Brill

Forms and Flux in Plato's "Cratylus"
Author(s): Brian Calvert

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1970), pp. 26-47
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181839
Accessed: 27-02-2015 04:06 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 04:06:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Formsand Flux in Plato's Cratylus

BRIAN
CALVERT
In this paper I want to consider two passages of the Cratylus in some

detail (389 a - 390 e, and 439 c - 440 d). Despite their familiarity
to students of Plato, it is my belief that commentators have overlooked certain subtle but important distinctions that are to be discerned
in them, - distinctions which, if sound, modify the usual interpretations of the dialogue.
Briefly, what I hope to show is that in the first passage we are introduced to a different kind of non-sensible entity, akin to the Form,
but whose main distinguishing feature is its plurality, as opposed to
the unity characteristic of the "classical Form". In the second, a short
discussion of Heracliteanism, it seems to me that Plato's analysis of
the doctrine of flux is far more intricate and complicated than is
generally allowed.
I. Discussion o/ the making of shuttles and the making of names
1. 389 a-b. When a carpenter makes a shuttle, Plato tells us, he does
so first of all by "looking at (P)&irctv)something the nature of wlhich
is to weave"' (7rpkTOLoiO'U
'rt 'O EpCEXeC
xepyuL'=Lv).If
the shuttle he is
making breaks, the carpenter does not take as his model for making
another the broken one, but looks to the "form" (Cx?tvo ' ei80o) which
o `aTLV XCpXt4).
is most properly called the "the shuttle itself" (au'oeo
This passage is very similar2 to one in the Republic, when Plato
writes (596 b): - "the craftsman ... fixes his eyes on the idea or form,
and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other case the
tables..." (6 asuLoupyq... 7rpo6 T'iV cav P)X?7ZWVOUTr 7MLt O pCV TOq
xXLvos 4 8?
&
TpaOea
Translations are based upon the Loeb edition of the Cratylus.

V. Luce, "The Theory of Ideas in the Cratylus", Phronesis, 10 (1965),
pp. 25-6, following V. Goldschmidt, argues that there are certain important
differences between the passages, and stresses their dissimilarity. I shall be
examining his arguments below. This article is hereafter cited by the author's
name.
2 J.
26
389 b-c. But when Plato begins to go into more detail concerning the
construction of actual shuttles, complications set in, complications
formulation in the Republic.
which are not dealt with by the ou-rcoitoLcZ
The carpenter makes shuttles for weaving different kinds of cloth, and
all the shuttles he makes "must contain the form of shuttle, and in
each of his products he must embody that nature which is naturally
ao4 SXrLveao,
OL0C
best for each". (7&a v4 I v 8rst 'Toqq
x-pxc
a,
? xO aT(,
XOt>XMr'fJ 7UrS'uxS,
-oOcYi)V a7COtOOL
T'7V
(puaLV EL;
TO
EpYOV
xcxa,rov).Plato appears to be hinting here at some distinction between

m ypu'Lq. His use of ,uev... Uz... is at least a prima facie
that
we are meant to see some contrast. All shuttles must
indication
have the EZ8ogof shuttle, but in each actual product must be embodied
the yuaLqwhich is best for the job in hand. In other words, the notion
seems to be that while all shuttles have the same e'8oq they do not
all have the same CV5LM. The yupacsof the shuttle made for weaving
thick woollen garments is different from the ypuia of that made for
weaving those of light linen material.
TroeT8ogand
2. 389 c-d. The contrast is strengthened by this and subsequent

sections. From the case of shuttles, the argument is generalised to
include all other instruments, before a return is made to particular
products.
"Soc: And the same applies to all other instruments. The artisan must discover
7tcuxo6
the instrument naturally fitted for each purpose (X!6 yp6aL &xo&tWcs
6pyxvov &keup6v'a)and must embody that in the material of which he makes
the instrument, not in accordance with his own will, but in accordance with
its nature. He must, it appears, know how to embody in the iron the borer fitted
by nature for each special use (no cpiact Ex&co rpUtprvoV 7teyupx6q).
Her: Certainly.
Soc: And he must embody in the wood the shuttle fitted by nature for each
kind of weaving (6qv ?UaCt XEpX(80C&Xia'M rpUXUZMV).
Her: True.
Soc: For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular
kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments."
The making process is explained more fully. What is embodied in the

material is the "instrument naturally fitted for each purpose", and
this I take to be equivalent to "the nature which is naturally best for
each." (i.e. I take TorcCaret?XCa-Trc7wrpx6 opyavov as an equivalent
formulation to rairnrv -rrv pu'cv o'L exCa-rWxCXXarC 7Cp?9UXEV.The use
at each occurrence strengthens this interpretation.)
of abroMR6vat
27
After the artisan "looks to" the "Form", the next step is for him to
discover the "nature" concerned, and to put this into the material.
The Form is not described as being materialised, although it is said
that all instruments "contain" (gycLv) the Form. Nor is the "nature"
to be identified with particular physical objects. This is made clear
when it is said to be discovered prior to the making of actual instruments. In that it is described as being put into material, it is
conceived as something different from that material and the finished
instrument. Therefore, once we envisage an instrument to fulfil a particular purpose, e.g. a shuttle for making a heavy woollen cloth, we are
not considering the actual concrete tool. Nor are we considering the
general Form whose nature is simply to weave; particular purposes
fall outside its scope.
3. 389 d - 390 b. The generalisation for all instruments is now applied
to names, which Plato has previously described as instruments "of
teaching and of separating reality" (388 c):
"Soc: Then, my dear friend, must not the law-giver also know how to embody
in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object?
Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the name itself,
if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different law-givers do
not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget it on that account; for
different smiths do not embody it in the same iron, though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same idea,
though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it
be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?
Her: Certainly.
Soc: On this basis, then, you will judge the lawgiver, whether he be here or in
a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name,
in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse law-giver, whether here or anvwhere
else, will you not?
Her: Certainly.
Soc: Now who is likely to know whether the proper form of shuttle is embodied
in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it?
Her: Probably the one who is to use it, Socrates."
Certain parallels between the accounts of the making of names and of

shuttles are apparent. In the making of names, the lawgiver "looks to"
C 8 garv 6vopa.)just as the
"the name itself" (7tpo Tog TxeZvo
(PXCrrowrac)
carpenter looked to the shuttle itself. In sounds and syllables, corresponding to the wood of the shuttle, the lawgiver embodies "that
name fitted by nature for each object" ('o' ex&atcr ?p)a 7trpUX0
28
Gvopam).Similarly, the carpenter has embodied "the shuttle fitted by

nature for each kind of weaving". A different but, I take it, equivalent
formulation for this is given at 390 a and b. What is embodied in
letters and syllables is described as "the proper form of the name"
(TO ToU O4Ov6p.xroq
el8oq TO' npo&rxov) and that which is embodied in
wood to make a shuttle is now called "the proper form of shuttle"
(TIo 7poaiXGov EMo xCpx(toq)
I am aware that there are certain difficulties in this passage which

not yet considered. But before doing so, I think that, on the
have
I
evidence of the text examined so far, there is sufficient justification
for suggesting that Plato has certain distinctions in mind which can
be set out as follows:
- ourO O ealrrv x (the preferred formula)
(a) the "Form"
- 8r
0q of x
Form"- O WXxeL to do, or to be, x
rcpuxev
(b) the "Proper Form" ypusa of x oiLoc&x&a-caxaMXAMUr-n
T-
Exca CT pUaCL7W?UX0q x
T6 7rpOaiXOV ?L80I
of x
(c) Actual concrete x's.

The distinction betweeni the Form and particular things is familiar
enough. What needs to be done now is, firstly, to try and justify what
grounds there are for claiming that class (b) above (the "Proper
Form") refers to an entity different from particular things and the
Form. Secondly, I shall consider how clearly the distinctions are made.
Finally, there is the question of whether the Form here is to be regarded as the transcendent Form of the Phaedo and Republic, or
whether the stage is merely set for the emergence of such a Form.
In relation to the Formi:
(a) The "Proper Form" is more determinate in character. For
example, in the case of shuttles, the Form of shuttle is more abstract
in the sense that it lacks specification for the particular type of
weaving to be performed. The npoaqxov el?o0 (i.e. 7rpoavxovEx&at& fitted for the particular task), is more definite, and this increase in
determinate content seems to be in the direction of function. While
the Form has the nature of weaving simpliciter, which all shuttles have,
the npoaqxov etlo4 of shuttle for task A is different from that for task B.
Although Plato doesn't say that the formulations are equivalent, the use of
&Cx787 at 390 a 6, as well as the general context, justifies such an interpretation.
29
Similarly, in the case of names. The Form of name has the nature of
naming simpliciter (later described as revealing the essence of something). The 7rpoOqxovel8oq of name has the nature of revealing the
essence of this thing. Hence, while the name4 for table and the name
for chair will both have the Form of name, the npoovxov el8oq of the
name for table will be different from that for chair.
(b) the "Proper Form" is more numerous. This point is a corollary
of the first, but important for emphasising the difference between the
entities concerned. For example, the "Proper Form" of shuttle for
weaving cloth A is distinguishable not only qualitatively but also
numerically from that for weaving cloth B. But there is only a single
Form of shuttle. In more general terms, there is only one Form of
something, but there are as many 7poavxovrCX ?s
of that Form as
there are different kinds of s'pyoto be performed. Hence there are more
"Proper Forms" than Forms. Moreover, although we can say a priori
that there is only one Form, we cannot say how many
rpoQaXOVrCX
st8
there will be of the Form. New weaving techniques will demand new
shuttles, new entities discovered will require new names.
In relation to particular things:
(a) As was pointed out above, the fact that Plato describes the
"Proper Form" as being discovered prior to the making of instruments,
and of being, as it were, impressed upon the material to make the
product, implies that he intended it to be different from the actual
product.
(b) there is also a difference in number. There are more concrete
particulars than "Proper Forms". While there are many instances of
shuttles designed for the weaving of thick woollen cloth, there is only
one "Proper Form" of such a shuttle. While there are many occurrences of the name for table in written and spoken language, there is
only one "Proper Form" of such a name.
Then again, Plato makes the point that instruments of different appearances could perform the same task, and so embody the same
"Proper Form". In the case of names, for example, variety in letters
and syllables is admissible, provided that the essence (oUatm)of the
I translate ovo,u as "name" throughout, even though in some places "word"
may be preferable. For a fuller discussion cf. Richard Robinson "The Theory
(1955),
of Names in Plato's Cratylus", Revue Internationale de Philosophie,
p. 221 ff.
30
object to be named is made clear (394 a). So the names "Hector" and
"Astyanax" are said to mean the same thinig - they have the same
"Proper Foim". Hence particular objects (the actual occurrences of
the written or spoken names "Hector" and "Astyanax") which are
plainly different, but which have the same "Proper Form", cannot be
identified with that "Proper Form".
4. If, as I have sought to show, a case is to be made out for differentiating the "Proper Form" from Form and particular things, it
might seem surprising that other commentators5 have not remarked
on this distinction; or, if they have, they do not appear to regard it
as indicative of a distinction of any interest or importance. G. M. A.
Grube approaches my position when he writes:
"In the same way the lawgiver who names things must look at 'that which is
a name in itself' and must give to each name the proper eidos of name in whatever syllables is suitable."6
But although Grube specifically mentions the ntpoaixov el804, he pays

no further attention to it, and does not dwell upon the issue. J. V. Luce
comes even closer to my position, saying that:
"Socrates appears to draw a distiniction between a generic shuttle and various
specific shuttles. A&to 8ga-TLv
6
XSPX_x (389 b 5) which is contemplated, seems to be
distinguished from T-rVc95aeLxepx18c kXOaTr7re?uxulocv(c 9) which is embodied.
A similar distinction occurs in the parallel passage dealing with names. AC)r6
&xELvo
68aTLv 6vo1va,at which the vo1io'k-,q looks seems to be distinct from 'r6
exaa-ro 6cpEtneuxog G`votawhich he embodies in sounds and syllables (389 d)."7
Moreover, Luce makes it clear why he does not consider the distinction
important, for he continues:
"But the distinction, such as it is, is not well maintained throughout the whole
passage. EI8o4, used now of the generic shuttle (389 b 3), is later used of the
5 For a typical sample of such commentators, cf. G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Though.
(Methuen, 1935), p. 13ff. P. Friedlander, Plato: (2) the Dialogues (trans. Ht
Meyerhoff, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 201. P. Shorey, What Plato
Said (University of Chicago, 1933), p. 261. A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his
Work (University Paperbacks, Methuen, 1963), p. 80ff. Sir David Ross, Plato's
Theory of Ideas, (O.U.P.), 1963, p. 19.
I Grube, op. cit. in n. 5, p. 14.
7 Luce, p. 24.
31
specific (390 b 1). Similarly, in the recapitulation of the theory of naming at

390 e the &-%tLoupy6q
6voQLduroivlooks at -T -rTXq5aLt OvoFaoc
ov &x&a'rand embodies
its el8oq in letters and syllables."8
To this may be added a later note:

"... Ross... finds no examples in the Crat. of phrases implying or suggesting
transcendence
of the Ideas. Egimand
?18o0
are joined with tino8&86vxt at 389 e 3
and 390 a 6, cI8o; with xela,&= &vat 390 b 1-2. All shuttles must 'have' the
el8oq (ixetv at 389 b 10). Shuttle making, like name making, is viewed in terms
of purely human needs and purposes. Those who view the Idea of Shuttle as
transcendent ought to take the saine view of the Idea of Name, which seems
even more unlike a transcendent entity."9
It would appear that the reason why Luce and others do not attach
any significance to the difference between Form and Proper Form is
that Plato himself is taken to obliterate the distinction. I would
contend, however, that the distinction is maintained more rigorously
than Luce allows.10
To make the contrast between the Form and Proper Form even
clearer, it does not seem to me that Luce makes a cogent case against
seeing a close similarity between the theory of artefacta here and in
the Republic. None of the arguments he presents to show important
differences between the Form of Bed and the Form of Shuttle do I
8 P. 24.
9 P. 30, note 32.
10 Of the passages
Luce mentions, those at 390 b 1-2 and 390 a 6 refer to the

npoaixov el8oq. The use of the term IXeLvat 389 b 10, the only place where the
"Form-particular" relationship is brought up, is, I suggest, too vague to carry
much weight, especially since Plato has to hand the stronger ternmi7roSLU6vO
to express immanence. The remaining two passages are more problematic. The
language at 389 e 3 certainly suggests the distinction is being ignored. But
given the context of the paragraph, where it is stressed that instruments, thouglh
looking different, may perform the same function, it may be that Wcxrefers to
(6pyavov). At 390 e 2-4, the difficulties could be resolved
T-6kxia'rw 99L
7M?Uz6x
thus: if, in the phrase a9To5 -r el8oq, we understand
auocro5to refer to
&xcXaTco,
and take tr elgo; to mean T-v ocuiav (a possible equivalence), this passage would
theii be more consistent with what Plato says elsewhere (e.g. at 393 d) about
the correctness of names. There need be no problem about the contemplation
T6
of the Proper Form (here, T6
9'aeL
NVoic Ov &x&atcr). As Plato points
out at
389 c 3-7, the Proper Form must be envisaged prior to its embodiment.
If this analysis is correct, there are fewer counter-instances (and perhaps
none that is incontestable) to the claim that in this section Plato distinlgulislhes
Fornm,Proper Form, and physical object.
32
find convincing."1Consequently, there is more reason to assert that

Plato comes very near to, or even arrives at, the point of distinguishing the transcendent Form; and if Plato has distinguished the
transcendent Form in this part of the dialogue, the stronger the case
for making a firm distinction between Form and Proper Form.
Nevertheless I agree with Luce that there are good reasons for
regarding the Cratylus as a transitional dialogue. I think, however,
that the best support for the evolutionary hypothesis is to be found
elsewhere.
The main problem of this section revolves around the 7rpoaixov
alo4. If the Proper Form has been distinguished, what is the purpose
of the distinction, and why does Plato not make it more clear?
In the text Plato seems to describe the relation of Form to Proper
Form as that of genus to species. In the case of shuttles, for instance,
the genus is "that whose nature is to weave", while the species of this
11 Cf. Luce, p. 23. While there is nothing in the Cratylus corresponding to the
&be64yu'oupy64 of Republic 598 d, the notion of God's making the Forms is, as
Ross points out (Plato's Theory of Ideas pp. 78-9), a peculiar feature of the
Republic account, and inconsistent with what is said elsewhere about the
ontological status of the Forms. Secondly, while it is true that the Form of
Shuttle is not described as "fully real", Gregory Vlastos (see note 24) has raised
the question of how such language as "tull reality" is to be interpreted. I hope
to show that later in the Cratylus Plato does talk of Forms in language which
amounts to an assertion of their being fully real. Thirdly, it is true that talk of
a paradigmatic el8o4, and of el8o; as mi',r68 ICtLV is carefully established in the
Cratylus, while such language is assumed in the Republic. Yet such a use of
language is quite consistent with the position that here, for the first time, we
are witnessing the actual emergence of the transcendent Form. Finally, the
extent
to which Plato succeeds
in distinguishing
6
el8o4 or oc'r6 8a'nv,
the sub-
stance of Luce's fourth point, has been discussed already.

Luce raises the question of how the Form of Name is to be interpreted, if we
take the Form to be transcendent. This seems to me to be a difficult problem,
whether or not we regard the Form as a "separate" entity, and a full account
would be impossible to give here. But, briefly, I think an answer could be made
on the following lines. The Form of Name is that whose nature is to make plain
the essence of whatever is named, with no specific content attaching to the
"whatever". The Proper Form of Name, on the other hand, is that whose
function is to reveal the essence of a particular object, or class of objects of the
same kind. If we may leave aside the sense reference question, and if "revealing
can be taken as "showing the meaning of",
the essence of" (riJvoua'Lav8&vXo5v)
the Form of Name amounts to the general requirement that every actual name
must fulfil in order to be a name - it must mean something. While all names
have in common this same general feature, viz. they have some meaning, the
particular meanings they have, of course, are quite different.
33
genus are "that whose nature is to weave cloth A", "that whose nature
is to weave cloth B", and so on. Plato also seems to characterise the
Form as that which is contemplated, and, I am inclined to think,
separate and disembodied, as opposed to the Proper Form which can
be, and is, embodied. It could be that there is the beginning ot an
explorationi of the notion that the Proper Form acts as a link between
this world and the world of Forms. However he only concerns himself here with terms, such as "shuttle" and "name", which have a
strongly functional flavour. It is difficult to be sure wthat Plato would
reply, if we asked what were some possible Proper Forms of more
typical transcendental entities like ociTotxocX6vor cxuro &yafO'v.
But the fact that so little is said, together with the fact that the
Proper Form is not taken up again at the end of the dialogue, incliines
me to the opinion that the most likely answer is that the distinction,
of which Plato himself may have been only half aware, merely reflects
bewilderment in his thought at the time of writing the Cratylus. If,
as is possible, his use of language is inconsistent, and his employment
of quasi-technical terms such as e'B04 and 'Lax is imprecise,12 this
wavering, as well as his failure to clarify and press through the implications of the distinction, may simply show hesitation in his mind.
He may be uncertain how many kinds of non-material entities there
are; he may feel in doubt about their interrelationships and relationships with things in this world - factors tending to iindicate that the
dialogue occurs prior to a period of metaphysical construction. Moreover, as I hope to show, the doubt and uncertaiinty continue when he
comes to investigate the ontological status of sensible particulars.
II. Discussion of the doctrine of flux
1. Plato discusses the Heraclitean doctrine of flux at most length in
this dialogue and in the Theaetetus. In the Cratylus it is far from easv
to see:
(a) What Plato understands by "being in flux". Several possibilities
are half discerned, which differ from the analysis of the meaning of
"flux" given in the Theaetetus.
12 As has often been noted, the terms el8o; and t8?
are not used exclusively
by Plato in the technical sense of "Form", and in this dialogue we find instances
of their occurrence in a number of senses. Cf. 418 e iya&o5 yap W8mousaoTo
g&ov - "obligation is a kind (i.e. sub-class) of good", and 386 e 9V TL E180q T(4O
6v'r&vetatv, at wpa9tq - "actionis are class of realities."
34
(b) Whether, and in what sense, he thinks the material world to be

in flux.
The whole passage is confused by some curiously invalid argumentation, so that Plato is prevented from realising the significance
of the possibilities presented. At this point, except for an affirmation
that truth is to be discovered in things rather than language, the
dialogue ends in an inconclusive tangle.
2. 439 c-d.
"Soc: Consider, my worthy Cratylus, a question about which I often dream.
Shall we assert that there is any beauty itself, or good, or any other entities of
L xIV x a'rovv
'v
this kind? (7t6'epov,pLkv tL eIvMLOUcT XCX6V xal &yoC,6VXOC
OVToV
oUYrcL,
Cra: I think there is, Socrates.

Soc: Then let us consider this, not whether a particular face, or something of
that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not in our
tr xaxk6v)always such as it is?
opinion, beauty itself (ao6TG
Cra: That is inevitable."
If there are reasons for saying that in the earlier part of the dialogue
Plato has distinguished the transcendent Form, albeit with some sense
of nervousness and hesitation, it would be natural to take ai'ro xBo6v
or xucroTo xxOv as equivalent to the formulation uro' 'o 'a'rt xcx?o6v,
the preferred expression of 389 b ff. Moreover, in certain important
respects, cxu'r xBo6v and aorr6 &ydc6,v are talked of in terms which are
strikingly similar to the characterisations we find given of the Forms
in the Phaedo and Republic. Though it is true that we find an expression like xrx &e 6wVrm
xxC 7repUX-rom(397 b 8) used in a situation
which has nothing to do with Forms, the present context places great
emphasis on the absolute unchangeability of ocvr6T' xa.X6v,as opposed
to the beauty of things that do change. This contrast between permanence and change from the ontological viewpoint receives epistemological backing, as we shall see. Only of that which remains in the
same state can there be yvC0GLa.
It is more difficult to be sure of an interpretation of the phrase

&v9xmcarov-rFv OvTwv.Luce appears to me to be unnecessarily disparaging of Plato's efforts when he talks of the "all-inclusiveness
about the twice repeated
formula &vgxarrTov ti'v 6vr&v (Crat. 439 c 8 -
d 1, 440 b 6) which does not seem to square with the 'separation' of

MUrr) oi aLxfrom r&inot?A in the Phaedo...'3 In its first occurrence,
13 Luce, p. 25.
35
at 439 c 8 - d 1, the formula is Cv &xa'rov r7v 6vmv ou'rw; the ourlY)

is probably intended to refer back to things like aTow xo6v anid
oUrr6Myoy&v,in which case its scope becomes much more narrow. It
is tempting to conjecture that in these two places, where the formula
occurs, 'Li ov'r may be interpreted in a semi-technical sense (- TO'
6v',wg 6vra), though elsewhere in the dialogue the term is use(d quite
and just
and -TOC t
frequently as a synonym for TXi 7rp&yptoctc
seems to mean "things" - a point that may be symptomatic of the
confusion to come.
That the theory of Forms is not as fully worked ouit and clarified as
we find it in the Phaedo and Republic, I do not dispute. Nevertheless,
it is surely hard to resist the conclusion that Plato is making the
distinction here between a mutable world and a separate realm, wlhich
is free from instability.
To deal with the passage in more detail. As far as particular tlhings,
such as faces, are concerned, Plato wants to dismiss them from immediate con-sideration, and to argue that whatever their "ontological
status", the flux doctrine cannot hold of the Forms, whose absolute
permanence is stressed. However, Norman Gulley14 maintaiiis that
Plato is saying here, "at least implicitly and almost certainly explicitly
also", that sensible things are in flux. He supports his claim by taking
but as aii ex%ML... pLZv not as a continuation of the hypothetical,
planatory indicative clause, the sense then being, "for all these things
are in flux".
Such an interpretation is openi to serious doubt. First of all, as
Gulley himself concedes, it makes better grammatical sense to take
the clause in question as a continuation of the hypothetical. Secolndly,
the context is better understood if Plato is regarded as having an open
rmind on the subject. It would be odd to say, with Gulley, that Plato
accepts the doctrine of flux as true for sensible things imme(liately
prior to an attempt to analyse what "being in flux" means; and at
440 C ff., Plato admits that he is uncertain whether to agree witlh the
Heracliteans about the status of material things. To say this would
be a strange reversal from what Gulley would regard as a categorical
statement of the opposite opinion a page earlier.
On the other hand, Luce'5 seeks to have the clauise xcxl. . .?LV exNorman Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, Methueii, (1962), pp 72-3.
pp. 32-3. My reasons for differing from Luce may be summarised as
follows:
logical exercise";
(a) Luce talks of the passage being "ain essentially
14
15 Luce,
36
cluded as a copyist's gloss. I think, however, that retention of the

clause makes better sense of the passage, for, as I shall argue, we do
have some discussion of what it means to be in flux.
3. 439 d-e.
"Soc: Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this,
then that it is that (tp&'rov iv 6rL kXeNV6la-rv, 7?t-ra 6'n toLo3rov), or must it
inievitably, in the very instant (&4i.a)while we are speaking, immediately become
something
else (&X)o or>T6 e1ug
ylyvafL)
and pass away and no longer (-nzX"tL)
be what it is?
Cra: That is inevitable.
Soc:
How, then, can that which is never in the same state (6 [Litno'T
&acYu'Tw
9xfe) be anything? For if it is ever (no-re) in the same state, then obviously at
that time it is not changing; and if it is always (&c() in the same state and is
always the same, how can it ever change or move, since it never relinquishes
its own form? (q&v
UTrOi Mo&q4).
tLarILcktVOv T-5
Cra: It cannot do so at all."
This argument about being, which is to be followed by an argument

about knowledge (440 a-b), is not at all easy and straight-forward.
It begins by talking about "beauty itself", or the Form of Beauty
(I take the first "it" (ouro) to refer back to aoUnTro xoa6Xv),but the
statements made are general in scope, and so it would be just as
correct, and simpler, to understand his remarks as having no special
reference.
There seems to be an inference from:
(a) "If something is continually changing from moment to moment,
we can't say that it is first this and then that, for while we speak, at
this very instant it immediately becomes something else, and is no
longer what it is."
to (b) "That which is never in the same state is not anything."
"ontological considerations... blur the basic contrast of the sentence...", and
"the clause brings to premature birth the ontological implications of Plato's
essentially logical argument". This seems to me to conflict with what he
says earlier (p. 29) of Plato's "idealist tendency to equate logic with ontology".
In the earlier dialogues we do find logical, epistemological, and ontological
strands almost inextricably intertwined. We should not be surprised to find
this intermingling in the Cratylus also.
(b) The earlier attacks on flux at 411 b-c and 439 c are against universal
flux. At 439 d we now have some things excluded from the flux doctrine.
Prior to an analysis of the notion of flux, it seems to me to be quite consistent
to reject universal flux, but leave oneself open to accepting a limited version.
37
This inference lies behind the orthodox interpretation which takes

Plato, in this part of the dialogue, to regard sensible things as being in
flux and as having no determinate characteristics. That is, it seems to be
taken for granted that Plato was impressed by the argument, and that it
forms the basis of his postulation of eternal unchanging Forms.16 But
I am far from sure that Plato was impressed by the argument, irrespective of his later position. By this I mean that while he doesn't
seem to find any fault with its logic, he does have serious reservations
about where it leads. The doubts expressed in the concluding paragraphs, about which I shall say more later, reflect his instinctive
feeling that something has gone astray. I think it is worthwhile to
examine the argument and show why it fails. If we can see exactly
why it is unsound, and locate precisely the points at which Plato was
misled, we shall be in a better position to appreciate how close in fact
he came to laying to rest the ghost of Heraclitus, rather than embracing
without question the doctrine of flux as true of the material world.
Against the argument the following objections can be raised. Given
something in a process of continual and, presumably, rapid change,
we are always and inevitably "out of date" in whatever name we
assign to it; i.e. at time t, we perceive it as A, but when we come to
call it A, it is time t2, and it is no longer A but B. From which, Plato
claims, it isn't anything, since it is never in the same state. But because
we can never at any time give a name to the state it is at that time in,
it does not follow that we can in no sense give it a name. Even if we
grant the force of the "time-lag" argument, we could say that at
time t1 it was A, at time t2 it was B, and so on. Hence to this extent
we would be correct in our assignation of names.
The argument also seems to refute itself. There is a difference
between something being in a process of change from one state to
another, and something never being in any state at all, not being
anything. The force of the argument depends upon denying this
difference. Yet at the same time, Plato implicitly recognises the
difference when he says that what is in a state of perpetual change is
"always becoming something else" (&Bo... ytyvsaact). To be something
is not to be in no state at all.
else (&XXo)
Nevertheless, we do have some distinctions made which are relevant
for an assessment of what is to be understood by the doctrine of flux,
as well as Plato's attitude to sensible objects.
16
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987 a 29ff.
38
(a) "That which is never in the same state" is contrasted with

(b) "That which is sometimes (or, for a time) in the same state"
and
(c) "That which is always in the same state."
Though Plato makes little of the distinctions drawn, this differentiation
is surely important. If to deny that something is unchanging and
always the same is to assert that that thing is in a state of flux, this
latter category is now shown to be complex, consisting of (a) and (b)
above. Hence we cannot talk simply of flux without considering, as
Plato does, what different meanings the notion has. Moreover we are
shortly to have another classification made at 440 a where Plato
distinguishes
(d) "That which is in no state."
This analysis cuts across the distinctions made in the Theaetetus where
flux is considered as change of place and as qualitative change. The
present context reminds us of the classifications made in the Republic
(477 a ff) where things of this world are assigned to an intermediate
ontological status, between being and not being. In which case we
might be inclined to say that sensible objects would fall most plausibly
under category (b) above. They are obviously not permanent and unchanging in any absolute sense; they are in flux in the sense that they
are, for some time (7ror), in the same state - that is to say, they have
some stability. Why Plato doesn't himself pursue this possibility,
which would modify considerably the impact of Heracliteanism in the
Cratylus, is a question I shall deal with in more detail later.
4. 439 e - 440 a.
"Soc: No, nor can it be known by anyone. For at the moment when he who
seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different (&X?oxot
dX?oZovytyvoL-ro)so that its nature and state can no longer (oUx...
-L) be known;
and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state (6...
Cra: It is as you say.
The subject of the first sentence ("it") refers back to "that which is
never in the same state", and the point made here about knowing
seems intended to be parallel to the point just made about naming.
As soon as an observer focuses his attention upon something which is
never in the same state it changes and becomes something else and
can no longer be known for what it was. Difficulties similar to those of
the previous section attach to the reasoning here.
39
Mutatis mutandis, the comments made on the "time-lag" aspect of

the argument can be transferred here. Then again, Plato passes from
talking about "that which is never in the same state" to "that which
is in no state". His argument demands an equivalence between the
former and the latter phrase. Yet at the same time this equivalence is
denied, for "to become something else and different" implies that it
enters some state and not none.
We can perhaps see why Plato does unconsciously contradict hinmself, if we examine more closely the following propositions:
(a) We cannot know that which is never in the same state.
(b) We cannot know that which is in no state.
There is an unnoticed ambiguity in the sense of "cannot know".
To say "we cannot know x" may be taken as asserting a necessary or
contingent statement. It is a necessary statement if x is such that it
logically excludes the possibility of its being known. Otherwise it is a
contingent statement. Let us consider now the two substitutions Plato
makes for "x", in terms of the two propositions mentioned above.
In the second we have "that which is in no state", "that which could
not be", that is to say "that which is nothing". (All of these phrases I
take to be satisfactory renderings of TO qyiC
Cxov.) If there is no
possible object of knowledge, if there is nothing "there" to be known,
then it is necessarily unknowable, and the statement is necessarily
true.17 In the first we have "that which is never in the same state".
The question that arises now is whether Plato understands this phrase
as necessarily or contingently excluding the possibility of knowledge.
Here the lurking ambiguity causes confusion, for the evidence in the
text seems to suggest that Plato wants to take it in both senses.
The use of the "time-lag" argument, as well as the employment of
tensed language (terms such as &{p, 9Tt, and F-64) suggest that this
statement is to be regarded as contingently and not necessarily true.
In which case it is a psychological statement about our ability to know.
Some things move or change so quickly that we cannot, as a matter
of fact, "catch hold" of them.
But Plato also tries to give logical force to this statement by urging
an equivalence between "what is in no state" and "what is never in
17
Cf. Republic 477 a "How could that which "is" not be known?.. that which
in no way "is" is in every way unknowable". Cf. also 478 c "To that which is
not we of necessity (AR&vMiyx-) assigned nescience, and to that which is,
knowledge". We notice the use of &E&vOCyxmto emphasise that this is a logical
claim.
40
the same state". This is a mistake. There is a difference in kind between

them, as there is a difference in kind between both of these and "that
which is always in the same state". In fact, "what is never in the same
state" is akin to "what is sometimes in the same state", for the difference between these is one of degree and not of kind. In the Reputblic
these latter two states are grouped together and occupy the category
between Being and Not-being.
I think it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this
passage. We have a symptom here of what many commentators have
called attention to, namely Plato's apparently ambivalent attitude
to sense knowledge and material objects. The problems which this
attitude generates are summarised by Gulley:
"What then becomes of the doctrine that sensible characteristics are 'copies'
or 'images' of Forms, that they are recognisable and hence are able to prompt
the recollection of Forms? This doctrine clearly assumes that tllere are determinate and recognisable sensible characteristics; indeed it is a doctrine that
sensibles are determinate and recognisable in so far as they 'participate in' and
hence 'resemble' Forms.
There is a serious inconsistency, then, between this doctrine and the consequences drawn by Plato from the fact that sensibles are in flux."'8
As we have seen, to be in flux is, according to Gulley's interpretation,

to be devoid of determinate characteristics. Yet it seems to me that,
in connection with these final sections of the Cratylus, the inconsistency
is an unnecessary and unreal one. By this I mean that had Plato only
pressed further with his analysis of what it is to be in flux, and utilised
the various possibilities he had at least half seen, it would have been
clear that there does not have to be any mutual exclusiveness between
"being in flux" and "having determinate and recognisable sensible
characteristics". He has done enough, in his analysis, to show that
there are some interpretations of the meaning of "being in flux" which
are quite consistent with the possession of determinate characteristics.
Although this is not stated explicitly, the argument here does seem
to depend upon a correspondence between ontology and epistemology,
or, as Plato puts it, between the known and the knower (440 b). That
is to say, as in the Republic, each ontological category has a corresponding epistemological state, and on this point a comparison
between the Cratylus and the Republic reveals an interesting situation.
18
Gulley, op. cit. in n. 14, p. 74.
41
(i) in the Republic

Ontological category
That which is
That which is and is not
That which is not
- Epistemological state
- Knowledge (yvCat)
(86r)
- Belief
(&yvoLa)
- Ignorance
(ii) in the Cratylus

Epistemological state
Ontological category
That which is
- Knowledge
That which is sometimes in the same state

That which is never in the same state
That which is in no state
(yvoL4)
Lack of knowledge
The trouble in the Cratylus passage stems from the fact that there is
only one knowledge word (rvCat) and this is reserved for "what is
always in the same state" or "that which is". Moreover, the doctrine
which asserts a close link between knowing and being takes the form
here, it seems to me, that if there is no knowing state, then there is nio
object "there" to be known. In which case, if anything fails to qualify
as an eternally unchanging and permanent entity i.e. if it is not a
Form, then there can be no knowledge (yvCaLm)of it. Since Plato does
not introduce the notion of 86Rm(belief) or acta,VY~Lq(perception), he
is led to say that if we cannot have yviiatq of anything, there can be no
cognitive apprehension of it at all. Hence it is unknowable and in no
determinate state.
5. 440 a-c. Attention switches from things (as possible objects of
naming and knowing) to knowledge itself, and initially the broad
contrast is drawn between things which change and things which are
always the same. It is then argued that if there is knowledge, it will
fall into the latter category; for if it were in the former it would
change to something other than knowledge. Hence knowledge is
something which is unchanging and permanent.
"Soc: But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are
changing and nothing remains fixed; for if knowledge itself does not change and
cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be
-re &v&et 4 yvoatL xoxl eN 'vatq), but if the very essence of
knowledge (1ikvoL
knowledge changes, at the moment of its change to another nature than know&v uidatrtLot &Xxozl8oq yvacog) there would be no knowledge,
ledge (&La'r' as
and if it is always changing, there will always be no knowledge, and by this
reasoning there will neither be anyone to know nor anything to be known. But
42
if there is always that which knows and that which is known - if the beautiful,
the good and all the other verities exist - I do not see how there is any likeness
between these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux or motion. Now
whether this is the nature of things, or the doctrine of Heraclitus and many
others is true, is another question."
This passage seems to reflect the "all or nothing" attitude to knowledge. The "perpetual stability" of knowledge is a necessary and
sufficient condition for there to be knowledge (pova re av oc&rn
yvi.t)a xoL
o ety yv&aLq).If our minid is not in this state, it has cognition
of nothing - it is equivalent to &lyvoain the Republic.
It is a pity that, in the Cralylus, Plato seems to make his epistemological divisions in the wrong place. A strict dichotomy is drawn
between knowledge and lack of knowledge, but only knowledge of
that which is unchanging (i.e. infallible, certain knowledge) is allowed
to count as knowledge. The disjunction is assumed to be exhaustive.
But the alternatives of infallible knowledge, on the one hand, and no
knowledge at all, on the other, present a false picture. If he had seen
here, as he sees in the Republic, that the dichotomy is more happily
made between infallible knowledge and non-infallible knowledge, he
would have been in a position to appreciate that the latter disjunct is
complex, embracing fallible (or empirical) knowledge, ao'x, and utter
ignorance. As it is, his lack of logical acumen in this passage has the
unfortunate consequence of blurring the careful and subtle distinctions
made in the analysis of flux. An ontological advance is frustrated by
an unsophisticated epistemology, and objects of sense experience are
apparently condemned to wallow in an unknowable realm."'
6. The most likely conclusion to be drawn from this second section is
that Plato has an open mind about the status of sensible objects. In
the final paragraphs of the dialogue a contrast is drawn between
Cratylus' confidence and Plato's doubt. Part of this doubt is due,
I think, to the language he has used to describe sensible objects. They
are called roc6v'ro, T'X7rpxyp.ocrao
and ro&Xp+'tMoc. Occasionaly he seems
'
to use
Ov-rain a more restricted sense, but more commonly the terms
are used interchangeably. Understandably, he would recoil from the
,'could be such as "to be in no state" (Xx
suggestion that 'r 6v'acO
"I
I think that this relatively unsophisticated epistemology (relative to the

Republic, that is) may be taken as an indication that this dialogue was written
before the Rebublic.
43
6mXC e^ovToc),for such a suggestion would seem to Plato as self contradictory as to assert "Realities are unreal". Furthermore, while the
invalid arguments of the previous section force him to the extreme
Heraclitean position, he is plainly aware of its absurdity. He feels he
cannot commit himself to what he sneeringly dubs the "leaky pot" or
"catarrh" theory of matter.
The earlier parts of the dialoguc tenid to confirm that Plato wanits
to take an "objectivist" standpoint.20
(a) At 385 e ff., in opposition to Protagorean subjectivismn, lie mainitains that things "have some fixe(d reality of their own".
(b) In the shuttle passage, discussed in the first )art of this paper,
he talks of Proper Forms (or Forms - for here the soundness of the
distinction argued for does not matter) being embodied in the
appropriate material.
(c) Finally, at 423, e, he writes:
"Has not each thing an essential niature (o&aL) just as it has a colour anid the
other qualities we just mentioned? Indeed, in the first place, have not colour
and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist (8am Lc[wroct
each and all an essential lnatulre?"
ToU?ivocC)
tXi)r-1s rpoapTaroq,
By oi)aLahere, Plato seems to have in mind that which both gives a

determinate nature to something and bestows existence upon it. (cf.
the etymological derivation of ou'ao at 401 c).
Consequently, I find I cannot agree with Gulley's assessmenit that
Plato's argument, "both in the Cratylus and the Theaetetus, includes a
denial that what is in flux is in any way determinate".21 Nor can I
agree with Crombie when he says that "the last pages of the Cratylts ...
seem to hand over the physical world to the Heracliteans".22 What
we have in the dialogue can leave us far from sure that there is a convinced acceptance of the flux doctrine, particularly if this is taken as
including a denial of any stability or determinacy for material things.
7. The final question to concern us is whether we have a "degrees of
I am aware that evidence drawn from earlier parts of the (lialogue cannot l)e
regarded as clinching. For, as Gulley has shown in connection with the Phaedo,
it is possible for Plato to take inconsistent positions in the same work. Nevertheless I do not think it can be ignored entirely.
21 Gulley, op. cit. in n. 14, p. 73.
22 I. M. Crombie, An Examinations of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. II
(RouLtledgeand
Kegan Paul, London 1963), p. 323.
20
44
reality" theory in the Cratylus. As Luce says,23 there is no explicit

statement, in the section 389 a - 390 e, that the manufactured shuttle
is not fully real. But if we concentrate on the latter passage, is there
x'o=6v is "more real" than beautiful faces?
any reason for saying that oct>ro
Gregory Vlastos has conducted a careful analysis of the senses of
"more real", "really real", and similar phrases in Plato's writings
associated with talk in terms of degrees of reality. He argues that the
best sense for "real", and this I shall call for convenience his positive
thesis, is that of "cognitive reliability". That is to say, when Plato
describes Forms as being more real than particulars, the best way of
interpreting him is to take him as meaning that Forms are more
reliable as objects of knowledge.24
The positive thesis is argued for convincingly. But Vlastos also
claims25 (and here, it seems to me, the soundness of his position is more
open to doubt) that:
(a) as we commonly use the word "existence", it is absurd to talk
of degrees of existence.
(b) there is no evidence that Plato's degrees of reality theory need
be understood as meaning, or including, the notion of degrees of
existence.
These claims I shall call Vlastos's negative thesis. Many would agree
that the notion of degrees of existence is, if not absurd, very difficult
to comprehend. Nevertheless some philosophers, such as F. H. Bradley,
do seem to have talked in these terms. Can we be sure that Plato
himself would have found such talk absurd?26
Luce, p. 23.
Gregory Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato", in New Essays on Plato
and Aristotle, ed. Renford Bambrough (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
1965), "...the grounds on which sensible particulars are judged to be less real
than their respective Forms coincide very largely ... with those categorical
features which disqualify them for serving as objects of a certain kind of knowledge: knowledge which, Plato says, has "infallibility", or, in less inflated,
more exact, terms for what he means, logical certainty. Nothing can qualify as
a cognoscendum for this purpose if it is concrete, temporal, spatial, and caught
in chains of physical causation - if it is cluttered up with contingent characters.
All of its properties must stick to it with logical glue..."
26 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
26 It may be that Vlastos wouild say that Bradley indulges in "one of those
overstrenuous linguistic games, like Hegelese" (Vlastos p. 1). On the other hand,
Bradley might have retorted that Vlastos begs the question by confining the
discussion to the ordinary uses of "exist". Is there evidence, he might have
asked, that Plato always uses languiage exactly as the average Greek would
have understood it?
23
24
45
The question of absurdity apart, however, are there reasons for

saying that Plato's degrees of reality theory at least includes degrees
of existence? It is a matter of dispute, as Vlastos points out,27 how
far Plato actually succeeded in formulating the ambiguities of slvox.
But in this dialogue I do think there is some evidence that throws
doubt on Vlastos's negative thesis.
The passage at 423 e, quoted above, together with the etymological
derivation of oUaLoat 401 c, strongly suggests that Plato thinks here
of existence being a predicate. In which case Plato could say that
''x exists more than y" just as much as he could say "x is more red
than y". In his own words, "everything has an oijabx, just as (cW..ep)
it has a colour". Consequently, on this point, I find myself more in
agreement with Runciman,28 and feel it would be safer to say that
Plato's gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees
of existence.
Nevertheless, Vlastos's positive thesis has interesting implications
for an assessment of this final passage. Plato has urged a strong
contrast between things which are always in the same state and are
objects of yvCat, and things which are not. Or, in Vlastos' terms, he
has drawn a contrast between what gives complete cognitive reliability
(the realm of necessary truth), and what does not. So impressed is
Plato with his discovery of what offers logical certainty that all other
objects are dismissed as cognitively unreliable; and he is led to emphasize this discovery by the exaggerated claim that if we do not
attain to necessary truth, we have nothing at all.
If we can say that Plato has discovered here what gives complete
cognitive reliability, and if, as Vlastos asserts, this is the most important sense of what it is to be "really real", we find another mark
of the presence of the Phaedo-Republic Form.29 Even if we do not have
the actual occurrence of such language as 6vtn 6v, we do have that
language "cashed out" (to use Gilbert Ryle's phrase), in its most
27 VIastos,
p. 8, note 5.
W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (C.U.P. 1962), pp. 22-3.

29 Viastos, p. 17, "Thus it [i.e. that which is cognitively reliable] must possess
those very features which are the defining characteristics of the Platonic Form.
In recognising only one kind of knowledge... Plato has no choice but to say
that only the Forms were completely, or purely, or perfectly "real" in the sense
I have been investigating in this paper: cognitively reliable. Thus the degrees
of reality doctrine is, in this respect, a lucid consequence of Plato's epistemology.
Recognising only one kind of knowledge, Plato had no choice but to recognise
only one kind of full or complete reality."
28
46
lucid and comprehensible form. We have, that is to say, what is

equivalent to an explicit statement of the full reality of ocuTo xocxv
and ocu6 cXycx,6v.
Moreover, if things which are always in the same state stand at the
top of the scale, as far as completeness of reality is concerned, and if
the various entities distinguished in parts I and II of this paper are
brought together, the combination has interesting results. We are left
with a richer variety of possible modes of being than elsewhere in the
dialogues, and they can be arranged in "decreasing order of reality"
as follows:
(a) Forms (under this heading I take together aTo& o xzLV X and
o metea-tv ol6v?CatV).
(b) Proper Forms.
(c) Actual concrete entities, or things which are, for a time, in the
same state (taking together particular shuttles and particular
faces).
(d) Things which are never in the same state (a more fleeting version
of (c)).
(e) Things which are in no state (i.e. toc
c
Zxovro).
However, to detect so many possible links that go into the making of
the "great chain of Being" is not to discover a peak of achievement in
Plato's gradational ontology. Rather, in my opinion, it is a reflection
of a sense of uncertainty on Plato's behalf. Not all critics would agree.
P. Shorey, for example, says "..... anyone with a feeling for Platonic
style must recognise that the tentative and hesitating language of the
last two pages of the Cratylus is playful and ironic".30 But as I have
argued throughout, I think his hesitating language is to be taken
seriously, and mirrors faithfully his state of mind at the time of
writing the Cratylus. The metaphysical parts of the dialogue demonstrate that Plato is in genuine ontological perplexity. That some of this
sense of bewilderment is brought about by unsound argumentation is
another matter.31
University of Guelph, Ontario.
30
Shorey, op. cit. in n. 5, p. 268.

"I I am grateful to Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd for helpful suggestions he made during
the preparation of this paper.
47

Brill

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Brill

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Forms and Flux in Plato's "Cratylus"

Author(s): Brian Calvert

Formsand Flux in Plato's Cratylus

In this paper I want to consider two passages of the Cratylus in some

'rt 'O EpCEXeC

Translations are based upon the Loeb edition of the Cratylus.

xcxa,rov).Plato appears to be hinting here at some distinction between

2. 389 c-d. The contrast is strengthened by this and subsequent

The making process is explained more fully. What is embodied in the

Certain parallels between the accounts of the making of names and of

Gvopam).Similarly, the carpenter has embodied "the shuttle fitted by

I am aware that there are certain difficulties in this passage which

(c) Actual concrete x's.

that there is only one Form, we cannot say how many

But although Grube specifically mentions the ntpoaixov el804, he pays

specific (390 b 1). Similarly, in the recapitulation of the theory of naming at

To this may be added a later note:

of the Ideas. Egimand

are joined with tino8&86vxt at 389 e 3

Luce mentions, those at 390 b 1-2 and 390 a 6 refer to the

NVoic Ov &x&atcr). As Plato points

find convincing."1Consequently, there is more reason to assert that

to which Plato succeeds

stance of Luce's fourth point, has been discussed already.

(b) Whether, and in what sense, he thinks the material world to be

Cra: I think there is, Socrates.

It is more difficult to be sure of an interpretation of the phrase

formula &vgxarrTov ti'v 6vr&v (Crat. 439 c 8 -

d 1, 440 b 6) which does not seem to square with the 'separation' of

at 439 c 8 - d 1, the formula is Cv &xa'rov r7v 6vmv ou'rw; the ourlY)

cluded as a copyist's gloss. I think, however, that retention of the

else (&X)o or>T6 e1ug

and pass away and no longer (-nzX"tL)

This argument about being, which is to be followed by an argument

This inference lies behind the orthodox interpretation which takes

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987 a 29ff.

(a) "That which is never in the same state" is contrasted with

Mutatis mutandis, the comments made on the "time-lag" aspect of

the same state". This is a mistake. There is a difference in kind between

As we have seen, to be in flux is, according to Gulley's interpretation,

Gulley, op. cit. in n. 14, p. 74.

(i) in the Republic

(ii) in the Cratylus

That which is sometimes in the same state

I think that this relatively unsophisticated epistemology (relative to the

By oi)aLahere, Plato seems to have in mind that which both gives a

reality" theory in the Cratylus. As Luce says,23 there is no explicit

The question of absurdity apart, however, are there reasons for

W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (C.U.P. 1962), pp. 22-3.

lucid and comprehensible form. We have, that is to say, what is

Shorey, op. cit. in n. 5, p. 268.

You might also like