Intercultural Education

Vol. 21, No. 3, June 2010, 281290

A dynamic conception of humanity, intercultural relation and

cooperative learning
Khosrow Bagheri Noaparasta* and Zohreh Khosravib
a
Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Tehran, Jalale Ale-Ahamad Ave.,
Chamran Highway, Tehran, Iran; bFaculty of Education and Psychology, University of
Al-Zahra, Tehran, Iran
Intercultural
10.1080/14675981003760465
CEJI_A_476568.sgm
1467-5986
Original
Taylor
302010
21
KhosrowBagheri
knb502@york.ac.uk;
000002010
and
&
Article
Francis
(print)/1469-8439
Francis
Education
Noaparast
kbagheri4@yahoo.com
(online)

The main focus of this paper relates to the conceptualizations of human identity
and intercultural relations needed for cooperative learning (CL) to occur. At one
extreme, some have argued that the relation between different cultures should be
conceptualized in terms of incommensurability. At the other extreme, a
standardization and unification along with the trend of globalization is supported
at the peril of leaving pluralism aside. This paper argues that neither of the two
extreme views can provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for CL at the
intercultural level. Such a theoretical basis can be sought in providing a
compromise between Donald Davidsons principle of charity and Gadamers
view of understanding in terms of fusion of horizons. Consequently,
understanding is neither merely an inner nor an outer endeavour; rather it
involves both. Cooperative learning in this framework implies that the material
for learning is neither in the hands of the learner nor in those of the so-called
teacher. In fact, this material develops an intercultural relation by means of
both poles of the relation. CL involves reciprocal support as well as reciprocal
critique.
Keywords: universalism; pluralism; dynamic identity; learning; cooperation

Introduction
At the heart of Winchs (1958) debate was the question of availability of standards
with reference to which one can judge the rationality of other cultures. The debate
soon led to the polarized alternatives of universalism and relativism. At one
extreme, relativists defended the uniqueness and integrity of cultures by denying
the possibility of meaningful comparison in respect of rationality and truth. At the
other extreme, universalists not only defended, but also regarded as inevitable, the
availability of common standards of rationality. In what follows, we will criticize
such polarized accounts of intercultural relation and will try to develop a more
productive alternative in terms of an overlapping relationship between different
cultures. It will be argued that this alternative view provides a dynamic conception
of human identity. Finally, this dynamic conception is used as the basis for developing a model for cooperative learning (CL) between supporters of different
cultures or sub-cultures.

*Corresponding author. Email: khbagheri@ut.ac.ir

ISSN 1467-5986 print/ISSN 1469-8439 online
2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14675981003760465
http://www.informaworld.com

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K. Bagheri Noaparast and Z. Khosravi

Relativism and dissolving comparison between cultures

Relying on Ludwig Wittgensteins (1958) forms of life, Peter Winch developed a
view of social science in terms of incommensurability, defended by Kuhn (1970),
according to which different cultures cannot be compared with each other by means
of an external universal standard. Accordingly, to understand a culture, we should
neglect our own cultures standards and logic and avoid generalizations about cultures
and, instead, try to understand the culture concerned in terms of its inner logic and
relevant standards. In this way, we should become familiar with the whole system of
the culture and try to empathize with its members and look at the world through their
eyes. Otherwise, we will commit what Winch refers to as a category mistake (Winch
1970, 93). This is an essential error in which a wrong criterion is used to understand
cases that are not in fact relevant to the culture. This misplaced criterion leads to
distortion rather than explanation.
This approach has undoubted strengths, the most important of which consists of
curing ethnocentrism developed in the name of universalism. Relativism is an important stance insofar as it invites us to be cautious about the possibility of cultural biases
leading to wrong generalizations (Margolis 1996). However, relativism suffers from
limitations, the most significant of which is that it dissolves the problem of biased
comparisons by precluding the possibility of making any comparison at all between
cultures.
Furthermore, there is a big irony in the relativists argument. When Winch talks
about category mistake, he in fact presupposes a background logic in terms of which
he can compare the two cultures concerned as belonging to two distinct categories
of that logic which cannot and should not be conflated. Without presupposing such
background logic, how can one talk about a category mistake? In other words, the
notion of category mistake presupposes a higher principle to the effect that different
categories should not be conflated, and this tends to be a universalistic logical principle. Thus, even though relativism aptly focuses on differences between cultures, it
ignores the background commonalities without which one cannot even refer to the
differences concerned.
Universalism and underestimating cultural differences
Universalism in studying cultures is a stance that defends the existence of a set of nonnegotiable standards which are supposedly applicable to different cultures. Some (e.g.
Jarvie 1970; Lukes 1970; Toulmin 1972) more positively account for universalism,
whereas others (e.g. MacIntyre 1984), in a rather passive way, do not exclude universalism. A more common strategy that universalists follow in supporting this stance is
appealing to general principles of logic and scientific reasoning being held to be
applicable to peoples activities in different cultures (Lukes 1970). Accordingly,
people of all cultures have implicit commitments in following such logical rules as
non-contradiction and identity. The non-contradiction principle tells us that being is
not non-being or, in other words, we cannot say of something that it is and that it is
not in the same respect and at the same time (A is not non-A). The Law of Identity
tells us that something is what it is (A is A). As for reasoning rules, similarly, universalists hold that when people make claims, they support them by appealing to such
methods of reasoning as induction, deduction and analogy. Thus, universalists take
these rules of logic and reasoning to be the universal standards that can be used to
understand and evaluate the rationality of peoples activities in different cultures.

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Universalists are right in so far as they show that there must be a common background between different cultures. This should, however, be considered a minimalist
account rather than a maximalist one. In other words, the universalists claim should
not be understood as showing that there must be some commonalities between cultures
and this, by no means, indicates that there cannot be sharp differences between them
nor does it provide sufficient background for explaining them. And this is exactly
what we would need to be able to account for the differences and clashes that now and
then occur between cultures.
Even though we argued that the Winchian notion of category mistake ironically
presupposes a background logic that provides an advantage for the universalist stance,
it should be acknowledged that a strong universalist stance is beset by the problem of
invidious comparison. In fact, some universalistic claims were ethnocentric attempts
to make invidious comparisons, with damaging consequences for the perceived rationality of non-western cultures.
Dynamic overlap relationships between cultures
Having considered the criticisms of both relativist and universalistic accounts, we
need to look for a better explanation of the relations between cultures. This alternative
will be referred to as the dynamic overlap relationship. By overlap we mean that
there are commonalities between cultures, and by dynamic we mean to say that the
common parts, as well as the uncommon ones, can be increased or decreased and that
they are not necessarily static. In order to provide an account of the dynamic overlap
relationship, it will be presented through a brief examination of Davidsons principle
of charity, Winchs view on empathy and understanding a culture from within, and
Gadamers (1976, 1989) fusion of horizons.
Along with his rejection of incongruent conceptual schemes, Davidson (1984)
talks about principle of charity. He concludes with his argument from translation
that one should consider people of other cultures as agents having intentions and
meanings if one can claim to understand them. Via this principle, he encourages us to
consider those peoples deeds and utterances as intelligible as far as possible; otherwise, we cannot claim to have understood them because, in that case, we are not treating them as not having intentions or trying to communicate or perform actions. In
other words, we do not treat them as people at all.
The principle of charity presupposes that ones own culture is the criterion. Thus,
we should interpret the behaviour of other cultures people in full terms of our own
culture as positively as possible. While Winch tries to say that we should neglect our
own culture when trying to understand another culture, Davidson implicitly claims
that we can understand other cultures only by means of the criteria of our own culture
and, when we use these criteria with charity, we will be able to understand better.
It seems that the proper answer to the question of how one can understand other
cultures should be sought somewhere between Winchs position and that of Davidson.
The latter is right as far as he regards as inevitable the use of our own culture in
attempts to understand another culture, because our understanding always exposes
something of our inner concepts, meanings and criteria, which are acquired mainly
from the culture within which we have lived from infancy. Otherwise, how can we
understand something if we leave aside whatever concepts, meanings and criteria we
has acquired? However, Winch is also right when he supposes that ones concepts,
meanings and criteria may fall short of giving an accurate account of another culture.

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In such cases, we need to change our inner devices and somehow acquire new
concepts, meanings and criteria.
This necessary combination of the insights from Winch and Davidson reminds one
of both Kant and Piaget at once. Kants famous comment about human cognition was
that intuitions without concepts are blind, as concepts without intuitions are empty
(Kant 1933, 75). To use Kants terms, Davidsons view without that of Winch is
empty, and the latter without the former is blind. Piagets (1964) view of the
development of intelligence in childhood is that it involves both assimilation of new
components into the childs schemas and accommodation of these schemas to the new
and strange conditions. To put the above point in Piagets terms, we can say that
Davidsons view invites us for assimilation, while that of Winch provides us with
accommodation and, in fact, these two processes need to be combined. This combination will remove the limitations of both views.
Charles Taylor, in his comparison between Davidsons view and Gadamers
(1989) fusion of horizons, prefers the latter to the former. By fusion of horizons
required for understanding a text, Gadamer meant a combination between the readers
horizon of thought and those of the writer. In other words, understanding the meaning
of a text is neither merely related to the intentions of the writer nor is it limited to what
occurs in the mind of the reader. While Taylor accepts along with Davidson that we
need to do our best in translating the others statements into our own language, he
differentiates between our language in the first encounter and our extended language
due to the fusion of horizons:
The problem is that we need to understand how we move from our language at the time
of encounter, which can only distort them, to a richer language that has place for them;
from making the best sense in our initial terms, which will usually be an alien imposition, to making the best sense within a fused horizon. I cannot see how we can conceive
of or carry out this process without allowing into our ontology something like alternative
horizons or conceptual schemes. This I think marks the superiority of Gadamers view
over Davidsons. (Taylor 2002, 138)

In fact, Taylor holds, unlike Davidson, that we have conceptual schemes, but they
should be changed due to the encounter of cultures, and these changes are necessary
to avoid the distortions that those schemes impose upon us.
Nevertheless, Taylor himself admits that one needs to extend Gadamers view to
include intercultural relations. This is because Gadamer meant by the fusion of
horizons an intracultural relation between an interpreter and a text, both of which
belong to the same tradition, even though with a historical distance:
Even where we define ourselves against certain features of the past, as the modern
Enlightenment does against the Middle Ages, this remains within our identity as the
negative pole, that which we have overcome or escaped. We are part of the effective
history (Wirkungsgeschichte) of this past, and as such it has a claim on us. My point in
this essay has been that Gadamers account of the challenge of the other and the fusion
of horizons applies also to our attempt to understand quite alien societies and epochs.
The claim here comes not from their place within our identity, but precisely from their
challenge to it. (Taylor 2002, 142)

Now, looking at Taylors statements from the viewpoint of the dynamic overlap
model, we should say that his understanding of Gadamers view and even his
suggested extension on it presupposes an initial external or even contrastive relation

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between cultures, rather than an overlap relation. When Taylor says in the first quotation above that our language at the time of encounter can only distort them, he
disregards that there is a common part among different human cultures and that this
part plays an important role in understanding them, instead of saying that it can only
distort them. In addition, if we deny that there is such a common part, how can we
move to a richer language that has place for them? Even in Taylors reformulation
of Gadamers view, when he talks about other cultures and states that the claim here
comes not from their place within our identity, but precisely from their challenge to
it, we can ask: how is it possible to be a challenge from an alien culture to our identity without there being a common part between them at the same time? If these
cultures belong to totally different worlds, how could a challenge arise between them
at all?
After all, it seems that the notion of fusion of horizons itself needs to be
examined in terms of its presuppositions. This notion indicates that the fusion can
occur, and this presupposes that the horizons were distinct from each other in the first
place. Still, this distinction should be stronger in the case of alien cultures that matter
for Taylor, compared with cultures belonging to the same tradition as Gadamer
intended. But if we regard such a distinct relation between cultures, how can there be
a fusion between them? Examined from the dynamic overlap angle, the fusion does
not, in fact, occur in the first place, it is rather being discovered as something that is
rooted in human cultures due to the humans humanity. Overlap relation indicates the
possibility of such a discovery, but as far as the dynamic part of the phrase is
concerned, it indicates that there can be developments in the pre-existing fusion.
Our challenge to Taylors view is just to maintain that commonality is overlooked
in the idea of fusion of horizons, and it needs to be considered as a necessary element
for understanding intercultural relation. Otherwise, we are in full agreement with him
as far as he takes the dynamic notion of identity:
The analogous point here is that in coming to see the other correctly, we inescapably
alter our understanding of ourselves. Really taking in the other will involve an identity
shift in us. That is why it is so often resisted and rejected. We have a deep identity investment in the distorted image we cherish of others. (Taylor 2002, 141)

This is, in fact, a very important point: cultural relations are unfortunately based
primarily on a static conception of identity. According to this static conception, people
take their identity from their culture totally and once and for all. Not only does this
stance prevent any changes occurring in the identity concerned, but also turns it into
a source of pride, on the grounds that it is what makes people different from others in
other cultures. However, according to the dynamic conception of identity, who am
I? is related to who are you? Hence, any changes in the answer to the latter will
modify the answers to the former. Thus, who am I? cannot be answered totally and
once for all in terms of my present cultural and intercultural understanding. We do not
know ourselves in full terms, partly because we do not know other people in other
cultures properly. Conversely, we know ourselves as we do now, partly because we
have certain presuppositions about other cultures people in terms of certain categories. That is to say, our identity is relative not absolute, and this relativity is dynamic
rather than static. In terms of this mutual dependence between cultural identities, even
an encounter with a primitive culture can affect our identity in certain ways. In the
first place, we might consider ourselves as civilized because we consider them as

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K. Bagheri Noaparast and Z. Khosravi

wild. However, this is not the full picture of our identity, and it will be changed if
we consider that what is actual in them is potential in us. Otherwise, how can we
understand the wild behaviour of civilized people during a war? This phenomenon has
been observed over and over again during the last century between civilized
cultures.
To conclude so far, we suppose that a dynamic overlap model can provide a better
account of intercultural relations. This requires that, for at least two cultures, there be
a common part and two uncommon parts, while the borders of commonality, as well
as non-commonality, are in potential flux. This relationship leads to a dynamic
conception of identity in terms of which a persons cultural identity is dependent on
his or her understanding of other cultures, so that a change in the latter will lead to a
change in the former. The common aspects among cultures include, at least, logical
components such as the non-contradiction principle. These commonalities also
involve methodological components, such as deduction, induction and abduction, as
well as some common-sense substantive beliefs such as accepting the external world
and having artistic interests.
To decrease differences between two cultures, people of the cultures should appeal
to the commonalities and extend them as far as possible. As a result of this attempt:
(1) some components of uncommon parts might become common, as perceived oppositions are seen as misunderstandings; (2) other components can appear resistant to
change.
Now, for the dynamic identity to appear, some requirements should be met. These
are as follows:
(1) Who am I? is partly dependent on who are you? and vice versa. Thus, to
understand ourselves better, it is necessary for us to understand others.
(2) To understand others better, we should recognize our prejudices. As Gadamer
(1989) has shown, these prejudices are necessary in the first place for a person
to be a member of a culture. But they soon appear as barriers to understanding
other cultures without distortion. Thus, without recognizing these prejudices,
it is not possible to understand others in other cultures.
(3) We should be open to challenges that other cultures pose to us and vice versa.
To take these challenges seriously is, in fact, a way of recognizing the
prejudices.
(4) We should co-verify the challenges by appealing to the commonalities. We
should regard the challenges as a subject for inquiry and, hence, verify and
co-verify them.
(5) We should change ourselves if the challenges are met. The challenges are
potentially right or wrong. Thus, we must be ready to make modifications in
case of being wrong and thereby change ourselves.
(6) We should change ourselves if they are confirmed. This is the other side of the
coin.
(7) There might remain some differences and oppositions between others and
ourselves that cannot be transformed to commonalities. Tolerance is required
in such cases, until some neglected angels appear to resolve the problem or
some new evidence becomes available to resolve the problem.
Having explained the dynamic overlap model and its requirements, one can now
apply it in the case of CL among members of different cultures.

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Contingencies and necessities of CL

Based on the dynamic conception of identity, CL will have a definition perhaps
different from what is usually meant by this term at first glance. Accordingly, CL is a
mutual process that potentially transforms the cultural identity (identity 1) of teachers
and students to an intercultural identity (identity 2).
The main concepts in this definition need to be emphasized. First, by mutual
process, we mean a process in which both teachers and students learn from each
other. Hence, it is a process that cannot be established without deep involvement of
both teachers and students. This kind of involvement requires more active roles to be
played by the students and a higher readiness to change themselves on the part of
teachers. By cultural identity (identity 1), we mean the first acquired identity that can
be characterized by prejudices that a culture has about other cultures. By intercultural
identity (identity 2), we mean an identity that lacks the first prejudices about other
cultures and includes some new elements acquired from them.
Cooperative learning defined as such has characteristics that can be classified into
two categories of contingencies and necessities. The former refers to indeterminacies
in CL that, in their turn, show some strengths of this kind of learning. The latter, on
the other hand, refers to necessary conditions that need to be provided in order for a
learning context to be called cooperative. In what follows, each of the two categories
are explained below in more detail.
Contingencies of CL
Contingencies or indeterminacies of CL indicate flexible points in this kind of
learning. Contingencies can be sought in two dimensions of learning: the learner and
the subject matter of learning. As far as the learner is concerned, who is to learn is not
determinate in CL. Officially, of course, there are teachers and students in a
cooperative classroom, but in reality the roles of teacher and student are not fixed.
Teachers can be the real learners and students can be the real teachers, as well as
some students can be the real teachers, and some others can be the real students. Who
is to learn depends on who is confronted with challenges or reasonable critique, just
as who is to teach is dependent on who has raised these challenges and critiques.
The second dimension of learning that is contingent is the subject matter of learning or what is to be learnt. Again, there might officially be some subject matter for a
cooperative classroom, but the real subject matter is not determinate and even determinable. This is because in transition from identity 1 to identity 2, it is not known what
prejudices are there in cultural identities of cooperators that need to be criticized.
These prejudices, which can constitute the real subject matter of learning, can only be
known through a dialogue that characterizes the main method of CL, as explained
below. In a dialogue, I do not know what you will give me as an answer to my question or what challenges you might raise against my viewpoints. A fortiori, I do not
know what I myself will say in response to your not yet known answers or challenges.
Thus, only a free dialogue can reveal the real challenges and critiques from which one
should learn what can be learnt, and a free dialogue is something that is by no means
pre-determined or determinable in principle.
One might say that the subject matter of a cooperative classroom is determinable
because prejudices of different cultures that can be used as the subject matter are
known as typical characteristics, as some people refer to western and eastern prejudices, or Buddhist, Jewish, Christian and Islamic prejudices and the like. However,

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K. Bagheri Noaparast and Z. Khosravi

not only are these typical characteristics clichs without real representations, but also,
because of their inaccuracy, they might be offensive. Furthermore, at stake in a cooperative classroom are flesh and blood persons who can be different, compared with the
clichs, in different ways. Finally, it should not be forgotten that these clichs are, in
their turn, the subjects of discussion, and members of a cooperative classroom should
decide about these clichs as a result of their discussions; in other words, they should
determine the fate of the clichs, rather than being determined by them.
Necessities of CL
The second category in CL refers to the necessary conditions of such learning. As
being cooperative parallels contingencies in some respects, it requires necessities in
others. While contingences were in the two dimensions of learner and subject matter
of learning, necessities are to be sought in the dimension of methods or procedures of
learning. In other words, the necessities are to be sought in how to learn, and they are
as follows:
(1) Openness: In order for CL to take place, the first necessity is openness.
Accordingly, both sides of official teachers and students, or real teachers
and students who both might be students, should be open to challenges that
one side raises for the other. In other words, persons of neither side should
consider themselves secure from the possible challenges to their cultural identity. These challenges might refer to limitations of this cultural identity as well
as misconceptions about other cultures that it might be loaded with.
(2) Consensus: The second element in the procedure indicating how to learn is
consensus. In order to decide about the contraries and challenges that belong
to the uncommon parts in the dynamic overlap model explained above, a
consensus is needed that can be sought in the common part of the model. The
two sides of teachers and students not only should be explicitly conscious
about the contents of this common part, including formal as well as substantial
components mentioned above, but should also rely on them in discussing their
contraries.
(3) Critique: The third necessary element in the procedure of CL is critique. Every
person in the cooperative classroom must be active in raising critiques about
the limitations, as well as misconceptions, they recognize in the cultural identities of their cooperators. Even though it might appear antagonistic at first
glance, this active role should be played as a necessary road to reaching the
goal of intercultural identity, or else everyone will remain content with being
imprisoned in their identity. Needless to say, a critique on consensual elements
of the common part must be a reasonable one with enough evidence to raise a
challenge.
(4) Support: This is perhaps the most difficult part of the procedure concerned.
This element tells us that everyone should support the other side of the discussion, against their initial viewpoint, whenever the other side seems to be on the
right track. As Gadamer most aptly says about this element of a dialogue, it
can only occur through a commitment to the truth because of the manner in
which the discussion is being processed: What emerges in its truth is the
logos, which is neither mine nor yours and hence so far transcends the interlocutors subjective opinions that even the person leading the conversation

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289

knows that he does not know (Gadamer 1989, 368). According to the
transcendence of truth from both sides of a dialogue, interlocutors should not
hesitate in supporting the other side against their subjective opinion.
(5) Readiness to change: A further step in the procedure is readiness to change.
This is also a necessary element and, in fact, the final one in moving to identity 2. Whenever people recognize limitations or misconceptions in their
identity 1, they should be ready to change it properly. The fruits of CL appear
in this stage because adding something new, taken from the other side, to ones
cultural identity is the most significant manifestation of cooperation.
(6) Tolerance: The last but not the least element in the procedure indicating how
to learn is related to differences that are resistant to change. Such differences
prevent the overlap model from turning to the complete correspondence. Even
though one tries to decrease the uncommon parts, it is neither necessary nor
even desirable to reach a final point in this process. What is necessary in CL
is to learn to tolerate in the case of persistent differences. Tolerance is as
important as consensus, and perhaps this kind of difference is necessary for
CL, because the prefix co requires some degree of difference; otherwise
cooperation turns to mere operation.
It is important to differentiate between two kinds of tolerance: affective and
epistemological. In the former, there is only an emotional dimension being silent
when a person disagrees with you. However, in the latter, a cognitive or, better, a
metacognitive dimension exists. In this sense, tolerance is not merely a polite encounter, rather it is a de facto acceptance of a disagreement, along with the possibility that
the others view might turn out to be correct.

Notes on contributors
Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of
Tehran. Currently a visiting academic, his research concentrates on philosophical foundations
of action in the Department of Philosophy at the University of York, UK. He has published articles on constructive realism in Constructivism in the Human Sciences and Advances in
Personal Construct Psychology.
Zohreh Khosravi is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Al-Zahra in Tehran.
She is interested in foundations of human action. She has published articles on constructive
realism in Constructivism in the Human Sciences and Advances in Personal Construct
Psychology.

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