Civil Pro Cases-Jurisdiction

[G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003.]

SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and ELIADA
GALDIANO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA VALDEZ, Respondents.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to reverse the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 3 ("DARAB") which reversed the Decision 4 of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office ("MARO") in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon ordered
the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the
land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also awarded the same
segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano.
The Facts
The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property in Poblacion
(formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Atty. Manuel D. Cab ("Cab") is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan
del Sur with an area of 125,804 square meters ("Cab Property"). The Cab Property is covered by OCT
No. P-5638 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab Property is traversed by the Butuan to
Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal building of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the
lot occupied by the municipal building. 5
In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel ("Atuel") as administrator of the Cab Property.
Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez ("Valdez") arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte.
Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to
Valdez. 6 On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a "Lease of Improved Agricultural Land" under
which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property for P300.00 per year for two years.
In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel ("Spouses Atuel") and the Spouses George
and Eliada Galdiano ("Spouses Galdiano") to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property.
The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on this 2,000-square
meter lot ("Subject Lot").
On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the town plan of
the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of the
Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded that
Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same.
On 2 October 1988, responding to Cabs letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that
Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated.
The MARO added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation
Patent No. A-159969 was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion ("PD 27 Land") of the Cab
Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdezs emancipation
patent. Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law lessee,
not a tenant. 7 Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct
an investigation regarding the petition. 8
On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ("HLURB") approved the Town
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified
the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining portion as institutional and park or open
space.
On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez ("Spouses Valdez") filed a complaint
9 for "Recovery of Possession with Damages" with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez alleged that the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano "stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion of
the above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less." The Spouses Valdez claimed

that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused "to restore
possession of the said portion of land" to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez
possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as
well as unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages.
In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no
cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator
of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon Cabs instruction
and consent, they had been occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez
leased a portion of the Cab Property in 1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed
out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no
dispossession to speak of.
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation patent issued to
Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab
Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential,
hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27. 10
On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision which
disposed of as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to segregate the
TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and award the same to the
respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 11
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB
Central Office. The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory
rights of the complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and
(2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer)
concerned to assist the parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents for
whatever improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to be paid by the complainants.
SO ORDERED. 12
Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review 13 with
the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central
Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to
the Municipality of Sibagat. 14
Hence, the instant petition.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation
patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision should be respected because it enjoys the
presumption of regularity.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo 15 where this
Court held that upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the land.
The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v. Macaraeg 16 is applicable. In
Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his
property. However, "once a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to
agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or
with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very
essence of a leasehold agreement." Otherwise, the Court added, "it would be easy to subvert, under the
guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily
credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry." 17
The Issue

After a review of the issues raised, 18 the question boils down to whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled
to seek redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano but on
an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs
lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of
possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the
Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction. 19 The Court has discretion to determine
whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 20
In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are
farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot.
The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite repeated demands, 21 the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. 22 The
Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and
restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them and the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 23 this Court ruled:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it,
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of the MARO, 24
indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter
Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise
the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v.
Torres, 25 this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession or accion
publiciana, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. . . . 26
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the
parties. 27 This Court held in Morta, 28 that in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute,
it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
. . . 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, Et. Al. v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 30 that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as
amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is
defined as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to be the
owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim
ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA
No. 6657. 31 The instant case is similar to Chico v. CA, 32 where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since
the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should not have taken cognizance of the
Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in
a court of general jurisdiction. 33 Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve . . . possession of real property." 34 However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside
of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property. 35 Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the
Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any
emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the
emancipation patent as part of their affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well
settled that the jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 36
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties. 37 The active participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest
jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot
disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action. 38 The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties. 39
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal
or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity. 40 Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in
the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised
by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and
the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
MAROs Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARABs Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 133365. September 16, 2003.]

PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. JOSE M. PANLILIO, Respondent.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January
15, 1998 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which ruled that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Consequently, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the consolidation of
Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
. . . We also leave it to the respondent Judge to decide whether he will return Civil Case No. 96-635 to
Branch 146 or keep it in his docket but should he opt for the latter, he should act on it as a separate case
from Civil Case No. 94-1634.
WHEREFORE; the petition is partially granted and the assailed Orders dated July 23, 1996 and
September 17, 1996, allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634 and
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the
consequent complete severance of the two (2) cases. 2
The facts follow:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On April 27, 1994, petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez.
Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634.
On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment 3 by
default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual
damages of P359,621.03 with legal interest, P50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit.
On February 10, 1995, a writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila
Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon
and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
On June 2, 1995, private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 941634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over
her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already
delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million.
On June 9, 1995, the trial court denied Panlilios motion for intervention:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Submitted for resolution is Jose M. Panlilios Motion for Intervention dated May 31, 1995.
This Court has to deny the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that
the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
action. 4
On January 29, 1996, the trial court declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the
conduct thereof.
On May 3, 1996, Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary
attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was
raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 5 In the meantime, Panlilio again
attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to
consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
On June 13, 1996, Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on
condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not
object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the
two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge
Diokno but its motion was denied.
On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, among
others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and
Civil Case No. 94-1634.
In a decision dated January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge
Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in
his docket and decide it as a separate case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that Civil
Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998.
In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil
Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of
the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
We disagreee.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. 6 In general, jurisdiction
may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or
over the issues framed in the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. 7 Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the
time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person.
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the
regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently
annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
"Jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority
to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions
arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the
case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62
the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a
separate case in his own sala.
Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno
decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and
the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition less in its
docket.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case No.
94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it wasted
the precious time not only of the parties but also of this Court.
All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 142595. October 15, 2003.]

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL, Petitioner, v. JESSE CACHOPERO, Respondent.
In the instant appeal by petition for review on certiorari, 1 petitioner Rachel Cachopero Celestial assails
the February 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45927, "Jesse C. Cachopero
v. Regional Executive Director of DENR, Region XII and Rachel C. Celestial," which reversed and set
aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18 dismissing
respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and mandated the Regional Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII to process the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of respondent Jesse Cachopero in DENR Claim No. XII-050-90 to
which petitioner filed a protest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Plan No. (XII-6)-1669) with the Bureau of Lands covering
a 415 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the
Salunayan Creek in Katingawan, Midsayap.
In his MSA, respondent alleged that he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built a
residential house and introduced other improvements.
Petitioner filed a protest against respondents MSA, claiming preferential right over the land subject
thereof since it is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential house situated at Lot No. 2586G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, Poblacion 8, Midsayap.
Following an ocular inspection, the Bureau of Lands, finding the land subject of respondents MSA to be
outside the commerce of man, dismissed petitioners protest and denied respondents MSA, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the ocular inspection, it was verified that the land in dispute with an area of 415 square meters was
formerly a part of the Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation
canal by the National Irrigation Administration. However, it was certified by Project Engineer Reynaldo
Abeto of the said office in his certification dated May 19, 1982, that only a portion of the same containing
an area of 59.40 square meters more or less was taken as part of the National Irrigation Administration
service road. It was also ascertained that the P20,000.00 residential house wherein Jesse Cachopero and
his family are living is not within the 69-meters width of the national highway. However, per the
certification of the local office of the District Engineer for Public Works and Highways, the government
may need the area where the house stands for expansion in the future. Moreover, it was also certified by
the Office of Municipal Mayor that the whole area covered by the miscellaneous sales application of
Jesse Cachopero is needed by the municipal government for future public improvements.
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the subject land is outside the commerce of man and therefore,
not susceptible of private acquisition under the provision of the Public Land Act. However, in keeping with
the policy of our compassionate society in tilting the balance of social forces by favoring the
disadvantaged in life, we may allow Jesse Cachopero to temporarily occupy the land in dispute, after
excluding therefrom the portion needed for the existing right of way being claimed by Rachel Celestial to
be [the] only adequate outlet to the public highway until such time that the land is needed by the
government for expansion of the road.
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that this case, be, as hereby it is, dismissed and this case (sic), dropped from
the records. The Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse Cachopero is hereby rejected and in
lieu thereof, he shall file a revocable permit application for the land in question after excluding from the
southern part of the land the area of five (5) meters for right of way purposes as shown in the sketch
drawn at the back of this order. The segregation survey of the area shall be at the pro-rata expense of the
parties.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
Petitioner thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against respondent and his wife before the
Municipal Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, docketed as Civil Case No. 711. A judgment based on a
compromise was rendered in said case under the following terms and conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
That Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case, are going to vacate the
premises in question and transfer the old house subject of this ejectment case at the back of Lot No.
2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, located at 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from today, but
not later than April 30, 1990;
That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2)-meter wide exit alley on the eastern portion of said lot as roadright-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the west of Lot No. 2586-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462;
That defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements introduced fronting the residence of the
plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on

the same area;

(Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently or on May 21, 1991, respondent filed another MSA with the DENR Regional Office of
Cotabato involving a portion of the same lot subject of his first MSA, covering an area of 334 square
meters, more or less (the subject land), and docketed as DENR-XII-Claim No. 050-90. This time, the MSA
was supported by a certification 4 dated January 9, 1989 issued by the Office of the Mayor of Midsayap
and an Indorsement 5 dated January 16, 1989 by the District Engineer of the Department of Public Works
and Highways stating that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by
the municipal government.
Petitioner likewise filed a protest against her brother-respondents second MSA, alleging a preferential
right over the subject land, she being the adjacent and riparian owner, and maintaining that it is her only
access to the national highway. She thus reiterated her demand for a five (5)-meter road right of way
through the land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
After another investigation of the subject land, DENR Regional Executive Director Macorro Macumbal
issued an Order dated February 17, 1994 stating that it was suitable for residential purposes but that, in
light of the conflicting interest of the parties, it be sold at public auction. Respondents second MSA was
accordingly dismissed, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that the said property is a dried bed of
Salunayan Creek resulting from the construction of the irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration; that it is suitable for residential purpose . . .
It is evident that under the law, property of the public domain situated within the first (1st) to fourth class
municipalities are disposable by sales only. Since municipality of Midsayap, Cotabato is classified as third
(3rd) class municipality and the property in dispute, Lot no. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, is situated in the poblacion
of Midsayap, Cotabato, and considering the conflicting interest of the herein parties, it is therefore
equitable to dispose the same by sale at a public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as
amended, pertinent clause of which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder, . . .
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is ordered as hereby is ordered that the instant protest is
dismissed and dropped from the records, and the Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse C.
Cachopero is rejected and returned unrecorded. Accordingly, the CENR Officer of CENRO XII-4B shall
cause the segregation survey of a portion of five (5) meters in width running parallel to line point C-1 of
the approved survey plan (MSA-XII-6)-1669, sketch is shown at the dorsal side hereof, as a permanent
easement and access road for the occupants of Lot No. 2386-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462 to the national
highway. Thereafter, and pursuant to paragraph G.2.3 of Department Administrative Order No. 38, Series
of 1990, the CENRO XII 4B shall dispose the remaining area of the lot in question through oral bidding.
SO ORDERED." 6 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said order of the DENR Regional Executive
Director, but it was denied by Order of February 27, 1995 by the OIC Regional Executive Director of
Region XII, Cotabato City in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A meticulous scrutiny of the records disclosed that Civil Case No. 711 for ejectment, decided on the basis
of compromise agreement of the parties dated August 10, 1989, involved "transfer of the house from Lot
No. MSA XII-6-1669 to the litigants parents property situated at the back of protestant property, Lot No.
2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462." Whereas the issue in DENR XII Claim No. 050-90 involved the
disposition of lot no. (MSA II-6)-1669 a residential public land being exclusively vested with the Director of
Lands (Sec. 4, C.A. 141).
The two (2) meters wide exit alley provided in the compromise agreement was established by the
protestant from her private property (Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462) for the benefit of her brother,
herein respondent, upon his transfer to their parents property at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC),
Psd-105462. Whereas the five (5) meters wide easement imposed on Lot No. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, a public
land, provided in the decision in DENR Claim No. 050-90 is in accordance with Article 670 of the New
Civil Code . . .
With all the above foregoing, we find no reversible error to reconsider our Order of February 17, 1994.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 7
Respondent thereupon filed on April 3, 1995 with the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order
assailing the Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995 of the DENR Regional Executive
Director and OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII, Cotabato, attributing grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance thereof.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondents petition for certiorari for lack of merit and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, as it did deny his motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, granted said petition, and accordingly reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of Respondent. 8
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate courts decision having been denied by
Resolution of March 2, 2000, 10 she lodged the present petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted
contrary to law and jurisprudence 1) in holding that the RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over
respondents petition, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable to the
instant case, and the contested land is public land; and 2) in ordering the processing of respondents MSA
pursuant to R.A. 730. 11
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over respondents petition for certiorari
as (a) it "is in the nature of an appeal" 12 falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under
Section 9(3) 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended; and (b) respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies when he failed to appeal the questioned Orders to the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources. 14
Petitioners petition fails.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition
for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil
action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). In Silverio v.
Court of Appeals, 15 this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished
between these two modes of judicial review as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the general types of cases, to take a
cause and apply for relief to the appellate courts by way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar
modes through the broad process of appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal
brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit
and the persons of the parties or any such error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari "cannot legally be used for any other purpose." In terms of its function,
the writ of certiorari serves "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve parties
from arbitrary acts of courts acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. 16 (Italics,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit
and not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction to issue the writ of
certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action therefor, independent of the
proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. 17 As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, 18 the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus 19 under Section 21 20 of B.P. 129.
A perusal of respondents Petition dated April 3, 1995 filed before the RTC clearly shows that it alleged
that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director acted with "grave abuse
of discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction" when they issued the
questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995. Evidently, respondent sought a
judicial review of the questioned Orders through a special civil action for certiorari which, as
aforementioned, was within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato. 21
Additionally, this Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instant case
falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable
injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action
of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order (Vivo v. Cloribel,
18 SCRA 713; De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269); or where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy. 22
True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same
may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and non-observance thereof is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint, 23 the rationale being:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded

an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. 24
However, this requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately,
among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in
quo warranto proceedings.25cralaw:red
Hence, where the act complained of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, as
was alleged in respondents petition before the RTC, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required and resort to the courts through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
permitted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We hold that it was an error for the court a quo to rule that the petitioners should have exhausted its
remedy of appeal from the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees
and thereafter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to
question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1)
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, while certiorari as a remedy may
not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly
enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been said that where the rigid application of the
rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are
justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly shown that there is a patent and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 27
The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC
Regional Director acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995, respectively.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In resolving respondents second MSA and petitioners protest thereto, the DENR Regional Executive
Director, after considering the conflicting interest of the parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by
directing the sale of the subject land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act," provides the
procedure for the disposition of lands of the public domain which are open to disposition or concession
and intended to be used for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the
highest bidder. However, where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit
issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in
Section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of
the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official
Gazette or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary.
(Emphasis supplied)
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 28 on June 18, 1952, however, an exception to the foregoing
procedure was created by authorizing disposition of lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of
bidding, provided that: (1) the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified therein and (2) the area
applied for is not more than 1,000 square meters. 29 The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act No. 293, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in
the municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a
parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall
be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him not
more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the
occupant has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten percent of the purchase
price shall be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal

annual installments.
SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. 30
SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of lands for residential purposes
which are not inconsistent herewith shall be applicable.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1952. (Emphasis supplied)
Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952, and the DENR Regional
Executive Directors February 17, 1994 finding that the subject land was "suitable for residential
purposes," it was incumbent upon him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were applicable to
respondents MSA. As held by the Court of Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive
Director gravely erred in ordering the sale of the subject lot through oral bidding applying Section 67,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and not Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without bidding.
We agree with the petitioner.
Apropos is the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 785, ruling that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to be used as a residence . . . they can
be sold on private sales under the provisions of Republic Act No. 730."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Agura v. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"R.A. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by
bidding, if the area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
We see no reason why these ruling should not be applied in this case which involves 415 [should have
been 334] square meters only. 31
The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the Public Land Act upon a
finding that it was more "equitable" in light of the "conflicting interest" of the parties. In his "Answer" to
respondents petition before the RTC, the Director justified his non-application of R.A. 730 in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being disputed, Republic Act No.
730 requisite (sic) vas not meet (sic) that for this law to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the
first place not a land in conflict. There being a pending protest for final adjudication, the said conflict
continues to exist thus an impediment to the application of Republic Act 730 32 (Emphasis supplied)
which justification he reiterated in his Opposition 33 to respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTC decision.
The Directors reliance on equity as basis for his action was misplaced, however. It is well-settled that
"equity follows the law." 34 Described as "justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or legal pronouncements. 35 Where pertinent positive rules are present, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 36
A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows nothing therein to support the
Directors contention that the pendency of a protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA.
Indeed, that Section 1 of R.A. 730 gives a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable public land
suitable for residential purposes implies that there may be more than one party interested in purchasing
it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau (formerly the Director of Lands) to determine whether the material facts set forth in
an MSA are true:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of
any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be
the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith,
and for the purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts.
In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud,

concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by
the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation
may issue without further proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify whether the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA
are well founded, and, if so, to cancel the MSA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection under oath to any application or
concession under this Act, grounded on any reason sufficient under this Act for the denial or cancellation
of the application or the denial of the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been given
suitable opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is found to be well founded, the Director of Lands shall
deny or cancel the application or deny patent or grant, and the person objecting shall, if qualified, be
granted a prior right of entry for a term of sixty days from the date of the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process respondents MSA,
and to ascertain, particularly in light of petitioners protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase
the subject land at a private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.
In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondents MSA and summarily ordering, without factual or
legal basis, that the subject land be disposed of via oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land
Act, the Director acted with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As the Court of Appeals held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional Executive Director applying
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are
patently erroneous, the authority of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
warranted. 37
The Directors commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean that respondent
automatically has the better right to the subject land. As mandated by law, the Director must process
respondents MSA, conduct an investigation, and determine whether the material facts set forth therein
are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A. 730.
A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that petitioners protest raises serious
factual issues regarding respondents qualification to purchase the subject land in particular, whether
he already owns a home lot in Midsayap and whether he has, in good faith, constructed his house on the
subject land and actually resided therein. These factual issues are properly within the authority of the
DENR and the Land Management Bureau, which are tasked with carrying out the provisions of the Public
Land Act and R.A. 730, 38 do determine, after both parties have been given an opportunity to fully
present their evidence.
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 39 and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, 40 the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. 41 It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted
for purposes of an imperfect title. 42
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea. 43 As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 46 And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondents first MSA, the District Engineer having
certified that the government may need the subject land for future expansion, and the office of the
Municipal Mayor having certified that it was needed by t he municipal government for future public
improvements. 47 Consequently, it was only after the same offices subsequently certified 48 that the
subject land was suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that
it became alienable and disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this Court in Bracewell
v. Court of Appeals 49 held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public
land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land
subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the

government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even
granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still
cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. 50 (Emphasis supplied)
With respect to petitioners invocation of the principle of accession under either Article 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same does not apply to vest her with ownership
over subject land.
Under Article 370 51 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which took effect in the Philippines on December
7, 1889, 52 the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally
changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned
bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance
therefrom. 53
When the present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, 54 the foregoing rule was abandoned in
favor of the present Article 461, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the new bed since it is believed
more equitable to compensate the actual losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing. 55 Thus,
the abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s) of the land(s) onto which the river changed its course
instead of the riparian owner(s). 56
Petitioner claims that on October 22, 1966, when she purchased the property adjoining the subject land
from Marcelina Basadre, the said subject land was already a dried-up river bed such that "almost one-half
portion of the residential house . . . was so already built and is still now situated at the said dried-up
portion of the Salunayan Creek bed . . ." 57 She failed to allege, however, when the subject portion of the
Salunayan Creek dried up, a fact essential to determining whether the applicable law is Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value. 58
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when"
[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is
a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the
active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. . . 60 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river,
not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. 61
Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land from the government, 62
she did so through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989 63 instead of the prescribed form. By such
move, she is deemed to have acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for
her to have applied for its purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming
otherwise. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

[G.R. NO. 132477 : August 31, 2005]

JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ, ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ, ENRIQUE ABOITIZ,
MATTHIAS G. MENDEZONA, CEBU INDUSTRIAL PARK DEVELOPERS, INC. and FBM ABOITIZ
MARINE, INC., Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, in
his capacity as DAR Secretary, and DIR. JOSE LLAMES, in his capacity as Director of DARRegional 7, Respondent.
DECISION
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands
were reclassified as industrial lands.1 On 03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved
Balamban's land use plan and adopted en toto Balamban's Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the
passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively.2 As part of their
preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the
necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. 3
Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter from Mr. Jose
Llames, Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing him
that the DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to
cease and desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal
liabilities.4
Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City a Complaint
dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. T-590.5 In an order6 dated 12 August 1996, the RTC,
ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 7 It justified
the dismissal in this wise:
A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code expressly provides that the Municipalities through
an Ordinance by the Sanggunian may authorize the reclassification of the agricultural land within their
area into non-agricultural. Paragraph (e) of the aforesaid Section, provides further: that nothing in this
Section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provision of Republic Act 6657. In
an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, quoted: With respect of (sic) conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses the authority of the DAR to approve the same may be exercise (sic) only from the date of
the effectivity of the Agrarian Reform Law on June 15, 1988. It appears that the petitioners had applied for
conversion on June 13, 1995 and therefore the petitioner (sic) are estopped from questioning the
authority and jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The application having been filed after
June 15, 1988, the reclassification by the Municipal Council of Balamban was just a step in the
conversion of the aforestated lands according to its purpose. Executive Order No. 129-A, Section 5, "The
Department shall be responsible for implementing Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and for such purpose
it is authorized to (J) approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural
land into non-agricultural uses." Said Executive Order amended Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3644
which clearly mandates that the DAR Secretary (sic) approve or disapprove conversion are not impliedly
repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of Republic Act 6657 the above laws and other laws not inconsistent of
(sic) this act shall have suppletory effect. Further, Section 68 of Republic Act 6657 provides: No
injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the
Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and Department of Justice in their implementation of the program.
With this provision, it is therefore clear (sic) when there is conflict of laws determining whether the
Department of Agrarian Reform has been exclusively empowered by law to approve land conversion after
June 15, 1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls only with the Supreme Court or Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for Restraining Order is hereby ordered DENIED
and the main case is DISMISSED, this Court having no jurisdiction over the same. 8
In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners.9 Petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 10 In a resolution11 dated 11 November
1996, this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 12 Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the said resolution but the same was denied in a resolution dated 27 January 1997. 13
At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered 14 to file their Comments on the petition. Two
sets of comments from the public respondents, one from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial
Office15 and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, 16 were submitted, to which petitioners filed
their Consolidated Reply.17

On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 18 affirming the Order of Dismissal
issued by the RTC.19 A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated
30 January 1998.20
Hence, this petition.
The following issues21 are raised by the petitioners for resolution:
(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of
Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the
CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;
(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining development works on the subject lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against
the DAR.
In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to reclassify portions of their
agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 22 23 of the Local Government Code.
According to them, if the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which
has already been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or
which has been distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must be confirmed
by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to
become effective. If, however, the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in order for
the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall within the DAR's conversion authority.
Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and
all-encompassing power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural lands.
Said section only grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands which have already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and which have already been
distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
The petition lacks merit.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction
over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of
Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:
". . . True, the DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural
lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the only instances
when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every
landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically
follow from the said department's express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that
any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be
cleared by the DAR."
The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having
undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals,24 where it was
held that reclassification of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified.
Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment
of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural
land for other purposes.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of Balamban, Cebu, which
reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the

Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995,
long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or
that can be raised thereon.
To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12 dated October
1994 which reads:
Administrative Order No. 12
Series of 1994
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION
OF ARICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
The guiding principles on land use conversion is to preserve prime agricultural lands. On the other hand,
conversion of agricultural lands, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum use of land as a national
resource for public welfare, shall be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner.
To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as amended, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has issued several policy guidelines to regulate land use conversion. This
Administrative Order consolidates and revises all existing implementing guidelines issued by the DAR,
taking into consideration, other Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion.
II. LEGAL MANDATE
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove applications for
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to
Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
B. Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and
other land uses.
C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of
agricultural lands.
D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President, provides that
"action on applications for land use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A."
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS
A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land (Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).
B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use.
C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. It also
includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.
V. COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced. It shall also include agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural

uses, after June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office
of the President and those proposed to be used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as provided in
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,25 we held:
Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v. Allarde (318 SCRA 22
[1999]).
The Court of Appeals' reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in order. In the said opinion, the
Secretary of Justice declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to conversions of agricultural
lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is
based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and extensive coverage
of the agrarian reform program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that lands
already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any
conversion clearance:
I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the following
guidelines are being issued for the guidance of the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to the conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such
conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are
already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance.
The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code
explicitly provides26 that "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any
manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction
was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This
Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De Villena,27 found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction'
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian
reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent
provision reads:
"Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
"It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide
all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward

this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it. . . ."
Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or not an injunction is the
appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land, we
rule in the negative. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996
of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002.]

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second
Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region,
Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager,
Respondents.
DECISION
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its resolution dated June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
54587.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private
respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot
was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was
mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started
the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly
identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent, through its general
manager, informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen
their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners
defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by
SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After
Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private
respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to
Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This
prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court 2 rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and
ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondent the amount of P10,000 as moral damages and
another P10,000 as attorneys fees. The pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the proposal
that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the
payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed and sold at public
auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh.9) was
issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation obtaining, the reformation of instruments, even if allowed,
or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering
that plaintiff is no longer the owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any
substitute therefore (sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor
both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18
where his house is presently standing.
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident that what
plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has
been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being
clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail
the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed." 3
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September 17, 1998,
petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the court a quo had no
jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably,
petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999,
petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of
judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. 4
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this instant petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of estoppel,
even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No.
17115.

At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of a trial court
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not
in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial
court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. 5 We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that,
while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage,
active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party
from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: 6
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
x

"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same
jurisdiction . . . [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."cralaw virtua1aw library
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa v. Court of Appeals; 7 Ang Ping v.
Court of Appeals; 8 Salva v. Court of Appeals; 9 National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals; 10
Province of Bulacan v. Court of Appeals; 11 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 12 this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops
such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even
once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution
against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission
to the damage and prejudice of the private Respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not. 13
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are
disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the
elementary principles of justice and good faith. 14 There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never
raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily
and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to
repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 149754. September 17, 2002.]

MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, v. ALAN G. GO, FELIPE LANDICHO, and VINCENT TECSON,
Respondents.
DECISION
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals setting aside an order of execution
pending appeal issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On May 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City, rendered judgment by default in Civil
Case No. Q-98-35332, entitled "Mortimer F. Cordero v. Alan C. Go, 2 doing business under the name and
style of ACG Express Liner, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson" (for breach of contract
with damages), ordering the defendants, herein respondents Alan Go, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent
Tecson, together with Tony Robinson, jointly and solidarily to pay to petitioner Mortimer F. Cordero
damages in the total amount of P19,291,352.043.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 19, 2000, while respondents received their copy on
June 29, 2000. Prior to his receipt of the decision, petitioner had filed on June 14, 2000 a motion for
execution pending appeal of the judgment. This was opposed by respondents, who moved for a new trial
on the ground that their failure to attend the pre-trial conference of the case, on the basis of which they
were declared in default, was due to the negligence of their counsel.
In its order of July 28, 2000, the trial court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal and
denied respondents motion for new trial. In its order, the trial court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Plaintiffs motion for execution pending appeal is well taken there being written proof/admission before
this Court by the counsel for defendants that there is an impending bankruptcy proceeding [against
defendant Tony Robinson] hence possibly rendering nugatory whatever judgment that has been rendered
in this case (Astraquillo v. Javier, No. L-20034, 30 January 1965, 13 SCRA 125).
x

Moreover, the dire need for financial resources arising out of a plainly valid, just, and binding obligation,
justifies execution pending appeal (Ma-ao Sugar central Co., Inc. v. Canete, 19 SCRA 646). Lastly, it
appears from the evidence presented during the hearing that defendants are seeking to evade judgment
in this case by disposing of or encumbering their properties to defeat execution. 3
Respondents received a copy of this order on July 31, 2000. On August 1, 2000, they moved for a
reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial court on August 18, 2000. On August 21, 2000,
the trial court ordered the issuance of the writ of execution, to implement which the sheriffs garnished the
bank accounts of respondents and levied six parcels of land belonging to respondent Go. On November
8, 2000, the sheriffs issued a notice of sale of the levied real properties on December 14, 2000. But
execution was stayed on September 29, 2000 in view of a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by
the Court of Appeals at the instance of respondents (CA-G.R. SP No. 60354). On August 8, 2000,
respondents also filed a notice of appeal of the trial courts decision of May 31, 2000. Initially, in its order
of August 21, 2000, the trial court denied due course to the appeal for failure of respondents to pay the
appellate docket fees on time. But, on November 29, 2000, it reconsidered its order and gave due course
to respondents appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 69113).
Petitioner filed two motions, one entitled "Ex-Parte Motion for Break Open Order" and another one entitled
"Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of Check," to implement the writ of execution earlier issued by the trial
court. However, in view of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, which it received on October 4, 2000,
the trial court, on November 27, 2000, denied the aforesaid motions of petitioner, set aside its earlier
order for the release of garnished funds, and canceled the sheriffs notice of sale of November 8, 2000.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of November 29, 2000 giving due course to respondents
appeal and, after the expiration of the 60-day TRO, again moved for the issuance of a "break open" order
and the encashment of checks. In addition, he filed two other motions entitled "Ex-Parte Motion to
Proceed" and "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Cebu City Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino as Special Sheriff."
Respondents opposed the motion for the appointment of a special sheriff.
In an order dated December 18, 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
order giving due course to respondents appeal. As to petitioners motions for the implementation of the
order of execution and respondents opposition to the motion for the appointment of a special sheriff, it

directed the parties to reiterate the same before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 69113 on the ground
that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case by reason of the perfection of respondents appeal.
On January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP. 60354, granting
respondents petition for certiorari and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.
The appeals court subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of August
31, 2001. The Court of Appeals held in its decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
True, at the time that the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed, the court a quo had the
jurisdiction to exercise its good discretion to direct discretionary execution. However, at the time it recalled
its earlier Order dated August, 21, 2000 (denying due recourse to the appeal), and gave due course to the
appeal, the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this Court was still in force and effect, the same to
expire on 04 December 2000 [per] the Resolution dated 29 September 2000 declaring the TRO in full
force and effect. Such recall gives due course to the appeal retroactive to the time of the actual filing of
the Notice of Appeal on 08 August 2000.
However, what militates against the discretionary execution long prayed for by private respondent is the
fact that the court a quo has no more discretion to order the same as it was already relinquished of
jurisdiction over Civil Case Q-98-35332. Under paragraph 3, Section 9, Rule 41 of the [1997] Rules [of
Civil Procedure]" (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time of appeal of the other parties." As
to private respondent, [the] time to appeal expired on 05 July 2000, or on the sixteenth day after he was
served a copy of the Decision of 31 May 2000 on 19 June 2000, he not having filed a motion for new trial
or reconsideration which tolls the reglementary period to appeal. Discretionary execution was temporarily
but effectively enjoined by the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this Court which expired on 04
December 2000. However, before the expiration of the TRO, the Court a quo issued the Omnibus Order
dated 27 November 2000, canceling the Sheriffs Notice of Sale, the same being null and void, which
consequently cancelled the public auction sale to be held on 14 December 2000. From such order, we
could infer that on the motion for discretionary execution, action is deferred, if it is not altogether denied.
This observation may be confirmed from the fact that on 29 November 2000, it issued an Order giving due
course to petitioners Notice of Appeal, and directing the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the entire
records of Civil case No. Q-98-35332 to this Court for proper action and disposition, without reserving its
right to act upon the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because technically, prior to transmittal of the
original record, it may order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39 (Ultimate
paragraph, Section 9, Rule 41).
x

It may be observed that the Order dated 28 July 2000 granting execution pending appeal as well as the
Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issued on 21 August 2000 remained outstanding, for which an inquiry
as to whether the same w[as] issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction would have been ripe. However, the original records of Civil Case No. Q-98-35332 ha[ve]
already been received by this Court on 19 December 2000, and the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No.
69113. Thus, granting that Sheriff Belarmino had the authority to issue the Sheriffs Notice of Sale of Real
Properties, its implementation has been rendered moot by the loss of jurisdiction of the court which
appointed him, coupled by the transmittal of the original records of Civil Case No. Q-98-35332. Whether
execution pending appeal is warranted by the circumstances of the case is a matter for the better
consideration of this Court, not in this petition but in the appeal of the case. 4
Petitioner, therefore, brought this appeal. He alleges
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD LOST ITS
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, AND ORDERS IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ITS RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
INASMUCH AS PETITIONERS MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN
THE FIFTEEN (15) DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL AND THE RECORDS WERE STILL IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT WAS ISSUED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO JURISDICTION TO EXTEND THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED IN THIS CASE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS PETITION
SINCE THE PETITION HAD THE FOLLOWING FORMAL DEFECTS;
A. THE PETITION WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED TO THE RESPONDENT;
B. THE PETITION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN THAT IT DID
NOT STATE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY PERSONAL SERVICE WAS NOT RESORTED TO
IN THIS CASE;
C. THE PETITION WAS, IN TRUTH, NOT VERIFIED;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE
PETITIONERS NUMEROUS PENDING MOTION[S]. 5

The petition has no merit. Rule 39, 2 (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court had lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
On the other hand, Rule 41, 9 pertinently states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
x

[P]rior to the transmittal of the original record . . ., the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Petitioner contends that, since at the time he filed his motion for execution pending appeal on June 14,
2000, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case (as respondents appeal was perfected only on
August 8, 2000) and still had the records of the case (as the same were ordered elevated to the Court of
Appeals only on December 18, 2000), it can validly implement its order of execution notwithstanding the
perfection of respondents appeal.
To be sure, the trial court still had jurisdiction of the case when it ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal. However, the fact is that the enforcement of its order was restrained by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354. On the other hand, the subsequent perfection of respondents appeal
forced the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The twin moves of respondents
rendered execution pending appeal impossible not only while the TRO was effective but even after its
expiration, in view of the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals. Eventually, on January 29,
2001, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts order of execution pending appeal. Petitioner cannot
take advantage of the expiration of the TRO to seek an implementation of the trial courts order of
execution, as this was the very issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 (for certiorari).
The trial court properly held itself to have no jurisdiction to act further on the case. Instead, in its order of
December 18, 2001, it referred petitioner to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 with regard to
his efforts to seek implementation of the order of execution. Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling.
Anent petitioners claim that respondents petition in the Court of Appeals was deficient because it lacked
verification and an explanation for lack of personal service of the petition on him; that the same was
improperly served on petitioner instead of his counsel; and that the Court of Appeals failed to resolve the
motions filed by him for the dismissal of the petition, lifting of the TRO, and setting of the case for oral
arguments, suffice it to say that these matters have been raised before, and were found to be without
merit by, the Court of Appeals in its decision of January 29, 2001 and resolution of August 31, 2001, and
this Court finds no reason to modify its rulings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 29, 2001 and
its resolution, dated August 31, 2001, are AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.