DE JOYA vs.

JUDGE MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 162416; January 31, 2006
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the
nullification and setting aside of the warrant of arrest issued by Respondent
Judge against petitioner in a criminal case for syndicated estafa. Petitioner
and his co-accused were among the incorporators and directors of State
Resources Development Management Corporation. The documents found in
the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that Hao, one
of the accused, induced the private complainant Dy to invest more than P1M
in the said corporation; issued several checks purportedly representing the
return of Dys investments, which checks were however dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds; and that the accused all knew of the
corporations activities and transactions. Petitioner asserts that respondent
judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
ISSUE: Whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant
of arrest
HELD: YES. The documents submitted by the prosecution for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause
as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It bears remembering that in determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.
Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable
men have an abundance. Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of
the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case
against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a
warrant of arrest against him. It should be emphasized that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty, of guilt of an accused.
VIUDEZ III vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 152889; June 5, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with murder. A Resolution was issued by the
Investigating Prosecutor for finding probable cause to indict the petitioner
and others for the crime of murder. Two informations for murder were filed
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued warrants of arrest on the
same day. Just 2 days after the issuance of the warrant, petitioner moved to
suspend its implementation and to suspend the proceedings, pursuant to
Department Circular No. 70 of the DOJ, which provided that the appellant
and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal,
the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. Petitioner was of the view
that the clear intention of the Circular is to suspend all proceedings including
the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending resolution by the
Secretary of Justice of the petition for review he filed with the latter.
ISSUE: Whether a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the
Sec. of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the
proceedings of the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of
arrest

HELD: NO. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the
determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent
implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review by the Sec. of Justice as to the finding of
probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the
exclusive prerogative of the judge.
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 170180; November 23, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner Valdez was charged for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs after finding dried marijuana leaves inside his bag. Among the
witnesses were the 3 tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union, namely,
Bautista, Aratas, and Ordoo, who effected the arrest, and who all testified
that the drugs were found inside the bag of petitioner. However, their
statements as to who ordered petitioner to open his bag and who brought
out the contents thereof were conflicting. The RTC convicted petitioner of the
crime charged. The CA affirmed. Petitioner thus prays for his acquittal,
claiming that the warrantless arrest and seizure was unlawful, and the
evidence obtained to be inadmissible.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful

HELD: NO. Based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not
one of the circumstances under Section 5, Rule 113 was obtaining at the
time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not
committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
Petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but
natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot
by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or
was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod
when they approached him.
Petitioner was ACQUITTED.
JUDGE ABELITA III vs. DORIA
G.R. No. 170672; August 14, 2009
FACTS: Pursuant to an incident report received by respondent P/Supt. Doria
(initially obtained through a telephone call) and after investigation, petitioner
was asked to go with Doria to the police station. The report was about a
shooting incident where a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner
was implicated in the incident. When the police officers caught up with
petitioner, they found 2 firearms inside his car, one in the front seat, and the
other at the back of the drivers seat. The firearms were confiscated by the
police officers and petitioner was arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and frustrated murder. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a

complaint for damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed

petitioners complaint and rejected his claim of frame-up. His motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was illegal because the
arresting officer did not have personal knowledge of facts under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
HELD: NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission
of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a
report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the
report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the
incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed
then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which
they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of
the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
PEOPLE vs. MOLINA
G.R. No. 133917; February 19, 2001
FACTS: SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of
an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The informant pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher this was the first
instance that SPO1 Paguidopon saw Mula. As to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover,
the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge
of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. Another information was
received by SPO1 Paguidopon months after, stating where the alleged pusher
will pass by. This time, the police officers apprehended accused-appellants.
They had with them a black bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves
inside.
ISSUE:
arrest

Whether or not the case at bar constitutes an in flagrante delicto

HELD: NO. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would

justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit, or have
committed a crime. Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of
the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not
have been certain of accused-appellants identity, and were, from all
indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest. Clearly, to
constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Mula and Molina were ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE vs. MONTILLA
G.R. No. 123872; January 30, 1998

FACTS: Accused-appellant Ruben Montilla was charged for unlawfully

administering, transporting, and delivering 28 kilos of dried marijuana
leaves. According to the police officers who arrested accused-appellant, they
were aided by an informer who told them a day before Montillas arrest that
a drug courier would be arriving the next morning. It was the same informer
who also pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter
alighted from a passenger jeepney on the day of the arrest.
In this appellate review, appellant disputes the trial courts finding that
he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.
Moreover, he argues that the police authorities had ample time and
opportunity to procure the requisite warrant since their so-called informer
apprised them of appellants arrival the even before the day appellant was
arrested. Anchoring on this point, appellant holds that the consequent search
and seizure is also unlawful.
ISSUE:
lawful

Whether or not warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was

HELD: YES. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time,
this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that
he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact
name of the subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional
problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be
delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such
delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival,
or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the
drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or
were being brought by someone separately from, the courier. On such bare
information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court
that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying
therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening
time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should
be considered, especially in rural areas.
PEOPLE vs. CHUA HO SAN
G.R. No. 128222; June 17, 1999
FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, strict monitoring and patrolling on the Bacnotan coastline was
made by the chief of police and his officers. While doing this, they received a
radio call from the barangay captain of Brgy. Tammocalao requesting police
assistance because of an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
Accused-appellant was seen alighting from the speedboat carrying a bag
which was later found to be containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.

After due trial, the RTC, characterizing the search as incidental to a

valid in flagrante delicto arrest, thus allowing the admission of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti, held Chua Ho San guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced him to death
by lethal injection.
ISSUE:
lawful

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was

HELD: NO. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not
fall under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Persistent reports of
rampant smuggling and difference in the appearance of accuseds watercraft
from the usual boats that commonly cruise over the area, do not constitute
probable cause. There was no classified information that a foreigner would
disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. Accused-appellant was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him
as in the process of perpetrating on offense. And despite claims by the peace
officers that Chua attempted to flee, one of them testified that the latter was
merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the
officers approached him. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence
because the same was illegally seized, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction. Chua was
ACQUITTED.