Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed
by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized
by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and
(2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the
United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in
the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75
Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a
body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent
thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor
thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by
the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed.,
1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that,
as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's
contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the
decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in
the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection
with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to
promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not
transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be
construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate
government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward
the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in
return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent
allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a
citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a
foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may
commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by
giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof
since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he
receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most

of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection
he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power
to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they
exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those
against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can
not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for
the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the
said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that
is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army,
subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra;
1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or
not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the
military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and
because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by
the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of
the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the
resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of
their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people
of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom
and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of
the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving
the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but
also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to
Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the
Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of
complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United

States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the
judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final
and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained
by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same
way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the
United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the
Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition,
as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without
prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion.
Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace,
there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated
during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation.
The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war
starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with
national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists,
by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be
the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in
support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation,
the laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason,
under the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his
government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is
either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the
sovereign, under whose protection he is." United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law.
ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the
protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is
reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government
under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and
permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and
permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he
renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled
in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for
that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one
natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from
all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are
under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature
of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as
the one affords protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of
rights which they acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own
misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost
whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance
equally permanent to the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege

lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other
inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a
state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in allegiance to
the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226227.)
Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which
is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the
commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection
he receives; that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right
of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which arises by nature and
birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by
denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for
however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by
the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3
C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which
he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p.
68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state the
obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty
is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates
is its government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which
the state utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its
sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American
Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had
been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a
duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the
other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)
Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the
government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection
received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning
absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx

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Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen
or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the
alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle
vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary
insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and
juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or
subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the
people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition
that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by
absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of
France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity
different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece,
and modern democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement
embodied in the fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some
plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the
consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the
country. But the idea cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our
people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the
enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There
is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and
existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence"
of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband.
Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers,
functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the
theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid
and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home,
may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We
have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the
Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the
name of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of
sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty,
following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized
by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By
such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle that
sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of independence on July
4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign
people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant,
it may be added in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner
of the future democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the
principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired by all who want to be spared
the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it
is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend
the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity,
but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws
violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any
valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of the Commonwealth
which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during
the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to
Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to
serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted
for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays
the untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution
provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an
aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended
during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the
absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the
survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required
to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their
country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the
latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the
sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to
disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau,
there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the
citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not
that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in
the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should
continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal
protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the Japanese regime,
whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up,
are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in
Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been
mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the
existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the
Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from
our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give
way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our
legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring
absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy,
admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of
the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The

enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment,
contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people
and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the
initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of
haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the
most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may
appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political
actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To
love the enemy is not natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is
it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law,
could not have established in our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came
as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance
even a temporary one from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are
free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will
be the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic
practices. In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their
arms to rally behind the paladium of the invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September
25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and
decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2,
1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive departments have jointly declared that during the period above
mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security,
including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had remained in full effect and should be
enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time the act was
being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of
creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws
punishing them have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice.
This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not
suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to
help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted principles
of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is
advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept
it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended
allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the
latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that
there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially
those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result
is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's
theory, the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even since the
Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be
suspended during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila
and other parts of the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had
already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all
our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing
the President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative,"
(section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in
order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the
rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency,
including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available
the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will
cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes
involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to
revindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong,
history will indiscriminality classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our
conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations
with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to

show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they
acted as such during the critical period of test.
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of
the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the
Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their
legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same
period there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II,
the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their
conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in
time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments
had no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time
war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that
account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international
disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its
existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely
different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and
methods of warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well
defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the
innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in
neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and
solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in
his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international
legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments
designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time
to time in adopting settled principles to new situations.
xxx

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xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder
doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that
launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate
warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the
juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is
the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and
practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to
seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies.
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being
an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American
concept of its effect. He said, "war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty.
This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and
subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations
revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given
the legal profession the task of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into
harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared
that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of fortyeight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime. At
the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a
resolution stating that "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."
xxx

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We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international law has
abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of
the law be mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the United States Office
of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).

When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and
"the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by
Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of
defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that
"international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making
was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that
report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he
mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of
the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th
Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression
constitutes an international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at
an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid
succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still,
and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent invasion
and occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his
theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations
when all war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military
occupation in the course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the
entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945,
expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to
seek the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her
consent to that modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter.
With the modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all
its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military occupation of another
nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving
that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and
condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an
international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a
war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right
growing out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying
certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only
this sense should we speak here with respect to this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar
breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with
respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or
right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as
in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime
itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the
appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in
their occupation invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who
have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that
this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals
in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United
Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years
before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution,
Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the
occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law
which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court
recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to
said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against
humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In
such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of
our people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied the City of
Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of
suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is
one of those high privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere
with.
. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain
measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon
him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These
concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions,
personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.

The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to
the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)
. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the
occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International
Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is
but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not
consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to
him. In the same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the
inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other
hand, he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' . . . willingly to submit to
his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows
that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of
obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of
obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of
allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's country is
unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate
the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is
absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death;
loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented
or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the
invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's
irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them to
act, to speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to
face their country and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and,
in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of
allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no
criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine
Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them
under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the
very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established
thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of
the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the
Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government
thereafter only the name of that government was to be changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always
the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant
or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of
treason. "The Government of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people
of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution
which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding
officials under this Constitution" of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the
Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and
resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people they are
the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally
liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as
continued by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the
"Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was
the same government which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most
that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence that
they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not
extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason
committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they
acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same only his status has changed.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full
harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II,
section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that
"laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that
laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military

occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff,
Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally
suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such
action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance
to the United States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
and in view of its position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as
interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the
exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the
isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in
chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the
United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the
Military Administration under martial law over the district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the
said Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial
courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further
orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the
Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and
regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military Administration,"
especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase
outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and
purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the
Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the
interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the
inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further
step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the
occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit
the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of
pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental
functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power,
whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate
for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for
the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country
(United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as
not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country"
(Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a
temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution and the
laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the
purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or
conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and
quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were
required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in
a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the
following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese
oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only
have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible
condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective
constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance
to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary,
to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law
and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and
necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the
preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished
by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure
government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers
only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous
optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want,
physically assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand,
will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were
to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can
all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the
belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied

10

area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane.
Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the
enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the
absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the
occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the
individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945,
p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for
"war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied
territory and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such
inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly
rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code,
but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent
occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent
occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly
expressed in the following passage (page 298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth
Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force
during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be
applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of
postliminium, because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear
intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97,
and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already
terminated completely.
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military
occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the
reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition
against any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more
essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and
described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States the court of highest human authority on that subject and as the decision was against the
United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the
occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify
the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind
of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to
warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great
Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of
Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United
States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close
of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and after that was done Government of the United
States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the
duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was
that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces in hostility
to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there; and that a court of the
United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide. But this
illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story,
that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single
question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties
imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for
duties cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended,
and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to
recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was
therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods
imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require.
Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the
case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the
goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they say there would be no pretense to say
that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not
distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were
any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this case
leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents occupation, is to be governed by
him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the
erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in
this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for
the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods

11

imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory
of its former sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should
be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has
become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty
can have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial
whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary,
or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be
rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors."
We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove
adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws
that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom
cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have
become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the
military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take
an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of
American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a territory of another State does not
operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer
receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the
control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the
law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or
subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary
allegiance" to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom.
The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war
with his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of
international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from
that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can
expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to
exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should
insist that States should provide system of law and of courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to
furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens
within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens;
but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are
granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected."
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed
in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other
than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is
a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign
power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal
Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be
"delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military
occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being
liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from
complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they
do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part military operations against their own country."
Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and
becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present
state of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming
number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which
leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there
would not be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to
and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our and the American
regular fighting forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering that the latter's
military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military unmolested by America. In
this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it
was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in
the resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the
midst of the civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely
followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this
line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During
belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants
of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with
each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of
opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its
passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the
occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and

12

regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a
convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p.
1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it extended over a
little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and
mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the
detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371,
373.) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of
the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a
wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth
in the first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the
Filipinos are not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all
ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were
undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino
people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a treason statute but because they
preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and
totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will
unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and
informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or
punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the
military authorities of the returning sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through
the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and
informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act offensive to person or
property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the
conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or
American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war
against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese
occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the
guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way
legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.
It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and
cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the
Philippines, when their mere physical presence implied force and pressure and not after the American forces of
liberation had restored the Philippine Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of
international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense
indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were
those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn
the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of
the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave
aid and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective
during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation
of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is
to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the
Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army,
did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United
States from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in
the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the
hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily
carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The
United States, a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military
occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take
an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine
of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for
the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to
that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from
which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population.
The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much
freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because
the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during the military occupation than any
exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of
judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies,
should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he,
but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion
for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his
just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing
criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal
system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run

13

the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial
appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military
occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas errors of the
mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of
suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude,
had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the
present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty
existing during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States.
This court has already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with
such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true
that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people
sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient to
and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its many provisions
essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United
States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to make said
declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines.
Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to
the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare allege that
the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but
its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty
over the Philippines continued to be complete.
The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is
conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For
practical political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should
be formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the
control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one
State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically,
indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental
agencies of other States, those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental
machinery of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be
Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal
hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs
of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete
autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as
to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist,
and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the
mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered
as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed
in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the
central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several
sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial
application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create of them
bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of
any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local selfgovernment be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp.
74, 75.).
The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American
Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true
for it has been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional
forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign
status of the individual States is no longer contested.
It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous
powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the
national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the
national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the
States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], p.250.)
This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the
individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251,
252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as
the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the

14

Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth
Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States
and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
[1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty
from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the
Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not
treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order,
merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines Islands shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of
the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and
determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the
Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article
can remain operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains,
however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for
treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines, the latter
being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of
the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United
States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the
United States is deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the
enactment and application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of
Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with
restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same
court in Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that
the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier
case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother
country, the United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United
States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent
nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as
having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated
in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue
the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine
Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmea who was with him, that proclaimed on
October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official
participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth
Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in
the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against
the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason
against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines.

EN BANC

15

[G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002]

JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is
the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be
excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of
his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution[1] finding probable cause warranting the
filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other
respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10,
2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that
the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent
Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis,
petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion[2] alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists
to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal
gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be
discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to
be fixed by respondent court.[3]
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.[4]
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct Ombudsman To
Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents.[5]
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Quash and
Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion.[6] Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing
after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH dated
June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable
cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he
be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused.[7]
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied
the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court
to enter a plea of not guilty for him.[8]
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him
the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;

16

3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and
with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not
vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which amounts
to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality.[9]
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the
equal protection of the laws.[10]
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has
been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[11] We take off from the Amended Information which
charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie Atong Ang,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE
VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John
DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a)
by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)
by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000]
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c)
by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d)
by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001[12]

17

Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the
premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute
plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is
divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of
plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte
and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the
crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the
accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is
of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with
the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The
phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the
Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase
several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series as they appear in
R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[13] we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their
popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances. Series
refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word
combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items.
Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of
the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable
cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum
of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The
submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of
charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
x x x

xxx

xxx

Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the
statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a
certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in
January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as
one Jingle Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].[14]
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least two occasions. The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire
sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman
that:
x x x

xxx

xxx

It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, in exchange for protection from
arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x.[15]
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable
cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the
petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and
is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue
cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the
courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense.[16] Thus, he posits the following
questions:
For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on
one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser
penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be
the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The
law does not provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the
courts are called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have
intended.[17]
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with
only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of

18

the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to
death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is.
Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in
the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these
allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former
President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2
of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary
to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial of substantive due
process.[18]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in subparagraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a
principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second
paragraphs of the Amended Information.[19]
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis--vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime
of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how
plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former
President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to
the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling,
and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d)
of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion
of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item
[1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead
names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of
stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation
which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate
acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that
the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does
and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in subparagraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold
that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in subparagraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts
alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A
study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of
ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors
found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former
President to acquire illegal wealth.[20] They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation
of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases
were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.[21] R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder

19

Law[22] was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to
Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the
use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in
stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch
so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases
of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the
corrupting influence of power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Subparagraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the chain conspiracy,
usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication
and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.[23]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is
former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve
as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common law. Under
Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our
jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy
to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy
itself is the gravamen of the offense.[24] The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by
concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful,
by criminal or unlawful means.[25] Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with
one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.[26]
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy[27]
conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer.
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,[28] as
follows:
Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or
District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office,
trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like
means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be
performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office,
or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or
impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than six years, or both.
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and
(2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to commit any offense
against the United States refers to an act made a crime by federal laws.[29] It refers to an act punished by

20

statute.[30] Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory.
[31] These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson,
murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright
violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other
areas of federal regulation.[32] Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses.
The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense,[33] hence, the court
rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related
conspiracy.[34]
The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or
money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.[35] It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner
whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.[36]
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law on how
conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include particularities of
time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy.
Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.[37] An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient
where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the
overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement.[38] To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to
state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a
conspiracy is to allege an agreement.[39] The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where
conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as is required in
cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.[40]
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with
cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of time, place,
circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a
mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as
a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section
6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must contain
the following averments:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by
statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in
order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or
by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[41] The information must also state the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[42] The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.[43] No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements
of the crime charged.[44] Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.[45] What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes.[46] The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.[47]
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must
be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of conspiracy to commit treason is
committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government
or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.[48] The elements of this
crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in
which the Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a)
levy war against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the
offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the
information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy
is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.[49] The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others,[50] for the act of
one is the act of all.[51] In People v. Quitlong,[52] we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the
offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:

21

x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more
accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others,
is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally
guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused
as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary
and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead
his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an
indictment may be held sufficient if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the
character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842844).
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the
words conspired or confederated or the phrase acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in the information in
the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of
purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term
conspire or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy
must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter
that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct
proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;[53] or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts.[54]
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement,
a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually
pursue it.[55] A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused
committed the crime of plunder. It used the words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the
ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before
this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical
Reasons. Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is lifethreatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman
to which petitioner replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the
motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for
petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution
of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. Petitioner reiterated the
motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan.[56]

22

On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and
requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for lack of factual basis.[57] Basing its finding on the
earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that
purpose that he be allowed to post bail.[58]
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[59]
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein
both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence.
The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.[60]
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should
be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December
20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five
months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., please see Separate Opinion.
Kapunan, and Buena, J., joins Justices Santiago and Gutierrez in their separate dissenting opinions.
Ynares-Santiago, J., pls. see separate Dissenting Opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see my Dissent.
Carpio, J., no part as before.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-430
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO), defendant-appellant.
Alejo Labrador for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.

23

PERFECTO, J.:
In a decision penned by Judge Angel S. Gamboa, concurred in by Judges Jose Bernabe and Emilio Rilloraza, all of
them of the People's Court, accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with
homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias Salvador in the amount
of P2,000, and to pay costs.
The information charges appellant of the crime of treason as defined and penalized under article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces during the
period comprised between December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, as follows:
1. That on or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and province aforesaid, Francisco Abad
(alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, join
participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at the house of Magno
Ibarra, and did then and there apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of possession of a revolver which
had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that Magno Ibarra still had the revolver, the
latter was confined in the Japanese garrison.
2. That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province aforesaid, the said Francisco Abad
(alias Paquito), as such informer of the Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, for more
than two months, of one Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for having remarked that the Americans
would soon return many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.
3. That on or about September 28, 1944, in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, as
such informer of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably force,
coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio Salvador and Liberto Salvador to go, as they did
to go to the Japanese garrison where the said Osias Salvador and his two brothers, at the instance of the herein
accused in his presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed
later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and
injuries inflicted upon him.
4. That on or about November 12, 1844 and on the occasion of a stage show held in the said municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, taking advantage of his connection and influence as informer and
spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously hand over one Francisco Donato
to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said Francisco Donato, for an incident in which the accused
was entirely to blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar
cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
Nine errors are assigned in appellant's brief.
The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the first count,
notwithstanding the fact only one witness testified to the overt act alleged therein.
Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel. The latter
testified that when appellant, accompanied by his brother and Japanese soldiers, went to their home, demanding
the surrender of a revolver of her husband, the husband was out supervising the harvest of their palay, and the
latter happened to learn of the incident by information from the wife. Magno could not, therefore, corroborate his
wife as to the latter's testimony concerning appellant's coming to their house.
The testimony of Magno Ibarra as to what happened to him in the garrison, where he was told by appellant to
produce his revolver, is not corroborated by his wife nor by anybody else.
The Solicitor General advances the theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite, made up
of, or proved by several circumstances, and passing through stages, it is not necessary that there should be two
witnesses to each circumstance at each stage. The theory is not well taken. The two-witness rule must be adhered
to as to each and everyone of all the external manifestations of the overt act in issue. Appellant's going to the
Ibarra house, in search of the revolver, is a single overt act, distinct and independent from appellant's overt act in
requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to the garrison, to produce his revolver. Although both overt acts are
inter-related. it would be too much to strain the imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as
different manifestations, phases, or stage of the same overt act. The searching of the revolver in the Ibarra house
is one thing and the requiring to produce the revolver in the garrison, another. Although both acts may logically
be presumed to have answered the same purpose, that of confiscating Ibarra's revolver, the singleness of purpose
is not enough to make one of two acts.
The lower court erred consequently in not pronouncing that the first count of the information was not proven.
Whether accused caused the arrest and incarceration of Fausto Francisco, as alleged in the second count of the
information, is the next question raised in appellant's brief.
In the afternoon of March 10, 1944, while conversing with a group of about ten persons, Francisco, who had just
arrived from Manila, stated that the Americans were coming nearer to the Philippines and, on noticing a Japanese
plane flying over them, added that in the very near future they will see American planes flying over the
Philippines. The accused was among those present in the group. Jose Tamurrada and Adriano Reyes were also
among them. At night of the same day Francisco attended the dance held in the auditorium of Palimbo, Camiling,
on the occasion of the barrio fiesta. A group of Japanese soldiers, accompanied by appellant and his brother
Mariano, arrived. Appellant pointed at Francisco saying, "That is the man;" whereupon, Francisco was arrested and

24

was imprisoned for almost two and a half months, during which time he was subjected to torture and made to
undergo hard labor for being an American propagandist. These facts were testified by several witnesses for the
prosecution.
Appellant, who has resorted to an alibi as defense, made an almost exhaustive analysis of the declarations of the
witnesses for the prosecution in a forceful effort to discredit them. A careful reading of said declarations leads us
to the conclusion that they deserved credibility and by them it was proved beyond all reasonable doubt that
appellant was present in the group which in the afternoon heard Fausto Francisco make statements in favor of the
Americans and that he caused the arrest of Francisco in the auditorium by appointing him to the Japanese soldiers
who arrived with him at the place.
Among the arguments in appellant's brief relating to the second count in question, the one in which appellant
alleges that no one has ever heard that, after the afternoon statements of Fausto Francisco, appellant went to the
Japanese garrison and informed the Japanese soldiers thereof, appears to be stronger. In fact, there is no evidence
as to what the appellant did during the time intervening between when appellant heard Francisco's afternoon
statements and when appellant went at night to the auditorium to have Francisco arrested by the Japanese
soldiers accompanying him and his brother Mariano. But the natural relationship between the two incidents makes
unnecessary any evidence as to appellant's conduct and actions during the intervening period. Besides, it is not
alleged in the information that it was appellant who denounced Francisco to the Japanese for the afternoon
statements in question, and even if we should disregard any connection between the afternoon incident in which
appellant heard Francisco's statements and the incident in which Francisco was arrested, and, furthermore, even if
we go to the extent of disregarding completely the first incident, the fact that appellant caused the arrest of
Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who
accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the
Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes, among them the suppression of
American or anti-Japanese propaganda.
Upon this our conclusion, appellant's insistence that there were well-known Japanese spies, instead of him, who
must have given the tip to the Japanese as to Francisco's statements, is of no consequence.
The next question raised by appellant is the third count of the information upon which the appellant's brief dealt
in three assignment of errors, 3, 4, and 5.
Liberato Salvador testified that in 1944 he was a member of Major Ramsey's Guerrilla, which he joined on March
5, 1942, he having been formerly in the Recruiting Division of the Philippine Army. On September 28, 1944, he
went to Camiling with his brother Osias to find out the strength of the Japanese garrison stationed there, and to
said effect "we brought along with us five gallons of coconut oil just pretending to sell it in the public market in
order that we cannot be detected by the spies of our enemy, the Japanese." Then they saw the accused "who was
about five meters away from us." Felix Abad asked for a ride back to Mangatarem. While Osias was talking with
Felix, the accused "winked his eye and then, immediately, Magdalera drew his revolver and pointed at me. He
winked with a motion indicating that I was to be captures. My brother Osias approached me. We were asked to
raise our hands." Because Liberato protested that he was not making any trouble and at first did not raise his
hands, Magdalera said: "No you are a member of the guerrillas, you are fighting against the Japanese." Then
Epifanio Salvador approached his brother Liberato and told him: "Raise your hands because he is a spy of the
Japanese," referring to Cristoper Magdalera. Then Felix Abad suggested to Magdalera that the Salvador brothers
be brought to the Japanese garrison, 25 meters away from the market. The incident took place at about 3 o'clock
in the afternoon. At the garrison "we were tied up against the wall of the building. At about 6 o'clock in the
afternoon were given water to drink (about five or six gallons) and maltreated. They hung me and tied in the wrist
with the rope around my neck. They hung me with my toes barely touching the floor. Then they boxed me and
beat me with a baseball bat until I was unconscious. I did not regain consciousness until they stuck a lighted
cigarette in my face at about 8 o'clock already in the evening."
When he regained consciousness, he heard his brothers shouting for help and groaning. Witness was about six
meters away from them, but he has not seen them being tortured because "we were brought again to the porch
and tied our neck in the same way they tied us before, with our hands tied at the back. At about 4 o'clock in the
morning of the 29th, my brother Epifanio Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, who was
sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, was able to untie his rope and then, all of a sudden Epifanio left us. The
sentry who was just sitting in front of us with a rifle at fixed bayonet was sleeping. When the sentry was
awakened he asked: "`Where is your brother Epifanio Salvador?' I answered the sentry: `I do not know.' Then, at
first he was planning to release us to look for our brother Epifanio. We consented to be released, but the sentry
changed his mind and got another big rope with which he whipped us again right and left. Then they went to our
house, the house of Epifanio, and looked for him. And when they were not able to locate him they got my sister-inlaw Inocencia Manson de Salvador and she was also questioned as to where was my brother Epifanio, and tied up
her hands as they have done to us. After that, Osias Salvador and myself were brought to the room just behind
the one we were tied up and they got an electric wire and tied us again, but putting on a bench and the bench
was too short that the legs of my brother Osias was on top. We were tied and then rolled with the wire from my
head up to the head of my brother, aside from tying us from neck to leg. We talked, my brother and I, to escape if
we can. After ten minutes, a Japanese entered the garrison and he had a bamboo with which whenever we asked
for water and food they beat us. They question us: `Where is the machine gun you are hiding? You are hiding six
machine guns and automatic rifles; where are the rifles and revolvers? Where are the Americans now?' That was
done to us many times. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon one of the Japanese came to us and cut our hair and
said: `Kayo dalawa patay mamayang gabi.' We answered: `Ngayon na.' The Japanese said: `No, tonight.' Then in
my struggle to remove the rope around my leg I was able to untie it without my knowledge. One of the Japanese
entered to find out what we were doing, but he did not inspect me and left again. Although my hands were
bleeding, with my courage to live still I grabbed the electric wire and cut it trough continuously doing this (witness
showing the act of twisting something with his fingers), and unbound myself. When the sentry entered, I allowed
the electric wire to be placed as it was. Then it was 6 o'clock (on September 29) from the bells of the church. My
brother Osias said: `I can not escape, I am weak. My face is bleeding. I cannot walk. If you are untied, the thing for
you is to live, if you can run for your life. Never mind for me. If I am dead, never mind. Now we are fighting our

25

common enemy, the Japanese. I want you to find out what will be the result of this war.' Then he kicked me,
because I was untied already up to the knee. I tried to remove the rope at his back, but he said: 'No, I can not
run.' And he shouted: 'You better run for your life.' Then I saw one Japanese that heard that, and I jumped outside
and when I fell to the ground I saw another Japanese watching and shouting words that I can not understand. I
just ran. Between the municipal building and the street there was a barbed wire fence and jumped it over and
then passed to the rear of the municipal building, passing between the house of Mr. Javier and the Treasurer's and
then to the bank of the river. I passed under the bamboo groves and I went to the house of my friend (Gregorio
Javier) and I was able to go up and then fell down weak." Osias was the commanding officer of the guerrilla unit in
which Liberato was a second lieutenant and Epifanio, a volunteer without grade. Since then Liberato did not see
Osias any more, but he was able to locate Epifanio in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The testimony of Liberato Salvador was substantially corroborated by Epifanio Salvador on all what happened
from the afternoon of September 28,1944, when they were arrested in the market place up to about 4 o'clock in
the morning of September 29, when Epifanio was able to untie himself and escape from the Japanese garrison,
passing in front of a sleeping sentry two meters away from where the Salvador brothers were tied.
Augusto Antonio testified that the accused told him that Osias Salvador was killed, bayoneted by a Japanese
soldier, behind the elementary school building, near the closet, where the corpse was later buried. The
information was given by the accuse in 1945 when the Japanese were still ruling.
Appellant endeavors to discredit Liberato and Epifanio Salvador's testimonies by trying to show the improbability
for Liberato to have seen the accused making signs to Cristoper Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the
relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the place
where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the relative positions of
witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the place where Liberato was
being arrested only after Magdalera had pointed his pistol at his back.
The fact that, while he was going southwest, he had seen the accused in the northeast making the sign to
Magdalera, is satisfactorily explained by Liberato by saying that "because a man wanted to by the Japanese
begins to observe everything," and he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs," and at that time
the accused was "in the left side," and with respect to Epifanio, appellant's surmise that he was "apparently away"
appears to without basis if it is recalled that it was Epifanio who advised Liberato to hold up his hands, when
Liberato was refusing to do it, by saying, in allusion to Magdalera, "he is a Japanese spy."
Appellant maintains also that it must have been Felix Abad whom the witnesses for the prosecution saw winking
his eyes at Magdalera for the latter to arrest the Salvador brothers and not Francisco Abad. But the theory cannot
be maintained upon the positive and unequivocal testimonies of Liberto and Epifanio pointing the accused as the
one who made the sign. Appellant's insistence to put the blame on Felix Abad, by trying to show that it was he
and not the accused who made the sign, even if accepted, will not relieve appellant of all responsibility, because,
according to the witnesses for the prosecution, he went along with his brothers Mariano and Felix and Cristoper
Magdalera in bringing the Salvador brothers to the Japanese garrison where they were delivered by the accused
himself, and it was Francisco Abad who told the Japanese "that we were guerrillas."
In the sixth assignment of error appellant complains that the lower court admitted evidence of supposed
treasonable acts of appellant but which are not specifically alleged in any of the counts of the information.
Appellant points specifically to the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz, to the effect that in the moth of October,
1944, at around 11 o'clock, while witness and others were around a gambling table, appellant came unnoticed
with six Japanese soldiers and demanded of those in the gathering the information of the whereabouts of Lt.
Riparip and Sgt. Juan Asuncion, both of the guerrilla army, and that sometime in November, 1944, on the occasion
of the shooting of Eustaquio Domingo, the accused was in the Japanese garrison while the Japanese soldiers
proceeded to the site of the shooting, gathered all the males found thereabouts, bringing one of them, Benjamin
Aremajo, to the garrison to be later dragged to the plaza where he was beaten up, facts which were declared
proven by the lower court.
The assignment is well taken as the above facts are not alleged in any of the four counts of the information. The
fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the description is a conclusion made
by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in the four counts. The information alleged
that the accused "adhered to and served as an informer of the enemy, . . . giving them aid and comfort in the
following manner, to wit:", and then follow the four counts.
Furthermore, even if the word "informer" in the information should justify the admission of the evidence in
question, the lower court erred in finding the facts proved when the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz about them
has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason cases.
Appellant assigned as the seventh error of the trial court in finding him as an informer "on mere assertions of
witnesses to that effect without supporting treasonable acts and in making findings of fact not supported by any
evidence at all" and makes the complaint, specifically, in relation with the following pronouncement in the
appealed decision:
. . . The accused acted and served as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese army in Camiling,
directing his espionage activities or detecting and gathering informations about the activities of members of the
guerilla organizations, of persons maintaining or providing for the support thereof and of persons possessing
firearms or in any other manner connected with the underground resistance movements against the Japanese and
spying on the movements of those persons who cherish the return to the Philippines of the Americans, . . .. Proofs
adduced by the prosecution of the fact that the accused had been acting as an informer and spy for and in the aid
of the Japanese are highly convincing. One after another the various witnesses for the prosecution has pointed his
accusing finger at the accused to have been an informer and spy of the Japanese army. . .

26

The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo, and Agustin de
la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the information, and their
testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as required by the two-witness rule.
The assignment of error is well taken.
Appellant complains in his eight assignment of error that the court failed to take into account two mitigating
circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of
Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused, and, appellant's age.
On September 26, 1942, a group of around thirty guerrillas took the Abad family to the barrio of Ketegan. On
October 17, Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad were brought to the schoolhouse, and from that time on they were
never seen alive again. On January, 1943, the family was released minus the above mentioned two members, and
they proceeded to Camiling where Mariano Abad, the eldest son, was living, as explained by his widowed mother,
"to whom I could look after the support inasmuch as he is my living eldest son. He was with the Japs because that
was the last resort for him to do inasmuch as if he did not do that he would have been killed by the guerrillas."
These facts cannot be considered to mitigate appellant's guilt as they are not of a similar nature or analogous to
those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts alleged in
counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The fact that his eldest
brother, Mariano, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix, was also in the service of
the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother, the accused had to depend on Mariano
for his support, the same as the other members of the family, are circumstances from which, in view of
appellant's immature age, did not allow him the freedom of initiative and action which should be expected of a
person who is aware of the full consequences and responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify
crediting appellant with a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Although we hold appellant as one of those responsible for the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do not agree
with the lower court in finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as according to the evidence,
it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged the Japanese to the
extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his brothers to escape. If his
brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have been killed by the Japanese if we
take into consideration that, after almost two and a half months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto
Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with
the killing of Osias Salvador.
Upon the conclusion we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth assignment of error in appellant's
brief.
Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code with the
attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as provided in number 2 of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the modification of the lower court's decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
I reserve my vote. The decision in the Laurel case is not as yet final.
Separate Opinions
BRIONES, M., disidente:
Creo que el apelante debe ser absuelt, por duda razonable. Parecia pesar una maldicion sobre la familia del
acusado: perseguidos por los guerilleros, algunos de sus miembros perecieron en manos de estos. El cargo mas
grave contra el acusado es el relacionado con la muerte de Osias Salvador. Pues bien; me parece que las pruebas
acerca de este cargo no justifican la condena.

27

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1582

March 28, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
DALMACIO LAGNASON, defendant-appellant.
Juan Medina Cue for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of treason, was convicted and
sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from the evidence. From the time of the occupation of the
Province of Occidental Negros by the American troops, there had existed therein a band of men in arms against
the Government of the United States, which band was led by the defendant and which in October was
campaigning through the northern part of the province. In the southern part was another similar band led by
Dionisio Papa. These two parties, though in communication with each other, had formerly operated
independently, but in each month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed himself and his forces under the
orders of said Dionisio Papa. His band was constantly armed and kept together, and its object was to establish an
independent government.
On October 29, 1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo of Murcia in said province,
but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there stationed. During that night two inspectors of the
Constabulary arrived with additional forces and early in the morning they left the pueblo in search of the
defendant. He was encountered with his party about three kilometers from the pueblo and was attacked by the
Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a half. The defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty of
his men were killed. On the side of the Constabulary were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were acting as
guides. The defendant's band consisted of between seventy and eighty men. They had for arms five or ten rifles,
bolos, daggers, and one small cannon. The defendant when captured was armed with a rifle, a revolver, and a
bolo. Most of his men wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps. They carried no banners, but did carry
two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the cannon.
Article 3, section, of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to
the same overt act or on confession in open court.
The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. L., 112), contained the following provision:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or
shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States of elsewhere, and shall be
thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of the
treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason
against the United States, and shall suffer death.
The statute law of the United States stood in that form, so far as we are informed, until the act of July 17, 1862
(12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second sections of that were as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That every person who shall hereafter commit the crime of treason against the United States, and shall be
adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or at the

28

discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand
dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or
all of the property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the owner at
the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort
thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be
convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said
punishments, at the discretion of the court."
In the Revised Statutes of the United States these provisions appear in section 5331, 5332, and 5334, which are
as follows:
SEC. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies war against them, or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.
SEC. 5332. Every person guilty of treason suffer death; or at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at
hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected
out of any or all of his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such
treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason shall,
moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
SEC. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both of such
punishments; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission are as follows:
SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the United States, or the
Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death
or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less
than ten thousand dollars.
SEC. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States, or of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid
or comfort to anyone so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not
more than ten years and he fined not more than ten thousands dollars.
The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes of treason, rebellion, and sedition. Article 236 of that
code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of Act No. 292, but that act, as to treason and rebellion, is
practically a reproduction of the sections quoted from the Revised Statutes.
Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of the country, the question as to what constituted, a
"levying of war" within the constitutional definition of treason had been before the Federal courts on several
different occasions.
In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted the definitions of the phrase
"levying war" which had been given by different judges of the United States, and declared through the Chief
Justice what the latter afterwards said in Burr's case (25 Fed. Cases, 13), to wit:
That part of his disposition which bears upon this charge is the plan disclosed by the prisoner for seizing upon
New Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States. That this plan if consummated by overt acts would amount
to treason no man will controvert.
Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the
enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5, 1) constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not
treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with
the purpose of overthrowing the Government was "levying war against the United States," and was therefore
treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed.
Cases, 105.)
No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or insurgent so far as the act of "levying
war" is concerned. All of the cases tried before the United States courts have grown out of insurrection. The case
of Mitchell grew out of the "whisky rebellion" in western Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of the Northampton
Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of Burr's attempts; the case of Hanway out of resistance to the fugitive slave
law; and the case of Greathouse out of the civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made under the
second clause of the Constitutional provision, namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It has been said that the
word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy and does not include a rebel.
If it were not for the provisions of the second section of the act of July 17, 1862, now section 5334 of the Revised
Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, the case at bar would present no difficulty. The
defendant would be clearly guilty of treason and punishable under the first section of Act No. 292. He was
engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was captured after an armed contest. It matters not
how vain and futile his attempt was and how impossible of accomplishment. The acts performed by him
constituted a levying of war. Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall be punished by death, or

29

imprisonment for not less than five years. Section 5334 declares that one engaging in a rebellion or insurrection
against the United States shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years. As the act of engaging
in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by both sections and in
different ways.
This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case of United States vs. Greathouse (4 Sawy., 457 S. C.; 26
Fed. Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting in the circuit court. The defendants in that case were indicted
under the second section of the act of July 17, 1862 (New Revised Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No. 292, sec. 3), for
fitting out in the harbor of San Francisco a privateer to aid the then existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in
charging the jury:
But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in the second section which would not constitute treason,
except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the
Senate, and read the several sections of the acts together, the apparent inconsistency disappears. Looking at the
act alone, we conclude that Congress intended (1) to preserve the cat of 1790, which prescribes the penalty of
death, in force for the prosecution and punishment of offenses committed previous to July 17, 1862, unless the
parties accused are convicted under the act of the latter date for subsequent offenses; (2) to punish treason
thereafter committed with death, or fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, unless the treason
consist in engaging in or assisting a rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws
thereof, in which event the death penalty is to be abandoned and a less penalty inflicted. By this construction the
apparent inconsistency in the provisions of the different sections is avoided and effect given to each clause of the
act. The defendants are, therefore, in fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the protection and privileges
allowed to parties accused of treason, without being liable, in case of conviction, to the penalty which all other
civilized nations have awarded to this, the highest of crimes known to the law.
Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said:
If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the present rebellion constitutes a levying of war, it follows that
in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress has denounced the same crime; and that a party amenable to
the second section for having "engaged in the rebellion and given it aid and comfort," must also be guilty of
treason by levying war against the United States.
As, then, the offenses described are substantially the same, though a different penalty is attached to their
commission by the sections referred to, it was held by the court, under the first indictment, which was in terms for
treason, that the smaller penalty could alone be inflicted, that the prisoners could not be capitally punished, and
could therefore be admitted to bail. On the same grounds it was considered that under the present indictment,
which pursues the language of the second section, the offense charged was treason; that both the offense as
described and the overt acts charged amounted to that crime, and that the accused were entitled to all the
privileges secured by the Constitution or allowed by law to parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding,
that in consequence of the legislation referred to, penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In determining,
therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted under this indictment, it will be proper to consider whether
their acts constitute in law "a levying of war," for an engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort amounts
to a levying of war; while at the same time we may also inquire whether their; acts are such as would, if done with
regard to a public enemy, constitute an adherence to him, "giving him aid and comfort."
As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, "treason against the United States is defined by the Constitution itself.
Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense. Its construction is entrusted to the
court alone."
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for this crime and the construction
placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of Greathouse was that under both sections the offense was
treason, but when the treason consisted of engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it could be punished only by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, in other cases it could be punished under section 1 by death, or
imprisonment for not less than five years.
That the Commission when it used the phrase "levies war," in the first section of Act No. 292, intended to give to it
the meaning which it then had in the United States, can not be doubted.
It Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following language in speaking of the phrase "levying war:"
But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the United States. It is a technical
term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose language is our language, and whose laws form the
substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our
Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it.
In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of the same phrase, said:
At the time the Constitution was framed, the language incorporated into it from the English statute had received
judicial construction and acquired a definite meaning, and that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts
of the United States.
No one can believe that the Commission intended to abandoned the well-recognized meaning which the phrase
then had and give to it a meaning entirely different. If that had been their intention they would certainly have
used other language, so that their intent not to adopt the recognized meaning would have been manifest.
That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the
time the act of the Commission was passed, can not be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts
constituted a "rebellion or insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections

30

can only be reconciled in the manner employed in the case against Greathouse, and that decision should be
followed.
However, in respect to the penalty, it makes no difference whether the offense called rebellion in section 3 of Act
No. 292 in considered an offense different from that of treason defined in section 1, or whether the decision in the
case of Greathouse be allowed and the acts punished by section 3 considered as of the same character as those
punished by section 1. In either case the punishment can not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.
There would be difference in respect to evidence to prove the two crimes. If rebellion and insurrection are treason,
a defendant can not be convicted under section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
or by confession in open court. (Act of Congress, March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not treason he could be
convicted upon the testimony required in ordinary cases. In United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the
constitutional provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of the act of 1862
(our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the overt act of the defendant
was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase
"owing allegiance to the United States," which is found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of the act,
makes a difference between the two sections in the case at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu and is
therefore covered both by section 1 and section 3.
This court has decided two cases in which treason was charged. In the case of United States vs. Antonio de los
Reyes, February 23, 1904,1 the defendant was acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved. In the case
of United States vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 9322) the defendant was acquitted because there were not two
witnesses to the same overt act.
The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty however, from death to ten years and a fine of $10,000,
money of the United States, with the costs of this instance against the defendant.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C. J., MAPA, JJ., concurs:
I concur in the result of this opinion in accordance with section 3 of Act No. 292, covering the crime of rebellion.
MCDONOUGH, J.:
I am of opinion that the crime committed is that of insurrection and not that of treason, and that the conviction
should be had under section 3 of Act No. 292 for insurrection.
The case of the United States vs. Greathouse et al. (26 Fed. Cases, 18) does not seem to be in point. The
defendants there were charged with taking part in a rebellion against the Government of the United States. There
was no doubt at all that rebellion did not fall short of actual war and of a state of war, and so Mr. Justice Field said:
"It is not necessary that I should go into any close definition of the words `levying war,' for it is not sought to
apply them to a doubtful case . . . . War of gigantic proportions is now waged against the United States . . . and all
who aid in its prosecution are guilty of treason."
In the case before us, however, it does not seem necessary to closely define the words "levying war," for they
have been applied in a case that is more than doubtful.
In the Greathouse case the learned judge met with a difficulty when he undertook to so construe the section of
the act of 1862, relating to the punishment for treason, and the section following, defining the crime of rebellion
or insurrection and prescribing the penalty for this latter offense different from that prescribed for treason; and to
justify his conclusions he held that all that Congress intended by the act of 1862 was to preserve the punishment
for treason committed prior to 1862 as it was prescribed in the act of 1790 "unless," as he stated, "the parties
are convicted under the act of 1862 for subsequent offense" and to punish treason thereafter committed with
death. It must be confessed that the language used is not clear, and the conclusion reached as to the
construction of these two sections seems to have been strained to fit the case the before the court.
Long after the civil war Congress caused the United States Statutes to revised, and the sections of the act of 1862
were changed by omitting that part thereof relating to the liberation of the slaves of those found guilty of treason,
rebellion, or insurrection. That revision is found in sections 5331 and 5332, defining and providing for the
punishment of treason, and in section 5334, which defines and provides for the punishment of rebellion or
insurrection. No reference whatever is made in the revision to the act of 1790, nor can these sections be
reasonably construed to mean that treason committed before this revision, or before 1862, is punishable
differently from treason committed after the revision of the statutes. In case of doubt regarding the proper
construction of statutes the courts frequently refer to the debates of the law-making body when the measure was
under discussion. Judge Field in his opinion made reference to the discussion in the United States Senate when the
act of 1862 was being considered.
It appears," said the learned judge, "from the debates in the Senate of the United States when the second section
was under consideration that relating to rebellion or insurrection that it was the opinion of several Senators
that the commission of the acts which it designates might, under some circumstances, constitute an offense less
than treason." The court, however, gave no consideration and no weight to this discussion, apparently for the
reason that there was no doubt that the rebellion, in which the defendant was charged with participating, was "a
gigantic war."
Since there seems to be now no reason, and since there was no reason at the time Congress revised the statutes
in 1873 and incorporated therein the provisions of the act of 1862 as sections 5331, 5332, 5333, and 5334, for
preserving the penalty for treason committed prior to 1862 and fixing another penalty for a like crime committed
thereafter, it may be reasonably held that there is no such distinction now. To hold that the acts described in

31

section 1 of Act No. 292 of these Islands constitute treason, and the acts described in section 3 of that act also
constitute treason, is to hold that the law provides contradictory punishments for the same offense; thus the
punishment for treason under the first section may be death or imprisonment for not less than five years and a
fine of not less than $10,000, whereas the punishment under the third section can not be death, and may be
imprisonment for any period less than ten years and for a fine in any sum less than $10,000. It can not be that the
law-making body intended such a contradiction and such an interpretation of this law. It is much more reasonable
to hold what the plain language of the sections indicate as the debate in the Senate shows that it was the
intention of the law-making body to create a crime of a less degree and of less magnitude than that of levying
was against the Government, which new crime was designated as rebellion or insurrection.
It is easy to conceive that an insurrection may exist which does not amount to war. The three tailors of Tooly
Street who resolved that they were the people of England might be emulated here by three natives who might
assemble in public, proclaim the independence of the Islands, carry a cross or a banner, fire their revolvers, or
throw their bolos at the Constabulary, and then take to their heels; but this would scarcely be held as a levying of
war against the United States or against the Philippine Islands. It may, however, be held, that a movement of that
kind is an insurrectionary movement. In other words, there may be a state of insurrection without being a state of
war an insurrection of a less degree than war; although the insurrection may eventually attain such proportions
and such magnitude as to ripen into war.
In the Prize cases (67 U. S., Sup. Ct. Rep., 635) the learned counsel for the prosecution and the Supreme Court
gave clear definitions as to what constituted war and a state of war.
Mr. Wm. M. Evarts, the distinguished counsel for the Government in those cases, stated:
War is emphatically a question of actualities. Whenever the situation of opposing hostilities has assumed the
proportions and pursues the methods of war peace is driven out, the ordinary authority and administration of the
law are superseded, and war in fact and by necessity is the status of the nation, until peace is restored and the
laws resume their dominion.
In the same cases Mr. Justice Grier stated:
A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents the number, power, and organization of
the persons of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile
manner a certain portion of the territory, have declared independence, have cast off their allegiance, have
organized armies, have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as
belligerents and the contest is war.
The proof in the case at bar does not show such conditions or such a state of affairs as constitute was within these
definitions; nor do the acts of the defendants show that they were levying war. The executive branch of the
Government did not call upon the regular army for help to put down the rising; material law was not proclaimed;
the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus were not suspended; the civil power remained supreme; the civil courts
were open; and the resistance to law was not such as to render the civil authorities powerless to cope with it; in
fact, the insurgents were easily put to fight by the Constabulary.
In 1902 the President of the United States proclaimed a state of peace in these Islands, except in the Moro
country. Nothing has since happened of sufficient importance or magnitude to cause this court to acknowledge or
to hold in this case that a state of war now exists. A few roving bands of brigands, organized primarily for plunder,
but pretending to the patriots and shouting for Philippine independence in order the more readily to obtain help,
immunity, and protection from sympathizers are not to be considered as organized armies occupying territory and
levying war, especially when the civil authorities are able, without great difficulty, to purpose, capture, and punish
the robbers or insurgents.
It if be desired to have no division line between treason and insurrection, the Commission mar readily repeal
section 3 of Act No. 292. While that section remains as a part of the law, it should be given considerable in a
proper case.
I am of opinion, therefore, that section 3 of Act No. 292 was intended to cover the crime of insurrection as
distinguished from treason, and that the defendant should be punished pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of
Act No. 292 for the crime of insurrection.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
The defendant was charged with the crime of treason under section 1 of Act No. 292 of the United States
Philippine Commission. He was tried in the city of Bacolod on the 14th of January, 1903, by the judge of the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros, with several others, and was found guilty and sentenced to
the penalty of death. He appealed to this court. The following is the statement of facts disclosed by the evidence
in this cause:
In the month of October of the year 1902, the municipal president of the town of Murcia, of the Province of
Occidental Negros, in the Philippine Islands, received a letter signed by Dalmacio Lagnason and others who
entitled themselves "generals" of a celebrated band. This band was called "Babaylanes." This band had existed
from time immemorial, and had lived in the mountains in the southern part of the said province. The band was
armed and during the days of the Spanish Government had frequently attacked the then existing authorities. It
had frequently attacked the provincial government, and on the 29th and 30th of October, 1902, made an attack
against the United States Government, as constituted in the said pueblo of Murcia.
This letter was forwarded by the municipal president of Murcia to the senior inspector of the Philippines
Constabulary, Mr. John R. White, and at the same time information concerning the same was given to a corporal,
Bernardo Abasola, of said Constabulary, commanding the detachment of said Constabulary in the said pueblo,

32

who, on the said 29th day of October, having information that there was a band of Babaylanes in the suburbs of
said town, numbering from eighty to one hundred and twenty men, went out to find them and finally located them
in a place called "Iglauaan," near the town of Murcia. Upon being satisfied of the existence of said band, he
returned to the town of Murcia and informed the senior inspector, Mr. White. The band, taking note of the fact that
the members of the Constabulary had withdrawn, advanced up to the suburbs of the town of Murcia, deciding to
enter the same, and for this reason the forces of the Constabulary detachment were obliged to attack them, and
did then and there have a skirmish with the said band, until it retired to a place called Iglauaan, where they were
first discovered.
The band was armed with Springfield rifles, a small cannon, bolos, and lances, and was commanded by the
defendant, Dalmacio Lagnason, the negro. At 7 o'clock in the evening of the said 29th day of October,, the
inspector, Mr. White, arrived at the town of Murcia with more soldiers, and at 2 o'clock of the following morning
Inspector Smith arrived with more forces. These being combined, with Mr. White in command, at daybreak on the
30th of October, they went out in pursuit of said band, following the tracks left by them the previous afternoon.
At 6.30 a. m. of the 30th of October, and in the same place where the party was located the previous day, it was
discovered by the said Constabulary forces. The band retreated until it crossed the Caliban River, when it opened
fire upon the Constabulary and a fight ensued at close range, which enabled all the members of the band to be
seen. The fight lasted approximately an hour and a half. Two guides of the Constabulary called Tranquilino Toscano
and Lazaro Guibon died in consequence of wounds received from shots from Springfield rifles. Among the
members of the band Esteban de los Reyes, Rufino Rayo, and twenty other members were killed. The band then
took fight and was pursued by the Constabulary forces, which succeeded in capturing the general, Dalmacio
Lagnason, who, during the action was discharging a Springfield rifle at the inspector, Mr. White, and later, during
the same fight, attempted to discharge a revolver at Mr. White, which arms were found upon his person at the
time of his capture. There were also found where the fight took place a small cannon, various talibones, lances,
and two large wooden crosses and various papers. A few days after the fight Simon Perje and Isidro Oyco were
captured in a small shank in the mountains near the place where the fight took place. One of these was wounded
in the thigh and the other in the knee. They confessed that they were members of the party of Babaylanes under
the order of Gen. Dalmacio Lagnason; that they took a direct part in the action with the Constabulary forces on
the 30th of October, in which action they were wounded. Bernardo Talondata, Vidal Artegosa, Valeriano Talaman,
and Luis and Vicente Dimit testified before the president that a few days previous to the fight between the said
band of Babaylanes and the Constabulary, they were in a certain house when several armed men presented
themselves and compelled each of them to join the said band of Babaylanes under the command of Gen.
Dalmacio Lagnason and others; that they had complied with said request against their will under fear of being
maltreated or murdered. They were subsequently conducted to various points, and finally to the country
surrounding the mountains of Murcia, where, on the 30th day of October, an action took place betweenn the said
band and the Government forces, from which band, during the said fight, they escaped.
The testimony of the senior inspector of the Constabulary, Mr. White, given in open court in the trial of the cause
against the defendant, is as follows:
Q.

Do you know any band in arms against the Government of the United States in this province?

A.
Yes, sir; I know the band of Dionisio Papa, camped in the southern part of this province, and that of Dalmacio
Lagnason, in negro, who is camped in the northern part.
Q.
Do you know if any one of these bands, within the last few months, has attempted to attack any town of this
province?
A.
About the end of the month of October last the band of Dalmacio Lagnason, composed of some eighty men,
armed, attempted to attack the town of Murcia and the Constabulary detachment of the same place.
Q.

Have the Constabulary forces had fight with this band; and if so, did they offer any resistance?

A.

Yes.

The COURT.

Can you state the place of the fight?

A.
Two fights were had near the barrio of Iglauaan, on the Caliban River, some three kilometers from Murcia,
the first on the afternoon of the 29th of October, and the second at the same place at 7 o'clock on the morning of
the 30th of said month.
Q.

What was the result of these engagement?

A.
The result was that in the first fight one of the band that attacked the town died, and in the second twentyone Babaylanes died, and Dalmacio Lagnason was captured, with three Springfield rifles, a revolver, several
talibones, lances, and other effects, among which a small cannon also was found where the fight took place.
Q.

When Dalmacio was captured did he have any arms?

A.

Dalmacio had a Spriengfield rifle, a revolver, and a talibon.

Q.
Can you state the names of the men killed among the loyal troops during the fight to which you have
referred?
A.

They were Tranquilino Toscano and Lazaro Quiachon.

Q.

Were Dalmacio and his people uniformed, or did they have any special distinction?

33

A.

The greater part of Dalmacio's men had black shirts and white pants, and some had black-peak caps.

Q.
Did Dalmacio and his men resist the troops of the Government for some time, or, on the contrary, did they
scatter when the firing commenced?
A.

The fight lasted an hour and a half.

Q.

Among the bodies found in the enemy's camp, were any recognized?

A.
The bodies of Esteban de los Reyes and Rufino Rayo were seen at the same place where the fight took
place, among the dead of the band.
Q.

Did the guides of the loyal troops die by reason of gunshot wounds, or from bolos?

A.

They died as the results of wounds caused by shots from Springfield rifles.

Q.

How did you know of the existence of that armed band which attempted to attack the town of Murcia?

A.
One of the ways by which I knew was by letter which Dalmacio and other generals of the band addressed to
the president of Murcia, which was forwarded to me.
The COURT.
Did you have any knowledge through other channels besides the letter presented that the armed
band under the command of Dalmacio Lagnason received orders from Dionisio Papa, or operated independently?
A.
I know that since the occupation of this province by the American troops, Dalmacio Lagnason operated
independently in the north, although in connection with Papa, according to information I received from the military
guarding this town. These facts are proven by various documents captured on various expeditions made to the
mountains against said bands.
The COURT.

Did Dalmacio Lagnason's band carry any flags during said fight?

A.
They did not carry a flag, but two large, wooden crosses, which were captured in the second fight and which
were also distinguished in the first fight by the loyal troops.
The COURT.
Could the Constabulary forces distinguish from their position during the fight those who formed
the enemy's band?
A.
At the distance at which they were they could only distinguish the groups, although, as I was advancing with
my forces, I could distinguish and recognized Dalmacio, who discharged his gun at me, and tried also his revolver,
although the latter did not work. Dalmacio later drew his talibon, which he flourished against me. The other
members of the band, who numbered seventy or eighty men, acted in a hostile manner, sometimes advancing
and other times retreating, but always maintaining resistance until the moment of their flight.
The COURT.
Dalmacio?

When you saw Dalmacio Lagnason, who shot at you, did you already know that it was the same

A.
As I had information that Dalmacio was black, I suspected immediately that the one who pointed his gun at
me was the same Dalmacio, because he was black, which suspicion was confirmed, inasmuch as the party whom I
supposed was Dalmacio, being near me, surrendered himself, falling on his knees and confessing to be Dalmacio.
This fact was also confirmed by the other prisoners captured on the following day.
The testimony of Walter Smith, given at the trial, is as follows:
Q.
As an inspector of Constabulary were you present at the fight which took place at the pueblo of Murcia on
the 30th of October last, and what was the nature of the enemy who opposed you?
A.

I was present at the said fight with a band of those called Babaylanes, under the command of Dalmacio.

Q.

Do you know if Dalmacio and his band were constantly organized and where they located themselves?

A.
According to official data, it is a band located between the towns of Calatrava and Cadiz Nuevo, which was
constantly armed, and assembled with the object of establishing an independent government, contrary to that
established in this province, and to occasionally devote itself to robbery.
Q.
Are you acquainted with any of those who formed part of this band of the enemy which fought the
Constabulary on the said date?
A.

I am acquainted with Dalmacio Lagnason, who is now present.

Q.

Of how many was the band composed, and with what arms were those who formed the same provided?

A.
Approximately it was composed of some seventy or eighty men, armed with five or ten guns, bolos, lances,
Springfield rifles with ammunition, a revolver, and a small cannon.
Q.

Were those who formed Dalmacio's band armed?

A.

I can not state that all were, but I am sure the greater part were.

Q.

Did Dalmacio's band offer resistance to the forces of the Government?

34

A.

Yes; they offered resistance for an hour and a quarter or an hour and a half.

Q.

What was the result of the fight on both sides?

A.
On the enemy's side I saw five dead, but afterwards official information stated twenty or twenty-five. On our
side there were two killed who acted as guides, and whose names I do not now remember.
Q.

What was the reason of this fight?

A.
Having received information that said band intended to enter the town of Murcia, and continue to this
capital, in view of which, to preserve order, it was decided to go out and meet them, and they were found at a
place called Iglauaan.
Q.

During the fight, or afterwards, were some of the enemy's band made prisoners?

A.
Immediately after the fight Dalmacio was captured, and I returned to the town of Murcia, having ordered
that some soldier go out to recover the bodies, and on their return they brought some prisoners who were
captured in the cogon grass near the place where the fight took place and who were presented to the officer in
charge, Mr. White.
Q.
In connection with the fight and the advance of Dalmacio's men upon the town of Murcia, do you know if
any injuries were caused to private individuals?
A.
I am not aware of any injury to private individuals. I can say that according to information, several private
persons were invited to join the band of Dalmacio.
The testimony of Rosalio Teflora is as follows:
Q.

Were you present in any fight during the last days of the month of October last?

A.
Yes, sir; on the 30th of October, at the place called Iglauaan, of the town of Murcia, against the band of
Babaylanes commanded by Dalmacio, who desired to enter the said town. I was under the orders of Senior
Inspector White.
Q.

What was the result of said fight?

A.
We lost two guides, whom I saw fall at my side, wounded by a shot; and a little while after, one of the
enemy's shots smashed the butt of my gun. I do not know the enemy's losses, because I returned to Murcia in
compliance with the orders of my chief, to look after wagons. Three guns, a revolver, and many bolos and lances
were captured from the Babaylanes, and the chief of the band, Dalmacio, was captured personally by Inspector
White.
Q.

Besides Dalmacio, were others of said band captured?

A.

Two others were captured in the brush near the place where the fight took place.

Q.

Do you know the object of Dalmacio's plans?

A.

All that I know is said band intended to attack and take the town of Murcia.

The foregoing facts, in my judgement, are sufficient to indicate that the said defendant, with his associates,
intended to overthrow the Government of the United States, as constituted in the said town of Murcia, in the
Province of Occidental Negros, in the Philippines Islands. The defendant was a resident in the Philippine Islands,
and owed allegiance to the United States Government in the Philippine Islands. His acts, as disclosed by the proof
in this case, show clearly that it was not his intention to oppose the constituted authority in these Islands in the
administration of the Government, but to absolutely overthrow the Government.
Any organized attempt, by force of arms, on the part of persons joined together in a band, who owe allegiance to
the Government, to overthrow and destroy the constituted Government is the levying of war against that
Government. The evidence in this case of the United States vs. Lagnason clearly shows that the defendant and his
band intended to destroy the constituted Government of the United States in the pueblo of Murcia in these
Islands, and is therefore guilty of the crime of treason. No formal declaration of war is necessary in order that
parties shall be guilty of levying war against the Government. War may exist without a proclamation to that effect.
Actual hostilities may determine the date of the commencement of war, though no proclamation may have been
issued, no declaration made, and no action of the executive or legislative branches of the Government had. This is
recognized by the proclamation of the President William McKinley, issued on the 26th day of April, 1898, which is
as follows:
Whereas by an Act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has existed
since the 21st of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain;
and whereas it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present
views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practices, it has already been announced that the policy of this
Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris.
(Buenaventura et al., 87 Fed. Rep., 927.)
Neither it is necessary for the Government to wait until those who are attempting to overthrow the Government
should make a showing of apparent power necessary to destroy the Government or any part of the same before it
may declare that those who are guilty of such an attempt are guilty of levying war, and therefore guilty of

35

treason. Neither it is necessary for the authorities of the Government to call upon the military arm of the
Government before such a condition may be recognized on the part of the Government.
I can not give my consent to the doctrine enunciated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Willard, filed in this case. I can
not subscribe to the doctrine that the crimes described and defined in sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission are the same, and that the only punishment which can be imposed under
either is that provided for in section 3. Mr. Justice Willard evidently reaches this conclusion upon the theory that
the treason and rebellion or insurrection are the same crimes, and that you can not have two punishments for the
same offense, and that if the statute does provide for two punishments for the same offense, then the lesser
penalty only, under the statue, can be inflicted. This latter doctrine may or may not be true, but in my judgment
the premises assumed here by which this conclusion is reached is not justifiable. The legislative body in these
Islands clearly created, by Act No. 292, two distinct crimes or two distinct degrees of the same crime, with
separate and distinct punishments.
Neither can I subscribe to the doctrine that this court should make no distinction between the crime of treason,
defined in section 1, and that of rebellion or insurrection, described in section 3 of said Act No. 292. The
Commission intended to create separate and distinct crimes by said sections.
No one will contest the statement that rebellion or insurrection is of the nature of the crime of treason. Neither will
the statement be contested that manslaughter is of the nature of the crime of murder, but yet no lawyer will
contend that the punishment should be the same nor that the punishment provided for manslaughter is the only
punishment which can be inflicted for murder, and that those who commit manslaughter should be stigmatized
with the allegation that they have committed murder. At times the courts have great difficulty in distinguishing
murder from manslaughter, but when the distinction is once made, by evidence, then the courts have no trouble
in administrating the penalties created by the law for the respective crimes of murder and manslaughter. So I am
also persuaded that it is a most difficult task, at times, and in particular cases, to make a clear distinction
between treason and insurrection. The crimes are of the same general class, and only differ in their magnitude
and gravity. What may be in its incipiency a mere insurrection, may come to be, in the final proportions which it
assumes and the extent of its purposes and possible results, high treason. Treason is the highest crime which a
man may commit against his government. This has always been so regarded. There are many instances of record
where men charged with high treason were tried and convicted, after their death, even, and whose bodies were
quartered by means of horses in the public square. A man who has been found guilty of treason in never able to
outlive the stigma that he has thus brought upon himself.
Neither can I secure the consent of my mind to agree with the finding of fact contained in the opinion of Mr.
Justice McDonough, that the accused in this case, under the facts proven, is guilty of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection and not that of treason.
Treason may be defined as an organized effort, on the part of those who have owe allegiance to a government, to
overthrow their government, and either to establish another in its place, or to establish a state of lawlessness and
rapine, while insurrection may be defined as a resistance, by unlawful means, to the operation of some particular
law, or to the constituted authorities. This resistance may grow out of a misunderstanding of the purposes of the
Government on the part of individuals, or in the purposes, or the methods employed in the enforcement of a
particular law. It may be that those who are opposed to the purpose and operation of a particular law and the
wisdom of its enactment are as loyal, generally, to the existing government as any of the citizens of the
commonwealth, and may be perfectly willing to join with the loyal troops against the enemies of the government
and those who desired to totally destroy it. The Congress of the United States appreciated these facts when it
amended the law of 1790 by the acts of 1862, and later by the act of 1875. Congress appreciated the fact that
many loyal citizens might, from their own standpoint, oppose, as has been done by unlawful means, the operation
of a single law, and that the stigma cast upon them by charging them with treason was entirely too severe.
Congress, therefore, provided for a lesser crime in the act of 1862, and called it rebellion or insurrection. Many
obnoxious laws have been repealed and better ones enacted in their stead, and the condition of the whole people
improved thereby by a determined opposition to them. As a result of the interpretation by the courts of the law of
1790, as was given in the case of Mitchell in the whisky rebellion, as well as that in the case of Frills, Shay &
Brown, Congress saw and appreciated that the odium cast upon such persons and the punishment provided for in
said act of 1790 was entirely too severe, and therefore amended such act as indicated above.
The Commission, in enacting the present law defining treason as rebellion or insurrection, have not lost sight of
these considerations. The fact that the Commission intended to create two crimes instead of one by sections 1
and 3 of Act No. 292 is further verified by the provisions of section 17 of said act, which provisions are as follows:
A foreigner, residing in the Philippine Islands, who shall commit any of the crimes specified in the preceding
sections of this act, except those specified in sections 1 and 2, shall be punished in the same way and with the
same penalty as that prescribed for the particular crime therein.
This court has on more than one occasion found persons guilty of the crime of rebellion or insurrection by that
name, and the decisions in said cases were signed by all the judges. I see no occasion now for concluding that
those crimes should have been classified as treason.
We have also tried men and sentenced them to life imprisonment and death for robbery under Act No. 518 of the
Civil Commission. Is it possible that any person, in view of the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 292, can conclude
that the punishment of imprisonment for ten years only can be inflicted upon those who take up arms against the
Government and by force and violence attempt utterly to destroy it? We are not of the opinion that the Legislature
of these Islands intended to provide by law that those who are guilty of robbery or brigandage could not be
punished with imprisonment for less than twenty years, while those who are found guilty of treason could not be
punished with imprisonment for more than ten years. Such a conclusion is unjustifiable.
The decision of the court below was justified by both the evidence adduced in the trial and by the law, and
therefore should be affirmed with costs in both instances.

36

COOPER, J., dissenting:

The defendant was charged, under section 1 of Act No. 292, with the crime of treason and was convicted and
sentenced to the penalty of death.
The section under which the conviction was made reads as follows:
Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the United States or the Government of the
Philippine Islands, who levies war against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death or, at the
discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not less than ten
thousand dollars.
In the decision reached in the case by a majority of the court, distinct views were entertained, the view held in
common being that the defendant is guilty and should be punished with imprisonment for the term of ten years
and a fine of ten thousand dollars. It is said in the majority opinion, delivered by Justice Willard, that the offense
as defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 denominated treason, and the offense as defined in section 3 of said act
denominated as insurrection or rebellion, are of the same character and that each offense is treason; but that in
fixing the penalty, though the indictment is under section 1 of said act, and the offense of treason as defined
therein is punishable by death at the discretion of the court, yet the penalty prescribed under the third section for
the offense of rebellion and insurrection must be applied, which is imprisonment for not more than ten years and
a fine of not more than $10,000.
It is said in the concurring opinion by Justice McDonough that there are separate and distinct offense defined and
punishable in section 1 and section 3 of Act No. 292, the offense defined in section 1 being that of treason and
that defined in section 3 being that of rebellion or insurrection; that the acts committed by the defendant
constitute the offense of rebellion or insurrection and not that of treason; and that the penalty to be applied must
be that which is prescribed in section 3 of rebellion of insurrection.
The conclusion reached in the majority opinion seems to result from an adherence to the case of the United States
vs. Greathouse (4 Sawyer, 457; 26 Fed. Cases, 18), decided by Mr. Justice Field in a trial in the circuit court in
which he presided.
In that case the defendant was on trial charged with the offense of rebellion or insurrection under section 2 of the
act of Congress of July 17, 1862, and not for treason under section 1 of said act.
Prior to the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, several cases had risen involving a construction of the provision
contained in section 3, article 3, Constitution of the United States, and the act of 1790 made under this provision
of the Constitution.
There had been much discussion in the early cases as to what would constitute a levying of war within the
meaning of the term as used in the constitutional provisions. This discussion involved both the question as to the
acts which amount to a levying of war and as to the motive or purpose of those engaged in the same.
At the time of the decision in the Greathouse case these questions had been well settled and the result of the
decisions was stated by Justice Field in the following language:
To constitute a levying of war there must be an assemblance of persons in force, to overthrow the Government, or
to coerce its conduct. The words embrace not only those acts by which war is brought into existence, but also
those acts by which was is prosecuted . . . . The offense is complete, whether the force be directed to the entire
overthrow of the Government throughout the country, or to defeat the execution and compel the repeal of one of
its public laws.
Under the provision of the Constitution defining treason, the offense was complete whether the force was directed
to the entire overthrow of the Government or whether it was a rebellion or insurrection against the authority of
the United States or the laws thereof; but a distinction was though to exist, at the time of the enactment of the
law of July 17, 1862, between the offenses defined in the same. As stated by Justice Field, it was the opinion of
several Senators that the commission of the acts which Congress designated in the law might, under some
circumstances, constitute an offense less than treason.
But the judges were of the opinion in the decision of the Greathouse case that Congress had not created separate
and distinct offenses by the enactment of the first and second sections of the act of July 17, 1862; that by the first
section of the act (secs. 5331 and 5332, U. S. Rev. Stat.), in which treason is defined and made punishable by
death, and by the second section of said act (sec. 5334, U. S. Rev. Stat.) in which the offense of rebellion or
insurrection is defined and made punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years, Congress has not done
more than created the offense of treason.
It must be borne in mind applying the Greathouse case here, as said by Justice Field in that case, that treason
against the United States is defined by the Constitution itself and Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain,
construe, or define the offense, its power over the subject being limited to prescribing the punishment for the
offense.
The Philippine Commission was not restricted in this respect and had the power to divide the offense of treason,
such as is defined in the Constitution of the United States and as it had been construed by the United States
courts, into as many offenses as it saw fit and to affix such punishment as was deemed proper to each class of
cases.

37

Such considerations as evidently influenced the court in the Greathouse case with reference to the power of
Congress to enlarge, restrain, construe, or define the offense of treason should have no weight in the
determination of the question here.
It is hard to conceive that in enacting Act No. 292, the Commission had in view the decision in the Greathouse
case, for, as stated, the Philippine Commission was unrestricted in its action to define treason.
It is also difficult to understand that the Commission intended to punish the offense of treason by imprisonment
for not more than ten years and a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars when the punishment for treason
has in the first section, in express language, been fixed at death, or imprisonment for not less than five years and
a fine of not less than $10,000.
Such a confusion of ideas and terms can not be attributed to the Commission.
If we leave out of consideration the Greathouse case, the question seems hardly susceptible of argument or
discussion.
Nor can I agree in the views expressed in the concurring majority opinion.
The different between the "levying of war," which constitutes the crime of treason under section 1, and that of
insurrection and rebellion as provided for in section 3, does not depend upon the magnitude of the movement, but
rather upon the intention and purposes of the persons engaged in it.
If the intention is to utterly overthrow the Government and establish another independent government in its
place, and the person engaged in the act owes allegiance to the United States or the Government of the
Philippine Islands, the offense is treason and is punishable under section 1; while if the intention and purpose was
simply to obstruct and resist "the authority of the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
the laws thereof," the offense is rebellion or insurrection.
To resist the authority of the Government of the United States or the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, by
rebellion or insurrection, was regarded by the Commission as much less culpable and of a less dangerous
character to the Government than where the intention was to entirely overthrow the Government and substitute
an independent government in its stead. This idea is fairly illustrated by a case recently decided by this court, in
which the Government through it officers was resisted in taking the census of the people in a certain pueblo, on
account of the belief of the people there that the taking of the census was intended to furnish means to enable
the Government to exercise its taxing power on the property in that particular section of the country. Another
illustration was the opposition made to the sanitary laws during the late cholera epidemic among certain ignorant
people, who believed that the sanitary inspectors were engaged in poisoning the wells in the country, and
opposed them in the performance of their duties.
While persons engaged in such resistance to the laws and authority of the Government may be guilty of rebellion
or insurrection, they are not guilty of treason as defined in the first section of Act No. 292.
What constitutes a "levying of war" has been given a definite meaning by the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case Ex Parte Bollman (4 Cr., 75), and in the elaborated opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Marshall on a motion to introduce certain evidence on the trial of Aaron Burr for treason (found in Note B,
appendix; 4 Cr.). These decisions have set at rest the question; they have been referred to in the majority opinion
and need not be further considered.
To constitute a levying of war it is not necessary that a state of war should exist in the sense that armies must be
organized and placed in the field; or that the executive branch of the Government should have called upon the
Regular Army for support; or that martial law should have been proclaimed; or that the courts of the country
should be closed and the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus suspended; or that the civil power should have
been rendered powerless to cope with the uprising; or that hostilities should assume such proportions that the
world acknowledges those engaged in it as belligerents and the contents as that of war, for if the movement has
assumed such proportions as entitle those engaged in it to the rights of belligerency, in modern times those
engaged in it are not generally punished for treason; to punish them all would be equivalent to extermination.
I am not inclined to treat with contempt what are termed roving bands of brigands. In a number of cases this court
has had before it proof of the nature and character of the Katipunan organization and its allied branches, under its
various names in the Philippine Islands. The subject has also been treated of in the reports of the Chief of
Constabulary. The character and extent of its operations is a matter of public notoriety. From all of which it may be
well inferred that it is of a much more serious character than is indicated in the concurring majority opinion. It is
not for the courts to treat such questions in any other way than from a legal standpoint. It is our duty to enforce
the laws which have been enacted, rather than to express our individual views upon political questions that
belong solely to the legislative power.
The offense of treason is not only the highest offense known to the law, but is the one most dangerous to the
existence of government.
The laws enacted by the Philippine Commission against treason are the only means of protection to the
Government. The legislative power has been fit to inflicted severe punishment upon those engaged in these
dangerous undertakings. A sufficient discretion is given the courts in fixing the penalties. The discretion which has
been left to the court in inflicting the penalties for the infringement of the law is the only discretion which we can
rightfully exercise.
The defendant and his followers constituted not only "a warlike assemblage, carrying the appearance of force, in a
situation to practice hostilities," but hostilities actually resulted. The paraphernalia of war, even cannon, were
evidence. The slain and wounded gave further evidence of the character of the undertaking.

38

There was a levying of war within the meaning of section 1, Act No. 292, and all of the elements of the crime of
treason exist in the case. The punishment under this section should be inflicted.
TORRES, J., dissenting:
In Act No. 292, passed November 4, 1901, the crimes of treason and rebellion or insurrection are not defined with
proper separation, as they appear in the Penal Code, as offenses of a different character, each with a separate
classification under the penal law.
However, as the only law applicable to the offense with which Dalmacio Lagnason is charged is Act No. 292, it is
necessary to disregard the doctrines of the Penal Code and limit this decision to determining the proper
interpretation to be given to sections 1 and 3 of that act.
If according to section 1 it is treason to levy war upon the Government of the United States or upon the
Government of these Islands, or adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine
Islands or elsewhere, then acts constituting rebellion or insurrection are also acts of treason, for to rebel against
the sovereignty of the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands is to levy war upon them.
Every act of public uprising or of open hostility against the sovereign power and the government of the country or
its agents by a band of rebels, is an act of war, and therefore, although treason and rebellion are not synonyms in
the language of the act in question, it is to be inferred from the text of sections 1 and 3 that within the crime of
treason that of rebellion or insurrection is included as species is within genus, and that this crime is also of the
nature of treason. The fact that the death penalty is prescribed in the two sections in question is not an obstacle
to this view of the law, owing to the different degree of guilt presumed in each one of the two sections of the act.
Upon the supposition that the offense committed by Dalmacio Lagnason is comprised within section 1 of Act No.
292, and that he was the leader of the armed uprising and the one who put himself at the head of the band which
levied war upon the agents of the Government, he is the one principally responsible for that overt act of
opposition to the sovereignty of the United States, which, although in accordance with the legal technology it
should be classified as rebellion, is, nevertheless, treason under the provisions of the act in question, and
consequently the proper penalty, in our opinion, is life imprisonment.
In the application of penalties, the principle which controls is that of production between the offense and
corresponding penalty prescribed by the law. It is permissible to disregard the rules derived from this principle, for
such an error would be contrary to the dictates of reason.
According to these principles, it is not just that the leader of the band should suffer only the same penalty as that
imposed upon his subordinates, who merely acted under him in the rebellion and carried out his orders. There is
unquestionably a higher degree of criminality on the part of the leader, and consequently his criminal
responsibility is heavier than that of his subordinates, who merely carry out his felonious designs. In this case
Isidro Oyco and Simeon Perje, subordinates of Lagnason, were condemned to ten years' imprisonment and to the
payment of a fine of ten thousand dollars by a judgment which, not having been appealed, has become final with
respect to these two accused. This circumstance corroborates our view as to the propriety of condemning the
principal leader of a rebellion in accordance with section 1 of Act No. 292, his guilt having been proven by the
testimony of more than two credible witnesses.
Apart from the reasons above expressed, the circumstance that section 3 of the act in question leaves it to the
discretion of the court to impose upon a defendant a penalty of imprisonment of from one day to ten years and a
fine of from $1,000 to $10,000, is worthy of serious consideration.
In section 1 the penalty is death or, at the discretion of the court, that of imprisonment at hard labor from five
years to life and a fine of not less than $10,000. Consequently, if the death penalty is not imposed an accused
might be sentenced under section 1 of this act to a period of imprisonment of less duration than that which might
be imposed in accordance with section 3 thereof, according to the view taken as to the gravity of the crime and of
the greater or lesser degree of the guilt of the defendant. Furthermore, in support of this opinion, the result of a
long and careful study of the article of the Constitution in point, of the provisions of law, and some of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, cited in the majority opinion, we must state that section 3 of
Act No. 292 taking it for granted that within the definition of the crime of treason is included the offense of
rebellion fixes the responsibility of those who incite, promote, abet, or take a secondary part in an insurrection,
or give the insurgents aid and comfort, and fixes as to them a lesser penalty than that prescribed for rebels falling
within the provisions of section 1 of the act.
Consequently, the act of levying war upon the Government of the United States or that of these Islands is
punished in the two sections in question. The chiefs and the leaders of the rebellion and the principal rebels
should be punished according to section 1 of the law, but their subordinates and those who only take a secondary
part in the acts of war or rebellion should be punished in accordance with section 3 of the same act.
In our humble opinion, this is the way the act in question should be applied in cases of treason or rebellion or in
other cases arising under section 3.
In case the eighty men led by Dalmacio Lagnason had been surrounded and forty of them taken alive as the result
of a fight with the Constabulary, could all have been condemned to death or to life imprisonment in accordance
with section 1 of the act, because each and every one of them was levying war upon and making armed
resistance to the authorities of the Insular Government? It might have been possible, but reason and good sense
would have protested against the unjust severity of the penalty as compared with the respective guilt of each one
of the rebels. For the same reason, inversely considered, we are of the opinion that the penalty prescribed by
section 3 is inadequate for the offense committed by the defendant Lagnason, the principal leader of the band.

39

For that reason the court below, while condemning his two subordinates to suffer the penalty of ten years'
imprisonment and a fine of $10,000, condemned this defendant to death.
For the reasons stated in our opinion, the decision of the court below should be reversed and the defendant
sentenced to the penalty of life imprisonment, the payment of a fine of $10,000, and to the payment of the costs
of both instances.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 28, 1949
G.R. No. L-1547
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO BATE (alias BORJA, alias PATSO), defendant-appellant.
P.J. Sevilla for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The appellant Maximo Bate alias Borja alias Patso was charged with treason before the People's Court, on nine
counts. In the course of the trial, the Special Prosecutor informed the court that he was dropping counts 3, 6, and
8 of the amended information. After trial, the People's Court (Fifth Division) found the defendant guilty of counts 1,
2, 4, 5, 7, and 9, stating that it entertained no doubt as to the guilt of the accused; that the overt acts alleged in
the information on said counts had been fully substantiated by the witnesses for the prosecution, and that there
was nothing in the record to show why their testimonies should not be given full credit. He was sentenced to
suffer life imprisonment with all the accessories of the law and to pay a fine of P10,000, plus costs. He is
appealing from that decision.
At the beginning of the trial the appellant admitted in open court that he was and had always been a Filipino
citizen. For the sake of clearness we shall take up the different counts and facts alleged under them in
chronological order.
Under count 7, it has been duly proven that on October 8, 1943, while the deceased Bernardo Laborete and his
companions, many of whom were guerrillas were in or around the store of Maxima de Java at Tisa Market, Cebu
City a truckload of undercover men, among them the appellant Maximo Bate, then armed, and some Japanese
soldiers arrived. The companions of Laborete ran away, but he, because of his sore foot could not escape. The
Japanese soldiers and their companions started shooting and hit Laborete on the shoulder as a result of which, he

40

fell down. Later on, one of the raiders finding him on the ground wounded shot him in the head killing him. The
identity of the person who wounded Laborete on the shoulder and the one who later shot him in the head has not
been established. But it is a fact that after the shooting, and while the Japanese soldiers were investigating, the
appellant posted himself on the road as a guard on the look-out for snipers.
Under count 1, it has been proven that on October 13, 1943, while Alfonso de la Cerna, Ariston Sevilla, and
Genaro Tabares were in a store in Punta Princesa Market in Cebu City, a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and
armed Filipino undercover men, among whom was the appellant, raided said store and the three men were
apprehended, accused, and maltreated on the spot and were later tied up and taken to the Headquarters of the
Japanese Military Police in the National School they received further punishment. They were kept in said building
as prisoners up to October 27, 1943 when they were transferred to Guindolman, Bohol where they were made to
work, and were not released until three months after. In that raid at the store at Punta Princesa Market, the
appellant played an important role by pointing his rifle at Tabares and telling his fellow raiders to take the three
men (meaning Tabares and his companions) to the Japanese Military Police Headquarters.
Under count 9, the evidence shows that on December 3, 1944, the appellant Maximo Bate, Pablo Labra, Francisco
Concepcion and two soldiers raided the house of Clemente Chica and questioned him on his alleged guerrilla
activities. Conception previously informed that Japanese that Chica has received a letter from the guerrillas in the
mountains. At first, Chica denied any connection with said guerrillas but appellant and his companions advised
and pressed him to admit said connection. Chica was taken to the Japanese Military Police Headquarters at the
normal school Building where apparently made some admission, including his possession of a revolver, because
the following day he was taken back to his house by the Japanese recovers who recovered his revolver from a
coffin where he had kept it.
Under count 2, it was equally proven that on January 5, 1945, at dawn a group of Filipino spies including the
appellant and some Japanese soldier raided the house of Singson Family in Pardo, Cebu City. Besides the members
of the family who were the two sisters Felipa Singson and Susan Singson and their brother Hospicio Singzon, there
were many Filipino evacuees in the house. Three of these were immediately apprehended and tied up and when
one, named Ben Abellaneda of the raiding group pointed Hospicio Singson the appellant immediately tied him too
and began to maltreat him by choking and punching him. After some investigation, the three evacuees were
released but Hospicio was taken to the Military Police Headquarters and was never seen nor heard of afterwards.
Under count 4, the evidence reveals that on January 12, 1945, while Francisca Bacalla and Pascuala Bacalla were
riding in a horse-drawn vehicle on Tres de Abril Street, Cebu City, the appellant who was then armed and who was
accompanied by several under cover men arrested Francisca Bacalla and took her to Sgt. Yoshida, chief of the
Japanese Military Police, where she was investigated and maltreated she was suspended in the air, stripped of all
her clothes while she was being investigated and questioned specially by the appellant. During said investigation
she evidently made some admission about the connections of certain people in Cebu with the guerrillas, as may
be gathered from the facts in count 5.
Under count 5, the following day or rather on January 13, 1945, at two o'clock in the morning the appellant
accompanied by Francisco Bacalla, some Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercover men raided the house of
Rosario Bacani and Anita Bacani in Bulacao, Cebu. Rosario and Anita who were suspected as guerrilla operatives
and which they really were, were questioned and maltreated in an effort to make them admit their guerrilla
connections. They were suspended in the air with their hands tied behind their back. In the course of the
investigation, the appellant suggested to Sgt. Yoshida who was then with the raiding party that they pour gasoline
in the house and set it on fire, but his suggestion was not followed. That same morning the two sister Rosario and
Anita and their brother, all tied and secured with the same rope were taken to the house of Doctor Colegado, then
being used as a Japanese garrison where they were confined and kept prison, Rosario for 20 days, Anita for 14
days and their brother for 4 days.
In his defense, the appellant claims that he joined the guerrilla movement in September, 1942 but he following
year he was arrested and imprisoned by the Japanese for his guerrilla connections and between September, 1943
and February, 1944, while under Japanese custody, he was assigned to work in the kitchen of the Japanese
Military Police and in September, 1944 he escaped and went to Leyte. In September, 1944 he was again captured
and charged with killing one, Francisco Catil; that from November, 1944 up to the arrival of the American forces
he was assigned to work in the house of Sgt. Yoshida of the Japanese Military Police as a trusted prisoner. He
further stated that he had no connection with nor was he present in the several raids attributed to him under the
several counts already mentioned except in the raid made at Punta Princesa Market on October 13, 1943 under
count 1, where he says that he was taken there by the Japanese only to identify the killer of one Amang Dempsey.
However, in connection with this claim of appellant and was well observed by the Solicitor General, it the purpose
of the raid was to find out who killed Amang Dempsey, the Japanese in that raiding party should have questioned
the three men they had apprehended, namely: De la Cerna, Sevilla and Tabares about the of Dempsey as well as
of his killer, but no such questions were asked and the raiding party merely questioned there men as to their
guerrilla connections and activities.
To corroborate the appellant in his claim that he was not present in the raid in the store of Maxima de Java under
count 7, he presented Arcadio Mondejar who told the court that he was one of the men in the truck which arrived
in front of De Java's store, but it was not a raiding party but only a shipment of rice of the NARIC; that the
appellant was not present at the time; that what really happened was that Bernardo Laborete who was then
armed with a revolver, tried to hold up the truck and that the Constabulary soldiers who were in the truck as
guards shot him.
Even with this attempted corroboration we are inclined to accept this theory of the appellant. In the first place,
the witness theory of the appellant. In the first place, the witness Arcadio Mondejar was, like the appellant, a
treason indictee and confined in the same jail with him. And besides being good friends, they evidently realized
that they were in the same predicament and decided to help each other out. If the truck really contained only rice
for distribution, there was no reason why it should be help by Laborete especially, if as claimed by Mondejar, there
were several armed Constabulary soldiers guarding it. It is more reasonable to believe the prosecution that it was

41

really a raiding party composed of Japanese soldiers and Filipino spies, one of them being the appellant, which
succeeded in dispersing the guerrillas found in and around the store and killing one of them.
In connection with all these counts found proven against the appellant by the People's Court, it may be
remembered that during the period covered by these counts the appellant was always seen armed and in the
company of Filipinos undercover men who allied themselves with their superiors the Japanese soldiers and
Military Police. The appellant was seen always accompanying and aiding these raiding parties and took quote an
important part in them, questioning the people found during the raids, apprehending them, tying them up, even
threatening and torturing them in an effort to obtain the information desired. Furthermore, there is no reason
known why the witness for the prosecution should falsely accused the appellant of these grave charges.
All the charges under the five counts 1, 2, 5, 7, and 9 have been established by the testimonies of at least two
witnesses. As regards count 4, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, only one witness Felisa Taboado testified as
to Francisca Bacalla's arrest by the appellant and only one witness, Conrado Bao, the cook of Sgt. Yoshida testified
about her investigation oat Yoshida's house by the defendant; but although not sufficient to prove the overt acts
of which he is accused, nevertheless, the evidence may be considered as proof of his adherence to the enemy.
In conclusion, we find that the guilt oft he appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt and finding
the decision appealed from in accordance with law and supported by evidence, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
Moran, C. J. Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
We concur in the decision affirming the judgment of he People's Court. The evidence on record has proved beyond
all reasonable doubt overt acts of treason committed by appellant.
We cannot agree, however, with the pronouncement as regards count 4 of the information upon which only one
witness Felisa Taboado, testified as to Francisca Bacalla's arrest and only one witness, Conrado Bao testified as to
Bacalla's investigation by appellant at Yoshida's house wherein it is said that the uncorroborated testimony of
each of said witnesses can be considered as proof of the defendant's adherence to the enemy. We are of opinion
that to prove any element of the crime of treason that constitutes an overt act or upon the same is based, it is
indispensable that the two-witness rule be strictly adhered to. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code does not
distinguish, for purposes of the two-witness rule, between overt acts of aid and comfort and overt acts of
adherence.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
May 28, 1952
G.R. No. L-4533
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORENZO MORALES, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
Juan and Cruz for appellant.
PARAS, C. J.:
The defendant, Lorenzo Morales, was charged with the crime of treason in a two-count information, count one of
which was abondoned by the prosecution. The other count reads as follows:

42

That on or about December 12, 1944, in San Miguel, Bulacan, the above-named accused Lorenzo Morales, then a
member of the MAKAPILI organization, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the
enemy, did then add there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lead, join, and accompany a group of Japanese
soldiers and other MAKAPILI members in a raid in barrio Santa Lucia, San Miguel, Bulacan, resulting in the capture
and apprehension of Maximo Ramos, Alejo Velayo, Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo, Fermin Chico, Bonifacio de
Jesus, and Arsenio Pacheco, all guerrillas, and in the confiscation of 112 rounds of ammunitions and clothing of
said Bonifacio de Jesus; and thereafter all the above-named persons were taken to the Japanese garrison in Santa
Lucia, San Miguel, Bulacan, where they were beaten, maltreated and detained for a period of 22 days after which
Bonifacio de Jesus was released, Maximo Ramos was able to escape and Alejo Velayo, Rufino Velayo, Ricardo
Velayo, Fermin Chico and Arsenio Pacheco were killed.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a decision finding the defendant guilty as charged, and
sentencing him to imprisonment for 20 years, reclusion temporal, and to a fine of P10,000, plus the costs. From
this decision, the defendant appealed.
The facts as found by the trial court and supported by the evidence for the prosecution are briefly as follows: In a
raid made by a group of Japanese and Makapili in the early morning of December 12, 1944, in Santa Lucia, San
Miguel, Bulacan, Ricardo Velayo and Rufino Velayo, brothers were arrested from their house. During the raid, the
appellant, armed with a gun, remained downstairs as a guard. At about 10:00 o'clock in the same morning Ricardo
and Rufino Velayo, together with Fermin Chico, Alejo Velayo, Arsenio Pacheco, Maximo Ramos, Bonifacio de Jesus
and Salvador Eusebio, also arrested from other places in Santa Lucia, were taken near the house of Rosalina de
Guzman where they were tortured to death, with the exception of Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos, and
Salvador Eusebio. The dead bodies were buried near the place of the torture, but those of Ricardo Velayo and
Rufino Velayo were later exhumed and buried in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The appellant, however, though present on
the occasion when the victims were tortured, did not actually take part in the fatal ceremony. All those thus
apprehended and killed were guerrillas.
The arrest of Ricardo and Rufino Velayo in their house was testified to by Ramon Velayo, their father, and
Herminia de San Jose, wife of Rufino Velayo, who lived in the same house. Ramon Velayo declared that, as the
raiders approached his house, he jumped out and hid himself among the bushes nearby, from which he was able
to recognize the appellant who went back and forth, with a gun, as a guard near the premises. Herminia de San
Jose in turn testified that Ricardo and Rufino Velayo were guerrillas; and when the Japanese came to her house,
they asked for firearms and arrested her husband and brother-in-law; that the appellant in the meantime posted
himself, with a gun, as a guard around the house.
The torture which resulted in the death of the victims above mentioned, except Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos
and Salvador Eusebio, is established by the testimony of Maximo Ramos, Salvador Eusebio (two survivors) and
Rosalina de Guzman. The latter testified that a group of Japanese and Makapilis brought several Filipino prisoners
near her house in Santa Lucia, among whom she recognized Bonifacio de Jesus, Maximo Ramos, Rufino Velayo,
Ricardo Velayo, Alejo Velayo, Arsenio Pacheco and Fermin Chico. All, except Bonifacio de Jesus and Maximo
Ramos, were tortured to death. The testimony of Maximo Ramos and Salvador Eusebio is corroborative.
The defense presented Cirilo Domingo and Luis Santa Maria, former guerrilla officers, who testified that their
investigations showed that the appellant had nothing to do with the crime imputed to him. The appellant also
introduced Felisa de Velayo, who testified that she saw Rufino Velayo, Ricardo Velayo, and Alejo Velayo while they
were maltreated to death, and that the appellant did not take part in the killing, although he was present as a
prisoner. The appellant testified that he was working in the field and, while the Japanese conducted their raid in
Santa Lucia, he was not molested.
The trial court was correct in finding the appellant guilty. The two witness-rule was fully met. Counsel for appellant
doubts the veracity of Salvador Eusebio, because the latter was not mentioned in the information as one of the
victims. Even without said witness, however, the testimony of Maximo Ramos and Rosalina de Guzman is
sufficient. No ulterior motive on the part of the witnesses for the prosecution has been shown, so that it cannot be
argued that they were biased against the appellant. There can be no dispute that the victims were guerrillas,
because the appellant himself and his witness, Cirilio Domingo, admitted the fact.
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense is materially conflicting, in that while the appellant testified
that he was in the field when the raid was made, his own witness, Felisa de Velayo, declared that as the Velayos
were being tortured, the appellant was there as a prisoner. The testimony of Cirilio Domingo and Luis Sta. Maria as
to the result of their investigations, cannot overcome the positive evidence presented by the prosecution.
Appellant also insists that his mere presence is not sufficient to constitute treason. It appears, however, that he
was carrying a firearm and was seen behaving as a guard. During the Japanese occupation, nobody could carry a
a gun freely in the presence of Japanese soldiers, unless he was an agent of or in cahoots with the enemy.
We think it far-fetched to suppose that the defendant happened to be in the place above mentioned as a mere
spectator or by accident. Openly carrying a firearm while going with the Japanese soldiers can only be reconciled
with the idea that the man was in league with and the confidence of the enemy. (People vs. Capacete, 45 Off. Gaz.
2035.)
Appellant's Filipino citizenship is proven by certified true copies of his identification record card and certificate of
citizenship (Exhibits A-1 and B-1), the originals of which (Exhibits A and B) are on file on the Bureau of Prisons.
Since these are official records, it was not necessary to identify them. The criticism of appellant's counsel that
they were not properly identified is therefore without merit.
Although, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the prescribed penalty should be in the medium period,
or reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor General, we are inclined to affirm the sentenced imposed
by the trial court, it appearing that the appellant admittedly did not have any participation in the torture that

43

resulted in the death of the victims. "We have punished the commission of treason on the basis of treason on the
basis of the seriousness of the treasonable acts, and of the presence or absence of atrocities on the victims,
rather than on the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances." (People vs. Cana, 87 Phil. 577.)
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Labrador JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9529. August 30, 1958.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for Appellee.
J. M. Cajucom for Appellant.

44

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON WHEN SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED. Where the prosecution had established that
during the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino Citizen, and owing allegiance to the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid and comfort by rendering service with the
Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its Detective force in the province of Iloilo, and that
in the performance of such service, he participated actively and directly in the punitive expeditions periodically
made by the Japanese forces in the guerrilla-infested areas of the said province and committed robberies, arson
and mass-murders, said accused is guilty of the crime of Treason.
2. EVIDENCE; BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. Mere denial by appellant who is charged of the
crime of Treason cannot prevail upon the positive assertion of the witnesses for the government establishing
incriminating facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence that between positive and negative testimony, more
weight and credit.
3. ID.; DURESS; LONE TESTIMONY INSUFFICIENT. The defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon
appellant for which he had to serve in the detective force of the Japanese Army may not be believed on his lone
and self-serving testimony if there is not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or coerced by the
Japanese.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death by the Fifth Division of the defunct Peoples Court for the
crime of treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of the
appeal duly interposed by the accused but also under the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
which provides mandatory review by this Tribunal of all decisions or judgments of the lower courts imposing death
penalties. Meantime, it was discovered that the transcript of stenographic notes taken down on October 8, 1947,
before the Peoples Court was missing and unavailable, by reason of which and upon recommendation of the
Solicitor General, we promulgated a resolution on August 1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses who testified before the Peoples
Court, namely, Gregorio Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and the accused himself. Thus the case was sent
to that court.
On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that he be allowed
to withdraw his appeal so as to avail himself of the benefits by the Executive clemency granted to all prisoners
convicted of treason, including those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first
withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of First Instance of Iloilo returned the case to us for whatever action we may
take in view of the withdrawal requested, for, at all events, the case had to be reviewed by us regardless of
defendants appeal. The case was included in the agenda prepared by the Clerk of Court for September 21, 1953,
only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without calling the attention of the Tribunal
that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which decision called for an
automatic review and judgment by us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably
on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where briefs had not been filed, as in the present case, said petition for
withdrawal was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. However, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
the same date, and after the passing of the resolution, appellant filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating
his request for withdrawal of appeal previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching thereto
two documents said to be copies of the conditional pardon granted him and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in
the office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering this second petition
when we realized the nature of the case and that the withdrawal of appeal granted on September 21, 1953, was a
mistake and contrary to legal precedents. So, in a resolution dated October 19, 1953, this Tribunal reconsidered
its resolution of September 21st granting withdrawal of appeal, and again remanded the case to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimonies above referred to, with instructions that a new decision be
rendered based on the said testimonies and on the standing evidence adduced before the Peoples Court. The
resolution of October 19th read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct Peoples Court after trial of appellant
Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder and
sentenced him thus
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of the
complex crime of treason and murders as defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with
Article 48 of the same Code, sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the amount of
P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia Tambirao in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the proceedings.
"Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also
under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this
Tribunal of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the
defendant shall have appealed or not.

45

"It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8,
1947, could not be located, and following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution was
promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the
testimony of said witnesses.
"Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating that
about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including
those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedly to give
finality to the judgment of the lower court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said
petition the Court of First Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the
case to this Court for whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of the petition for withdrawal of the
appeal filed by appellant and because the case had to be reviewed by the Supreme Court anyway regardless of
the appeal by the defendant.
"The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court on that date as regards this
was prepared by the Clerk of Courts Office only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the
defendant. Our attention was not called to the fact that defendant had previously appealed from a decision
sentencing him to death, which decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. So, following the
practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where the briefs have not yet
been filed, as in the present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal was granted by resolution of September
21, 1953. On the same date, however, and presumably after the passing of the resolution, appellant Villanueva
filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating the request for withdrawal of his appeal previously made with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits A and B, said to be copies of the conditional
pardon and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the Office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It
was only on considering said petition that we realized the nature of the case and the decision appealed to this
Court, the withdrawal of which appeal had been granted by the resolution of September 21, 1953.
"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any
other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not
remove the case from the jurisdiction of this Court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review
the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to
render the decision of the Peoples Court final. In fact, as was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case
of U.S. v. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this Court of a decision imposing the death
penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly
without force or affect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a
judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment
and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not
final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death
penalty is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.
"Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of retaking the testimony of those
witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the case was virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the
evidence and the testimony received during the trial before the Peoples Court which is still intact and available
shall stand and the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the same witnesses who testified on October 8,
1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances, it is
necessary for the trial court to render a new decision because the new trial is being held before a new Judge and
there is no assurance that the witnesses testifying, although the very same ones who were on the witness stand
on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and in the same manner that they did at the former trial,
although they are supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de Almario v. Fidel Ibaez, Et Al., 46 O.G. Nos. 1, p.
390). Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that
the said witnesses as far as possible confine themselves to the same points on which they testified on October 8,
1947, because the testimonies of said witnesses including the defendant are referred to and described in the
decision of the Peoples Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129, and that there are only four witnesses including
the accused himself.
"Examining Exhibits A and B submitted by appellant in relation to his petition for the withdrawal of his appeal,
we find that although his name appears in the list of prisoners convicted by the Peoples Court and supposed to
be pardoned conditionally, the pardon itself refers to the remission of the unexpired portions of the prison
sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed below who were convicted by the defunct Peoples Court of
treason and committed to the new Bilibid Prison to serve their sentence. It is highly doubtful that the pardon
could have contemplated and included appellant herein because his sentence of death does not merely involve a
prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death sentence is not exactly served but rather executed. Moreover,
Exhibit B says that those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only after their
appeal has been withdrawn. The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decision of the
Peoples Court final, resulting in conviction, this to bring it into harmony with Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the
Constitution which requires conviction as a condition precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have
already stated, despite defendants withdrawal of his appeal from the decision imposing the death sentence,
there is no definite conviction or sentence until and after this Tribunal has reviewed the case and rendered its own
decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial
court based on the new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in which case there would be no automatic
review by us.
"Let the record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for new trial and thereafter,
for a new decision."cralaw virtua1aw library
At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the defense, Ambrosio Tuble and Basilio Taborete, were
introduced. Appellant also presented documentary evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly granted
him. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the decision of
the Peoples Court, and, reproducing said decision, rendered judgment on October 11, 1955, sentencing appellant

46

to capital punishment. The case was again elevated to us for automatic review and judgment and given the
present docket number.
In the amended information filed before the Peoples Court, appellant was accused of treason on ten counts, but
the prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower court
found that Counts 1 and 2 were not proven, and convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The prosecution established that during the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino citizen, and owing
allegiance to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid and
comfort by rendering service with the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its Detective
Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in the performance of such service, he participated actively and directly in
the punitive expeditions periodically made by the Japanese forces in the guerilla- infested areas of the province of
Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson and mass-murders, specifically as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of Baroc and Atabayan, municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to
adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and
comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in
company with other Filipino spies and several Japanese soldiers, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco, Melchor Trieco, Cosme
Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto, Napoleon Luceno, Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio Belandrez on
the charge that they were guerrilla soldiers and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and torture them;
that subsequently the persons above-mentioned were taken away and were not seen or heard of since then; that
on the occasion of the aforementioned patrol, the above-named accused and his companions, with intent of gain
and without consent of the owners. thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously loot the house
of Jose T. Belandrez, taking therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the amount of P300; emergency notes in the
amount of P1,200; jewelry valued at P500; clothing valued at P200; and other personal effects; and from the
house of Toribia Taleon, jewelry, watches, clothing and other personal effects with a total value of P160 more or
less."cralaw virtua1aw library
Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and Maria Mendoza, corroborating one another, testified that at
dawn of June 10, 1943, appellant, accompanied by some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house of Jose
T. Belandrez situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and took therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry worth P300, and clothing
valued at P200; that they also arrested Dionisio Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno, members of
the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said three members of the
Bolo Battalion never returned.
Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this Count, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August, 1943, in the municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did
adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give, as he did give said enemy, aid and comfort, in his
capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other
Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and
apprehend several persons suspected of guerrilla activities, among whom were Federico Tinamisan, Eustaquio
Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador Tedor, Tomas Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta, Andres Tayo, Victorio Tuante, Manuel
Teano, Matias Tirante, Rufo Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilarion Toga and several others, who were
gathered in the Chapel at barrio Napnapan, where the persons aforesaid were investigated, maltreated and
tortured, as a consequence of which Salvador Tedor died of the beating and torture indicted upon him by the
herein accused and his companions; that the following morning about thirty-seven persons were taken to the yard
of Valentina Amandorons house, where Jesus Astrologo, Carlos Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the
Japanese killed by beheading Andres Tai, Victorio Tuante, Roque Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania, Rufo Tulato,
Agapito Trompeta, Tomas Trompeta, Celedonio Tupino, Simeon Ledesma, Hermenegildo Taleon, Marcelo Turid,
Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid, Jose Tamon, Cornelio Taghap, Eustaquio Doga, Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU)
Lucio (LNU), Juan (LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo (LNU), and several others whose names are unknown, while
Alfredo Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and wounded on their necks but miraculously escaped
death."cralaw virtua1aw library
Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa Gua, Natividad Duga, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilario Taghap and
Valentina Amandoron who, corroborating one another, stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was a Monday,
at about six oclock in the evening, while Eustaquio Duga and his family were at their home in Tigbauan, Iloilo, he
saw Japanese soldiers and some Filipinos approaching their house; that Eustaquio Duga notified his wife and they
immediately started to flee; that unfortunately, they were overtaken by the Japanese soldiers, and Eustaquio
Duga was arrested by herein appellant who was in company with said Japanese soldiers; that Eustaquio Duga was
taken to the nearby barrio of Napnapan; that sometime later, Severa Gua found the dead body of Eustaquio Duga,
with his head almost severed, among other corpses in the yard of the house of Valentina Amandoron.
On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his companion Roque Teologo were walking in a barrio road in
Napnapan, Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that Trompeta
and Teologo were taken to the barrio of Ermita, of the same municipality, where they were investigated together
with about thirty persons who were suspected as guerrillas; thence they were brought to the house of Valentina
Amandoron where appellant and his companions killed in cold blood Trompetas companions as well as those
persons who were brought there earlier. Among the twenty-five persons killed on that occasion, were Andres Tayo,
Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato, Roque Teologo, Jose Taucon and Matias Tiranea.
Count No. 8. The information equally recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

47

"8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy,
and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer
and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army; and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese
soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme Calacasan, Nazario
Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevega, Jose Canillas, Aurelio Calacasan, Graciano
(LNU), Juan (LNU), and three others, names unknown, on the charge that the persons aforesaid were guerilla
soldiers or guerrilla sympathizers; that thereafter these persons were taken to barrio Taal, municipality of San
Miguel, where the accused and his companions set fire to and burned several houses in the aforesaid barrio; and
later to barrio Baguingin, municipality of Leon, where the above-named accused and his companions investigated,
maltreated and tortured them; that the above-named accused further adhering to the enemy did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, and with evident premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to
death Cosme Calacasan, while tied to a tree with hands tied behind his back; while Nazario Calimutan was
bayonetted and killed in the same manner by Jesus Astrologo, Filipino, co-spy of the herein accused; while
Graciano (LNU) and Juan (LNU) and two others (names unknown) were bayoneted to death by the Filipino and
Japanese companions of the accused; that after the killing of the aforesaid persons, the above-named accused
and his companions did gather the corpses of their victims in the house of Juan Caya and thereafter did set fire to
and burn that house with the dead bodies inside."cralaw virtua1aw library
Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each other, testified that at about eight oclock in the morning
of August 12, 1943, while Aurelio Calacasan, Cosme Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario
Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevieja and Jose Canillas and several others were in the barrio of Anonang, Leon, Iloilo, they
were arrested by Japanese soldiers and taken to the barrio of Taal, of the same municipality, where they saw
appellant and his companions. After setting afire the houses in said barrio, appellant and his companions brought
the prisoners to barrio Agboy, of the same municipality, where they were investigated regarding their guerilla
activities or connections; that during the investigations, appellant stabbed to death Cosme Calacasan who was a
member of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that after several prisoners were killed, their
corpses were gathered and placed in a house which was set on fire.
Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended information recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy
and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer,
spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese
soldiers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid against
and mass arrest of persons suspected as guerrilla soldiers and sympathizers, as a consequence of which, about
eighty persons, male and female, both young and old were arrested and gathered in a schoolhouse and chapel in
the barrio of Buenavista, and thereat investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused and his
companions; that subsequently about thirty persons including women and children were taken to the house of
Aquilino Sales, where about fourteen persons were bayonetted and killed by Japanese soldiers, namely, Julia
Cabilitasan, Mercedes Calopez, Andrea Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel Canag, Rosalia Calopez, Luz Caldito,
Estelita Camorahan, Roman Cabilinga, Tomas Canag, Luis Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin, Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio
Caldito; while Paulina Cantara, Alejandro Calsona and Bienvenido Cabankalan received and sustained bayonet
wounds but survived and were able to escape after the house of aforesaid Aquilino Sales was set on fire and
burned by said patrol of Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers."cralaw virtua1aw library
Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro Calsena and Perpetua Canag, who testified for the
prosecution, corroborating one another, stated that at about eight oclock in the morning of August 12, 1943,
several residents of barrio Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were arrested by the appellant, who was armed with revolver
and bayonet, and his companions consisting of Filipinos and Japanese soldiers; that said barrio residents were
brought to the barrio schoolhouse where they were investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan was
singled out by the appellant who tied her hands behind her back and brought her under a "doldol" (kapok) tree,
near a chapel, where she was stripped of all her clothings until she was naked. Appellant investigated her
regarding the whereabouts of her husband who was a USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after severely beating Julia
Cabilitasan, brought her to the house of Aquilino Sales where there were other Filipino prisoners. Shortly
thereafter, appellant and his companions started the massacre of the prisoners. Appellant stabbed Julia
Cabilitasan three times with a bayonet. In that massacre, fourteen persons including women and children were
killed. Among those killed were Julia Cabilitasan, Macario Cabilitasan, Roman Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia
Calpit. Later, said house was set on fire.
Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding this Count, recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the municipalities of Guimbal and Tubugan, Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did
adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his
capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other
Filipino spies, Bureau of Constabulary and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably arrest Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Edgardo Escorido,
Editha Escorido, Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor Tabanda, Elena Gierza, Natividad Gersalino, Jovita
Gersalino, Ernesto Tambirao, Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio Tortugalete, Paz Tabora, Basilisa Taborete,
Gloria Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with unknown names on the charge that the persons aforesaid
were either guerrilla soldiers sympathizers and supporters; that the aforesaid persons were then taken to the
house of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein accused, did then and their investigate, maltreat, or otherwise torture
Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido and Eustaquia Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess as to their
connection with the guerrilla movement and the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that subsequently the
herein accused further adhering to the enemy did deliver to a Japanese executioner Juan Gelario, Felipe Tanato,
David Garnica, Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana, who were all executed and killed one after
another; that the killing of Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana took place shortly after they were

48

abused and raped by the Japanese and BC soldiers in the house of Jacinto Taborete; that while this was going on,
Jovita Gersalino and Lourdes Tabanda were taken to another house by the herein accused, Filemon Palacios, Jr.,
Vicente Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they were abused and raped; that subsequently the persons
gathered were asked who of them were relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga for they would be released and when an
old woman answered that they were all relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga, the Japanese soldiers at once started to
indict and deliver bayonet thrusts on the persons gathered and as a consequence of which about thirty of them
were killed and several were wounded that subsequently, the herein accused and his companions proceeded to
barrio Buluagan, where one Saturnino (LNU) was arrested, investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein
accused and later killed by the Japanese."cralaw virtua1aw library
Gloria Escorido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza, testifying in support of this Count, and corroborating one
another, stated that at about seven oclock in the morning of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and several
Japanese soldiers were on a punitive expedition in the barrio of Miadan, Guimbal, Iloilo, they arrested the barrio
residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in Tubongan, Iloilo; that the barrio residents, who were about fifty persons,
were brought to the barrio of Laguna, Tubongan, Iloilo, where they were investigated and maltreated; that during
the investigation, appellant tied the feet of Gloria Escorido, hanged her with her head downward and beat her
with the branch of an "aguho" tree; that appellant likewise brought to the house of Jacinto Batorete three females,
namely, Luz Tabiana, Jesusa Jimenez and Juana Tabiana where the said girls were abused by the appellant and his
companions; that appellant also bayoneted to death Sofia Tambirao for the simple reason that she was the cousin
of Tranquilino Geonanga, an officer of the guerrillas; that appellant and his companions massacred on that
occasion around thirty persons, among whom were Jovita Gersalino, Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Sofia
Tambierao, and Edgardo Escorido.
We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated actively in the punitive raids made by the Japanese
soldiers and in arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas, but personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely 16
years of age at the time (Count 10), and killed in cold blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three times
(Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her three times, with the added ignominy of stripping her stark
naked moments before killing her (Count 9), and Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of appellant
as testified to by eyewitnesses who have survived the harrowing massacres, speak eloquently that his adherence
to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort, was accompanied by cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton disregard of
the feelings and decency of his fellow citizens.
The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence for appellant, his defense in the lower court merely
consisting of (1) his denial of the overt acts imputed upon him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective
force of the Japanese Army since January 1st, 1944, it was because he was made to accept the position under
duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for the good of the people, he having saved many Filipino
lives from Japanese atrocities.
We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record because of the seriousness of the charges against appellant,
and we find that the evidence for the prosecution is overwhelming, such that appellants counsel de officio
instead of filing a brief, made a manifestation dated November 29, 1955, stating that "after a thorough study of
the records of the case, he finds nothing therein sufficient to disturb the decisions of the Peoples Court and of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo imposing capital punishment on the accused." Said counsel further stated that "The
accuseds only evidence which directly attacked the governments proofs was his denial of what several witnesses
testified to." This manifestation was considered by this Tribunal as appellants brief, in its resolution of December
6, 1955. Certainly mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon the positive assertion of the witnesses for the
government establishing incriminating facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence that as between positive and
negative testimony, the former deserves more weight and credit.
Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the
detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with the Solicitor-General that "except the lone and self-serving
testimony of the appellant that he was coerced to cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there is not an
iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any evidence showing
that the alleged compulsion or coercion was grave and imminent."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done.
A threat of future injury is not enough." (16 C. J., 91).
"To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great
bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
accused for escape or self defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield
himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person."
(Whartons Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
"Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by the law. No man, from fear or circumstances to himself
has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief upon mankind" (Lord Denman in Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Car.
and P. (Eng.) 616, v. Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 273).
When the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of lost testimonies, appellant
attempted to give the case a new twist by filing a motion to quash on the ground that the pardon extended him
has already extinguished his criminal liability and that his conviction by the Peoples Court had placed him in
jeopardy. This motion was denied, but during the trial appellant was allowed to present documentary evidence
relative to the clemency extended him, consisting of Exhibit 1 which is a certified copy of his conditional pardon;
Exhibit 2, a certified copy of the letter of the Legal Assistant of the President dated June 30, 1953, addressed to
the Director of Prisons; Exhibit 3 the motion to withdraw appeal filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo;
and Exhibit 4, the Tribunals resolution of September 21, 1953, granting said withdrawal. In addition, appellant
presented an Exhibit 5 the decision of the Peoples Court in the case of People v. Jesus Astrologo, dated December
11, 1947, sentencing him to death; Exhibit 6 the conditional pardon extended to said accused dated June 27,

49

1953; and Exhibit 7 the letter of the Legal Assistant of the Office of the President to the Director of Prisons, to
show that said Jesus Astrologo who is now enjoying his freedom by reason of the pardon extended, has been
allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw his appeal pending review of his death sentence.
Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we reiterate our ruling in our resolution of October 19, 1953,
hereinbefore quoted. As to appellants contention respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find it
untenable, for the Astrologo case (88 Phil., 423) was elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he filed his brief
on October 21, 1949, and we rendered judgment on March 30, 1951, commuting the sentence to life
imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon granted him on June 27, 1953, or more than two years after
the final judgment, was therefore in order, and cannot be invoked by herein appellant as a precedent.
As to the payment of indemnity in the amount of P2,000 to the respective heirs of each of the victims of
appellant, the Solicitor- General recommends that this amount imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000.
We find this recommendation to be correct, as it is in consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal on
the matter; hence the decision of the lower court should be amended accordingly. Furthermore, although the facts
of the case verily justify the imposition of death penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty should be, as
it is hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua, in accordance with law.
Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC
January 21, 1949
G.R. No. L-365
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO RACAZA, defendant-appellant.
Pedro C. Mendiola for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Antonio Racaza was charged with treason on 14 counts and tried din the City of Cebu before the First Division of
the People's Court. The information is as follows:
That during the period comprised between January , 1944 and February, 1945, more specifically on or about the
dates and periods herein below mentioned, in the municipalities hereinafter stated all within the Provincial of
Cebu and Bohol, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused not being a foreigner but a Filipino
citizen owing allegiance to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of
said duty of allegiance did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably adhere to the Empire of
Japan with which the United States and the Philippines were then at war, giving said enemy the Empire of Japan
and the Imperial Japanese forces in the Philippines, aid and/or comfort in the following manner, to wit:
"1. That on or about May 8, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comport fort to the enemy said accused did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably acting as a Japanese spy lead, guided and accompany a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and
Filipino undercovers, which apprehended Custodio Abella; that the Filipino undercovers, which apprehended
Custodio Abella; that the aforementioned accused did question Abella as to the hiding place of Captain Ibaez, G2 of guerrilla forces; that during the investigation, the herein accused hit Custodio Abella several times with a
revolver and did threaten to kill him if he did not give the desired information; and while Abella's hands were tied
behind his back, the herein accused did knock him down and choke him, while another companion did jump up
and down several times on Abella's stomach; that said Antonio Abella was finally taken and detained at the
Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters for fifteen days:

50

"2. That sometime during the month of August, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, the
accused therein acting as a Japanese spy and undercover with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
aid and comport to the enemy did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol composed of two Japanese soldiers and twelve Filipino undercovers which apprehended one
Florencio Perez as a guerrilla suspect; that over his pistol to the accused as and upon denying of having any
pistol, said accused and his companions did hang him with a rope and while he was thus suspended in mid air, the
herein accused and his companions hit Florencio Perez on the head hand in other parts of the body with the butts
of the revolvers and with their fists; that the accused then took Florencio Perez outside the house and threatened
to shoot him on the back of his head unless he told where his pistol was;
"3. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe. Province of Cebu, the aforesaid accused
acting as a Japanese spy for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany three Japanese
soldiers to the house of Pablo Seno; that upon arrival at the said house, the herein accused and his companions
did apprehend the said house, the herein accused and his companions did apprehend Pablo Seno and his
daughter Anunsacion Seno for alleged guerrilla activities and connections and did ransack and take away many
objects therein; that said Pablo Seno and Anunsacion Seno after having been tied and tortured by the accused
and his companions were imprisoned at the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters and since then nothing more was
heard of them nor are their whereabouts known;
"4. That on or about December 2, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, for the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, the aforesaid accused acting as a Japanese spy
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable lead and guide a patrol of Japanese soldiers
and Filipino undercovers to the house of one Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla suspect; that said Rufino Seno was
tied, beaten and tortured and brought to and detained at the Japanese Kempei Tai Headquarters at Cebu City and
since then nothing more was heard of him nor are his whereabouts known;
"5. That on or about the first day of July, 1944, in the municipality of Clarin, Province of Bohol, Philippines, said
accused, acting as Japanese spy and with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, them and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead and guided a patrol composed of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the enemy which apprehended Leonilo Mercado and Jovito C. Soria
for alleged guerrilla activities; that Leonilo Mercado was brought to the municipal jail of Clarin, and detained up to
July 12, 1944 when his wife visited him; and since then Leonilo Mercado was not seen again nor heard from, nor
are his whereabouts known;
"6. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the City of Cebu, the herein accused who was a Japanese spy, with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead and guide a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the house of
Silvina Caballon; that upon arrival at said house, the herein a accused and his companions did ask Silvina about
the whereabouts of her brother who was a guerrilla and to surrender the latter's revolver; that upon receiving an
unsatisfactory reply, said accused forcibly undress her, choke and beat her; that the aforesaid accused then took
her to another house where through force, violence and intimidation he attempted to have sexual intercourse with
her, but which criminal purpose the accused did not realize on account of reasons independent of his own will;
"7. On or about the 24th day of August, 1944, in the Mandawe, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting
as Japanese spy, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of fifteen Filipino
pro-Japanese undercovers and two Japanese soldiers in search of guerrillas, guerrilla suspect and their supporters,
and did apprehended Patricio Suico, Leonardo Ouano and Eduardo Ouano from their homes and did bring them to
the Japanese Navy Kempei Tai Headquarters in Cebu City where they were questioned on the whereabouts of
Sulpicio Ouano, brother of Leonardo Ouano and a guerrilla suspect, and Patricio Suico was questioned and blamed
for not taking proper steps against the guerrillas as barrio lieutenant; that the accused therein and his
companions did bring the aforesaid three persons back to Leonardo's house at Banilad where they again tied,
hung tortured on account of which Patricio became unconscious; that while said Patricio Suico was thus
unconscious, the accused and his companions did build a fire under the sled where Patricio Suico was, on account
of which said Patricio was burned and died; that while being detained in Cebu City, Leonardo and Eduardo Ouano
managed to escape and fled to the mountains;
"8. Sometimes during the month of December, 1944, in the municipality of Lahug, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
the accused herein acting as Japanese spy with four other Filipino undercovers for the Japanese Army, with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comport to the enemy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably capture Pedro Lavares and Luis Hallares and did detain, tie and torture them at the
Kempei Tai Headquarters for alleged guerrilla activities; that said accused and his aforesaid companions did detain
likewise in said Kempei Tai Headquarters Bonifacio Suico and Aniceto Taranza and did torture them by giving them
fist blows tying them with ropes, hitting them with bamboo poles and wooden pestles to force them to tell the real
connections of Major Alejandro Fortuna with the guerrillas that due to said punishment and torture, Bonifacio
Suico died; that after torturing Aniceto Taranza, said accused and his companions did bring him to the river bank
near by and did kill him with a saber;
"9. On or about July 28, 1944, in the Mabaling, City of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as Japanese spy with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers for
the Japanese Army and did capture Vicente Abadiano, Nazario Abadiano, Tereso Sanchez, Fidencio Delgado and
some twenty Filipinos whose names cannot now be stated all suspected of being guerrillas and of having allegedly
taken part in the ambush of Japanese soldiers on board a truck while passing at the boundary of Mambaling on
July 25, 1944; that all the persons above-named and twenty mountains near Ponta Princesa and after having been
questioned and tortured, twelve of them including Nazario Abadiano and Tereso Sanchez were shot by the herein

51

accused and his companions, all of whom died except Tereso Sanchez who is now an invalid due to wounds he
received;
"10. On or about July 21, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as Japanese
spy with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably in company with three Filipino undercovers like the accused and
two Japanese soldiers, capture Jose Roda for being the brother of Apolonio Roda alleged G-2 operative for the
guerrilla who could not be found, Claros Numeran for being related with Santiago Numeran a guerrilla suspect
whom accused and his companions were looking for, and Marciano Alejandrino a guerrilla suspect, and did
maltreat and torture said Jose Roda, Claros Numeran and Marciano Alejandrino and later did bring them to a
secluded spot at Mambaling and shoot them to death; that due to the fact that the wounds of Jose Roda were not
serious, he survived;
"11. On or about November 17, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably guide, lead and accompany a patrol composed of
ten Filipino undercovers for the Japanese Army and two Japanese soldiers for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas, guerrilla suspects and their relatives and the herein accused and his companions did catch Hipolito
Cabahug, Dioniso del Castillo, Victorino del Castillo and Demetrio Congson and did whip and torture the last three
persons for being allegedly messengers for the guerrillas; that said accused and his companions finally did kill
Dionisio del Castillo and Victorino del Castillo by inflicting fatal wounds on theirs necks with swords;
"12. Sometimes in January, 1945, in Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu Province, said accused who was a Japanese spy, with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol composed of Japanese soldiers and
Filipino undercovers for the Japanese to Inawayan, Pardo, Cebu for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas; that
the herein accused and his companions did catch one Hospicio Singson from his house, tie him with a rope, hang
and torture him urging him to till about reports and papers from the mountains (guerrilla reports) and questioning
him about money contributions to guerrillas; that thereafter said Hospicio Singson was carried by accused and his
companions to the local Japanese garrison and since then he was not seen again nor heard from, nor are his
whereabouts known;
"13. On or about the 5th day of January, 1945, in the municipality of Cebu Province of Cebu, with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy the aforesaid accused acting as Japanese spy, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead a group a Filipinos who were enemy
undercovers to the house of Susana Singson; that upon arrival at the said house, said accused and his
companions did catch Hospicio Singson, brother of Susana Singson and who was a guerrilla suspect; that the
herein accused and his companions tied and tortured Hospicio Singson and brought him to the Japanese Kempei
Tai Headquarters in the City of Cebu and that from that date Hospicio Singson was not seen again nor heard from,
nor are his whereabouts known;
"14. That on or about January 25, 1945, in Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused who was a
Japanese spy, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead and accompany five other Filipino undercovers and did
arrest Anacleta Eben, that the herein accused and his companions did take Anacleta to the Japanese Kempei Tai
Headquarters where she was questioned on the whereabouts and activities of her daughter who was a member of
the Women's Auxiliary Service (Guerrilla); that during the questioning Anacleta Eben was tied, hung, boxed,
beaten and beaten and tortures, and while said accused was questioning her, he did choke and threaten to kill her
with a gun.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of all the counts and sentenced him to death ands to pay a fine of
P20,000 and costs, It said that "the prosecution substantiated the overt acts specified in counts Nos.
2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,12, and 13 by two competent witnesses, and the through the confession of the defendant in open
Court."
The trial was not conducted in strict accordance with law and the rules of practice and procedure, giving rise to
confusions, misunderstanding, and non-presentation of evidence on some charges. The court below itself was led
into serious errors.
After several witnesses for the prosecution had given testimony, defendants counsel informed the court that his
client, upon the latter's insistence, was willing "to enter a plea of guilty and ask whatever consideration or mercy
the court will give him." Upon being asked whether or not he ratified the statement of his counsel, the defendant
answered yes. He also answered yes to the question whether he was aware of the consequences of a plea of
guilty (t. s. n., pp. 50-51). However, when the information was read over again, the accused said that he admitted
some of the charges but not all (t. s. n., pp. 51-52). Specifically, he said he pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4, 7, 12,
an 14 and not guilty to counts 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 (t. s. n., pp. 54-55).
The prosecution then resumed the presentation of evidence and called witnesses to substantiate the charges to
which a plea of not guilty was entered. But after three new witnesses, had taken the stand, and while the third of
them was testifying, counsel for the accused reiterated "his petition at he instance of the accused himself", that
the latter be allowed to changed his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to all the 14 counts. Informed of his
attorney's statement, the defendant said "I am pleading guilty. I accept my guilt" (t. s. n., pp. 71-73).
As counsel insisted on putting his client on the stand, the prosecution went ahead with its witnesses who testified
on counts 6, 9, 12 and 13. Then it rested and the accused testified on his own behalf.
According to defense counsel the purpose of the defendant's testimony was not to deny his guilt for the crime of
treason; it was, he added, to "clarify certain points which he (accused) denied when he was informed again of the
contents of the information filed against him."

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After having been sworn the defendant again said that some of the charges filed against him were not true; that
in some of those cases there were other persons responsible for the commission of the crime, 9, he said who were
tortured because of their refusal to give information, be taken to Isisaki and Muraki, after which they were
marched off to Lensa by Japanese soldiers. There were about 20 prisoners, he said. Upon arriving at Lensa they
were shot by Muraki and Isisaka in the presence of Captain Suriyama. He admitted having gone with these people
and seen Isisaka and Muraka shoot the prisoners with luggers. He said about 700 civilians were herded on that
particular date and that it was among these 700 that 20 were executed.
In answer to a question of Judge Saguin if he wanted to make any statement regarding counts 3 and 4, to which
he had pleaded guilty, the defendants answered in the affirmative. He said that when they apprehended Pablo
Seno and Anunciacion Seno, he and Pedro Labares stood guard under the house while the Japanese went up.
When the Japanese came down they brought the Senos. From there they returned to the Normal School where
prisoners were confined. That was, he said, all he could say.
As to Del Castillo (count 11), he said he was not the one who killed him but two Japanese by the names of Isituca
and Pujisaki; that it was Pedro Labares and not he who reported Del Castillo to the Japanese; that he accompanied
Labares because the Japanese ordered him to do so. He said that his sole connection with the Japanese was as a
driver of Watanabi. He said that after he was captured as a guerrilla he was told that he should drive their car or
else he would be killed (t.s.n., pp. 98-102).
Regarding count 2, he said it was Japanese accompanied by some Filipinos, one of whom was Antonio Tancingco,
who arrested Florencio Perez. Reminded that he had pleaded guilty to this count, the accused after the session, he
had been struck in the head and that when he came back to court he was still confused. Nevertheless, he said
having guilt he wanted to abide by his plea fully realizing its consequences, now that his mind was already clear.
(T. s. n., pp. 102-104).
In answer to a direct question of Judge Borromeo, the accused answered in the affirmative the question whether
he admitted the facts and pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 4,7, 12, 13 and 14 (t. s. n., p. 104). But when these last
counts were read over again and he was told to plea after each count was read, he pleaded guilty to counts 2 and
3, and not guilty to counts 4, 7, 12, 13 and 14 (t.s.n., p. 105).
With specific reference to count 7, he said: "When we apprehended Suico and Ouano, they were brought to the
pier before Yusidati, a sergeant of the Japanese Military Police here. At night time, Ouano, his nephew and Patricio
were taken by four Japanese by the names of Muraki, Isisaki, Pujisaki and Koydi and other members of the
Japanese Military Police. We started from the pier about 9:00 o'clock of that evening and they took a truck and
proceeded to Mandawe. Upon reaching Mandawe, right in the house of Leonardo Ouano, there they were
investigated by Muraki. In the affidavit, it says that Patricio Suico was burned and that is not true. The truth is
that, during that night, those three were brought back here to the pier, and from that time on Ouano and Suico
were never heard by me any more." He admitted that he took part in the apprehension of these persons but said
that he was ordered to do so by Watanabi (t. s. n., pp. 106-107).
With respect to count No. 12, he said that those who took part in the apprehension of Hospicio Singson was
Maximo Bati alias Pacho (t. s. n., p. 108).
With regard to count 13, he said he had nothing to say and renewed his plea of guilty to this charge (t. s. n., pp.
108-109).
As to the counts which the defendant denied or qualified, his plea does not posses the requirement of a plea and
should have been rejected and the parties directed to introduce their evidence. A plea of guilty must be
unconditional save to explain mitigating circumstances. The defendant's responsibility on these counts therefore
have to be gauged by the prosecution's evidence and defendant's admissions.
From the defendant's changing attitude, changing pleas and statements, only counts 2, 3, and 13 survive the test
of having been confessed in open court. The prosecution's evidence and defendant's testimony substitute counts
4, 6, 9 and 11. On count 7, only one witness testified; on the rest none whatever.
Count 4. Maximina Basubas, 46 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, the accused apprehended her son
Rufino Seno for being a guerrilla; that Rufino Seno was tied, beaten, tortured, and taken to and detained at the
Japanese Kempei Tai headquarters in Cebu City; that since then he heard nothing more of him; that with the
accused were other Filipinos and Japanese.
Jose Cui, 24 years old, testified that on December 2, 1944, Antonio Racaza "raided our place". Racaza was
accompanied by other persons, Japanese and Filipinos; that he (witness) was arrested with four others, among
them Apolonio Ceniza and Rufino Seno. They were taken to the U.P. Building in the city of Cebu, near which he
was punished personally by Antonio Racaza, hung by the hands tied at his back and whipped with a golf club
(witness showed the scar). He said that he was accused of being a guerrilla; that Rufino Seno was brought with
him and others in the afternoon of December 3 to the Kempei Tai; that a Japanese took Rufino Seno out and he
had not seen Rufino since.
Count 6. Silvana Cabello, 22 years old, single, testified that in August 1944, Antonio Racaza and others came to
their house looking for somebody her brother who was a soldier. Among the men who came she recognized
only the accused. In her house the accused and others undressed her. She prayed to God and pleaded that she be
not undressed. They succeeded in their purpose however and her naked body was exposed. They pushed her
mother when the latter was not able to produce any arm. From that place they took her to Buakaw where they
went up a house apparently in search of something. when they did not find anything they moved to another
house. In the latter house they caught a man, took him behind a tree and there killed him. Then a soldier, Teofilo
Navarro, who had killed that person, approached her and said, "Well, how do you like to come along with me
behind the cassava trees?" She refused and then they proceeded to the provincial road with her; she was crying.

53

At Basac, near a big house owned by Filemon Rago, Antonio Racaza told her, "Come along with me." Once in that
place he hugged her and kissed her and told her to take off her panties. Then she said her devotion to the Virgin
Mary praying that she might be delivered from her aggressors. Luckily, the accused did not succeed. Afterward
one companion of the accused, Jose Abascas, slammed her against a coconut tree and embraced her. Later, a
truck passed by and she was told to get on. Then Racaza approached the Japanese and later she was released.
Raymunda Sabillano, 42 years old, testified that on August 19, 1944, Antonio Racaza came to her house at night
(it was Saturday) looking for her son who was a guerrilla soldiers. He had many companions among whom were
two Japanese. They were armed but Racaza was not. As she was not so, they undressed her daughter, Silvina
Cabellon, and Antonio Racaza told witness to step out. when she heard her daughter cry out she tried to get
inside but they blocked her way. Afterward they left her daughter dress up again and took her away. About 3
o'clock in the morning the girl returned. Her house is in Pardo, Cebu City.
Count 9. Hilario Cabaezas, 56 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944, her house was surrounded and
she and the inhabitants of the house were apprehended and taken to a place near the Normal School in Basac.
Those who arrested them were, among others, Antonio Racaza, Carding and Loloy. These three tied them and she
pleaded for mercy. From her house she could see may people tortured in the Basac school building. There must
have been around 1,000 people there.
Pastor Abadiano, 45 years old, testified that on the 29th of July, 1944 the accused and his several companions
with Japanese came up to hi house and maltreated him, trampling on his body. When he could not endure the
punishment any longer they asked him where his nephew Inocencio was. Inocencio was a guerrilla soldier. Among
those who were tortured and killed were Sario Abadiano, Tomas Bacalla, Quirico Abellanosa and Lope Bacon. The
witness was allowed to go when they found the brother of Inocencio. Vicente Abadiano was one of those who
survived the torture.
Tereso Sanchez, 25 years old, testified that he knew Antonio Racaza. On July 29, 1944, he was arrested by Filipino
spies. About 1,000 were apprehended and taken to the school building in Basac. They were taken there to be
screened building in Basac. They were taken there to be screened for guerrillas. Among those who tortured
civilians was Antonio Racaza. He saw Jose de la Cerna. Antonio Racaza was armed with a revolver. After he was
tortured he was taken to the mountain of Lensa. With him were about 24; all of them were tied. When they arrived
at the mountain, the Japanese and their Filipino cohorts told them to sit down . The prisoners were taken by the
Japanese to another place where they were shot. The witness was shot by Filemon Delgado and was hit in the
neck, the bullet coming out his left eye. He was left for dead and that was how he lived to tell the story. Before he
was shot, Nazario Abadiano was shot by Antonio Racaza and killed immediately.
Vicente Abadiano, 19 years old, testified that he was apprehended on July 29 and brought to a place where his
bother Nazario was killed. His brother was apprehended on July 29 and brought up where he was killed by Antonio
Racaza. He actually saw Racaza shoot his brother; it was in Lensa, in the mountain. His brother had his back on
Racaza when Racaza shot him in the buttock. He saw Tereso Sanchez as one of the victims in that massacre. He
also witnessed the mass torture in the school building before the victims were marched up to the mountains.
Jose de la Cerna, 34 years old, testified that on July 29, he was one of the people arrested in Basac and
concentrated in the school building. Those who made the arrests were Japanese and Filipino undercovers. Among
these were Antonio Racaza, Antonio Tancinco, Roberto Bautista alias Eriberto Ocampo, Filemon Delgado, Margarito
Campos and Jesus Campos. Antonio Racaza was one of those who beat him (witness) with an iron bar, kicked him,
boxed him and inserted a galvanized iron tube into his throat through which sand was poured. He was choked and
was unconscious for several minutes. When he came to, they questioned him as to the whereabouts of his brother
who was with Governor Abellanosa. Then he was hung from two to five o'clock in the afternoon. The cause of the
massacre and mass torture in Basac was that about three or four days before July 29, the guerrillas attacked a
train loaded with naval officers on Mambaling bridge in Dulho, Cebu.
Count 11, Hipolito Cabahug, 18 years old, widow, testified that her husband was captured by Racaza and his
companions on November 16, 1944, in the municipality of Mandawe, Province of Cebu. On that date Antonio
Racaza came up to her house leaving his companions below. He threatened the people in the house with his
sword, told them not to move, and asked the witness whether her husband was a soldier. Because her answers
were not satisfactory, he arrested her and her husband and Antonio Racaza hung her husband. While her husband
was hanging in mid-air they beat him with a big bat. Then they lowered her husband and Racaza hung her
instead. While she was dangling in the air they stepped on her husband's prostrate body trying to force him to
admit that he was a guerrilla. They put o his neck a piece of lumber and stepped a man sat astride her husband's
abdomen. Afterward they hung her husband again. After he was released this time he was taken across a creek;
that was the last she saw of him. The cadaver was found by her father-in-law Gregorio Del Castillo. Her brother-inlaw, Victorino del Castillo, was taken the next morning and brought to the same place. They also hung Victorino
and beat him while hanging. He died before his body was brought down.
Gregorio del Castillo 50 years old, testified that this sons are dead because they were arrested by Antonio Racaza
at their place It was November 16, about 9 o'clock in the evening. Hipolita Cabahug is his daughter-in-law living
with him. He was present when his sons were arrested. Hipolita was told to come along. He found the next day the
bodies of his son in a creek. One of them was naked with several wounds and the neck was almost severed from
the body. Rope was still tied around his hands.
To sum up, we find the defendants guilty of counts 2, 3 and 13 by the defendant's plea of guilty, and of counts 4,
6, 9, and 11 by the testimony of two or more eye-witnesses to the overt acts. These admitted and proven
charges, in the opinion of the majority of the court, lead to the same result reached by the trial court.
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, treachery and
employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.

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The first three circumstances are, by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to
aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is, in many cases, as in this, a
long, continued process requiring, for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and
persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength;
and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements, which was Racaza's purpose in collaborating
with the enemy, the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered
was itself the personification of brute, superior force, and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun
the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its
adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to the romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of
treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton
robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be
regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the
main Criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above
mentioned, of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed in treason
characterized by killing, the killings themselves and other accompanying crimes should be taken into
consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which
they were committed. Were not this the rule, treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its
perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. to avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in
treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to which
the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds.
The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that
conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed
standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the
punishment with the enormity of the offense my be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in
furtherance of the law's aims.
The judgment appealed from is correct in this result and the same should be affirmed with costs. However, as four
justices dissent from the imposition of the death penalty, the appealed sentence is modified and reduced to
reclusion perpetua and legal accessories, a fine of P20,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
"A big crowd gathered at the plaza of the Cebu capitol during the three days of trial and right there the public
showed visible indignation with an eager desire that the collaborators be dealt with by the court of justice without
mercy."
The above quotation comes from the appealed decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of treason and
sentencing him to death and to pay a fine of P20,000 and the costs.
There is no question as to appellant's guilt. The evidence on record is conclusive, and defendant himself pleaded
guilty to several of the counts of the information. We find that he committed the acts alleged in the information.
The only question raised in this appeal refers to the penalty imposed by the People's Court.
Counsel de oficio makes two assignments of error: First, that the lower court erred in not considering the plea of
guilty entered by the defendant as a mitigating circumstance, and second, in considering evident premeditation,
taking advantage of superior strength, treachery and employing means to add ignominy to the natural effects of
his acts, as aggravating circumstances, and prays that the appealed judgment be modified to any degree within
the limits of reclusion temporal and to a fine of P10,000.
The prosecution maintains that the plea of guilty cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of
appellant because it had been entered after seven witnesses for the prosecution had already testified. But
counsel de oficio points out that the plea should be considered as a mitigating, circumstances, although entered
after some witnesses for the prosecution had testified, because of the provisions of paragraph 10 of article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those
above-mentioned," should be considered, referring to the specified mitigating circumstances. the similarity or
analogy between a plea of guilty entered after some of the witnesses for the prosecution had testified cannot
seriously be disputed. The circumstances in question should be taken into consideration in the judgment.
The appealed decision states that the aggravating circumstances in question concurred "in most of the overt acts
committed by the defendant, " but without specifying the specific acts constituting said circumstances. The
prosecution's brief supplies the needed specifications.
The undressing to two women and attempted rape of one of them are pointed out as adding ignominy to the
crime. According to the evidence, Silvina Cabellon was the only one undressed. The attempted rape on the person
of Silvina Cabellon may be considered as ground for the prosecution of a different offense, but cannot be
considered as aggravating treason, a crime political in nature. In the attempted rape there was nothing political
and it had nothing to do with defendant's adherence and aid to the enemy.

55

Nighttime, superior strength, aid of armed forces, treachery, and evident premeditation should be considered as
essential elements of the treason committed by appellant. We take judicial notice of the fact that said elements
have always or almost always accompanied the procedures under taken by the Japanese for the suppression of
guerrillas. The accused, having adhered to the enemy and allowed the underground movement, it was natural for
him to follow the same tactics of his masters.
The medium penalty provided by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code be imposed upon appellant, as no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances can effect his legal responsibility. Although his plea of guilty should be
considered in his favor, it should be considered only with regard to the counts to which he pleaded guilty, and
there are other counts in the information to which he did not plead guilty and which are fully supported by the
evidence on record.
A majority voted to affirm the appealed decision, but in view of the contrary opinion of the writer, the principal
penalty is modified to reclusion perpetua, and affirmed in all other respects.
We cannot vote for the affirmance of the appealed penalty. not only for the reasons as above stated, but for the
further reason that it is not beyond the realm of probability that the trial court could not have been completely
free from the psychological of the mob frenzy described in the a quo decision the pertinent paragraph of which is
quoted at the beginning of this opinion.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2956. May 23, 1951.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEUTERIO ICARO, Defendant-Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Ramon Avancea for plaintiff and appellee.
Jose P. Parentela for defendant and Appellant.
SYLLABUS
TREASON. Adherence to the enemy may be inferred from the overt acts of treason committed by the appellant,
consisting in the arrest of persons suspected of being guerrillas who, with the exception of one, were never seen
again, especially because the appellant was armed and in company with armed Japanese soldiers and other
Filipinos.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J. :
This is an appeal by the defendant, Eleuterio Icaro, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
finding him guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 plus the costs.
In a nutshell, the facts upon which the appellant was convicted by the trial court are stated in the appealed
decision as follows: "The evidence clearly shows that, during the latter part of 1944, and early in 1945, while the
United States of America, the Philippines, and the Allied nations were at war with the Japanese Empire, defendant
herein, Eleuterio Icaro, a Filipino citizen, owing faith and allegiance to both America and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, openly adhered to the enemy, and gave it aid and comfort. Armed with a rifle, and in company with
other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, he took part in raids against guerrilla suspects, and in their
arrest. Among those arrested, because of their underground activities, by the defendant and his companions,
were Norberto Ungkiatco, on December 23, 1944, Emilio Biscocho, Santiago Nipal Victor Vergara, Valentin Vergara
and Vicente Ele, on January 3, 1945, and Andres Ramos, on January 15, 1945. With the exception of Emilio
Biscocho, none of the other persons mentioned above has been seen again."cralaw virtua1aw library
The brief for the appellant stresses the criticism that the evidence for the prosecution utterly fails to prove
appellants guilt in conformity with the two-witness rule required in treason cases. We find, however, from an
examination of the record that the arrest on December 23, 1944, of Norberto Ungkiatco in the municipality of
Calauan, province of Laguna, by the appellant in company with Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos, on suspicion
of being a guerrilla, was testified to by prosecution witnesses Norberto Ungkiatco and Matias Mendoza. With
respect to the arrest on January 3, 1945, by the appellant in company with Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos,
of Emilio Biscocho, Santiago Nipal, Victor Vergara, Valentin Vergara and Vicente Ele, on suspicion of being
guerrillas, prosecution witnesses Emilio Biscocho, Anselmo Maranan and Tranquilino Martinez testified
substantially in unison. The arrest on January 15, 1945, by the appellant accompanied by Japanese soldiers and
other Filipinos, all armed, of Andres Ramos, a guerrilla suspect, is confirmed by prosecution witnesses Aurora
Azucena and Crispin Aniceta.
We have no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses who are appellants townmates. The
only explanation given by appellant why all the prosecution witnesses incriminated him is that they concentrated
in him their hatred against his "compadre" Roman Amatorios. It is improbable that said witnesses would have
done so, especially because of the lapse of time between the date of the commission of the crime and the date of
the trial. In the ordinary course of things, the fact that said witnesses testified in the way they did during the trial
is a fairly safe indication that they were telling the truth being impelled undoubtedly by a desire to let justice take

56

its course, and undeterred by any impulse to forget and to forgive as a result of the passage of time. The defense
that the appellant and his family moved from Calauan to Santa Maria, Laguna, where they resided continuously
until June 15, 1945, cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Much less can his
denial of the imputations by eyewitnesses be given credit.
The trial court found that there is no direct and conclusive proof that the appellant was a Makapili, and this finding
is assailed by the Solicitor General on the ground that while there is no documentary evidence to show that
appellant had joined the Makapili organization, the witnesses for the prosecution are unanimous in alleging that
appellant was in fact a Makapili. The point becomes unnecessary, since adherence to the enemy may be inferred
from the overt acts of treason committed by the appellant, consisting in the arrest of persons suspected of being
guerrillas who, with the exception of Emilio Biscocho, were never seen again, especially because the appellant
was armed and in company with armed Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 2, 1949
G.R. No. L-433
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First
Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in
issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a
member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead
guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did
apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men;
that the herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete;
that in the same date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person
who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm
did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said
accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for
being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a
portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died
as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all
armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier
for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain
him at the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May
26, 1944 by said accused.

57

The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with the result
that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the
case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined
that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of
treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the
crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of aid and
comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in
question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its
sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in
which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery and
employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to
aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a
long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and
persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength;
and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration
with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered
was itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun
the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its
adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of
treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton
robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be
regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the
main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above
mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason
characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration
for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were
committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator
advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be
adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has
exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and
pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and
carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment
with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the
furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty
is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the
sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

58

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-856

April 18, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court
sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6,
all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and
commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were
used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were
Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana
Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce
here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her
house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the
house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown;
that the accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did
not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some
other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her
to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he,
Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge

59

with her; that on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally
she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini
left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos
took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance
organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese
Colonel might select those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of
threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese
Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All
these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de
Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this
Court is fully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia
Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer,
and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused
Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first
their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl
Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force
and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against the desire of the
accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named
Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion,
Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused
threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that
while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the
other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda,
covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in
the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the
accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the
said Governor Hontaosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecer brought the
two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr.
Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she
was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations
in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her
sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the
investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused
brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in
Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse
with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her will; that two days, later, upon the
pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to
a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had carnal knowledge
with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on the pretext that she was
to be used as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister
Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister
Flaviana was conducted into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her
hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel
Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited
house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her
(the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown,
she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the
accused came and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he
daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her
daughters and she found them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and
told her that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the
witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house;
that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was
then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter
returned to her house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they
would have preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the
accused had raped her.

60

The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of
the time that had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two
witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to
conceived that these girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true.
The Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies
of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas,
Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers,
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend another
banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit
best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of said
Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and
companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office of
the Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held on June
and receptions was to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral
purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said
hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room,
laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that
particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she
was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need
not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that the deeds
committed by the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues
that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a fundamental
concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the
morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company kept up their
morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts,
would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by common
agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a
line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy
is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the
enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of
charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not
technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to
use in waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the
government of the giver. That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering"
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was
not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies
and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily
and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United
State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its
army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and
unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission,
may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana
Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes
could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 682, which says:

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Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged,
the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged
in the information and established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the
Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of which an
accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light
of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was
innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise
or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial." (People
vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not charged
against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be
noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PABLO, M., disidente:
Disiento. En mi opinion, los hechos probados constituyen delito de traicion.
El acusado de buena reeputacion en Bohol para ponerlas a disposicion de los oficiales del ejercito enemigo, ha
ayudado a ellos en la obra de destruccion. En la guerra se emplea la destruccion para triunfur, y la destruccion se
realiza en las cosas y en las personas. Inutilizar para el trabajo o para la guerra a los habitanesdel pais invandido
es destruirles en mayor o menor grado y violar o deshonrar a las mujereses tambien destruirles material y
moralmente y es peor aun que matar y aniquilar. En el caso presente, el acusado ayudoal Coronel Mini y Dr.
Takibayas en deshonrar a varias senoritas,poniendolas en una situacion peor que la de las esclavas. Si el reclutar
a hombres o mujeres para ser obligados a constuir trincheraspara el ejercito invasor constituye delito de traicion;
si el apoderarsedel arroz de los ciudadanos en sus casas para darselo a los soldadoshambrientos del ejercito
japones es traicion; por que no ha de constituirtraicion el reclutar a senoritas para ser utilizadas por los
enemigosen sus desos bestiales, como un medio de entretenimiento o alivio de sus trabajos? Flaviana y Feliciana
Bonalos, ilegalmente arrestadas y entregadas despues a los dos oficiales-bestias, en su declaracion, han dicho
que hubieran preferido morir que ser violadas.
El argumento del Procurador General, que merece seria consideracion, es del tenor siguiente:
In the United States Army, and we believe this is also true in the Japanese Imperial Forces, a unit known as the
United Services Organization (U.S.O.)functions with the primordial aim and view to keep at peak the morale of the
soldiers. To achieve this, varied forms of entertainment like movies, dancer, stage show and the like are provided
for at an enormous expense. In fine, the soldiers are surrounded with all the comfort and opportunities that they
ordinarily enjoy in their civilian life. The reason for this is to tone their nerves and minimized as much as possible,
they heavy strain on them incident to the nature of their mission in time of war. Such entertainment because the
more imperative when it comes to soldiers who are assigned overseas, on a foreign soil, in a no man's land,
devoid of the inspiring association of their families, girl friends and those dearest to them.
. . . Clearly, therefore, appellant provident them with what should have been the burden of the Japanese Imperial
Forces, relieving the latter of the trouble, expense, and difficulty of sending over to these Islands Japanese women
to entertain their soldiers to bolster up their morale. In other words, the services of the Japanese women who
were so replaced by ours, through the efforts of the appellant could be diverted to other important phases of
military activities either in the homeland or in this sector. Hence, the aid and comfort to the enemy is evident.
Si el Coronel Mini y Dr. Takibayas del ejercito japones no encontraban otroconsuelo o solaz para olividar sus
preocupaciones y ytritezas mas que en saciar su lujuria, entonces el proporcionarles mujeres contra la voluntad
de estas es ayudssrles en recuperar entusiasmos perdidos e infundirles nuevo vigor para proseguir la guerra de
conquista. Bien sabido esta que los soldados no son maquinas de acero que pueden estar peleando todas las
horasde todos los dias; necesitan tiempo de descanso para recuperar fuerzas perdidas, de entretennimiento para
olvidar lugubres pensamientos y franco esparcimiento para vigorizar su espiritu. Si para el Coronel Mini y Dr.
Takibayas, el violar a las senoritas reclutadas por el acusado era buenarecompensa de sus esfuerzos militares,
entonces para ellos vale la penade exponer la vida en la luncha porque despues de todo quedan bien
compensados. Que mayor satisfaccion para ellos como la de disfrutar libremente de las senoritas de la provincia
con la ayuda del acusado? Poresa satisfaccion, redoblarian sus enfuerzos de conquista para tener otras
oportunidades de saciar sus apetitos bestiales. Bajo tales inclinaciones morbosas, darles entretenimiento, solaz y
esparcimiento es ayudarles en la guerra.

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No es exagerado suponer que dichos oficiales japoneses hayan dejado en su pais hijos, esposas y madddres a
quienes quieren de corazon, y en sus momentosde soledad, de tristeza y de nostalgia no ess imposible que se
acuerden de ellos y lleguen a decir para si mismos: "Que sacamos de esta guerra de invasion, dejando a
nuestros hijos, nuestros hijos, nuestras familias ynuestros hogares abandonados solo para satisfacer las
ambiciones de conquista del emperador? Cada vez que nos damos cuenta de que no somos mas que unossimples
instrumentos para sacrificar tantas vidas y haciendas para la vanagloria del japon, se nos rebela la conciencia.
Creemos que la guerra es inicua, injusta: debemos abandonarla. No debemos continuarr invadiendo territorios." Si
estos pensamientos persistiesen en la mennte de dichos oficiales, indudablemente perderian su entusiasmo, su
eficiencia en el servicio: su obsesion les haria indiferentes, pasivos, inutiles para laguerra. Pueden deponer su
actitud, pueden cruzarse de brazos e inclusive pueden desertar, y eso seria fatal para la nacion invasora. Pero si,
porinclinacion natural, encuentran entretenimiento, esparcimiento y alegria en violar mujeres, entonces el
proporcionarseles es una ayuda efectiva. Esdarles calor, entusiasmo y valor en la guerra de conquista.
Hay mayor traicion como el poner a disposicion de los enemigos al ser mas querido, a la mujer? Que se
apoderen de todas nuestros production nuestros recursos: de todo cuanto encuentran a su paso; pero, por Dios,
salvemosel honor de nuestras mujeres.
Voto por que el acusado sea condenado por el delito de traicion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

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December 17, 1947

G.R. No. L-1138
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
Jose H. Tecson for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Jose Fernando was found by the People's Court in a decision rendered October 17, 1946, guilty of the crime of
treason, as defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of the law, and to pay a fine of P15,000, and the costs.
The information filed against appellant is as follows:
That on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereinafter stated and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jose Fernando, not being a foreigner but a citizen
of the Philippines owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of
said allegiance, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably adhere to their enemy, the
Empire of Japan, with which the United States and the Philippines were then at war, giving said Empire of Japan
and the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines aid and/or comfort in the following manner, to wit:
1. That in or about the early part of 1942, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of
giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously to join and become an informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, a Japanese military police organization.
2. That in or about the period comprised between 1942 and February 1945, in the City of Manila, the abovenamed accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, as informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, report to the Kempei-tai, a
number of person as members of guerrillas, resulting in the arrest and apprehension, torture , and death of a
number of those persons; and still in the furtherance of his purpose of giving aid and/or comfort to the enemy, the
above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously join, lead and accompany Japanese
soldiers in their raids against guerrillas, resulting in the arrest, apprehension and detention of a number of
guerrillas.
3. That in or about May, 1943, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving aid with
intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest,
maltreat and detain Ponciano Briones, for the purpose of finding the whereabouts of Lt. Col. Pacifico Briones of the
guerrillas.
4. That in or about August 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and
with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously arrest,
maltreat and detain Carlos Paz who was suspected of a being a guerrilla.
5. That in or about the early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of
giving aid and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously arrest or cause the arrest of Gregorio Hernandez; and still in pursuance of his purpose of giving aid
and/or comfort to the enemy, the above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously
investigate the said Gregorio Hernandez charging him with being a guerrilla and selling firearms to the guerrillas,
and threatening to take him to Fort Santiago, and tried to persuade him to become a spy for the Japanese.
6. That in or about early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving
and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously
arrest or cause the arrest of Abraham Albines, and thereafter, the above-named accused investigated the said
Abraham Albines, charging him with having sold firearms to threatening to take him to the Japanese officer in Fort
Santiago.
7. That in or about May, 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with
intent to give comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously lead, join, accompany
and assist a group of Japanese and Filipinos which tried to arrest Consolacion Tongol, and being unable to
accomplish that purpose, the above-named accused and his Japanese and Filipino companions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest Gabriel Tongol, a brother of Consolacion Tongol, and detain him for two
days and three nights in the Kempei-tai garrison.
8. That in or about May 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and with
intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously lead, join,
accompany and assist a group of Japanese soldiers and Filipinos for the purpose of obtaining the surrender of
guerrillas in barrio Candating, Arayat, Pampanga, and not being able to obtain any favorable result, the abovenamed accused, together with his Japanese and Filipino companions, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously attack the civilian population of Candating, Arayat, Pampaga, resulting in unnecessary hardships to,
and in the wounding of, many civilians.
The lower court found that during the period comprised between 1942 and 1945, appellant was an informer and a
member of the Kempei-tai, and, as such member, he had a group of ten renegade Filipinos whose mission was to
make arrest of guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to investigation and torture in order to ferret out whatever

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information they possessed regarding the activities of the underground forces; he had Gregorio Hernandez and
Abraham Albines, father of Pacifico Briones, a ranking officer of the guerrilla forces, and subjected him to
investigation and torture in order to elicit from him information as to the whereabout of his son; and that he
attempted to arrest Consolacion Tongol, but failing in his purpose, because of the intervention of the guerrillas, he
took into his custody Consolacion's brother, Gabriel Tongol.
The fact that appellant has been an informer and a member of the Kempei-tai has been established, not only by
the evidence presented by the prosecution, but also by the testimony of the accused himself, who, however,
claims (a) that he was forced into the service by the enemy and (b) that his employment was a fact known and
sanctioned by chieftains of the guerrilla outfits which governed Manila in their spheres of activities. Both defenses
were rejected by the lower court.
At the hearing of this case on August 16, 1946, appellant made the admission that he is a Filipino citizen.
Eleven witnesses testified for the prosecution.
1. Odon Alimagohan, 42, residing at 1535 Felix Huertas, Manila, testified that during the Japanese occupation he
came to know the appellant one night in a gambling house at the corner of Oroquieta and Quiricada streets.
Appellant was accompanied by three others. The people therein moved to run away, but the visitors told them not
to be afraid because they were only looking for a certain person. Appellant often visited Dodong, a friend of the
witness, who saw him twice carrying firearm. The witness knows that appellant was a member of the Kempei-tai.
He asked the witness if he wanted to work with the Kempei-tai. The witness did not join it, "because the Japanese
refused to accept me."
2. Zoilo Rufino, 22, married, residing at 1255 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that he came to know appellant during the
Japanese occupation because their homes are near each other, witness' house located in Sales Street, and
appellant's in Comandante street. In 1944, the witness was arrested by Domingo Santiago, informer of the
Japanese. He was taken to the house of the appellant in Comandante street. There he saw five men, including
appellant, and a woman. He was detained there for about four days and was investigated and maltreated by
Domingo Santiago, who was asking for the whereabouts of his brother. Appellant was staying in the house at night
time. On the first night, the witness was placed under the house, but on the following days he was brought up.
When he was arrested he was tied but after two days he was untied. Appellant saw the witness being tied. A few
hours after his arrival in the house, a Japanese appeared who "told us that we are bad men; but when we refused
to admit he told us that it is better for us to die because in that case they will not be taking the trouble of covering
our bodies with newspapers." Witness' brother was also arrested. The witness was released by order of appellant
who did not impose any condition. The witness was released ahead of his brother. Domingo Santiago was asking
the witness P20,000 for his release. The witness told him that he cannot afford that amount because his earning is
only enough for his needs. Appellant told the witness that he can be released but his brother cannot because he
was an ex-convict. After his release, the witness looked for money and gave it to appellant after which his brother
was released. He saw appellant in the place carrying arms. Later on, the witness heard from neighbors that his
brother, Laureano Rufino, was arrested by an informer and a Japanese and killed.
3. Santiago Briones, 40, married, 441 Evangelista street, Manila, testified that he had his tailoring shop at 820
Ilaya street, Tondo, and one day appellant, accompanied by one Adriano, came asking for the father of Pacifico
Briones. The witness purposely denied knowing where he was, because he knew that Pacifico Briones was a
guerrilla leader in the Central Luzon area. Appellant and companion showed that they bore firearms with them.
Surprised, the witness admitted that Ponciano, father of Pacifico Briones, was living in the house. They went inside
the house and they saw Ponciano, who is also an uncle of the witness. Appellant asked Ponciano for his son, but
Ponciano answered that he did not know where his son was. They took Ponciano away. It happened in 1943 but
the witness cannot remember the month.
4. Ponciano Briones, 66, married, unemployed, resident of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, testified that he had known
appellant who married in Cabiao. In 1943, he was arrested by appellant at Ilaya street in his house located on a lot
to reach which it was necessary to pass through the tailoring shop of Santiago Briones. Appellant was
accompanied by Ruperto Adriano. They were armed with pistols. Appellant was asking for Pacifico Briones. He
wanted the witness to find his son and to surrender him to them. Appellant and his companions were spies of the
Japanese. His son Pacifico was a guerrilla major in 1943. The witness was brought to a building called Meisic. The
next morning he was brought to the China Bank at Dasmarias street. Appellant and companion were forcing him
to look for his son and to surrender him. There were many Japanese at the China Bank. He was investigated by
appellant and his companion. Appellant struck him on the ribs with the butt of a revolver. In the afternoon the
witness was released on condition that he was to report every morning to the Japanese Mijara at the China Bank
building. He reported for about five days. Afterwards he was brought to Arayat, Pampanga. He was brought by
appellant together with the Japanese, because they heard that his son was in the mountains of Arayat. He
remained in the place for about a week. The Japanese told him to write to his son and go around the town to
secure information about his son. From Arayat he was brought to Manila and then to Cabiao by appellant, Ruperto
Adriano and Mijara. In Cabiao he remained for about eighty days. He was brought to a Japanese captain named
Kimura. Kimura asked him about his son and to look for him and surrender him. He was required to work in the
garrison, to cut grass and fetch water. After eight days he was brought to Manila. He was not arrested anymore
and returned home to the province. His son belonged to Ramsey's guerrilla unit. His son is dead. He was shot at
the China Grill when he was a lieutenant-colonel and when the Americans had already arrived.
5. Gabriel Tungol, 49, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant since he took away
witness' sister. It was in April, 1943. It happened at Mangakakutud Arayat. One morning and a companion "came
to our house" armed with revolvers. They said that "they were taking away my sister," to surrender her "to the
Japanese." His sister Consolacion in the beginning joined the guerrillas. "They were not be able to take away my
sister because she was sick" and "on that night the guerrillas came and took away my sister and Maria, another
sister." The following morning appellant with another companion returned and took the witness to the Japanese
garrison in Arayat. "The Japanese took my statement and I was detained there for two days and two nights. They
were asking me of the whereabouts of my sister." He was maltreated by the Japanese and at the time appellant

65

was present in the place. After taking his statement and two days' and two nights' detention, the witness was
released. In May, he was arrested again by the appellant. He was again detained for two days and two nights in
the Japanese garrison. After his release, he was arrested for the third time by the Japanese, he did not see
appellant anymore, and was again detained for one day and one night. He did not see appellant. He escaped,
"because the Japanese tried to kill me. I went to the mountains."
6. Fernando Tongol, 33, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant when he arrested his
brother Gabriel. Appellant and a companion "came to our house" and "told us they will surrender my sister
Consolacion in Manila and asked me to go with them. We tried our best to please them in our house. They told us
to prepare and after two hours they returned, but at that time my sister became sick because of that sickness of
my sister they were not able to take her away. After that they departed, and I also left. That night my sister was
taken away by the guerrillas. My brother was taken away the following day," by appellant and a companion. They
were armed with revolvers. They brought his brother to the Japanese garrison.
7. Engracio Manese, 27, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that Gabriel Tongol is his brother-in-law. In
May, 1943, he was living in barrio Mangakakutud, Arayat. In Manila, appellant took away by the guerrillas. Gabriel
was taken to the Japanese garrison. His wife Maria became afraid and hid in one of the houses, then joined
Consolacion who was with the guerrillas in the mountains.
8. Juanita Rosales, 24, married, laundry woman, resident at 1729 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that she had known
appellant since the Japanese occupation, Gregorio Hernandez is her husband, who was arrested by appellant. The
arrest took place at 1729 M. Hizon street. It was nighttime. Her husband was brought to Comandante street, the
place where the office of Jose Hernandez was located. She went to the place the following morning. She saw there
Jose Fernando and his men in her house. She talked with Leoncio Fernando one of the accused men and with
appellant. She asked appellant why he arrested Gregorio Hernandez and appellant answered "because he was a
guerrillero. Jose Fernando told me then that if I do care to live with him he would release Gregorio Hernandez but
if not, he will bring Gregorio Hernandez to Fort Santiago. Then, we continued talking. After that, I talked also to
Gregorio Hernandez and I told him what Jose Fernando told me and my husband said to me, `Well, it is up to you,
because if that is the only way for my salvation, then you use your discretion.' Then, I told Jose Fernando 'I will live
with you on condition that you release Gregorio Hernandez' and he really released Gregorio Hernandez." Gregorio
Hernandez was brought to the House of Jose Fernando at Dapitan street. He was released in the afternoon
following the day of his release. From that time, the witness came to live at Comandante street with Jose
Fernando. "I do not remember for how many months I lived there. I lived with him as his wife in order to secure
the release of Gregorio Hernandez. I have seen the men he arrested. I cannot remember how many men were
brought there, but I know that almost everyday there were persons who were brought and maltreated there." Jose
Fernando and his men were maltreating them by using a piece of iron. The witness saw Japanese in the house.
The Japanese were Mjara and Quijacho. They used to go to the place once in a while. About two times a week. It
was said that Mijara] was an interpreter and Quijacho was the chief of the accused. Everytime they went to the
place they used to talk with the accused, who was given rice and money by the Japanese. The witness was
brought to Zurbaran street and also to Canton Hotel. In Zurbaran she lived with Jose Fernando under the house of
Mijara. They left that street, "because according to them, as they arrested many persons, they were afraid that
the guerrilleros may go to that place." She stayed under the house of Mijara "quite long." While there, she saw
persons arrested by Jose Fernando. They were maltreated. There were few brought to Zurbaran street but many at
Canton Hotel, located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Azcarraga streets. When she was living with Fernando at
the Canton Hotel, almost everyday, she saw persons being arrested and maltreated. "It is very seldom that a day
had passed by without a person arrested ... There were many persons living there also. According to them, those
arrested persons were guerrilleros. They maltreated them and tied them up. Then they were given to the
Japanese." The Japanese just went there. There were three men under Jose Fernando. Among the arrested persons
the witness remembered one by the name of Berting. After leaving the Canton Hotel, she went to Jaen, Nueva
Ecija with Jose Fernando. "I deserted him without knowing or rather without his knowledge and I went back to my
house." Gregorio Hernandez is in Bulacan. When appellant arrested Gregorio Hernandez, he was accompanied by
Leoncio Fernando, Carlos Domingo and Johnny. The witness became acquainted with Jose Fernando only at
Comandante street before he arrested her husband. It was two weeks before. Since then, "he has been making
some propositions to me." She was then working at Comandante street, "because I had a small bar there." The
accused was visiting her there. Her husband was arrested because he was suspected as a guerrillero although he
was not.
9. Fidel Ferreras, 25, married, laborer, resident at 1226 Lealtad, Manila, testified that he has known Jose Fernando
for a long time, since they were in the Buencamino Hacienda. The witness was arrested by Vicente Reyes at
Tutuban station because of being a USAFFE and was delivered at Meisic station to Jose Fernando. He does not
remember the date. "Upon my arrival there, Jose Fernando and the Japanese called Simura, conferred with each
other, and after their conference, Jose Fernando began to punish me. "I was hanged" by the Japanese, "for more
than one hour. While I was suspended and tied in the wire with my face downward, the Japanese was hitting my
legs and other parts of my body and this Jose Fernando was talking with that Japanese." The witness showed a
scar of about two inches long and one-fourth inch wide located at the right clavicle, for a wound he suffered from
the beatings. Jose Fernando did not take part in the maltreatment. "He just asked the Japanese to maltreat me."
The witness saw Ponciano Briones, father of Pacifico, when they went to Cabanatuan because they were loaded
together in the same train. They were six in all, including Vicente Reyes, a Japanese, and Jose Fernando. They
were brought to the house of Captain Kimura. The witness was asked questions there. He remained in Cabanatuan
for more than a month in the house of Captain Kimura. "We were free to go anywhere in that house. From
Cabanatuan we were brought to Arayat" by Jose Fernando and the Japanese Kimura. The witness does not
remember when he was released. "I was released from the Japanese garrison in Arayat." When he was being
investigated at Meisic by the Japanese, Jose Fernando acted as an interpreter. Jose Fernando told the witness to
confess if he was really an ex-USAFFE. Jose Fernando was armed with a rifle but he wore no uniform.
10. Gregorio Hernandez, 29 , single, telephone operator, residing at 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he was arrested
by the accused in 1943. He had forgotten the month and date. It must be about October. He was arrested in his
house at M. Hizon street. "At night, when I was lying in my bed, at about 10 o'clock, I heard that somebody was
knocking our door, and when I went to see who was knocking the door, I saw three men. Only I know the names of

66

the two but not their surnames Johnny and Frank, and the other one is Dominador Rodriguez. They forced me to
go down from my house. I was not even able to put my suit. I was in my sleeping outfit." "He was brought to the
corner of Oroquieta and San Lazaro. I found there the herein accused Jose Fernando. Frank, referring to Jose
Fernando, faced the witness and told him 'Here is your man'." His hands were tied by Frank upon order of Jose
Fernando. He was there for about thirty minutes. Abraham Albines and Carlos Francisco arrived arrested. "We
were brought to Rizal Avenue and to Comandante street," guarded by five persons including Jose Fernando.
Fernando "took us to the house one by one and asked about our activities as guerrilleros." Fernando was armed
with a .45. The witness was asked about names and activities of guerrilleros. He answered that he did not know
anything about the guerrilla organization. He remained in Comandante street the whole night. Fernando ordered
his men to tie the hands of the witness who was brought to Dapitan. There was no misunderstanding between the
witness and Jose Fernando before 1943.
11. Abraham Albines, 28, singles, government employee, 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he came to know Jose
Fernando after his arrest in the early part of October, 1943. This witness was in gambling den at the corner of
Quiricada and Oroquieta streets when four men raided the place. They asked for Gregorio Hernandez, Carlos
Francisco and the witness. Gregorio Hernandez was not there, because he went out. Carlos Francisco and the
witness were taken and brought to the corner of Oroquieta and San Lazaro. Among the four persons who raided
the place was Jose Fernando. When they arrived at the place they saw Gregorio Hernandez already tied with three
men. Then they were taken to Comandante street, they were investigated by Jose Fernando. Fernando asked the
witness about his guerrilla activities and whether he wanted to join the Kempei-tai. The witness did not accept the
offer. In 1944 the witness was occupied in helping in the laundry at Bambang street. The witness was not a
guerrillero. Appellant asked him questions but did not maltreat him.
Nine witnesses testified for the defense.
1. Arsenio S. Muoz, 53, single, Captain, residing at 551 Espaa, knew the accused since before the war. He was
the contractor of the River Control between Cabiao and Candaba during the war. He met him as a guerrilla
lieutenant, and they often met each other because the witness was also a guerrilla. They used to meet at Cabiao
and Arayat. The accused was second in command to Captain Basco in the early part of 1942. The witness does
not know whether appellant remained as a guerrillero until the liberation. In 1943, the witness met the accused in
Manila at the Central Hotel with other Filipinos and the witness "heard that he was working with the Japanese. Mr.
Jose Fernando knew that I passed to Briones organization and he knew also that I am a guerrilla member and also
I knew that he was working with the Japanese and he came to me and he induced me to surrender to the
Japanese, but I did not approve his proposition, and then I told him: `I think Joe, I cannot surrender.' Then he
replied: `Well, it is up to you, if you want to surrender or not. Then, one day, while I was taking my lunch in the
Plaza Hotel, one Mr. Rufino Buenaventura approached me and he told that I should go to Military Administration
Office between 12 and 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and I went there and I was brought before a Japanese
interpreter as a guerrilla member and I admitted that I was a guerrillero, and at about 3 o'clock that same
afternoon, Mr. Jose Fernando and his companions arrived and Mr. Fernando approached me and told me that I
should not be afraid, because he was willing to help me, and at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon I was released.
After my release, I was told that I should go to Nueva Ecija with one Leonor but I told him: `I cannot go.' My
regiment was the one who arrested Jose Fernnado and turned him over to the CIC."
2. Roberto Simbol, 32, married, ex-serviceman, residing at 1511 Ipil, Sta. Cruz, Manila, testified that in 1942 he
was in a guerrilla organization in Arayat with Jose Fernando, who was first lieutenant with the late Lt. Col. Pacifico
Briones. Fernando was appointed organizer of the Barrio Defense Corps. In January, 1943, there was a split
between the Huks and the USAFFE men and by that time Jose Fernando and Pacifico were captured by the Huks
but were able to escape. The witness came to Manila when he was sick of malaria and after his recovery in the
San Lazaro was captured by a Japanese of the Kempei-tai. Jose Fernando heard about his capture and worked for
his release, and once he was released he went back to his outfit "and since then I knew that Jose Fernando was a
Japanese agent."
3. Estanislao, Ordoez, 54, married, businessman, residing at 1482 Quezon Blvd., testified that he knew the
accused in Cabiao in 1935 or 1937. He met him in Manila. The accused told him that he was working with the
Japanese, but he was also working for certain Filipinos. According to him, he was working as an agent of Fort
Santiago. He also told me that he stayed there to keep the Filipinos who happened to be there. In 1945, when
Texas men came to the house of Jose Ramos, witness' friend, confiscate rice, they were given money to avoid the
confiscation, the witness requested the intervention of the accused, who was able to have the money returned to
the owner. The Texas men were agents of Fort Santiago. The incident happened in 1944.
4. Exequiel Lacanlale, 41, married, detained in Muntinglupa, testified that he knows Gabriel Tongol. In May 1944,
the witness was in Arayat with the Japanese as a prisoner. Mayor Ramirez of Arayat reported Gabriel Tongol to the
Japanese that he had gun and he was a member of the Huks. Gabriel Tongol was arrested by the Japanese and the
witness saw him maltreated. Tongol admitted that he had a gun. Later he told the witness that he had to admit
because he could no longer suffer the maltreatment. The Japanese compelled Gabrile Tongol to produce the gun
and as a guaranty his wife and children were taken as hostages. He was told that if he could not produce the gun
his house will also be burned. The accused had no connection whatsoever with the arrest of Gabriel Tongol. The
witness is in Muntinglupa, "because I was suspected being a Japanese spy." In 1943 he was staying in Macabebe,
Pampanga and in the middle of the same year he was in Arayat. He worked with the Japanese from 1943 to 1944,
"because I was captured by them on December 6, 1942." He was accompanying the Japanese in their raids, "there
was no alternative except to go with them." When Gabriel Tongol was captured by the Japanese the witness
present. Consolacion Tongol was not there, but his wife was present. There were about twenty Japanese in the
group.
5. Joaquin S. Galang, 26, married, merchant, residing at 1463 Dapitan, testified that about the middle of 1944, the
accused was introduced to the witness as a good young man who was acting as agent of Fort Santiago and able to
serve friends, by Mr. Tecson, a former companion of the witness at Liceo de Manila. The accused was also
introduced as a guerrillero. The witness stated that in case something happen he would request the help of the
accused, who committed himself to give help and added that he was a grandson of Felipe Buencamino and that

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he was from Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. One morning in October or November, the accused went to the witness' house
to ask him if he was acquainted with Marcos Villa, who was a colonel under General Luna, stating that there was a
warrant of arrest from Fort Santiago against him because the Japanese said that guerrilleros went to his house,
adding that he did not want the old man be arrested, suggesting to the witness to see to it that the old man
should go to the provinces. The witness, being a friend of Marcos Villa, induced the latter to go to Isabela and
even lent him P70 for transportation. The witness also testified about the request of the accused to ave Alejo
Galang who was about to be arrested that night by the Japanese for helping guerrilleros.
6. Antolin S. Rosales, 34, single. miming engineer, residing at Visiones, Sampaloc, Manila, testified that in
September, 1942, he met the accused in the house of Governor Robles. A week after the witness raided the
Cabanatuan jail, because there were guerrilleros imprisoned therein. The witness was the captain of guerrilla
organization. The raid was successful. In 1943, while the witness was a prisoner in Fort Santiago, a Japanese
asked the accused if he knows the witness. The accused answered that the witness was a good element. After a
month, the witness was released. One day, the witness met the accused in the Escolta, where the accused
informed him that he was an agent of the Japanese. During their long talk, the witness came to trust him and give
him information about his guerrilla organization and other underground work. But in July , 1944, the witness was
arrested. In January, 1945, the witness entered Manila, under Captain Maloles. In 1945, the witness is released on
bail. He is one of those accused of the crime of treason.
7. Mario M. Bundalian, 41, married, district engineer, Bureau of Public Works, San Fernando, Pampanga, testified
that he knew the accused in 1941 as one of the contractors of the government. He met him sometime in 1943 in
Manila and the accused reported about his guerrilla activities in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, being in the USAFFE unit,
and they discussed abut their work, but the conference did not last long. In 1943, the witness was a guerrilla
officer assigned in Manila.
8. Jose Fernando, 33, married, testified that at the outbreak of the war he was working in the Hacienda
Buencamino at Cabiao. He was a contractor in a government construction job. On December 10, 1941, he helped
the Red Cross at Cabanatuan. On June 2, 1942, he went to the Ramsey guerrilla unit. Since the beginning he was
not satisfied with the Japanese occupation, so "I conferred with my townmates to form a body to combat the
Japanese administration. We contributed money and we collected arms, and we organized a guerrilla unit." The
witness was a first sergeant in June and in the following month he became the first lieutenant of the Fort
Squadron. "I was assigned to the area comprising the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlac, up to April
5, 1943. There was a split in the ranks in our guerrilla organization between USAFFEs and Hukbalahaps, and there
were encounters between those two factions. My Commander, Dominador Basco, and myself were captured by
the Hukbalahaps that captured us was raided by the Japanese, and I, together with Dominador Basco, were able
to escape; and after escaping I reported to my former squadron. On my return to my former squadron, I stayed
there for two days with them and I, Col. Briones and my commanding officer, Dominador Basco, agreed that we
should place our respective families in a safer place, so I brought my family here in Manila." He brought his family
to Manila on the seventh or eight of the April, 1943. "While I was looking for a place for my family I was
apprehended by the Military Police together with Vicente Reyes and Ruperto Adriano. These two persons were
formerly attached to our squadron, but at that time they were already with the MPs. I was tied, and I was brought
to Fort Santiago. I was maltreated, investigated; they starved me there, and they gave me the water cure
treatment. After that they tied me; then they made me rest in a certain room and I was approached by Vicente
Reyes. Vicente Reyes asked me to tell them that I am really a Lieutenant Colonel in Central Luzon, because,
according to him, he reported that I am the Lieutenant Colonel, because he was under obligation to point out the
highest officer of the guerrillas in the Central Luzon area to the Military Police. I told him that it is against my
conscience, but he told me that there is no other remedy, because otherwise he and myself will die. After that, I
was called again by the MPs an d I was investigated and I saw Vicente Reyes had really presented evidence
against me and I saw the evidence were clear, and so I admitted that I am the highest ranking officer of the
guerrillas in the Central Luzon. The Japanese officer told me that if really my intention was to help my
countrymen, then I should accept a position with them in the pacification of my countrymen. At first they offered
me the position of Japanese informer. I refused this position, and what I suggested was employment in the office,
in their management of the peace campaign. The Japanese did not accept my offer to work in their office, and
instead they made me the head of ten Filipino agents in the Kempei-tai and they told me that if I would not accept
this position, the Japanese would kill me and will behead all the members of my family. I accepted the position
that they gave me and after that I reported to my squadron and other guerrilla men and I related to them what
happened to me. The emissary whom I sent to different guerrilla units to relate my plight, named Leonor
Francisco, came back to me and he told me that those people told him to tell me to continue also to help the
guerrillas. I selected real guerrilla men, mostly ex-USAFFES and other people entrusted the communication that I
sent to those different guerrilla units." The witness had connections with Squadron 29, USAFFE, that is Ramsey, at
that time in Cabanatuan; with Lt. Teofilo Francisco stationed at Meycauayan, Bulacan; with Roberto Simbol
stationed at Bataan; with Col. Pacifico Briones stationed at Pinatubo Mountains; he was sending communications
to the unit under Dominador Basco. There were also several small units of guerrillas with whom the accused had
had connections, among those were the unit at Dapitan, under Col. Marking, the unit at corner of Oroquieta and
Zurbaran, under Wenceslao Lamsen, and that under Capt. Leon Pichay, in Manila. "Upon my employment in the
Japanese Military Police, the first step that I did was to select seven trusted genuine guerrillas, and to these seven
men entrusted the communications that I sent to the underground and to several guerrilla units. Then, among the
ten men given to me by the Japanese of whom I was the head, I dismissed seven of them, and I retained in my
office three ganaps. I cannot dismiss all of them, because this will arouse the suspicion of the Japanese, so I have
to retain three in my office. Whenever there was a raid proposed by the Japanese to be made, the first step that I
did was to warn the people there to transfer to another place, and after that, I report back to our office and
reported to the Japanese that there was no guerrilla in said place; however, if they are not satisfied with the report
and they wanted to raid the said place, they can do it because I am satisfied that they could not find any person
there, because I warned them beforehand. Take, for example, the unit under Commander Dominador Tombo. At
the beginning of the year 1943, Capt. Tombo and myself were already wanted by the Japanese in the province, so
we went here in Manila. This Capt. Tombo, everytime he came to Manila, the first thing that he did was to report
to me, telling me that they are here, and they came here with ten of fifteen men, and asked my advise or what
advise I can give him. Then I told them to go to a certain place, giving him the number of my telephone, so that in
case of danger they might call me and as a matter of fact, up to the middle of the year 1944, when Capt. Tombo

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returned to the province, nothing happened to them, and even I gave them my revolver and ammunitions.
Another case is about the headquarters commanded by Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, in the City of Manila, corner
Zurbaran and Oroquieta. This headquarters was being closely watched by the Japanese Military Police. Inasmuch
as one of my activities was to protect the guerrillas, I contacted Capt. Lamsen and I told him that his headquarters
was being watched by the Japanese, and I told him that the best way to do, inasmuch as the building that he used
as headquarters was composed of two stories, was that I will occupy the second story, so that I can camouflage
the activities of the guerrillas, and in case the building will be raided, the Japanese will find out that I am using the
first floor as my office. So, when the Japanese came to raid the place, I was confident that they could not find any
guerrilla men in said building. When Capt. Lamsen approached me and asked me to do whatever I can, so that he
will not be able to manage guerrilla unit. I did what I could to prevent the Japanese from employing him, and I
succeeded in this. Then, another fact happened to Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, when one night in November, 1944,
at about 8 o'clock, the Military Police of the Airport Studio raided the place of Capt. Lamsen. I was the one who
happened to be there, and when the Japanese Military Police found me, they asked me why I was there, and I said
that I was occupying the place as temporary office; then the Japanese searched the place and found nothing, and
they left."
The witness testified also that one Manuel Gallego was wanted by the Military Police. He warned him and so
Manuel Gallego was not arrested by the Japanese. Gallego was the representative from the Second District of
Nueva Ecija. The witness used to help civilians coming from the provinces and arriving at Tutuban so as to prevent
their rice from being confiscated by the Military Police. He also used to help peaceful guerrillas when they were
being maltreated by the Japanese. Jose Fernandez, a lieutenant in the Ramsey Unit at Meycauayan "was arrested
by the Japanese but my runner came immediately and reported to me that Jose Hernandez was arrested by the
Japanese so I went at once to a superior officer to tell him that the person arrested is one of my men who is
helping me in my peace campaign. I was able to convince the superior officer, and Jose Hernandez. The same is
true with respect to Vicente Nuez, of Squadron 4, when he was arrested by Vicente Reyes and Buenaventura I
interceded in their behalf, and through my intercession, they were released." "While I was under detention in the
month of May, Ponciano Briones was arrested by Vicente Reyes and one Ruperto Adriano, and I came to know this
fact, because Vicente Reyes and Ruperto Adriano told me that they had arrested Ponciano Briones. After he was
investigated he was released." The witness had nothing to do with the detention and maltreatment of Ponciano
Briones. In December, 1944, Jose Nogoy, nephew of Ponciano Briones, brought from Cabiao a machinery which
was confiscated by agents of the Japanese Military Administration. Ponciano Briones approached the accused
requesting him to recover back the machinery or its costs, which was P4,000. The witness was able to recover
only P3,000 and for his failure to recover the remaining P1,000, Ponciano Briones harbored resentment against
him. Last September, 1944 I, together with my men, arrested Gregorio Hernandez in his house because there was
a complaint against him that he, together with other Texas men extorted five thousand pesos from Pablo Pastao
and Estanislao Ordoez. After arresting him, I brought him to my office, and while I was investigating him he told
me that he left the five thousand pesos to his companions. Then I gave him some warning, and then I sent him
home after taking the five thousand pesos from him. Since the month of June, 1944, I met Juanita Rosales, in one
of the houses of prostitution and Juanita Rosales was one of the inmates of that house and I came to know her and
came to have understanding with her: we agreed to live with each other. Her name was not Juanita Rosales she
was Juanita Ibaez, according to her certificate. We lived each other for ten months, since June, 1944. While we
were in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, about the end of March, 1945, Juanita Rosales told me that Gregorio Hernandez had
been sweetheart before the war. Before April 27, 1945, I discovered that Juanita Rosales returned back to her old
business in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, and I scolded her and I told her to leave. She returned here to Manila and I even
gave her P20 for her transportation expenses. I met her at the headquarters of the guerrillas at Meycauayan on
April 27, 1945. Nothing happened to us. When she came to the headquarters of the guerrillas at Meycauayan she
reported to the guerrillas that I was an agent of the Japanese Military Police." The accused had Abraham Albines
arrested because he "was in company with Gregorio Hernandez in their thieveries." Because Consolacion Tongol
was sick, "she asked Lt. Leonor Francisco to fetch me. Upon my arrival at the house of Consolacion Tongol I asked
her why she sent for me. She told me that she was sick and she wants to be hospitalized in the city. Then I told
her to be prepared and I will conduct her to the hospital in the city. She told me that her money and clothes were
placed at different places, and the best time for her to start was on the following day. I took my lunch in her
house, and after lunch, she told me that she will get her clothes in the laundry; but after 30 minutes, a group of
Japanese, accompanied by the Municipal Mayor of the town came to raid the house, and I was one among those
arrested in the house. When I asked the Japanese why he was arresting me, told me that I was denounced as a
bad man. Then I showed to them my identification card, and the Japanese then found that I was a bad man. I was
conducted to the office of the Military Police in the town and there in the office I saw Consolacion Tongol. We slept
in the town of Arayat that night, and that night I learned that Consolacion Tongol was kidnapped by guerrillas, and
on the following morning I returned to Manila. Consolacion Tongol was the nurse of our guerrilla unit." The witness
does not know anything about Gabriel Tongol. The second time the accused went to Arayat was because he was
sent for by the barrio people of Candating and by the head of the guerrilla unit. They asked him to intercede with
the Japanese authorities who have committed many abuses against the population. "Upon my arrival I
remonstrated with the Japanese military authorities and I transmitted to them the plight of inhabitants of the
barrio. On my arrival there in the barrio of Candating, the town mayor gathered the people of the barrio, and
about 300 people gathered there, and the mayor separated those who were not guerrillas and he denounced the
guerrillas to the Japanese. I interceded for them and explained to the Japanese that those people were not
guerrillas, they were simply farmers, and I explained to the mayor that with that system there will be no peace in
the town. I quarrelled with the mayor, because the mayor was insisting that those men who were segregated were
guerrillas, and as a result of which I quarrelled with him. to save those people, I selected one person by the name
of Mabini, and I gave him instructions as to what he should do, that somebody should be sacrificed, that he should
suffer, because that would be their only salvation. He followed my instructions, and they were saved. I took hold
of this person named Mabini, and I investigated him in the presence of the Japanese, and I even slapped both of
his face, and this man insisted that he is not a guerrilla, that he is a peaceful farmer. Then the Japanese
approached us, and they asked what the person was trying to explain, and I told the Japanese that he was saying
that he was not a guerrilla, that he was a peaceful farmer, but that we could not understand each other. Then the
Japanese explained to me. I exerted my efforts to convince the Japanese that I was really investigating, and
because of that they were saved." After his mission in Candating, he returned to Manila, "Upon my return here in
Manila, I closely watched the activities of the Japanese Military Police, and I stole the plan and sketches of the
places here in Manila and suburbs to be zonified by the Japanese; and one time I was able to steal from the car of

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Colonel Takano, here in Escolta, the plans and sketches of the different places here in Manila and suburbs that
were to be zonified; and as a matter of fact, the loss of those maps created a furor here in the city among the
Japanese, and they have offered a reward of ten million pesos for the recovery of said sketches and maps. They
were not recovered, because I sent said maps and sketches to the guerrilla officer, Capt. Antolin Rosales; and as a
matter of fact what happened then was that even the detectives at the City Hall were arrested here in Manila, and
some of them were brought to my office and were investigated. Then I helped in the arrest and investigation of
the "texas" here in Sampaloc and Quiapo. When the American liberating forces arrived here in the city, February
3, 1945, I went with Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, and I indicated to him the places of danger that may endanger the
lives of Americans and guerrillas; and after that I proceeded to Jaen, Nueva Ecija."
After the witness joined the Japanese Kempei-tai and he was made the head of a group of ten men, he separated
seven among them, but he could name only one Johnny, one Tony, one Pedro and one Ruperto. He forgot their
surnames. In 1942, he left Nueva Ecija because of the fact that he sensed that he was being pursued and wanted
by guerrillas and the Japanese and by the peace officers of Cabanatuan or Cabiao. After he was made head of a
group of Filipino agents, the accused enjoyed absolute freedom and he could escape. The Japanese "had not
trusted me, so they were always suspicious of me. I had access to their offices, because at times they called us or
investigated us."
9. Dominador Panis, 28, married, sportsman, residing at 772 Tayabas, Manila, testified that he has known Jose
Fernando before the war. Fernando knew pretty well that the witness was active in the resistance movement. They
dined together many times, and the accused told him several times of raiding certain places. In November, 1944,
the witness was arrested by the Japanese and brought to the Airport Studio where he was released. At the
garrison, he was tortured and several scars of his face show the effects of his torture. I saw the accused once
inside the Airport Studio.
After carefully weighing the above testimonies, we are convinced that the prosecution has been able to prove
beyond all reasonable doubt that appellant, being a Filipino citizen, had adhered to the cause of the Imperial
Government of Japan, by giving aid and comfort to their military forces stationed in the Philippines during the
enemy occupation, having served as informer and active member of the Kempei-tai, the Japanese military police
organization, having arrested Ponciano Briones, Gregorio Hernandez, Abraham Albines and Gabriel Tongol as
guerrilla suspects or having immediate connection with guerrilla suspects, in an attempt to suppress the
underground resistance movement. I proving the overt acts imputed to appellant, the two-witness rule provided
by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code has been fully satisfied.
Appellants claim that he was forced into the service of the Kempei-tai by the enemy appears to be without merit.
The circumstances under which he alleges having been forced by the Japanese to serve them seem to belie his
allegation. It is incredible that, while appellant was undergoing detention and maltreatment for his alleged
connection with the resistance movement, the Japanese should, without much ceremony, upon appellant's show
of willingness to abide by their order to serve them, release him, provide him with firearms, and put under his
charge a group of Filipino informers in the service of
Kempei-tai. To place appellant in such a responsible position, full of opportunity and means either of helping the
Japanese or sabotaging their military efforts, appellant must beforehand have shown them strong evidence of
adherence and loyalty for the Japanese to trust him.
If appellant's claim of unwillingness was true and he was helping the underground resistance movement at heart,
he offered no explanation for his failure to take advantage of the freedom granted him during the long months of
service in the Kempei-tai by fleeing from the enemy to join the guerrilla forces or by sabotaging the military
efforts of the Japanese. His corroborated claim of having stolen zoning maps appears to be too flimsy to be
believed, not only because appellant has not shown any military usefulness in said theft, but also because the
Japanese needed no maps for their zonings which they practiced in a haphazard and indiscriminate way. That
appellant, instead of fleeing from, or sabotaging the efforts of, the enemy should have made arrests and
investigations to actually help the Japanese in their campaign for the suppression of guerrilla activities, makes
wholly unacceptable his claim of having entered the service of the Kempei-tai involuntarily.
Appellant's allegation that his employment in the Kempei-tai was known and approved by guerrilla leaders is a
gratuitous allegation without any reliable evidence to support it. Not a single guerrilla leader or guerrilla soldier
was called by appellant to support or corroborate him in his claim.
At any rate, even on the hypothesis that appellant's claim of his involuntarily induction into the Kempei-tai, and
that said induction was approved by the guerrilla chieftains, have been proved, they cannot exculpate him from
criminal responsibility for the arrests and investigation of guerrilla suspects and their relatives and for the
punishments and tortures inflicted by him on them, as conclusively proved by the evidence on record, as with said
overt acts he helped the military purposes of the enemy, with no other purpose than to show his adherence and
support to the Japanese cause in the last war.
Appellant never claimed that he made the arrests and investigations and inflicted the punishments and tortures
impelled by force or induced by insurmountable fear of the Japanese, which, if proved, would relieve him from
criminal responsibility, nor with the knowledge and approval of guerrilla leaders, which, even if accepted, would
not exculpate him of rather make said leaders answerable with appellant for the crime of treason.
The appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
In the result. Appellant caused the arrest of many persons who have been severely punished illegally.

70

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 17, 1947
G.R. No. L-880
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FORTUNATO MUOZ (alias FORTUNAO VIZCARRA), defendant-appellant.

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Delfin Gonzales for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
The substance of the testimonies of the eight witnesses for the prosecution is as follows:
1. Adelaida Villareyes, 25 single, resident of Bamban, Tarlac, testified that in September, 1943, she was in Tapuak,
Bamban, with the Americans Captain Bruce and Lt. James Hart, and Zinghine, and a Filipino named Jose Raagas.
They were in their hideout in a small hut. There were plenty of tall grasses and bamboo thicket. Captain Bruce
was forming a guerrilla organization. "I was the supply officer and I was nursing them." At 5 o'clock in the morning
of September 3, 1943, the hideout was raided by Japanese constabulary and spies. "That morning we were
sleeping soundly and we had a little dog named Daisy. This dog started making noise inside the mosquito net and
we all woke up. Then we heard the noise of so many people coming and they opened fire so we finally dropped to
the ground and stayed there for a while until the firing was over. After the firing was over, I crawled and I wanted
to get away because the place was surrounded by Japanese, constabulary men and spies." the spies were Jose
Arquiola, Garcia, Mateo Lacsina, and Fortunato Muoz, the accused. When the Americans "were already tied up,
Fortunato came, and I saw him with Hart's shoes and his flight overall, and a small bag, and the .45 caliber
revolver that used The Fortunato Muoz, the accused. When the Americans "were already tied up, Fortunato
came, and I saw him with Hart's shoes and his flight overall, and a small bag, and the .45 caliber revolver that
used to belong to Hart. When I was grabbed by the Japanese there was no other trail, and as I happened to look
at the stream I saw Lt. hart lying there. His back was against the bank of the stream. I saw a hole on his forehead
they grabbed me and took me where Zinghine was and tied me. Zinghine "was tied up when I got there like I was,
hands behind his back." Captain Bruce and Raagas "got away." From the place "they walked us and when we got
by the gold mine, we sat there for a while, and then we continued to the garrison." There were guns in the
Bambang garrison, "When we got there they untied me and took me to another office inside the garrison and
asked me questions if there are other guerrillas and more Americans, and I said no. The next day they took us to
Capas jail; we stayed there two and a half days and then they took us back to Bamban." In Capas the Japanese
asked them about guerrillas. After six days in Bamban, "they took me to Magalang." In the Magalang Japanese
garrison "I stayed there almost three months. I was captured on April 3, 1943, and was released on December 7,
1943. I went back to the mountains and joined Captain Bruce and the rest of the guerrillas that they used to have
while I was away." While in Bamban, she saw guerrillas being tortured. "They (the Japanese and the spies,
including Fortunato Muoz) tortured them everyday just to make them tell if they knew more guerrillas and
whatever they wanted to find out. I saw them, and the dipped them into the swimming pool there, and they sat on
their stomachs." Since the accused had Lt. Hart's .45 pistol "he had that always. The only spy that was not
carrying a gun was Arquiola." The witness was connected with the Luzon Guerrilla Forces, South Tarlac Military
District, under Captain Bruce, the organization having been recognized on February 21, 1945. The witness held
the rank of captain and was discharged on May 29, 1945.
The witness was held by the Japanese in Magalang for almost three months and she saw that the accused arrived
three times with the Japanese. They were all armed and appeared tired. After the raid in which she was captured
she saw the accused when she was already tied up and thereafter she saw him every day in the garrison.
2. Jose Raagas, 48, married, residing at Bamban, Tarlac, testified that in September, 1943, he was in Tapuak in the
hideout which he made for his American companions, James Hart, Zinghine and Captain Bruce. There was also
Deling, the wife of Captain Bruce, whose full name is Adelaida Villareyes. At dawn, on September 3, 1943, they
were raided by twenty Japanese soldier, ten constabulary men and four Filipino spies. The latter were Vizcarra, the
accused, Garcia and Jose Arquila. He saw the accused Vizcarra carrying a rifle, M-1. "He was lying flat on the
ground with the rifle on his hands. I recognized him because he was near me; he was facing the American James
Hart who was shot by the accused. I ran away and two constabulary soldiers were chasing me. I went to the top of
the hill. I saw them assembled, with Zinghine already captured. I went to look for my other companions." Captain
Bruce was the first to run away. On the following day he returned to the place and "I saw the body of James Hart,
and our hideout was burned. When I was captured on September 15th and 16th, 1943, in my house, I saw the
accused again. When I went to my house to get food for the Americans, my wife told me that Vizcarra and Lacsina
went there and were looking for me." "After I had furnished my supper at eleven o'clock that night, the Japanese
came. They arrested me, they tied me around my waist like a monkey. I was tied tightly after arriving at the
garrison by Vizcarra and Lacsina, and I was made to drink water by the Japanese water cure. They were forcing
me to divulge the whereabouts of Captain Bruce," referring to Vizcarra and Lacsina. "I did not reveal because it
was against my conscience, and besides, I was taking care of them." From the garrison he was taken to the Mayor
of Bamban. "I was given an appointment as a spy of the Mayor, and he told me to fetch ny shotgun from the
mountains and surrender it to him." The day following his arrest "I was taken again to the garrison by a policemen
and a Japanese. I was again made a spy by the Japanese, and they told me to go to the barrios to look for
Americans." He surrendered his shotgun and worked as a spy for the Japanese for about two months. "I just
reported every two or three days, and when I was not able to report any American, they dismissed me and told
me that I was useless, and they got back my gun." During those two months he sometimes saw the accused
joining the Japanese in their raids, and sometimes in the company of three other spies. "He used to go in and out
of the Japanese garrison freely. Every time the Japanese went on raid he was always with them." The accused
used to carry with him the .45 caliber pistol which belonged to Lt. Hart. The witness recognized it because there
was a nail on it instead of a pin. When the accused went out on raids he carried with him a rifle. The witness is
connected with the USAFFE Guerrilla, Bamban Battalion, Co. A, under Captain Wage. He knew the accused as a
Hukbalahap since 1942. He was a Hukbalahap "until the time he became a spy."
On September 3, 1943 when the raid took place, it was raining and foggy. "When the dog barked we were
awakened then, and I said that may be they were Japanese, and Bruce ran away." Zinghine "was inside the
mosquito net, sick with malaria, and did not move, so he was captured by the Japanese." Adelaida stayed in the
hut. "When the firing began, Bruce already disappeared. I urged Hart to escape but he told me, 'No, I want to
shoot a Japanese.' The firing was on, so I went down the hut and lay down. Hart also went down and began to fire
also. It was dawn between light and darkness, and the sun was already rising." After going down, Hart "went away

72

from me because he told me he wanted to fight the Japanese. When I saw him he was already dead, I ran away,
but before that, I saw the accused in front of hart, with his gun aiming at him." Hart died in front of the hut. The
next day the witness saw Hart with a gunshot wound at the forehead.
3. Florentino Manipon, 45, married, police of Bamban, Tarlac, testified that he served as chief of police during the
Japanese occupation from February 21, to December 31, 1942. Then he was incarcerated for six days and
dismissed as chief of police, but served again as such from May, 1943, to April, 1944. He was incarcerated by the
Japanese. "They were suspecting me as giving aid to these Americans hiding in the mountains" which was true.
The witness knows that the accused Fortunato Muoz alias Vizcarra worked in the Japanese garrison as a spy,
"because whenever they raided a certain barrio he was with them with arms and rifles and the time I used to
see him at the Japanese kempeitai in Bamban, Tarlac, and whenever he went with the raiding party he had a side
arm and a rifle with him." The witness saw the accused in a raid in the last week of August, 1943, in barrio La Paz
"where they captured eight guerrilla suspects." The witness saw the accused in raids on several occasions, but he
can remember only that made on the last week of August, 1943, because a policeman, Florentino de la Cruz, was
among those captured. The witness remembers also that raid made in barrio Bagco by the Japanese and
Fortunato Muoz, because they asked the witness, a policeman, Fortunato Rivera, to act as a guide. "In the
poblacion I used to see Vizcarra with the Japanese raiding the market." The accused worked as a spy for the
Japanese in 1943 and 1944, up to October, when the witness fled to the mountains. The last time he saw him was
in the garrison on December 19. At that time the Japanese, accompanied by the accused, apprehended all the
policemen including Miguel Ballesteros, the chief of police.
4. Miguel Ballesteros, 44, married, sergeant of police, residing in Bamban, Tarlac, testified that he served as
sergeant of police from February, 1944 to December, 1944. He came to know the accused since August, 1943,
after the zoning in Bamban. The accused dropped in at the municipal building in the company of Lt. Fugi and the
Japanese interpreter Oka. "They brought about thirty persons for our custody. Seventeen of the thirty persons
were picked by the Japanese officer with the assistance of Fortunato Muoz. Fortunato Muoz picked seventeen
persons out of the thirty as members of the guerrillas. He pointed them out one by one. They were brought to
concentration camp at Capas, O'Donnel, in the same afternoon when Vizcarra, the Japanese officer and the
Japanese interpreter came, in August, 1943." The remaining persons were told to sit down in front of the
municipal building, and "they were instructed by Vizcarra that they must not join the guerrilla forces and that they
must cooperate with the Japanese soldiers." The accused talked in Pampango. Then said persons were released.
On that occasion the accused was carrying a .45 caliber revolver. The witness saw him many times, sometimes
accompanied by Japanese soldiers and sometimes by Garcia and other spies. In September, 1943, the accused
was in the company of Lt. Fugi and he was 'telling a group of people assembled in the municipal building that he
had captured Lt. James Hart, and he was holding the .45 caliber automatic pistol which, as he said, was the gun of
Lt. Hart. That was between September 3 and 4, 1943. The accused and the Japanese came to the municipal
building with the purpose of telling the people what had been done to Lt. Hart and his companion. In November ,
1943, the witness and four policemen, while in the municipali building, heard shots coming from sitio Santol. They
went to the place and "we saw Vizcarra and the Japanese soldiers apprehending the people who were running.
About fifteen of the persons apprehended were lined up and Vizcarra picked out twelve of them who were brought
to the Japanese garrison. Among those apprehended were Hermogenes Sibal and Alberto de Leon. They were
accused by Vizcarra as members of the guerrilla. "They were taken to the Japanese garrison. Some were released
on the night on the same day and others were released the following morning. Only three of the twelve remained
in the garrison. On December 17 or 19, 1944, all the eleven members of the police force, including the witness
who was then acting as chief of police were apprehended by Japanese soldiers together with Constabulary
soldiers. About one hundred fifty other persons were also apprehended. All were brought to the garrison. There
the witness saw Vizcarra," he was rendering assistance to them." The Japanese were giving the third degree to
those captured. The witness was detained for two days. The other policemen were also released. They were
arrested because "the garrison commander had received information that the police force were members of the
guerrilla forces under Captain Bruce," and the information was correct. After being released, "I ran away to the
mountains. When Vizcarra went to the municipal building to tell a group of persons that he was the one who got
Hart, he added: "As a matter of fact I am wearing his clothes and got his gun." The witness was tortured in the
death chamber. He was wounded at the back of the head. He was injected with medicine after which "I felt
unconscious and I spat blood." He was tortured by the Japanese. "I managed not to talk; I did not squeal.
5. Juan Alfonso, 38, married, laborer, residing at Bamban, Tarlac, testified that he came to know the accused
because they worked together for the same landlord before the Japanese occupation. In August, 1943, he met him
when he came along with the Japanese soldiers who effected the raid in Tapuak. The accused carried a firearm, .
45 caliber revolver, on his waist. After the raid on September 3, the accused came again to the barrio, where the
people were gathered. Oka, the Japanese, speaking in Tagalog, introduced the accused to the people in the
following manner: "Here is the man pointing to the accused who killed James Hart. You better capture or kill
other Americans as he did and you will also be compensated as we compensated him." At that time the accused
was beside the Japanese, and he did not say anything. At the time Vizcarra was introduced to the barrio people,
the Japanese zoned the place, but nobody was arrested. Referring to the raid of September 3, the witness said:
"At eleven o'clock that same morning when we heard the shots I went to the place which the Japanese raided and
I found Hart in the hole dead."
6. Fortunato V. Anunciacion, 31, married, unemployed, residing at Bamban, Tarlac, testified that on August 25,
1943, he was captured by the Japanese military forces at Bamban, while he was in the house of his aunt at barrio
La Paz. The Japanese were aided by spies, one of them being Vizcarra, the accused. According to Captain Katino,
the witness was arrested because the spies who were with him told that the witness was a guerrilla leader. All in
all seven persons were arrested and brought from Bamban to Mabalacat. The accused was carrying a revolver.
They were taken below the house of Mr. Morales. The Japanese soldiers and the spies were in the upper story.
"After eleven days imprisonment in Mabalacat I was brought by the same Japanese soldiers and constabulary men
to Tarlac military police jail. I stayed in Tarlac four months and seven days." He was released on January 12, 1944.
"The day I was released by the military police I was bound to the mountains to rejoin my unit, but I have seen
Vizcarra with another spy whose name was Posong Garcia. They were both standing on the railroad track in front
of the railroad station of Bamban. At the moment I saw them I feared to proceed directly to the mountains and
instead I went near them and said: 'How are you tokayo?' and he said 'I am alright'. I further said: 'You have a new

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uniform' and he said: 'This is the overall used by Lieutenant Hart.' Then he asked me if I knew already the death
of Lieutenant Hart and as I kept silent, he proceeded saying: 'And this is the pistol of Lieutenant Hart. You know I
was the man who killed him when we raided their hideout, I had only a glance at him and the moment I sighted
him I killed him with one bullet and as a reward for killing him, this overall and this pistol were given to me by the
Japanese.'" The accused and his companion confiscated rice, sugar and other goods from the civilians who were
bound for Manila riding in the train. Witness was arrested on August 25, 1943, and was released only on January
12, 1944, and during that period he has never been out.
7. Melencio Wage, 28, widower, captain, Philippine Army, testified that he came to know the accused in a raid in
1943. The accused was carrying one .45 automatic pistol in the company of a group of Japanese. They came back
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. In the group there were three Filipinos including the accused. The Japanese were
armed with rifles. Again he saw the accused between seven and eight one morning in 1943 with Japanese
soldiers. When they returned there were three persons with them with hands tied with rope across their backs.
The testimonies of the seven witnesses who testified for the defense are as follows:
1. Serafin Sotto, 48, married, laborer, resident of Mabalacat, barrio lieutenant during the Japanese occupation,
testified that he was working in the sugar central at Bamban, where he used to see the accused who was working
in the garrison which was within the compound of the sugar central. The witness was the president of the twentyone barrio lieutenants of Mabalacat. He requested the accused that if he knew of any raid to be made" he should
let me know. And the accused used send me the notice directly so that I could notify the others , and through
them the people." In April, 1943, "he wrote me a letter advising me that he and the Japanese were going to raid
several places Bulog, Sapang, Balen, Pesucul, and others. I left my house early in the morning and walked
along the roads trying to meet the folks who were selling milk early in the morning, and advised them to return
home to advise the barrio people of the coming of the Japanese and PC so that they also advise the guerrillas to
leave the place if there were any, thus, saving guerrillas and the barrio people." On Good Friday during the Holy
Week of 1944, one Japanese guard was killed. "The next morning the accused passed by Mabalacat coming from
Bamban and he saw us standing by a barber shop and told us that if we were going to the cockpit in Angeles the
following day, to tell the others not carry guns because the Japanese would raid the cockpit. They really raided
that place the following day, and I was one of those arrested in the cockpit. They lined up the people there and
made them face the sun. The accused was helping the people in lining up, telling them not to worry because if the
had no guns nothing would happen to them, and advised them likewise not to be pale." Upon request of the
accused, the people from Mabalacat were released, including the witness. The witness was a sugar cane inspector
of the central which operated under the charge of a Japanese who used to be a carpenter for the central. The
witness has known the accused since 1920.
2. Generoso David, 34, married, residing at Mawake, Mabalacat, testified that he was a classmate of the accused,
a former foreman in Mawake. He met the accused during the time he was with the Japanese on September 15,
1943. "He was under the custody of the Japanese." In February, 1944, he saw in his barrio the accused with the
Japanese. Nothing happened because "before their arrival I received a note from him to the effect that is there
were guerrillas in our place we should tell them to go away because he and the Japanese would come and raid the
place. I asked the guerrillas to move to another place."
3. Estanislao Melo, 60, married, merchant, resident of Angeles , testified that in February, 1944, "while I was on
my way home to Angeles carrying my pigs in a carromata, I met Japanese in a truck on the way, and they tried to
get my horse. I saw the accused with those Japanese and he asked me where I got the pigs from, and I told him
that I had bought them for sale and then he intervened requesting the Japanese to let the pigs alone." The
witness saw again the accused on Easter Sunday in Angeles. "The Japanese ordered all the people in the cockpit
to get out, then I saw the accused with them aligning the people. They begin searching us for firearm and when
they found none, they told us to continue with the cockfighting."
4. Vicente Aquino, 54, married, farmer, resident of Mabalacat, testified that he saw in his barrio the accused who
"simply told us that the were on their way on patrol." In September, 1943, between four and five o'clock in the
morning, the witness heard the shots in rapid succession. It was foggy and dark and drizzling. "According to what I
heard after that they said that an American was killed."
5. Venancio Rivera, 35, married, barber, residing at Mabalacat, testified that on August 18, 1943, his house in
Mabalacat was burned by constabulary soldiers, because "I was suspected as being connected with the
guerrillas." The witness used to visit the accused who "asked me why I was there and I told him I was wanted by
the constabulary and the Japanese, so he advised me to hide very well lest I would be caught by them. What I
knew at that time was that he was already working in the garrison." In August, 1944, "when the Japanese were
already hot in pursuit of their enemies, this accused, on about ten occasions, came to notify me to escape
because the Japanese were going to raid the place where I was at that time." On September 10, 1944, a place in
Bamban where the witness was, was zoned by one Yamashita who came from Concepcion. "The accused knew
that my life was at a stake so he talked to that lieutenant Yamashita although I did not know what they talked
about, but afterwards I was released."
6. Gregorio Gaa, 42, married, laborer, residing in Tondo, Manila, testified that he joined the Huks from 1942 to
1944. The accused was in the same squadron with the witness. "We were coming from sitio Banaba and when we
passed by that sitio Cubcub, when we arrived at the river bank, we were ambushed by the Japanese and we had
to fight. After the fight, as we were to leave our hiding place in the sugar-cane field, the accused fell sick and he
asked us to let him stay. He was left in barrio Banaba. When I saw him afterwards, he was already with the
Japanese, and working for them. On that occasion, he always asked us what we needed, and on several occasions,
personally we asked him what we needed in the form of ink, pencils, papers and others. We simply sent someone
to him. Because we used to write."
7. Fortunato, Muoz, the accused, testified that in May, 1942, he left Mabalacat because he was wanted by the
authorities. He joined the guerrillas. "We (including Gregorio Lagman) were accepted as soldiers." After a month
he was transferred to another organization under Commander Malvar where he remained "until I was captured by

74

the Japanese in September, 1943. We were in Mapalaksio, we were informed that the Japanese were going to raid
us and that they were already near. For that reason, we left the place. We arrived at Cubcub at about three o'clock
in the morning. As we were about to cross the river, we met the enemy. There was a fight our squadron was the
first to fight. Luna, our vice commander was shot, and my group was able to retreat in barrio Makbu, a sugar-cane
field. While we were there, I became ill. The next day, I asked for permission to separate from my group and
remain there. When I was taken to a doctor, I was caught in barrio La Paz by the Japanese. I was taken together
with several other people, among them a certain Tanian and Cabanela. Quite a long time, about eight days. We
were taken to the garrison. We were punished, maltreated. Our arms were tied behind our back and we were
taken out, led by the constabulary soldiers. They hang bags on our back" and they were taken to the hills of barrio
Tapuak where they arrived between three and four early in the morning. "Mateo Lacsina, Jose Orquiola, and
Alfonso Garcia went away with some Japanese and constabulary soldiers. We were left in a rice land and those
others who were left with us later went around. I don't know where they went. Fifteen minutes afterwards, we
heard machine-gun shooting. About thirty minutes or one hour. Jose Orquiola came back to tell them (the
Japanese soldiers who were left) that their commander was calling for them. When we arrived there, I already saw
Daling, an American, captured. Then I also saw the hut where they lived." The accused came to know Hart. 'I did
not see him on that occasion, but when he returned to the garrison, Daling and others said that Hart had been
shot by the Japanese." The accused denies having shot Hart and having taken his revolver. "As a matter of fact, I
saw the gun in the hands of Jose Orquida." Jose Orquiola, Alfonso Garcia and Mateo Lacsina were taken by the
guerrillas. It is not true that the accused is responsible for the maltreatment of some of the people caught by the
Japanese. "On the contrary, if the Japanese arrested any, I used to talk to the Japanese and pleaded for them." It
is not true as stated by Adelaida Villareyes that the accused was seen by her maltreating a guerrilla in the
garrison at Bamban. "I stayed there only for about an hour. As a matter of fact, I went there for a certain purpose
of pleading for her and when my request was turned down, we have not invited her to play bowling." Adelaida
became angry when the accused did not accede to her request to join the Hukbalahaps in 1942. The accused
denied having anything to do with confiscating rice and other commodities at the station in Bamban. "When the
constabulary soldiers were confiscating things, I even pleaded to them not to do it." The accused left the service
of the central when the Americans began bombing the Philippines, and then joined the resistance movement.
After he was arrested by the Japanese, "I agreed to work with them provided they let me live with my children. I
could not escape anymore because had I done so, they would have taken my family. They made us guards of the
laborers. A Filipino was paying our salary. We were the ones who were taking turns in guarding the premises." The
witness served the Japanese from September, 1943, until May, 1944. "At first they made me help the cook, and
after that, they took from me along when the went out. They took from me a revolver, caliber .32, and that was
the one they returned to me." Jose Orquiola, Mateo Lacsina and Alfonso Garcia were Japanese spies. "I remember I
went out with them probably on two occasions. The first time they took me along, we went to barrio Mangcop,
because the Japanese wanted to ask for papaya and took us along to carry them. The second time, we went to
barrio Mawake, this time to ask for camotes." Regarding the .32 caliber revolver, "I asked for it and the Japanese
sergeant returned it to me." The accused was retained by the Japanese "for what use he could be to them in
connection with the guerrillas." After sometime, the accused went to his barrio and explained his situation to the
guerrillas "that the Japanese forced me to work with them, and if I did not do so they would taken my family so
that they told me I could stay also help them."
The information filed against appellant reads as follows:
That during this period comprised between August 1943 to January 1945, more specifically on or about the dates
hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereinafter stated and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and/or the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines with which the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war giving to said
enemy aid and comfort in the following manner , to wit:
"1. That in or about August, 1943 and at the diverse other dates occurring the Japanese Military occupation, in the
province of Tarlac, the herein accused for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and
comfort did willfully, feloniously and treasonably join, become, serve and act as informer of the Imperial Japanese
Forces.
"2. That on or about September 3, 1943, in the municipality of Bamban, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused for
the purpose of giving and with intent to give the said enemy aid and comfort did willfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead, assist and accompany a patrol composed of Japanese and Bureau Of Constabulary soldiers to
barrio Tapuak, and once there did attack and raid the camp of Captain Alfredo Bruce and in the course thereof the
herein accused, with the aid of Japanese and constabulary soldiers who were all armed thereby affording him
impunity did wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully shoot and kill Lt. James Hart and the said patrol did thereupon
capture Adelaida Villareyes and (FNU) Zinghine who were in said camp and forthwith bring them to the Japanese
garrison in the town where they were detained for over one week after which said Adelaida Villareyes was
released and (FNU) Zinghine brought to Capas, Tarlac, where he was bayoneted to death by the Japanese.
Contrary to law.
The lower court finding the appellant guilty, without the attendance of any circumstance modifying his criminal
responsibility, sentenced him to life imprisonment, with its accesories, and to and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the
costs, one-half of his preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the main penalty.
The evidence in this case has conclusively shown that in the early morning of September 3, 1943, appellant was a
member of a group of Japanese soldiers, constabulary men and Filipino spies which raided a guerrilla hideout in
Tapuak, in which Lt. James Hart was killed, and an American named Zinghine and Adelaida Villareyes, wife of
Captain Alfred Bruce, were taken prisoners and brought to the Japanese garrison in Bamban and Capas. At that
time the raid took place, appellant, a Filipino citizen by his administration made in open court, was in the service
of the Japanese army as agent and spy, and it is evident that he participated in the raid to give aid and comfort to
the enemy.

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Appellant does not deny having been present near the place of the raid at the time it took place, but alleges that
his presence at about one hundred yards from the raided hideout was due not to his own will but to the fact that
the Japanese brought him to the place to carry foodstuffs, with hands tied at his back. This allegation, besides
being far-fetched, cannot prevail over the testimonies of Adelaida Villareyes and Jose Raagas. The inherent
inverisimilitude of appellant's testimony is evident. There was no reason for the Japanese top carry foodstuffs not
needed for such a short expedition and it is inconceivable that they should let him bring them on his shoulders
with his hands tied and as prisoner, needing to be guarded by soldiers who had to fight against the guerrillas. The
testimony of appellant, taken as whole, has rather the effect of adding more weight to the evidence of the
prosecution. By said testimony, it appears absolutely certain that appellant had voluntarily rendered effective
service as an agent of the Japanese. Even crediting to him whatever benefits some individuals, including his
witnesses, derived from the help he rendered them, the facts that he was thus able to help them shows his
influence upon the Japanese, gained through his usefulness to the latter.
Adelaida Villareyes was later released. There is no evidence as to what finally happened to Zinghine.
Upon the record, appellant's guilt has been conclusively proven.
Being in accordance with article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs
against appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result. Appellant is responsible for the death of Hart.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 31, 1950
G.R. No. L-2321
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARSENIA NUEZ, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Gaw for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by Arsenia Nuez from a judgment of the People's Court which convicted her of the crime of
reason on an information consisting of one count, and after proper trial sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.
In the brief filed in her behalf by counsel de oficio it is contended that the alleged overt acts alleged in the
information and which were made the basis of her conviction were not clearly proven to establish the guilt of
appellant was predicated merely on circumstantial evidence and that the accused in accordance with the
requirement of the treason law.
The charge brought against Arsenia Nuez before the People's Court appears in the following:
That during the period comprised between December 8, 1941, and March, 1945, more specifically on or about the
dates hereinbelow mentioned, and in different places in the Philippines hereinafter designated, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance
to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines in violation of the said oath of allegiance, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonably adhere to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, against which the United States and the Philippines were then at war,
by extending, facilitating and giving assistance, aid and comfort to the above-mentioned enemy, in the following
manner and form to wit:
The herein accused, with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, on about July 32, 1944, wilfully, unlawfully
and treasonably acted as the finger-woman when the barrio of Tapia, General Trias, Cavite, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, was "zonified" by the Japanese, pointing out to the Japanese several men
whom she accused as guerrillas, among whom were Carlos Guarin, Cayetano Asistores, Dionisio Carandang,
Carlos de los Reyes, Dionisio Asistores and Severino Portugues, who were then and there loaded in a truck and
taken away by the Japanese and were never heard of since that time; on the same occasion the herein accused
wilfully and treasonably pointed to the Japanese soldiers several women whom she accused as wives of or

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connected with guerrillas, among whom were Balbina Rosa whom she pointed out as the wife of a guerrilla and as
a result of which the said Balbina Rosa was imprisoned by the Japanese for two months and seven days.
Contrary to law.
It appears from the evidence that Arsenia Nuez, according to her own admission, a native-born citizen of the
Philippines, was a resident of barrio Pasong Kawayan, municipality of General Trias, Province of Cavite, where she
lived with her family up to the month of July, 1944. She was married to Albino Torres, but her husband having
abandoned her, she moved to the City of Cavite where, in consonance with he loose morals, particularly during
the Japanese occupation, she became the mistress of Magno Garcia, a Japanese mestizo and a notorious spy in
the service of the Japanese Kempei-tai in Cavite.
No less than four witnesses took the stand before the People's Court to substantiate the allegations made in the
above-quoted charge. They are Teodoro Guarin, Marcelina Reyes, Perpetua Cadava, Florencia Luneta.
Teodora Gluarin, a sexagenarian and a merchant of Pasong Kawayan, General Trias, Cavite, stated that one
afternoon in the month of July, 1944, Arsenia Nuez, in company with a man named Garcia and four truckloads of
Japanese soldiers arrived in Pasong Kawayan for the zoning of the barrio. The Japanese soldiers rounded up the
inhabitants, including women and children, and herded them into a pre-designated place; they also rounded up
Ceferino Portuguez, son of the witness, and Carlos Guarin. During the process of zoning, the appellant pointed out
those two persons to her Japanese companions by telling them that they are bad men and guerrillas. Immediately
thereafter, the Japanese soldiers tied the hands of Portuguez and Guarin and loaded them on a truck, and the two
prisoners, with other persons from the same barrio, were taken away by the Japanese and brought to the City of
Cavite. Teodora Guarin said that after that she never saw her son Ceferino again. She also testified that Garcia,
known as "the fat man," was accompanying the appellant and the Japanese soldiers in the zoning of that place
and was a notorious Japanese spy in Cavite. Appellant was living in Cavite with Garcia as his mistress, and, during
the zoning of the barrio of Pasong Kawayan, she saw the appellant wearing a Japanese cap and clothing similar to
that worn by Japanese soldiers.
Marcelina Reyes, a resident of barrio Tapia, General Trias, Cavite, testified that she knew the appellant since her
childhood. In July, 1944, Arsenia Nuez was in company with Japanese soldiers when they conducted a zona in her
barrio and arrested Perputua Cadava, Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos de los Reyes, Dionisio Colanting and a man who
answered to the name of Tano. The witness was also arrested by the Japanese pursuant to the indication of
appellant who informed them that her husband, Alonso Saliba, was a guerrilla. Marcelina was therefore loaded on
a truck together with Ceferino Portuguez and a few others, and brought to the Military Police garrison in Cavite
City, where she was investigated regarding the guerrilla activities of her husband. While she was detained in
Cavite for two months and seven days, she saw the appellant sitting on a chair and holding office at the Kempeitai headquarters in Cavite. Appellant was married to a guerrilla by the name of Albino Torres and the accused
joined the Japanese to compel the surrender of her husband. When the prisoners were brought to the City of
Cavite, appellant was on the front seat of the vehicle, next to the chauffeur, and on that occasion she was wearing
a Japanese uniform. Marcelina further stated that Carlos de los Reyes, one of those arrested and taken to the City
of Cavite from the place of the zona, has never returned nor seen after his arrest; likewise, her brother Carlos de
los Reyes and many others who were arrested have never to their respective homes.
The third witness Perpetua Cadava declared that she was acquainted with the appellant since her childhood. She
narrated practically the facts testified by the two previous witnesses and added that when she was arrested
together with Marcelina Reyes, Ceferino Portuguez and others, her hands were tied and she was loaded on a truck
together with those persons already mentioned. They were taken to Kempei-tai garrison in the City of Cavite and
investigated regarding her guerrilla connections. During her questioning in the Kempei-tai garrison, appellant was
pacing up and down the floor of the premises and once approached her saying, "Is it true that your house is being
used as headquarters of Magirog and is it also true that your husband is a guerrilla?" after which, she was slapped
on the face by appellant. Perpetua corroborated the other two witnesses when she stated that appellant was
dressed in Japanese uniform, was wearing sun glasses, and frequently pointed out by her were immediately tied
by the hands and loaded on trucks by the Japanese. This witness kept in the Kempei-tai garrison for one month
and one day.
The fourth witness is Florencio Luneta, a merchant in the town of Tanza, Cavite. According to her, in 1944, she
lived with the appellant and some guerrillas in the same house in the barrio of Tapia, General Trias. In July, 1944,
the appellant suddenly left the house and lived with some Japanese in the City of Cavite. One afternoon, appellant
came to the barrio of Tapia with Japanese soldiers traveling in four trucks and in order to conduct a zona in that
place. The appellant pointed out the witness to the Japanese as the laundry woman of Magno Mairoguin, a
guerrilla leader in Cavite; she also pointed out the Japanese Marcelina Reyes, Perpetua Cadava and Balbina Posas.
In fact, these women were wives of guerrillas and being pointed out by appellant their hands were tied and they
were loaded by the Japanese on trucks and brought to the Kempei-tai headquarters in the City of Cavite. Florencia
was investigated regarding her connections with guerrilla she leader Magno Mairoguin, and during her questioning
she was confronted by her accusers, the appellant herein. She told the appellant, "Woman you might be mistaken;
I am not a laundry woman of the guerrillas." She was detained in the Japanese garrison for one month and a half.
During her confinement therein she saw appellant frequently in the Japanese headquarters. She saw appellant
wearing a cap and a suit similar to that worn by the Japanese soldiers and when going out on a expedition with
the Japanese, she usually sat near the chauffeur.
In the light of the above-stated facts, it is undeniable that this appellant has been acting as the "finger woman" of
the Japanese when the latter zoned the inhabitants in the barrios of Tapia and Pasong Kawayan, municipality of
General Trias, Cavite. All the witnesses for the prosecution have attested that she was always in the company of
Japanese soldiers, that she was always in the company of Japanese soldiers, and that appellant was wearing sun
glasses, a Japanese cap and uniform, and that she was the one who pointed her accusing finger at the persons
already mentioned above who were immediately put under arrest by the Japanese members of the Kempei-tai and
transferred to their headquarters, investigated and tortured.

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It is distinctly shown that in taking part in the zoning activities of the Japanese, appellant was responsible for the
arrest of several persons such as Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos Guarin, Carlos de los Reyes and others, with the
added circumstance that the three named persons have never bee seen alive again, and although it is not the
purpose of the prosecution to make her directly and personally responsible for the disappearance, and perhaps
the killing by the Japanese, of Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos Guarin, and Carlos de los Reyes, yet the conclusion is
inevitable that, by pointing them out to her Japanese masters, she had greatly cooperated in their arrest,
detention, disappearance, and perhaps death, by the positive act of accusing them and pointing them out to
Japanese kempei.
Appellant admitted that she pointed out to the Japanese and caused the arrest of Ceferino Portuguez and three
other persons; she also admitted that she had been living in the house of Magno Garcia, a notorious Japanese spy
in the City of Cavite from July, 1944 up to the date of liberation thereof. She alleged, however, that a group of
armed bandits locally known as "Texas" kidnapped her from the home of her parents in Pasong Kawayan, General
Trias; that Ceferino Portuguez, a rejected suitor, was a member of that band; that her kidnappers brought her to a
place called Santol where she was outraged; that after abusing her, her kidnappers brought her to the house of
Perpetua Cadava where she was made to stay overnight guarded by Portuguez and three others. The day
following the zoning referred to by the witnesses for the prosecution, the house of Perpetua Cadava was raided by
the Japanese soldiers and they found her there in premises with Ceferino Portuguez and the latter's companions.
When she was investigated by the Japanese, she reported to them what happened to her, and that she was
kidnapped by the "Texas" band; but the Japanese did not believe her story and instead brought her to the City of
Cavite and placed her under the custody of Magno Garcia. Upon the arrival of the American troops she escaped
from the house of Garcia and proceeded to Batangas, Batangas, and stayed in the house of a friend. Then an
American member of the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) arrested her on the charged of being a Japanese spy.
The above denials and assertions made by the defendant fail to counteract the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For instance, one Felix Cubal who claims to be a next-door neighbor of the Nuez family, testified
that one day previous to the zoning of Pasong Kawayan, the appellant was kidnapped by the "Texas" band, but
the appellant's father, Placido Nuez, put on the witness stand by the defense, declared that he had no close
neighbors, that his house was isolated and very far away from others, that he was working on his land when this
happened and learned about it when he returned home. Alleging that he was afraid of the Japanese, he said,
however, that he did not notify the local authorities about it nor take any steps to ascertain the whereabouts of
his daughter, and that it was only on the following year, when the American forces were already occupying the
province of Cavite, that the witness learned that his daughter, the appellant, was in the city of Cavite. The
attitude of utter indifference shown by Nuez in the connection with the matter of the alleged kidnapping of his
daughter is so unnatural, so contrary to the well-known strength and closeness of the family ties of the Filipinos,
that we hardly believe the accuracy of this story of the kidnapping, and that appellant voluntarily left her home
for the city of Cavite to join the Japanese.
This shows that the evidence of appellant is based on a shaky foundation. In fact, even assuming that her
contention that she was criminally assaulted and kidnapped by the "Texas" bandits is true, yet, we fail to
understand how such acts could justify her treasonable acts and adherence to the enemies of her country and
fellow citizens. We find that the testimonies of the four women who were put on the stand by the prosecution ring,
true, and it is unbelievable that they would have concocted such accusations against this appellant, one of their
own sex, if the facts related by them on the witness stand were mere fabrications.
The Solicitor General, agreeing to the plea of counsel for defendant, invites our attention to the attendance of the
privilege mitigating circumstance of minority of this offender when she committed those treasonable acts. (Rev.
Penal Code, art. 13, par. 2.) The transcript of her testimony shows that this appellant, answering to questions of
her counsel, said that, according to her mother, she was born on the 17th of August, but she did not know what
year." Her mother just told her that she "was 18 years old." However, when on January 5, 1948 she was put on the
stand, after being sworn as a witness, she said that she was 21 years of age. Considering that the evidence shows
that her treasonable acts were committed after her alleged kidnapping and raping by the "Texas" bandits in July,
1944, we may safely conclude that she was over 15 and under 18 years of age when she violated the treason law,
and in the absence of evidence to the contrary (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 9, 1890, Viada,
Vol. 2, page 14, cuestion 2; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil., 246) when the culprit is over 15 and under 18 years of age,
"the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period," upon this
culprit (Art. 68, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code).
Treason is punished by reclusion temporal to death and a fine not to exceed P20,000. According to the rules for
graduating penalties provided in article 61 of the Revised Penal Code, "when the penalty prescribed for the crime
in composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." In this instance, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, to be imposed in
its medium period, on account of the absence of modifying circumstances.
Pursuant to section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, this appellant, herein convicted of treason,
is, however, not entitled to the benefits of the said law.
In view of all foregoing, Arsenia Nuez is, therefore, sentenced to ten years of prision mayor. Thus modified, the
judgment appealed from is otherwise affirmed, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2193

February 1, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO CANIBAS, defendant-appellant.
Simeon M. Gopengco for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan Jr. and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on two counts, appellant Florentino Canibas was found guilty, in a unanimous decision, by
the third Branch of the People's Court, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P10,000, with costs.
On count 1, the court found that the accused, a native of Tarlac, arrived in Batangas from Lopez of the now
Province of Quezon in November, 1944. Soon after that, Makapili unit was organized in Lipa by the accused
together with one Nicolas Gonzales and others. Gonzales became the titular head of the organization and

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defendant, its secretary. The accused, as members of the Makapili, wore Japanese uniform and white arm band,
was armed with a revolver, mounted guard and did sentry duty, accompanied Japanese soldiers in raids against
supposed guerrillas, confiscated foodstuff, and forced male citizens to work for the Japanese army.
In support of count 2, the court found that on February 11, 1945, a group of Makapilis, among whom was the
accused, accompanied by Japanese troops, raided barrio Marajuy, municipality of Lipa, Province of Batangas
apprehended almost the entire population of the barrio, about 300 in all, including children and adults, men and
women, and marched them to a citrus experimental station. In that place, the accused and others tied the victims
by two's, after which the Japanese slaughtered the prisoners with bayonets, with the exception of a few who were
able to escape, one of them being Juan Navarro, who testified at the trial. in the killings, children were tossed up
in the air and caught with the points of bayonets as they fell. Besides those who succeeded in escaping, five
young girls were spared; they were selected for their good look by the accused and his fellow Makapilis, and taken
to Nicolas Gonzales' house ina barrio in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, where they were kept as "servants" for Gonzales
and the Japanese. One of those girls was Lutgarda Tolentino, scarcely 15 years of age at the time of the massacre,
also a witness for the prosecution.
The first count has not have been established by the oaths of at least two witnesses. There are no two direct
witnesses to any of the component parts that made up the whole overt act of appellants membership in the
Makapili. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300.)1 But the testimony on this branch of the case is sufficient proof
of adherence to the enemy. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not to be proved by two witnesses. Clear intent
and knowledge may be gathered from the testimony of one of the witnesses, or from the nature of the act itself,
or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 980; People vs. Adriano, supra.)
The second count has been established in the manner required by law of treason. There is no proof by two
witnesses of the seizure at their homes of the inhabitants of Barrio Marajuy by the Japanese and the accused, but
there were three eye-witnesses to the fact to the fact that the accused was present at the mass killings, taking
active part therein in collaboration with the Japanese, by personally tying the hands of some of the victims and
directing the same operation with regard to others.
The accused, corroborated by Gonzales and another witness, put up an alibi, saying in answer to various
questions that he knew nothing of the charges and of the testimony of the government witnesses against him. He
said he fled to the mountains when the Americans were coming. The People's Court believed the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses and we do not think it committed any error in so doing.
The judgment of conviction and the penalty imposed are in accordance with law and are hereby affirmed, with
costs of this instance against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

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