Scientific theories cannot postulate a holistic understanding of the universe, and its

objects, from lab experiments and observations. Burdened by the limits of language, scientific
processes and inevitable references to existing knowledge, these supposedly real descriptions
of nature assume homogeneity across all objects despite our imperfect grasp of what nature
entails. In the following paper, I will outline how a scientific theory is merely a synopsis of
normal science that, when applied further, becomes a faon-de-parler for scientists. The firsts of
the six sections will support the instrumentalist view while the latter considers many
counterarguments from the scientific realism community, including those of Karl Popper.
I. Underdetermination Argument
According to instrumentalists, the aim of science is not to discover truths but rather to
produce intellectual structures that provide useful frameworks of thought to answer questions
and solve problems in a given domain (Van Fraassen, 2002). It captures the hidden (and obvious)
commonalities that link observations and experiments to form the grounds for bolder scientific
hypotheses. A scientific theory, in these terms, is the mechanism that brings fact 1 to fact 2 but
it, in itself, does not describe anything.
On the contrary, realists believe that theories provide a legitimate description to scientific
phenomena. To evaluate how legitimate they are, scientists must simplify those statements into
ones that can be observed through experiments. A theory is validated if the test results match
what it proposes. But this process is flawed, anti-realists say as the same experimental results
can prove multiple theories at once. These experiments were not (nor cannot) be designed to
prove a singular idea as the result is impacted by numerous other principles as well. For instance,
any controlled test of Newtons laws of motion is subject to his law of universal gravitation for,
without it, the former laws would be invalidated. A single observation of external force, in other
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words, can validate both laws as the same time. The experiment can prove multiple theories right;
as a result, it would be unreasonable to posit any theory as the ultimate explanation when others
may arise in the future.
Realists respond to this claim by explaining how certain alternatives are better than
others better in terms of how simple/economical/powerful/plausible they are over the rest.
This difference, combined with the need to remain compatible with observations, eliminates
most of the other alternatives that are bound to exist. One example of this thinking is Occams
razor, a rule-of-thumb used in problem-solving where a hypothesis is selected for having the
fewest assumptions. Each assumption is seen to reduce the credibility of a potential answer. This
process certainly eases scientific discussions; nonetheless, it distracts from the realists objective
of what a scientific theory is intended to do. As explanatory power is forgotten behind these
criteria, the selected hypothesis may not be the most legitimate scientific explanation.
II. Theory Precedes Observation
The presence of a priori hypotheses in science challenges the legitimacy of scientific
explanations. Popper, in the first chapter of his book Conjectures and Refutations, describes his
frustration over the firmly-held belief that science proceeds from observations to theory. To
observe is absurd, he states, in the absence of a motive. He explains:
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of
view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it
presupposes similarity and classification, which in their turn presupposes interests, points of
view, and problems. (Popper, 1962)
Popper experiments this idea by asking his students to observe, after which they were forced to
ask observe what? as they did not have a direction to executive the instruction. From this, he
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applies the same concept to scientists. Scientists are unable to observe without a particular frame
of reference or expectation in their mind. They must anticipate a reaction, determine the results
they wish to see and visualize how their potential outcomes may strengthen or weaken the
purpose of their experiment. The absence of these actions would deter them from making any
observations as they require a motive to do so.
Another prerequisite to observation is the presence of a communication system that
captures the phenomena that is recorded. Scientists expect that modern language is capable of
transcribing what they observe. By enacting vocabulary to describe or assert a particular insight,
scientists draw on the past by indexing their observations to human practices, culture and
behaviour. But each word (a) is relative to other words and their meanings; (b) may not contain
the ineffable knowledge the scientist hopes to share; and (c) is interpreted differently by every
individual, depending on their experience with the word. What is rough to me, for instance, is
bound to be understood differently by you. Most of all, words connect meanings to relative
experiences in the past; making it extremely difficult to communicate novel experiences. It
compels scientists to reference everything to history which, for critics of induction, is an
irrational guide for anything that occur in the present.
Together, the failure to record unbiased observations in the sciences is nearly
unavoidable. The realist argument falls as scientists cannot explain a physical world without
reference to their senses and the inherent limitations of language. As observations are key
determinants to the legitimacy of a scientific theory, a failure to produce impartial verification
prevents the assertion of any scientific theory as the truth. True facts are necessary to make a
conception about them, true. Newton spent his entire life trying to argue from Phenomena
without feigning (arbitrary or ad hoc) Hypotheses but could not satisfy himself in this regard.
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Poppers counterargument to this shortcoming is the distinction of psychologically a

priori thinking and a priori valid beliefs. He explains the inevitability of all humans to carry
inborn ideas. It is not possible for us to ignore our habit of finding or recognizing regularities in
observation, he says, but our recognition of those similarities may be completely wrong.
Scientists can easily create a different mental environment where we fail to find regularities as
it would be too chaotic to the one we live today. This is a worthwhile thought to this issue;
nevertheless, scientific theories will remain incapable of true verifications and thus remain as
illegitimate descriptions of the world.
III. Presence of Essentialism and the Ultimate Explanation
The proposal of theories as real explanations puts an end to fruitful questions in scientific
discussion. After all, it is logically invalid to have two legitimate descriptions characterizing the
same scientific phenomena. Does the Earth revolve around the Sun? What causes the formation
of rainbows? Is there a Higgs-Boson particle? While we may believe that certain questions have
clear-cut answers, the last question cannot be definitely answered with the breadth of todays
scientific knowledge. Under this approach to scientific theories, however, the first theory that
evolves from scientific research will be the ultimate explanation for the phenomenon.
The basic assumptions to this approach are more dangerous. Scientific realism is
frequently characterized by its outcome-driven attitude towards scientific work; upon discovery
of a conception that the theorist regards as the truth, this outcome is defended against all
competitors. As only one truth is allowed, the overwhelming commitment towards the theory
will savage worthwhile formulations that are less developed, more innovative, less vigorously
promoted, or maintained by scientists with less political clout. (Cacioppo et al., 2004) Overall,
this approach does not test the limits of applicability to the theory it defends as the absolute
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truth. As scientists overwhelmingly apply these theories, they expose areas in which it cannot
explain or provide instrumental value to. With no alternative theories available, they are left to
completely discard these ideas and remain with no answers to these phenomena.
The truth is, however, that science is continuously evolving. Given the increasingly
specialized nature of science, very few researchers set the entire theoretical groundwork of a
theory in their professional lives while achieving total compatibility with their data. (Okasha,
2002) It would not be meaningful or progressive for science, in general, if theories were
discarded at the first sign of trouble. And they are not; Adams and Leverrier discovered Neptune
upon examining the failure of Newtons theory to explain the observed orbit of Uranus. They
extended the application of his gravitational theory to include forces exerted from large bodies of
matter nearby. In this sense, Newtons scientific theory could not legitimately describe the real
orbital positions of planets. There was a limit to its application as it was only effective when
planets were distant enough to not exert a force on one another, and was the cause behind why it
failed. But, as improvements were made, the theory still remains an effective answer to many
scientific phenomena. A realist approach to this dilemma would have discarded the theory for
not describing the truth.
IV. Positing Real Things When They Cannot Be Observed
It is important to demarcate the lines between real and unreal things in the world to
answer the question on the objectives of science and its theories. Realists adopt the notion that
everything in the world is real (hence their name). Even if it cannot be observed by the human
eye, different apparatuses (such as particle detectors) can be utilised as reliable tools to help us
magnify details or reduce the size of objects. Grover Maxwells 1962 book The Ontological
Status of Theoretical Entities sums up the argument as one impossible to resolve. It is best, then,
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to believe that all entities are real as (a) there is no principled manner to split detection from
observation; and (b) both sides confirm the presence of observable entities.
But modern science also confirms the use of detected entities in scientific work. The
electron, for instance, was never observed the human eye; it was, however, detected in a cloud
chamber by the water droplets formed on the ionized gas as electrons passed through. Realists
quoted this event as an observation for the properties that scientists recorded (i.e. its negative
charge) but only the reaction, not the object, was observed. A million tests may be conducted
to define the electrons properties but our understanding of these unobservable entities will
solely remain in conjunction to the vacuum they were examined under.
A small example of what I mean: limestone is an observable sedimentary rock. As
mineralogists have seen the entity and dissolved its chemical composition, they are able to
predict its behaviour under all sorts of weather and environments rain, prolonged droughts,
sudden freezing, etc. This is not possible with unobservable entities. While scientists can
reasonably expect their behaviour when different chemicals are mixed (through countless tests
done in the past), it is impossible to determine their neutral behaviour without a physical
observation. Furthermore, scientists cannot hypothesize about their reactions under any
environment unlike what is possible with limestone. The above instance demonstrates the need
to divide real and unreal entities in the world as our ability to (not) observe their nature shifts
how far our scientific theories can legitimately describe them.
In his counterargument to his own view, Popper admits to this problem as a pseudoproblem since an instrumental approach towards science (with no forward assertions ex. as
the most legitimate form) is both a summary of its observations and experiments and a legitimate
description of the world. This description may not be what it is, but a collection of its properties
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paints a general description of how it exists in the universe and provides scientists with a
qualitative object to lead them to conduct theoretical innovation, boundary setting, integration
and problem-solving activities (Cacioppo et al., 2004). For example, Galileo and Einstein both
spoke of the Earth as a rotating physical system. Neither of them had observable (real) evidence
to back their description; even so, a conceptual understanding allowed them to use the model and
solve problems that involved real objects. It provided a frame of reference for their peers to
adopt and use towards the discussion of physics and, eventually, design technology to dispatch
satellites to verify these claims.
V. Response to the No Miracles Argument
I believe the following section is the strongest argument to and from the instrumentalist
community. As I previously mentioned, the assumption of scientific theories as legitimate
description of real things in the world hampers the general discussion of scientific knowledge as
scientists would have no reason to reassess those claims (as they are already right). But the
instrumentalist community opposes this view; in the 1981 book A Confutation of Convergent
Realism, Larry Laudan published a well-known list of over 30 theories that were empirically
successful but later refuted and disposed by science. This was a dealing blow to this discussion
as that condition was central to the debate.
For a theory to be published, scientific realism insists that observational data must match
the theoretical claims it proposes. If this is not achieved, these scientific hypotheses remain as
mere ideas. Since the majority of published theories respect this condition and have rarely been
refuted since, realists believe that all theories (that achieve empirical success) will remain
approximately true. The publication of Laudans list exposed how historical evidence
demonstrated the inaccuracy of theories, despite the data presented. Two notable examples were
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the phlogiston theory of combustion and Huygenss wave theory of light. Both were appropriate
fits to what scientists observed in their time; however, the increased sophistication of apparatus
introduced new observations that defied the theory and proved how empirical success is a
temporary notion for judgment. Scientists cannot be sure that future observations will resemble
those known today and, as a result, should not use data compatibility as rational justification for
legitimate theories.
This notion of success is also susceptible to the problems of induction. As David Hume
would complain, scientists assume that nature is uniform and, as a result, would allow them to
draw general conclusions from historical observations. Critics of induction believe that history is
an unreliable guide to the future as the two instances demonstrated above, it is hard to make
ultimate explanations on a limited number of observations.
Some individuals did eventually refute Landans facts by proving how he did not choose
the most successful theories of the time such as crystalline spheres, which were once the
fundamental entities of cosmology. Others, in addition, criticized how scientific truth was still
relevant in these refuted theories. Not all parts of the old theory should be demolished, they say,
as parts of them remain to develop new principles.
VI. Poppers Realization and Self-Defeat
My final section critiques the work of Karl Poppers book Conjectures and Refutations and is
divided into two (unrelated) components.
(a) Search for Knowledge
Popper admits, in the final chapter of Conjectures, that the quest for pure knowledge
is impossible to achieve. He analogizes his frustration as a mountain climber who
attempts to reach the mountain peak amidst heavy fog and clouds; while he knows that
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the peak is bound to appear, he is unable to determine whether he has reached the apex or
not. The same could be said about our scientific theories; while the ultimate explanation
does exist, scientists should never conclude on those descriptions without a fixed
framework of time. Until the age of discovery is over (i.e. the end of time), it is
impossible for scientific theories to count as legitimate descriptions for the inability to
find wrongs does not make the propositions right.
Popper also makes an interesting admission to Thomas Kuhns idea of paradigm shifts
in science. He states, on p. 319:
Yet it is also important that in principle, and as long as there are no revolutionary
changes in our background knowledge, the relative appraisal of our two theorieswill
remain stable. (Popper, 1962)
Kuhns argument was precisely that; the revolutionary changes in our fundamental
scientific assumptions within a period are bound to occur that, consequently, change our
approach to scientific work in general. For a scientific theory to remain legitimate,
scientists cannot revolt against the base of knowledge it was developed upon. But
different periods of revolution (Copernican, Newtonian, Einsteinian, Darwinian) in
various sciences have triggered drastic changes in how physics and evolutionary biology
is understood to bring total change to some of its theories (i.e. heliocentric model of the
universe). This would not been possible if those theories were so-called legitimate in
the first place as nothing would tear them down.
(b) The Computational Rule v. Pure Theory
Popper also critiques the instrumentalist view of scientific theory as a very
unscientific approach. He divides scientific theories into two components; computational
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rules and pure theories. Whereas pure theories make forthright descriptions about
real things and are verified under crucial experiments (which aim to refute them),
computational rules are only tested for their limits of applicability. They were never
intended to be accurate representations of the world in the first place. So he asks; how
can we evaluate the appropriateness of these tools? By not containing features that would
allow them to be tested or falsified, scientists could conduct science in irrational or
untested directions. On the other hand, pure theories provide a definite yes or no
and support scientific progress in a slow and sequential manner. These sorts of activities
are the only ones that qualify as scientific in his view.
Popper is only correct, however, under Popperian standards. It is his belief that
scientific theories are valid if and only if it passes the falsifiability test; and, since
computation rules are not intended to be true, the test cannot be applied to them. From
this, he deduces that all scientific theories must represent real things in the world as any
other proposition would not be qualified to pass the test. But why should falsifiability be
the ultimate criterion for validity? Why must scientific ideas be validated (and validating)
to be considered as a theory? Kuhn takes this idea further in a passage from The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions:
No theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is confronted at a given timeon the
contrary, it is just the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that,
at any given time, define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science. If any and
every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all
times. (Kuhn, 1970)

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Poppers insistence of a falsifiability test is, ironically, as troubling for scientific progress
as much as an absence of it. He is accurate in questioning our reliance on instrumental
theories when we rarely stop to evaluate their legitimacy; but, on the contrary, his
proposed evaluation theory would severely restrict the number of theories that are
allowed to represent anything in the world.

In sum, it is my belief that scientific theories are a summary of the observations and
experiments that scientists conduct. I have attempted to provide six succinct reasons of the
prospects and perils of observing scientific theories as a reflection of the real world, varying
from our inability to produce unbiased observations to the limitations of scientific discovery if
we adopted the perspective of absolute truth. By maintaining a less confident attitude, scientists
will be able to add value to each others work and sustain a broad range of reasonable
alternatives for society to investigate as their environment changes and new observations appear.

Max Zhu
December 2013

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Works Cited
(Van Fraassen, 2002)
Van Fraassen, B. C. (2002). The empirical stance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
(Popper, 1962)
Popper, K. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations. 7th ed. Cornwall: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(Cacioppo et al., 2004)
Cacioppo, J.T.; Semin, G.R.; Berntson, G.G. (2004). Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific
Symbiosis. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
(Okasha, 2002)
Okasha, S. (2002). Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. 1st ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.
(Kuhn, 1970)
Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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