
1897-1898
AN ACCOUNT OF
THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE

ORAKZAIS AND AFRIDIS
UNDER
GENERAL
SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART,
G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
BASED (by permission) ON LETTERS CONTRIBUTED TO

'THE TIMES'
BY
COLONEL
H. D.
HUTCHINSON
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN INDIA

AUTHOR OF 'THE STORY OF WATERLOO,' 'THE STORY OF 1812,' 'THE STORY OF
CORUNNA,' 'military SKETCHING MADE EASY,' ETC., ETC.
WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS
%antion
MACMILLAN AND
CO., Limited
NEW YORK THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
:
1898
AU rights reserved
DEDICATED BY PERMISSION
TO
GENERAL
SIR
WILLIAM
S.
A.
LOCKHART,
G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
COMMANDER OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE.
PREFACE
I
BELIEVE
this narrative
of the Tirah Expedition
gives an accurate account of the operations, and
hope
it
will also
be found a readable account.
interest will certainly
maps and
be enhanced by the
plans which accompany
excellent illustrations, for which
my
Colonel
friends
Its
reliable
it,
and by the
am
indebted to
More - Molyneux,
Assistant
Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, LieutenantColonel C. Pulley, commanding the 3rd Gurkha

Rifles,
and
distinction
portray
others.
in
the
scenes
in
These
served
officers
expedition,
and
their
with
pictures
which they were themselves
actors.
It
has not been part of
my
plan to
reference to the frontier policy of the
of India.
It is
a policy of which
" Quot homines, tot sententics."
it
make any
Government
may be
said,
Nothing, indeed,
could be more striking than the fact that on this
THE CAMPAIGN
viii
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
men whose knowledge
great Imperial question,
of
the subject, and experience, are equal, hold opinions

absolutely opposed.
province,
or
my
discussion which
It
is,
purpose,
however, outside
even to approach the
much
has recently attracted so
public attention.
chapters, following
have only,
my
my
in
my
usual practice
introductory
when
write
the story of a campaign, endeavoured to state so
much
of facts which are notorious as
the general reader to form his

to the cause of the war,
and
"
own
may
enable
conclusions as
what they
killed
each
other for."
H. D.
London,
\st
September 1898.
HUTCHINSON,
Colonel.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
Introductory
CHAPTER n
The
.16
Afridis and their Grievances
CHAPTER
HI
Preparations, and the Plan of Campaign
CHAPTER
Waiting to Begin
22
IV
.
43
CHAPTER V
The Actions at Dargai
CHAPTER
In the Khanki Valley
57
VI
.
.76
THE CAMPAIGN
IN TIRAH,
CHAPTER
1897-98
VII
PAGE
The Capture of the Sampagha
Pass
CHAPTER
The
Capture
VIII
Arhanga
the
of
Occupation of Tirah
Pass,
.
CHAPTER
Life in Tirah
The
85
the
and
-95
IX
Affair of the 9TH November
112
CHAPTER X
Still in Tirah
The
Terms to the Orakzais
Affair of the i6th November
The
.128
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X
The Correspondence of the Mullahs
CHAPTER
The Move to Bagh
Terms
to the Afridis
CHAPTER
-151
XI
Reconnaissance to Dwatoi
The
The
XII
Mastura
The Punishment
Preparations to leave
of the Chamkanis
Tirah
1ST
Brigade
158
in
173
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
xi
XIII
PAGE
Through
the Dwatoi
THE Bara Valley
Defile
.
again,
and down
.186
CHAPTER XIV
The Bazar Valley Expedition and Reoccupation
OF the Khyber The Affair at Shin Kamar
The End of the Campaign
207
CHAPTER XV
Tactical Lessons and Concluding Notes
224
APPENDIX
Officers Killed and
Wounded
247
!>SSfr?"???"!-
MAPS AND PLANS

General Map to Illustrate the Operations
...
Plan of the Actions at Dargai,

October 1897
.
At end
of book
8th and 2oth

To face page 62
Outline Sketch of the Dargai Heights
71
Plan of the Action at the Sampagha Pass
89
Plan of the Action at the Arhanga Pass
100
Plan of the Picquets on the Arhanga Pass
114
Plan of the Action at Shin Kamar
217
ILLUSTRATIONS
General Sir William Lockhart,
Brig.-Gen. Sir
W.
G.C.B., K.C.S.I.
G. Nicholson, K.C.B.
The Camp at Shinauri

"The
brave
little
followed close."
wretched mule
The
this particular
numerous"
Scottish
49
61
Borderers
Dargai, \Zth October 1897
down, and the road
falls
blocked at once
"On
Tofacepage 28
Gurkhas streamed across the
deadly space.
"A
Frontispiece
is
,,78
evening the casualties were
82
"Sir William Lockhart
examined
proaches to the pass
The Mastura Valley.

The Mastura Valley
looking
the
ap-
,,88
93
98
I09
119
121
North
" Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient
and return
escorts,
with forage"
Saran Sar
"The men,
in the evening laden

.
qth November
up
i?>gy
however, rallied bravely round their
officers"
THE CAMPAIGN
xvi
"
day
them
in
The Dwatoi Defile
went
for
them
in
is
little
the
dashing
129
161
,,167
Engledue,
style "
were
of
178
the
,,192
"
3th the march was resumed "
the
Gurkhas the
Gurkhas
fortress"
mountain guns again
greatest service
On
to.
A company of the Queen's, led by Lieut.
" The
camp
To face p. 123
"
" Every house in this valley
"
1897-98
search party found the bodies the next day"
" Sir William Lockhart received
"
IN TIRAH,
i99
Raw Material
Between pages 238, 239
Finished Article
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTORY
" Now tell us all about the war.
And what they killed each other for ? "
" Why, that

"
I cannot
HAVE been through
myself;
friends
written
But
it is
all
over,
if
and ask them

killed
said
he,
victory ! "
campaign
it
Tirah
in
a great deal with
have read much that has been
about
patches.
this
have talked about
and
tell,"
But 'twas a famous
it
in
newspapers, books, and des-
am
quite sure that, even
you button-hole ten

"all about the war,
each other for
"
you
answer from each, and no two
intelligent
that
men,
and what they
will get
will
now
a different
agree in essential
particulars
This may seem an amazing assertion

but
We all
am
convinced
know
is
to
make,
not far outside the truth.
that the general object of the expedi-
by us against the Afridis and Orakzais

exact reparation for their unprovoked aggres-
tion launched
was to
it
THE CAMPAIGN
sion
IN TIRAH,
Peshawar - Kohat border,
on the
chap.
1897-98
attacks on our frontier posts, and for the
for
damage
to
by these raids on
But that is only our
subjects.
Hfe and property inflicted

territory
their
and British
British
We
view of the matter.
to get behind this,
want
and ascertain the Afridi view. Why did they, who

had faithfully kept their agreements with us for
why
sixteen long years,
did they rise against us,
Were
and commit these outrages ?

"
unprovoked," as
we
so confidently assert
the Afridis and Orakzais were
arms against us
in
Waziris, the Swatis,
and
Bajauris,
in
1897-98,
Besides,
not the only tribes in
The
momentous year.
the Boners, the Mohmands, the
this
others,
in
they altogether
have
all
been on the war-path
deadly earnest;
and undoubtedly
something more than a fanaticism fanned by frenzied

Mullahs has been the cause of a conflagration so
widely spread, so
Before, then,
fierce,
and so dangerous.
plunge in medias
res,
and recount
the incidents of a campaign which took us into a

wild and difficult and
unknown
country, and intro-
duced our troops to a warfare more serious than

anything they have been engaged
Mutiny,
which
it
will
in
since
the
be interesting to discuss the events
preceded the expedition, and rendered
necessary, and to arrive,
conclusion as to the
if
we
can, at
"why " and
some
it
definite
the " wherefore
"
of
it all.
It will
which
be understood, of course, that any opinions
may
express in the course of this narrative
INTRODUCTORY
are
my
own, that
acquaintance with
to place
profess to possess no special
facts,
and that
them before the reader
merely endeavour
in the light in
who has had
they have appeared to one on the spot,

ordinary opportunities
read,
to
which
mark,
and
learn,
inwardly digest them.
To
I
go, then, at once to the root of the matter,
venture to submit that for Xh&fons
we must hark back
the year
to
et origo mali,
1893,
when
Sir
Mortimer Durand returned from Cabul with the
Agreement
Boundary
Afghanistan
in
his
signed
by
the
Amir
of
hand, and that that document
was the outward and visible sign of all our subsequent troubles on the North- West Frontier. Our
idea in proposing that a definite boundary should
be demarcated between Afghanistan and India was

a most just and reasonable one. We wished that
it
should be
made
once
and control the
influence
should remain.
and
frays
clear,
under whose
for
all,
tribes
on
the
border
Wild, turbulent freebooters, loving
forays,
fiercely
jealous
of
their
inde-
pendence, acknowledging the authority of no one
but their
own immediate Maliks and
Mullahs, they
been a veritable thorn in the

and the difficulty
flesh of successive Governments
of restraining them within limits, and of dealing
out punishment to them when patience and
had
for years past
the expedients
of diplomacy were exhausted by
more - than - usually - lawless outrage, was

accentuated by the fact that it was in many in-
some
THE CAMPAIGN
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
Stances
impossible to say, or at least a delicate
matter
to
own
the
were
offenders
or fairly inside the pale of
Amir
subjects of the
our
whether
decide,
influence.
For this principal reason, it was deemed necessary

to come to a definite agreement with the Amir
regarding a boundary.
Once a line was agreed to,
and demarcated, between Afghanistan and India,
there could be no question when raids and outrages
were committed as to the responsibility of the
Power concerned, or
as to the right of that
to intervene, restrain,
and punish.
But
it
is
boundary
an open secret that the idea of a
was
negotiations
distasteful
for
that
it
fell
commission
details of
it,
The
Amir.
the
to
friendly
Cabul to arrange the

very nearly
Power
to
visit
more than once
through, and there can be no doubt
required
the
all
that Sir
diplomatic
skill
command,
to get
the
and
patience,
tact,
and
Mortimer Durand could
Agreement signed by His
Highness, and to carry the
affair
to a successful
conclusion.
For the Amir and
his people
What
with the existing rigime.

could a boundary
were quite
serve for
them
useful
?
satisfied
purpose
The
tribes
seldom troubled them, and the English, on the

other hand, had always been well able to take care
of themselves
What was
when
their borders
the need then
certain effect of
it
were
of a boundary
would be to lop
off,
harried.
?
One
and place.
INTRODUCTORY
under the influence of the British Govern-
definitely
ment, certain tribes and sections, which hitherto

had, at least nominally and outwardly, acknowledged
the
Amir
as their
By
Suzerain.
so
much
at all
North of the
the new boundary would run
events he would be disadvantaged.
Khyber,
particularly,
through
districts
and Asmar
in
of
interference,
at
last
into
the
Mohmand
country,
Bajaur,
which he was extremely sensitive
and
though
reluctant
was
he
acquiescence,
persuaded
we may
was with many an arriere pensde, and

mental reserve, that he appended his
be sure
much
it
signature to the fateful document
and shrewd as he
is,
and
that, astute
he foresaw then the storm that
would blow when actual demarcation should be

attempted.
But the
irritation
caused by the actual boundary
question, with the interference
and misappropriation
(from his point of view) which

comparatively insignificant.
It
it
threatened,
was
was a deeper anxiety
which troubled the Amir, and made
the
whole
He was not a
and
knew
nothing of
European
history,
student of
Napoleon, and his wars of aggression and conquest
and yet, even as the Czar Alexander, after the
overthrow of Frederick William at Jena and Auerarrangement repugnant to him.
stadt in
ment of
1
806, protested against the total dismemberPrussia,^ not
"the Czar objected to Napoleon absorbing Silesia, not

would be unjust to Prussia, but because he feared Napoleon as a
After Jena,
because
it
from friendship to Prussia,
THE CAMPAIGN
but because he deemed
IN TIRAH,
it
chap,
1897-98
wise to keep such a
powerful neighbour as the French Emperor at arm's

length
so did the
Amir
the
could
longer
tribes
instinctively feel that the
be
maintained
Afghanistan, the longer would his

safe.
Of any
their
between India and
original independence as a buffer
secluded and
in
own
country be
injustice or hardship to
the tribes, or of what fate might befall them through
coming under
British influence
own wishes and
of their
was supremely
and
control, or
even
feelings in the matter,
he
Such considerations would
careless.
not affect him, any more than similar sentiments in

similar circumstances
of Prussia was
fate
swayed Alexander when the

discussed with Napoleon at
But the Amir well understood what a
Tilsit.
wonderful power of absorption the British possess.
Where
to
they go they stay.
be their motto
J'y suis, fy reste, appears

and being convinced that once a
boundary was fixed they would
live
up
to
it,
he was
with alarm for what might happen next.
filled
We,
of course, on
our
side,
have always
re-
pudiated any idea of advance or annexation, or of

interference with tribal customs
and independence
but circumstances have often been in the past, and

will
be no doubt
We
find
neighbour."
at once,
it
in the future,
too strong for us.
necessary to push forward military posts,
..." Napoleon certainly would have made
had he not feared thereby
an end of Prussia
to lose the friendship of the Russian Czar.
That Czar cared little for Frederick William, but he had a keen distrust of
Napoleon, and insisted that Prussia should remain between them as a buffer.
Poulteny Bigelow, History of the German Struggle for Liberty.
INTRODUCTORY
to
make
roads to them, to raise tribal levies, to
establish police arrangements, to interfere in tribal
and so
quarrels,
forth
and however judiciously
these steps are taken, however they
upon
forced
by whatever name we may describe them,
us,
the result
we
may be
is
practically
same
the
we
dominate,
we advance, we
absorb,
we
destroy independence, and
assume the administrative control of the
country occupied.
Such would,
be
and
argument,
and with
the Amir's line of thought
such convictions in his mind it is easy to understand
why he
at all events, rightly or wrongly,
should
proposals
for
intensely
when agreed
would mean that

mountain barrier
dislike
and carried
to,
they
in the course of years the wild
many
points
the fierce and warlike tribes
posed
out,
from
at present shutting off India
Afghanistan would disappear, because

penetrated at so
boundary
the
their strength
by our
who
it
would be
military roads
hitherto
had
inter-
between the Afghans and the
English would be tamed, and disarmed, and dominated
and
in
their
place
he would
have
powerful neighbour living right up against his
his
own
ring-fence, overlooking him, and possibly threaten-
ing next his
own
independence.
However, he signed the Agreement. Sir Mortimer Durand returned to India with honour, his
mission accomplished, in November 1893, and the
next step
in the proceedings, the actual
of the boundary agreed
to,
demarcation
was forthwith under-
THE CAMPAIGN
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
taken by the Indian Government, to whom, howit was patent, from many indications, that the
A
work would not be carried out unmolested.
strong escort, some 3000 men and 6 guns, was
ever,
accordingly sent with the Delimitation Commission,
Gomal
vi& the
Valley, into
Southern Waziristan,
commence the task, and

In the
the immediate consequence was Wana.
early morning of the 3rd November 1894, our camp
where
it
was intended
to
at that place
who
was
fiercely attacked
thus rudely and emphatically
made
their pro-
our presence, and against our work.
test against
They
by the tribesmen,
were, of course, beaten off (after a severe and
costly engagement),
against them
and a regular expedition sent
after this,
under Sir William Lockhart,
traversed their country from end to end, inflicted
severe loss upon them, drove off their flocks and
and destroyed
herds,
towers.
their village
defences
and
In the end they sued for peace, accepted
our terms, paid up the fines demanded, and allowed

the boundary from the
Tochi and the Kurram
Gomal
in the
south to the
in the north to
be demar-
cated without further interruption.

I
have only referred to
illustrate
this
Wana
affair
to
the spirit in which the tribes regard our
arrangements about a boundary, and to show the

Amir's acumen and judgment were correct
he foresaw the storm that would burst

might attempt to demarcate the
And how
can one
when
whenever we
line
agreed
to.
blame these people, simple.
INTRODUCTORY
savage, and unsophisticated as they are
We may-
much as we Hke, and protest as

loudly as we can, but when they see the long line of
boundary pillars going up when they are told that
them
explain to
as
henceforth
all
inside that line practically belongs to
the British Raj, and that from this time their allegi-
ance must be to us
and when,
they note
finally,
our surveyors at work, mapping their country and
measuring their
fields, their reflection
you do protest too much
"
!
And
is,
"
Methinks
they are
irresist-
ibly driven to the conclusion that their country
annexed, and their independence gone
which
with
it
is
not easy to dispel
military posts
midst,
for
as,
a conclusion
when we
follow
on their borders, or
instance,
those
Wana, and at points in

Kurram valleys, and more
the
now
is
in
on
their
established
at
Gomal, Tochi, and
especially
on the Samana
range.
The
next section of the boundary which
we
pro-
posed to demarcate was that north of the Khyber,

where the line would run through Mohmand, Bajaur,
and Asmar.
we
were,
Here, as
literally,
have previously
on very
delicate
indicated,
ground indeed,
and although the Mission worked with the full concurrence of the Amir, and travelled indeed as his
and under the escort of

difficulties constantly
and
hitches
guests,
his
troops,
yet
and such
frequent references to their respective Governments
by Afghan and English officials were necessary, that
little or no progress had been made with the work
arose,
THE CAMPAIGN
10
when,
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
in the spring of 1895, the Chitral affair oc-
curred,
and a mihtary expedition to that
more grave
diverted attention for a while to matters
In the autumn of
than boundary commissions.
Low
1895 Sir Robert

India,
and
stayed in Chitral
we
to
keeping of
tribal levies in
it
we made a
from India, and placed

our pay
in the
it
and we estab-
on the Malakhand and Chakdara.
lished strong posts
In
But we
completed.
built a fort there
good road
returned to
his troops
task brilHantly
their
country-
had come to an
Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar
and our Commission was withdrawn, the
meantime, matters
the
absolute dead-lock on the

border,
boundary unmarked.
This brings us
a
for
to a point
moment, not
where we may pause
consider
to
the
wisdom
or
expediency of our policy on the Frontier (which

it
is
no part either of
discuss) but to consider

facts
which
my
plan or
have stated
it
will
my
business to
In view of the
its effects.
probably be con-
ceded as reasonable inferences

(a)
That
the
boundary agreement
distasteful to the
Amir
was
most
and a fortiori to
his subjects.
((5)
That
the
tribes
on
the
border
were
thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of

the boundary, that their fears were accentuated by our establishment of military posts
in
Wana,
in the
in Chitral,
Tochi and Kurram
valleys,
on the Malakhand, and on the
INTRODUCTORY
Samana
and that
range,
assurances
they
ii
in
spite
trembled
for
of our
their
in-
dependence.
That the Amir's subjects and
(c)
along
the
border,
Hyder Khan,
officials
particularly
Sipah Salar,
the
mander-in-Chief, would
be,
and
were,
thoroughly imbued with the Amir's
and spirit in
boundary agreement.
views
would lay particular
matter
the
stress
upon
all
Gholam
or Com-
of
own
the
this last point,
because while the Sipah Salar has been universally
charged with
and while
hostility to the
has been laid at his door that he has
it
corresponded
(to
on the border,
the "
Mad
our hurt) with the leading Mullahs
Say id Akbar of the Aka Khels,
e.g:
Fakir
" in
country
instigated risings against us,
with
Hadda Mulla
Swat, and the
Mohmand
at Jarobi in the
men
Indian Government
that he has
and helped the
tribes-
and even men

made to prove that he
throughout on his own initiative and
ammunition,
arms,
strenuous efforts have been
has acted
responsibility,
of the Amir,
and
in direct opposition to the wishes
whom,
it is
asserted,
having the Afghan
troops and tribesmen of the Jellalabad district at

his back,
he was strong enough
Well, perhaps he was
to defy.
not in touch or corre-
spondence with his master, but there are certainly
some who think

June
1897,
the
otherwise, and when, on the loth
Maizar
outrage
(in
the
Tochi
THE CAMPAIGN
12
valley) occurred,
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
chap.
regular bolt from the blue, for
was a time of profound peace and quiet on the

border and when this ominous occurrence was
it
followed by the attacks on the Malakhand in the
end of
July,
by the
rising of the
Mohmands and
Bajauris in early August, and finally by the revolt
of the Afridis and Orakzais in the latter part of the
same month, then undoubtedly the universal sentiment was that the Amir himself was at least in
sympathy with an outbreak which had set the
whole border in a blaze from the Malakhand to the
Kurram.
And most certainly there were substantial reasons
for connecting the Amir with these risings.
It was
notorious that for some years past "he had been
devoting
himself
with
much
persistency to
the
religious nature of the sovereignty which he wields
over the followers of the prophet in north-west

India,
and beyond; and the means employed to
solidify his
supreme headship as the
light of religion
were such as to be considered antagonistic to the

preservation of harmonious relations between the
tribesmen and the Indian Government.

the
book
There was
Takwim-ud-din, inspired by the Amir
command, which impressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and

all-important character of the jehad that war of
religious fanaticism laid down by the Koran as the
duty of every follower of Islam to wage against the
The book was certainly a remarkable
infidel.
himself,
and written to
his
INTRODUCTORY
and even assuming that the greater

was merely a rehearsal and exposition
production,
part of
it
of doctrines laid
it
feel
in the
Muhammadan
gospels,
Abdur Rahman
less singular that
the necessity to propagate afresh
and give them
doctrines,
at
down
was none the
should
13
such a time.
his
Fanatical
own
its
imperial impress
Mussulmans
realise only
too completely at present that the jehad
is,
under
given circumstances, a part of their creed, and
was with reason argued
have
that to
newly interpreted in times of peace by a

ruler
was
more or
in itself
less of
its
it
meaning
Muhammadan
an incitement to
spread out the green flag of Islam, and to smite the

infidel
It
wherever found."
was further noted
assumed the
the Light of
that the
Amir had
of Zia-ul-Millat
title
Union and
self significantly in
Faith,
wa
recently
ud-Din,
and referred
correspondence as the
"
i.e.
to him-
King
of
Islam."
was well-known that a Turkish visitor

had been received with honour in Cabul in May
1897, and that all Mullahs had been summoned to
Also,
it
that city for an
interview shortly afterwards.
It
may be that the Turk was a nobody, travelling

on his own account, unaccredited by the Sultan's
Government and it may be that the gathering of
:
the Mullahs had no political importance whatever.
But the significance of incidents like these must

depend upon the connection in which they are
1
Mills,
The Pathan Revolt in North- West India.
THE CAMPAIGN
14
viewed
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and when they were shortly succeeded by
an uprising of the tribes on the
frontier, as
spread as
and (apparently)
it
was unlocked
for,
wide-
unprovoked, then the voice of the public and the

press,
with one accord, declared the
Amir
to
be
responsible for the trouble.
The
Indian Government so far shared the popular
opinion at this time as to address a strong remonstrance to His Highness.
"A
strong expression of
the Governor-General's opinion regarding General
Gholam Hyder's
relations with the
Hadda
Mullah,
and the part taken by Afghans from the Jellalabad
Mohmand
was forwarded
to the Amir, together with an admonition that something more than a mere formal disclaimer of responsibility was expected from him."^
This produced a
reply which was accepted as satisfactory and sincere.
district in the
The Amir
disturbance,
explicitly denied all responsibility for the
outbreaks that had occurred, and emphatically repudiated
He
all
connection with the revolting tribesmen.
issued orders forthwith strictly forbidding any
of his
own people
to join the tribal gatherings,
and
directed that no refuge within his dominions should
be accorded to armed bodies of tribesmen fleeing

before the advance of our troops.
This prompt disavowal and action on H.H. Abdur
Rahman's part restored him to favour in the general

and when shortly afterwards he read
estimation
:
"The
Risings on the North-West Frontier, 1897-98" (p. 150), Pioneer
Press, Allahabad.
INTRODUCTORY
15
out in public durbar the Viceroy's letter to himself,
and the
draft of his
solemnly asserted
British,
and
own
his
and
reply,
sincere
same
for
the
his determination to maintain his agree-
ments with them unbroken, he was

in the
at the
friendship
fully rehabilitated
good opinion of Government and it may

and throughout
;
be said here that, from this time,
the operations which ensued, he adhered honourably

to the friendly attitude assumed.
CHAPTER
II
THE AFRIDIS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES
The
Afridis alleged their
reasons for quarrelling
with the British to be
2.
Encroachment upon
Enhancement of the
3.
Interference with tribal customs, in that
1.
their country.
salt tax.
refused to give up to
women
as
had
taken
them such of
refuge
in
we
their
British
territory.
Probably the
being considered
in
first
of these
in the light of
reasons,
what
the facts
have written
the preceding chapter, was the real teterrima
causa belli:
made by
posts
and, in
the
their leaders that
audacious
demand now
we should abandon our
on the Samana, and withdraw altogether
from the Swat Valley, they doubtless reckoned on

the countenance and support of the Amir.
At the conclusion of the Afghan war of 1878-80

the Government of India, with the concurrence of
the
Amir,
entered
into
Afridis to keep open the
an agreement with
Khyber
Pass.
the
For cen-
CHAP.
II
turies past the route vid the
Afghanistan,
approach sink
it
and
it
is
by comparison
insignificance
into
of the
first
importance in the
and trade and
interests of peace
it
Khyber has been the
highway connecting Central Asia,

and India.
All other avenues of
great historic
with
17
that
civilisation
should be steadily kept open, and safeguarded
who
against the marauding bands
made
tolls
it
their
money from
The Government
that
all
who have ventured
it.
basis,
and
of India determined, therefore,
arrangements permanently on a
to place the Pass
sound
have
happy hunting-ground, and have levied
of blood and
to use
in the past
it
was agreed,
the Afridis should

receiving
this time,
in
February 1881,
from
cease their raiding
from Government
in
lieu
of
the plunder collected from caravans and travellers
an
annual
further
payment of 87,000
decided
that
forts
rupees.
It
be
should
built
was
by
us in the Khyber, and garrisoned by levies furnished by the Afridis, but paid by
This put
us.
another 87,000 rupees annually into their hungry

pockets.
These arrangements were fully assented to by

the Afridis, and cordially concurred in by the Amir,
to
whom
it
is
a matter of
much moment
that the
Pass should be kept open uninterruptedly for

for
he derives a large revenue from the
by caravans which traverse

Forts were
it,
leave his territory.
as
traffic,
tolls
paid
they enter or
built
by us
at
AH
THE CAMPAIGN
i8
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
Musjid, and at Landi Kotal, and at one or two
intermediate points
armed
were raised and
the levies
and under the command of men Hke Mr.

Hastings (who was their first CO.) and afterwards Colonel Warburton (whose name is a house;
among
hold word
and
border clans),
these
still
under Captain Barton of the Guides, they
later
discharged their duties punctually and
faithfully,
and peace and order reigned along the
perilous
route.
But
was
this
to
The
end now.
preposterous
demand of the Afridis that we should withdraw from

the Samana and the Swat Valley could not, of course,
be entertained for a moment. They decided, thereurged on by their Mullahs, to break the
fore,
faith
they had kept with us for sixteen years, to sack the

forts,
and
to close the
Khyber.
Orakzais to join them

almost before
could
fall,
They persuaded
in this declaration of war,
we had
the
and
realised that such a stroke
they had assembled their lashkars, and
attacked and captured forts Ali Musjid, Maude, and
Landi Kotal.
in revolt
later,
the Orakzais rose
on the Kohat border, and
the
Samana
and
isolated,
ful
few days
forts,
fell,
man
of which one, Saragheri, small
after a heroic defence
of 36th Sikhs,
died to a
fiercely assailed
who
constituted
before the
enemy
its
by the handgarrison,
finally
and
got posses-
sion.
In
the
meantime
the
Afridis,
realising
the
gravity of the situation they had themselves created,
II
turned
now
Amir
the
to
for
aid
19
the coming
in
In a petition sent to Cabul by a deputa-
struggle.
and Elders, they wrpte
tion of their Maliks
The British Government has been from olden times gradually

and even upon Afghan territory, and
encroaching upon our country,
We
has erected forts at various points within our borders.
have
Afghan Government on many occasions,

but your Highness has paid no attention to our complaints.
Therefore, being helpless, and having regard to Islam, and our constancy
in religion, we have now, under the guidance of God, opened the
door of jehad in the face of the said Government, and we have
complained of this
to
the
We
severed our connection with them in every way.
and
destroyed five forts on the
Samdna
have plundered
Hangu, one fort at
above
Shinauri, at the foot of the Samdna, in British territory, one fort
at the Ubldn Bass, near Kohat,
etc., etc.
Th^re
are, however, three
Samdna) which have

grace of God we will destroy and burn
big forts on the top of the said mountain (the

not been taken yet.
these also.
All
the top of the

the
the
of Tirah have taken up their position on

mountain {Samdna) ; and at its base, from Kohat to
Rud-i-Kurman
Orakzai runs, and

to
By
the people
in the district
of Kurram, the frontier of the

making ]eh3.d from time
the tribesmen have been
We
time within their respective limits.
will never consent to
tender our allegiance to the British Government,

subjects.
We
and
become their
will never give up the reins of authority of our
country to the hands of the Government.

willing to tender our allegiance to the
On
the contrary,
King of Islam.
It
we
are
is
in-
cumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our

interests, and consider our position, but that of the whole of Afghanistan.
We therefore send these eighteen persons from among our
Maliks, Ulama,
presence.
range,
We
and we
and
Elders, with our petitions to your Highness'
are at present engaged in a jehad on the

request that
your Highness will
Samdna
be pleased to do
for our good and benefit ; and, by the grace of God, we

your Highness' instructions, because we leave the
conduct and management of our affairs in the hands ofyour Highness
in every respect.
We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen
what
is
will act up to
to
do service to your Highness.
This
is the
time to gain the object
THE CAMPAIGN
20
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
of your Highness}
All the Moslems are now at the disposal of
your Highness in the shape of regular troops, artillery, and money.
If the British prove

services to be done
We
may
To
this
reply.
Dated
appeal the
Rabius-Sani, 1315 (7th Sep-
Amir turned
was sent on
Moslems.
be left to us by
hope that after the perusal of our petition
favour us with a
tember 1897).
The
your Highness.
your Highness will
victorious, they will ruin the
on this side
The
a deaf ear.
him in Cabul, but the

members of the deputation were refused an audience,
and were not allowed to proceed beyond Jellalabad.
On the 23rd of September His Highness replied as
petition
follows
to
I have perused your petitions,^ all of which were with one object.
I now write to you in reply that it is eighteen years since I came to
Cabul, and you know yourselves that I went to Rawal Pindi (in
April 1885^ by the Khyber route. In consideration of my friendship with the British Government I had gone to their country as
and on my way Ifound many ofyour tribesmen on both

of the Pass, who made salaams to me.
If what you state now
true, why did you not tell me at that time about the matter, so
their guest,
sides
is
I might have
that
conferred with
HE.
Viceroy about it?
the
Some years after this, when the boundary was being laid down,
Sir Mortimer Uurand passed through the Khyber and came to
Cabul.
All the frontier tribesmen knew of this, and saw the
Mission with their own eyes.
Why did not then your Mullahs,
and Maliks, and Elders come to me when Sir Mortimer Durand
came with authority
to settle the
discussed the matter with

silent,
now a
and
him
silence indicates consent.
boundary, so that
At
all
that time
'
A remarkable
Each
could have
remained
I do not know on what
breach has taken place between you
after you have fought with them,
you
and
account
the English.
and displeased them, you inform
But
me.
expression.
section of the Afridis seems to have petitioned separately, but the
purport of their combined appeals
is
given accurately above.
II
21
have entered into an alliance with the British Government in
regard
to matters
of
and up to the present

from the side of the
State,
the agreement has occurred
We
standing that they are Christians.
time no breach of
British, notwith-
are Moslems
and followers
of the religion of the Prophet, and also of the four Khalifas of the
Prophet.
How can we then commit a breach of an agreement!
What do you
to fulfil your
promise;
Koran
say about the verse in the
promise
is
the first duty
"Fulfil your
of a Moslem.
God,
on the day when the first promise was taken, asked all the creatures
God
whether he was their
God and
our Creator^
or
They
not.
you are our
will never, without cause or occasion,
Infidels
You
test."
will
T
of great importance.
swerve from an agreement,
thus see that the matter of the agreement
up
Yes,
of agreements.
will thus be distinguished by this
because the English,
'
Therefore, on the day of the resurrection
the first question will be about the observance
and Moslems
said,
is
to the present time,
have in no way departed
from the line of boundary laid down in the map they have agreed
Then why should I do so? To do so will be far
upon with me.
from justice. T cannot, at the instarwe of a few interested people,
bring ignominy on myself and
What
own
my people.
own hands you must now
you have done with your
on your
best
backs.
judge of your
T have nothing
affairs.
(literally, spoiled the matter')
Now
to
that
do with you.
you have got
you want me
to help
Now
them
to
the
into trouble
You have
you.
allowed the time when matters might have been ameliorated

by.
carry
You are
to slip
T cannot say or do anything. I have sent back from

I gave them each a
Jellalabad the Maliks you had deputed to me.
lungi and ten rupees for their road expenses, and T did not trouble
come
And
to
Cabul.
that, for the present,
out of the Amir.
what were
It
was
all
the Afridis got
would be interesting
their thoughts
to
and speculations,
know
as, dis-
appointed and with heavy hearts, the members of the

deputation retraced their steps to the highlands of
Tirah.
CHAPTER
III
PREPARATIONS, AND THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
While
the Afrldis sought in vain the help of the
Amir, the Government of India was organising

forces to punish them,
its
and the Commander-in-Chief
was considering the plan of the coming campaign.

It was generally admitted that the autumn was not
the most favourable time for the start of the expedition.
If
any choice had been permissible
matter, the spring,
when
in the
the luxuriant crops of the
uplands of Maidan and Tirah, and of the

valleys of
Mastura and Bara, were ready
would have been the best season
An
for
fertile
for cutting,
an advance.
invasion of their country at this time, following
on a rigorous blockade throughout the preceding

winter, would probably have brought the tribes to
their senses,
and secured
tively early in the day.
or delay.
The
their submission,
But
it
swift
was no time to dally
irruption into the Khyber,
capture and destruction of our
blow to our
compara-
prestige,
forts,
and the
were a serious
and an outrage demanding
and certain punishment.
To
have delayed
CH.in
active operations for even a
23
week longer than was
necessary for earnest preparation, would have been

misinterpreted on both sides of the border to
hesitation, weakness,
and
mean
and irreparable mis-
fear,
chief and misunderstanding might have been
the
result.
It
was wisely decided therefore
forthwith
Lockhart
against the
was
to launch a force
General Sir William
foe.
nominated
command
to
it,
and
hastened out at short notice from England, where
he was enjoying a well-earned holiday,
assume
to
army which included many of
the leadership of an
the finest regiments,
and Native,
British
in
the
Service.
The composition of
those who filled the
the force, and the
commands
chief
names of
and staff
appointments, are given below.

In considering the size of this force,
remembered
that the Orakzais
it
must be
and the Afridis could
muster between them between 40,000 and 50,000

fighting men, if all the sections combined and put
But
forth their full strength.
that this
would happen
it
was not probable
and, notwithstanding the
pressure put upon them by
their Mullahs,
sections held aloof from the
first
example
certain
the Adamkhels
^while others, particuand the Jowakis, for

larly amongst the Orakzais, betrayed irresolution
and reluctance to join in the fray.

formidable numbers
Still, it was certain that
would oppose our advance.
The
country to be
THE CAMPAIGN
24
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
invaded was a terra incognita, but known to be wild
and mountainous, abounding

dangerous
defiles
in difficult passes
and
the tribesmen were notoriously
well-armed, enterprising, and bold
and the
line of
communication would be a long one, subject to

attack throughout
its
length,
Therefore, large though the force des-
guarding.
cribed below was,
it
was
that not a regiment too
The
and requiring careful
force
was
and the event proved
felt,
many had been
detailed.
officially styled the "
Tirah Ex-
peditionary Force,'' and was distributed for operations
as follows
{a)
main column of two
divisions, each consist-
ing of two infantry brigades and certain

divisional troops, to start from
Kohat and
advance on Tirah from the neighbourhood

of the
{b)
Samana
range.
force to hold the line of communication of
Kohat and Tirah

the posts on the Samana range),
of one mountain battery, two
the main column between

(including
consisting
native cavalry regiments, and four native

infantry battalions.
{c)
mixed brigade,
Column,"
to
be styled the " Peshawar
to operate as required
from Pesh-
awar.
{d)
force,
designated the "
Column,"
to
in
support on the
line, for
employment as
be stationed
Hangu-Parachinar
Kurram Movable
circumstances might require.
HI
{e)
mixed brigade
to
be formed at Rawal
Pindi as a reserve.
These
forces
were composed as follows
THE MAIN COLUMN First
Division
Firsi Brigade
2nd
Battalion,
1st
2nd
The Derbyshire Regiment.

The Devonshire Regiment.
1st
Gurkha
(Rifle)
Regiment.
30th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 6 British Field Hospital.

No. 34 Native Field Hospital.
Second Brigade
2nd
Battalion,
1st Battalion,
2nd
The Yorkshire Regiment.

Royal West Surrey Regiment.
Battalion, 4th
Gurkha
(Rifle)
Regiment.
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.

Sections
Sections
A
A
and B of No. 8 British Field Hospital.

and C of No. 14 British Field Hospital.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS
No. I Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. I (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
Two Squadrons, i8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
28th Regiment of
Bombay
Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
One Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners

The Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
The Maler Kotla Imperial Service Sappers.
A of No. 13 British Field Hospital.

Section
Second Division
Third Brigade
1st Battalion,
1st Battalion,
25
The Gordon Highlanders.

The Dorsetshire Regiment.
THE CAMPAIGN
26
2nd Gurkha
1st Battalion,
IN TIRAH,
(Rifle)
1897-98
ci
Regiment.
15th (The Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Fourth Brigade
2nd
Battalion,
1st Battalion,
1st Battalion
The King's Own Scottish Borderers.

The Northamptonshire Regiment.
3rd Gurkha
(Rifle)
Regiment.
36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Sections
Sections
C and D of No.
A and B of No.
9 British Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal
Artillery.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
Machine Gun Detachment, i6th Lancers.

Squadrons, 1 8th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
2 1st Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers).
No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
One Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners.
The Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry.
Two
The Sirmur
Section
Imperial Service Sappers.
of No.
LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
I Kashmir Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
39th (Gurhwal Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2nd Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
No.
8th Regiment, Bengal Lancers.
No.
Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

The Jeypore
Imperial Service Transport Corps,
Ill

The Gwalior
27
Imperial Service Transport Corps.
Ordnance Field Park.

Engineer Field Park.
British General Hospital, of
500 beds,
at
Rawal
Pindi.
Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Rawal Pindi.
No.
Field Medical Store Dep6t.
No. 2 Field Medical Store Depot.

No.
(For First Division.)

(For Second Division.)
Veterinary Field Hospital.
No. 1 1 British Field Hospital.

No. 47 Native Field Hospital,
\
I
For sick and wounded
ing from the
field.
No. 64 Native Field Hospital. /
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

2nd
2nd
Battalion,
Battalion,
The Royal Inniskilling

The Oxfordshire Light
Fusiliers.
Infantry.
9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
34th Pioneers.
4Sth (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry
57th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
9th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No.
No.
No. 45 Native Field Hospital, A and B Sections.

British General Hospital, of 250 beds, at Nowshera.
Native General Hospital, of 500 beds, at Nowshera.
THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

1
2th (Khelat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1st Battalion, 5 th
Gurkha
The Kapurthala Regiment
Rifles.
of Imperial Service Infantry.
3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

6th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
One Regiment
Section
of Central India Horse.
of No. 3 British Field Hospital.

Section B of No. 46 Native Field Hospital.
Native General Hospital, of 200 beds, at Kohat.
return-
THE CAMPAIGN
28
THE RAWAL
IN TIRAH,
1897-'
PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE
The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

The Duke of Comwall's Light Infantry.
27th Regiment (ist Baluch Battalion) of Bombay (Light) Infantry.
2nd Regiment of Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.
2nd
Battalion,
1st Battalion,
Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers.

The
follows
and commands of the force were as
staff
ARMY STAFF
Commanding
Lieutenant-General
the Force
General Sir
K.C.S.I.
W.
S.
A. Lockhf. 't,
(Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell,
F..
C. B.
8th Bengal
Lancers.
2nd Lieutenant
H. A. Annesley, i8th
J.
Hussars.
Lieutenant G. R. De. H. Smith, Central

India Horse.
I'
Orderly Officers
2nd Lieutenant E. H. E. CoUen, Royal

Artillery.
Maharaj
Dhiraj
Pratap
Sir
Singh,
Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Jodhpur.
Deputy
Adjutant
General
Chief of the Staer

.
Assistant Quartermaster-General
Deputy Assistant QuartermasterGeneral
...
Intelligence
Officer
^
Haldane,
Gordon
Swanston,
8th B.L.
Medical
Officer
(with ^
the temporary rank of Surgeon^
Major-General)
ant Quartermaster-General.
Captain E.
W.
S.
K. Maconchy, D.S.O.,
4th Sikhs.
f Captain
Principal
O'SuUivan, R. E.
L.
Highlanders.
1 ^^^^^.^ ^
General for Intelligence

,
A.
Quartermaster-Generalf Colonel G. H. More-Molyneux, Assist-
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-
W.
for Intelligence
^..î.j..i/-.
if Captain J.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General -!.,,,
Nicholson,
7th Bengal Infantry.
Major G. H.
Field
G.
f Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Barrow,
Assistant Adjutant-General
^
Assistant
W.
and ( Brigadier - General

C.B.
I
i,
F.
,.
Badcock, D.S.O.,
F.
,
1st
,,
Battalion 5th Gurkhas.
g^^g^^^_(,^,^^^j
Thomson, C.B.,
j^^;^^ ^^^.^^^ g^^^j^^^
'
PTcni a Photograph hy Bassano.
Brigadier-General Sir W, G. Nicholson, K.C.B.
An
Deputy Adjutant-General and Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

ablliticsy fertility oj resource, and experience in zua?', the value of whose assistance
difficult /or me to acknowledge in adequate terms. -Sir William Lockhakt's Despatches.
officer
is
of brilliant
To /ace page
28.
it
Ill
Secretary
to
Brigadier -General,
Commanding /
Royal Artillery
\
I
Orderly Officer, Royal Artillery
Ordnance
Brigadier-General,
Co.^manding f
Royal Engineers
Brigade- Major, Royal Engineers

Orderly Officer, Royal Engineers
Superintendent,
Army'
Signalling
Artillery.
de
C.
Major H. F. Mercer, Royal Artillery.

Colonel C. H. Scott, Royal Artillery.
B'^^^'-Cl"^l J- E- Broadbent, R.E.
(^'* *= temporary rank of BrigadierGeneral).
Captain S. L. Craster, R.E.
Lieutenant H. Biddulph, R.E.
^| ^^J'
J"
^- Logan-Home,
1st
Bed-
fordshire Regiment.
Grimston,
{Captain R. E.
Headquarter Commandant
Royal
Hamilton,
C.
Artillery.
Army
Morris,
A.
Brigadier-General C. H. Spragge, Royal
./Captain
Brigade-Major, Royal Artillery
Officer
W.
Medical / Surgeon -Major

t Medical Staff.
Principal
Officer
29
Bengal
6th
Cavalry.
Assistant-
Judge Advocate- General
^- J"
(^''ff
Infantry.
^9*
2^
Balfe,
Deputy
^"^'^^
^^
(.
E.
{Lieutenant -Colonel
Principal Provost Marshal
Judge Advocate- General,

f Captain G. W. Palin,
missary-General.
Commissariat Transport Officer
Assistant
Com-
\
Staff-Surgeon (from the Force).
B.
L.
Glover.
f Lieutenant-Colonel
Controller of Military Accounts
W.
R. Le G. Ander-
son, Military Accounts Department.
/Captain
Field Paymaster
Lieutenant -Colonel
f Veterinary
Inspecting Veterinary Officer
Shewell,
G.
P.
Military
/Brevet -Colonel
Chief Survey Officer
I
Principal Chaplain
Accounts Department.
Sir
T.
H.
Holdich,
K.C.LE., C.B., R.E.

Rev. A. S. Dyer, M.A.
MAIN COLUMN
First Division
Commanding
(writh
the local rank

[-
Brigad ier-General
W.
P.
Symons, C.B.
of Major-General)
Aide-de-Camp
Captain A. G. Dallas, i6th Lancers.
M. Wikely, 17th B.C.
Orderly Officer
Lieutenant
Orderly Officer
Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th B.C.
J.
/ Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, CLE.,
17th Bengal Cavalry.
THE CAMPAIGN
30
Assistant Quartermaster-General
IN TIRAH,
^- ^- ^- ^''^'' ^""^ Derbyshire

Regiment.
f^^^'
I
f Captain
General
Field Intelligence Officer
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Lancers, Hyderabad Contmgent.
Townsend, Army
W. K.
Captain
Duthy, Royal
Artillery.
Macleod, Royal Artillery.
Captain A. R. Braid, Royal Artillery.
Commanding Royal Engineers
Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Hart, R.E.
M. R. Thackwell, Royal
/Captain O.
Adjutant, Royal Engineers
Engineers.
/Major J. A.
\ Engineers.
Assistant Field Engineer
E.
f Lieutenant-Colonel A. E.
Divisional Ordnance Officer
Field Engineer
Punjab
Lieutenant C. E. E. F. K. Macquoid, 1st
Adjutant, Royal Artillery
2nd
Nicholls,
| Surgeon-Colonel
\ Medical Staffi
Commanding
Royal Artillery
A.
Infantry.
Principal
Medical Officer.
'^
CHAP.
1897-98
{Lieutenant
J.
Ferrier,
Royal
D.S.O.,
F. N. Carmichael, Royal
Engineers.
W.
{Lieutenant
H.
Royal
Bunbury,
Engineers.
Assistant
ssistant
Superintendent,
Su
Army /
\
Signalling
Provost Marshal
Captain H.
T.
Kenny,
2nd Bombay
Lancers.
/Captain H. W. G. Graham, D.S.O., Sth

.
Lancers.
{Colonel L. W.
Commissary-General
sariat
{Captain H.
Assistant to Commissary-General
Christopher,
Commis-
Department.
S.
G. Hall, Commissariat
Department.
Chief Transport Officer
{Major
Mansfield, Commissariat Depart-
ment.
Assistant
Chief
to
Transport
(,^pj^j^ T.
Divisional Commissariat Officer
\
Assistant to
Divisional
H. Smith, 12th B.C.
I
/ Major W. R.
Officer
Commis^ /Lieutenant
sariat Officer
Yielding,
CLE.,
D.S.O.,
Commissariat Department.
H.
C.
Corbett,
i8th
Hussars.
{Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Commissariat
Divisional Transport Officer
Department.
Assistant to Divisional Transport
Officer
Survey Officer
Chaplain, Church of England
Wesleyan Chaplain
Roman
/ Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Bat\ talion. The Manchester Regiment.

Major
W.
T. Bythell, R. E.
Rev. R. M. Kirwan, M.A.
Rev.
Catholic Chaplain
Rev. Father N.
J. Findlater.
J.
Winkley.
Ill
31
First Brigade : First Division
.(Brigadier-General
Commanding
Orderly Officer
R.
/Lieutenant A. H. S. Hart, East Surrey

Regiment.
L
^^P'"'"^- ^- ^- ^^'"^^"'
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General
'
II
^ ^
5th Gurkhas.
Deputy Assistant
Brigade Commissariat Officer
Regiment.
.(
Commissary-General.
(.
.1
Brigade Transport Officer
t
,
-n-
NichoU,
Bedford-
W. Mann.
First Division
A.D.C.
A. Gaselee,
Brigadier- General
^
t
C.B.
Lieutenant A. N. D. Fagan,
!^,,,.
Hyderabad Contingent.
(
Officer
1st
Lancers.
Veterinary Captain H. T.
I.
^^ ^^ ^- '^""^' 'Sth Bengal

| ^^P'^
Second Brigade
H.
Regiment.
shire
Veterinary Officer
^
Orderly
2^"^""
Captain A. Mullaly. Deputy Assistant
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat f Lieutenant
,.
Commanding
'^'
Quartermaster- f Captain H. R. B. Donne, 1st Norfolk
General
Officer
V.C,
Hart,
C.
ist
Lancers,
*
T^
*
A
I
. Aj. rAdjutant-General
Deputy
Assistant
f
<
_,
General
.
W.
Major
,
Veterinary Officer
Ist
Bed-
Gurkhas.
.
C.
D.
S.
Deputy
Leslie,
Assistant Commissary-General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat r Captain

Officer
Aldworth, D.S.O.,
Major A. A. Barrett, 2nd Battalion 5th
f Lieutenant
.
fordshire Regiment.
H.
de
Gough,
P.
la
i6th
Lancers.
Lieutenant H. Macandrew, Sth B.C.

Veterinary Lieutenant
W.
F. Shore.
Second Division
,.
Major-General Commanding
Aide-de-Camp
f
.
Maior-General
A.
G.
Yeatman-Biggs,
-J
.|
Captain E.
St.
A. Wake, 10th Bengal
^^^^^^^
'Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.
uraeny umcers
I
.
H.
H.
Lieutenant - Colonel
Hon.
Maharajah Sir Nripendra Narayun,
Bahadur, of Cooch Behar, G.C.I.E.,
6th B.C.
THE CAMPAIGN
32
IN TIRAH,
R.
{Lieutenant -Colonel
CHAP.
1897-98
Ridgeway,
K.
V.C.
Assistant Quartermaster- General
General for Intelligence
\
f
Principal Medical Officer

'
Royal Artillery
King's Royal Rifle Corps.
/Captain
Lieutenant-Colonel
Major C. P. Triscott, D.S.O., R.A.

Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley,
H.
(Balu-
Indian Medical Service.
Commanding / Lieutenant-Colonel
\ Artillery.
24th
Walters,
F.
Regiment of Bombay Infantry.

Surgeon-Colonel G. M'B. Davis, D.S.O.,
chistan)
R.
Royal
Purdy,
Captain H. D. Grier, Royal Artillery.
Divisional Ordnance Officer
Captain H. F. Head, Royal Artillery.
Commanding Royal Engineer
Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Wilkieson, R.E.
Captain T. Fraser, R.E.

Field Engineer

Assistant
Superintendent,
Provost Marshal
Captain F. H. Kelly, R.E.
Lieutenant
W.
A. Stokes, R.E.
Lieutenant C. B. L. Greenstreet, R.E.
Signalling
Army /Captain G.
\ Regiment.
/Captain W.
C.
Rigby,
Knight,
C.
Wiltshire
1st
Bengal
4th
Cavalry.
/ Lieutenant W. M.
Field Treasure Chest Officer
Grimley, 20th (Punjab)
Bengal Infantry.
W.
Chaplain, Church of England
Rev. H.
Roman
Rev. Father A. Vanden Deyssel.
Catholic Chaplain
/Lieutenant-Colonel
Divisional Commissariat Officer
\
Assistant
to
Divisional
sariat Officer
Nelson,
M.A.
B.
L.
P.
Reilly,
Commis / Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd

\ P.C.
{Major H. L. Hutchins, Commissariat
-
Divisional Transport Officer
Department.
Assistant to Divisional Transport
Officer
Survey Officer
/ Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal
Assistant Survey Officer
Infantry.
Mr. E. A. Wainwright, Survey of India.
Lieutenant G. A.
Third Brigade
Commanding
(with the temporary
R.E.
Second Division
/ Colonel
rank of Brigadier-General)
J. Leslie,
F.
J.
Kempster,
D.S.O.,
A.D.C.
/ Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal
o.
'
Munster
'Major H.
Fusiliers.
St.
Leger Wood,
shire Regiment.
1st Dorset-
Ill
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Major
General
H.
Brigade
Transport
Officer
^
^
Veterinary Officer
W.
Lieutenant R. A. N. Tytler, 1st Gordon
Highlanders.
Veterinary Lieutenant C. Rose.
.|
Second Division
J3.S.O.
/Lieutenant
.
Horse
Royal
Wellesley,
P-
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- / Captain F.

General
I
.
rscn
Officer
( Captain
'^
/
I
|
I
Veterinary Officer
J.
M. Edwards, 3rd Bombay
Light Cavalry.
E. Y.
Watson,
Commissariat
'
-!
I.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat
Blood, ist Royal Irish
J-
C.
Artillery.
C^P'^^^.
R.
29th Punjab
Birch,
/Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B.,
omman J.mg
Orderly Officer
T,
^'^'"="^'''"^"'
Infantry.
Fourth Brigade
^'
-{^"'j^^cG^'
Officer
Bengal
19th
Lancers.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat f Lieutenant F.
Massy,
S.
33
Department.
Lieutenant N. G.
^^Pt^
H. Armstrong,
J-
East
ist
Yorkshire Regiment.
Veterinary Lieutenant F.
Bombay
Eraser, 4th
Cavalry.
W.
Wilson.
Line of Communications
_
, ^General Officer
/-.
JCommanding
( Lieutenant-General Sir
i
-v ,^ n
Palmer,
A. P.
Aide-de-Camp
Lieutenant F. C. Galloway, R.A.
Orderly Officer
Lieutenant H. O. Parr, 7th B.
Assistant
Adjutant and Quarter- f Captain (temporary Major)
master-General
Deputy Assistant
Adjutant
and
Quartermaster-General
Principal Medical Officer (with the-v
temporary
rank
of
Surgeon- V
Colonel)
Commandant
_
I.
G.
Philipps, 1st Battalion,
5th
Gurkhas.
g^.^^^^
w.
g^^^^^^
E. Saunders,
Lieutenant
Army
Colonel
Medical
Staff.
Captain Watkins, Royal Artillery.
f Captain
!
i
Section
Captain
W.
Infantry.
Senior Ordnance Officer
Section
TuUoch, 24th Bombay
I.
J.
Captain
Commandant
O. B.
S. F. Shore,
8th Bengal
Lancers.
f
It
Lancers.
I
St.
G. L. Steel, 2nd Bengal
THE CAMPAIGN
34
Section
IN TIRAH,
CHAP.
1897-98
{Captain F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal
Commandant
Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding, / Lieutenant - Colonel
Royal Engineers

Field Engineer
W. Thurburn,
J.
Royal Engineers.
Captain H. V. Biggs, Royal Engineers.
Captain C. H. Cowie, Royal Engineers.
{Lieutenant H.
Rogers, Royal
S.
En-
gineers.
/Lieutenant R. P. T. Hawksley, Royal
I
Provost Marshal
Engineers.
Lieutenant A. E. Turner, Royal Engineers.
Major L.
S. Peyton, 14th
Chief Commissariat Officer
/ Brevet Colonel
Chief Transport
/ Major
I
Officer, L. of C.
\
Assistant
to
Chief
Veterinary Inspector
Bengal Lancers.
M. Keighley, D.S.O.,
C. V. Williamson, Commissariat
Department.
Transport /Captain
Officer
C.
H.
T.
Smith,
Bengal
12th
Cavalry.
Veterinary Captain F.
W.
Forsdyke.
Staff at the Base

/Colonel
Base Commandant
Deputy
Assistant
Adjutant
and
Commandant,
Depot
British
I
I
W.
Major A.
Vousden,
V.C,
Indian
J.
W.
Allen, ist East
Kent
Regiment.
Troops /Major A.
L
J.
Staff Corps.
de
B.
V.
Durham
Paget,
Light Infantry.
Adjutant
and
Quartermaster, /Captain A. F. Bundock, 2nd Battalion
Troops Depot
South Lancashire Regiment.
L
Commandant,
Native
Troops /Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.S.O., 2nd
British
Depot
\ Bombay Infantry
/ Captain M. W. S.
Base Ordnance Officer
Officer in charge of Engineer Field
Park
(Grenadiers).
Pasley,
Royal
Artil-
lery.
Captain U.
W.
Evans, R.E.
{Major H. R.
Base Commissariat Officer
Marrett, Assistant
Com-
missary-General.
/Captain
W. H. D.
Rich, Assistant
Com-
missary-General.
Lieutenant F.
Departmental Assistants
Commissariat Officer
to
Base
W. H.
Deputy
Forteath,
Lieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Lieutenant H.
G.
P.
Beville,
Deputy-
Ill
Departmental Assistant
...
Trans-
(for
-1
*
.
I
>
port) to the Base Commissariat

V-
35
,.
,
.,
.,,.
,
,
Captain H. N. Hilliard, t,
Deputy
Assist,
ant Commissary-General.
W.
Captain
P.
M.
i8th
Pollock,
Hussars.
H.
Captain
Smyth,
Battalion,
1st
Cheshire Regiment.
Regimental
Assistants
Base
to
Lieutenant T. E. Bayley, 20th Hussars.
Commissariat Officer
Lieutenant C. G. E. Ewart, 5th Bengal

Cavalry.
N. Davis, 3rd
Lieutenant E.
Controller of Military Accounts
Infantry,
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

A. G. Hammond,
V.C, A.D.C.
H. D. Hammond, Royal
{Brigadier - General
Commanding
C.B., D.S.O.,
Orderly Officer
{Lieutenant
Artillery.
Assistant Adjutant
and
Quarter- ( Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Gwat-
master-General
Deputy
Assistant
Adjutant
and
kin, 13th Bengal Lancers.

Major C. T. Becker, 2nd King's
{Captain F. H. Hoghton,
Own
Scottish Borderers.
1st
Bombay
Infantry (Grenadiers).
Lieutenant-Colonel
Royal Artillery
Royal
Artillery.
Major T. E. Rowan, Royal Artillery.

Major E. C. Spilsbury, R.E.
Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E.
Army f Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, East Yorkshire
\ Regiment
.
Assistant
Superintendent,
Signalling
{Lieutenant H. H. Jones, Deputy Assistant Commissary- General.
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat f Lieutenant V.
Officer
\
.
R. Pigott,
1st
Battalion
Cheshire Regiment.
/Lieutenant

Veterinary Officer
R.
G. Thomsett,
Captain F. R. Drake, Royal Artillery.
Brigade Ordnance Officer

Field Engineer
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel
Army Medical Staff.

Commanding, f Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. M. Smith,
I
C.
Charlton,
Royal Horse
Artillery.
Veterinary Lieutenant F. U. Carr.
THE CAMPAIGN
36
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
THE KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN

Commanding
(with rank and pay
of Colonel on the Staff)
Orderly Officer
/
1.
Depmy
W.
Colonel
Hill, Indian Staff Corps,

^
I
I
Captain R. O. C.
Regi-
M'Swiney. D.S.O.,
1st
Scudamore, D.S.O.,
1st
*^^j' ^- ^-
Lancers,
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- f Captain C.

General
Hume, Border
ment.
P.
Royal Scots
Fusiliers.
r Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel
.}
I
Brigade Ordnance Officer
|
l
Field Engineer
lery.
A. Gibbon, Royal Engineers.
J.
/Lieutenant
En-
A. Tandy, Royal
E.
Assistant
Service.
Lieutenant D. R. Poulter, Royal Artil-
Captain
W.
R. Murphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical
Superintendent,
Army
gineers.
( Lieutenant
R.
C.
Scott
4th
Elliott,
Signalling
Madras Pioneers.
./Captain C. F. T. Murray, Assistant
(.
Commissary-General.
H. Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire

J Captain P.
Officer
Light Infantry.
/Captain H. W. C.
Madras Infantry.
I
Survey Officer
/ Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Wahab, C.I.E.,

R.E.
I
Veterinary Officer
Veterinary Lieutenant
Colquhoun,
W.
24th
N. Wright.
THE RAWAL PINDI RESERVE BRIGADE
,.
Commandmg
_
f
.
"
-^
Orderly Officer
|
f
<
Brigadier
General
C.
R.
Maceregor,
s 5 .
2nd Lieutenant E. W. C. Ridgeway,

j>
&
,
29th Punjab Infantry.

r Major Sir R. A. W. Colleton,' Bart.,'
I
^.-..Aj-**/^-
,'
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- / Captain

General
I
.
(
I

Officer
/
1
,,,,.,.
Royal Welsh
H.
1st
Fusiliers.
Hudson,
19th
Bengal
Lancers.
Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Commissariat
Department.
Lieutenant A. P. Trevor, 20th
Infantry.
Bombay
Ill
Lieutenant K. E. Nangle, 3rd Infantry,
Veterinary Officer
The
Warburton,
Blakeway.
But
in Sir
Veterinary Lientenant
W.
Anthony.
S.
with the Force were Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I.,
political officers
Colonel
37
C.S.I., and
Messrs.
King, Hastings,
Donald,
William Lockhart himself was vested supreme
and
political
power, as well as supreme military control of the expedition.
The approximate
in
strength of the force detailed
the foregoing pages was loio British officers,
10,882
British
native
troops,
troops,
491 native
officers,
197 hospital assistants,
19,558 followers, 8000 horses,
22,123
179 clerks,
18,384 mules and
and 1440 hospital riding-ponies.

But to
these figures must be added an enormous number of
ponies,
camels, carts, ponies,
etc.,
working on the long
line
of communication with Kohat, and gradually brought

into use as needs increased
and the roads were im-
proved.
In considering the plan of campaign
borne
in
mind
it
must be
that the objective of the expedition
was Tirah, the summer home of the Afridis and

Orakzais, which had never before been entered by
a British force, or, for the matter of that, had never
been
visited
by any European.
The
distribution of
the force to effect the object in view has already been

indicated.
The
chief feature of the
scheme
is
the
advance on Tirah of the main column in one

body, under the personal command of Sir William
Lockhart, "from the neighbourhood of the Samana
range." Other plans suggest themselves, andnodoubt
direct
THE CAMPAIGN
38
were discussed
for
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
example, the advance of one
division only, with the headquarters,
from the Samana,
while the other, diverging at Usterzai, shortly after
leaving Kohat, might penetrate via the valley of the
Kariach river and the Landukai Pass, into Mastura,
and there join hands with the main body. This

would perhaps have relieved the pressure caused by
an advance on a single
political objections to
line,
it.
but possibly there were
simultaneous advance
up the Bara Valley, by the Peshawar column, under

Brigadier-General
Hammond, would have
cut off
the Afridis from retreat in the direction of Jellalabad
and Lalpura, whither already they were sending
But
their families.
this
no doubt would have been
a very hazardous undertaking.
though absolutely unexplored

to
be long and
defiles.
The
difficult,
The Bara
at this time,
and abounding
risks involved
in
Valley,
was known
dangerous
in fighting a
way up
such a route, and in maintaining such a long and

precarious line of communication, far outweighed
any advantage
to
be gained by attempting a diversion
of this kind, unless with a very
than was at
this
much
larger force
time available for the purpose, and
had any disaster (and such things
will
brought the movement prematurely to a

Sir William
been
Lockhart's
standstill.
own advance would have
seriously embarrassed at a critical juncture.
The special advantage of the line

for the
via
happen)
advance of the main column,
Shinauri,
actually selected
viz.
from Kohat
Khorappa, and the Sampagha and
Ill
Arhanga
Passes, into Tirah, was, that up to
advanced base, Shinauri,

from
territory, while
be struck
at the
lay
it
this point,
inside
our
39
the
own
not only could a blow
very centre of the Orakzai country,
cutting the defenders into
achievement from
two
at
a political
once (an important
point
of view,
for
already there were waverers amongst them), but

also the Tirah plateau, the objective of the expedition, the
hub and heart of the
be reached
At
the
crossed the
garbur
from
Afridi nation, could
in four or five easy marches.
same
time,
when
the main column had
Samana and was assembled
in the
Khanki
this point,
Valley,
it is
at
Khan-
a question whether
and before assaulting the Sampagha,
one of
its divisions might not with advantage have

marched up the Khanki Valley and penetrated into
Tirah independently, via the Chingakh or Lozakka
Pass.
Here, again, the argument is that by
separating
the
divisions, the
pressure caused
moving such a mass of men and

single road
by
transport on a
would be relaxed, and consequent delays
avoided, and that the
enemy would be alarmed by
the demonstration against his flank and rear.
But there were undoubtedly strong reasons
for
adhering to the single line of advance, and keeping

the column concentrated.
In the first
to
place, the stronger the force brought
bear directly on the objective point, the less
formidable and obstinate the resistance likely to be
met
with, while the value
and importance of a quick.
THE CAMPAIGN
40
decisive,
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
knock-down blow, where Asiatics are con-
cerned, are not to be over-estimated.

Secondly, a considerable proportion of the trans-
port was of an inferior type, and imperfectly organised,
while the supervising staff was limited.
Had
that staff been divided into two sections at the very
outset of the expedition, confusion and delay would

certainly
have increased.
Thirdly, the whole country-side up the
Valley was hostile.
Khanki
is,
moreover, a region inter-
sected by deep ravines, and
commanded by numerous
It
heights, while the existing roads

it
were
and tracks through
practically useless for military purposes.
Consequently, had this double line of advance
been adopted, a much larger force to guard the communications would have been imperative, and as no
advance on either line could be made until sappers

and pioneers, working incessantly, had improved the
way
sufficiently to
the
animals,
it
which was
military labour available,
strictly limited,
long as
admit of the passage of laden
would have taken
at least twice as
actually did to accomplish
its
double task,
and the delay thus caused would have been most

mischievous.
Even with a
single line of advance
it
was found
necessary later to reinforce the troops on the line of
communication by one native infantry regiment to

hold the Dargai heights, and by a pioneer regiment
to strengthen the
Khangarbur
post,
And
after
column had passed
on.
when the main

the Sampagha
41
Pass had been captured the whole of the First

Brigade, augmented by a pioneer regiment and a
battery of
in
artillery,
had to be posted permanently
the Mastura Valley to overawe the Orakzais,
and maintain uninterrupted communication between

Khangarbur and the headquarters in Tirah.
The
theoretical advantages of a double line of
advance are obvious and indisputable,

other hand, the practical objections to
have endeavoured to make
but,
it,
are
clear,
on the
which
not to be
denied.
may be added
when
Khangarbur nothing was known of
It
the western passes

or the Lozakka
here that
the
by
the condition of
Durbikhel, the Chingakh,
one of which the detached
division,
had
adopted,
would have had
the
the force was at
been
double line of advance

to
make
its
way
Tirah, except that native report declared them
be extremely bad.
When
later,
in
into
all
to
an expedition
Chamkanis and Massozais, an opportunity was afforded to examine these passes, the first
two of them being actually crossed by our troops,
against the
they were found to be so
difficult as to fully justify
the decision previously arrived at by Sir William
Lockhart to pursue his course by a single
line of
advance.
We
may now consider the preliminaries of

campaign made fairly clear, and I proceed, with
the
the
kind permission of the proprietors of the Times,
42
THE CAMPAIGN
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
chap, hi
with the narrative of the expedition in the form of

letters
contributed by
me
impressions were fresh
at
the time, and while
but expanded now, and
supplemented where necessary by notes and

mation which have reached
letters
were
written.
me
infor-
since the original
CHAPTER
IV
WAITING TO BEGIN
KOHAT, bth
"
Tout
October.
"
There has been

waiting enough for the launch of this expedition, and
even the Afridis amid the rocks and glens of Tirah,
conscious that the long arm of retribution must
eventually reach them, and exact a full penalty for
their treacherous assaults on Ali Masjid and Landi
Kotal, must wonder when we are going to begin.
But
if
work
vient a qui sait attendre
the mills of the British
is
sure,
Raj grind
and they grind exceeding
set in motion.
An
expedition into a
which
unsurveyed country
like that
Samana range and
the Safed
lies
Koh
slowly, their
once
small,
difficult
and
between the
mountains, and
against such warlike and well-armed tribes as the
Orakzais and the Afridis, was not to be lightly

undertaken, nor without ample means and careful
preparation
many
and while other insurgent clans
directions
to the south,
the
Waziris
in the
in
Tochi Valley
and the Mohmands, the Bajauris, and
the Swatis to the north
had
still
to
be dealt
with.
THE CAMPAIGN
44
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and absorbed some of our best regiments, together

with a large proportion of the transport, the Tirah
When
expedition had perforce to be postponed.
our authority had been re-established

districts,
undivided attention could be paid to the
formidable foe on our western border

us,
in these other
and whose proud boast
is
who
has defied
that no white
man
has
hitherto invaded his stronghold.

It
that,
was
in the
end of August, 23rd
to the 25th,
smarting under the sense of their imaginary-
grievances, and prompted by fanatical impulse
and
senseless rage, the Afridis attacked, and eventually
captured and burned, our forts on the Khyber line
Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid, and Fort Maude.
With
minds inflamed by the preachings of their Mullahs,

and excited by the treacherous success achieved by
the Waziris in the Tochi Valley, by distorted reports
of the murderous fighting on the Malakhand, and by
the example of the
Mohmands
recklessly broke a faith they

years, and, throwing
the sword their
who
war
at
Shabkadr, they
had kept
for sixteen
prudence to the winds, put to
own kinsmen
the
levies in our pay,
and declared
Government which has
the past with forbearance and
gallantly resisted their assaults

to the knife against a
ever treated them in

with generosity.
But generosity has

of even an Indian
The
its limits,
and the forbearance
Government can be
overstrained.
Bonerwals, that powerful tribe located between
the Malakhand and the Indus, had indeed been
let
WAITING TO BEGIN
IV
45
alone by us, though surely after the events of the 26th
the attacks on the Malanever had any Government better cause
July and following days
khand
for
But
quarrelling with them.
Our
too much.
should
we
prestige would indeed be lowered
now from
shrink
and exacting reparation

mischief done
inflicting chastisement,
for the blood shed,
and the
and therefore, almost within a week
of the occurrences in the
Council had
was
this last outrage
come
Khyber, the Viceroy's
to a decision,
and the
fiat for
the
expedition to Tirah had gone forth.
That was
here
we
in
are well
ready to begin
been
wasted.
the beginning of September, and
on
in chill October,
But what a busy month
yet.
Not a
not an hour of
day,
Well and
and not quite
loyally
have been intrusted
Avith
it,
have those
has
it
has been
toiled
who
the preparations which
must be completed before such an expedition can be

Hereafter, no doubt, their names
safely launched.
will be honourably mentioned with those whose more
congenial task will be to lead the troops in battle
against the enemy.
have before
me
the revised scheme of the operations
of commencing, and when
while
now on
write
the eve
note for you that
provides for the concentration of a force which

cludes
10 10
British
officers,
491
native
it
in-
officers,
10,882 British non-commissioned officers and men,
22,123 native non-commissioned officers and men,

8000 horses and ponies, upwards of 1 8,000 baggage
animals (chiefly mules), and over 20,000 followers.
THE CAMPAIGN
46
etc.,
and involves the
this
huge
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
collection of supplies for feeding
force for at least
two months, then
will
it
be conceded that the task of the past few weeks has
been no
light one,
and that those who have borne
the burden and heat of the day in connection with

will
it
be entitled to gratitude and recognition when
the time comes to consider the question of honours
and rewards.
Meantime
their labours
have borne
force stands ready, fully equipped,
Yet
start.
the
fruit, for
and impatient
to
few days more, a very few, patience
for a
must be exercised, the reason being, that unexpected

developments on the
Mohmand and
have delayed the troops which are

their
campaign
is
Bajaur side
detailed, after
over in the North, to come
and join brigades destined
for
the
down
operations in
Tirah.
In another four or five days, however, they
will all
have arrived, and then a general advance
will
begin.
It
is
needless to dilate on the spirit
which animates the troops on
and men are
alike
keen
this occasion
for the fray,
officers
and eager
to
For weeks past every one in authority, from

Sir George White downwards, has been besieged
by entreaties and appeals from individuals and
start.
To
regiments to be detailed for this expedition.
be
left
out of
fortune.
it
The
is
lamented as an irretrievable mis-
appetite
of the
troops
has
been
whetted by the accounts of the severe fighting that

has already taken place, and by the description of
the gallant deeds already performed.
So
far as
can
WAITING TO BEGIN
IV
be judged
certain that the Orakzais
it is
combine
will
to
and Afridis
defend stubbornly their hitherto
They
strongholds.
inviolate
47
are the
finest
and
hardiest race, physically speaking, on our frontier
they are known to be well armed, and they can put
upwards of 40,000 men

Assuredly they
will face
into the field against us.
us bravely, and, the greater
the certainty of hard fighting, the keener the anxiety
of every soldier of
sent,
and
to bear his share in
With such a
and
Her Majesty
officers,
in India to
be pre-
it.
spirit prevailing
amongst the men
and with such a practised leader as Sir
William Lockhart, whose very
name
is
a tower of
strength on this wild frontier, the issue should be

sharp, short,
and
decisive.
Camp Kohat, 12M

Still
waiting to begin
After
all it is
October.
one thing
war against the Afridis it is another

But
"let loose the dogs" and start the game.
to declare
to
in
this instance, there are others besides the Afridis to
think
of,
and great allowances must be made
for
those who have had the preparations to make for

Not only is it
the arduous campaign ahead of us.
being undertaken on a scale greater even than that
on which we started the Afghan

but also every
War
detail in connection with
of 1878-80,
it
has been
complicated by the expedition on our hands at the

same time against the Mohmands, the Waziris, the
Swatis, and the Bajauris, and
by the unexpected
THE CAMPAIGN
48
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
chap.
developments which some of these "side-shows"
have taken
and
at the last
batteries
and
moment.
Thus, regiments
and
transport
hospitals,
etc.,
destined for Tirah, have been unavoidably detained

in other quarters,
tutes
have had
to
and
be found
from distant stations
though
What
it
at the eleventh
for them,
hour substi-
and called up
means delay,
All this
in India.
does not, of course, mean wasted time.
has been done
in the
way
of preparation by
the great Commissariat-Transport Department while

outsiders chafe and
to
begin
? "
wonder
must be seen
"
when
are they going
be believed.
to
Our
railway from Rawal Pindi ends at Khushalgarh, on

the banks of the Indus, 32 miles from Kohat, which
is
to
trains
1
500
For weeks past
be our base of operations.
have been delivering at

to
2000 tons of stores
daily,
terminus from
and the Transport
immense amount
and war material to Kohat on
Department have been moving

of supplies, clothing,
this
carts, camels, mules, ponies,
this
and bullocks, an endless
stream, discharging on the stony plains round this
now become thickly studded

in every direction with mounds of stuff destined to
feed and supply man and beast for weeks to come
cantonment, which have
in the distant wilds of Tirah.

it
looks as
if
To
the uninitiated,
chaos was supreme, but, so far from
that being the case, the reception
and distribution of
the convoys as they arrive, proceed without a hitch.
Every one has an appointed task, and everything

has an appointed place, and though upwards of
[5
WAITING TO BEGIN
IV
50,000
men and
49
and more than 20,000
followers,
animals, have to be daily provided for here,
done quietly and

and that
efficiently
this should
concerned
in
be so
it is all
without fuss or delay
reflects great credit
on
all
making and working the necessary
arrangements.
But
for the present,
It is true troops
remember, we are
come and go every
marches are short ones.
halted.
day, but the
They arrive from Peshawar,
three marches away, and as the brigades are completed, pass
on to Hangu, Kai, and Shinauri, only
four marches away.
At
these places, too, large
commissariat depdts have been formed, more especially at
the last named, Shinauri, which for some
time to come
is
will
be our most advanced base.
It
Samana range
situated at the foot of a spur of the
only some five miles from the ridge, and from

via
the
Chagru
Valley,
eventually be made.
It is
the
main advance
it,
will
then that the strain
will
come, and that the commissariat-transport arrange-
ments
will
be severely
more than a
tested.
When
there
little
is
single six-foot track for troops
and
animals, and that winding in and out on a steep

gradient, through darkling glens and
gloomy
defiles,
the question of food and shelter, sufficient and in
But we
becomes a deeply interesting one!
know the Department. They have perhaps never
been tried so high as they will be on this occasion,
time,
but they have worried successfully through

a tough transport task before
this,
and we have
many
little
THE CAMPAIGN
50
doubt that they
will
IN TIRAH,
overcome
chap.
1897-98
difficulties in this
all
instance too.
Still it will
be no promenade for them.
Duke
the Great
you make war

starve
and
get beaten
"
say of campaigning in Spain, " If
in that
if
country with a large army you
you go
into
it
with a small one you
Well, the saying
We
cable here.
is
in
a sense appli-
have guarded against
certainly
defeat, for the size of the force mobilised

if it
Did not
does not frighten, the Afridis, as
must
it
flatter,
certainly
But on the other
surprises better-informed people.
we do not expect to
we may sometimes have to wait
hand, though
starve,
we
think
a while for our
dinners
I
give you here the
full
text
of Sir William
Lockhart's proclamation to the Tirah Afridis and
Orakzais
In the year 1881, the Afridis of the Khyber Pass entered

into treaty engagements with
the British Government,
under-
taking, in consideration of certain allowances, to maintain order
throughout the pass, to deal with offences on the road, to furnish

levies for the
above purpose, and to abstain from committing
outrages in British territory.
Up
to the
month of August
last
these engagements have been, on the whole, faithfully observed,

but during that and the succeeding month, the Afridis have
broken their engagements, attacked, plundered, and burnt posts

in the Khyber Pass, which were garrisoned by levies furnished
by themselves, and have joined the Orakzais in attacking British
Kohat border.
tribal and service allowances hitherto
granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzais
are declared forfeit, and entirely at the disposal of the British
posts and villages on the
For these offences
Government
all
to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they
WAITING TO BEGIN
IV
may
The
51
Government has also determined to

to march through the
country of the Orakzais and Afridis, and to announce from the
think
fit.
British
my command
despatch a force under
heart of their country the final terms which will be imposed.
This advance
is
made
mark the
to
part in the attacks above mentioned,
fact that these tribes
took
and the power of the British
Government to advance if and when they choose.

The Government have neither the intention nor the wish
to inflict unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they
immediately make submission and reparation.
The terms and
conditions on which such submission will be accepted will be
announced to the jirgahs of the tribes when I have arrived in
Tirah ; and I am authorised to enforce fulfilment of these terms
and conditions, and of any further terms and conditions which
opposition by any tribe or section or individuals there may
render
it
necessary to impose.
It is therefore notified that all
who wish to live in peace with

their own country and to see
the Sirkar and desire to possess
abilities in
no more
it
occupation of the Sirkar should
assist
the power and
in
to the utmost of
the work of enforcing compliance with
my
their
orders and
with the said terms and conditions, by which means they will
save the tribes from the further punishments which any opposition
to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring
upon
them, and the tribal country from further occupation.

It
is
too
soon
judge
to
proclamation, which
the
ment made when you are about

enemy's country, with
through their lands,
power to assert our

how and when we
of
this
the usual style of announce-
is
emphatically that until
effect
this
to
invade
difference.
It
an
states
we have entered and marched

in
order to demonstrate our
position as rulers,
like,
we
and
will listen to
to strike
no over-
Their offence has been too gross

and too unprovoked for it to be now lightly pardoned
In the past these tribes have boasted
or condoned.
tures from them.
THE CAMPAIGN
52
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
we cannot and dare not enter their country.

Now the time has come to dispel that illusion once
and for all.
The purdah will be lifted, the veil
that has hitherto been so jealously kept down will
that
be drawn
aside,
and "from the
country" Sir William Lockhart

the tribal jirgahs,
will
when they come
submission to him, the
final
heart
of
their
announce to
in to
make
their
terms and conditions on
which the British Government
will
conclude a peace
with them.
This
is
of course a just and wise policy.
It is
some of the clans, amongst the Orakzais

especially, and more than one chief of repute and
true that
amongst the
terms, and expressed
position
each of them, tnore

please
sir,
sir,
it
Afridis,
have already sued
for
contrition for their misdeeds,

suo, protesting "it
was the other boy,
wasn't me,
sir."
But
very rightly they have not been listened
to, or even
Afghan
answered, yet. A Pathan or an
understands
only one kind of argument, the argumentum ad
baculinum, a good knock-down blow.
Administer
that, and he will respect you, and bear you no ill-
will.
But argue with him, parley or compromise
with him, and you are
He
lost.
will
words smoother than your own, he

anything you want, he
will
give you back

will
promise
greedily accept your
bribes and your subsidies, but he will despise you

in
his heart,
and he
will
betray you at the
first
opportunity.
I
am
not concerned here to discuss this policy or
WAITING TO BEGIN
IV
that for the
management of the
or to speculate
was
how
precipitated,
avoided, though
But
heads.
it
and
plete
how they
or
much might be
may be safely
Orakzai
this
will
on our
frontier,
could have
written on
said
now
fashion,
in
been
all
that,
expedition,
through
will be, carried
and stern
tribes
the present series of troubles
committed ourselves to
be,
53
it
these
having
should
such com-
that hereafter Afridi
and
think twice, and hesitate long, before
they break out again into such wanton outrage.

In the meantime,
fight.
not at
It is
is
it
fairly
because
all
certain they will

" cornered "
we have
them, but, though there are waverers amongst them,

it
because after years of proud boasting and
is
absolute immunity
from
any punishment
(if
we
except the Bazaar Valley raids in 1878-79) their

reputation as the most
warlike and
would be
tribe
on the
their
" faces blackened "
if
frontier
lost
among
all
for ever,
sure
some hard knocks
heights are
won
will
their
But there
is
and we may be
be exchanged before the
leading into their hitherto inviolate
stronghold, the breezy
As a
will do,
and
true Pathans,
they failed to stand up to us now.
no question of what they
independent
uplands
known
as
Tirah.
matter of fact our latest information as to
movements points
to a concentration of their
strength already in the upper
Khanki
Valley,
and
occupation by them of dominating points at the
western end of the Samana ridge, whence they can

observe our preparations
at
Shinauri,
and even
THE CAMPAIGN
54
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
an attack on that camp itself.

These
would be chiefly Ofakzais, but behind them we hear
on good authority that the Afridis are collecting on
threaten
Sampagha
the
Pass, and
will
it
probably be for the
possession of this point that our
be fought, and the 28th or 29th

ably be the date of it.
Before
close this letter
first
big fight will
inst. will
may
not improb-
refer briefly to a
much discussed lately. It is

we have some 2000 Afridis in our own ranks
the present time.
They are amongst our best
matter which has been

that
at
and have borne themselves bravely

many a fight on the side of the Sirkar. But it
soldiers,
unquestionable that there
them on the eve of
is
in
is
an uneasy feeling among
this expedition against their
own
Already several have deserted, taking

and accoutrements and ammunition with
them, arguing no doubt that it is trying them too
country.
their rifles
high to expect them to march against their

kinsmen, and assault their own
was what no one required them
order
^
villages.
But
own
this
do.
An army
has been published expressing
confidence
Subjoined
is
to
the order referred to.
G.O.C.C, dated 8th October 1897.
The Government of India have lived at peace with the Afridi tribe and
made an agreement with them, under which the British forts in the Khyber
were intrusted
to their care.
Allowances were paid to the
were issued so that they might be strong
in their alliance
tribe,
and arms
and friendship with
the Government of India, and have the means of forcing turbulent persons
to keep the peace.
Without any provocation the
Afridis, in conjunction with
other tribes, have broken their alliance with the British Government, and
have attacked and destroyed the forts which their tribe had engaged to guard.
Further, they have waged war against our garrisons on the Samana and else-
WAITING TO BEGIN
55
and sympathy with their peculiar

and announcing the decision of Govern-
their loyalty,
in
position,
ment
that under the special circumstances the Afridi
companies
in
our service
will
be sent back to stations
where they will carry on garrison duties only, while

at the same time they are assured that so far as
can be managed, their
own homes
Tirah
in
will
be
spared, and their people and property- unmolested.
This arrangement and
assurance should restore
this
Yet such
confidence to them.
the suspicious and
is
designing nature of the Afridi, so restless and excited
does he become in times of
and so
little
trust
would
and danger,
difficulty
he
promises made by any of his
repose
own
in
similar
people under
where, killing some of the soldiers in the British service, and causing great
loss of property.
The
British
Government, confident
in its power, cannot
sit
down
quietly
under such defiance and outrages, and has been forced by the wanton acts of
the Afridis themselves to inflict punishment
and
on them
to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for
The
in their
own
what has
country,
lately
taken
Government have given proofs

of their loyalty, devotion, and courage on many a hard-fought field, and the
value of their services has been fully appreciated by the Government of India.
place.
Afridi soldiers in the service of the
After the most careful consideration of the circumstances connected with the
Tirah expedition, the Government of India have decided to show consideration

to those Afridi soldiers who wish to keep their engagements, and to excuse
them from service in the campaign which the Government have been forced
to wage against their fellow-tribesmen.
On
these grounds alone
it
has been determined that Afridi soldiers
are serving in the regiments detailed for service
who
on the Peshawar - Kohat
border, are not to be employed near the Tirah frontier at the present time,
but their services will be utilised elsewhere.

effect
will
at once issue.
property of those
who have
As
The
necessary orders to this
far as possible care will
be taken that the
not taken part in the raids on British territory
is
neither confiscated nor destroyed during the time that our troops are engaged
in the Orakzai or Afridi territory.
This order is to be read and carefully explained to all Afridi soldiers

belonging to regiments detailed for service on the Peshawar-Kohat border.
56
THE CAMPAIGN
IN TIRAH,
similar circumstances, that
it
is
chap, iv
1897-98
doubtful
if
the just
and humane order of the Commander-in-Chief

entirely quiet their fears,
it
though
it
is
will
obvious that
was the most considerate action His Excellency
could have possibly taken.
CHAPTER V
THE ACTIONS AT DARGAI
Headquarters Camp, near Khangarbur,
zind
Long
my
ere this arrives
October.
telegrams will have
in-
formed you that the curtain has been rung up and

the play has begun.
letter to
and
you when
his skill in
had hardly posted
collision with the
enemy
my
last
occurred,
choosing a strong position, his resolu-
tion in defending
it,
the numbers he can bring into
the field against us, and the efficiency of his equip-
ment and
fire,
by the severe
as testified
have already incurred,
are proof,
all
wanted, of the arduous task ahead
makes us
rejoice that
if
we have such
losses
we
proof were
task which
a tried and
capable leader as General Sir William Lockhart,
and which
warrants
fully
Cornmander - in - Chief,
Government of India,
force into the
of the
is
in
judgment of the
the
the
decision
of the
sending such a powerful
field.
In this letter
idea than
and
shall
be able to give you a better
possible within the limits of a telegram,
immense
difficulties
of
many
kinds which
THE CAMPAIGN
58
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
beset an expedition on this wild and mountainous

frontier, of the desperate nature of the fighting,
and
of the valour of our troops.
The
first
Shinauri,
advance from
was fixed
advanced base,
our
for the 20th, but in the
mean-
time the enemy, aware of our intentions (for our
working parties trying to improve the road up to

the top of the Chagru Kotal, or ridge, and as far
as possible
down
the other side, had sufficiently
and unavoidably indicated our intended

skilfully
route),
had
occupied in strength the village of Dargai
and the
Narik spur,
which
forms
the
western
boundary of the Chagru Valley, and completely

dominates the road down
perforce descend.
It
it,
by which we must
was necessary,
therefore, to
dislodge him from this coign of vantage as a pre-
liminary measure.
Sir William
ingly ordered this to be done
Lockhart accord-
by the 2nd Division,
and planned that
General Westmacott's brigade
should engage the
enemy
in
front,
supported by
and No. 9 Mountain Batteries, while General

Kempster's brigade, accompanied by the scouts of
No.
the 5th Gurkhas, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and No.
4 Co. Madras Sappers and Miners, should make

a wide detour to the west, and get round his
right flank
in
issuing
Great secrecy was observed
and
rear.
the
orders and making the necessary
arrangements for the attack, as
it
was very much
desired to find our friends "at home," but subse-
quent events have assured us that they are
full
of
59
and may be depended upon to accept battle

whenever we choose to offer it. The conduct of
the operations was intrusted to General Sir Power
Palmer, as General Yeatman- Biggs was temporarilylaid up by sickness.
It must be remembered that
he has been here since the beginning of August
last, and the hard work, single-handed for a long
fight,
time,
and the exposure have naturally
upon
told
him.i
Leaving Shinauri
elected to march,
turn
to
at
A.M.,
General Kempster's
with which
brigade,
Sir Power Palmer himself

commenced its circuitous climb
enemy's
the
right
Westmacott
flank.
started an hour later, and by 9 a.m. had reached

the Chagru Kotal, on which at 9.20 his batteries
came into action against the

the enemy thickly clustered.
ridge at Dargai, where
The range was
2500 yards, and though, of course,

power of the 2.5-inch gun, a very
in
its
shell
well within the

perfect
weapon
way, yet the fear was expressed that this
might have the not-to-be-desired
fire
of dispersing the
enemy
away before the
infantry
inflict
about
too soon, and driving him
severe punishment.
could get at him
No
doubt
been done, and as often regretted,

This gallant
effect
"He
and
this often has
for those
was in
who
\frj bad state of
health from the outset, but his indomitable spirit carried
him through the
officer
died in January.
whole of the operations, only

I would fain have sent
to die at
him back
to India
Peshawar on the 4th January 1898.

from the Samana, or subsequently
from Khangarbur, but the responsible medical

remain in the
field,
not agree with
it."
officers
considered
him
fit
to
a decision which gratified him, though I personally could
Sir
Wm.
Lockhart's Despatches.
THE CAMPAIGN
6o
and run away
fight
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
another day,
will live to fight
and an enemy frightened away by long-range
may be
fire
likened to
flies
shell
brushed off a pot of
honey by a wave of the hand. They are not hurt,

and will all settle again in the same place directly
you leave them alone. Fortunately in this instance
this was not the effect.
The tribesmen were under
such
excellent
rocks,
cover,
and improved by
themselves, that
and
all
provided by the
naturally
walls,
they had to
up by
built
etc.,
do was
to
lie
and they soon found that the
sit tight,
low
shells
them very much. Meantime Westmacott's regiments toiled up the steep ascent to
reach their foe, the ist Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles
leading, the King's Own Scottish Borderers and
the Northamptons in close support.
(The fourth
did not hurt
regiment of
this
brigade, the gallant 36th Sikhs,
ever famous for their glorious defence of Saragheri
and Gulistan, was not out to-day.)

credible
It
It literally
had
precipitous
was the mountain-side.
men
in-
any enemy could be turned out of
that
such a position as that occupied by the
the
seemed
could
to
be climbed up
move
only in single
was perforce painfully slow.
to,
In
file,
enemy now.
so steep and
many
places
and progress
Sir William Lockhart,
attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the chief

of the
staff,
personnel,
and by the
rest of the headquarters
was on the Samana Sukh,
closely observ-
ing the movement, and watches were often compared

to note
how
the attack was getting on.
But
if
slow,
'
The brave
little
Gurkhas streamed across the deadly space.

followed close."
The
y^^W^
Scottish Borderers
Dargai, \^th October 1897.

To face page
61.
V
it
6i
never flagged, and ere long the quick sharp cracks
of the enemy's
rifles,
mingled occasionally with the
louder booms of their jezails, showed that
coming under
effective
fire.
At
was
twelve noon
last, at
it
was reached whence a rush across
exactly, a point
open must be made and the affair finished.

There was no hesitation. Gallantly led by Major
the
Rose, Captain Bateman-Champain, and Lieutenant
Beynon, the brave
Gurkhas streamed across
little
the deadly space as fast as their legs would carry
them, or the steep slope would permit.
retreat shot
slopes.
credit
Scottish
and with loud cheers the

was carried, and the enemy in full
Borderers followed
crest of the hill
The
down
close,
as he nimbly fled over
its
reverse
was a gallant action, reflecting great

on all engaged in it, and testifying to their
It
The
endurance as well as to their pluck.
really
dangerous zone crossed at the run was not more

than lOO yards across, but so close was the range,
and so hot the
up
his
fire,
Gurkhas
left
men
killed
the Borderers
marvellous that this was

is
a good soldier threw
he reached the other
thirteen
stony slope
that
many
arms and pitched heavily forward stricken
to death, before
this
that
about this time
all
and wounded on
six.
the loss.
It
is
quite
But the
fact
Kempster's brigade was
beginning to make the pressure of
its
and the tribesmen, ever anxious when

threatened, gave
The
side.
way probably
advance
felt,
their rear
is
with greater readi-
ness than they otherwise would have done.
THE CAMPAIGN
62
To
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
movements of this brigade I must now

advert.
The route by which it advanced had been
reported on only by natives, and as usual their estimate of its difficulties, and of the time required to
the
much
reach a given point, was
too low.
As
a matter
was the track that

Sir Power Palmer, after some five miles had with
difficulty been accomplished, was compelled to send
back to Shinauri No. 8 Mountain Battery, and all
laden animals, under escort of the Dorsets, and two
of
fact,
so extraordinarily bad
companies of the 15th Sikhs: the mountain-side

being absolutely impracticable for four-footed beasts.
And, though no
effort
well appreciated that
was relaxed,
it
for the
General
was Sir William Lockhart's
design that Kempster's brigade should deal the decisive stroke
and so
rear, yet so
long was the road,
the climb, that the
enemy was already
from the
terrific
in retreat
when
at last
upon the
scene.
They
Kempster's
men appeared
were, however, in time to
accelerate his departure with effective volleys, after
which they joined Westmacott on the captured

ridge.
It
was now past
2 p.m.,
and time to think
about returning to camp at Shinauri,

distant
on a bad road.
accordingly
5 P.M.,
when
fully eight miles
Westmacott's regiments
filed off at once,
and between 4
p.m.
and
the sun was rapidly sinking in the west,
Kempster prepared
to follow them.
But, meantime,
the booming of the mountain guns, resounding up
and down the Khanki Valley, had spread the news

that a fight was going on, and from north and east
63
and west the Afridis and Orakzais hastened

scene of the
to the
and General Kempster, who was
strife,
by
as Westmacott's troops had
preparing to withdraw vid the Chagru Kotal

the same road, that
is,
make dispositions to meet them, and to cover the

movement in retreat. These dispositions were so
to
ably conceived, and executed with such alacrity and

spirit
by the
tired
The
success.
men, that they met with entire
excellent practice of the batteries on
the Chagru Kotal, and the steady volleys and resolute bearing of the Gordons, 15th Sikhs, and two
companies of the Borderers, who covered the withdrawal from the heights, were too much for the
enemy, who, however, pressed

characteristic dash
carried on until long
and courage.
aftfer
though the tribesmen by

thousands,
they
their
attack with
The
fight
darkness had set in
this
was
but,
time numbered several
were steadily kept
severe loss inflicted on them, so
much
at
bay and
so that, after
passing the Chagru Kotal, the retreat was absolutely
From
unmolested.
six long
that point there
and weary miles
reported that
all
to camp.
still
remained
General Palmer
the troops, British and Native, be-
haved with the greatest steadiness, but the honours

of the action must be divided between the Gordon
Highlanders^ and the 15th Sikhs, whose losses were
respectively
Amongst
1
shot
In
and eight
killed
and wounded.
the former were Major Jennings-Bramly
this affair,
down
ten
No. 2967, Private W. Rennie of the Gordon Highlanders,

enemy at close quarters, and obtained honourable men-
four of the
tion in General Palmer's Despatch,
THE CAMPAIGN
64
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and Lieutenant Pears (attached from the
killed,
Scottish Rifles) severely wounded.
The
towers and defences of Dargai were
ually destroyed before the troops retired,
village itself
camp
was burned.
and the
rear-guard reached
at eleven o'clock at night,
arms since 4
miles,
The
effect-
having been under
marched between 20 and 25

climbed some 3000 to 4000 feet, and fought
A.M.,
a severe action.
was not a bad day's work,
It
and on the following morning Sir William Lock-
Power
hart telegraphed his congratulations to Sir
Palmer on having so successfully carried out
his
instructions.
It
was hoped
would drive the
that this action
enemy permanently from the Dargai heights, and

leave the road down the Chagru Valley open for
the safe passage of our troops
were over-sanguine.
was not
at all
The
quenched by
but our expectations
ardour of the tribesmen

their reverse
on the
8th.
Reinforcements were hurried up to the enemy by

the maliks from Khangarbur and Ramadan, and the
evening of the 19th found them established
in their
old position in greater strength than ever.

question, of course, suggests
itself,
the position, having once captured
admitted at once
certainly
that,
had
it
is
it ?
The
surrender
It
feasible,
may ^be
it
would
have been advantageous to hold the posi-
tion won, until, at least, the
column
been
Why
to
advance of the main
Khangarbur had been
a question
if it
was
feasible.
effected.
The
But
it
water-supply
65
Khand
Talao, nearly
of Dargai was at a spot called
away to the west, and the road to it was

commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that,
three miles
in the presence of
been obtained
an enemy, water could not have
for the troops unless these heights,
as well as the village of Dargai, had been held in
Khand Talao
force.
itself
was
inaccessible to trans-
port animals coming either from Shinauri or from
Dargai.
If at
this
to occupy Dargai,
stage
and
had been attempted
it
also
to
hold the heights
dominating the water-supply, serious delay
in the
advance of the force into the Khanki Valley would
have been the certain consequence and the troops

engaged in the operation would not only have been
;
entangled in extremely
difficult
ground, where, until
the communications had been improved,
been almost impossible

food, water,
to supply
and ammunition, but
it
would have
them betimes with

also, until
established ourselves strongly in the
we had
Khanki
Valley,
they would have been exposed to serious attack from

the north and west.
have
arisen,
Thus grave
complications might
and attention and strength would have
been diverted from the main and all-important object

(which at this time was the capture of the passes
leading into Tirah) into indecisive side-issues.
In
fact, to
hold Dargai alone with a small detach-
ment, as was possible
later,
was impossible while
the enemy were masters of the Khanki Valley.
While
to attempt the
major operation of occupying
the position in force, and the heights beyond
it
too,
THE CAMPAIGN
66
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
would have been a hazardous experiment
in
view of
the considerations stated, and a source of anxiety
and weakness rather than of confidence and strength.
The
fact that the place
in greater strength
drew from
it,
was reoccupied by the enemy
than ever as soon as
shows that any detachment
on the night of the i8th would
at
we
with-
left
there
once have been
fiercely attacked.
Moreover,
it
must be remembered
the
that
primary object of the operations on the i8th was

to drive off the comparatively small bodies of the
enemy (Orakzai Alikhels) who at that time held

Dargai, and who constantly annoyed our workingparties
Nothing more than
on the road below.
this
was contemplated nor was it anticipated that they

would be strongly and immediately reinforced by the
;
Afridis, or possibly other
But
been made.
arrangements might have
view of Sir William's orders

I
and
in the actual circumstances,
shall refer presently, the
for the 20th, to
in
which
requirements of the case
did not appear to justify action which, as
have
shown, would almost certainly have delayed and

dislocated the whole plan of campaign.''
To
the
continue
intention
On
of
the 19th October
Sir
William
it
had been
Lockhart that the
2nd Division should resume work on the Chagru

1 I have written at some length on this matter, because no point in the
campaign has been so adversely criticised as this failure to hold the Dargai
There are always two sides to
heights when they had been once captured.
every question, but irresponsible

persist in seeing
one only.
critics,
and men with
theories, will often
Kotal-Khorappa road.
and the
losses
67
After the severe fighting,
which the Afridis had sustained on
was not unreasonably surmised

that the presence of our men, working under the
the previous day,
protection
it
of strong covering -parties (which
had
been arranged), might deter the enemy from
But the troops had been much
occupying Dargai.
on the
fatigued
re-
i8th,
and had an arduous task
them again on the 20th, when the march to

Khanki Valley was ordered to begin, so General
Yeatman-Biggs decided to give them a rest. Sir
before
the
William Lockhart on the Samana (Headquarters

this
time were at Fort Lockhart) was not aware of
this resolution until
in
at
the matter.
portance of
it
was too
having
the
would have ordered them

from the
We
late for further action
Otherwise, convinced of the im-
working -parties
to be covered
out,
he
by troops
ist Division.
now come
to the 20th,
when
the advance
from Shinauri into the Khanki Valley must be com-
menced
in earnest, the
2nd Division leading.
William Lockhart's original instructions to the
mander
for this
Sir
Com-
advance had been to move by the
Chagru Kotal, and the road on

But, late in the
the west side of the Chagru defile.
evening of the 19th, General Yeatman-Biggs wired
up to say that, as the Dargai heights were now occupied again in strength by the enemy, he proposed
direct route, via the
to
march down the eastern
Samana Sukh and
side of the defile, via the
the Talia spur.
This movement
THE CAMPAIGN
68
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
would, in his opinion, avoid the loss that would
be incurred by using the other road, and engaging
enemy on the way, strongly posted

were on such commanding vantage-ground.
the
Sir William
prove
Lockhart could
they
as
however, ap-
not,
His previous decision had been
this idea.
deliberately arrived
and was based on the
at,
fact
down
that he had reliable information that the road
the Talia spur was a mere goat-track, quite unfit for
But more than
laden animals.
that
any attempt
to thus
this, it
was obvious
evade the tribesmen posted
about Dargai would not only have failed in

object, but also
would have,
couraged them to attack
its
in all probability, en-
us.
They
descend from Dargai, and, crossing the
could easily
defile,
vigor-
ously harass and oppose the difficult march
down
the thickly -wooded
Talia
spur
and
and precipitous slopes of the
to
be caught on such ground
during a tedious processional movement, encum-
bered by long trains of
baggage,
hospitals, in a position, in fact, in
mander would
willingly sustain
reinforcement would be
an
supplies,
and
which no comassault, in
which
and from which

withdrawal would be dangerous, was an experiment
too
full
difficult,
of risks to be permitted.
A reply
was therefore sent that night to General
Yeatman-Biggs that the original plan must be adIt was intimated

hered to, and the difficulty faced.
time
that
two
battalions
of the
to him at the same
1st Division, and one of its batteries, might be
borrowed
for the
day to
69
assist in clearing the
Dargai
and that the Northamptons, and No. 9

Mountain Battery, from Fort Lockhart, would co-
heights,
operate from the
Samana Sukh.
evacuate the heights as
soon
in
as
all
probability
the
advancing
reached the point below the
troops
some two or three miles

the
joins
defile,
as
where
Kotal
only
the Narik Darra
would
rear
their
was further
It
remarked that the enemy would
then
be
threatened.
It is
tention
thus clear that Sir William Lockhart's in-
was
to
engage the enemy
in front with
down
portion of the force, while other troops pushed
the defile and threatened their rear,
a combination which would
Darra
have expelled them from
their
via,
the Narik
almost certainly
position
on
the
heights without such severe loss as a purely frontal

attack
must inevitably
man- Biggs held that
men down
it
it
involve.
But General Yeat-
would be dangerous
to
march
the defile until the heights overhanging
had been captured, and, acting on
this
judgment,
ordered a direct assault by the main front approach
be delivered as soon as his leading troops had

reached the Kotal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the
to
20th
and
gallantly
it
it
only remains
was carried
now
to
record
how
out.
General Kempster's brigade, consisting of the

Dorsets, the Gordons, the 2nd Gurkhas, and the
15th Sikhs, was charged with the task of storming

the frowning heights, and
it
was strengthened
for
to the position they
71
had reached, without being able
Major Judge was
to advance farther.
spot by a shot through the head.
killed
on the
Captain Robinson
was mortally wounded, and many more dotted the

slope, struck down by the leaden hail.
In vain did
others attempt to follow the splendid lead that had
been given them.
the
Their vigilance now
fully roused,
enemy poured down such a murderous fire from the
cliffs
above that the head of each formation attempt-
ing the
fatal
passage was swept away, and Gurkhas,
Dorsets, and Derbys, suffering terribly and enduring

bravely,
could get no farther.
At
this juncture
General Yeatman-Biggs ordered the Gordons and

the 3rd Sikhs to the front, and General Kempster,
arranging
first
for three minutes' concentrated fire
on the sangars by the massed batteries, launched

them to assault. The time had arrived for desperate
was now nearly three o'clock in the

afternoon, the dead and wounded were lying thick
on every side, over 100 men had already fallen, and
the enemy were shouting their defiance, waving
their standards, and beating their drums, confident
in the impregnability of their position, and certain
now of success. But the Gordons had yet to be
reckoned with.
Rapidly forming his men and
addressing them in burning words,^ Colonel Mathias
action, for
it
dashed out
at the
head of
his gallant regiment, and,
closely backed by the 3rd Sikhs, in a

1
costs.
"Highlanders!
The Gordons
The General
will take
it
"
I
moment they
says the position must be taken at all
THE CAMPAIGN
72
were
across, carrying
all
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
every one with them
in the
impetuosity of their onrush, storming the ridge with
a resolution that was

opposition.
thrilled
witness
But
and beating down
resistless,
was indeed a splendid
It
the nerves of
all
who were
exploit,
all
and
privileged to
it.
stay.
Did
say that they were "
all
across"
Three men of the Gordons,

including Lieutenant Lament, dropped killed on the
spot, and forty-one more fell, more or less severely
wounded, amongst them Major Macbean,^ shot
Well, that
is
wrong.
through the groin

hit in four
places;
Lieutenant Dingwall, severely
Lieutenant Meiklejohn, Lieu-
tenant Craufurd, and Captain Uniacke,
wounded
foot,
and Colonel Mathias himself,
but only
slightly.
Many
others
all
slightly
hit in the
were shot
through their clothes or accoutrements, and had

marvellous escapes.
heavily too.
The other regiments all suffered
The Dorsets had
nine killed and forty
wounded, including Captain Arnold, whose wound

was dangerous ^ the Derbys four killed, including
;
Captain Smith, and eight wounded
eighteen killed and forty-nine wounded
two
killed
and two wounded
the Gurkhas
;
the scouts
and the 3rd Sikhs
three killed and twenty wounded, including Lieu1
Major Macbean was among the first to spring from cover, and lead his
He was shot almost immediately, but continued to cheer
attack.
men to the
his men on
2
while lying on the ground.
Captain Arnold was wounded in a heroic attempt to lead his
men
across
" Come on, E ComGordon rush occurred.

pany !" he shouted, and sprung to the front, but was struck down almost
immediately by the deadly hail from above.
the deadly space before the
73
tenant White, shot through the chest.
This
corps splendidly supported the Gordons
fine
their
in
great charge, and their Colonel, Tonnochy, was con-
The grand
spicuous in the forefront of the rush.

total of killed
some
and wounded was
199.
This
will
give
idea of the difficulty of the position, and the
severity
and accuracy of the
fire
to
which the
assaulting columns were exposed, and in a situation,

too,
whence they could not
The enemy's
losses, too,
reply with
were severe,
much
effect.
but, as usual,
they managed to carry off most of their dead and
wounded, and
accurately.
it
is
impossible to estimate
They, however, acknowledge
them
defeat,
and have made no attempt since to molest the victors,

or to retake the lost position, on which the brigade
bivouacked for the night.
were carried back to
The dead and wounded
Shinauri,.
where the former
were buried with the honours which they had so

gloriously earned, and the wounded were placed in
the base hospitals, where there
is
every arrangement
possible for their care and comfort.
Such
is
the story of the fighting on the
20th of October, and, whatever criticisms
8th and
may be
why and the wherefore of it, it will

always remain a noble monument to the valour of
passed on the
our troops, and to the splendid heroism of British

officers as troop leaders.
Before dismissing this subject,
must narrate two
or three incidents connected with the Gordons' grand

attack,
which are worth placing on record.
THE CAMPAIGN
74
The
first
chap.
1897-98
they were headed in their
that
is,
memorable rush by
IN TIRAH,
One
their pipers.
of these,
named Findlater, blowing his loudest and best, was

among the first to show the way across that deadly
strip
of ground above described, and when, after
traversing but a few yards, he was laid low, shot
through both
against
he managed to prop himself up
legs,
and continued with unabated
boulder
"
energy to play
The Cock
o'
the North,"
mating his comrades by the familiar and

music of his beloved pipes.
recommended
sincerely
for
hope he
stirring
This hero has been
the Victoria Cross, and

will
get
it,
ani-
for
it
we
all
has been grandly
earned.
Another
stiff ascent.
first
to
is
that, as the
Gordons breasted the
Colonel Mathias, no longer quite in his
youth, was
somewhat short of
breath,
found himself at
know."
this
moment
quite
and said
whom
he
"Stiff climb,
eh,
Colour -Sergeant Mackie, alongside
Mackie ?
last
young as
was you
Not
so
I
"Nevermind, sir/" answered the
Sergeant, giving his
CO.
gallant
a hearty slap of genuine
admiration on the back, which almost knocked his
"Never mind, sir!

"
gaun
verra
strong
an
auld
m.an !
Ye re
for
I must add, that when the ridge was captured the
Gordons of their own accord lined up and gave three
remaining wind out of him
cheers for their gallant Colonel, and
officers, British
and Native, of Sikhs and Gurkhas, crowded round

to
shake him by the hand.
The
only other incident
75
would mention
is,
that
on the 22nd Sir William Lockhart had the Gordons

paraded, and addressed them with reference to their
dashing conduct on the 20th.

Sir William, "testify to
many
"Your
records," said
a gallant action per-
formed by you, and you have now added

another which
have gone
for us
of
it
may
to
them
worthily rank beside those that
more hard work ahead

all, and I am confident you will do your share
well when the time comes to call upon you
before.
There
for a fresh effort."
is
Sir William thanked Colonel
Mathias personally, and the assembled

their gallant leading,
missed.
officers, for
and the parade was then
The men were immensely
dis-
pleased by the
prompt and kindly praise bestowed by the
Chief.
CHAPTER
VI
THE KHANKI VALLEY
IN
Khangarbur, 27M
At
daybreak on the next day, the
Division
commenced
its
21st,
October.
the 2nd
advance to the Khanki
Valley according to programme, Sir William Lockhart and
staff
accompanying the movement, but
marching independently from Fort Lockhart, down

the Talia spur, with the Northamptons, the 36th
Sikhs, and No. 9 Mountain Battery.
The
reports
previously received on the state of this road were
amply confirmed now.
The baggage
small force did not reach

the.
22nd, and
23rd.
The
day only as
some of
first
far as
Khangarbur
until late
on
not until mid-day on the
intention had been to
Khorappa, but that
at the junction of the

river, is so
it
of even this
Chagru
defile
commanded on every
move on
this
locality, situated
with the Khanki
side
by overhang-
ing heights, that the advance was continued another
two and a half miles up the valley
to a spot nearly
opposite the large fortified village of Khangarbur,
where an extensive plateau on the north bank of
THE KHANKI VALLEY
IN
CHAP. VI
the Khanki afforded the necessary space for the

large force assembling, and,
the
its
remoteness from
commanding ground, promised
nearest
against those
security
by
monly known as
to fire into your
prowling marauders (com-
whose chief amusement
snipers)
camp
fair
all
is
night.
Khangarbur was full of Afridis, who briskly

opened fire upon the leading brigade General
Westmacott's but No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A.,
promptly coming into action, pitched some shells
into the village, and the enemy decided not to
remain.
Some infantry who were pushed to the
front quickened their retreat, and they were soon
out of sight in the hills to the north.
There were
no casualties on our side, and probably very few on
theirs.
The march from

garbur)
Shinauri to this place (Khan-
a very long and trying one, fully thirteen
is
and down
along what in
many
miles up
hill
places
a rough track barely a foot wide, and for
is
dale,
the last four or five miles
of a ravine.
Where men, and
baggage animals have

file it is
out.
when
tail
of
the head
how the column
arriving at the
supervenes darkness, with

forts
is
stretched
hardly clear of the old
it is
is
mules, and guns, and
to follow such a trail in single
easy to imagine
The
merely the stony bed
is
and dangers and
all
risks.
its
new.
camp
Then
attendant discom-
All calculations as to
time and space are simply set at naught by conditions such as obtain in a country like this.
THE CAMPAIGN
78
wretched mule
at once.
IN TIRAH,
down, and the road
falls
check of
chap.
1897-98
is
blocked
this kind, occurring not
once
but a hundred times probably in the course of the

day, multiplies in effect in geometrical progression
as
it
passes from front to rear, and causes delays and
fatigues
which
it is
simply impossible to describe in
words.
The
that
it
country must be seen to
difficulties of this
be appreciated, and
it
must also be remembered
produces nothing
in
the
way
of supplies
except here and there a very moderate amount of
Hence everything
Then consider what our
now assembled on this
forage for the transport animals.
must be carried with
us.
There are
numbers are.
ground 6800
British
ranks,
10,200 native ranks,
17,000 followers, and upwards of 25,000 animals!
The
daily requirements of this multitude in the
way
of food alone (and they have other needs) amount to
3000 maunds' weight of

mate (i maund = 8o lbs.).
base at Shinauri
and narrow and

and
traffic,
is
stuff at a
moderate
at present so long
steep,
esti-
But the road from our

and winding,
and so crowded with troops
that supplies can only be very gradually
brought up, and are consumed here almost as soon

as they arrive
while to crown our
difficulties, it is
almost impossible to send back to Shinauri the
unladen transport animals, because of the extreme
narrowness of the track, on which two mules can

hardly pass each other, except at a few points.
Needless to say, sappers and pioneers have been.
wrctclied mule
falls
duwii,
ami the road
is
blocked
at once.
Tofaccfii'^c
73-
THE KHANKI VALLEY
IN
VI
and
are, toiling
without ceasing to improve
every day has made
In
traffic
is,
fact, it
it,
and
but their work
better,
it
by the
dreadfully interrupted
traffic.
79
is
ceaseless stream of'
has been a case of stopping the
or stopping the work.
The consequence of such extraordinary difficulties

of course, that we have remained here longer
than was anticipated to
But the
1st
let
and and Divisions are assembled now;
and as we are here within

foot of the
the columns close up.
Sampagha
seven miles of the
six or
Pass,
after
will,
it
attacked on the 28th or 29th, as
be
all,
advised you some
days ago.
I
have gone into
all this
some length by way
at
of explanation of our long halt here, which no doubt

is criticised
quarters,
better.
and commented upon adversely
in
many
know
and perhaps by some who ought to

But an army must be fed, and it would be
more than rash
attempt hasty movements in
to
advance, and reckless enterprises, against a hardy
and daring enemy, without being assured of ample

supplies for man and beast, and feeling confident
that every position gained can be maintained
and
supported.
But
for this
if
we
can satisfactorily account to ourselves
we cannot make
long waiting,
wherefore of
it
course, put
it
down
proportion
to
estimation)
clear
the
display,
to
the
do
and
which
their
why and
They, of
Afridis.
to hesitation
timidity
the
fear,
we
(in
and
in
their
own courage and
THE CAMPAIGN
8o
confidence increase,
we
happily
could
IN TIRAH,
and
numbers
their
have attacked
probably have found

it,
for
it
it
not a very hard task to
it
our unavoidable delay has been the

opportunity, and they have
made
But
now.
tribesmen's
the most of
it.
latest information is that all the Afridi clans
now
are
fully
represented on the Sampagha, and
combined with the Orakzais, there are not
that,
less
If
would not then have been defended
by more than half the men that hold
Our
too.
Sampagha
we should
the
Pass within a day or two of arrival here,

capture
chap.
1897-98
than 10,000 or 12,000 of the
political
reports
enemy in our
know from
We
also
reconnaissances
and
immediate neighbourhood.
spies
that
they have been busy for some time past in adding

to
and strengthening the defences of the
building walls and sangars to
approaches,
command
digging trenches and
rifle
pass,
likely
all
pits,
and
Amongst them are hundreds of

many of whom have served
their time in our sapper companies, so they know
the business well, and are now turning to excellent
erecting obstacles.
old pensioned soldiers,
account the training they have had in our ranks.
So
storming of the Sampagha Pass
the
something to achieve
among
but there
the troops in regard to
it,
is
be
only one feeling
and that
ness to begin, and anxiety to be
will
in
the
is
eager-
leading
brigades.
But besides these reports of the gathering of the

clans,
and of
their preparations to defend vigorously
IN
VI
the
THE KHANKI VALLEY
8i
of the great gateways of their country,
first
have other evidence of

boldness
for
their
numbers,
activity,
we
and
day by day our foraging parties have
been harassed by them, and night by night our
camp has been surrounded and
with
fusiladed
On
increasing audacity and severity.
the night of
the 23rd particularly the enemy's onset amounted
almost to an attack, and some of the picquets were

heavily engaged from dusk until after midnight.
good
blood-stains found the next morning
few star
tions,
shells
were
fired with
effect,
in
and the
many
direc-
with a few bodies actually retrieved within
only 30 or 40 yards of our
lines, attested at
once
the boldness of our assailants, and the fact that they
had not gone away unpunished.

were
Our own
casualties
insignificant.
The
quiet.
night of the 24th passed
in
comparative
But on the 25 th the foe seemed
recovered his
spirit, for all
to
have
our foraging parties on
by guns as well
as by infantry, were much harassed by crowds of
Afridis, who followed them up with amazing energy
and intrepidity as they returned to camp, and
excited general comment and admiration by the
skill with which they skirmished on the mountain
side, and by the accuracy and judgment with which
they delivered their fire. There was more than one
that day, though strongly guarded
instance of their waiting with

infantry
had
to
coolness until our
show themselves on the sky-line as

some ridge, and then
they crossed the crest of
THE CAMPAIGN
82
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
delivering a volley, at a range of 1000 yards sometimes,
and invariably knocking some one over.
As
darkness came on they closed in on the
camp, and their marksmen, establishing themselves

in coigns of vantage,
unpleasant for
us.
make it extremely
do not know anything more
began
to
uncomfortable than this whistling of bullets round
The
one from hidden enemies.
you escape from
replied to, nor can
from
and you are as
directions,
all
On
one spot as another.

the
were
casualties
for
it,
it
comes
much exposed
particular evening
numerous
among men and
and animals, some twenty odd being
Captain
Badcock,
he
sat
down
to
D.S.O.,
15th
Munster
Fusiliers,
5th
was shot
dinner,
Hadow,
Sikhs,
Field
arm
just as
in the left
and Lieutenant -Colonel
and
Lieutenant
orderly officer
had very narrow escapes,

or going
ing them,
Badcock was
hit
hit.
Gurkhas,
to
General Kempster, were wounded.

officers
in
this
followers
Intelligence officer,
be
cannot
fire
through
by a Snider
Crocker,
Brigadier-
Many
other
bullets just miss-
their
bullet,
tents.
Poor
which shattered
the bone so dreadfully that amputation was necessary

at once.
He
has borne the operation well, and,
hope, will soon

hills
make a good
from which the
chiefly directed,
fire
recovery.
on the camp seemed to be
one to the east and the other to
the south-west, were occupied last night by our

troops, a
the
we
Two distant
own
wing of the 3rd Gurkhas holding one, and
Nabha
Infantry, with admirable spirit, volunteer-
IN
VI
THE KHANKI VALLEY
The consequence was we
ing to hold the other.
were
left in
83
comparative peace, and slept the sleep
of the just.
you by wire of the
told
came
in
five
men,
who
Afridis,
on the 24th and gave themselves up
to
one
of our picquets, saying they wished to be loyal and
would not
They proved
fight against us.
to
be a
subadar and a sepoy of the 26th Punjab Infantry,
and three pensioned native

all
whom, as
have come
of
well
they really
was
it
officers of other corps,
once remarked, might very
at
weeks ago without hindrance had

But
wished to prove their loyalty.
in
arriving on the eve of a general engagement, and
coming
straight
from the enemy, strongly posted
within six miles of us,
more
in
it
it
if there was
For surely the
does seem as
than meets the eye.
Afridis would not have let
them pass over
with the chance that they might reveal
all
to us
their
plans and dispositions and strength, unless they had
some
ulterior design in letting
ever, they reckoned that
we
them
go.
If,
how-
should receive them
with open arms, pat them on the back, and give
them
liberty to
come and go
calculated, for the
five
as friends, they mis-
men were
folded while being conducted
carefully blind-
into
Sir
William
Lockhart's presence, and are detained as prisoners
pending the development of events.
The Queen's
gracious message of approval of
the valour of her troops, of sympathy, and of tender

inquiry after the welfare of the wounded, has been
84
THE CAMPAIGN
greatly appreciated by
many
hearts.
The
IN TIRAH,
all
feeling that
and anxiously
animates every soldier

best service of which he
as
Her Majesty
is
this wild frontier,
any of her subjects,
in this force to
is
chap, vi
ranks and has gladdened
watching the progress of events on

as attentively
1897-98
capable.
render the
CHAPTER
VII
THE CAPTURE OF THE SAMPAGHA PASS

Camp
At
last
we
are fairly under way.
weary waiting
and
have
not wasted.
the Mastura Valley,
in
at
fully
It
Khangarbur, but
it
ôth October.
was a week of
was
inevitable,
But the time was
explained why.
Reconnaissances and foraging parties
were sent out
daily,
officers, resulting in
good exercises
men and
for
the acquisition of useful informa-
tion regarding routes, etc.,
and
in the accumulation
of a considerable quantity of fodder for the transport
amount of
animals, and a limited
Also, as
grain.
there were constant skirmishes
with the enemy,
without serious loss on either
and
after each encounter
side,
we always
as,
moreover,
perforce retired to
our camp, he was gently encouraged, so
many
us fondly hoped, to believe himself equal,

superior, to us,
if
of
not
and so we imagined would make a
bold stand on the Sampagha, and give us a chance

to beat
him there handsomely.
however,
show.
we have been
Finally,
In this expectation,
deceived, as the sequel will
during
the
week
that
we were
THE CAMPAIGN
86
reconnoitring, and
IN TIRAH,
foraging,
chap.
1897-98
and skirmishing, the
commissariat were busy pouring supplies into Khangarbur, the road to which from Shinauri has
now
been so much improved by the strenuous exertions

of the Engineers, that even camels can traverse
it
and on the 26th and 27th a convoy of 3000 of these

animals, which carry loads of 400 lbs. each, came
safely through to our camp.
Thus, by the evening
of the 27th, Sir William Lockhart was prepared to
resume the advance
in earnest,
and
the long-looked-for orders for the
on that
to the joy of all
move were
issued
date.
The march
Gundaki was a very short and easy

one on paper, barely three and a half miles but it
meant a good deal more than that for the troops
engaged in it.
From Khangarbur the route lay
almost due north up a broad and undulating valley,
fully one and a half miles wide at the start, but
narrowing just beyond Gundaki to barely one-third
of that distance.
It is bounded on the east and
west by low hills, which had to be cleared of the
enemy and crowned by our infantry before the force
to
could advance.
On
the east particularly lay
some
heights which had been regularly held by the Afridis,
and on which, on the evening of the 27th, we could

count five or six standards and see crowds of men.
The
36th Sikhs and the Northampton Regiment
were accordingly ordered
them
out,
and
this
was
to start at 5 a.m.
effected without
and turn
more trouble
For your
than was involved in an arduous climb.
vn
Pathan
is
not an early
87
He will say his evening
riser.
prayer with fervour, and eat his evening meal with
and then*
gusto,
flesh,
he
the spirit and in the
fortified in
on
will sling his rifle
his back, stick his
knife into his belt, and start out for a few hours' real
which means that up
enjoyment before he turns
in
about II
the sport
P.M. (or
later, if
is
good) he
to
will
amuse himself by shooting into his enemy's camp, or

by stalking and cutting up stray camp followers or
belated convoys.
But about midnight, conscious of
duty thoroughly done, he
will retire to his eyrie in
the rocks, curl himself up, and sleep
if
the sun has topped the horizon, and
warmed
the
chill
morning
allowed until
its
rays have
Consequently, he
air.
is
if only he be sought
happened on this occasion.
Before the Afridis were fully aware of the manoeuvre,
not infrequently caught napping,

early enough.
And
so
it
the column, under Colonel Chaytor, was upon them,
and
hastily bolting, their
few
volleys, they
movements quickened by a
abandoned
their vantage ground,
and the right flank of the force was made secure
for
the day.
Similarly, the hills
cleared by troops
on the
(the
of the road were
left
Yorks,
half-battalion
4th
Gurkhas, and half- battalion 3rd Sikhs) detached
from the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee's), and by

9 A.M. the force was in
full
First Division on the
left
on the
right,
march up the
of the
line,
valley, the
the Second
both preceded, of course, by strong
advanced guards.
Sir William
Lockhart himself
THE CAMPAIGN
88
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
chap.
rode at the head of the main body of the First

Division.
The
opposition
by the enemy to this

nil, and there were only
offered
advance was practically
some ten or twelve casualties incurred in the skirmishing on the flanks. On arriving on the ground
on which it was proposed to encamp for the night,
or rather bivouac (for the force
is
without tents), the
troops were halted, and piled arms, while the baggage

and rearguards closed up.
In the meantime. Sir
William Lockhart, from commanding ground well to

the front, examined the approaches to the pass, and
arranged the plan of attack for the following day.
Up
as
to the point
I
have
gentle
rise
said,
now
reached, the ground had been,
undulating and easy, and with" a
But
towards the pass.
directly
the
Kandi Mishti stream was crossed, which here lay at

feet, it was roughly broken up by ravines and
nullahs, between which long rugged spurs ran out
from the mountain side, ending many of them in
precipitous slopes, which could only be ascended in
single file and at particular points.
The road up the
Sampagha Pass was in full view, zigzagging up one
our
of these spurs.
is,
spur,
be
we
as
was the
full
of
To
the east of
it
(on our right, that
stood facing the position), on an adjacent

village of
armed men
Kandi Mishti was
Nazeno, which appeared to
and
to the west the village of
similarly held.
High up on
the
zigzag path, sangars and walls could be seen, and
everything pointed to a stout defence and a sharp
5
5^
vii
fight
on the following day.
It
was not
to be,
ever, notwithstanding that reconnaissances
on
briskly,
and that our picquets
were
enemy
plan of
was as
attack
follows,
omitting
The honour
of leading the direct attack by the
main approach
to the pass
2nd Brigade (General
was intrusted
Gaselee's), the
of the division co-operating.

leave
fired
to fight.
The
details
how-
left flank, inci-
tending to confirm the belief that the
all
meant
were
this night
sharply attacked, particularly on the
dents
89
the
to
Gurkha
scouts
This brigade was
to
bivouac at 5 a.m., and it was reckoned

would be across the Kandi Mishti stream, and
established on the far side of it by daylight.
By
its
the same hour, the massed batteries of the two

divisions, thirty-six guns,
under Brigadier-General
Spragge, and the rocket detachment, under Captain
Browne, R.A., were to be in position on a flattopped spur beyond the stream, almost opposite
the centre of the position to be attacked.
The
4th Brigade (Westmacott's) was to support the 2nd,

particularly
on
its
right flank,
(Kempster's) was to follow
it
and the 3rd Brigade

in reserve.
The
ist
Brigade (General Hart's) was distributed to protect

the batteries, and to co-operate with, and support
movement by detaching a regiment

village of Nazeno on the right flank
the whole
to
assail the
of
our advance, and another to attack Kandi Mishti
on the
left flank.
may
say here that the Devons
THE CAMPAIGN
90
on one
side,
Gurkha
Sage,
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and on the other the 2nd battalion
Rifles (who,
severely
by the way, had
wounded
in
ist
their colonel,
reconnaissance the
previous evening) carried out these operations very
The baggage was
successfully.
for loading
left in
camp ready
under suitable guards, which included
Nabha
the
Infantry, and a squadron of the i8th

Bengal Lancers, with instructions that it was to be
brought on directly a helio message was sent back
to
it.
Such were
briefly Sir
positions for the attack
William Lockhart's
dis-
on the Sampagha Pass,
to
which every one has been so keenly looking forward

for so
many days
past, and,
notwithstanding some
small delays caused in the beginning of the operations,
The morning of
they were entirely successful.
29th October was dark and cold, but
General Hart's Brigade was the
and had occupied
its
up
country, and in the dark,
easy to lose your way.
The
is
it
and
clear.
move
off,
good time
their ground,
But
to cover the general advance.
difficult
to
first
allotted positions in
to protect the batteries as they took
and
still
in
such a
particularly
batteries of the First
Division got blocked on the road, and thus were
somewhat
coming
into action
and General
wrong turning in one of
the ravines through which it was threading its way,
and lost a little time before it recovered its right
late in
Gaselee's Brigade took a
direction.
By
But these mistakes were soon put
7 A.M. the attack
was
fairly
right.
launched on the
vn
lines
designed by Sir William, and
evident that the
enemy did not mean
seriously, for they could

in
many
it
directions,
soon became
to fight very
be seen vacating positions
and wending
their
the very crest of the pass, as though
make
they had determined to
91
it
way up
to
was there
their stand.
At one important
point, however, on the zigzag

was a large sangar which evidently held
some determined spirits and as the Queen's and
road, there
who
Gurkhas,
the 4th
General with them)

a smart
fire
advance
the
led
(their
approached
in capital style,
it,
was opened on them, and several men
The
were knocked over.
of the batteries of
fire
the Second Division was, however, turned on to

this
sangar with such effect
about twenty minutes of
hundred or
so, bolted,
it,
and the
anything
sputtering
and
organised
was aimed
fire
casualties
some
knocked many
hill-side.
After
advance was nowhere opposed by

an
like
standing
occupants,
its
shells
of them over as they fled up the

this the infantry
after
that,
occurred
Queen's had one
man
at
defence,
it
from many points,
and
here
killed
though
The
there.
and eight wounded
commanding officer, Major Hanthe Gurkhas two, the Yorkshires
(including their
ford
Flood),
four,
the
36th
Sikhs
two men
killed
and two
wounded. No. 8 M.B., R.A., three men wounded;

No.
officer.
Bombay
Captain
De
M.B.
lost
Butts, killed
its
commanding
by a shot
abdomen, and there were a few other
in
the
casualties.
THE CAMPAIGN
92
But the
total
the
of
size
was
the
IN TIRAH,
engaged,
of the enterprise, and the

of the
defended
with one
it
to
magnitude
the
great natural strength
Had
by the enemy.
held
position
proportion
insignificant in
force
chap.
1897-98
they
quarter of the determina-
shown by them on the Dargai heights on the

20th inst., no doubt the loss of life would have
tion
been
The
did not.
fact is that,
seemed
events, they
The
Let us be thankful that they
greater.
far
practice
made by
Their
excellent.
beautiful
on
this occasion at all
afraid to face the artillery
fire.
the batteries was certainly
appeared to burst with
shells
where wanted, and
precision just
their
handling generally on this day was admirable.
By
A.M.
9.45
leading
the
of
troops
General
Symons's division had arrived on the crest of the

ridge,
and the pass was captured, but
what
later
when
the
firing
had ceased.
1.15
is, I
understand, the
enemy had been
it
was sometime
official
entirely driven
off,
and
Sir William Lockhart himself,
attended by General Nicholson, Sir Richard Udny,
Lord Methuen, and the
rest of his staff,
had by
this
time arrived on the summit, whence a heliogram
was
at
once despatched announcing the news to the
Commander-in-Chief, and
Viceroy.
The
to
troops had
all
his
Excellency the
acquitted themselves
admirably, for the climb had been a most arduous

one,
and though the opposition had not been very
serious,
yet
through from
the
attack
had been carried
right
without a check.
The
start to finish
%<:-^
v^
'
VII
93
summit of the pass is 6700 feet above sea-level, so

an ascent of fully 2000 feet was included in the
morning's work.
The Mastura
Valley
general level
Its
is
now
lay smiling
below
us.
only some 800 to 1000 feet
below the crest of the pass, so the descent into
it
by a terribly stony, but very gently graded, road

was a very simple matter. The troops were pushed
on at once, the Yorks and the 3rd Sikhs remaining
on the pass for the night, to protect the transport
with which the road was now blocked, and BrigadierGeneral Hart's Brigade halting at Kandi Mishti to
maintain communication with Gundaki.
We
have
ance of
all
been much struck by the appear-
this valley.
even here
It is
wide,
at its head, fairly
and walnut
flat,
timbered with apricot
trees about the villages,
numerous and
well-built,
which are very
and evidently inhabited by
an industrious and well-to-do people.

of land
is
terraced,
under cultivation, the
and signs
well watered
of
plenty
great deal
fields are carefully
and
comfort
are
But the inhabitants, of course, have
abundant.
all
fled.
With
herds,
they have betaken themselves across the
their families,
their flocks
and
their
mountains to some remote fastnesses, or possibly

across the
Afghan border,
until this
time of tribula-
tion be overpast.
The
two days have been such a tax upon

the transport that to-day, the 30th, Sir William has
decided to halt, partly to rest the animals, and partly
last
THE CAMPAIGN
94
to reconnoitre the
is
now
onward
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
chap, vii
The Arhanga
road.
within five miles of us.
It leads
Pass
us into
Tirah proper, the inviolate home of the Afridis.

Will they defend
and
scuttle
it
like
men, or
will
they scatter
before our advance, as they, and their
neighbours, the Orakzais, did yesterday

the question of the moment.
hours should see
it
answered.
That
is
Another twenty-four
CHAPTER
VIII
THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA
AND THE
PASS,
OCCUPATION OF TIRAH
Headquarters Camp, Maidan, Tirah,
Sih November.
Here we
are in the promised land at last
land
not exactly flowing with milk and honey, but extensive,
and capable of
highly cultivated,
fertile,
much development under a settled government.

But of this more presently.
The past week has
been an eventful and important one, and
hark back to
thread of
I
its
my
my
closed
must
commencement and take up
narrative where
last letter
last
dropped
the
it.
on the 30th October
in
the Mastura Valley, the day after that on which
the
Sampagha Pass was
Sir William
captured.
Lockhart would gladly have gone on

attack of the
Arhanga
Pass,
at
once to the
and the troops would
have cheerfully responded had he called on them

for this effort, which at one time was at all events
considered.
But prudence dictated a
least twenty -four hours.
distance to the pass
was
In the
uncertain,
first
and
halt for at
place,
the
its difficulties,
THE CAMPAIGN
96
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
based altogether on native report, a matter of conIn the next,
jecture.
let
was absolutely necessary
it
to
the transport close up, and give the Commissariat
Many
time to push up supplies.
regiments, so
great was the block on the Sampagha, did not get
baggage on the evening of the
their
29th,
and spent
the night a la belle dtoile with only their greatcoats
and the rations carried
these reasons Sir William decided to halt

to
the troops and the
rest
come
allow supplies to
approaches
to
the
For
one day
in their haversacks.^
on,
baggage animals,
and
Arhanga,
European had heretofore
to
to reconnoitre the
whose
heights
no
scaled.
Thus, while the reconnaissance was proceeding
on the 30th, the Commissariat and Transport Staff

devoted their best energies to keep the stream of
laden mules and ponies flowing throughout the day
from Gundaki over the Sampagha into the camp
at
Sappers and Miners and Pioneers toiled
Mastura.
unceasingly to improve the road, and the whole of

the
St
under General
Brigade,
direction, exerted
itself
to
Hart's
personal
press on the important
work by helping to control and direct the traffic.

There were some who thought it would be impossible, so great was the block on the road, to
make such arrangements by the evening as would
1
"My
great difEculty
was
the. want of food,
some corps having absolutely
nothing in hand, and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the
arrival of supplies.
what could be
But by redistributing what there was, and making use of

man was eventually
collected from neighbouring villages, each
provided with two days' rations."
Sir William Lockharfs Despatches.
THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA PASS
VIII
justify a forward
move on
97
But Colonel
the 31st.
Commissary -General with the

His
force, is a resourceful man and a masterful.
spirits, too, are never-failing, and his way of always
Christopher,
the
taking a rosy view of things, and of making the best

of a situation, has the effect of reassuring his subordinates and
work
into
making them
cheerfully put their best
the moment.
the task of
Major
In
Mansfield, too, the head of the Transport, he has
a most
efficient
General
assistant
Nicholson,
and
it
of
chief
the
was enough
the
for
to
Staff,
intimate what were Sir William Lockhart's wishes
regarding the advance on the morrow for Colonel
Christopher
to
determine
department was concerned,
that,
it
so
as
far
his
could be arranged.^
In the meantime. Sir William Lockhart himself,
attended by the principal
officers of his
and
Staff,
by General Kempster's Brigade, and a

battery of artillery, rode out to view the road and
examine the approaches to the Arhanga Pass, and,
escorted
The
as far as might be, the enemy's dispositions.
party was fired on soon after leaving camp, but the
enemy
fell
back as our skirmishers advanced, and
careful observations
foot of the pass,
were made almost up
to the
on which Sir William was able
plan the attack for the morrow.
The whole
from camp to the summit of the pass
is
to
distance
only about
four miles.
1
"Thoroughly acquainted with
officers
military requirements. "
their
work, and
full
of resource, these
and were always ready

Sir William Lockharfs Despatches.
never raised unnecessary
difficulties,
to
meet
THE CAMPAIGN
98
was
It
IN TIRAH,
once obvious that
at
easier one to attack than the
proaches to
and deep
for
it
chap.
1897-98
this
pass was an
Sampagha.
The
ap-
were not broken up by such frequent
was more favourable ground

turning movements, and opposite the centre of
ravines, there
the position was a low
which, at a range of
hill,
barely 1300 yards from the crest of the pass, formed
an
On
ideal position for artillery.
the other hand,
no enemy, certainly not an enemy with the reputation and the rifles of the Afridis, should have
allowed himself to be driven from such a position as
by the Arhanga heights without
that formed
flicting terrible loss
on the
in-
Behind the
assailant.
rocks and sangars on the crest-line, or sheltered on

the reverse slopes of the mountain, they could not
after
all
be very much hurt by
their lofty
they willed
disposition
shell-fire
while from
vantage-ground they could note, and,

it,
if
prepare in good time to meet, every
made
for the attack
while almost from
the foot of the laborious ascent the troops advancing
them would be exposed to their effective

Thus there was certainly no balance of
rifle-fire.
advantage on our side, and notwithstanding that
they had not shown much spirit at the Sampagha, it was confidently expected that they would
rally on the ramparts of the Arhanga, and defend
against
desperately the last avenue leading to their cherished

Tirah.
But again we were disappointed pleasantly disappointed, if you will because no one wants to see
Y
^5
O
z.
o
o
>
VIII
a long
list
may indeed be
of casualties, which
proof of desperate fighting, but

evidence of good generalship.
own
brave
not necessarily
The
Afridis, in our
British
have often shown themselves dashing and
But
soldiers.
left to
themselves, they are no
better than any other wild tribe,

ferior to
is
and under the leadership of
service,
officers,
99
some
the
and decidedly
Waziris, for example.
in-
More-
it is impossible not to doubt that they have

been much impressed by the valour of our troops,
and the splendid leading of the officers, on the
over,
Dargai heights, on the
i8th
and 20th October,
while all reports tend to show that their own losses

on those occasions were much heavier than has
been generally supposed. So now, when from their
eyries in the rocks they noted the General's skilful
dispositions, the steady
unwavering advance of the
men, the numbers launched against them, and the

deadly precision of our
failed
artillery fire,
their hearts
them, and they went.
Let
me
explain
now what
Sir William Lockhart's
attack were, and
dispositions
for
carried out.
The 2nd
how
they were
Division was to lead, General
Yeatman-Biggs commanding. The advanced guard

was formed by the 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General
supplemented by the 3rd Gurkha
and a company of Sappers.
Its special
Westmacott),
scouts
was to drive in any outlying picquets of

the Afridis, and take possession of the low hill in
function
the centre, previously mentioned, in order to
let
the
THE CAMPAIGN
100
massed
The
batteries
two divisions occupy
of the
Sapper company, followed the
work round
action, to
4th,
come
orders were, after the artillery had
it.
and
into
Westmacott's
to the left of
and demonstrate against the enemy's
battalions,
Next came Major-General Symons,
right flank.
commanding
under
chap.
1897-98
Brigade (Brigadier- General Kempster),
3rd
also with a
its
IN TIRAH,
the ist Division, with the 2nd Brigade
Brigadier- General
Gaselee,
to
which was
assigned the important duty of turning the enemy's
This brigade,
left flank.
too,
was accompanied by
a company of Sappers, and the remaining Sapper
companies, with the 28th
Bombay
Pioneers, followed
close in rear of the centre, ready to
push forward
and commence work on the road over the pass

directly
opportunity
The
offered.
ist
Brigade
(Hart's) of General Symons' Division concentrated

this day, the 31st, in the
Mastura Valley, where
it
stood in reserve as a strong point d'appui between

the two passes.
The baggage
of the advancing
troops, as at the storming of the
camp ready
stacked, and
left
in
orders that
was
to be brought
it
sage to that
effect
on
directly a
mes-
was heliographed back.
Sir William Lockhart's dispositions
Such were
for the attack
on the Arhanga, and as the Afridis
noted the quiet business-like
were carried
Sampagha, was
for loading, with
out, the
way
in
which they
numbers sent against them,
the menace to their flanks, and the searching
fire
of
the guns, they must have considered their plight a
THE CAPTURE OF THE ARHANGA
vni
hopeless one from the
first.
PASS]
loi
By 5 a.m. the force

to move ofif from its
was under arms and ready

bivouac, and by 7 o'clock the skirmishers of the
advanced guard were in contact with the enemy, a
few of whom had been thrown out as scouts as far
as the foot of the slopes leading to the crest of the
Arhanga.
once driven
at
in,
the low
the centre (called Unai, from the village on
hill in
it)
These were
was occupied by the Borderers, and by 7.45
a.m.
the three batteries of the

British,
No. 8
British,
2nd Division (No. 9

and No. 5 Bombay), under
Colonel Purdy, R.A., had come into action on
its
summit, and were making excellent practice against

the enemy, visible in groups here and there on the
sky-line of the
pass.
The
Division (No.
British,
No.
batteries
of the
ist
Derajat, and No. 2
Kohat), under Colonel Duthy, R.A., arrived very

shortly afterwards and prolonged the line to the
right,
so that Brigadier-General Spragge by 8,15
had a well-posted
deadly fire on the
line of
36 guns pouring a most
Afridis (the range
was never
out-
side 1300 yards), under cover of
which the infantry
now advanced
The order
have already ex-
plained.
It
to the attack.
of the attack
practically
devolved upon Brigadier-
General Gaselee's Brigade to deal the stroke that

should be decisive.
Accordingly, while the guns,
and Westmacott's Brigade, held the enemy in the

centre, and while Kempster diverted attention by
demonstrating against his
right,
the battalions of
THE CAMPAIGN
102
Gaselee's Brigade (with

5th
Gurkha
Captain
scouts,
Lucas
IN TIRAH,
whom
in
Lieutenant
up the ravines on
steadily
for the
some eighty
and
his
minutes to ten exactly their leading
chap.
1897-98
day were the
number, under
Bruce)
climbed
and
left,
files
at
ten
reached the
The ascent was a very steep one,

though well sheltered the greater part of the way
from direct fire, and there was admirable rivalry for
crest of the
hill.
the honour of being the
As
first
to top the summit.
nearly as possible the Yorkshire
Regiment and
same time,
but the Queen's, the 3rd Sikhs, and the 4th Gurkhas
were all close up, and the performance of the whole
brigade was excellent.
the 5 th
The
Gurkha
scouts arrived at the
Afridis did not wait for the
of this flanking movement.

full retreat,
time that
ceased.
self
it
development
They were
already in
"over the
it
By
hills and far away," by the

was accomplished, and firing at once
1 1
a.m. Sir
on the top of the
down
full
William Lockhart was him-
pass, troops
were being pushed
into Tirah as fast as the
cipitous road
narrow and prewould permit, and the good news had
been flashed back direct to Fort Lockhart, on the
Samana
range, for transmission to the Viceroy and
to the Commander-in-Chief, that the pass was
in
our
possession.
The
strength of the
their losses,
it
is
enemy on
this occasion, or
impossible to estimate.
It
was
expected that they would muster in thousands for

the defence of this particular pass, and that here,
if
VIII
103
anywhere, they would make a great and gallant
But
stand.
it
were actually
may be doubted if even 1000 of them

in line when we attacked.
The
remainder were probably more concerned

ing their families
safety
It
in
remov-
and flocks and herds to places of
and refuge than
may be supposed
meeting us
in
that, as
in fair fight.
they have had weeks of
warning, they might have done this sooner, but

.
procrastination
is
characteristic of all Orientals,
and
possibly they could not bring themselves to believe,

until literally the eleventh hour, that after centuries
of inviolate seclusion,
we
should dare, or should be
and penetrate into their

There can be no question, at all
able, to "lift the purdah,"
sacred valley.
events, that they quitted in haste, for evidences of
the fact abound.

full
Their houses,
for
example, are
of grain and walnuts and potatoes,
they might
easily
thought of
it
have removed
and they
will
etc.,
at leisure
soon
feel
which
had they
the want of
these things, for wherever they have gone, they
And
cannot live on their neighbours very long.
if
their strength on the Arhanga be represented by x,

their
losses
may be
absolutely unknown, and
they
may
be.
They
expressed by y.
it
is
futile to
are
guess what
Blood splashes were found
in
many
places along their line of defence, and undoubtedly
some of them were killed and others wounded,

chiefly by the artillery fire, but the actual numbers
placed Aors de combat must be a matter for conjecture.
THE CAMPAIGN
104
To
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
turn to our side, our casualties were practi-
cally nil.
Captain Searle, of the 36th Sikhs, was

wounded severely by a chance shot quite at the
commencement of the proceedings, and there were
four or five
men
hit
during the attack.
soldiers or battery drivers
That was
accounted for by the reasons

cated
It is
all.
only to be
have already
indi-
but the insignificant losses do not in any
degree detract from the credit due to the General,
and
to the troops, for the success attending a plan
designed and resolutely executed.^
skilfully
From
down on
part of
Arhanga Pass we looked
the crest of the
the promised land, Tirah, or rather on that
it
known
which we had just

Orakzai Tirah
north of
us,
left, is
Rajgal, which no doubt
of them, and
it
these
may have
is
valley to the
we
shall visit
No
Tirah proper.
pean has penetrated into

though one or two
Valley,
also a part of Tirah, but
Maidan and the next
shortly, constitute Afridi
Afridis
The Mastura
as Maidan.
valleys
Euro-
hitherto,
traversed the fringes
has been the proud boast of the
from time immemorial that no enemy of
whatever race or creed has ever attempted to cross

the mountain barriers which shut
meddle with them
we have changed
1
in their
that now.
all
" That a more formidable
own
resistance
them
in,
and to
fastnesses.
Well,
The
was not offered
veil of their
in the passes lead-
ing respectively into Orakzai and Afridi Tirah I attribute to the lesson taught
They
those tribes at Dargai in the actions of the i8th and 20th October.
then learnt that their strongest positions could not avail them against the
Sir William Lockharfs Despatches,
valour of British and Native troops."
viii
temple has been rent
in twain,
105
and the mysterious
There was no
lingering on the Arhanga when once the enemy had
been driven off. Troops at once poured down the
been rudely revealed.
interior has
northern slopes to the
fertile valley
below
sappers
work on the road before the

last reverberations of the guns had died away among
the mountains; and the baggage being " helio'd " up,
and pioneers were
the stream of
unfortunately,
some of the
it
on
trains
at
set
with such violence that,
in
this
and the succeeding night,
were overtaken by darkness, and
raided by the enemy, with most

ourselves
in
men and
material,
serious
as
loss
shall
to
relate
immediately.
The
encampment of the
place selected for
force
was a locality about three miles due north of the

Arhanga, near a hamlet, in about the centre of the
Maidan district. There are no villages here strictly
so called, nor in the Mastura Valley. But there are
innumerable houses dotted
They
all
over the country.
occur every quarter of a mile or
so,
and are
large, strong, substantial buildings, generally includ-
ing a tower or keep, and capable of a strong defence
so long as
artillery is
Guns would,
once.
not brought against them.
of course, knock them to pieces at
In each of these houses lives a family, or a
group of blood relations
in
one,
for
example,
several brothers, with their wives and children, and

fathers
and mothers,
etc.
in
another a petty
with his immediate following, his
sisters,
chief,
cousins,
THE CAMPAIGN
io6
and
are
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and so on. But, needless to say, they

empty now. With one accord the people
aunts,
all
have
fled before
we have
our approach, and
the
valley to ourselves.
But not the surrounding hills. They are full of

houseless and prowling marauders, and no party
can leave camp
any direction without a skirmish,
in
or an exchange of shots with them.

Afridi clans the Zakka-khels are the
the most powerful
and
influential,
Of
all
the
most numerous,
and the most
notorious for daring raids and treacherous attacks.
They
inhabit
strips of
all
Southern Maidan and important
country in Maidan, and in the Bara, Bazar,
and Khyber Valleys.
map
glance at these places on
show that they hold a geographical posiwhich gives them superiority and
pre-eminent consideration in all Afridi councils.
At
the
will
tion in Afridiland
present they are our immediate neighbours to the

south, and, in fact, our line of communications with
the
Mastura Valley, via the Arhanga Pass,
through Zakka-khel
This
fact
lies
territory.
was rudely brought
to our recollection
by the occurrences of the nights of 31st October and

1st
November, which
will
now
said that immediately the pass
describe.
have
was captured on the
baggage was helio'd for from the rear, and,

most unfortunately, on two days running, such a
crowd was allowed to stream over the pass that it
could not be cleared out of the dangerous defile on
31st, the
this side before darkness
had
set in.
This was the
VIII
Zakka-khels'
watch,
Swooping down from
opportunity.
the crags, on which
day they had kept patient
all
they rushed
weary
the
in
their
on
raids
men
tired
The
both occasions.
Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)

second night three
and
trains
and were only too suc-
escorts at various points,

cessful
107
killed
lost
on the
and four wounded,
ten boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition (iioo rounds
and some 350 kits, together

with 71 baggage ponies, which were carrying them,
and which stampeded in the darkness as soon as the
in a box), three rifles,
firing
On
and shouting began.
drivers
were
killed
the
and wounded, and
belonging to the 15th Sikhs were carried
was bad.
serious,
They ought
188
kits
off.
Not only
but the moral effect of them
These were very unfortunate

were the losses
night nine
first
events.
But
not to have occurred.
the confusion attendant on a rapid advance after a

successful action
is
unavoidably great, and the
control necessary at points in rear, which
strict
must often
commander and his staff more anxiety than

the enemy in front, is frequently lacking for the first
cause a
day or two.
However, the
strictest
measures have
since been taken to prevent convoys and baggage
from being benighted, and we must hope that some

early opportunity
may be
afforded of getting even
with the Zakka-khels.
In the meantime the force has settled

is
down and
enjoying a few days' well-earned rest pending
the next development of the situation.
This
will
THE CAMPAIGN
io8
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
probably take the form of some discussion with the

In Sir William Lockhart's original procla-
tribes.
mation to them he said that from the heart of their

country he would announce to them the
The
terms
final
of the
British
country
is
officers
can get into touch with their maliks these
terms
now
heart of their
reached, and as soon as the political
be announced.
will
lishing
Government.
announcements
The
way of pub-
usual
circumstances
in similar
is
to
send out copies by hand to the various clans and

sections
but they are an ignorant,
illiterate
people,
and the documents thus distributed must then be

read and interpreted to them by their Mullahs,
can, of course,
and
distort their contents,
own
their
add
do, explain, suppress,
purposes.
to,
and to
as they please,
For these
who
or
suit
reasons, the occa-
sion being an important one, instead of sending out
proclamations by messengers, the tribes have been
summoned to send in their jirgahs, in order that

they may be plainly told by ourselves what are the
terms imposed. The jirgahs of the Samil Orakzais
(who from the
first
have been ready to
treat with
us), and of at least three of the Afridi clans
the
Malikdin-khels, the Khambar-khels, and the Kuki-
khels
may
mediately
will
be expected
but
it
is
to
doubtful
arrive
the
if
have any dealings with us just
same
almost
im-
Zakka-khels
yet.
At
the
time, seeing us in possession, occupying their
lands and devouring their stores
and noting our
determination and our power to punish
with the
to ,~
viii
winter, too,
109
coming on while they are wanderers
on the bleak mountain -sides
they must see the
we may
hopelessness of prolonged resistance, and
reasonably hope that, within a measurable period of

time,
we
shall induce
them
The temper
to terms.
ever, a factor
varuim
to
meet us and to agree
of these wild tribes
is,
how-
mutabile semper, and
et
it
is
too early yet to forecast what line they will take.
Meanwhile, the troops pass the days

always accompanied by
in frequent
The former
reconnaissances and in foraging.
officers of the
are
Intelligence
Branch, and of the Survey Department, and, under

the superintendence of Colonel Sir
dich, R.E.,
and Colonel More-Molyneux, A.Q.M.G.
for Intelligence, the
through or occupy
exploited.
Thomas Hol-
The
whole of the country we pass

is
being rapidly mapped and
foraging parties are worked on a
regular system, and with great success.

valley
is
allotted,
for
foraging
division, half to the other.

off particular sections
Each
to each
Half the
purposes,
to
one
division then tells
brigade,
and each
brigade in turn points out particular lines to be
worked by each regiment.

fusion,
Thus
there
and no waste of power or time.
mules go out every day, with
is
no con-
Strings of
sufficient escorts,
and
return in the evening laden up with forage, which
abounds, and with sacks of potatoes, wheat, Indian

corn, pumpkins, walnuts, etc., of
is
all
of which enough
found to appreciably lessen the strain of supply
on the commissariat.
The
fodder
is
taken straight
THE CAMPAIGN
no
to the transport lines
IN TIRAH,
and stacked
chap.
1897-98
the food stuffs
are deposited in the brigade store depots of each
whence the commissariat officer

them as rations in due course.
brigade,
reissues
The
in
charge
foragers not infrequently find odds and ends
of booty which they annex for themselves

o\A.jezails,
to
swords and daggers, and Korans.
wit,
These
mementoes of the
campaign.
Of Korans there are two kinds the
one printed in Peshawar or Lahore, and of no particular interest or value
the other hand-written, and
generally illustrated and illuminated.
These are
are retained by the finders as
and are very precious
rare,
finds indeed.
few,
however, have been taken.
One
day
expedition from camp, undertaken on the
was of more than passing

briefly refer to it.
There is a
after our arrival here,
and
interest,
will
place a short three miles west from this spot called
Bagh.
It is
simply a mosque, or musjid, surrounded
by a small grove of
but
trees,
it
is
notorious as the
place where the Afridis hatch most of their raids

forays
it is
originated and decided on
known
and
the spot where the present uprising was

;
and
as a centre of intrigue
it
has always been
and fanaticism.
Sir
William Lockhart decided, therefore, to pay Bagh

a
visit,
to demonstrate
to reach
practices
to
them anywhere, and to punish their malhow and when we please. A small column,
consisting of the King's
the
St
the Afridis our power
Battalion 3rd
Own
Gurkha
Scottish Borderers,
Rifles,
and No. 8
VIII
iii
Mountain Battery R.A., the whole under the com-
mand
Colonel
of
King's
Dixon,
Borderers, the senior
officer,
Own
was accordingly de-
spatched to carry out Sir William's orders.

of the
enemy were on the
column marched
out,
Scottish
hills
few
on our right as the
and they managed
to
knock over
Gurkhas before a few well-directed shells

from Major Shirres's battery cleared them out. The
famous mosque was then approached.
In appearfour of the
ance
it is
shed.
It
mean
is,
building,
little
better than a cattle-
however, a place of worship, and
therefore, as a matter of course, respected.
not touched
Sirkar's wrath
it
were
all
but,
as
It
and punishment, the trees surrounding
" ringed," which
be dead within the year.
means
that they will
If the party
had only the Gurkhas' kukris.
place will lose its
made
his
importance and
we
These, however,
served every purpose, and no doubt,

accursed Feringhi has
all
had carried
axes they might have been felled at once, but
was
a permanent mark of the
now
that the
mark on Bagh, the

sanctity.'^
Captain T. G. Maclaren of the Borderers was slightly wounded in this
reconnaissance.
CHAPTER
LIFE IN TIRAH
IX
THE AFFAIR OF
THE QTH NOVEMBER
Maidan, Tirah, %th November.
We entered this valley on 31st October

still
tion
we may remain
which
raises reflections.
It
we
are here
is
a situa-
This
indefinitely.
cannot be regarded
as a satisfactory one, from the soldier s point of view.
So long
ing,
as
we were on
the move, advancing, attack-
gaining ground, defeating and driving off the
enemy whenever
encountered,
it
sailing,
and every one was happy.
we had
to take
not a
breaking eggs,
gloves.
Our
all
plain
What though
some hard knocks, and
You
little?
was
rough
to
it
make omelets without

and you cannot make war in kid
losses
cannot
and our fatigues were
day's work, and were cheerfully endured.
all in
the
But now
has come the unsatisfactory part of the business, the

halt while
we
try to negotiate,
and consider ways
and means, and we are conscious that the delay and

inaction involved thereby are as mistaken as to the
motive
for
them (by our enemies)
some and unpleasant
in their
as they are irk-
consequences to our-
LIFE IN TIRAH
CHAP. IX
selves.
It
is,
however, unavoidable that we should
on our oars
rest here
be considered
for a while,
and a
halt
knotty points are discussed in
Simla and the Foreign

in
as there
is
a military aspect of the campaign
political as well as
to
113
Ofifice
is
all
necessary while
their bearings
taking part, no doubt,
But a savage and untutored
the discussions.
enemy does not always understand why we halt, so

I may usefully state some of its immediate effects
upon him, and some of the considerations to which
they give
rise.
The first and immediate

in our active operations
their
wind and
and
of this pause
that the Afridis recover
is
and bethink
their frightened senses,
themselves to seek
as best they
effect, then,
may
reprisals,
and
to get
even with us
for the defeats inflicted
for the insults
upon them,
and injury resulting from the
They are
They know very well
in open fight.
They
invasion and occupation of their country.
no simpletons, these
now
that they cannot
Afridis.
meet us
recognise our superiority in organisation, in equip-
ment, in leading, and above

give way
as
all
in guns,
and they
we advance, without attempting
an opposition which they
But when we
halt
feel
would be
to offer
fruitless.
and form big camps, and begin
to
think rather of feeding ourselves, and of maintaining

safely
our long line of communications,
than of
following and attacking them, then the Afridi sees

his opportunity,
turn
now
and says
softly to himself,
There goes a convoy
let
"It
is
my
us ambuscade
THE CAMPAIGN
114
it
my
There,
let
us rush
let
us harass
it
it!
which
is
There marches a reconnaissance

There overhead is the wire on
;
it
And,
animals
Come,
there
finally,
us
let
of billowy
fields
its
let
huge camp,
their
is
long rows of thousands of baggage
its
who wants
each other
infidels talk to
eating us up, with
canvas, and
chap.
1897-98
brethren, starts a foraging party
which these accursed

us cut
IN TIRAH,
And
into it!"
fire
mark
a fairer
his
for
rifle ?
these things
all
they do, and have done, with more or less success,
during the
Almost every night
last ten days.
we have been
since
here the telegraph wire has been cut,
Convoys coming
over the Arhanga have been raided and reconnaissances and foraging parties are fired on when
and a mile or two of
it
carried
off.
only a mile or two out of camp, and in some instances
have even been rushed by swordsmen, and sustained
As
common
serious loss.
been a
to firing into
camp by
occurrence, and
it
that the casualties are not greater.
unpleasant,
while
you
are
pipe round a
have got
is
all
to
right,
whizz
this
dinner,
at
camp
yourself,
trying
or
men
has
extremely
of
bullets
enjoy a
to
in.
If
you
in action, that
and a proper and honourable way of
You
take,
which no soldier objects

is
It is
before turning
fire
it
miraculous
spatter
be shot leading your
being shot.
dark
and
night,
is
autre
chose.
in
to.
fact,
But
There
is
a legitimate risk
to
be potted
in the
neither glory for
nor gain for your country,
such an end to your career, and, as
in
achieving
said before,
it
The Picquets on the Northern Slopes of the Arhanga Pass.

November_ December 1897.
From a Sketch by Major
A.
Bewicke- Copley, K.R. Kif C
D.A.QJi.6 for Intelligence.
2"^
D".
T.EF.
References.
A.B.C.D.E.F
Night and Day picquets,

b.c.d.e.f.
strongly intrenched
Day picquets.
Z.Z, Points from which enemy sought
to attack
convoys on the road.
The arrows show the ground covered by the fire of the picquets.
To /ace fi^ê /M.
LIFE IN TIRAH
IX
is
115
extremely unpleasant to hear the ping of the
shots, to
see
men knocked
over
was
(I
when he was
opposite Captain Badcock
sitting
hit),
and
may be your turn perhaps next.

To those who have not soldiered in these wild
mountains it may seem astounding that measures
to feel that
it
cannot be devised to stop this night
firing,
and to
render camps perfectly secure during the hours of

darkness.
Something, of course, can be done, and
you may be sure that such precautions
as are pos-
In a country like this
sible are not neglected.
it is,
however, quite impracticable to put a camp down

in a locality
which
two or three spots.

held by picquets, as a
in their turn, so
commanded from at least

These commanding spots are
not
is
rule
but their posts
completely under
fire
may
be,
from some
adjacent height as to be almost untenable.
Again,
these tribesmen, wily, bold, and active as they are,

think nothing of getting in on dark nights between
a picquet and the camp, and in such a position three
men with Martini- Henry rifles can easily

"brown" the camp with forty or fifty shots before
they can be dislodged. The whole country is a
or four
network of ravines, nullahs, and rugged hills, and

is admirably adapted to the guerilla tactics which
they profess and excel
stationary
we must
of annoyance and
7 p.m.,
and so long
as
we
are
put up with a certain amount
loss
from
this night firing.
On
was unusually bad about

and amongst other casualties
the night of the 6th

dinner-time,
in,
it
THE CAMPAIGN
u6
Lieutenant
was
Gififard,
IN TIRAH,
of the Northampton Regiment,
and Captain Sullivan, 36th Sikhs,
killed,
wounded by a shot through the

GifFard
had been
and as the
chap.
1897-98
Poor
forearm.
left
sitting at the
severely-
head of the
table,
became hot, he shifted his seat to

one which seemed a little more sheltered, saying,
laughingly, "This isn't good enough; I'm going
to move."
He had hardly reached his new place
when he was shot dead. It was very sad. His
fire
day was attended by Sir William
funeral the next
Lockhart, with the headquarters
camp not on
officers in
and
staff,
all
the
Captain Sullivan's
duty.
He
luck in being hit was very bad.
was not long
ago invalided to England from Suakin, but managed
and hurried out
to pass the Board,
as he
He
knew
regiment was going to the
his
had succeeded
in
soon
to India as
front.
overtaking us this very day
(the 6th) at about 11 a.m.,
and was
shot,
and of
course placed hors de combat for the rest of the
campaign, at six the same evening.
On
fortune of war!
Such
is
the
the next night but one, the
8th, Captain Watson, of the commissariat depart-
ment, was shot dead by a stray bullet in the same
He
way.
was a
comrades, and,
But
it is
War
is
indeed
not any pleasanter to be shot
out foraging or reconnoitring.

incurred on
and the best of
sorrow to say, leaves a widow and
children to lament his fate.
four
cruel
first-rate officer,
these duties since
when
Yet our casualties

we came here on
31st October are steadily mounting up.
explained
LIFE IN TIRAH
IX
in
my
system on which the collection
last letter the
of forage and supplies
have added what
117
conducted, and
is
the
is
might
these parties
that
fact,
never go out without encountering marauding bands

of Afridis, and becoming engaged with them more
Success in one or two raids
or less seriously.
makes these men extremely
bold,
and they are as
They
cunning and clever as they are audacious.
show much patience

their prey,
and great dash and impudence
when they make them.
attacks
they are beaten

frightened,
mules
It is
killed
will
So
that almost daily
and wounded
too,
but
we
we
point
all,
own
satisfaction
of
any certainty on the
they hold
think they have done well

lives of their
combats.
and wound some of
kill
have the
rarely
will
lose a few
in these inglorious
being able to speak with

and, after
we
get
will
stampede, and escorts
doubtless true that
them
in their
Nearly always
but sometimes drivers
off,
get separated.
men
watching and waiting for
in
life
if at
very cheap, and
the cost of a few
they have slain some of us and
have captured some of our mules and baggage. In

any case, actions of this class are fought by us on
the defensive.
All the moral advantages and ela-
tion pertaining to the attack are theirs
all
the dis-
advantage and depression ours.
The
question, then, of the
tandem ?
How
When
it
will
long
change
this
is
Quousque
situation
In what direction
next development be
is
hour,
It
is
to
last ?
will
the
understood that as
THE CAMPAIGN
ii8
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
soon as representative jirgahs of the tribes can

terms of Government
be assembled the
But we must
announced to them.
At
jirgahs.
present they
have arrived, and
certainly
be
catch our
show small sign of coming
Some
in to parley with us.
first
will
of the Samil Orakzais

it
is
said that
the Afridi clans are also on their
way
most important and powerful of
all
some of
in.
But the
of them, the
Zakka-khels, openly defy us to do our worst, and
urge the others, many of

them, not to
have reason to fear
Accordingly,
yield.
worst to them.
whom
we
are doing our
Sir William Lockhart has hitherto
issued the strictest orders to spare the houses and

villages
and
we have passed through

which we are halted. But the
the country
in
in the valley in
Zakka-khels do not understand clemency of

kind.
They
put
it
down
to weakness.
It is
that they are the mainspring of the revolt.
this
known
They
were the leaders of the unprovoked attacks on our

forts in the
Khyber, and carried
bulk of the loot
off
from them the
and they are the section which
has principally opposed our advance, raided our

convoys, attacked our foraging parties, and fired
into our camps.
For these very
sufficient reasons
Sir William Lockhart has decided not to allow the
Zakka-khels any more law, and

houses
in
all
Maidan, from the loop-holed walls and
towers of which
we
are fired on daily, are to be
Whether this
of making them yield
burned and levelled to the ground.
measure
their fortified
will
have the
effect
THE AFFAIR OF THE
IX
their submission, or
whether
9TH
it
NOVEMBER
will
119
exasperate them
making a big attack on our camp, time alone
into
can show.
We
should
to the justice of their
all
prefer the latter
but as
punishment there cannot be
two opinions.
loth November.
The
events of the last two days have been such
as to accentuate
have, in
fact, to
tunate that the

to
An
it.
all
that
have already written.
outline of
what happened
been wired to you, but the
has, of course,
fuller details
one can
There
give in a letter will not be without interest.

is
now an occurrence so unforterm disaster may almost be applied

record
a mountain a short five miles north-east of this
camp, named Saran Sar.
feet.
over
it
about 8000
rough but evidently much used road leads
into the
when we
Its height is
first
Upper Bara Valley, and by
arrived,
and almost daily
have been seen going and coming
this
road
since, Afridis
going, that
is,
on our approach, and coming, when they think they

safely can, to remove from their villages and houses,
at the eastern extremity of the valley, the grain, etc.,
left
behind when they
first
hastily fled.
Lockhart decided to pay Saran Sar a

9th
inst.,
khels
all,
partly to look
and destroy
Sir William
visit
on the
up these tribesmen, Zakkatheir fortified houses and
towers, and partly to have the adjacent country sur-
veyed and mapped. Accordingly, Brigadier-General
Westmacott was nominated to command the expedition, and the following troops placed under his
THE CAMPAIGN
120
orders for the day
The
own
36th Sikhs, of his
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
Northamptons and the
brigade, and the Dorsets
and the 15th Sikhs, of the 3rd (Brigadier-General

Kempster's) brigade
also the following Divisional
M.B. R.A., No, 5 Bombay

M.B., and No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and
troops: No. 8
British
Lockhart himself rode out
Sir William
Miners.
with his staff to witness the operations.
The
7 A.M.
troops breakfasted early and started at about
Within about two miles of camp they en-
countered opposition, and dispositions were

attack.
The
artillery,
climbed a steep
hill
made
to
escorted by the 15th Sikhs,
on the
right, and,
coming into
action against groups discernible on the lower slopes
of the mountain, speedily dispersed them.
Dorsets were sent to the
left
to
make
that flank
Northamptons and Sappers advanced
secure, the
the centre, and the 36th Sikhs on their right.
enemy, as
and by
usual,
1 1
a.m.
gave way before
in
The
this direct attack,
the summit of the mountain had
been gained with only

party at
The
trifling casualties.
The survey
once got to work, and Sir William Lock-
hart arrived later and
Westmacott on the
joined
Brigadier
General
whence a fine
view was obtainable of the country beyond. So far
If only we could always advance and
so good.
So long as we front our foes, and
never retire
attack them, and press them, no matter what the
crest of the ridge,
odds, so long do they acknowledge our superiority
and
yield to the inevitable.
But our
first
movement
THE AFFAIR OF THE
IX
9TH
NOVEMBER
121
them in turn to become

And so it was now. At 2 p.m. the
the assailants.
The Sappers and the 36th
retirement commenced.
in retreat
is
Sikhs were
lowed
later
Thus
five
the signal for
first
sent back to a position in rear,
fol-
by three companies of the Northamptons.

companies of this regiment were tem-
by themselves, more than

enough to hold their own against any number of
Afridis, for there was still plenty of daylight, and
support was close behind. At this time hardly an
enemy was in sight, but as these companies were
porarily left
on the
crest
gradually withdrawn the tribesmen appeared as
if
by
magic, and, pressing on their heels, delivered a hot
many casualties
in the rearmost company, commanded by Captain
Parkin.
The men, however, rallied bravely round
fire at
close range, causing at once
their officer, and, with great courage
and coolness,
wounded were
picked up and brought along. Sergeant Lennon of
this company particularly distinguished himself by
his deliberate shooting, and set an excellent example
kept the foe at bay, while
all
the
of steadiness in a trying situation, which had the

best effect.
The
result
was
that the supports in rear
up to
this" time were only ten or twelve men wounded.
The 36th Sikhs, well posted now, allowed the whole
of the Northamptons at this point to pass through
them, and, when they had given them time to reach
were
at last safely reached,
the foot of the

ing the
hill,
enemy
and the
casualties
followed them down, easily keep-
at arm's length,
and incurring no
THE CAMPAIGN
122
casualties
IN TIRAH,
At
themselves.
the
however, they overtook the
encumbered by
move
base of the
Northamptons, who,
so Colonel Haughton,
hill,
wounded, had been able to
their
only slowly
chap.
1897-98
command-
ing the 36th, again took up positions to cover their
At
further retreat.
up
into
this point the
ground breaks
The Northamptons,
deep stony ravines.
camp by marching
almost directly home
unfortunately, elected to regain
through one of these which led
from
this point.
say "unfortunately," because
if
attacked in such a situation the best and bravest
men must be
dreadfully handicapped.
Companies
and sections get broken up and separated, and
re-
gular control or united action becomes impossible.
And
something of
this
kind happened now.
camp was only

trailing its
was
It
already close on six o'clock, and getting dusk.
The
a short two miles distant, and, slowly
weary length over the
boulder-
difficult
strewn bed of the stream, the head of the North-
ampton column was almost home, while the
tail
was
still
at the foot of the hill in touch with the cover-
ing
36th Sikhs.
When
Colonel
Haughton was
assured by a report sent to him that the North-
amptons were
fairly started,
in line with the

1
assuming them to be
Dorsets and two companies of the
5th Sikhs, guarding their right flank, he withdrew,
clear of the ravine,
and eastwards of the
which the guns had been
in action in the
hill
on
morning,
in order to fulfil the role assigned to himself of safe-
guarding the
left
flank of the force on the
homeward
THE AFFAIR OF THE
IX
qth
NOVEMBER
Shortly after 7 p.m. he reached
march.
123
camp with
his regiment.
In the meantime a tragedy had been enacted in
body of Afridis, who had from the

marked the situation, swooped down
on the Northamptons entangled in the ravine, and,
the centre.
slopes above
from the high banks on the western
firing
shot
down
gaged
the stretcher-parties
in carrying off
and though
officers
side,
they
who were nobly
and protecting
their
en-
wounded
and men battled bravely
for
honour's cause, yet they were not fighting on equal
and the desperate struggle went
terms,
At
against them.
this juncture a
36th Sikhs, under Lieutenant
heavily
company
Van Someren
of the
(not one
of those that had been with Colonel Haughton, but
one that had previously been detached to support

the guns), returned to their aid, and, taking the
enemy
in
flank
amptons from
and
rear,
the
extricated
their perilous plight.
On
Northreaching
was called,
and it was found that Lieutenant Waddell and six
men were killed, Lieutenant Trent and twenty-nine
men wounded, and Lieutenant Macintire and eleven
camp,
men
at
about half-past seven, the
missing.
were
all killed.
may
roll
say here that these "missing"
search party found their bodies
the next day in the ravine where the fight occurred.
They
had, of course, been stripped of clothing and
arms, and
some of them slashed with swords, but
had not otherwise been mutilated.

The further casualties incurred on the 9th were
their bodies
THE CAMPAIGN
124
IN TIRAH,
Dorsets. Lieutenants
men wounded.
six
One man
Sikhs. Three
36th
killed,
men
the plain, unvarnished tale of this un-
is
fortunate day.
camp
Ingham and Mercer and
15th Sikhs.
and three wounded.

wounded.
Such
chap.
1897-98
It
like this
is
needless to say that in a great
many and
diverse opinions are held,
not only as to what might, could, and should have
happened, but also as to what did happen
two men are agreed as
to
how
and no
the blame for the
catastrophe should be distributed.
given you,
have, however,
and impartial
believe, a correct
state-
ment of the facts while as to blame, it is easy

enough to say that the General should have done
this, or that regiments should have done that
but
the simple truth is that the Northamptons themselves
had not the training and experience, and the practical
knowledge of the enemy's methods and tactics,
necessary to enable them to carry out successfully
;
that
most delicate and
difficult
operation of war,
namely, a retreat closely pressed by a savage
foe,
and conducted, encumbered by wounded, through a

terribly difficult country.
was no question of
It
by the General, of support by other

or of valour shown by themselves.
It was
dispositions
troops,
simply lack of the right kind of experience which

led
all.
them
The
be said
into errors, such as entering the ravine at

result
was
disastrous.
It
must, however,
for Colonel Chaytor, that this
the regiment had advanced by
that
was the route

was therefore
it
THE AFFAIR OF THE
IX
known
NOVEMBER
9TH
125
them all, and was the most direct road

and that with a number of wounded
to protect, and believing probably that it was flanked
on the right and left by other corps, it was natural
to
back to camp
perhaps that he should choose
to retire by.
it
Also, in justice to the gallant Northamptons, it

must be recorded that the way in which they stuck
to their wounded, and brought them through that
terrible nullah,
was a display of heroism and devotion
worthy of a regiment that fought
at
Surrounded by the enemy, exposed
to
Albuhera.
a galling
from the high banks to which they could not
fire
effectively reply, with

side,
dead and dying men on every
and the horror of
desperate situation
their
accentuated by the gathering darkness, they fought
on resolutely and bravely, and
sacrificed themselves
without hesitation to protect and save

their
if
possible
wounded comrades who could not help them-
selves.
I
cannot do better than conclude
this
chapter
with some extracts from the Pioneer of Allahabad,
which bear testimony to the noble conduct of
and men on
The
this
memorable
the Pioneer)
following extracts (says
from a private
letter written
thick of the fray
officers
occasion.
by one who was
are
in the
Tirah, Maidan, loih November 1897
Yesterday we had,
a fearful day, had to attack a pass and got there without any loss,
but in retiring to camp the enemy seemed to rise up from the
ground, and gave
Company
of the Northamptons, which was
THE CAMPAIGN
126
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
the rear company, an awful basting.

there were C, D,
F and
went to the assistance of
As luck would have it,

Companies close by, and they at once
their comrades.
It
Lieutenant Waddell and Sergeant GofTey were
was shot through the knee and
Litchiield
Underdown
Sergeant
slightly
shot through the ankle;
Trent wounded in the

rained about
me
if
sufferings
they were bad enough
imagine what
when they had
to
close this
till
killed,
to-morrow to wait
The whole
Sad news.
them
terrible
Sad
Macintire, Sergeant Luck, and eleven

battalion went out to look for
this
to
men
keep
them
alive
to see their
Lieutenant
tell.
morning, and
of the party missing are killed.
saw any one so
not
.
is
The
Total
They have brought
terribly affected as
loss his regiment has sustained.
The
I will
for the battalion's return.
twenty; wounded, twenty-eight.
I never
bullets
to
are missing.
the bodies, which are to be buried to-night.

up.
had
when we could carry them

be carried anyhow you can
went through.
they
The
so as to get
was
It
leg
his
Lieutenant
foot.
in retiring I
wounded men
possible safely into camp.
comfortably, but
his
was too awful.
and
like hailstones,
covering the unfortunate
and
he must lose
It
Sergeant
lose
will
Colour-Sergeant Hull
wounded.
thigh.
was here that
killed.
in
fearfully cut
he was
at the
only consolation their
have is that they died protecting our wounded men.

one can say enough in praise of the men of the Northamptons
who were in the engagement. They were literally fired at from
every side at once, but they were as cool and deliberate as if they
relations
No
were on an ordinary
of our brigade
is full
field day.
General Westmacott in
command
of praise of the Northamptons, and says, " I
never could have believed a regiment could have under such

cumstances behaved with such pluck and coolness."
Again
cir-
Lieutenant Trent was hit; there were only three stretchers

with the company and they were
only slightly
wounded
all full,
said he could walk,
but one man who was

and Lieutenant Trent,
who was
shot in the thigh with a Lee-Metford
was put
in.
were
now
Dum-Dum
bullet,
Lieutenant Macintire, a sergeant, and eleven men,
the last of
all,
and they were urgently ordered to
retire,
THE AFFAIR OF THE
IX
9TH
NOVEMBER
but Macintire said he could not leave the wounded, to

stuck,
and he and
had reached the

the
fire
all
his
village,
men were
By
killed.
this
127
whom
he
time the rest
and there was not a man left to return

man being either wounded or carrying
of the enemy, every
a wounded
man on
his
back or a
stretcher.
They
therefore
made
a slight detour to avoid the village, and while doing so the

stretcher in
the
men
which Lieutenant Trent was being carried broke

it put it down, and coolly repaired it under a
carrying
hail of bullets,
one
man
having a button of his coat on his chest
and the other two bullets through his clothes. The behaviour of the Northamptons that night was truly magnificent,
calmly returning over open ground, carrying their wounded men
shot
off,
under a galling
fire
without being able to
retaliate.
CHAPTER X
STILL IN TIRAH
THE TERMS TO THE ORAKZAIS

AFFAIR OF THE i6tH NOVEMBER
Maidan, Tirah,
THE
2th Novetnber.
In order to get even with the Zakka-khels, to

continue the destruction of their fortified houses,
and to complete the survey of the eastern portion of

William Lockhart ordered Brigadier-
this valley, Sir
General Gaselee's brigade/ supported by

to visit the
Saran Sar again yesterday.
artillery,
Sir William
again himself accompanied the troops.
On
occasion there was no mishap of any kind.
General
Gaselee, long well
Gurkhas, and an
known
this
as the Colonel of the 5th
officer of vast
experience in frontier
movements with great judgment, and though the Afridis again followed up the
fighting, directed the
retirement, they never got a look in at
Queen's
too
1
shot
uncommonly
straight,
all.
the
The
artillery
and the 3rd and 4th Gurkhas, with the 3rd
Scouts
3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's
R.W. Surrey Regiment,

The 3rd
The
in the retirement.
the Yorkshire Regiment, the 4th Gurkhas, and the 3rd Sikhs.
Gurkhas moved out in the afternoon to co-operate

batteries out were No. I, M.B. R.A., and No. 2 (Derajat) M.B.
^/ ^;V%
^"l^t
STILL IN TIRAH
129
Sikhs, forming the rearguard, the
enemy were kept
CHAP. X
thoroughly well at bay, and lost at least thirty

killed
and wounded.
were burned, including the

one
Chikkun,
casualties
slightly
of
their
men
many of their defences
great
fortified
principal
residence of
Our
maliks.
Lieutenant Wright, Queen's,
were trifling
wounded, one man of the Queen's
killed,
and one of the 3rd Gurkhas slightly wounded. It

was an entirely successful and satisfactory day,
and in a brigade order General Gaselee conveyed
Sir William
work by the
Lockhart's appreciation of the day's

troops.
somewhat unexpectedly, the Gar

Orakzai jirgahs came in. The whole of the Orakzai
Yesterday,
clans
being
Lockhart
thus
received
fully
represented.
them
in
camp
Sir
William
to-day.
Sir
William was attended by Brigadier-General Nicholson, the Chief of the Staff;
and Mr. L. White King,
by Sir Richard Udny
his chief political advisers,
and by the whole of the headquarters staff, and

escorted by a guard of honour of 100 rank and file
of the
the jirgahs were ushered

circle
When
Gordon Highlanders.
in,
all
and ranged
by clans by Sir Richard Udny's
They were
nearly
all
was ready
in
a semi-
assistants.
venerable old graybeards of
the tribes, and there was certainly nothing either

warlike or truculent in their bearing or demeanour.
About 100
arms.
of
They
them were admitted, of course without

are our guests while with us.
veniently neighbouring village
is
allotted to
con-
them
to
THE CAMPAIGN
I30
IN TIRAH,
live in, picquets are placed
ch/
1897-98
over them for their pr
tection,
and supplies are sent to them from our cam
The
proceedings opened by Sir William Loci
hart
and requesting Sir Richard Udny
rising,
say that,
now
that
we had
established ourselves
the heart of their country, the terms
Government would be announced
offered
to them,
and
explain that they must be fully complied with with:
fourteen days
any event he intend?
also, that in
to visit every part of their country,
and that
it
wou'
depend upon themselves whether he came as a

or as an enemy.
frier
Sir Richard
fluent
Udny, who
Pushtu scholar,
a most practised ar
is
explained
fully
all
this to tl
and with emphasis announce

the terms of Government to the expectant throni
jirgahs,
and
These were
I St.
etc.,
clearly
Full restoration of
looted from the
all
Khyber
arms and propert
forts,
or taken from
on any subsequent occasion.

and. Surrender of 500 breech-loading
3rd.
Payment of a
4th.
Absolute forfeiture of
fine of
rifles.
30,000 rupees.
all
subsidies
and
allo'v
ances granted to the tribes in the past.

5th.
Formal submission
The Maliks
to
be tendered
in
durba
marked interest ar
attention while these terms were announced
But it was not to be gathered from the
them.
countenances, or from anything they said, whetb
listened with
they thought them severe or lenient.
There can
1:
131
no question that, considering the unwarrantable and

unprovoked nature of the outbreak, the loot carried
and the damage done to
off,
and property, and
life
Government has been
the enormous expense that
put to in the effort to restore order and re-establish
its
authority, the conditions
tremely easy.
imposed are ex-
be very much surprised
shall
if
they
are not promptly accepted.
The
This was the whole of the ceremony.
jirgahs withdrew as they had come, and the pro-
ceedings terminated.
it
may be
If the Orakzais
reasonably hoped they
submit now, as
will, it is
improbable
the Afridis will continue the struggle
that
much
There are indications, indeed,

had enough of it. They
longer by themselves.
that they have already
cannot doubt our power, or that whatever petty

successes they
we must
run
here and there score, in the long
beat them and bring them to their
For the
bearings.
been
may
fired into
last three nights
our camps, and even the telegraph wire
has not been touched, so perhaps a
little
can be seen ahead, and the outlook
than when
not a shot has
commenced
is
ray of light
more hopeful
this letter.
15//%
The
November.
They
Orakzai jirgahs have come and gone.
are allowed until the 26th
terms offered them.
inst. to
Opinion
is
comply with the
a good deal divided
as to whether they will accept and comply with

or not.
answer
Personally
will
have
little
them
doubt that their
be affirmative, and that they
will
do
their
THE CAMPAIGN
132
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
best to carry out the conditions imposed within the
time
There can be no question that they

were all immensely relieved to find that their country
is not to be permanently occupied or annexed by
us
fixed.
and, assured of their independence, they are not
now over any minor
disposed to haggle
punishment being, as a matter of

lenient one.
fact,
point, their
an extremely
They have now asked our

them
officers to help
to divide fairly
Gar and Samil factions the amount

the number of the rifles demanded
political
between their
of the
fine,
because,
and
left
to
themselves (they say) they would certainly quarrel,
and never come
an amicable agreement as to the
to
share to be produced by each.
White King, under whose
Accordingly, Mr.
special political charge
the Orakzai clans are, aided by Messrs. Hastings,
Donald, and Blakeway, having talked the matter

over with the leading Maliks of each
decision
pay
was speedily arrived
half,
that each should
they being practically equal in numbers,
in importance,
to their homes,
and
and
substantial
They then
in wealth.
it
is
within the next few days
some
at,
faction,
proofs
to
be sincerely hoped that
we
shall receive
that
their expressed desire to " kiss
Meantime, on our
dispersed
side.
from them
they are earnest in
and be
friends."
anxious to be conciliatory, and to show consideration

to those evincing
has
let it
and
until
any disposition to yield or to
be generally known that from
some
definite
answer
is
treat,
this time,
submitted by the
135
payment will be made for all forage and

supplies taken by the troops, or collected, or brought
in for their use by the tribes.
This is a wise and
and
should
measure,
have
considerate
a good effect.
But, on the other hand, they have been given to
understand that the supplies and forage we must
have, and that if any obstruction is offered to the
jirgahs,
collection of
or
it,
if
our parties are fired on, swift
and severe punishment
most assuredly
will
Although up to the present
it
follow.
only the Orakzai
is
jirgahs that have been admitted to an audience, yet
the same method has been extended to those Afridi

clans
whose jirgahs are
in waiting
din-khels, the Khambar-khels,
and
as " they are a
fond of money
"
the Malik-
and the Adam-khels
most avaricious
vide
viz.,
race, desperately
" Official Gazetteer "
the
hope of gain may for the time being keep them

quiet and make them ready to help.
But there is no reliance whatever to be placed on
the word of an Afridi
:
Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder,
him the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge,
nothing can ever change him.
As he has lived a shameless,
cruel savage
And it would seem that, notwithso he dies.
standing their long intercourse with the British, and the fact that
very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and
must have learnt in some poor way what faith, and mercy, and
are to
no better than it was in the

Much has been said of their fidelity in
people
for us, but when it is remembered
own
justice are, yet the Afridi character
days of his fathers.
fighting against their
is
that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with nine out of ten of
THE CAMPAIGN
134
his
own
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
They have
people, the beauty of this attachment fades.
always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than

to
On
fight.
the whole (says Elphinstone) they are the greatest
among Afghans, and have no
robbers
faith or sense of
honour
but not,
fancy,
whatever.
cheerful picture,
is
not
it
overdrawn.
The boom of guns and the crack

that in
parties
some
not
are
punctuating
are
directions, at
my
finding
all
sentences as
that even
indications
rifles,
showing
events, our foraging
all
it
of
the
plain
sailing,
write.
Still,
Afridis
are
there
have had
enough of it now, and would be glad to see our

backs
and motives of self-interest may prompt
them to climb down at no very distant date. They
know by this time that we do not mean to annex
;
their country.
and haunting
That, no doubt, has been their great
Other considerations are of a
fear.
secondary importance to them.
whatever
it
may
The money
be, the rendition of loot,
fine,
and the
surrender of arms, they will put up with without
much
fuss.
The
forfeiture of all subsidies will, of
course, be a nasty
pill
to swallow, because the
sum
paid them by Government in the past, for maintaining order on the

able,
Khyber
route, has
about 100,000 rupees per
aggregate,
been consider-
annum
and of
this
the Zakka-khels, our present bitterest
opponents, have been used to take the largest share.

But, great
as
may be
giving up this grant,
it
the
is
sacrifice
involved by
better than being kept
indefinitely out of lands and homes, and seeing their
THE AFFAIR OF THE
defences
and
levelled,
i6th
their
NOVEMBER
135
substance devoured,
with the certainty that they must be beaten in the

long run, and that their eventual punishment
the severer the longer they
ment which
reasons, there
is
enable us to withdraw from this
will
We cannot expect the present
inhospitable country.
fine
be
some room to hope

long we may see our way to some settle-
For these
that ere
will
resist.
dry weather to
last
much
longer,
to rain or
snow
men and
followers into hospital.
will at
and a change
once send large numbers of

Moreover, the
on the Commissariat and Transport is daily

becoming more severe, and the question of feeding
this large assemblage of men and animals is constantly assuming a more serious aspect
so for
strain
every reason we shall be glad to cast out our shoes

over Tirah, and bid the Afridi a long farewell.
i^th November.
Since the above lines were penned an event has

occurred which distinctly discounts the sanguine
expectations expressed.
is
always
where can
full
this
truly
four hours
future,
it
is
written,
of "precious possibilities," and no-
saying be more applicable than on
this wild frontier
where
The
amid these savage surroundings,
no man can say what the next twenty-
may
not bring forth.
have already
you that when conveying to the jirgahs the

terms on which Government would accept their
submission and pardon their offences, Sir William
told
THE CAMPAIGN
136
IN TIRAH,
Lockhart informed them

intended to
visit
country, and that
any event, he
in
that,
every part of the Afridi-Orakzai

it
would depend upon
we came
behaviour whether
their
own
or
foes.
friends
as
pursuance of the policy thus declared,
Partly in
and partly to
partly to carry out survey operations,
continue
chap.
1897-98
more
destroying
Zakka-khels by
punishment of the
the
of
their
villages,
fortified
and
notably the residence of the Mullah Sayid Akbar,
Aka
Khel,
the
principal
of
leader
the
revolt,
Brigadier-General Kempster was sent on the 13th

into the
Waran Valley,
Kandao Pass,
Gordon High-
vid the Tseri
with a force which comprised the
landers, the Dorset Regiment, the 15th Sikhs, the
2nd Gurkhas, No. 8

No.
British
Bombay Mountain
Mountain
Battery,
No. 4 Madras
Battery,
Sappers and Miners, and No. 4 Company Bombay

Sappers and Miners. The 36th Sikhs, now well
known
to
fame as the brave defenders of Forts
Gulistan and Saragheri on the
September
last,
were
also
Samana range
at
General
Tseri
Kandao
placed
Kempster's disposal to hold the
in
Pass during the two or three days during which
he would be absent, and to preserve communication
between him and the main column
There
was
practically
advance of
this
allowed
to
it
force.
The
proceed to
in
Maidan.
no opposition
its
to
the
tribesmen, as usual,
destination
without
offering serious resistance, preferring to harass
when
settled
down
in its
it
camp, and to attack in
THE AFFAIR OF THE
earnest whenever
point aimed
NOVEMBER
commence
should
it
These are
march.
i6th
their invariable
its
137
return
The
tactics.
by General Kempster was only a
at
short four miles
down
the valley east of the pass,
was only about four miles from this camp

(Maidan) to the summit (it is quite a low pass), the
whole march was only some eight miles. Yet such
are the extraordinary delays and difficulties attendant
on moving with mule and pony transport on a
and, as
it
single narrow
hill
road
been made from Maidan
that,
although a start had
at daylight, the last of the
baggage and the rearguard were not

until half-past nine o'clock at night.
in the
new camp
The
four miles
of road on this the western side are'pretty
fair
going,
because our Sappers and Pioneers have been at
work on them, and have ramped the ravines and

nullahs,
and improved and widened the bad
But on the
places.
was a terra incognita,

was nothing more) was stony,
far side the country
and the track
(for
it
steep, narrow,
and
mile suddenly
down
difficult,
dipping after the
into a boulder-strewn, dry
first
bed
of a torrent between high, precipitous banks, beyond
which on either side the
hills
towered up to a
These heights, of course,

main body and baggage
passed through the defile I have described, and thus
the march was a difficult and trying one, though its
actual length was insignificant.
However, it was safely accomplished, and that
night, though one or two shots were fired into it,
considerable altitude.
had
to be held while the
THE CAMPAIGN
138
the
camp was
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
During the
practically unmolested.
next two days, the 14th and 15 th, the survey of

the adjacent qountry was completed, and reconnaissance and foraging operations were successfully
carried
were destroyed,
known
as
to a section
and the residence of
Mullah Sayid Akbar, the chief
stigator of the revolt
was
attached to
houses
fortified
some belonging
also
Zia-ud-din-khels
the notorious
sedition,
Zakka-khel
Several
out.
and
visited
it
destroying the
levelled.
however,
was,
Sayid's
discover whether
in-
and preacher of rebellion and
house
Before
alone.
let
it
The mosque
was searched
to
contained anything of interest
it
was found, however, except a

certain amount of correspondence, which was taken
charge of by the political staff, ^ and a mimbar, or
or value.
Little
kind of rude pulpit,
from which, no doubt,
Mullah used to make
his frenzied addresses to his
rude audience.
which
is fixed
It is fitted
with a staff on one side, on
an iron bracket intended, apparently,
hold a lamp or light of some kind.
to
brought away, and
memento
To
of the
resume.
the
will
It
was
be kept as an interesting
visit.
On
both these days, the 14th and
was some skirmishing when the troops

were out. On the latter date the enemy were
numerous and vigorous in their movements, but
1
5th, there
the brigade was well handled, and

'
Some
perusal.
all
and
some of the Indian papers
of the letters found are extremely interesting,
Translations have appeared in
are given in an appendix to this chapter.
went
will
;
well,
repay
selections
THE AFFAIR OF THE
while the casualties were
a good deal
15 th,
fired into
the
NOVEMBER
139
The camp was
trifling.
on the nights of the 14th and
and three or four
On
i6th
casualties resulted.
Maidan
6th the brigade returned to
to
was not a successful day.

The whole of the baggage was fairly
started by 9 A.M., the main body with it.
The
rearguard, under the command of Colonel Eaton
Travers, of the 2nd Gurkhas, collected its outlying
pickets at about half-past nine, and shortly afterwards commenced its movement in retreat. Colonel
Travers had with him his own regiment, the 2nd
rejoin the
main column, and
this
Gurkhas, one company of the Gordon Highlanders,
one company of the Dorsets, five guns of No. 8

British Mounted Battery, and the 3rd Gurkha
a sufficient and compact force for the
Scouts
purpose
visible
hand.
in
in
The enemy
at
time were
this
groups here and there on the adjacent
heights, but contented themselves with long shots,
and
the
interruption
finding he
proceeded
retirement
for
without
about a mile and a
was gaining ground too
'serious
half,
quickly, Colonel
Travers took up a strong position across the
which he maintained
until
well on
its
his retrograde
first
left
way up
march.
valley,
about one o'clock in the
main column was
afternoon, when, noting that the
now
when,
the final ascent, he resumed
The enemy now
time displayed some vigour
for
in pursuit,
the
and the
of Colonel Travers' line was severely pressed.
The Gurkhas who were
here,
were,
however,
THE CAMPAIGN
14
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
thoroughly steady, and, though they were under
a hot
and had several
casualties, they held the
Afridis in check until the
summit of the pass was
fire
gained safely by about 3
p.m.
was shortly before the summit was reached that

poor young Wylie of the 2nd Gurkhas was killed.
It
He
was the brightest and best of boys, a great

favourite in his regiment and out of it.
Shortly
before he was hit he had been exposing himself
somewhat recklessly, but, in deference to a friendly
suggestion from his colonel, had got under cover,
lying
In this position he in-
behind a rock.
flat
cautiously
raised
himself on his
turned round to speak to his
men
little
in rear
His head must have shown above the rock,
of him.
for
elbow while he
he was instantly shot through the

on the
course, killed
spot.
brain, and, of
Captain Macintyre, his
great friend in the regiment, seeing him drop, at
once went out under a heavy

body,
fire
which was carried into
and brought
in his
Camp Maidan
the
same evening.
When
the force under Colonel Travers reached
the top of the Tseri
exhausted,
was
cult,
for,
Kandao Pass
short, yet the
was much
ground was extraordinarily
and the necessity
commanding
it
though the direct distance from camp

for
continually
heights to the right and
route, to say nothing of the watchfulness
diffi-
occupying
left
of the
and vigour
necessary to stave off the enemy's incessant attacks,
had added immensely to the fatigues of the day.
THE AFFAIR OF THE
i6th
NOVEMBER
141
All this had been foreseen by General Kempster,
and
it
had been pre-arranged,
from
therefore, that
15th Sikhs, under Colonel Abbott,
this point the
should cover the retirement.
They
were, in
fact, in
on the heights north and south of the pass

when Colonel Travers and his troops arrived. These,
position
accordingly, passed through now, and followed the
main column
to camp,
and the 15th Sikhs took up
the rearguard duties.
These
tion,
duties at once claimed their pressing atten-
for the Afridis
now swarmed down from
heights of the Saran Sar, and,
the
availing
skilfully
themselves of the screen provided by the timber
which
is
thick
on the northern side of the
closed round the
15 th
boldness which compelled them to stand

think rather of defending
numerous wounded with

any movement
support.
The
in
fire
pass,
with a determination and
themselves
fast,
and
and
their
resolution, than of risking
retreat
until
assured
of the mountain
guns
of
at
some
this
juncture would have been welcome music to this

gallant regiment, but an order sent
for a battery to
where
it
come
by the General
into action at a particular spot,
would certainly have rendered signal service
was misunderstood, and

no help came from this quarter. But the brave Sikhs,
splendidly led, fought on with grand resolution. Their
comrades, the 36th Sikhs, under Colonel Haughton,
to the hard-pressed infantry,
were already retracing
their steps to support them,
and, encouraged by the approach of this reinforce-
THE CAMPAIGN
142
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
ment, they battled bravely against the hordes that

assailed
them
enemy
and, inflicting on the
more than equal
those
to
losses
sustained themselves,
they gradually withdrew from their advanced position.
that,
was about
between 4 and 5 p.m.,

elated by the offensive rdle they were assuming,
It
this time,
some hundred
Afridis
and attempted
to rush the retreating 15 th.
left
the shelter of the trees
They
were met by such a well-aimed and steady fire, and

such a prompt counter-attack, that few of the hundred
lived to regain the protection of the
wood and prob;
ably in no engagement since this expedition started
have
their losses
The
only,
been so severe as on
now come
36th had
this occasion.
up, half the battalion
under Colonel Haughton, and with them a
The
handful of the Dorsets under Lieutenant Cowie.

other half was
Abbott
Colonel
the
face
had
been severely
and neck by gunshots
above described
fore,
behind, under Major
still
devolved
the
command
now on
in
and the
difficult,
camp
still
fighting
the
of the party, there-
Colonel Haughton.
rapidly getting dark, the ground
broken, and
Des Vceux.
wounded in
the
enemy
was
thick
four miles distant.
was
precipitous,
on every
side,
Moreover, the
supply of ammunition was running short.

tion was, therefore, distinctly serious,
It
and
The
its
situa-
gravity
was suddenly accentuated by a volley from a cluster

of four houses^ directly in the path of the retiring
'
These houses had been burned
earlier
in
the day,
and were
smouldering, their outline showing a dull red against the darkness.
still
THE AFFAIR OF THE
i6th
NOVEMBER
143
There was only one solution of this

difficulty.
Colonel Haughton at once gave the order
to fix bayonets and charge.
This was promptly
done, and, with loud shouts and cheers, the hamlet
was bravely carried, the enemy in it shot, or bayoneted, or driven out, and the place captured.
It was
column.
Captain Lewarne, of the 15 th

and Lieutenant Munn, of the 36th,
in this operation that
Sikhs,
was
wounded.
killed,
Captain Custance, of the 36th, had been
shot through the thigh
As
the
to
do what they could
some
little
time previously.
wounded were now numerous, some five-andtwenty altogether, and as darkness had now set in,
Colonel Haughton decided to stay where he was for
the night.
Under his orders all at once set to work
to make their position as secure as possible, and
wounded, and
to
to render
first
aid to the
make them comfortable
for the
night.
Fortunately, from this time the enemy's
became
desultory,
and by about
11
p.m.
fire
his attack
died away, so that the night was passed in comparative peace.

that the Afridis
This
fact alone is sufficient
otherwise they would never have

I
proof
had been very roughly handled,

let
for
the troops alone.
must explain here that Major Des Voeux, with
the rest of his own battalion, and a weak half-company of the Dorsets, under Captain Hammond, who
had come up in time to take part in the gallant
charge above referred to, had seized a house across
a nullah, about 400 yards away from Haughton's

party,
and
at
once intrenched himself as well as he
THE CAMPAIGN
144
Hardly were
could.
when
pleted,
nullah,
IN TIRAH,
his
the Afridis
hoping to occupy
chap.
1897-98
rough preparations com-
swarmed up out of the
this
very house, from which
they could have effectively enfiladed Colonel Haugh-
They
ton's position.
met, however, with such an
unexpected and hot reception that they soon drew
Major Des Vceux's
shouting threats against
off,
Pathan servant,
and promising
whom
they apparently recognised,
to cut his throat
when they got hold
of him
But there had, unhappily, been serious misfortune

in
another direction.
When
been sent back to help the
the 36th Sikhs had

5th,
two companies of
the Dorset Regiment had been at the same time
detached to support the 36th.
One and
a half of
these companies were ordered by the senior
Captain
line
Hammond,
to take post in a
officer,
house on the
on which the Sikhs were presumably
back.
The
mond and
falling
other half-company, with Captain
Ham-
Lieutenant Cowie, went on and, as
we
have seen, joined, some Colonel Haughton, and some
Major Des Voeux. These men thus got through

But the others were shortly afterthe night safely.
wards
attacked,
and,
considering
their
position
untenable, they, unfortunately for themselves,
left
camp.
In
their post
and attempted
to retreat to
the gathering darkness they missed the road, got
entangled in ravines, very
much
as the
Northamp-
tons did on that fatal 9th, and, assailed on
by the
Afridis,
all
were soon broken up into
sides
little
THE AFFAIR OF THE
i6th
NOVEMBER
145
knots and groups, which defended themselves indeed
with courage and desperation against their savage

assailants, but, as
On
of success.
stances, the
Britisher
may be
imagined, with small chance
such ground, and in such circum-
Pathan
is
probably a better
man
than the
and the result of this deadly struggle
dark was that
in
in the
twos or threes during the night a
poor remnant of these Dorsets struggled wounded and
weary into camp,
and
their blood-stained bayonets
battered gun-stocks attesting the desperate nature of

the conflict in which they had been engaged.
eleven of them, including their two

ants Crooke and Hales, were
rifles
of these
Afridis,
men fell,
who by this
left
officers,
But
Lieuten-
behind dead, and the
of course, into the hands of the
time have got quite a good stock
of our Lee-Metfords, and plenty of ammunition.

It is
only
when speaking
fair to say,
being detached, that
am
oi companies
informed on the best
authority that the party with Lieutenants Crooke
and Hales consisted of only twenty-eight men
all
told.
The
were
actual
on
casualties
this
i6th
November
Dorsets.
Killed,
Lieutenant Crooke (attached
from Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (attached

from East York Regiment), and nine rank and
wounded, ten rank and

1
5th Sikhs.
men wounded.
;
and
fifteen
file
file.
Killed, Captain
Lewarne, and seven
Colonel Abbott, three native
men.
L
officers,
THE CAMPAIGN
146
36th Sikhs.
2nd Gurkhas.
Lieutenant Wylie, and
Killed,
men wounded,
At daybreak on
;
five
men.
the
7th
Brigadier
Gaselee's brigade went out to meet Colonel
and
his gallant Sikhs,
their
way
in,
with
all
chap.
1897-98
men wounded, Captain

Munn, and seven men.
Killed, six
Custance, Lieutenant
three
IN TIRAH,
General
Haughton
and found them already on
their
wounded.
In the evening the officers and
men
killed
were
buried on the outskirts of the camp. Sir William
Lockhart, and every one off duty, attending.
was sad
to see the long procession
carried past, but after

fearful
odds"
is
all,
It
of stretchers
to die in battle "facing
a befitting death for a soldier, and
events march too rapidly here, and casualties have
been too frequent, to admit of much time being spent

in vain regrets.
Hardly, in
fact,
had the remains
of our late comrades been committed to the grave
when
the usual firing into
camp commenced, and
each of us was reminded that their fate to-day might
be ours to-morrow.
I
should mention that before the funeral (which
did not take place until dusk). Sir William Lockhart
saw the Dorsets and Northamptons on parade, and

addressed them a few words of commendation for
courage in most trying circumstances, and of en-
couragement and advice
for the future.
"
We
must
remember," said Sir William, "that we are opposed

to perhaps the best skirmishers,
shots, in the world,
and the best natural
and that the country they inhabit
THE AFFAIR OF THE
is
the most
difficult
enemy's strength
i6th
NOVEMBER
The
on the face of the globe.
lies in his
thorough knowledge of
the ground, which enables him to watch
movements unperceived, and

lies in
Our
strength, on
our discipline, controlled
Our weakness
and mutual support.
of the country, and the
is
moral of
all this is
and that
fire,
our ignorance
consequent tendency of
The
small bodies to straggle and get detached.
tained,
our
all
to take advantage of
every height and every ravine.

the other hand,
147
that careful touch must be mainif
by mischance small
find themselves alone they should as

stick to the open,
much
parties
do
as possible
and shun ravines and broken
ground, where they must fight at a disadvantage,
and run every

trust,"
risk of being
said
Sir
off.
" that
we may soon meet
all
ambuscaded and cut
William
the
conclusion,
enemy and wipe
out
am
confident that
will all
behave with a
old scores with him, and
when that time comes you
in
steady courage worthy of the best traditions of your

corps.
In the meantime there
is
no occasion
to
be
depressed because some of us have been surprised,
outnumbered, and overwhelmed on bad ground."

Afterwards addressing the Sikhs and Gurkhas,
them highly for their

gallant conduct, and said he was proud to have such
regiments under his command.
He explained to
them, too, with what interest and sympathy the
Sir William Lockhart praised
Queen
personally watches the progress of events in
these wild
regions
(and,
indeed,
Her
Majesty's
THE CAMPAIGN
148
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
frequent and gracious inquiries are warmly appreci-
ated by
all
and said
ranks),
to them, as
to the British regiments, that
he had said
he hoped they would
soon have an opportunity of meeting the enemy

again on better terms, and paying off
all
old scores
with interest.
PS.
The following
written
for
throughout
interest
me by
this
extracts from a private note
an
officer
will
affair,
who was
be
present
with
read
deep
Meanwhile darkness had come on, and it was exceedingly

keep touch with each other. The ground was cut in
high terraces, down which we clambered as best we could, the
men tripping, sliding, and falling over each other, for no path
existed, and it was too dark even to distinguish the drop from
difficult to
one terrace to the
The
next.
difficulty of bringing
our wounded
under such circumstances, may be imagined, but cannot
along,
be described.
The
Afridis were
completely taken aback
by our sudden
charge and onslaught, just when they thought they had got us on
the run, and very few waited for the bayonet, but
man
Munn, who was
sword through
one of them, and several more were shot as they bolted. The
scene of excitement and confusion at this moment was indescribThe only light came from the smouldering houses, and it
able.
the
first
to reach the centre house, got his
from foe. When we

and were able to look round, the
There was practically no
situation was not very encouraging.
cover the enemy were still firing at us from three sides, and
casualties continued to occur, and many of us had narrow escapes,
However, it would
bullets going through our helmets or clothes.
have been madness to attempt any further move, so Colonel
was almost impossible
had pulled
;
to distinguish friend
ourselves together,
THE AFFAIR OF THE
Haughton made the
NOVEMBER
i6th
149
best dispositions he could under the circum-
The men were made

and the wounded were
down
in groups
round the
stances.
to lie
house,
placed in the only bit of cover
between a high bank and the smouldering ruins of the
available,
house, the warmth from which undoubtedly helped to save some
of their
the
etc.,
men were
enemy
Wherever
lives.
breastworks,
it
was possible we made rude stone
but materials were sadly wanting, and
wholly unprotected on the eastern
kept up a desultory
still
side,
many
of
whence the
Fortunately the darkness
fire.
prevented their aim being good, and most of their bullets whizzed
harmlessly overhead.
we
About 11
p.m. they left us altogether,
and
down to endure a long and bitter night as best we

could.
The cold was intense, and the men had no greatcoats
with them and nothing to eat, for we had expected to reach
camp that evening. The only way they could get any relief was
by taking it in turns to huddle together on the still warm rubble
settled
which had
fallen
time for the
from the burning houses.
officers, for it
find courage to
It was an anxious
was anticipated that the enemy might
make another
attack
reveal the weakness of our position.

fident bearing of Colonel
and made us
when
the rising
moon
should
But the coolness and con-
Haughton kept us all in good heart,

we should come out right
feel perfectly certain that
side uppermost.
Still it
was with
dawn
feelings of intense relief that
we saw
the pale
and knew that we could soon be up and

Communication was at once opened with Des Voeux,
doing.
across the nullah, and all the ground near by was carefully
searched to see if any of our men had been left behind, killed or
wounded, in the hurry and tumult of the events of the night.
Then we commenced our movement on camp, sending on the
wounded first under a strong escort. The enemy opened fire on
gray
appear,
us from the surrounding
hills
at once,
but in the uncertain
light
aim was bad, and no one was hit. We sent the wounded
along the main nullah running past the camp, and covered them
on one side with the 15 th Sikhs, and on the other with a
company of the 36th Sikhs and the few Dorsets who were
These latter, a mere handful of men, showed great
with us.
their
gallantry
and steadiness
all
through the
affair,
and although they
THE CAMPAIGN
I50
suffered
to every
IN TIRAH,
much from the cold and

call made upon them.
chap, x
exposure, responded cheerfully
We
camp
1897-98
had not gone far when we met a force coming out from
and right glad we were to be able to march
to help us
;
straight in without
any further trouble.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MULLAHS
{From
The
the
^^
Pioneer" of Allahabad)
following are translations of letters found in
Saiyid Akbar's house in the
Waran
Valley
the Mullah of Adda to the Mullah of

Mullah of Aka Khel, Badshah Sahib, Malik
Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, the Kamar
Khel, Khambar Khel and Aka Khel Maliks, Maliks Yar
Muhammad, Feroz, Walt Muhammad Khawas, Samandar
letter from
Translation of a
Sipak, the
and
other people of Tirah, dated the
13 1 5 H.
"jth
Rabie-us-Sani
September 1897.
'-^th
After compliments.
On
the ist Rabie-us-Sani 13 15
H.
30th August 1897, I determined with a lashkar to go out for a

holy war and defend the religion of the Holy Prophet.
When I
reached Lashkar
Killa,
and was staying there
received a "firman" from

Islam, in reply to
my
were to the following

" You should wait
I
may hold
respectable
taken.
for the night, I
"Zia-ul-millati-uddin," the
petition,
and understood
its
I will
which
effect:
for
a few days in your former place, so that
a consultation with the Khans, Maliks,
men
King of
contents,
chiefs,
and
about ghaza and decide what steps should be
then either come myself or send to you
my
son
loi jehad, with
our victorious troops and supplies, such as rations
and food, and
will let
you know
again.
I will,
with the greatest
THE CAMPAIGN
152
pleasure,
to
make
exertions in the
you people that
IN TIRAH,
way of jehad."
have postponed
I therefore write
my intentions
for the reasons
given above, but that you should, on receipt of this
among
yourselves and let
that I
may come
to
me know
faithfully of
Mohmand
you with the
You
of Nawagai, and other Mussalmans.

to save the religion of the Prophet.
Translation of a
letter,
chap.
1897-98
letter,
consult
your decision, so
people, the
Khan
should try your best
I shall await
your reply.
and
without date, from the Daulaizai
Sturi Khel Mullahs to the
Aka Khel Mullah and
other
Afridi Mullahs.
After compliments.
We attacked the Muhammadzai post on
Thursday and destroyed it.
We killed many Government
servants and returned with success to Ublan.
Our casualties
were two wounded, who have not yet died.
Please let us know
whether we should stay on here committing raids on Kohat, or
we have no
if we are
wanted there, or if you will send us reinforcement here. The
Shia Sipahs are afraid lest their property may be looted.
We
should dismiss the lashkar to their homes, because
Please also
supplies here.
let
us
know by
the bearer
have stood surety to them that none of the Afridis or Zia-uddins

will
We
cause them any injury.
Sipahs in order that they
may
have made peace with the
join us in the ghaza,
and you
should see that none of the Sipah property or animals are interfered with.
Translation of a
letter,
without date, from the Mullah of Adda
Mullahs and
all the
elders
to
of the Afridi and Orakzai
tribes.
After compliments.
Mussulman
The
countries, and,
Kafirs have taken possession of
owing
to the lack of spirit
of the people, are conquering every region.
all
on the part
They have now
reached the countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the

people of these places showed want of courage in the beginning,
they have
now
realised their mistake,
become ashamed
Kafirs) day
and
and having repented and

them (the
(of their former deeds), they attack
night,
and have quite confounded them.
have
myself informed the people of Lughman, and Kunar, and the
Mohmands,
Ningraharis,
and Shinwaris, and they are
They
to take part in the fighting.
summer
prepared
are simply waiting for the
to pass, as the country of Bajaur is without water
and common
shade,
all
153
necessaries oijehad.
I inform
cannot afford
folk
It is difficult for
you also that you may
oi jehad, which
is
the best of
them
devotions,
and the
we may not be ashamed
submissions, so that
to fight in
and
the
for
summer.
your best to further the cause
try
all
arrange
to
before
truest of all
God on
the
day of judgment, and be glorious before His Prophet. Though

these men have no means, yet as the holy verse runs that
" victory and triumph rest with God," it is possible that God may
give us victory and power to recover the country of Mussalmans
from the hands of Kafirs, but, if we fail, we shall have done our
best, and can bring a reasonable excuse before God on the day
God
of judgment, because
which
does not expect a thing from a
man
beyond his power. I have deputed Mullah AbduUa

Akhundzada of the Mohmand country, to attend on you, and,
God
is
willing,
decision you
he
reach you.
will
may unanimously
Please
let
me know
whatever
may be acted
am willing to come
arrive at, so that
it
If you decide to send for me there, I

you wish to come here, I also agree. If you choose to
commence fighting there, and desire me to fight in this direction,
upon.
but,
if
am
ready to do so
but
it is
necessary to
fix
the time and day
of fighting, so that, by the grace of God, the work be accom-
And
plished.
a matter
is
as
it is
said that the only thing a
to try his best,
and
man can do
in
that the accomplishment of the
matter rests with God, so to leave everything in the hands of
God
is
trust in
the best thing of
God.
May
of virtue at our
of the next world.
may be
all,
and
all
Mumins
(true believers)
God, the Almighty, lead us
last
all
must
to the path
moment, and save us from the punishment

enable us to do an act which
Him. Peace be upon all believers
And may He
acceptable to
from Sufi. Sahib to the Mullah Sahib of

Mullah of Aka Khel {Saiyid Akbar), Badshah
Sahib, Malik Amin Khan, Malik Sher Muhammad Khan,
Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan, Feroz, Wall Muhammad
Khan, Khawas Khan, Samandar, and the Maliks of
Translation of a
Sipah, the
letter
THE CAMPAIGN
154
Kamar
Khel,
and people of
Khambar
IN TIRAH,
KM, Aka
Tirah, dated the
']th
chap.
1897-98
Khel and
other
Maliks
Rabi-us-Sani 1315
H.^
i^th September 1897.

After compliments.
started with
Kot
the people of the
Mohmandarra, of the Hisarak Valley and of the whole

of Ningrahar, for jehad in that direction, but on reaching the
limits of Batikot with the lashkar, I received a letter from my
Valley, of
spiritual leader, the
which gave
me
Akhundzada Sahib (of Adda), the perusal of

and I understood its contents. He
pleasure,
wrote to say that I should return to
my
he could
let
me know
my
receipt of this letter

in the
place.
now
write to say that
on
you should assemble together, exert yourselves
me know faithfully of the result (of

may understand it. God willing, the
(Adda Mullah) with his lashkar of Bajauris, the Khan
way oi jehad, and
your meeting), so that

" Pir Sahib "
said,
In compliance therefore with his
again.
instructions I returned to
the
residence, with
Ningrahar lashkar, and should wait for a few days, when, he
let
of Nawagai, and the people of the Nigrahar, and myself too, will
start at
once
in that direction
and
Consider
religion of the Prophet.
will try
it
our best to save the
an urgent matter.
from Fakir Shah {? probably some Afghan

to the {Aka Khel) Mullah (Saiyid
Akbar), dated the 14th Rabi-us-Sani 1315 H. = -i.2th
Translation of a
letter
official in
Ningrahar)
September 1897.
I received your letter and understood

hope you will write daily the news of that side
and send it to Mullah Idris, who will forward it to me, so that I
may remain informed of the state of affairs in that direction, and
Rest assured in every way from
sympathise with the Prophet.
After compliments.
its
contents.
this side,
and always send us news of that
side.
letter from Adam Khan {Khambar Khel) to his

Muhammad Zaman Khan (sent from Kabul),
Translation of a
brother
dated the
i?>th
Jamadi-ul-Awal 13 15 H. = \^th October
1897.
After compliments.
jirga,
also joined
the Afridi and Orakzai
which was well received by the Amir.
His Highness
155
asked us about the causes which led to the quarrels between the
and the British Government. We stated that the British

Government were day by day violating the former agreements,
were forcibly encroaching upon our limits, and were realising
Afridis
and compensations from us for the arms which were stolen

Khyber by their own servants, and that these naturally led
to the disturbances.
His Highness said that if he could he
would try to make peace between us and the British Government.
We stated that, if the British Government agreed to give up all
frontier territories forcibly taken possession of by them, and did
not ask for the return of arms looted by us in fair fight, we would
make peace. The Amir then communicated our statement to
the British Government, and a reply to that is awaited.
We are
staying here, and every consideration is paid to us by the Amir.
Till the result (of our mission) is known, take
Rest assured.
care that you are not deceived by the English, whom you should
fines
in the
not believe.
Translation of a letter
from Kazi Mira Khan, and other Adam

to Mullah Saiyid
Khels composing the Afridi jirga at Kabul,
Akbar,
Aka
H. = 2^th
Khel, dated the 2?>th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315
October 1897.
After compliments.
Let
it
be known to you that having been
appointed by you and other Mussalman brethren as a jirga to

attend on His Highness the Amir, we arrived here, and held an
interview with His Highness,
who
advised us not to fight with
the British Government, and this was, and has been his advice
We
ever since.
said
we accepted
his advice, but that our wishes
We were ordered
ought to be met by the British Government.
to record them in detail, when His Highness said he would,
after consideration,
submit them to the British Government, and
see what reply they would give.
We
put
down our
wishes in
and presented them to His Highness, who submitted

them to the British Government, but no reply has yet been
detail,
received.
There
We
is
shall see
what reply comes.
a British Agent at
Kabul who has on
his establish-
became our
ment many Hindustani Mussalmans. One
well-wisher
Mussalman
and
a
This man is a good
acquaintance.
of these
THE CAMPAIGN
IS6
of his co-religionists.
correct news, which
is
He
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
us a piece of
has given
to the following effect
chap.
good and
"You, Mahommedans, must take care lest you be deceived

British, who are at present in distressed circumstances.
For instance, Aden, a seaport, which was in possession of the
British, has been taken from them by the Sultan.
The Suez
by the
Canal, through which the British forces could easily reach India in
twenty days, has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and
has
now been granted on
now
require six
The
lease to Russia.
British forces
months to reach India. The friendly alliance

between the British and the Germans has also been disturbed,
on account of some disagreement about trade, which must result
The
in the two nations rising in arms against each other.
Sultan, the Germans, the Russians, and the French are all in
arms against the British at all seaports, and fighting is going on
in
Egypt too against them.
The
nowadays.
In short, the British are disheartened
Viceroy, and the Generals
who are to advance

London that the
against you, have received distinct orders from
Khyber and Tirah must be brought to an end

two weeks' time, as the troops are required in Egypt and at
operations in the
in
In the case of the Mohmands, and people of
other seaports.
thousand British troops, and had

and property on them, the British,
in their great dismay, concluded a settlement with them for
twenty-four rifles only, whereas thousands of rifles and lakhs of
Gandab, who had
inflicted a
rupees
heavy
killed ten
loss of rifles
should have
Mohmands
been demanded.
This peace with the
and when the British get rid of

their other difficulties they will turn back and demaijd from the
Mohmands the remaining rifles, and compensation for their
is
by way of
losses.
They
British
subjects
make good
will
deceit,
say that,
as
the
Mohmands have become
by surrendering twenty-four
the remaining loss too.
The
rifles,
they must
British are always giving
out that their troops will enter Khyber and Tirah on such and
such dates, but they do not march on those dates and remain
is deceitful on the part of the English,
Mussalmans by a payment of 5 rupees and
I have
seek for an opportunity to make an attack by surprise.
thus informed you of the deeds and perplexities of the English."
where they
who wish
are.
This
to mislead
157
We, ih&Jirga people, consider it necessary to inform you of

so that you may be aware of the distress, confusion, and
deceitfulness of the British, and may communicate the information to all the Mussalmans of the lashkar, in order that they may
be on the alert against being cheated by the British in any way.
You should also send us daily news for our information, and see
that no attacks are made on you by surprise.
Also appoint a few
clever men as messengers to bring us daily news and letters from
you and vice versa. Send us by the bearers all news of that side,
and in future, too, send us fresh news daily by other messengers,
as it is important that we should know about each other.
this,
Translation of a
letter
from Sherdil Khan and Abdul Rahim,
son
of Malik Sinjah Khan Orakzai (of Barki), to Malik Sinjab

Khan, dated the 2Zth Jamadi-ul-Awal 1315 H. = 2Z^th
October 1897.
The Amir
received our jirga of the Orakzais and Afridis with
great honour
the
and
respect.
commencement of
Afridis
on the one
his inquiry
we
frontier limits
side,
He
asked the causes which led to
the hostilities between the Orakzais and
and the
British
stated that the British
on the other. In reply to

had encroached upon our
by taking forcible possession of the Samana and
other like places, and that they (the British) were demanding
compensation and
fines
from us
for
the
arms stolen
in
the
Khyber by their own troops from the middle of their own army,
and that these were the causes which naturally led to the quarrels
between the two parties. The Amir then said that if he could
he would tiy to effect peace between us and the British Government.
Upon this we said that, if the English gave up our
frontier territories, and abandoned the idea of re-occupying them,
and would not demand the restoration of arms taken by us in
action from British troops, we would make peace.
After this
the Amir, for the welfare of Mussalmans, communicated all that
we had stated to the British Government, and a reply to this is
We are now staying here, and the Amir treats us
expected.
You must therefore rest assured for us.
with great consideration.
Do not negotiate with the British, and take care that you are not
taken in by them.
Do
not believe them.
For the
rest all is well.
CHAPTER
XI
THE MOVE TO BAGH TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS

THE RECONNAISSANCE TO DWATOI
Bagh, Tirah,
Still
in the
Maidan
Valley, but
November.
7.(>th
at
last,
thankful to be able to say, on the move.
weary wait of nearly three weeks

But our
Maidan.
not so
much by
tion as
by
halts
in
order, for us to
It
are
was a
the last camp,
and our marches are dictated
the military exigencies of the situa-
political considerations.
powers that be
we
" in
"the
It is for
Simla and at the India Office to
obey
and
it is
to
be presumed that
the long halt in Maidan was arranged, partly, to

allow
Government
to
make up
its
mind
as to
what
terms should be exacted, and what policy pursued

and partly, in the hope that, seeing us in possession,
the Afridis would throw up the sponge, and

in.
is
we
We
know now
that anything like annexation
not, and probably never was, contemplated
also
know now
come
and
that to wait for our friends the
Zakka-khels to climb down was a mistaken and

So far they have not only defied us, and
vain idea.
THE MOVE TO BAGH
CHAP. XI
own
held their
159
against us with quite a fair measure
of success, but also they have had influence enough
with other sections of the
tribes,
notably with the
Kuki-khels, the clan next to themselves the most
numerous, and the most powerful, to prevent them
up
from even offering to make any terms
to date
with us.
At
same
the
time, our prolonged sojourn in
spot has been their opportunity.

daily skirmishes
and rearguard
It
one
has resulted in
affairs in
which they
They have
have often got the best of
it.
nothing to learn from
these Afridis, in irregular
methods
of fighting.
bold attack, the
skill
us,
absolutely
Contrariwise, their dashing and
with which they take advantage
of ground, the patience with which they watch for a
favourable moment, and their perfect marksmanship
all
these qualities have again and again
admiration, and
And
our men.
eating, so
weeks
at
made a
as the proof of a pudding
we go through
if
Maidan, and
total
moral as well as physical,
have been, and then

not be very
much
ties in battle
up
in
won our
sensible impression
is
upon
in the
the record of our three
up our gains and

and estimate what
strike a balance,
our favour.
Our
fancy
losses,
theirs
it
will
actual casual-
to the present time, including those
sustained by the Peshawar and
Kurram columns
insignificant percentage), are well over 650,
(an
and
if
an equal number of the enemy have been put hors
we have not the satisfaction of

And when we consider, in addition, the
de combat by us,
knowing
it.
THE CAMPAIGN
i6o
rifles
and ammunition we have
that has been raided,

that
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
lost,
the baggage
and the transport animals, etc.,

off, then it becomes obvious,
have been carried
and outside argument, that
down
involved by sitting
in the class of
warfare
camp, and
in a stationary
trying to keep open a long and difficult line of com-
munications, and to live

forage,
we
(to
a great extent)
with our savage
foe.
Let us be glad, then, that that trying period
The
by
compared
are at a great disadvantage
is
up from its old bivouac on

the 1 8th.
On that, and the next three days, the
whole of the troops, and an enormous accumulation
past.
force broke
of stores were
mentioned by
moved
me
in
to this present spot, Bagh,
my
letter of 5th
November
(Chap. VIII.), and described as the place famed for

its
musjid and sacred grove, in which the Afridi
rebellion
and the Khyber raid were planned, and
which fanaticism,
intrigue,
been hot-bedded and nourished.
Bagh
is
rather in
Khambar-khel and Malikdin-khel country than

Zakka-khel
territory,
west of our late camp.
in
and sedition have always

in
and only a short four miles
But short though the march,
and notwithstanding that the jirgahs of the two

sections named came in recently, the flanks of the
route had to be strongly guarded during the
move-
ment, and the new camp was laid out under a perfect mitraille
from sharpshooters ensconced under
cover in every adjacent house.
There were numer-
ous casualties, of course, but fortunately no officer
b
<,
THE MOVE TO BAGH
XI
i6i
though many had miraculous
was
hit,
say
" officer "
escapes.'^
only because officers have already
fared so badly, the percentage of losses sustained in
the commissioned ranks being extraordinarily high.
Hundreds of these
been
in
Afridis,
be
remembered, have
it
our service, and they not only easily recog-
by
nise our officers
their conspicuous head-dress
know
gallant leading, but they well
and
and
their value,
undoubtedly they select them for their attentions,
and pick them
off.
Every house
of them,
is,
as
in this valley,
I
have described elsewhere, a
Each has
fortress.
and one or more
and there are hundreds

little
thick strong walls, loopholes,
When
lofty towers.
these amiable
savages are not driven by necessity to unite to face
common danger, they

among themselves, and it
a
rence to find
continually warring
are
no uncommon occurone -half of a village carrying on a
skirmish with the other

several consecutive
is
which
half,
days,
may
last
for
the parties firing upon
each other from towers, or from behind rocks or
When
other shelter.
1
" One of the

the
same
their
ammunition
is
ex-
gun-layers was picked off while he was laying the gun, and
hardly a second after Brett,
up from
and as I
all
who had been showing him
position.
knelt over
him
the
'
target,'
got a bullet through
my
breeches.
had got
my
feet,
Brett next
had
Another gunner was knocked over
at
and Robinson's sword-scabbard was struck by a

bullet.
These were fairly close shaves. It was a hot comer while it lasted.
Our left section was much exposed, and at last I had to retire it. In coining
away it had to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire, but by trickling away one
mule at a time at a trot I got them all away untouched. I don't think the
Extract from a letter from Captain
Afridi is good at a moving object."
his ear chipped
by a
splinter,
Parker, R.A., commanding No. 2 (Derajat)
M.B.
THE CAMPAIGN
i62
hausted, or after seven
IN TIRAH,
1897-98
or eight
casualties
occurred on either side, the quarrel
chap.
have
generally-
is
by an interchange of marriages
These fortified houses have, therefore, been a
settled
standing danger to
us,
and as the troops have been
repeatedly fired on from them, and serious losses

sustained. Sir William Lockhart reluctantly ordered
them
that
is, all
them adjacent
those groups of
to
our camp, or to our main communications with the
Mastura Valley, vid the Arhanga Pass
to
be de-
stroyed. The houses have accordingly been burned,

and the towers blown up by the Engineers, and if
some innocent with

the guilty, it must be borne in mind that the
measure was not prompted by anger or malice,
but dictated by stern necessity, and the instinct of
the consequence be to punish
self-preservation.
Just before leaving
camp Maidan,
Sir William
Lockhart once more specially addressed the 15 th

Sikhs to bid them good-bye, and to assure them
them back only
that he sent
The regiment
and men, as
it
is
in their
own
sadly reduced in strength in officers
has been in the forefront of
fighting in this part of the world since
and has suffered many

were barely twenty
files
casualties.
strong as
referred to the splendid endurance

all
last
August
Its
it
all
the
last,
companies
stood on parade
Sir William, speaking in Hindustani, again
now.
by
interests.
ranks on the i6th
letter),
and pluck shown
inst. (fully
described in
my
and told the men they were worthy
TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS
XI
163
representatives of the great Sikh Khalsa, and that
them temporarily on the line of communications he was only giving them a well-earned
rest, but that should occasion require it he would
gladly send for them again.
The gallant 15th
were visibly gratified by the Chiefs appreciation
and soldierly praise, and cheered loudly as he
in
placing
concluded.
The
who have
30th P. I.,
all this
time been hold-
ing the twice-captured Dargai heights, are coming
up
The 2nd
in their place.
way
to the front,
and the Royal Scots Fusiliers
their places being taken
by
tions
on their
P.I. are also
regiments
on the
from
the
line of
too,
communica-
reserve
at
Rawal
Pindi.
On
the 2 1st Sir William Lockhart received the
jirgahs of four Afridi clans
the
Malikdin-khels,
the Khambar-khels, the Adam-khels, and the Akakhels.
The Zakka-khels and
the Kuki-khels were,
of course, conspicuous by their absence

travels quickly in the
East,
and
it
but news
would not be
many hours after the dismissal of the four jirgahs

named before the terms imposed by Government
would be known to all the absentees. These terms,
as
announced by Sir Richard Udny, were

1.
Restoration of
all
arms, property,
dered at the sack of the Khyber
forts,
etc.,
or on any
other occasion.
2.
Surrender of 800 breech-loading
3.
Payment of a
fine of
rifles.
50,000 rupees.
plun-
THE CAMPAIGN
i64
(The foregoing terms

in
IN TIRAH,
be
to
chap.
1897-98
complied with
fully
seven days.)
Formal tender of submission in open durbar.

Further, the jirgahs were told that Government
4.
reserved the right to decide hereafter the question

of
the
management
Khyber Pass
might give
in
and
the
of
administration
whatever order they
route, but that
the matter the tribes would be re-
Udny, who
is a fluent and forcible speaker, then went on to say
that amongst the letters found in the Mullah Sayid
quired to comply with
Akbar's house in
their
own
Sir Richard
it.
Waran was one
one from
foolish
deputation in Kabul informing them that
the English were in a bad way, that they had lost
Aden and
the Suez Canal
(!),
that their trade
was
ruined,
and that they were threatened by complica-
tions at
home and abroad which
required the speedy
The
presence of their troops elsewhere.^

therefore, might continue to
lish
Afridis,
fight against the
Eng-
them much
they would very soon have to
confident that they could not do
harm,
and that
evacuate their country,
begged them,
Sir
willy-nilly.
Richard
they had ever placed any reliance
if
now
was
We had come
an utterly mendacious statement.
with
deliberation
and purpose,
into their country
and they might rest assured that we had the power
on
this precious effusion, to believe
and the intention to remain
demands were complied

'
with.
in
it
until
With
See Appendix to Chap. X.
that
it
our just
this exhorta-
TERMS TO THE AFRIDIS
XI
came
proceedings
the
tion
165
an end,
to
and the
members of the jirgahs dispersed to their homes.

Amongst them were men who had seen service in
our own ranks, and one old fellow had no less than
four medals on his breast
Afghanistan,
North- West Frontier, India, 1887

tian
1878-80;
and the Egyp-
and Khedive's medals, 1882.
Although
the
political
officers
very
not
are
sanguine in their present estimate of the situation,

I
cannot help thinking there
early
is
room
and amicable settlement.
It
to
hope
may be
for
an
true that
the Zakka-khels, thanks chiefly to their geographical

situation in relation to the other sections, are the
most powerful of
still
all
the Afridi clans, and that they
defy us and continue recalcitrant.
Also, that
the Kuki-khels, another strong division, have not

"
come
dins,
But these Khambars and Malik-
in " yet.
who have come
are almost as important,
in,
and numerically very nearly equal
to the
two
first-
named, and there can be no doubt that they are
make terms with
sincere in their desire to

to see us depart.
there
We
have no
has not been time for that
quite expect that
when
one, though doubtless they
may
it
will
and
answer from
final
them yet
received
us,
but
be a friendly
ask for a
more
little
time for compliance with the conditions imposed
and that will not be unreasonable, as the looted

arms and property, for example, must be scattered
over a wide area, and
will
take time to
collect.
In
the thorough destruction of the Zakka-khels' towers
THE CAMPAIGN
i66
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and defences, and of many of their own too, they

have received now a stern object-lesson, and they
are convinced of our
tions
power
they drive us to
if
to give further illustra-
Moreover,
it.
receive fresh evidence that in the
on the
6th
described in
inst.,
losses inflicted
reports place
we
memorable
my
at
fight
last letter, the
were very severe indeed.
them
daily
Reliable
293 killed and wounded
and
independent testimony from the Peshawar side has

reached us
fully
corroborating this
and
estimate,
speaking of the engagement as the most costly
in
them that they have yet been engaged in.

There is, therefore, good reason to believe that
ere long submission will be generally tendered,
life
to
particularly as the tribesmen note the steady deter-
mination with which Sir William Lockhart
is
carry-
ing out his publicly-announced plan to visit every

part of their country in turn,
selves whether he
We were
three
comes
it
resting with them-
as a friend or an
enemy.
no sooner established here (Bagh) than a
days'
expedition was
arranged to
visit
Rajgul Valley and look up the Kuki-khels.
William himself accompanied
mand
this party, the
the
Sir
com-
of which was intrusted to Brigadier-General
Westmacott, whose troops included the King's
Own
Scottish Borderers, the 3rd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 28th
Company Madras Sappers,

Company Bombay Sappers, the Gurkha
and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. The
Bombay
No. 3
Scouts,
Pioneers, No. 4
idea was to march to Dwatoi
(lit,
the two rivers)
TIIK DH'ATOI LiEHLF.

'
deep gorge
fi.nnicd
by
prccipic'Ji
which
rise
up
sheei- sevci-al
hundred
feet
on either
Tojacc
side.
/'age 167.
XI
167
on the 22 nd, reconnoitre and map on the 23 rd, and

return to Bagh on the 24th.
The district to be
visited
was absolutely unknown, but
had been
it
ascertained that the road to Dwatoi lay through a

long, dangerous,
certain
that
and
Kuki-khels,
the
and
difficult defile,
who
it
moved on
the
lightest
sheets,
scale,
water-proof
and a couple of blankets, one day's rations
in their haversacks,
on mules
and two more carried
officers ditto
only
for
them
while Sir William Lock-
hart was attended by only one A.D.C.

staff
troops
possible
taking nothing but their great-coats,
fairly
inhabit
The
Rajgul, would oppose the movement.

therefore
was
chiefly
Brigadier -General
and of
Nicholson,
his
Captain
Haldane, Sir Richard Udny, and Lord Methuen
accompanied him.
The
distance
seven miles, but
to
it
is
Dwatoi proved
adequately describe the
difficulties
Within a couple of miles of Bagh
it
be about
in
words to
of the road to
it.
suddenly plungee,
following the stream which drains the

into a
to
almost impossible
Maidan
deep gorge formed by precipices which
basin,
in places
up sheer several hundred feet on either side, and

are topped by rugged heights which, on the day of the
movement, were crowned by the Yorkshire Regiment
rise
on one hand, and by the 2nd Gurkhas on the
To
is
call
it
a road
now
is
other.
only a fagon de parler.
It
a mere stony track scrambling along the river bed,
sometimes on the right bank, sometimes on the
and as often as not
in
mid -stream
in
left,
ice-cold
THE CAMPAIGN
i68
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
The water was nearly two feet

rain, when the stream is in flood,
water up to the knees.
deep now.
this route
possibly
After
must be quite impassable for hours, or

days, together.
Sometimes the gorge
opens out a
and the road runs out of
little,
it
on
to
higher ground, when, needless to say, the troops or

transport following
at
it
once come under
fire
from
There are about three miles of

and then the worst part of the
the last mile and a half into Dwatoi,
the heights above.
this pleasant walking,

defile is past,
though
following the river bed, running through
still
a more open and an easier country.
To
force a defile
brigade through
like this,
with
it
cumspection and dash.

course, to
its
and take a strong
baggage, requires
The
first
crown the heights on
drive off the
by the
was,
either side,
enemy who held them.
in excellent style
step
cir-
of
and
This was done
specially detailed troops,
the Yorks and 2nd Gurkhas,
who
started in the
bitter cold before daylight, and, breasting the climb

in gallant fashion,
few
accomplished their task with but
casualties, which,
however, included Lieutenant
Jones, killed, and 2nd Lieutenant Watson, severely
wounded, both of the Yorks, while bravely leading

on their men. The heights being thus in our hands,
Westmacott's Brigade advanced, the Gurkhas leading the way, and by four in the afternoon Dwatoi
was
occupied,
the
enemy
offering
throughout a
desultory resistance, which, as usual, such excellent
long shots are they, cost us a few
men wounded.
XI
169
and some of
his staff,
Sir William Lockhart himself,
did not escape by any margin to speak
being picked off by some sharp-shooters
of,
from
who had
securely established themselves in an eyrie on the
whence
rocks above,
made one
they
crossing on the road below them

gerous.
particular
extremely dan-
Four of the Borderers were knocked over

one strip, and eventually Sir William sent
on
this
up
his personal escort, a
to dislodge these
few
But though the troops,

exhausting
files
of the 3rd Sikhs,
marksmen, which they

had
march,
baggage did not
arrive,
after a
did.
most toilsome and

Dwatoi,
their
and such were the
extra-
reached
ordinary difficulties of the road that none of

in that night.
It
was
five o'clock
afternoon before the last of
it,
it
came
on the following
escorted by Colonel
Haughton and
his splendid Sikhs, the 36th, reached
the bivouac.
Consequently the General, and his
staff",
and the men,
hill-sides
all
alike,
had
to lie out
on the
during that bitter night, the thermometer
registering 20 degrees of frost.
Every
one, be
it
remembered, was wet to the skin almost up to the

waist,
and, arriving
on the ground only a
little
before sunset, there was no time to dry even one's
socks and boots

bullets
while as to
fires,
a few well-directed
from the enemy soon scattered the shivering
groups that had crowded round them.
As a matter of fact, the largest proportion of the

men had at once to climb the adjacent ridges, drive
the enemy off", and hold them during the freezing
THE CAMPAIGN
170
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
This they did with a cheeriness and dash
night.
The
which were admirable.
Borderers in particular
were sharply engaged before they established themselves on their ground, and were conspicuous by the
and
resolution
spirit
with which they attacked and
captured their point.
the baggage,
either for
rear,
and
it
When
Haughton parked
like
away some two miles
Paul,
in
for the rear-guard
came on Colonel
the mules on some terraced
darkness
all
placing
and,
St.
was not a cheerful night
was an anxious time
commander.
fields,
It
strong
"waited
round them,
picquets
Owing
for the day."
to
the good arrangements made, neither the baggage
nor the main body was seriously attacked during

the night.
During the 23rd reconnaissances were made in

various directions, and valuable mapping was carried
out by survey parties,
sides the
all
of
it
under
for
fire,
on
all
enemy were
for attack.
active and evidently collecting

During the night the camp was a good
deal fired into, but not
much harm done
and long
before daylight on the 24th the baggage was loaded
up and the return march to Bagh commenced. The

intensity of the cold, which was accentuated by a
wind that pierced like Rontgen rays, may be
imagined from the
fact that the spray
from the water
by wading, froze as
moustaches became mere blocks of
splashed
up
horses' tails as they swished
it
fell,
ice,
them about
while
and the
in
the
stream were covered immediately with long spiky
XI
icicles.
Several cases of frost-bite occurred before
camp was
The
reached.
heights on either side of the defile previously
described were
has,
171
still
who never
on the 22 nd,
held by the Yorks and 2nd Gurk-
quitted
them
after capturing
until the returning troops
safely through
had
all
them
passed
and the rear-guard of the brigade
was composed of the 3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs,

with two companies of the Borderers, the whole under
the command of Colonel Haughton.
The enemy,
of course, pressed these troops severely during the
retirement,
and many casvialties occurred, particularly
whom
amongst the
36th,
fighting
But the men, admirably handled by
fell.
on
the
brunt
of
the
Haughton, bravely led by their officers, and encouraged by the presence of Brigadier - General
Westmacott, who was constantly with them throughout,
were as steady and cool as
if
they were man-
oeuvring on a field-day, and returned the Afridis'
fire
with a judgment and precision that most effectually

disconcerted them, and kept them at arm's length.
It is quite
risks
impossible to describe the difficulties and
of taking a long baggage
long and dangerous
defile
train
such as this
through a
Nothing
is.
but individual courage, high training, perfect

pline,
and calm judgment
successfully,
when
will pull troops
acting as rear-guard in such a
country, and opposed to such an enemy.

qualities
disci-
through
were exhibited now
commander and men
alike,
in
All these
a high degree by
with the result that the
THE CAMPAIGN
172
IN TIRAH,
chap, xi
1897-98
enemy were eventually beaten off, leaving for once

in a way some of their killed behind them, and
allowing even three of their
rifles
to
fall
into our
Before sunset the whole force was safely in
hands.
camp, and a most interesting expedition had been

brought to a most successful conclusion.
The manner
in
which
the
Yorks and
2nd
Gurkhas were withdrawn from the heights on the

flanks was also admirable.
Sir William Lockhart
was extremely pleased with the soldierly spirit
shown by all ranks on this occasion. There was

enough fighting, hardship, and exposure on these
three
days
satisfy
to
the
keenest warrior
but
everything was faced and endured with patience,

pluck,
and cheerfulness, and General Westmacott,
who was
in
command
of the brigade,
gratulated on the complete
to
is
be con-
success of the enter-
prise.
The
casualties during this retreat
were
36th
Sikhs,
two men
officer,
Captain Venour, 5th P.I. (attached to the
36th), slightly
killed,
wounded
twelve wounded, and one
Borderers, two
wounded
3rd Gurkhas, one killed and three wounded.
CHAPTER
THE
XII
MASTURA
THE PUNISHMENT
PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE
OF THE CHAMKANIS
1ST BRIGADE IN
TIRAH
Bagh,
I
MAY
refer
now
a moment to the doings of
for
the 1st Brigade, which,
we advanced
yd December.
it
into Tirah,
will
be remembered, when
was
left
in the
Mastura
Valley to keep an eye on the Orakzais, and to
maintain communication between
Khangarbur
in
Khanki Valley and the headquarters in Tirah.

Under Brigadier-General Hart's vigorous administration, the Mastura Post, as it was called, was soon
the
converted into a strong position, and large convoys

of stores and supplies coming up, and of
and
sick going
wounded
down, were passed through daily
with ease and regularity.
Foraging parties were
sent out frequently, and successful reconnaissances
were
freely
the 25th
Pass,
in all directions (notably
November
7970
tion of
pushed
summit of the Torsmats

which resulted in the acquisi-
to the
feet high),
much
one on
valuable information
regarding the
THE CAMPAIGN
174
surrounding
IN TIRAH,
which
country,
has
thoroughly explored and mapped.
now been all

The Orakzais
Mastura Valley were not so aggressively
the
in
chap.
1897-98
hostile at this time as the Afridis in Tirah.
Still,
skirmishes with them were of constant occurrence,
and the troops had plenty of practice in fighting

and marching, to prepare them for the sterner work
which
this brigade, with the rest of the ist Division,
under Major-General Symons, was shortly to undertake.
On
8th November, for example, a party of the
1st Gurkhas, on duty on the southern slopes of the

Arhanga Pass, succeeded in surprising some of
the enemy who were lying in wait to attack convoys
near the village of Unai,^ and inflicted heavy loss
upon them
and on the
3th,
when some hundreds
pressed an attack upon one of our
of Orakzais
foraging parties in the valley, close to the Mastura

Post,
they were repulsed
casualties to
wounded
two
them,
and
to ourselves
officers.
Captain
and Major Money,
decisively,
at
the
cost
with
many
of only
six
which included, however,
Bowman
i8th
of the Derbyshires,
Bengal
troops on this occasion were
Lancers.
The
commanded by Major
who handled
Smith- Dorrien, Derbyshire Regiment,

his force with considerable skill.
In
my
last letter I
to Dwatoi.
1
This was our
Chap. VIII.
described the reconnaissance
Sir William Lockhart rejoined headartillery position in the attack
on the Arhanga
Pass.
See
THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CHAMKANIS
XII
175
Bagh on 24th November, and allowing

himself only two days for office work and correspondence and it is astonishing how even in the
quarters at
field
papers and telegrams do accumulate in a very
short time
started
again on the morning of the
27th for a longer and more extended tour through

the Chamkani-Massozai-Mamuzai country.
These
are sections, lying due west of our present camp,
about two or three marches only, but separated from
by a range of precipitous hills called the

Durghai Ghar, across which there are several un-
this valley
explored and
8000
feet
Massozais
in
between 7000 feet and

The Chamkanis and the
difficult passes,
height.
the
latter
particularly
were,
in
the
beginning of this trouble, exceedingly bumptious and

aggressive.
When
Sir William Lockhart published
his first proclamation to the tribes,
coming and his purpose, the

insolent reply, stating that they
from their Mullahs
announcing his
Massozais sent an
had
their
own orders
that they protested altogether
against the occupation of the Khyber, Samana, and
Swat
and that they would certainly oppose our
advance.
They have
since fully kept this promise,
and have throughout been actively
Khurmana
hostile in the
Valley,^ keeping us constantly
on the
Here I may mention that on 7th November Colonel Hill, commanding

Kurram column, made a reconnaissance in force from Sadr, through the
Khurmana defile, to Hissar, in order to explore the ground through which his
column would move in the event of operations being subsequently undertaken
Central
The following troops accompanied him
against the Chamkanis.
1
the
India Horse, 100 lancers mounted, 100 dismounted; 12th Bengal Infantry,
THE CAMPAIGN
176
alert at
patrols
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
Sadda (or Sadr), and regularly firing on our

and picquets whenever they got the chance.
For these
William's
reasons, as well as because
declared
policy
thoroughly every part

essential to look
of
to
visit
their
is
it
and
country,
Sir
explore
was
it
up these Chamkanis and Massozais
and Mamuzais, who, notwithstanding
that
their
jirgahs had been received, and that they had practically agreed to the conditions imposed,
disposition to submit
The command
was
intrusted
and pay up
showed no
their fines.
of the troops in this expedition
Brigadier-General Gaselee,
to
who
on the 26th with the Gurkha Scouts of the

3rd and 5th Gurkhas, the Queen's Royal West
started
100 men
men
Sth Gurkhas, 250
Kapurthala Imperial Service Troops, 100
Kurram Militia, 400 men and the maxim gun, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
The defile was found to be seven miles in length, and passable for cavalry.
The enemy being taken by surprise did not oppose the advance.
On the, return of the column to Sadr the same day, the enemy, who mean-
men
while had collected in considerable numbers, followed up the rear-guard, but

being driven back with heavy loss by the 5 th Gurkhas, discontinued their
attack,
and the
last five miles
casualties, so far as
known
were traversed without a shot being fired. Our

two native soldiers killed
at the time, consisted of
and four wounded, but the next day, the O. C. Kapurthala Infantry reported
that one native officer and thirty-five men of his regiment were missing.
It appears that a picquet of fifty men had been directed to occupy a hill
on the flank of the column, and when recalled by signal, which was duly
acknowledged,
it
moved
off to join the rear-guard.
Thirty-five
men
with a
Subadar, taking what the native officer must have believed to be a short cut,
became entangled in bad ground, and found their further progress barred by
a jungle
fire
which had been lighted early
in the day.
regain the road by which they had ascended the
hill,
They turned back to

enemy had dis-
but the
covered their predicament, and assembling in strength, succeeded in shooting

down the whole party. In the meantime, the remainder came in safely, and
believing the Subadar and his party to have arrived ahead of them, a report
of "
all
present " was
happened
made
to Colonel Hill,
until the following day.
who knew nothing
of what had
XII
177
Surrey Regiment, the 3rd Sikhs, 4th Gurkhas, 28th
Bombay
Kohat Mountain Battery,

and Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Bombay Sappers and
Miners a very compact Httle force. But this was
not the whole of it. It was only intended on this
first day to advance about five miles up to the foot
of the Kahu, or Durbi Khel Pass, 8700 feet, leading
into the Massozai country, for it was known that
Pioneers,^ No.
the road would require a lot of improving both up

to that point
and beyond
it
hence the large pro-
portion of Sappers and Miners accompanying the
So
brigade.
Sir William
gain an extra day for his
Lockhart, in order to
own work
in
camp,
left
Bagh himself, with his staff, on the 2 7th, taking on

with him the York Regiment, a wing of the Royal
Scots Fusiliers (who had only marched in the day
before),
the
2nd Gurkhas,
and
No.
Derajat
These troops overtook General

the forenoon of the 28th, and the com-
Mountain Battery.
Gaselee in
bined column, under his orders, crossed the pass

safely,
with
all its
baggage, the same day.
There
but between Bagh and
was no organised opposition,

the summit of the pass the country is thickly studded
with houses and towers, and some of these on both
days had to be cleared of the enemy's sharp-shooters
before the main body could proceed.
As
the road entered the low
foot of the pass, the

1
ground was
This regiment returned to Bagh
foot of the
after
Durbi Khel Pass.
hills
all
fringing the
in favour of the
completing work on the road to the
THE CAMPAIGN
178
enemy and
men and
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
But our
several casualties occurred.
ofificers
now every day improving
are
in
the skirmishing attack and defence methods essential

to success in this kind of warfare,
and they steadily
drove the Afridis before them, shooting several as
we
they ran, and burning the houses from which
At one point on a rocky ridge

the enemy had sangar-ed themselves
had been
some
fired at.
of
and held
strongly,
ground very doggedly.
their
But a company of the Queen's, led by Lieutenant

Engledue,
went
made them vacate

of
them
rifles,
them
for
dashing
in
at the bayonet's point, killing six
and securing
actually in the sangar,
Our
rare trophies with us.
the two days were one
two of the Yorkshires,

one Royal Scots
Gurkha
Scouts,
and
style,
man
total casualties
on
of the Queen's, and
and eight Yorkshires,
killed,
Fusilier,
their
four 4th Gurkhas, two
two Sappers, and one doolie-bearer
wounded.
On
the 28th
all
the troops and baggage had
crossed the pass, and the force concentrated the

following day at Dargai.
hitherto
blustered
The
Massozais,
exceedingly,
were
who had
apparently
startled to find themselves suddenly invaded,

their principal village occupied
almost as
we marched
by our troops
in their jirgahs
and
and
appeared on
the scene, and tendered submission.
Their country
much
pasturage, and
seems extremely
many
fertile,
well-built villages,
anxious to save.
with
which no doubt they were
There are
also splendid forests of
i%?S,.
xii
oak,
fir,
birch,
pay up
to
brought
The
and walnut.
179
jirgahs promised
their fines at once, and, as a matter of fact,
an instalment of
in
thirty rifles the next day.^
The Khani Khel Chamkanis,
however, further
showed no sign of coming in, so Sir

William arranged to look them up without delay.
Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Spurgin, Royal Scots
Fusiliers, in command at Dargai, with one battery,
a wing of his own regiment, the Yorkshires, 2nd
Gurkhas, and the two Sapper Companies, with
orders to improve the road to Khanki Bazar, in
which direction it was intended to march later. Sir
to the west,
William himself, with Brigadier-General Gaselee,
and No.
Kohat Mountain
battery, the Queen's,
the 4th Gurkhas, the 3rd Sikhs, and the Gurkha

Scouts, marched to Hissar, and there joined hands
with Colonel
Hill,^
with
whom
helio
communication
had been opened the previous day, and who had

come up from Sadr, through the Kharmana defile,
in compliance with orders previously sent him from
headquarters.
1
few shots were
camp on the night of the

wounded
also his
The following reference
Jodhpur.
fired into the headquarter's
29th, and two of Sir William's personal escort were

extra aide-de-camp, Sir Pratap Singh of
to this incident
my
thanks to
is
from Despatches:
"I take
Lieutenant-Colonel
this
opportunity of expressing
His Highness the Maharaj Dhiraj Sir
Pratap Singh, G.C.S.I., who was attached to me throughout the expedition

This very gallant Rajput nobleman was wounded on
as extra aide-de-camp.
the 29th November, and characteristically concealed the fact until I discovered
by accident some days after the occurrence."

2 Colonel Hill had with him 100 mounted men and 300 dismounted of
the 6th B.C., and the Central India Horse ; 400 rifles 12th B.I., 200 rifles
5th Gurkhas, and 200 rifles Kapurthala Infantry.
it
THE CAMPAIGN
i8o
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
It had been quite expected that the Mamozais

and the Massozais would show fight, and that the
Chamkanis, a small and insignificant

submit quietly.
But, as
often the case,
is
the unexpected which happened.
would
section,
it
was
The Massozais
and Mamozais tendered their submission, and paid

up their fines, as soon as our columns appeared on
the scene
while the Chamkanis, on the other hand,
hurled their defiance at us, and promptly dared us

to
at
do our worst
once (on
ist
They were
December),
accordingly tackled
punishment being
their
intrusted to Colonel Hill.
Colonel Hill's force consisted of 200 of the 5th
Gurkha
Rifles, 12th Khelat-i-Ghilzai
Regiment, the
Kapurthala Infantry, the 4th Gurkha
Rifles,
dismounted cavalry (6th B.C. and Central

Horse), the Kohat
(Royal Scots
Mounted
Fusiliers),
and
but not
India
Maxims
Battery, two
last,
400
least,
the
Gurkha Scouts. His objective was the principal

Chamkani settlement of Thabi, about seven miles to
the north-west of Hissar, and his orders were to
burn and destroy every

in
it
not,
or on the road to
however,
owing
This programme was
it.
out on the
fully carried
ist,
because,
to the extremely difficult country,
and the
stubborn
resistance
offered
expected delays occurred

tion
post and tower either
fortified
by
the
enemy, un-
and, thorough co-opera-
between the two columns, into which
purpose
troops,
of attack
did
not
for the
Colonel Hill had divided his
take
place
moreover,
it
was
XII
I8i
necessary to return to Hissar during daylight, to
avoid the risk of an attack on the rear-guard after
The
dark by the Massozais.
on
side
day were eight
this
Amongst
wounded.
Battye, of the 6th
included
Villiers
wounded
1
B.C./ and
Stuart,
and seventeen
killed
Richmond
former was
the
the latter were
in
Gurkhas,
5th
on our
casualties
Vansittart, 5 th Gurkhas,
severely
and Pennington,
2th B.C., slightly wounded.
On
a
the next day, the 2nd, Sir William directed
fresh
attack
commanding,
to
be made. Colonel
taking
him
with
half
again
Hill
battalion
of the
Queen's, and half a battalion of the 3rd
Sikhs,
the
4th
Scouts, and the
and
5th
Gurkhas,
Kohat Mountain
the
Gurka
On
Battery.
this
occasion complete success attended the operations.
Some commanding
heights, from which the attack-
ing columns had been

vious
day,
Gurkhas,
were
the
much harassed on
scaled
Scouts
in
leading
great
;
the pre-
style
and
by the
though
the
Chamkanis fought well they were driven from ridge

to ridge and suffered heavily, leaving many of their
dead behind them, so hot-foot in pursuit were the
Scouts under the bold leading of Captain Lucas and
Lieutenant Bruce.
^
"
With
It is
field
Mirak Shah, the chief Malik of
reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye, the Pioneer wrote
now almost a tradition with the Battyes that all shall

but one may nevertheless regret the death so early
this gallant family.
Richmond Battye was a young
die
on the
battle-
of yet another of
officer
of only eight
and conscientious in the discharge of

of a sound understanding, and full of a generous enthusiasm for
years' service, eager, active, alert,
his
duties,
his
profession."
THE CAMPAIGN
i83
the
Khani Khels, and
other
important
among
the slain.
IN TIRAH,
Mahmud
Maliks,
The
chap.
1897-98
and Saidu, two
have been
are said to
defences of Thabi were
razed to the ground, and the return march to Hissar
was unmolested.
were nominal.
Our own
casualties
The Chamkanis having been
on
thus
this day-
effectively
punished, Colonel Hill, with the troops of his
own
command, and taking with him all the sick and

wounded, was directed to return to Sadda (or
Sadr), where he arrived on the 5th without interruption by the way, and resumed his duties
as Warden of the Kurram Valley while these
frontier disturbances last
and Sir William Lockhart, marching leisurely via Khanki Bazar ^ and
the Chingakh Pass (7700 feet), returned to Bagh
;
on 6th December.
Here, in accordance with instructions previously
every preparation had been by this time
issued,
For the
cold here is already intense, and winter is coming
on us now with rapid strides. Directly snow falls
would be impossible to maintain ourselves in
it
completed
for
the evacuation of Tirah.
these bleak highlands, which the Afridis themselves
always abandon during the winter months.

I
At Khanki Bazar a column joined which had come up the
Khangarbur, with supplies

the 30 P. I.,
18
B.L.,
for Sir
William Lockhart's
force.
It
was
valley from
It consisted of
2nd
the
P. I., 4 guns, Kashmir Mountain Battery, and a squadron

whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maisey.
No opposition was encountered by the way. When Sir William Lockhart

marched for Bagh* this column returned to Khangarbur, with the exception
of the 2nd P.I., which now joined Brigadier-General Gaselee's brigade.
PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH
xii
decided, therefore, to
move
the weather continues
beforehand,
vid
fine,
Shinauri
183
to a milder clime while
and by sending
and Kohat,
off well
all
heavy
baggage and surplus stores, all sick and weakly

men, and even all Staff and departmental officers,
and
officers
not absolutely required on the march
with the headquarters of the army, or of divisions,

it
was arranged that everything should be ready
for
a start the day after Sir William Lockhart's return
from his excursion into the Chamkani-Massozai
The
country.
on the
troops remaining would then
move
lightest possible scale, without tents, as the
success of the impending manoeuvres must depend
upon the mobility of the columns engaged

The scheme is, briefly, to change the
in them.
base of operations from Kohat to Peshawar. The
2nd Division, General Yeatman- Biggs commanding, and Sir William Lockhart and Staff accom-
largely
panying, will march, viA Dwatoi,
down
General Symons, with General
Valley, to Barkai.
Gaselee's and General Hart's Brigades,
from the
latter's
move down
:
camp
in the
start
will
Mastura Valley, and
way the
the Waran
the Mastura, destroying on the
defences of the
Valley
the Bara
Aka Khel
thence they
villages, in
will cross
the Sapri Pass, and
2nd Division near Barkai or Bara Fort.

Here the whole force will link up with General
Hammond's " Peshawar column," and be within
join the
easy reach by a good road of Peshawar

at Bara, also,
we
should pick up again
all
itself
and
our heavy
i84
THE CAMPAIGN
baggage,
etc.,
now
IN TIRAH,
and be rejoined by
chap.
1897-98
all
those
who
are
round by Shinauri-Kohat-Pindi to
travelling
Peshawar.
Finally,
the
has remained in
Peshawar column, which hitherto

the vicinity of Peshawar, has been
directed to advance as far as Barkai by the 8th
December, and there to

store supplies, for the
select
camping-grounds and
main column, and to improve
the roads between Barkai and Bara
By
thus sweeping
Valleys
(Waran being
down
fort.^
the Mastura and Bara
visited en route) the
whole of
the Afridi-Orakzai highlands will be explored from
end
end
to
and, on the completion of the march,
the force will be concentrated about Barkai- Bara-
Jamrud, conveniently close to Peshawar,
in a posi-
tion to operate with effect against the Afridi settle-
ments
in the
lower Bara and Bazar Valleys, and to
reoccupy the Khyber.
Seeing us thus established
in positions
dominat-
ing their country, and within striking distance of
those lower valleys into which they themselves are

driven by the approach of winter, the Zakka-khels,
the most implacable of our foes, must see the
futility
of prolonging a struggle so disastrous to themselves,
and which,
result in
if
persevered
in,
will in all probability
a permanent weakening of
their
depriving them of the premier position

1
arrival at Barkai on the 14th December, I found that my

on these heads had been most thoroughly carried out." Sir Wm.
"On my
instructions
power by
which un-
Lockkart's Despatches.
PREPARATIONS TO LEAVE TIRAH
XII
185
doubtedly they hold now, and always have held
among
the past,
For amongst
the Afridi clans.
all
in
most of the other sections there appears to be a

genuine inclination to accept our terms, and to bury
the hatchet
and should the Zakkas, by obstinate
resistance to the bitter end, protract the anxieties
and hardships and sufferings of
all,
khels,
khels there
with
whom
and others (between

is
no love
us, and, as
country of our presence,
Khambar-
and the Zakka-
make
way of
lost) will
the quickest
quite on
is
it
the cards that the Malikdin-khels, the
separate terms
relieving their
combine with us
will
to
compel compliance by the Zakka-khels.

These, however, are only what the gifted
Baba",used
to describe as "precious possibilities."
only remained at this juncture to notify to the
It
tribes
why we were
leaving Tirah, and the subjoined
among
proclamation was accordingly circulated

clans by special messengers sent out
officers
am
"I
is
On
leave your country.
country until you

it
is
my
coming, and
fully
winter.
you
Whatever your
and, as an old friend of
to submit,
and so
let
am
my
troops
not going to
the contrary, I shall remain in your
evil advisers
many
in your other settlements
say that the Afridis attacking the English

;
do not wish
But
comply with the terms of Government
intention to attack
during the winter.
lion
political
going away from these highlands of Maidan," wrote Sir
be exposed to the cold of
and
by the
the
William, " because snow

to
" Ali
is
of you,
may
tell
you, I
like flies assailing
my
advice to you
a
is
your wives and families return from the
cold mountains to their homes."
CHAPTER
XIII
THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN, AND DOWN

THE BARA VALLEY
Mamanai,
i^th December.
Leaving to our friends the Zakka-khels, and others,

this document to think over, the movement, vid the
Dwatoi defile, down the Bara Valley was commenced
on 7th December. The force, which consisted only
of the Second Division, under General YeatmanBiggs and Army Headquarters, had been cut down,
as I have explained, in the way of baggage to the
lowest possible scale, and was rationed only up
to 14th December, by which date therefore it was
essential that
a junction should be effected with
Hammond
and the Peshawar

column somewhere about Barkai. The whole distance to be traversed was only about forty miles,
Brigadier
and but
it
General
little
was bad
certain
in
was known about the road except

opposition throughout
and a margin had
to
its
that
length was
be allowed
for delays
getting through the Dwatoi defile, and for an
expedition en route to
attack the
Kuki-khels
in
THROUGH THE DWATOI DEFILE AGAIN
CH. xiii
187
Thus, to take only seven days' supplies
Rajgul.
with the column was cutting

difficulties
rather fine, but the
it
of transport are a ruling factor in
these
all
matters, and, carrying only this small provision, the
baggage animals with the troops numbered nearly

12,000 mules and ponies.
The advance was
led
by Brigadier-General West-
macott's Brigade, Sir William Lockhart and staff
accompanying,
have described before the
My
between Bagh and Dwatoi.

its
defile
estimate of
first
vast natural strength and appalling difficulties
is
not diminished, but rather strengthened and con-
by a second inspection of
firmed,
might say of
Literally
it.
one
this place
In yon strait path a thousand
May
well be stopped
by
three.
But, most fortunately, our passage through the most
dangerous portion of
enemy
at
all.
The
it
was not opposed by the
Malikdin-khels,
who
ship over the country through which
claim lord-
lie
the
first
few and worst miles, had been happily squared by

our energetic
and on the promise
political officers,^
that their houses in the neighbourhood should be
spared they agreed not to obstruct our march.
Not-
withstanding, no military precaution to insure a safe

1
Colonel Warburton-'s influence
through his
efforts, eight
is
very great with
of the Malikdin Maliks
all Afridis,
came
in
the 6th, and promised to post unarmed picquets of their

heights through which our road lay to Dwatoi.
days and two nights, that

shot was fired in
it.
is,
until our troops
and, chiefly
on the evening of
own men on the
This they did, and for three
were clear of the
defile,
not a
THE CAMPAIGN
188
transit
2
was neglected.
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
The thermometer
registered
degrees of frost on the morning of 7th December,
but long before daylight the troops of the advanced

guard,
under Lieutenant
Colonel
C.
Pulley,
3rd
Gurkhas, had scaled the towering heights on either

flank of the advance, and
important points.
of his
own
made
secure the most
Colonel Pulley's force consisted
splendid battalion, half a battalion of the
2nd Punjab
Infantry, the 28th
Bombay
Pioneers, a
company of Madras Sappers, and a Mountain

which
The
last,
Battery,
of course, had to follow the river bed.
Pioneers and Sappers worked at the road as
they went along, while the flanking parties were

furnished chiefly by the Gurkhas.
Close behind
came the
the troops of the advanced guard
rest of
Westmacott's Brigade, and then followed the transport of the division, a surging mass of struggling
animals and shouting drivers that blocked the narrow

pass for miles and for hours, or rather for days, but
which came through

evening of the
9th,
safely,
nevertheless,
by the
under the protection of General
Kempster's Brigade, which formed the rear-guard of

the division.
I
may mention
Brigade
left
here that, as General Kempster's
Bagh
for
Dwatoi, General Gaselee's
Brigade (just returned with Sir William Lockhart
from the Massozai country)

Pass, to join
its
own
started, via the
Arhanga
division (under Major-General
Symons) in the Mastura Valley so that on 9th

December the evacuation of Maidan was completed,
;
XIII
and General Symons with
189
commenced
his division
march down the Mastura simultaneously with
his
our movement down the Bara.
To resume. Although the passage of the defile

was not opposed by the enemy, yet we were fired
on as soon as we emerged from it and headed for
our camping- ground.
brisk advance, however,
under General Westmacott's own direction, soon

drove the enemy
once posted on
off,
all
and strong picquets were
at
the surrounding heights, while
the main body occupied their bivouacs, and the

transport slowly filed on to the ground.
Night by
time had come on, but there was nearly a
this
moon, which made
it
as bright as day.
full
This was
all
our favour, and enabled our tired troops to stave
in
off successfully every attack
made on them (and
they were numerous up to midnight),^ and prevented

"
We
Company, K.O.S.Bs.) rushed this position (heights above

The enemy now retired to another sangar in
a clump of trees, slightly below us, about 300 yards away, and held other
We had to lie close here, as bullets
sangars beyond, and commanding it.
As this was to be our post for the night (it was
were coming in thick.
now only 3 p.m.), we entrenched ourselves as well as we could, and Captain
Macfarlane, who commanded us, posted one section under Sergeant Watson
1
(F.
Dwatoi) with pipes playing.
in a small sangar about sixty yards to our right.
we
It
We left loopholes in the
walls
built up, so that the sentries could look out without exposing themselves.
was a
bitter cold night,
and we were
all
wet through with wading during
the day.
" When it got dark the Afridis began to fire at us, but we didn't reply.
Suddenly one of the sentries called out, ' Stand to
They're on us
We
all sprung to our posts, and opened fire independently on a mob of men who
!
'
were charging down with loud shouts. Some of them were within twenty yards.
Our fire checked them, and they drew off. We could hear groans, and the
noise
made by
bodies being dragged and carried away.
One dead man was
within ten yards of our wall.
lefl
'
'
They now
established themselves under cover all round us within very
THE CAMPAIGN
19
much
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
of the loss and confusion amongst the trans-
port which otherwise would have ensued from being
benighted on the road.
On
the
next day, the 8th,
our fine weather
There had in fact been a drizzle

during the night, and when we roused in the morning the hills all round us were dusted with snow.
The highlands of Tirah had not been evacuated a
day too soon. It would have been disastrous indeed,
to be caught up there by the snow, which lies thick
in a severe winter for weeks together, and we condeserted us at
last.
gratulated ourselves that
The
only incident
brilliant
little
we were
of note
well out of
it.
on the 8th was a
dash by a detachment composed of
3rd Gurkhas and 36th Sikhs, supported by the
fire
of some mountain guns, to capture a peak about a

mile up the stream, which was strongly held by the
enemy, and which completely commanded the road
up the valley by which it was intended on the follow-
The
ing day to push a punitive reconnaissance.
men had
already been marching and fighting for
short ranges, fired frequently, shouted abuse in Hindustani,
by which
several of us were
orders, but waited to give
"Twice men were
hit.
them
We
and threw
stones,
took no notice, by Captain Macfarlane's
the bayonet should they
come
on.
seen by the sentries trying to crawl up close
and each
time as the sentry rose to bayonet them, he was shot dead through the head
by marksmen who were on the look-out. The men killed in this way were
Up to 10 P.M. we were much harassed, and
Privates Waits and Young.
constantly threatened by rushes, but after midnight they let us almost alone.
At daylight they fired briskly again, but none of
It then came on to snow.
us were hit
and
later in the day,
when
the Gurkhas
and Sikhs captured a
which commanded their position, they cleared out altogether. We were

From a letter by an Officer with the
relieved at noon by H. Company."
hill
Picquet.
xiiJ
191
more than thirty-six hours at a stretch when they

were ordered to fall in for this attack, but they
started
once light-hearted and cheerful, and,
at
by
led
splendidly
Someren, breasted
most gallant
style
West and Van
Lieutenants
the tremendous
climb in the
and captured the
hill-top right
away, with a loss of only four
men
and
killed
wounded.
On
come
the 9th, General Kempster's Brigade having
in
and taken over the picquets, General West-
macott marched his brigade up the Rajgul Valley,
Lockhart
William
Sir
accompanying,
the
with
mapping the country, which is all a terra

incognita to our surveyors, and of punishing the
Kuki-khels by destroying their towers and defences.
object of
speak of the Rajgul Valley, but
throughout
its
in
reality
it
is
length (three or four miles) more
Shut in on either hand

whose wooded spurs run down until
they almost meet in the stream at their feet, it is a
place in which troops must be handled with the
But the 4th Brigade are seasoned
greatest caution.
a
than a valley.
defile
by
lofty hills,
warriors now, quick to understand their general's

instructions,
out
and
so,
and
alert
and resolute
without a hitch or
steadily
up the
on the
flanks, taking
valley,
in carrying
falter,
crowning height
them
they worked
after height
advantage of the ground
like
the practised skirmishers they are now, driving the
enemy back with only
trivial loss to
themselves, and
holding them in check until the Sappers and Pioneers
THE CAMPAIGN
192
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
behind them had accomplished their work of destruction
and the survey parties had finished
their maps.
The mountain guns again were well to the front and of

the greatest service in expelling the enemy from the
shelter of their sangars,
and supporting and cover-
ing the infantry attack.
The
day were No.
on
batteries out
this
under Major Shirres, and No.
8,
under Captain Money, and the accuracy of their
5,
fire
was the subject of general remark.
The
retirement to
camp was
as usual actively
pressed by the Afridis, but the handling and work-
enemy
ing of the troops were admirable, and the
made no impression on them whatever

own losses must have been severe.
2nd
Gurkhas,
36th
Pioneers,
Scottish Borderers,
Sikhs,
while their
28th
P. I.,
The 3rd
Bombay
and two companies
Royal Scottish Fusiliers were the troops engaged.
And
now, on the loth, commenced our
difficult
and arduous march down the Bara Valley.

stages were
Dwatoi
Sher-khel, ten miles
to Sandana, eight miles

;
to
The
;
to
Narkandai, eight miles
and to Swaikot-Mamanai (about one mile east of

Swaikot) eight miles.
From
the above you will see there were only four
comparatively short marches to
up with
General
column.
It
Hammond
make
and the Peshawar
sounded so simple, but
us understood that
before joining
think most of
meant four days of the sternest

trial that the force has had yet.
it
work and stiffest

For though we knew
well
enough that our march
DOWN THE BARA VALLEY
XIII
was
not,
in
the accepted sense,
193
movement
in
was quite certain that such was the

construction the enemy would put upon it. We knew
retreat, yet
it
we were sweeping down the Bara and

Mastura Valleys merely by way of carrying out part
very well that
of a thought-out programme, that the march Pesha-
war-wards was only reculer pour m.ieux sauter, and

that the
measure was only preliminary
to fresh raids
up the Bazar and Khyber Valleys. But the Afridis,

intelligent though they be, would not look at our
ulterior aims.
They would only consider the situation
of the present and
the
opportunity of
the
moment. Their Mullahs would tell them that we

were flying from their country, defeated, and unsuccessful in our venture, and would urge them to
follow close on our tracks, and to strike hard for
vengeance' sake, and for their faith.
And, indeed, they did all this, and played their
own game throughout
the retirement with a deter-
mination and boldness and
skill
pelled our admiration, although
it
which often comcost us dear.
But
must not anticipate.

Our march commenced at daylight on the loth.
The general arrangement was that the 4th Brigade,
Westmacott's, should lead the way, and the 3rd
Brigade, Kempster's, bring up the rear, the whole
of the baggage and hospitals, etc., moving between
I
The Bara
and in many
nowhere a
the two brigades.
Valley
mile in breadth,
parts narrows in to
very much
less
than that.
Down
is
the centre of
it
THE CAMPAIGN
194
runs the Bara stream, a
IN TIRAH,
muddy
chap.
1897-98
torrent almost knee-
deep, 30 to 40 feet wide, brawling over a rocky bed,
winding
a great red snake backwards and for-
like
wards from one bank
to the other,
anon breaking up
dozen smaller branches, and then collecting
into a
again into one channel as
it
rushes through a rocky
The average width from bank
gorge.
the river-bed
is
less
to
bank of
than half a mile, mostly laid
out in terraced rice-fields, and though above the river
on the
left
bank there
is
a narrow bridle-path, the
whole of the transport was kept below, partly because of the broad front on which
it
could there
move, and partly because of the protection afforded
by the banks.
Beyond the
river
banks are
rice-fields
again in terraces, and beyond these again the

rising abruptly into
hills,
peaks and ridges which run up
9000 and 10,000 feet, all thickly covered now with

recent snow.
Throughout its length, therefore, the
to
valley
is
commanded by
the heights on either side,
and as every yard of our progress was

tested,
it is
easy, or, rather,
the tremendous
exertions,
it is
and
fiercely con-
not easy
I
may
to realise
add, risks,
involved in clearing these, mile by mile, in holding
them while the baggage passed through, and,

in
finally,
withdrawing from them.

It
must be remembered that never before on our
North- West Frontier have
we had
to deal with
an
enemy armed with long-ranging breech-loaders, as

It may be much argued where
these Afridis are.
they got them from, but the fact remains that they
xiii
possess them.
rifles,
The
195
majority have Martini-Henry
with which they shoot very straight up to
they have a
1200 and 1500 yards.
But
few Lee-Metfords,
or sixty probably, taken or
fifty
in addition
on the 9th
stolen from us at various times, notably
and
6th of November, and their supply of am-
munition
is
work thrown on flanking
the
Consequently,
apparently unlimited.
In the days
tremely heavy.
now is exenemy had
parties
when
the
nothing better than the jezail and a few Enfields
and Sniders,
it
was
practically
enough
keep them
to
a good half-mile clear of the line of march.

the flankers must go
much
Now
farther afield than that,
and points have to be occupied and held fully a mile

away on either hand before the road can be considered safe.
To
accentuate the
difficulties
of the march under
I have indicated, it rained and sleeted

and snowed throughout the night of the 9th and
during the loth and that rain made a cruel differ-
the conditions
ence to the wretched transport animals, and shivering drivers, and hospital kahars,
one
else, for that
matter) had to
lie
who
(like
out in
it
every
without
For it not only drenched them to

the bone, and froze them to the marrow, but it also
converted the rice-fields, across which they had to
plough their way, into veritable bogs, and in these
many a poor beast plunged up to his girths, and,
too exhausted to get on his legs again, was left
behind and lost. The ice-cold river, too, had to be
tents or shelter.
THE CAMPAIGN
196
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
forded ten or a dozen times in every mile, and long
many unhappy
before Swaikot was reached

frozen
by the
cold,
and
terrified
followers,
by the
bullets
whistling overhead, collapsed and died by the way,

in spite of the efforts of the escorts to
keep them
all
and bring them safely along.

However, we had to take the country as we
together,
found
it,
and the weather as
be waged without losses of

a matter of
casualties
fact,
on
it
came, and war cannot

kind occurring.
this
this first
As
march, on the loth, the
were not very numerous, either amongst the
troops or the followers
about twenty only
in the
two
It was on the next

was at its worst, the
brigades amongst the former.

day, the nth, that the weather
more severe, and the losses considerable.

The enemy seemed to realise that they had a great
chance now, and they attacked the rear-guards, who
were terribly delayed and embarrassed by the transport, and particularly by the hospitals, with great
fighting
determination.
The wretched
kahars, hardly able
when empty, seemed quite

unable to bear them when loaded with the weight
Yet they had to be brought
of a wounded man.
to
carry the
along,
doolies
and the troops had often
to hold the
savage pursuers
at
to fight desperately
bay while the dooly-
away with their precious burdens.

At last night came on while the tail of the rearguard was still nearly three miles from its bivouac
bearers got safely
with the main body.
It
consisted at this time of
70 men of the Gordons, 220 of the 2nd Gurkhas,
XIII
197
30 of the 2nd P. I., and 30 of the Dorsets, and was

commanded by that good soldier Major Downman,
of the Gordons.
Encumbered as he was at this time with twentyone wounded men, and with darkness approaching,
while scores of the enemy surrounded him on every
side, Major Downman promptly decided to seize a
house, and intrench himself for the night.
clump
of huts on the right bank of the river seemed to
and
afford the shelter sought for,
made
for
them.
attempted to
The enemy,
forestall
him
his little
column
noting his intention,
in the possession of this
vantage-ground, but Captain Uniacke, with a handful
of Gordons,
first.
The
made
a brilliant dash and got in
rest of the party
detachment was safe
soon followed, and the
for the night.
fighting from daylight to dark,
get
some
rest.
They had been
and were thankful
The men had behaved
to
with steadi-
ness and resolution in the most trying circumstances,
and the
officers
had
set a
courage and endurance.
most
brilliant
Among
the
example of
wounded
this
day were Lieutenant Williams, Hants Regiment,

transport officer, and Captain Norie, 2nd Gurkhas,
whose left arm was shattered into matches by a bullet

which strucjf it high up near the shoulder.
When day broke on the 1 2th Major Downman
heliographed in for help to Sher-khel, and General
Kempster went out with a couple of regiments and
a battery, and brought his gallant little detachment
The total casualties on the nth were not less
in.
THE CAMPAIGN
198,
than
inclement weather and
of the flooded country,
number of
followers
there
were
lost,
chap.
1897-98
or sixty amongst the troops
fifty
to the
IN TIRAH,
and,
owing
the dreadful
is
state
no doubt that a
and that consider-
able quantities of stores and baggage and animals
were abandoned, and
fell
the hands of the
into
enemy.
-
On
rest
the
2th Sir William Lockhart halted.
was imperatively necessary,
stant marching
for,
what with con-
and fighting and heavy picquet duties,
the strain had been incessant since the 7th inclusive.
From this point, too, the order of march was changed.

The 3rd Brigade was directed to lead the advance
and the 4th Brigade to undertake the rear-guard
duties.
The enemy by this

and daring,
us on
a "
effect
until
it
time had increased in numbers
was
plain they thought they
had
down grade." They fired into our crowded

camp on the night of the nth with considerable
and
parties sent out to forage during the
day, though very strongly guarded, were

in a
skirmish more or less severe
the sections of the Afridis
all
engaged
the time.
were represented
All
in the
hungry crowd, attracted no doubt by the hope of

plunder, but the bulk of them were Zakka-khels and
Aka-khels, and they had not forgotten to bring their
Lee-Metfords with them

as the only
to pitch a
way
few
tain side fully
It
was
actually necessary,
to disperse these prowling guerillas,
shells into
them, where on the moun-
2500 yards away a
little
knot of marks-
XIII
men had
199
established themselves across the river,
whence they kept up a most harassing

on the camp throughout the day and far
fusilade
into the
night.
On
the 13th the
march was resumed.
nately the clouds had
now
Fortu-
cleared away, and once
more the weather was bright and fine. The cold,

however, was intense, and the river had as usual
many
to be forded
Rarely
times during the day.
have troops been engaged
in severer fighting
Westmacott's Brigade on
this
December.
Encouraged by
memorable 13th of
their recent successes,
and with
their appetites for plunder
stuff that
had
fallen into their
withrawnj and while
fresh,
who was
his
their fierce
by the
But Westmacott's men
and with a
full
reliance
on
ever amongst them, animat-
presence
hardened their hearts
not clear of the
still
at arm's length
fighting.
were comparatively
them by
with a keener
were pressing
and were only held
most determined
ing
we were
at Sher-khel, they
their General,
now
Before even the picquets had been
zest than ever.
attack,
whetted by the
hands on the nth,
the Afridis plunged into the fray
camp
than
for
and
his
words,
stiff
day's
work
disputing stubbornly every inch of ground,
they
fell
slowly and steadily, firing on the crowding
and
back
enemy
with deadly effect whenever a chance offered, and
backing and supporting each other with a coolness
and judgment that was admirable

Scottish
The
to a degree.
Borderers nobly bore their share
in
the
THE CAMPAIGN
200
day's
the
and
operations,
engaged
also,
IN TIRAH,
were
Northamptons
the
but the brunt of the fighting
fell
on
36th Sikhs and on the 3rd Gurkhas, more
on
especially
the
And
last-named.
Gurkhas or Sikhs behave more

this
chap.
1897-98
trying
valiantly than
The former, under

commanded his
day.
Colonel Pulley (who

this occasion with
conspicuous
never did
ability),
on
Lieutenantbattalion
and the
on
latter
under Major Des Voeux (of Gulistan fame). Colonel
Haughton being temporarily

ness
attack,
and desperate
and
flanks
displayed a cool-
be surpassed.
not
who was
Pressed by the en^my,
the
sick,
and courage that could
unrelenting in his
work round
by
they had to carry
in his efforts to
drive
it
home, encumbered
numerous wounded men whom

along with them, and often running short of ammunition, these two grand regiments held their own
more than successfully against all comers, and
defeated every attempt of the foe to break their
line
or
even to hurry their
splendidly
supported
by
retreat.
the
They were
Borderers,
under
Colonel Dixon, one of the finest regiments in the

Force, while the
artillery, as usual,
timable service, pouring in a deadly
coign of vantage
so that,
rendered inesfire
from every
when darkness
at last put
an end to the struggle, heavy though the casualties

of the Brigade had been, the General and his
could
lie
down
men
conscious that their duty had been
thoroughly and bravely and effectively done, and

also that the
enemy had been very
severely handled.
XIII
201
day were well over 300, at a very

moderate estimate, while ours must have been
between fifty and sixty in the rear -guard alone, and
His losses
this
included the gallant Lieutenant West, of the 3rd
who was
Gurkhas,
on the spot by a shot
killed
through the heart, and Captain Bateman-Champain,
The Gurkhas had
of the same regiment, wounded.

besides
men
six
and sixteen wounded
killed
Borderers, two killed and twelve
wounded
the
and the
36th Sikhs, three killed and nine wounded.
That evening the whole Division bivouacked at

called Narkandai (Spin Kamar in the
a place
About
Despatches').
left
from Sher-khel we
the valley of the Bara, and followed a track
across the hills on the
dangerous
was
called.
bank, in order to avoid a
left
About \\ miles
and then night coming on, a halt
which
defile
along this track,
the
miles
3|-
We were
lay ahead.
here far from any water, but
men had been warned
to replenish their water-
bottles before leaving the river,
drink,
sacks, they lay
There was no
is
the
and with that
and such food as they had
name
down
to
in their haver-
to sleep just as they were.
the name Narkandai

merely
we passed a
village near us
of the locality
ând
comparatively quiet night.

I
should mention that communication was opened
with General
Hammond
this
day by
helio, and, in
compliance with a request previously forwarded to
him by
special
messenger from Sher-khel, he had
sent out to meet us a large
number of extra kahars
THE CAMPAIGN
202
and
which we
of
doolies,
IN TIRAH,
now
chap.
1897-98
stood
sorely
in
need.
On
next day,
the
the
14th,
the march
was
renewed, and the fighting, the same troops taking the
But the enemy, though
rear-guard.
pursuit, kept at a
and though
casualties,
much more
still
active in
respectful distance
was again a hard day, with several
it
was not nearly so trying as on the 13th,

same time, was quite as successful. Four
it
and, at the
miles out of Swaikot (or Barkai) Brigadier-General
Hammond met
Mamanai,
from
evening we were
in the
care,
inside
we
his
all
and by
five
comfortably encamped at
That
brigade.
slept the sleep of the just,
night,
free
and joyfully
thought of the morrow, when we should see our

heavy baggage once more, and enjoy, perchance, the
luxury of a tub and a change of clothes.
Here, too,
we were
glad to learn that General
Symons' Division had arrived
safely in the neigh-
bourhood of Bara, and to hear the

interesting
details of his
march down the Mastura, of
Waran
raid into the
his brilliant
Valley en route, and of his
successful passage of the hitherto unexplored Sapri
His march had been
Pass.
territory, and, therefore,
posed
but
the
chiefly
had been
Waran
through Orakzai
practically unop-
expedition
against
the
Aka-khels, which had been entrusted to General

Hart's Brigade, had been most skilfully
(the casualties
on our side being very
managed
few, while the
punishment of the enemy was very thorough), and
xiii
the crossing of the Sapri, a most
203
difficult pass,
had
been carried out with enterprise and judgment.^

Sir William Lockhart's whole force
now
stood
united about Swaikot (Barkai), Bara, Jamrud, and

the
phase of the Tirah campaign was ended.
first
may be
It
confidently asserted that in no expedition
or war in India since the great Mutiny has there
been such severe and constant
fighting,
or such
heavy
losses.
too, of
no ordinary kind, have been incurred daily

and the strain on the troops has been
and
n-ightly,
incessant.
'
Hardships and frequent exposure,
"The
We
are too
1st Division, while
much accustomed
to think
moving from Mastura to Bara, met with commarch was an arduous one, and in all
paratively slight opposition, but the

respects
was carried out
in accordance with
my
wishes."
Sir William Lock-
harfs Despatches.
The Passage of
"On
the
nth
The
rain
the column
came down
steadily all that day and the following night, and as we were mostly encamped
on rice-fields and boggy ground, it was not a cheerful time.
Our column
(Brigadier- General Hart's) included 7300 troops and followers, and about
Throughout the nth the Sappers and Pioneers
5000 transport animals.
worked hard to improve the road ahead, but it was desperately bad, and the
Long before daylight
dreadful weather increased the difficulties of their task.
on the 1 2th the advanced guard made a'start up the mountain-side, but so slow
was the progress made that though the leading troops, with Major-General
Symons, got through to Sapri (twelve miles) on the same day, the rest of the
column was benighted when only some nine miles had been accomplished,
and halted at a place called Khwaja Khidder. It was quite dark at 6 P.M.,
and as the transport was not then all in, General Hart had a long line of
bonfires lighted, stretching four miles, from the summit of the pass right into
the Safri Pass (5350 feet)
halted about two miles from the foot of the pass.
By
camp.
the cheery blaze of these beacons the tired animals were safely
and not a load was lost. It was a sight that

who saw it the lurid leaping flames, the
black dancing shadows, the endless procession of pack-animals and drivers,
and the groups of armed men keeping watch and ward. Fortunately the
guided through the dark
will not
enemy made no
fired,
forest,
be easily forgotten by those
serious attack during the night.
and we only had a couple of men wounded."
the 1st Brigade.
Only a few
From a
shots were
Staff-Officer
with
THE CAMPAIGN
204
IN TIRAH,
of the tribes on our frontier as
chap.
1897-98
an undisciplined
rabble to be treated with contempt, and brushed
whenever we choose to advance

against them in lordly fashion.
We have learned
now that the conditions no longer exist which
aside with ease,
warranted such a
We
belief.
and Orakzais are
Afridis
have seen that the
armed
practically as well
no
as ourselves, except that at present they possess

artillery
men
that they can shoot as straight as our
own
that they can skirmish a great deal better
than most of them
and that they are enterprising
and bold, and thoroughly understand how
to
make
the best use of the natural advantages which their
woods and mountains and rocky
and their
defiles,
freedom from the cares of transports and hospitals,
and such
like
be treated with respect
to
Such a
impedimenta give them.

;
(for
will
forewarned
least
is
is
and the next time we
approach him, our generals, and our
and our men
foe
staff officers,
be better prepared to tackle him

forearmed) than some of them at
were in the
commencement of
the
present
campaign.
The 2nd
needed
all
rest,
Division will
stationed about Bara-Barkai.
the hard fighting has fallen to
killed
and wounded
commencement
1000
of
1
now be given a much-
" During
men.''
the
of
alone
its
its
losses
the operations are
Nearly
and
lot,
since
little
General Yeatman-Biggs
in
the
short
himself
march from Bagh, through Dwatoi, down the Bara
valley,
the troops of the 2nd Division were almost unceasingly engaged A*ith the
XIII
is
and only devotion
ill,
tion to see
post
his
the
to duty,
thing through,
the head of his
at
205
and determina-
has kept him at

splendid
Division
during these trying weeks of fighting, hardship,
and
exposure.-^
The
under Major-General Symons,
1st Division,
Hammond's column, which
with Brigadier-General
quite
is
and
fresh
yearning
the
for
fray,
will
concentrate at Jamrud, preparatory to moving up

the
Khyber and Bazar
be a ten days'
Valleys.
be
still
full
will
probably
and undoubtedly there
affair,
more hard knocks going,

to
This
be
as the Zakka-khels appear
A start will
of fight.
will
be made about
the 23rd, and Sir William Lockhart will accompany

the expedition himself.
several sections of the Afridis
through whose country they passed
and
towards the end of the march they were followed up by a large gathering
representing every section.
the presence of
The
flanking, picquet,
and rear-guard duties
in
such an active and enterprising enemy were exceedingly
onerous, while the line of march was along the bed of a river, the water of
which was of icy coldness, and had to be repeatedly forded. The followers
and kahars suffered most from the cold, and to assist the latter wounded men
had
to
be frequently carried by
their
own comrades."
Sir William Lockharfs
Despatches^
^ Major-General Yeatman-Biggs died at Peshawar on the 4th January,
lamented as an accomplished gentleman, a gallant soldier, and a good friend,
by every one who knew him. The following general order was issued from
Headquarters on lOth January
"The
Commander-in-Chief has
it
in
command from
the Viceroy and
Governor-General in India to express to the army His Excellency's deep

regret at the loss which it has sustained in the death of Major-General
Arthur Godolphin Yeatman-Biggs, C.B., and his high appreciation of the
by that officer.
Yeatman-Biggs' services covers a period of
during which he was employed in the following campaigns
services rendered to the State
"The
record of General
thirty-seven years,
and military expeditions
"The
operations against the Taeping rebels in China, 1862; the South
THE CAMPAIGN
2o6
When
will all
this
go
operation
is
regiments
from India/ and some
will
will
stations without relief.
to
even
if
it
extent,
chap, xiii
and await develop-
be relieved by others
probably return to their
Doubtless, too, the Head-
quarters Staff and the Divisional

a great
1897-98
completed the troops
into winter quarters
Some
ments.
IN TIRAH,
reorganised
Staffs
will
be,
and reduced,
as,
should be necessary to resume active
operations in the spring, they will not be on the
same
scale.
African war,
879, during which he
commanded one
of the parties sent in
of Ketchewayo,
and subsequently served as Staff-OfRcer of the

Lydenburg column against Sekukuni and the Egyptian campaign of 1882.
In August 1897 General Yeatman-Biggs was intrusted with the command
of the troops in the Kohat and Kurram Valleys, then threatened by a
formidable combination of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and he conducted
the operations on the Ublan Pass, as well as those on the Samana, which
ended with the defeat of the tribesmen and the relief of Gulistan.
" On the formation of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he was appointed to
pursuit
command of the 2nd Division, which he held until a few days before his
The Commander-in-Chief shares the regret which will be felt by the
the
death.
army
at the
premature death of
this gallant oflScer."
The Devons were relieved at once by the Royal Sussex Regiment,

the Dorsets by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the Northamptons
by the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; all "having been much
'
weakened by
losses in action, or
by sickness."
Despatches.
CHAPTER
XIV
THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION AND REOCCUPATION

OF THE KHYBER THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN
If the Afridis were under the impression that with
the evacuation of Tirah
they were
now
to
we had done
be undeceived.
with them,
William
Sir
Lockhart had warned them before starting on his

march down the Bara that he had no intention of
leaving their country until they had fully complied
with the terms imposed by Government
now
and he
proceeded without a day's delay to carry out
them
the 15th and
his threat, failing their submission, to attack
On
in their other winter settlements.

1
6th
December the Peshawar column, under General
Hammond, marched from Swaikot

it
was concentrated by the
7th,
for
Jamrud, where
and joined on the
19th by the ist Division and the
Gurkha
Scouts,
under Major-General Symons.
reconnaissance into the
by General
showed
Hammond,
that the road
as
Khyber on the
far
as
had not been
i8th,
Fort Maude,
injured.
The
THE CAMPAIGN
2o8
telegraph
line,
IN TIRAH,
of course, had been wrecked, and
everything combustible in the
No
burned.
chap.
1897-98
fort itself
had been
one was seen or met during the day,
and Ali Musjid, about four miles further up the

pass, appeared to be deserted.
The
operations
now about
to be undertaken
com-
prised measures for reopening the road through the
Khyber Pass (which had been closed ever since the

end of August 1897) for reconstructing the Khyber
posts, which had been destroyed by the Afridis, in."
cluding the defensible serai at Landi Kotal

restoring the Landi Kotal water-supply
and
for
for de-
Zakka Khel villages in the

Khyber. At the same time, the Bazar Valley was to
be visited and swept with the besom of destruction.
On the 2ist and 22nd December the Sappers
and Pioneers were busy making roads to selected
Khyber
artillery positions at the mouth of the
stroying the defences of all
Pass.
On
advanced
Hammond's column
the 23rd General

to
Ali
Musjid,
Captain Barton's Khyber
the
9th
Gurkhas, and
Rifles, leading the
way,
and crowning the heights on the flanks. No enemy,

however, was encountered, and the village of Lala
China, near Ali Musjid, was without any sign of
life.
Its
towers were blown up the next day, and
large quantities of forage and fuel taken out and
brought into camp.
As
regards the fort of Ali
Musjid, the mischief done to

as was expected.
the
buildings inside
The
it
roofs
it
was not so great
and wood-work of
had been burnt, but the
THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION
XIV
were
walls
209
most part standing, and
for the
good
in
order.
On
the next day the ist Division marched out
from Jamrud, and encamped
Lockhart
William
arrived
at
Lala China.
same
the
at
Sir
time,
accompanied by General Sir Havelock- Allan, V.C.,
who had come
M.P.,
out from England to have
a look at the Frontier, and had been invited by
him during the Bazar expedition.

A few shots were fired into camp this night, and one
man was wounded.
Sir William to join
On
the 25th, Christmas day, the
entered the
Bazar Valley
William Lockhart
Division
ist
two columns.
in
accompanied
himself
the
Sir
left
column, which consisted of the regiments of General

Gaselee's
Brigade,
(Derajat)
M.B.,
No.
M.B.
Gurkha
the
Cpmpany Bombay Sappers and
with
about eight miles through low
brushwood,
by
No. 3
Miners.
This
column marched, via the Chora Pass,

village
No.
R.A.,
Scouts, and
fairly
to
covered
hills
easy
Chora
road.
No
opposition was encountered, and the next day the
column reached China,
its
objective, eleven miles,
which of course was deserted.
had a skirmish on
this
of the enemy, and two
wounded.
The
The
rear-guard
march with small
men were
killed
parties
and four
next day the towers and defences
of China were destroyed, and the column returned

to
the
Chora.
The enemy on
rear -guard
this occasion
with some pertinacity,
attacked
but were
THE CAMPAIGN
210
IN TIRAH,
repulsed with heavy loss
to
chap.
1897-98
themselves, a noted
named Idris, being among the killed.

Meantime Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade had
Mullah,
been having an arduous time.
In the advance of the
division into the Bazar Valley
column, and
Pass, to
panied
it
formed the right
march was directed, via the Alachi

Karamna. Major-General Symons accom-
this
its
column
in
person.
Karamna should
have been reached on the 25th, for General Hammond was co-operating by holding the Aspoghar
heights on the right flank of the ist Brigade, and the
village of Alachi
much more
itself.
difficult
But the pass was found very
than had been anticipated, and
an endless string of camels encountered

interfering with the
Khyber
in the
march of the troops, soon
after
movement
they had started from their bivouac, the
was so much delayed that the whole of the transport

had to spend the night a la belle dtoile to the east of
the Alachi Pass, where, under the protection of the
Royal Sussex Regiment and the
Gurkhas it remained safe. The next morning it came on, all

well, to Karamna, and the same day the force
pushed on another three miles
ist
to Burg.
Opposition
was encountered throughout, and a few casualties

were sustained but the enemy were easily driven
;
off,
and considerable
loss
inflicted
Communication was now opened
upon
with
them.
the
left
column, and while, on the 27th, the bulk of the

troops stood fast at
Burg,
a strong detachment
under Lieutenant-Colonel Cafe, Royal Sussex Regi-
THE BAZAR VALLEY EXPEDITION
XIV
ment,
211
moved out towards Walai.to picquet the heights
and protect the flank of General Gaselee's brigade

during its withdrawal from China to Chora, already-
These picquets were attacked by the

Afridis, and lost three men killed, and an officer.
Lieutenant Julius, Royal Sussex Regiment, and four
described.
men wounded.
I
should mention here that from
Karamna
a road
Beg
leads via the Bori Pass to a place called Lala

in the
Khyber
Pass, not far from Landi Kotal.
Sir
William Lockhart had originally intended to join

the
ist
Brigade on his return from China, and
march with it to Ali Musjid by this route. But on

Christmas day General Symons, who had reached
Karamna
with the leading troops of the brigade

reconnoitred
comparatively early,
and the road leading over

difficulties
so
it,
Pass
and found the physical

animals
great for laden
William, on his report
Bori
the
knowing,
that
Sir
too, that there
was
Karamna
gave
up
the idea, and both columns eventually withdrew
from the Bazar Valley by the same route by which
great difficulty about water at
.
they had entered

division
it.
By
the 30th
was again concentrated
at
December the
Jamrud.
The
2nd Brigade returned without opposition, but the

I St Brigade was constantly engaged in skirmishes
more or less severe, and sustained some loss,
inflicting
total
more,
however, on
casualties in
the ist
the
enemy.
Division
operations in the Bazar Valley were
The
during these
one
British
THE CAMPAIGN
212
IN TIRAH,
officer,-'
six British soldiers,
killed
and one British
and seventeen native
While the
chap.
1897-98
and four native
soldiers
officer, thirty British soldiers,
soldiers
wounded.
Division had thus explored the
ist
Bazar Valley, General Hammond's column had proceeded, on the 26th
The
but,
to
Landi Kotal.
and gates of the serai were found
walls
intact
December,
inside,
the
all
buildings
had
to
be
been
wrecked, the roofs, the iron-work, the wood-work
removed or
either
burnt,
and stores carried

Captain Barton, the
to live,
had,
were a
ruin,
and
all
movable property
The quarters in which

Commander of the Levies, used
off.
and everything they contained
of course, been
piping of the water-supply was breached,

of the pipes carried
The
and many
destroyed or looted.
off,
but the great tanks about a
mile and a half below the Kotal, constructed at a

cost of three lakhs of rupees, 2,0,000,
had not been
Government have already decided to reKhyber wherever necessary,
touched.
build and repair in the
and Landi Kotal, being the most important point

on the
line,
the
work there
will
be put
in
hand
forthwith.
On
the 27th a reconnaissance was pushed from
Landi Kotal towards the Bori Pass, as Sir William

Lockhart wanted information about the state of the
road on the Khyber side as well as on the Bazar
side.
^
It
was soon ascertained
to
be quite imprac-
Lieutenant C. R. Tonga, R.E., killed by the premature explosion of a
dynamite charge.
REOCCUPATION OF THE KHYBER
XIV
213
passage of a brigade, as a portion of

through which the track ran was found to
ticable for the
the defile
be a winding passage,
in places only four feet wide,
flanked by perpendicular
cliffs.
General Hammond's troops were from
this
time
employed in working parties on the Fort, in foraging

and demolishing village defences of the Zakkakhels
all
which command the route throughout,

convoying supplies and material sent up from
ing the
and
in
along the line of the Khyber, in picquet-
hills
These seem
the base.
trivial duties
when
written
down, but they mean incessant work and watchfulness for those who have to execute them, surrounded,
as the whole locality
and
relentless
is,
enemy.
by a keen and enterprising

Encounters were, of course,
of daily occurrence, and every
On
would occur.
casualties
now and then
a few
the 30th December,
however, an engagement somewhat more serious
The
than usual took place.
Light
Infantry were
fired
picquets of the Oxford
and attacked
into
in
earnest while they were being withdrawn for the

day.
Three men were
(Lieutenant- Colonel
Lieutenant
Owen)
killed,
and three
Plowden, Captain
and
eleven
officers
Parr,
and
men wounded.
1 The forward picquet in the valley commenced to retire at 3.30. p.m., and
was joined by the section under Captain Parr, and also by the section from
the Buddhist tope, which latter retired as a 'support to the two former in
extended order.
After passing the Buddhist tope by about 250 yards a
volley was fired into them from the left rear and three men were wounded.
The sections then got under cover in a nullah on their left as they retired ;
two of the wounded who could walk were sent along the nullah to the medical
officer of the regiment, while the third was dressed by Colonel Plowden on
THE CAMPAIGN
214
News
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
of this misadventure was brought into Landi
Kotal at half-past five
in the
evening by a bugler of
Oxford Light Infantry, who galloped
the
in
on
Colonel Plowden's charger with a note asking for
General
help.
Hammond
once set out with
at
reinforcements, extricated the Oxfords
dilemma, and brought them

with
all
their
all
from their
safely into
camp,
dead and wounded.
The Ali Musjid picquets were attacked on the

same day, and as the attitude of the Zakka-khels
seemed to be now increasingly hostile, Sir William
Lockhart strengthened the force occupying the pass
by ordering the ist Brigade from Jamrud to Ali

Musjid, and reinforcing the Landi Kotal garrison
with the 45th Sikhs and the 4th Gurkhas.
It
may be mentioned
here that on the
30th
December, on which date the pass seems to have

Afridis, General Sir Havelock-
been alive with
AUan was
Sir
killed.
William
describes the sad incident in his

the spot, under cover from
rest retired,
and
fire.
in so doing
had
When all
the
Lockhart
Despatches
wounded had got
to cross a bit of
clear
thus
away the
open ground where Corporal
was hit in the head and killed on the spot. Colonel Plowden, Lieutenant
Owen, and Lieutenant Fielden dragged him away up the nullah, and all retired under cover of the banks until the nullah broke away on their left flank
and again exposed them to fire. Here Private Butler was hit in the leg, and
Captain Parr and Lieutenant Carter having dressed his wound, the lastnamed officer took him on his back and carried him across the exposed bit
of ground ; but in the middle of this Private Butler was again hit and killed.
Lieutenant Carter being knocked over by the force of the blow.
Fielden
then came to the rescue and both ofiicers got him under cover, while Colonel
Plowden and Lieutenant Owen carried Bell's corpse across the dangerous bit,
and were both wounded in doing so.
Special Correspondent of the
Bell
*'
Pioneer."
THE AFFAIR AT SHIN KAMAR
XIV
He
left
me at
215
my permission
Lala China (on the 2 8th), and with
proceeded to Landi Kotal, arrangements being made to provide
him with a sufiScient

December the 30th,
fortunately left his
escort.
deeply regret to report that on
be was returning to Jamrud, he unescort near Ali Musjid, and riding down a
as
Every precaution had

and on bidding him good-bye at
had impressed upon him the necessity of invariably
ravine by himself was shot by the enemy.
been taken to secure

Lala China I
his safety,
remaining with the troops detailed for his protection.
While these events had been taking place in the

Khyber and Bazar Valleys, the 2nd Division had
been enjoying a well-earned rest at Mamanai and
Bara and it would not have been necessary to
refer to its doings again but for a most unfortunate
affair in which the 4th Brigade was involved on
On that day an expedition was
the 29th January.
planned to surround, and capture if possible, the
Afridi flocks and herds, with their attendant guards,
which, it was reported, were brought down daily in
large numbers to graze on the Kajurai plain, a
locality due west of Bara, and enclosed on the north,
west, and south by low spurs from the main range
which separates the Bara and Bazar Valleys, To
effect this four columns were ordered out simultaneously on the 29th January one from Bara to
;
strike across the plain
due west
one from Jamrud,
and one from Ali Musjid, as " stops " on the northern
boundary
and one,
to
be furnished by the 4th
Brigade at Mamanai, to ascend the Shin
and block escape
in
Kamar Pass
a westerly direction.
Although the utmost secrecy was observed about
THE CAMPAIGN
2i6
this enterprise,
was
in
it
IN TIRAH,
may be surmised
some way conveyed
chap.
1897-98
that
news of
it
to the Afridis, for after a
weary tramp of many miles, the Ali Musjid, Jamrud,

and Bara columns returned to camp without seeing
The Mamanai column
anything or any one.

not fare so well.
Seppings,
King's
It
Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry,
and consisted of Colonel Sepping's own

200
rifles
did
was commanded by Colonel

battalion,
36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton, and
two guns of No.
The advance
(Bombay) Mountain
Battery.
of this force was, as usual, hardly
enemy but directly retirement

commenced they assumed a vigorous offensive, and
opposed by the
crowded
to attack with great boldness.
Owing
to a mistake in transmitting, or in receiv-
ing an order by Colonel Seppings, a
company of
the 36th was prematurely withdrawn from a com-
manding
knoll
the
to
west of the
pass.
This
vantage-ground was instantly seized by the Afridis,
and as a part of the force with Colonel Haughton
was at this time still down the far side of the pass,
where it had been sent to explore some caves about
a mile below the crest, it was imperative to reoccupy
it.
Two
Yorkshire Light
once,
gallantly
companies of the King's

Infantry
led
attacked,
Own
therefore,
at
by Lieutenants Dowdall and
Walker, and driving the enemy back, established

a footing on the knoll, but only to find themselves
confronted by scores of tribesmen in a
position about
still
stronger
50 yards farther back, and against
KAMAR
SHIN
29* January
1898.
The contours are only intended

to shew the lie of the ground
References.
A. 2 Co'^-" York
L.I.
B.
/ Co.
JS<^S/ks.
D.E.F.G.H.K. Positions occupied by Companies York
+
+ +
Spot where
Spot where
X-
Its.
L.I.
C. / Co.
York
L.I.
during successive retirements.
Dondall and Walker
Col Haughton and
Lt.
fell.
Turing
fell.
Crest of the Pass.
7d /jce paê 2//.
XIV
the hot
fire
delivered by these
range they could

third
short
at this
barely hold their ground.
company of the King's
Infantry,
men
217
Own
Yorkshire Light
Captain Ottley's, held a small knoll on
the east of the pass, and the whole were under the
command
Own
of Major Barter, King's
Yorkshire
Light Infantry.
In the meantime
Sikhs, had returned.
down
Colonel Haughton, with his
Sending three of his companies
the pass, he remained on the crest himself
with one company, and his adjutant,
Lieutenant
Turing, to support the retirement of the Yorkshire
Light Infantry, who were now ordered to withdraw
from the heights on the right and

companies on the
wounded, and so
left
But the two
left.
were now so encumbered by
by the enemy,
fiercely attacked
that compliance with this order
was almost impossible.
Colonel Haughton's company, and Captain Ottley's,

were, at this time, both engaged in keeping off a
body of tribesmen who were now assailing the

pass itself by a direct attack from the north and
an urgent message for help was therefore sent back
to the main body below at the foot of the pass.
A reinforcement under Major Earle, King's Own
fresh
Yorkshire Light Infantry, soon arrived, but in the
meantime
disastrous
had
casualties
Lieutenants Walker and Dowdall,

shire
Light
gallant
Infantry,
had been
occurred.
of the York-
killed
also
Haughton and Lieutenant Turing
many men
of the Yorkshires
had
been
the
and
struck
THE CAMPAIGN
2i8
IN TIRAH,
down.
Even
fighting
was desperate, and
Major
after
Earle's
at
chap.
1897-98
arrival
the
such close quarters
that the officers repeatedly used their revolvers with
But the Yorkshires
effect.
showed the utmost

though
they had
eventually brought
the
in this trying situation
and courage
resolution
abandon
to
away
their
been safely sent to the

occurred,
pass
Lieutenant
Infantry, being
among
and
they
wounded, and held
their
savage foe successfully at bay
clear of the fatal
dead,
until
all
had
Before they were
rear.
many more
Hughes,
casualties
Yorkshire
had
Light
the killed, and Major Earle,
Captain Marrable, and Lieutenant Hall, all of the

The total casualties
same regiment, wounded.
were twenty-seven killed and thirty-two wounded,
a heavy list indeed.
Two miles out of the pass the column was met
by General Westmacott, with reinforcements from
camp
and under cover of these troops Colonel

Sepping's exhausted force completed its homeward
;
march
in safety.
The
death of the brave Colonel Haughton in
this unfortunate affair, after
with such credit

perils of the
and fame
Samana
he had successfully, and

to himself, survived the
fights in
September, and the
desperate actions on the 9th and i6th November,

previously described, besides
all
the chances of an
arduous campaign, was an event most deeply and

universally lamented.
His courage was conspicuous
always, and his coolness and judgment were never
XIV
219
disturbed by the clash of arms and the scenes of

strife by which he was so often surrounded.
His men, as brave as himself, simply idolised him,
bloody
and
years
for
called him, will
to
come, Harton Sahib,
be a name
they
as
where
to conjure with
the 36th Sikhs are concerned.
An
officer
who was
present writes to
me
All fought well.

Haughton and Turing died like heroes.
Haughton, apparently, went forward with half-a-dozen men to see
what was going on on the
left,
and how he could
these was killed by his side, and as
enemy
the
rifle at this
We will
He fired
dropping
One
of
and
fast,
Haughton was himself using a
He
time to keep the enemy in check.
was no use,
"
men were
getting quite close, Turing proposed a charge, but was
almost immediately shot dead.
it
best help the
Turing followed with a couple of Sikhs.
Yorkshires.
fire
for turning to
evidently saw
a Yorkshireman near him, he
a few more shots, then charge, and die like
and then
five times,
fell,
said,
"
men
shot through the head.
and a braver man never lived. Turing was a splendid little

fellow, and the loss of these two officers is a terrible blow to the
better
36th.
no doubt the Yorkshires were in one of the tightest

and were very highly tried. But they
came out of it well. They were kept together, and well handled
by their officers, and fought like men. The grim work was all
new to them, for thiey had only just come up to the front, and
There
is
corners in the campaign,
none of them had been

of
lot
officers.
The
in a fight before.
battalion
is
They must have a rare

now than it
a better battalion
was a week ago.
The
Sikhs also did well, as usual.
command when
and
well together.
were torn by
There
Young van Someren assumed
the others were killed, and kept his

It
was a great
trial
for him.
men
steady
His clothes
bullets.
is
little
else to record.
one time that this Shin
Kamar
was feared
at
would break
off
It
affair
THE CAMPAIGN
220
abruptly
all
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
negotiations for a peaceful settlement,
and necessitate
perhaps a resumption
of
active
But happily this has been avoided.

Throughout January, February, and March there
was outwardly little change in the attitude of the
operations.
by slow degrees they were
Afridi clans, but
realising
The
that they have been playing a losing game.
blow
to their prestige, the material losses they
suffered, the hardships they
endured,
and
above
all,
have
and their people have
the
determination
and
method and patience and judgment with which

them by
Sir William Lockhart these have all been powerful
factors in convincing them that to prolong the
struggle was only to prolong their own misery, to
weaken themselves permanently, and to make their
the operations have been directed against
:
punishment
in
the end severer, and their abase-
ment more complete.

Influenced,
no doubt, by these considerations,
convinced of our determination and our power to

enforce our
will,
and dreading a second invasion
in
come
in
the spring, one section after another has
and tendered
its
submission, and finally even the
Zakka-khels, the most truculent and redoubtable of
them
all,
have
at last
climbed down, and paid
and rifles
There can be no question that
fines
in the
demanded from them.

this
happy
result,
by which further bloodshed is avoided, is in the

main due to Sir William Lockhart's own personal
influence
amongst these wild
tribes
on the border.
XIV
To many
men he
of their leading
is
221
known
well
For years past he

has been a tower of strength on the frontier.
His
patience, and judgment, and firmness in dealing
with these Afridis during these long and weary
weeks, since we emerged from the Bara Valley,
by
he
all
is
liked
have not been
and
less
respected.
conspicuous than his energy and
decision while active operations were in progress.
And
that
do
they
if
it,
knew him
for a
he was compelled
and would
man
of his word, and
to strike again,
felt
he would
strike hard.
Well, that necessity has been happily avoided,
and no more convincing evidence of Sir William

Lockhart's personal share and dominant influence
in
achieving a peaceful end to the
negotiations
could be cited, than the extraordinary fact that
when
released at last from duty on the 5th April, and
about to start from Peshawar for England, to enjoy

a much-needed change and some well-earned repose,
crowds of
Afridis,
four or
five
hundred
at
least,
with Zakka-khels in numbers amongst them {mirabile dictu /),
surrounded his house,
wanted to hoist him on
cantonments,
their shoulders,
his carriage to the station,
and
with shouts and cheers that
vowing
in
that in future they
and drag
finally sent
made
him
the welkin ring,
would be the friends of
the English, and fight on their side
Surely no
campaign had ever such a remarkable ending

I
off
cannot do better than close this narrative with
an extract from Sir William Lockhart's
final
De-
THE CAMPAIGN
222
spatch,
and a copy of
his
chap.
1897-98
farewell
order to the
He writes
troops.
I wish to record
my
high appreciation of the conduct of
and Native troops serving with the Tirah Expedi-
the British
tionary Force.
losses
IN TIRAH,
Up
to the present
date (26th January) their
have amounted to 1050 killed and wounded.
They have
been subjected to great hardship and exposure, harassed at

night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and
engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on
picquet and in guarding foraging parties have been particularly
Hardly a day or night has been passed without

and whether we advanced or retired, every soldier had
to be constantly on the alert against enemies who made no stand
in the open, but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen.
The operations were carried out in a country which offered every
natural advantage to the tribesmen, and imposed on the regimental officers, and the rank and file, the necessity for individual
onerous.
casualties,
initiative,
unremitting watchfulness, and personal activity.
glad to say that the troops responded nobly to the call
them.
Cheerful and soldier-like under exceptionally trying
men have upheld
cumstances, officers and

traditions
of their
corps
am
made upon
to the utmost
cir-
the
and the honour of Her Majesty's
Army.
The
following was Sir William Lockhart's fare-
well order to the Force
TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ORDERS BY GENERAL SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.,

COMMANDING.
Camp Peshawar,
^th April 1898.
Special Order.
On
command of the Tirah Expeditionary

about to be reduced to a single Division, I thank
the work which, through their bravery and devotion,
relinquishing the
Force, which
all
ranks for
is
has been successfully accomplished in the past six months.
XIV
From
223
the beginning of October to the middle of January the
Force was engaged in active operations, and seldom have troops
been called upon to undergo greater

vigilant
and
wet, harassed
by distant
meet a more
fatigue, or to
After long marches in cold and
enterprising enemy.
rifle-fire
and by
assaults at close quarters,
the columns bivouacked in positions which had to be protected by
numerous strong picquets posted on commanding
heights,
and
those picquets were always liable to determined attacks, and to

molestation in withdrawal.
for the force, the
generally
most
There was,
in fact, little or
carefully chosen
open to long-range
fire
no
rest
camping-ground being
from scattered individual marks-
men, armed with the most accurate weapons.

The boast of the tribes was that no foreign army, Moghal,
Afghan, Persian, or British had ever penetrated, or could ever
penetrate their country
and being
for
but, after carrying three strong positions,
weeks subsequently engaged in daily skirmishes,
the troops succeeded in visiting every portion of Tirah, a fact
which
will
ruined
In
be kept alive in the minds of future generations by

and towers in their remotest valleys.
forts
this recognition
British
and Indian,
and Chiefs of
of the gallantry and devotion of
I include the contingents sent
all
ranks,
by the Princes
India, corps which have fought side by side with
the troops of the regular army, and have shared in the dangers
and hardships of the campaign.

For the past two and a half months the troops have been employed on the tedious duties of a blockade, and their discipline
during this period
I
is
deserving of high commendation.
congratulate the soldiers under
ful result
of the operations.
my command
on the success-
In no previous campaign on the
difficulties to be overcome been

none has the punishment inflicted on the
been more exemplary, or their submission more
North-West Frontier have the
more formidable
tribesmen
in
complete.
W. S. A. LocKHART, General,
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.
CHAPTER XV
TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDING NOTES
My
but
narrative of the campaign in Tirah
is
ended,
venture, before dismissing the subject, to add
made during the progress of the operations, which may be useful to soldiers of all ranks
should they, on some future occasion, find thema few notes
selves fighting
The
which
at the
first
on the north-west
essential
fact to
frontier of India.
be recognised
many of us did not fully

commencement of the campaign
I
think
one
appreciate
is
that the
them perhaps, but

the Afridis certainly) are now fairly well armed with
As to the means by which
the Martini-Henry rifle.
they have become possessed of these arms of precision there has been much discussion, and there is
tribes
still
on the
much
frontier (not all of
diversity of opinion.
Some
think they
Birmingham or Belgium, and

way via the Persian Gulf to the
Indian frontier some imagine that they are obtained
from the Amir's workshops in Cabul and some be-
are
exported from
thence find their

;
lieve that they are stolen in India,
and sold
for fancy
CH.xv
Probably from each of
prices across the border.
these sources the supply
soever they get them,
now
maintained
is
it
225
is
but,
whence-
certain that the Afridis
possess Martinis in large numbers, and have
besides an apparently unlimited stock of ammunition.
They
many
have, too, a good
of which
inflict frightful
Sniders, the bullets
shattering
wounds
and
the recent operations they obtained forty or
Lee-Metfords, and
in
fifty
made uncommon good use
of
them.
But not only have they got these arms of pre-
now
cision
in large
numbers, and not only are they
thoroughly expert as marksmen, but
borne
in
service,
also,
it
must be
mind, that hundreds of them enlist in our
and when they take
return to their homes, carry with
trained
by
them
all
the ex-
men who have been
perience and confidence of

carefully
and
their discharge,
British
and
officers,
have
marched, and often fought side by side with our
own
troops.
do not mean
that
familiarity
The
men
truth
is
cannot
for a
has in this
moment
case
bred contempt.
But these
probably far otherwise.
have
served in our
to imply
ranks without
acquiring an insight into our military system and

methods,'^
which
in the
day of
to turn to useful advantage.
that
we met amongst them
medalled pensioners, and

1
One
battle they are

I
it
several old
much
be-
was a common thing
of our best companies of Sappers and Miners
Afridis.
bound
have previously said
is
recruited from
THE CAMPAIGN
226
to find our drill-books
Urdu
It
editions
must
houses
these
the
and rugged
steep
tactics
that
Afridis,
be
to
they
are
Bred and born
mountaineers of the best type.
amongst
remembered, when considering
of fighting and
against
chap.
1897-98
and musketry regulations
in their deserted
also be
the conditions
employed
IN TIRAH,
and
and dark
hills,
dangerous ravines, inured to extremes of heat and

cold,
and
and accustomed from childhood

to
be on their guard against the wiles of the
treacherous kinsmen by
it
is
arms
to carry
whom
they are surrounded,
small wonder that they are hardy, alert,
reliant,
and
active, full of resource,
self-
keen as hawks,
and cruel as leopards.

Further,
it
is
be noted that their country
dangerous
cliffs,
country, therefore, in which
and
in
"manoeuvres," as
defined in
ravines,
while roads of
absence
strict " formations "
and
conspicuous by
any kind are
wild
defiles,
and rushing torrents everywhere
precise
is,
"stern and wild": high mountains,
like Caledonia,
precipitous
to
we
their
find
them described
our drill-books, are impossible
and
which marches must be performed under condiwhich they become slow, exhausting pro-
tions in
cessional
movements, the long
trailing
flanks
which are dangerously exposed to attack from
of
start
to finish.
The
in
difficulties
and dangers and
risks involved
waging warfare against such a

country
are
obvious.
In
former
foe
in
days
such
when
XV
237
expeditions have been launched against the tribes
on our
we have found them
frontier,
armed with
part
The extreme
Enfields.
most
for the
and a few Sniders and
jezails,
effective
range of the best
of these weapons was barely 1000 yards, so that
if
the flanks of a marching column were protected by
pushed out half a mile or
detachments
column was
up
to
But the Martini
fairly safe.
is
a mile, and the Lee-Metford up to two
particularly
when
the target
is
the
so,
effective
miles,
a mass of troops and
transport crowded into a river-bed, and covering

several miles of road.
Consequently, flanking de-
tachments must be pushed out to right and

a
full
left for
mile or more before safety can be assured.
Every march made in a country like Tirah is practically a march through a defile from beginning to
end.
The
road followed
the river-bed.
This valley
times narrower
is
generally
manded throughout by the
may be
the bottom of the valley,
is
sometimes wider, somenarrower, and
hills
imagined, then, what
on
toils
is
com-
either side.
It
are involved to
the troops, what delays, and what risks in crowning
these successive heights during even a short march

of eight or nine miles.
Yet no advance can be made

thus
made
safe.
until the flanks are
The enemy, who know
every inch
of the ground, occupy the summit of every com-
manding
knoll
with
great
skill,
intrench or sangar themselves.

is
and
invariably
A company or two
sent up the bare and rugged slopes to dislodge
THE CAMPAIGN
228
them.
It is
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
bravely done, but not without incurring
The enemy retreat higher up the

mountain side. The lower spurs are now held by our
men. The column passes on, more positions in succasualties.
cession being captured in like
manner as
it
advances,
by other detachments, from the advanced -guard.
At
the rear -guard comes in sight, probably
last,
hotly engaged with

following
if
it
possible,
The
boldly, eager for plunder,

to secure
a much-prized
flanking detachments are
now one
rifle
is
or two.
after another
It is
during
withdrawal that the greatest risks are run.
down
watchers above swoop

all
in
at once.
favour of their guerilla
know every
dip and break in
are
and anxious,
withdrawn, and join the rear-guard.

this
who
skirmishing bands,
The
The ground
tactics,
and they
Two
or three
it.
They cannot be left behind

They must be
to the tender mercy of the Afridi.
Four men are thus at once put out of
carried.
action to each man wounded and as many groups as
there are wounded men are immediately formed, to
soldiers are
wounded.
become
excellent targets to the pursuing
Let any one
and he
will
enemy.
try to picture this scene to himself,
have some
faint idea of the stern reality,
of the pluck and devotion of the men, of the cool-
ness and judgment of the
ance and hardihood of
officers,
all,
and of the endur-
which enable them, not
once or twice, but repeatedly, and day after day, to

face such situations with resolution,
from them with success.
and to emerge
XV

Regiments new
which have
attack
and
to this
229
savage mountain warfare,
only practised drill-book methods of
themselves seriously
retirement, find
handicapped when brought suddenly face to face

with the conditions
The
have described.
drill-
book makes no allowance for wounded men who

must be picked up as they fall, and carried along by
their
comrades
which the
nor does
is
certain to
units as
presuppose a terrain
activity of a goat
individual soldier,
pany
it
it
is
in
necessary for the
moving over which a combe broken up into almost as many

and
in
The
has men.
drill
moreover,
-book,
apparently assumes a slow and dignified pursuit on

the part of the enemy, and accordingly directs that
" retirements should usually
time" and
moving from cover

must be maintained "
upright position
drill-book
it is
if
was not written
the guide for us
all
in quick
to cover
!
iii
an
But the
for frontier fighting.
in India, as
Yet
England, and
these are the only methods constantly practised on
cantonment parade-grounds,
to
be performed
that " in
shake them
off at a
it
must be impossible
moment's
notice,
and
it
is
small wonder that across the border the attempt to
do so does not always lead
As
a matter of
fact, it
to satisfactory results.
was found
in practice in
Tirah, that while in attack, an advance could not
be too
deliberate, in order to prevent scattering
and
exhaustion, and to give time for echelons in support

to close up,
developed,
and
the
movements to be
way of making an enemy
for out-flanking
surest
THE CAMPAIGN
230
quit
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
movements had frequently to

otherwise the enemy would be
in retirement,
be made at a run,
on the top of the retreating skirmishers before they
had made good
their point.
The Pathan
of the present generation seems quite
have given up the practice of charging sword
to
As
which he was once famous.
in hand, for
the
quantity and quality of their firearms have increased
The
the necessity for close combat has diminished.
clansmen find
it
now more
is
easy,
and much
less
dangerous, to shoot you from behind a rock several
hundred yards away, than to rush
and
in
with a sword,
you by cutting you down.
try to slay
Also,
the hill-man, despite his fierce nature and fanaticism,
has the
bump
of caution very highly developed, and
never takes risks that he can avoid.
Consequently,
so long as even a few men, well-posted, are lying
down, and
firing steadily at him,
of coming on
and
those regiments
it
was the
who knew
he
is
extremely shy
practice, therefore, with
the business best, in a
retirement, to cover the withdrawal of companies

selected
men, who
company was
and then
fired
established in
rising
all
by
independently until their

its
new
together after a
position in rear,
raced
final volley,
back to their support, and invariably got
away
safely
before the Afridis realised that they had gone.^

1
" The 29th
of
December was a
particularly hard
rear-guard, and the enemy, apparently

us, followed us
up very
these rear-guard actions,
boldly.
We
and had only
knowing
it
was
day.
We
their last
have got very cunning by
were the
chance at
this
time at
fifteen casualties (I believe there
one or two in other regiments as well) as the
result of
were
being chased for several
TACTICAL LESSONS AND CONCLUDINC NOTES
XV
231
In attack, on the other hand, great deliberation was

enjoined.
were directed not to lead too
Officers
quickly, but to regulate the pace
by the
difficulties
of the ground and the condition of their men, the

great
being to maintain a steady advance
object
without getting scattered or unduly separated from

All "attack formations," as laid
supports.
down
in
the drill-book, are, of course, entirely inapplicable to
To
hill-fighting.
attack a position on a mountain
top an extended line of skirmishers used to lead the

officer
followed
its
always with them, and each company
way, an
own
skirmishing
extended, but with
companies followed
more
files
well
opened
closely in support,
Great depth
or less in echelon.
not considered necessary, as

hours by the Zakka.
section,
it is
That does not sound
itself
not
Other
out.
and generally
in attack
was
in civilised warfare,
dignified, but
it is
exactly
what
The way we have found most paying to conduct these retirements

follows
The rear-guard is formed in successive lines, one behind the
happened.
is
as
other, each
line
on the most suitable
of a ridge.
When
the
bit of
moment
ground possible, generally the
crest
to retire begins the line nearest the
enemy doubles straight down as fast as it can past the other lines and takes
up a position behind the rearmost one. The line immediately behind the
These beggars move so fast
retiring line covers the movement by its fire.
over this country that the only practical method is, when once a retirement
is
begun, for the retiring
men
to run like hares, otherwise
one gets
caught in the undesirable position of having one's back to the enemy.

time
when
things begin to be serious
is
when one
The
or two are hit between the
For many reasons it is

time of leaving a position and reaching the next line.
wounded men behind, as would be done in
impossible to leave dead or
European warfare, and a retirement through this country, which is quite

difiBcult enough for an active man to get over unhampered, is, when there are
This has been
several wounded men to be helped along, not all joy.
pretty nearly the only sort of fighting we have had ever since the Sampagha
was taken, and we none of us love it ; the chances are very one-sided, and the
enemy know this just as well as we do. " Extract from a Utter from an
Officer
in the Derbyshire Regiment.
THE CAMPAIGN
332
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
an enveloping attack was
but the importance of
not to be over-estimated.
Directly the tribesmen
thought there was the slightest danger to their flank

or line of retreat, they were
As
off.
never await a
a general rule the Afridis
charge, but
if
ever a position
and must be carried by
is
stubbornly held,
assault, there is
no doubt
that the whole of the troops in the front line should
charge together, their supports following
send them forward

disastrous.
fully
Up
on the 20th October.
To
detachments or driblets
in
This was
close.
is
exemplified at Dargai
Gordons
arrived no attempt to cross the decisive zone had
been made by any body of troops larger than a
company at a time. These detachments suffered
to the time the
such terrible losses in crossing the fire-swept space
up at the next cover they reached.

Gordons
charged, they sallied out, with
the
the 3rd Sikhs in close support, practically all in one
mass.
The enemy saw
That ended the affair.
they were not to be denied, and they evacuated
that they pulled
When
the position in which for several hours they had

defied a whole brigade.
Dargai was
Afridis
attack.
made a
the
only
resolute
instance
in
which the
stand against a serious
Their losses on that occasion were probably
more heavy than we supposed
at
the time, and
taking the lesson to heart, they did not again during

the campaign attempt to meet us in the
field,
or to
defend, with any appearance of being in earnest.
XV
233
even such strong positions as the Sampagha and
Arhanga
But
Passes, or the heights of Saran Sar,
one must beware against being
any
lulled into
sense of superiority or security by the small
false
resist-
ance offered to an advance, or by the ease and

loss
trifling
with which
immensely strong
such
The tribesmen's tactics are not

dictated by timidity.
They do not know what fear
means.
But they have plenty of common sense,
and conscious that they cannot stop us if we really
mean to come on, they quietly fall back as we
positions are won.
advance, and patiently await their turn, which they
know
will
That
come
as soon as
instant they
we
begin to
assume the
retire.
offensive.
Where
men have been seen before, they

now appear in dozens. The rapidity of their movements now is quite extraordinary and their marksonly three or four
manship and the skill with which they skirmish

from rock to rock, availing themselves of every
of ground, and
feature
work round the
constantly threatening to
flanks, are marvellous.
successfully before such an
coolness
and judgment.
enemy
If there
To
retire
requires great
is
any mistake
made, or any sign of hesitation or wavering,

instantly taken advantage
where
may
all
of,
and
was going well the minute
in
it
is
a moment,
before, disaster
ensue.
So much moral elation pertains

assailant, and so much depression
soldier
who
to the rdle of
to
that of the
has constantly to defend himself against
THE CAMPAIGN
234
IN TIRAH,
attack, that, with all Orientals,
the
hills
or plains,
whether dwellers
most necessary
is
it
chap.
1897-98
assume a
to
vigorous offensive whenever opportunity
and
offers,
In a great standing camp,
whatever are the odds.
however, such as we had for some weeks

it
in Tirah,
was unavoidable that we should constantly
afford
we
the Afridis the opportunity of attacking, while
were compelled
to
in
assume a defensive
Because,
role.
every day our foraging parties, strongly escorted by
never
less
than a brigade, with
far a-field to collect fodder
to
camp by sunset
had
artillery,
and
go
to
supplies, returning
and on these occasions they
were invariably followed up by the enemy, who

were, no doubt, as invariably beaten
off.
the time being they attacked while
we
defended,
and hardly a day passed without a few

being sustained in
One
fighting
is
or
this
casualties
most trying kind of warfare.
point that must strike every one where

is
for
Still
in question,
hill
whether attack or defence,
the great difficulty of exercising superior control
supervision.
dozen gallopers
at his disposal,
they are useless.
men on
foot,
General
may have
half
but on such ground
Messages must be carried by
and that takes a long time.
times, but not always, they can

difficulty, therefore, in
Some-
be signalled.
transmitting orders
is
The
extreme,
them executed, or in learning what is happening, is often serious enough to

make a commander desperately anxious. It is most
and the delay
necessary,
in getting
therefore,
for
every
officer
to
know
XV
beforehand what
when
the "general idea," so that even
is
and without
isolated,
gently co-operate.
will
company and
unlimited
scope
and
initiative
The
section
the
control
they display at
orders, he
may
intelli-
In no other kind of warfare
for
may depend upon
commanders
find
exercise
individual
of
such
and much or everything
the judgment and decision which
moments.
critical
camps and bivouacs by night

subject on which a few words may be usefully
safety of
Here, too,
the
235
drill-book,
admirable as
maxims, was not of much help

the fact that the Afridis
now
to us
and
is
said.
are
its
here, too,
possess long-ranging
arms of precision compelled the posting of picquets

outside the
found
camp
necessary
at distances far
previous
in
exceeding anything
expeditions.
One
great source of annoyance and loss to the troops in
Tirah was the
known
was
firing into
as " sniping "
to hold
all
camp by
night, vulgarly
and the only way
to stop
it
surrounding commanding points,
within a range of 1500 yards to a mile, by strong
Even
picquets.
marauders would get

the camp, and
on dark
then,
make
in
it
of
whom
prowling
between the picquets and
extremely unpleasant for us
while their ammunition lasted

turn, they
nights,
or until, in their
were stalked and ejected by the Scouts,

shall
speak presently.
But as regards the picquets themselves, it may

be noted that their strength was always such that
they were independent of support, which, indeed,
THE CAMPAIGN
236
on a dark
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
and over ground which was a network of precipices and ravines, it would have been
night,
impossible to send to them.
For the same reason
the picquets were always instructed to fight where
they stood, and never under any circumstances to
attempt to
back on the camp.
fall
The
positions
enemy
These posi-
occupied by them were generally held by the
when we marched on
tions
were
at
to the ground.
Half a
once attacked and captured.
company, or a whole company, was then

picquet to hold each of them, or as
left
many
of
as a
them
as were considered necessary, and the rest of the
troops were at once withdrawn.
The
picquets then
promptly intrenched themselves strongly, and placed

such
round their posts as they could
obstacles
They quite understood that they had

only their own watchfulness and efforts to depend
upon to see them safely through the night. They
improvise.
were often
their
few
fiercely attacked,
ground
casualties,
successfully,
but they always held
and generally with very
and there was no instance during the
campaign of a picquet being overpowered.

sentries
The
Their
were always placed inside the intrenchment.
rest of the
men
slept
on
their alarm-posts.
Patrolling of any kind in the night was, of course,

entirely out of the question,
I
and was never attempted.
have more than once
in
the course of this
narrative referred to the splendid services of the

Artillery.
We
and the way
in
had
six
Mountain Batteries with
us,
which they were handled, the pre-
XV
cision of their
237
and the wonderful effect of it,

were the admiration of all onlookers. At Dargai
on the 1 8th and 20th October, and at the attacks
fire,
on the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, the batteries

were massed, and their fire concentrated, with
marked
But, speaking generally,
effect.
and remem-
bering that these guns can follow infantry over almost
any ground, greater effect can usually be obtained

by dispersion of the guns, and by splitting up even
a single battery to work by sections.
An officer of
great experience with mountain artillery writes to
me
as follows
My
push on a couple of guns, with the infantry,

and ridge which they occupy, under cover of the
fire of those in rear, and then to push the rear-guns on in turn
(by sections), spreading them over the whole line of advance,
and so firing on the sangars from many directions instead of
directly from one only.
In country such as we have been fighting in, I never work my six guns together if I can help it.
By
splitting them up good positions are more readily obtained, the
guns afford a smaller mark to the enemy, they can be more easily
and rapidly pushed forward, or withdrawn, under cover of each
other's fire, and their converging fire from different directions is,
I feel sure, more effective against a strong position than the concentrated fire of double the number of pieces firing directly from
one spot.
In advanced-guard work two guns can always be safely kept
with the most advanced infantry, and in rear-guard affairs with
But in either case, a whole battery is
the most hotly pressed.
too big a unit to be worked thus in the fighting line in hill waridea
is
to
to every height
fare, for it
am
takes too long to advance, or retire
it,
as a whole.
a firm believer in our present gun, the
2. 5 -inch,
for
mountain battery work, provided the gun is new, and not old or
worn out.
I have seen it now in Burmah, Hazara (1891),
THE CAMPAIGN
238
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
Samana (1891),
Chitral (1895), and in Tirah, and have been

with ray present battery for ten years, so can speak with some
The gun shoots as straight as' a

and never gets out of order if new at
the commencement of a campaign.
It stands any amount of
knocking about, and throughout the Chitral and Tirah expeditions my artificers seldom had to put a hand to gun or
confidence of
little
up
die
its
merits.
to all useful ranges,
carriage.
cannot help asking why every one
during an expedition
set to
work
to abuse
it
and why,
full
is
as soon as
it
is
of
its
over,
in the papers or elsewhere ?
praises
do they
They
say
knock down sangars. They started saying this after the

Malakhand in 1895. But the sangers there were enormous
natural boulders which a 40 -pounder could not have moved
it
can't
Personally, I never try to demolish sangers.
men
I try to
kill
the
and it is on record that we did this with some

On the 14th September 1897 we
success at the Malakhand.
brought down the Tsalai tower with two percussion shrapnel,
inside them,
and sent the stones of the Saragheri sangars flying high in the
Firing at houses in Maidan and Bagh, our shells would go
through the walls, and burst inside, which is exactly .what is
wanted; and on two occasions we set buildings ablaze by our
air.
fire.
These are some of my reasons for my faith in the gun. I

If we get both in
have no belief in the outcry for a howitzer.
the same battery, the Lord help us
Lastly, why are we constantly kept to roads, and then
pitched into for taking up so much room? and offered many
useless and impossible suggestions for reducing the number of
our mules? We claim that we can go wherever an infantry
soldier can, so long as he does not go on his hands and knees.
Many Generals and Staff Officers do not realise this, and so we
!
many chances.
One last, word: there is one first principle which wants to
be widely known and strictly observed by all, but more especilose
ally
by
battery
Staff Officers.
when
speak to the
his
man
It is this
guns are in
at the wheel.
to the CO. of a
any more than you would
Dorit speak
action,
They
all
do
it
and
had
to
lUI \-
111]
\\\
\I
ki \I
vd, Siuila
Aiigcs 23S
and
239.
XV
TACTICAL LESSONS. AND CONCLUDING NOTES
explain, firmly to
me
one man who assailed
with suggestions,
that with only four guns I really could ^jf^fire at

different objects'
at.
one and the same time
239
more than
six
The, Gurkha Scouts have been so often mentioned, and have been so much in evidence, during
the campaign in Tirah, that a few remarks on their
organisation and
work
will
be appreciated.
They
men
of the
included a body of about 120 picked

5th -Gurkha
3rd and
under Capta:in
Regiments,
Lucas of the 5th Gurkhas
and Lieutenants, the

Honourable C. G. Bruce, 5th Gurkhas, and A. B,
Tillard, 3rd Gurkhas, specially trained to work on
;
the steepest hill-sides, and selected for their wiry
physique, fleetness of foot, and
Their careful preparation
skill
as
marksmen.
had made
in peace-time
them hardy, active, intelligent, self-reliant, and

resolute, and throughout the expedition, under
the bold leading of their
by
spicuousf
officers,
they were con-
dash and daring, both
their
in attack
and defence.
The
and
Scouts wore the uniform of their regiments,
their
of the regular soldier,

affairs,
and
when they
stalk,
ing the
no respect from that

except when engaged in night
equipment differed
sallied out
and cut
camp
by themselves
off "snipers,"
feat
On
went barefooted, wore plain

just their rifles
who were
to try
harass-
which more than once they
successfully accomplished.
them
in
these occasions they
clothes,
and took with
and bayonets, a few rounds of
ammunition, and, of course, their knives
the
well-
THE CAMPAIGN
240
known
IN TIRAH,
kukri, without which the
chap.
1897-98
Gurkha never
stirs
from his bivouac.
That the
may be
appreciated
were
special services of these Scouts
the close of the
inferred from the fact, that at
phase of the campaign their
first
500 men and six officers,

Sir William Lockhart's particular recommenda-
numbers were increased

at
to
tion/
At
same time, as the special duties on which

they were employed were precisely those which in
the Peninsular days could have been undertaken by
the " Light Companies" which were then kept up in
every regiment, and to which it was an honourable
the
distinction to
it
be posted, the question arises whether
would not be a sound thing once more to introduce
the " light
company
"
company
is
all
and
dis-
course, in these days, one
theoretically " as
and
better,"
into every battalion,
Of
pense with Scouts.
good
as another,
if
not
are supposed to be equally trained to
But the experience
the highest pitch of perfection.
gained with these Scouts shows that specially selected
men, under specially selected

special conditions
officers,
can,
under
the harder the conditions

"go one better" than
stronger the argument
average
men
1
line
company,
to deal with
"During
in
the
the
which the physique of the
one point only
is
not equal
all
drawn from the 3rd and 5th

Being trained mountaineers and
the present expedition the Scouts
Gurkhas have proved
especially valuable.
accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb the most precipitous
hills, lie in
Sir
Wm.
ambush
at night,
and surpass the tribesmen
Lockhart's Despatches,
in their
own tactics. "
XV
And
through.
much
the spirit of emulation
abroad, and
now
is
such a powerful incentive
is
struggle for distinction, that
it
241
so
in the
seems worth con-
immense good might not be done,

and the fighting power of every battalion substantially increased, by reviving in each the old Light
Company, posting to it only picked men and officers,
training them highly and specially, and in return
granting them some small distinctions and privileges
sidering whether
in
time of peace, and posts of honour and danger in
time of war.
I
many
think
this idea
Amid
practical soldiers
would
like to see
taken up.
the clash of arms, the
hum
of camps, the
commotion of marches, and the turmoil of

Military- Medical
the great
Indian,
are apt to
of
chronicler
perhaps)
stirring
is
deeds
the earnest,
scant
whose
events,
rather
directed
British
Services,
receive
the
(naturally,
narrative
of
than to descriptions of
in the field
self-denying work
patient,
and
from
notice
attention
to
retreats,
of those
the sick.
up wounds and tend

But where so many pages have been
devoted to
telling the story of the fighting in Tirah,
whose business
it
to bind
is
and of the pluck and endurance of the troops
many
situations,
it
fitness of things that
made
to the
is
in
only in accordance with the
some
reference should also be
Medical Department during
campaign, whose work,
if it
this
arduous
has not been so
much
THE CAMPAIGN
242
in evidence, or so
stories of frays
do
"
IN TIRAH,
much noised
and
forays,
chap.
1897-98
abroad, as have the
and "deeds of derring-
of the soldiery, has at least entailed on those
much toil and exposure, and has been

performed with as much zeal and devotion to duty.
engaged
Few
in
it
as
people, probably, outside the Department,
have any conception of the
strain
and responsibility
devolved on the Medical Services, not merely during

the continuance and stress of active operations, but
also in the preparations necessary before an
ready to take the
Here
field.
use to help the imagination.
figures
army
may be
Twenty-three
is
of
field
were mobilised for service in

Each of these could accommodate 100
hospitals altogether
Tirah.
sick
men,
and was
and comforts
fully
for three
equipped with supplies
months.
In addition, base
Rawal Pindi, Nowshera,

and Kohat, in which beds were provided for
upwards of 3000 men.
These figures will give
some idea of the scale of the organisation. But the
wild, roadless country in which the operations were
hospitals
were formed
at
conducted enormously increased the
difficulties
with
making
arrangements for the care and treatment and transport of the wounded and sick.
From Bagh in Tirah
which the Department had to contend
to the
advanced base
five miles
at
Shinauri
is
in
about thirty-
by a track traversable only by mules and
For these thirty-five miles those

who were too ill or too weak to ride, and there
were hundreds such, had to be carried in doolies
ponies, or
on
foot.
XV
243
(palanquins) and stretchers, and strongly escorted

all
the way, for the road throughout was in hostile
territory,
except the
From
able
few miles.
last
Shinauri wheeled ambulances were availthe railway was
for seventy-five miles, until
reached at Khusalgarh, whence
was a run of
it
eighty miles to Rawal Pindi.

It
may
easily
be believed that the work of carry-
ing the wounded, and transporting them to the base
was a very
hospitals,
a:ny
time
even on
is
The
real difficulty.
dooly at
heavy, cumbrous, and awkward to carry,
level ground,
and when the bearers are
But when the roads are
trained carriers.
steep,
stony,
and narrow, and crowded with transport and
troops,
and when the bearers are wretched untrained
coolies,
caught up from the nearest bazaars,
pressed into an unwilling service
then
it
and
may be
imagined what delays and accidents ensue, and what

terrible sufferings
must often be endured by the
wounded from the

they get en route.
jolts,
and
When
and drops, that
jars,
an enemy
is
near,
and
bullets are whistling around, the doolies, with their
pale-green
flapping
canvas
covers, form
spicuous target, and are often hit
the panic-stricken
bearers are always ready to drop them, and
they
can
and
it
frequently
fly, if
happened that the
wounded, abandoned by the regular

be carried by their own comrades.
carriers,
ambulance system
R 2
had
to
One would much
like to see the dooly extinguished, but
the feature of our
con-
it
has been
in India for the
THE CAMPAIGN
244
IN TIRAH,
chap.
1897-98
hundred years, and no one seems to be able to
last
suggest an efficient substitute for
But
if
it.
the dooly bearers were bad, the riding and
baggage
supplied
ponies
to
hospitals
the
were
These are matters for which the Medical

Department is not responsible. They take what is
worse.
given them, and have no choice
and as the
strain
on the Commissariat Transport was extraordinary
so many expeditions being on hand

simultaneously the animals supplied
the Field
at
this
time
to
Tirah were of
Hospitals in
description,
and were
the
directly the
most wretched
cause of not
of the delays and losses incurred in marching
little
down
the Bara Valley, as rear-guards and escorts
were constantly stopped either to help animals that
had
fallen
and thrown
their loads, or to give
them
time to get along.
Complete reorganisation of the present system

of
ambulance
providing
seems
an
imperative
necessity.
men were treated in the Field

Tirah.-'
Of these the Gordons con-
923 wounded
Hospitals in
tributed 70, the Dorsets 80, the K.O.S.Bs. 34, the
Northamptons
55, the
Derbys
35,
the
Yorks
42,
the 3rd Sikhs 28, the 15th Sikhs 48, the 36th Sikhs
72, the 2nd Gurkhas 66, and the 3rd Gurkhas 40.
These were the principal figures. Other corps made
The
up the balance.
killed
was
as 3 to
^
Up
i.
wounded to
Germans in 1870-
proportion of
With
the
to the middle of January 1898.
XV
71
it
was as
5 to
The wounds were
I.
245
inflicted by-
sorts of rifles, Lee-Metfords, Martinis, Sniders,
all
and sporting
most
terrible of
One
those by the Snider being the
rifles,
all.
noticeable feature of the medical arrange-
ments which should be recorded was the use

the
first
Rontgen
time in the
They were found
rays.
for
events) of
field (in India, at all
of the greatest
value in locating bullets and splinters of lead.
apparatus was brought out (entirely at his
The
own
expense) and worked by Surgeon -Major Beevor,
A. M.S., to
whom
all
the credit of the innovation
is
due.
Numerous medical
deserved mention
The
officers
fully
their attention to the sick

hospital.
The
and of the Indian
and wounded, both under
consider that the field equipment
mountain warfare, and that
The conspicuous
very objectionable, as
it
attracts the
Principal Medical Officer in the
field,
indebtedness to him, and to the other
ment of which he has been

in
in
too heavy and elaborate
is
Surgeon-Major-General G. Thomson, C.B.,
efficiency
and
might be materially reduced
it
without hardship to the patients.
my
my
fire
hospital arrangements were generally excellent,
for
is
Staff,
maintained their high reputation by
but
canvas doolies
well-
Army Medical
of the
Despatches, in which also the
in
subjoined passages occurred

Medical Service, have
obtained
officers
which
it
in
and
colour of the
enemy's
I. M.S.,
fire.
has been
I desire to express
officers
of the depart-
charge, for the high state of
has been maintained, often under very
unfavourable conditions.
The P.M.O. speaks in high terms of

Major W. A. Morris, A.M.S.
The Commander-in-Chief
his Secretary, Surgeon-
in India, in
submitting
THE CAMPAIGN
246
Despatches
these
wrote
to
IN TIRAH,
the
chap, xv
1897-98
Government of
India,
The
administration of the Military-Medical Service has been
and satisfactorily carried on during the same period

by Surgeon-Major-General A. A. Gore, P.M.O., H.M.'s Forces in
successfully
India, through whose efforts, and the ready co-operation of officers

and subordinates, the Department has, at a time of pressing emergency, been able to comply with the heavy demands made
upon it.
The
extent of these
statement that
it
accommodation
demands may be best
from the
realised
was considered necessary to provide hospital
for 1 2 per cent of troops
and
On
followers.
6526 beds were made
this
fact that
available, including 36^^

The accuracy of this forecast may be gauged from the
on the 20th December 1897 the number of sick in
hospital,
then
basis
hospitals.
The
at
its
was 11.16 per cent of the
results obtained in the treatment of the sick,
in surgical cases of
1
highest,
field
wounds, have been most
Twenty-three of these for Tirah
and
force.
especially
satisfactory.
the remainder for other expeditions.
APPENDIX
The
subjoined
summary
of casualties
incurred
during
the Tirah Expedition will be of interest.
From
the I2tk. October 1897 to the 6th
Killed, all
Wounded
Missing
ranks
Apiil 1898
.287
-853
........
.
Total
10
.1150
British Officers
Killed: as per
Wounded:
list
as per
A
list
......
Native Officers
Killed, 4
wounded,
23
56
LIST
TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Nominal Roll of British Officers Killed during the Expedition
Rank.
LIST B
TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
fOMiNAL Roll of British Officers
Rank.
Wounded during the
Expedition
2S0
THE CAMPAIGN
LIST
Rank.
IN TIRAH,
"Z Continued
1897-g
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'W
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The Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898 - The British Empire

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WIwfa^U

Genf.ral Sir William Lockhart, G.C. B.

of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright

the United States on the use of the

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE

SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART,

BASED (by permission) ON LETTERS CONTRIBUTED TO

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN INDIA

WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS

COMMANDER OF THE TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY

of the Tirah Expedition

gives an accurate account of the operations, and

be found a readable account.

interest will certainly

plans which accompany

excellent illustrations, for which

Quartermaster-General for Intelligence, LieutenantColonel C. Pulley, commanding the 3rd Gurkha

which they were themselves

has not been part of

reference to the frontier policy of the

" Quot homines, tot sententics."

could be more striking than the fact that on this

men whose knowledge

great Imperial question,

the subject, and experience, are equal, hold opinions

even to approach the

has recently attracted so

the story of a campaign, endeavoured to state so

of facts which are notorious as

the general reader to form his

Afridis and their Grievances

Preparations, and the Plan of Campaign

The Capture of the Sampagha

Affair of the 9TH November

Terms to the Orakzais

Affair of the i6th November

MAPS AND PLANS

Plan of the Actions at Dargai,

8th and 2oth

Outline Sketch of the Dargai Heights

Plan of the Action at the Sampagha Pass

Plan of the Action at the Arhanga Pass

Plan of the Picquets on the Arhanga Pass

Plan of the Action at Shin Kamar

The Camp at Shinauri

Dargai, \Zth October 1897

down, and the road

Gurkhas streamed across the

evening the casualties were

"Sir William Lockhart

proaches to the pass

The Mastura Valley.

" Strings of mules go out every day, with sufficient

in the evening laden

however, rallied bravely round their

The Dwatoi Defile

3th the march was resumed "

mountain guns again

A company of the Queen's, led by Lieut.

" Every house in this valley

search party found the bodies the next day"

" Sir William Lockhart received