Artic Case Neg - DDI 2014 SWS

***ARCTIC NEGATIVE-MASTER
FILE***
KQ Ports
Spills
Impact Defense
Alaskan infrastructure has minimal environmental impacts.
National Academy of Engineering 03
American National Academies (Cumulative Environmental

Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaskas North Slope, 2003; < http://delsold.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/north_slope_final.pdf>)//AB
Alaskas North Slope is underlain by permafrost a thick layer of earth material that stays
frozen year round. The permafrost is covered by a thin active layer that thaws each summer
and supports plant growth for a brief period. If permafrost thaws, the ground surface and the
structures it supports will settle. To minimize disruption to the ground surface, the North
Slope industrial infrastructure is specially builtpipelines are generally elevated rather than
buried, and roads and industrial facilities are raised on thick gravel berms. For a variety of
reasons, nearly all of the roads, pads, pipelines and other infrastructure ever built are still in
place. The environmental effects of such structures on the landscape, water systems,
vegetation, and animals are manifest not only at the footprint itself (physical area covered
by the structure) but also at distances that vary depending on the environmental component
being affected. The petroleum industry continues to introduce technological
innovations to reduce its footprint, for example, directional drilling and the use of
ice roads and pads, drilling platforms, and new kinds of vehicles. For some areas of
concern, the committee found no evidence that effects have accumulated. For
example, despite widespread concern regarding the damaging effects of frequent oil and
saltwater spills on the tundra, most spills to date have been small and have had only
local effects. Moreover, damaged areas have recovered before they have been disturbed
again. However, a large oil spill in marine waters would likely have substantial accumulating
effects on whales and other receptors because current cleanup methods can remove only a
small fraction of spilled oil, especially under conditions of broken ice.
Long-term effects of oil spills are minor.

Gillis and Kaufman 10
Environmentalists and Contributors to the New York Times (Justin and Leslie, After
Oil Spills, Hidden Damage Can Last for Years, 7/17/10; <
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/science/earth/18enviro.html?pagewanted=all>)//AB
Every oil spill is different, but the thread that unites these disparate scenes is a growing
scientific awareness of the persistent damage that spills can do and of just how long oil
can linger in the environment, hidden in out-of-the-way spots. At the same time, scientists
who have worked to survey and counteract the damage from spills say the picture in the gulf
is far from hopeless. Thoughts that this is going to kill the Gulf of Mexico are just wild
overreactions, said Jeffrey W. Short, a scientist who led some of the most important
research after the Exxon Valdez spill and now works for an environmental advocacy group
called Oceana. Its going to go away, the oil is. Its not going to last forever. But how long
will it last? Only 20 years ago, the conventional wisdom was that oil spills did almost all their
damage in the first weeks, as fresh oil loaded with toxic substances hit wildlife and marsh
grasses, washed onto beaches and killed fish and turtles in the deep sea. But disasters like
the Valdez in 1989, the Ixtoc 1 in Mexico in 1979, the Amoco Cadiz in France in 1978 and
two Cape Cod spills, including the Bouchard 65 barge in 1974 all studied over decades
with the improved techniques of modern chemistry and biology have allowed scientists to
paint a more complex portrait of what happens after a spill. It is still clear that the bulk
of the damage happens quickly, and that nature then begins to recuperate. After a
few years, a casual observer visiting a hard-hit location might see nothing amiss. Birds and
fish are likely to have rebounded, and the oil will seem to be gone. But often, as Dr.
Short and his team found in Alaska, some of it has merely gone underground, hiding in
pockets where it can still do low-level damage to wildlife over many years.
Econ Turn
(this card also theoretically proves why their aff creates economic stimulus and jobs because
they say infrastructure is key to these jobs)
Alaskan oil spill spurs economic growth empirically proven.

Levine 10
Staff Writer for Alaska Dispatch (Thomas, Economics of an Oil Spill Cleanup, 6/27/10; <
www.alaskadispatch.com/article/economics-oil-spill-cleanup>)//AB
While fishermen and shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico worry about losing their livelihoods, others may be
on the verge of a windfall. Experts talk about how the ocean and the oil and gas industry will be impacted
by BP's spill, but little attention has been paid to the economics of a spill cleanup. So me jobs will no
doubt be lost because of the spill, but others will be created. Workers are now being hired all
over the Gulf region to lay down boom, clean up oil, provide security, and prepare for further
damages. Many of these workers are finding jobs in economies that were weak . Alaska
was in a similar situation when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker hit Bligh Reef in 1989. Oils prices had
slumped, and the Alaska economy was suffering. More than 20,000 jobs had been lost in 1986 and 1987.
The economy was sputtering back to life by 1988, but it took off with the oil spill. No
year since the spill has seen a larger growth rate in the Alaska economy than occurred
in 1989, according to Neal Fried at the Alaska Department of Labor. The Gulf could see a similar boost.
Florida Gov. Charlie Crist on June 17 unveiled a website directing Floridians to more than 3,500 jobs
associated with the cleanup, although to this point the tens of thousands of gallons gushing from BP's
undersea crude oil volcano have largely missed the Sunshine State. The Deepwater site has now gushed at
least 42 million gallons, almost four times the 11 million gallons with which Exxon smeared Prince
William Sound. Immediately after that accident, the call went out across Alaska for workers to
help clean up and contain the spill. According to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council website,
10,000 workers and 1,000 boats were mobilized at a cost of $2.1 billion. Spill cleanup workers made
$16.69 an hour ($29.34 today, adjusted for inflation). Spill jobs helped pull Alaska's unemployment
rate down from 7.2 percent in May 1989 to 6.9 percent in September 1989 , when cleanup
operations ended, according to the Alaska Department of Labor. And the amount of money spent to
equip the cleanup operation created an economic wave that rippled through
Alaska as fishing boats were leased, pilots hired, workers fed, equipment maintained and
lawyers retained. Some lawyers had to hire additional staff to handle compensatory claims eventually
totaling over $900 million. Most of those claims were paid off over the next 10 years. The spill jobs,
while temporary, gave many people the means to put a down payment on a house or purchase a
car. Fried said the increase in purchasing power helped pull the economy out of what
had been the worst recession in 20 years. Some economic benefits have continued
for decades. Scientific grants to study the damage to Prince William Sound have continued to this day,
making the spill one of the most researched in history, according to the EVOSTC. And in 2008 Exxon
settled punitive claims in the case Baker vs. Exxon Valdez Shipping Co. The company was required to pay
fishermen and others another $995 million over 10 years.
Alt Cause
(Do NOT read this with the National Academy of Engineering 03 Impact Defense card.)
Arctic oil infrastructure itself will collapse marine ecology.

ORourke 6/15
Specialist in Naval Affairs (Ronald, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for
Congress, 6/15/12; < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf>)//AB
The warming Arctic has focused attention on threats to its wildlife and ecosystems, and
it is expected that increased oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development
activities may also invite increased scrutiny of possible harm to the fragile Arctic
ecosystems. Federal offshore programs are often the subject of this type of scrutiny, as
demonstrated by litigation largely focusing on environmental impacts. For example, plaintiffs
in cases challenging government approval of OCS development activity in the Chukchi Sea
generally are local communities and national environmental groups. The defendant in
litigation over federal leasing in the Alaska program areas is the Secretary of the Interior.
Typically litigation over federal offshore programs in Alaska takes place in two venuesthe
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and/or the U.S. District Court of the District of
Alaska. The schedule for litigation can be an issue because the schedule in one venue has
some bearing on rulings related to litigation in the other venue. A new schedule for litigation
regarding OCS development in the Chukchi Sea is currently under consideration. The
outcome of court cases will likely impact future development activities.
Its not just the spills Oil extraction itself will collapse ecology.
National Academy of Engineering 03
American National Academies (Cumulative Environmental

Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaskas North Slope, 2003; < http://delsold.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/north_slope_final.pdf>)//AB
Northern Alaskas environment and culture have already been significantly affected by oil
infrastructure and activities. There have been many benefits to North Slope residents
including more jobs and improved medical care and schools. These economic benefits have
been accompanied by environmental and social consequences, including effects of
the roads, infrastructure and activities of oil exploration and production on the
terrain, plants, animals and peoples of the North Slope and the adjacent marine
environment. Although a large body of research has assessed actual and potential effects
of oil and gas activities and infrastructure, no integrated, comprehensive analysis of
cumulative effects has previously been attempted. Cumulative effects can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time or within an area. In response to a request from Congress, the National Academies
convened the Committee on Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on
Alaskas North Slope to assess probable cumulative effects of oil and gas activities on
various receptorsthat is components of the physical, biological, and human systems of the
region. The committees consensus report assesses both present and likely future
cumulative effects on the North Slope and adjacent marine waters for the time period of
1965 to 2025 (in some cases to 2050).
No cleanup measures most of the timedark waters and no open

waters
Murphy 11 (Kim Murphy, Los Angeles Times national editor, 8/4/2011, Arctic oil spill could
prove tough to clean, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2011/08/shell-arcticdrilling-oil-spill.html || Alice)
Shell Exploration's plan for exploratory oil and gas drilling in the Beaufort Sea won
conditional approval from the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement. One of the big questions now is what happens if there's an oil spill.
Agency officials are expected as early as next week to act on Shell's oil spill response
plan, which conservationists say falls short of the mark for responding to an
accident in icy waters, often shrouded in darkness, hundreds of miles from the
nearest deep-water port. Earlier this month, Canada looked at the same issue: How hard
would it be to clean up an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea, which straddles the border
between the two countries. The answer? Really hard. Even in the "summer" season
between July and October, when Arctic drilling normally occurs, true open water
without ice occurs only 54% to 88% of the time, even close to shore, according to
the report, prepared for the National Energy Board by S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd.
of Ottawa. Conditions can be so bad that no ice cleanup measures are even
possible about 20% of the time in June, 40% of the time in August and 65% of
the time in October, said the report, which measured typical temperatures, wave
heights and ice patterns and how they might prevent the use of such responses
as in-situ burning, containment and application of dispersants. After October,
any active response would almost certainly deferred until the following
melt season , the report said. Canada, Norway and Russia are also studying offshore oil
development in the Arctic, with Moscow earlier this year announcing plans to proceed with
an exploration program in partnership with BP. "BOEMRE approval of Shell's drilling plan is
silent as to the agency's assessment of Shell's oil spill plan. BOEMRE shouldn't have
approved Shell's drilling plan without an adequate, approved oil spill plan demonstrating
Shell's ability to clean up an oil spill in the Arctic's icy waters," a coalition of conservation
groups, including the Alaska Wilderness League, the Sierra Club, Oceana and Defenders of
Wildlife, among others, said in a statement. They said Shell's assertion that it can
recover 95% of any oil spilled in Arctic waters using mechanical containment
devices is unrealistic, given a much lower rate of recovery during the recent spill
in the Gulf of Mexico, and assumes conditions in August, not October, "when ice,
darkness and bad weather prevail.
Arctic ice cant be cleaned upextreme cold conditions make

techniques ineffective
IMARES 5/1 (Institute for Marine Resources and Ecosystem Studies at Wageningen
University, a Netherlands research institute, 5/1/2014, Wageningen UR studies
environmental effects of oil activities in the Arctic region,
https://www.wageningenur.nl/en/newsarticle/Wageningen-UR-studies-environmental-effectsof-oil-activities-in-the-Arctic-region.htm || Alice)
Oil extraction in cold conditions is complex Compared to the North Sea oil
exploitation in the Arctic region is much more difficult. This has partly to do with the
poor accessibility of the immense area and limited infrastructure, such as ports and airports.
In addition, conditions are often very challenging due to fog, snow, storms
and prolonged darkness in winter . Moreover, the materials and techniques

used in the extraction process must withstand extreme cold and ice. As a result, the
risk of an oil spill in the large area around the Arctic is relatively high, the clean-up options
are relatively limited and the possible consequences are long lasting for the unique
flora and fauna such as polar bears, walruses and belugas. Oil is difficult to clean in cold
conditions It is not yet known how an oil spill in the Arctic region can be cleaned
up. In cold conditions, oil behaves differently than in the North Sea. The viscosity
of oil is higher for example. Oil spill response techniques may be less effective
or not effective at all. Dispersing agent, a kind of liquid soap that is used to
mix oil with water, might work less effectively with low temperatures, viscous oil
and the presence of ice. And what happens to the mixture of oil, dispersant and
plankton? Will it drop to the sea floor? During the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico this spill
response technique has been widely used. The consequence is a thick toxic layer on the
seabed without any marine life. The visibility of oil in ice covered areas may be low.
As a result the oil is hard to detect and to clean-up. Oil can also be transported to
other locations together with the ice.
Arctic cleanup too difficulttheir authors dont assume weather

conditions and offseason drilling
CBC 11 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/8/2011, Arctic oil spill cleanup would be
badly hindered, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-oil-spill-cleanup-would-bebadly-hindered-1.1013220 || Alice)
Any response to a possible offshore oil spill in the Canadian Arctic would be
severely hampered, even more so than previously thought, the World Wildlife Fund
says. Thats because Arctic ice, lack of daylight, winds and temperatures
make it extremely difficult to contain, burn off or disperse spilled oil , the
conservation group writes in a filing to the National Energy Board. During the potential
Arctic drilling season, it would be impossible to deploy an emergency oil-spill
response up to 84 per cent of the time, the WWF filing says. "We're not against drilling
per se, but what we are saying is that it shouldn't be done unless it can be done safely. And
what these numbers provide is a very sobering reminder of just how little capacity we have
to respond if something goes wrong," WWF program director Rob Powell said Thursday. The
conservation group is participating in the National Energy Boards review of Arctic offshore
drilling, undertaken in the wake of oil giant BPs offshore drilling disaster last year in the Gulf
of Mexico, the second-worst marine oil spill in history. Oil companies like BP, ExxonMobil,
Chevron and Imperial Oil have invested hundreds of millions of dollars to lease large tracts
of Canadas Arctic seabed for exploration. As part of its review, the energy board, which
regulates national petroleum and electricity projects in Canada, asked a consultant to look at
how difficult it would be to clean up a potential oil spill in the Arctic. The consultants report
submitted in July found that an emergency response to a spill would be impossible
between 15 and 78 per cent of the time, due to weather and other environmental
conditions. Figures understate real risks: WWF But the WWF says those numbers
understate the difficulties that a possible cleanup would encounter: Oil companies
acknowledge that they couldnt contain and recover oil from an Arctic spill of
more than 100 barrels, the group says, which wasnt factored into the consultants
report. The consultants numbers refer only to periods of open water during the
drilling season, whereas drilling can legally continue in those months even
when significant ice cover on Arctic seas would make countering an oil
spill impossible . The consultant didnt consider the effects of wind chill. Canada
hasnt approve the use of substances called chemical herders in an Arctic oil spill, yet the
consultants report assumes they could be used to help with cleanup. Taking those factors
into account, cleanup efforts would be impossible at least 44 per cent and up to 84 per cent
of the drilling season, depending on location and month, the WWF says.
Response efforts hindered by extreme weather and low visibility

Economist 12 (The Economist, 12/1/2012, Trouble beneath the ice,
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21567196-energy-technology-oilexploration-moves-arctic-new-methods-are-being || Alice)
AN OIL WELL suffers a blowout, causing a fatal explosion on an offshore platform. Oil spews
into the water at an estimated rate of 53,000 barrels a day. Company executives and
government officials blame each other as they try to find a way to stop the flow of oil. The
Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010 was a tragedy in many respects, but in one detail, BP
the operator of the well, which is now facing a bill of as much as $50 billionwas lucky. At
least it could find the oil. As more and more companies venture into the oil- and
gas-rich waters north of the Arctic Circle, they are being forced to imagine
another oil-spill scenario, one in which the response effort is impeded by
storms, fog, high winds and massive drifting ice floes; in which visibility
is minimal , where the nearest coast guard station is over 1,000 miles away and where
spilled oil accumulates on, in and under the ice. Such considerations have led to the
development of new technologies to detect and deal with spilled oil in remote, icy seas. In
open water conditions such as those in the Gulf of Mexico during the Deepwater Horizon
spill, the primary method for oil-spill detection involves satellite-mounted synthetic-aperture
radar (SAR). This technology, which can see through clouds and in the dark, involves
bouncing radio waves from orbiting satellites off the surface of the sea. Any oil floating on
the surface has the effect of smoothing the waves made by the wind on the water.
Admittedly, it is almost impossible to tell the difference between an oil slick and a
patch of calm water. But at least clean-up teams have some idea of where to start more
detailed searches. In the Arctic, however, SAR is less useful. One problem is that floating
ice looks just like oil or calm water to a SAR-equipped satellite. According to Rune
Storvold of the Northern Research Institute, a Norwegian research outfit, SAR-based oil
detection is only effective in conditions with less than 30% ice coverage.
Safety Precautions now

Spill prevention in place now
The Dallas Morning News 12 (The Associated Press. "U.S. Finalizes Offshore Drilling
Rules Inspired by BP Oil Spill." The Dallas Morning News. N.p., 15 Aug. 2012. Web. 01 Aug.
2014. <http://www.dallasnews.com/incoming/20120815-u.s.-finalizes-offshore-drilling-rulesinspired-by-bp-oil-spill.ece>. XM)
The safety measures are intended to make sure oil flow can be stopped if there
are problems. They deal with how the wells are designed, and how the cement
and barriers used to secure them are tested. The rules also require that blowout
preventers, which failed in the 2010 disaster, be independently tested by a third
party to ensure they are capable of cutting off the flow of oil. Todays action
builds on the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon tragedy and is part of
the administrations all-of-the-above energy strategy to expand safe and
responsible development of Americas domestic energy resources, Jim Watson,
director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, said in a
statement.
Shell solving problems now

LA Times 10 (LA Times. "Shell Outlines Precautions for Offshore Arctic Drilling." Los
Angeles Times. N.p., 17 May 2010. Web. <http%3A%2F%2Flatimesblogs.latimes.com
%2Fgreenspace%2F2010%2F05%2Farctic-oil-drilling-shell-response.html>. XM)
Shell Oil Co. is making its best case for why drilling in the offshore Arctic can be
done with fewer potential problems than what confronted BP in the Gulf of
Mexico. In a detailed response to the federal Minerals Management Service's
request for more assurances, Shell promises to deploy near the drilling sites in
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas a prefabricated coffer dam capable of containing a
blowout -- this time, unlike the dome that failed in the Gulf of Mexico, a device
designed to avoid a buildup of ice crystals.
Laundry list of measures Shell has put into place to solve the
problem
Read further for other measures Shell said it has put into place after examining the Gulf of
Mexico incident: Those measures include: --Reservoirs will be carefully evaluated
for pressure, fluid content and temperature before full-scale coring gets
underway in a bypass hole, reducing the risk of a "kick" or unwanted flow in the
original wellbore. --Testing of the blowout preventers will be conducted every
seven days, instead of every 14 days. --A subsea remote operating panel will be
installed on top of the blow out preventers that can be operated manually by
divers or a remote-controlled submarine in case it doesn't work automatically.
--The company will be prepared to apply dispersant underwater , at the source of
any oil fill, but only if it obtains the necessary emergency permits. Shell
emphasized there are important differences between exploration in Alaska and in
the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico: --Instead of drilling in 5,000 feet of water
to a depth of 18,000 feet, as with BP's Deepwater Horizon well, Shell will be
drilling in 150 feet of water, at a depth of up to 8,000 fee t in the Chukchi and up
to 10,200 feet in the Beaufort. --The pressure encountered is expected to be much
less than that found in the Gulf well, probably no more than 6,000 psi, compared
to about 15,000 psi in the Gulf.
Arctic comparatively safer and less risky to drill in


"Our biggest safety advantage is the water depth that will allow us to detect and
respond to an event quickly and appropriately," Shell said, and even in the case of
the failure of a drilling riser, the remaining fluid below the seafloor "would
effectively stop any well flow in such a low-pressure system." Recent industry
studies have shown that in some cases, cold water temperatures and ice such as
exists in the Arctic for long parts of the year could actually help contain spilled oil
and make it easier to clean up.
Migratory birds spread disease

Cornell n.d. (Cornell University. "All About Birds." Migration and the Spread of Disease.
N.p., n.d. Web. 31 July 2014.
<http://www.birds.cornell.edu/allaboutbirds/studying/migration/disease>. XM)
Migration and the spread of disease Migratory birds can play a role in the spread of
infectious diseases. Their ability to travel over long distances and through a
variety of habitats exposes them to a wide range of microorganisms. In most
cases they have developed natural immunities and the risks posed by exposure to
disease is limited. In a few rare cases, however, the birds are exposed to diseases
for which they have no immunity. This can be caused by the introduction of new
pathogens within their ranges or mutation of an existing pathogen. The
introduction of West Nile Virus into North America is a recent example of a
disease that was not particularly dangerous to birds or people within its historic
range. Once it moved to North America, where it was not previously known, birds
and mammals without a natural immunity were placed at risk. Thousands of birds
have died from West Nile Virus and the long-term effects are still unknown. While
the disease spread rapidly across North America, its spread was slowed by cold
winter weather, which temporarily eliminates mosquito populations. There is
great concern on the long-term affects of West Nile Virus as migratory birds carry
the disease to their tropical winter homes. There is no known natural resistance
to West Nile Virus in Central and South American bird species. The situation might
be significantly worse than in North America as mosquitoes have a year round
presence in the tropics.

Fuller et.al. 12 (Fuller, Trevon is a postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Tropical
Research at the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at the University of
California, Los Angeles., Staffan Bensch- is on Malaria Research Coordination Network, Inge
Muller, John Novembre-PhD (Integrative Biology), University of California-Berkeley, 2006 BA
(Biochemistry), The Colorado College, 2000, Javier Perez-Tris-Professor of Zoology
(Vertebrate Biology and Conservation Group - Complutense University of Madrid), Robert E.
Ricklefs-urators' Professor of Biology Department of Biology, University of Missouri, Thomas
B. Smith-DirectorCenter for Tropical Research UCLA Institute of the Environment and
Sustainability. , and Jonas Waldenstrom-Linnaeus University, Centre for Ecology and
Evolution in Microbial model Systems. The Ecology of Emerging Infectious Diseases in
Migratory Birds: An Assessment of the Role of Climate Change and Priorities for Future
Research. Vol. 9. N.p.: EcoHealth, March 2012. Print. Ser. 1. XM)
Pathogens that are maintained by wild birds occasionally jump to human hosts,
causing considerable loss of life and disruption to global commerce. Preliminary
evidence suggests that climate change and human movements and commerce
may have played a role in recent range expansions of avian pathogens. Since the
magnitude of climate change in the coming decades is predicted to exceed
climatic changes in the recent past, there is an urgent need to determine the
extent to which climate change may drive the spread of disease by avian
migrants. In this review, we recommend actions intended to mitigate the impact
of emergent pathogens of migratory birds on biodiversity and public health.
Increased surveillance that builds upon existing bird banding networks is required
to conclusively establish a link between climate and avian pathogens and to
prevent pathogens with migratory bird reservoirs from spilling over to humans.
Sea Otters spread disease

Sea otters cause disease spread
Batac 12 (Batac, Francesca-California Department of Fish and Game. "Did You Know Sea
Otters Can Transmit Diseases to Humans?" Seaotters.com. N.p., 25 June 2012. Web. 01 Aug.
2014. <http://seaotters.com/2012/06/25/did-you-know-sea-otters-can-transmit-diseases-tohumans/>. XM)
The obvious dangers of working with wild animals like sea otters are bites and scratches . Sea otters have
powerful jaws that can cause deep wounds, bone fractures or infection. Some
species of bacteria that are commonly isolated from sea otters can cause severe
wound infections when implanted in bite wounds or scratches. There is also a risk
of catching a zoonotic disease (a disease that is transferable from animals to humans) from handling
live or dead sea otters. An example of a zoonotic disease that most people are familiar with is rabies. Rabies has
never been reported from sea otters, but they are certainly susceptible to this virus, and rabies cases have been
reported from river otters. In addition to infection through skin wounds, humans can become infected
with zoonotic organisms by inhaling aerosolized droplets containing the

organisms, through splashes in their eyes or by accidentally consuming infectious organisms after touching
contaminated materials, such as blood, urine or fecal matter. Some important zoonotic organisms that are known to
infect sea otters include the single-celled parasite Toxoplasma gondii, the marine Brucella bacteria and the fungus
Coccidioides immitis. C. immitis infection causes the disease Valley Fever in humans. Human infection with this
fungus can be serious, so we are extremely careful when handling these cases. Luckily we only see a small number
of infected sea otters every year. We call C. immitis-infected otters Cocci cases As soon as we recognize them
we take extra precautions. Based on the experience of working in a necropsy (postmortem examination) setting for
many years, well describe the protective measures we take during postmortem examinations of stranded sea
otters. Basic personnel protective equipment (PPE) worn during all routine necropsies consist of a scrub top and
pants, tall rubber necropsy boots, gloves, eye protection, and a waterproof apron. When necropsying an otter that
might have a zoonotic disease, we also use a face mask, sometimes even one with a HEPA filter. We are also trained
to use a full-face respirator, or use a safety hood for additional protection, when needed. We complete postmortem
examinations on potential Cocci cases quickly and then freeze the carcass to reduce our risk of aerosol exposure to
this fungus. When the tissue form of C. immitis is exposed to the air for a prolonged period (1-2 days) it can form a
stage that can be more easily inhaled, triggering infection. We also collect any fluids and tissues for incineration to
prevent further transmission of the fungus. When cleaning, water pressure is lowered to prevent fungal splashing or
aerosolization. All surfaces are disinfected and the necropsy instruments are scrubbed and autoclaved (steam
sterilized) as a further precaution. Scrub tops, pants and aprons are washed immediately. This helps prevent crosscontamination and helps to protect staff health. Numerous factors help the necropsy staff determine if a given sea
otter may be a high risk for zoonotic disease. For example, because most Cocci cases are collected along the
shoreline of San Luis Obispo County, we are extra-careful when handling any otters that are found sick or dead in
this region. When performing the necropsy, potential abnormalities that can suggest the presence of a zoonotic
organism include swollen lymph nodes, an enlarged and/or spotted spleen or liver, pneumonia, pleuritis
(inflammation in the chest cavity), lung masses or the presence of abscesses, inflamed joints or reproductive
abnormalities. If these are present, it is best to conduct further tests. We can quickly examine tissue or fluid smears
on a microscope to scan for the fungus (cytology), try to grow the organisms in the laboratory (microbiology), or
examine wax-embedded tissue sections (histology) to help determine if an otter died from C. immitis or some other
potentially zoonotic disease. CDFG biologists recover approximately 2-4 C. immitis-infected sea otters each year.
The route by which sea otters are exposed to Coccidioides is not known, but is believed to be an example of landto-sea biological pollution as the organism originates from alkaline soils. It appears that this fungus-
contaminated soil either blows out to sea or flows downstream to the ocean, thus
affecting sea life. Depending on the state of the infection, the spores of Cocci
can also be aerosolized and inhaled by humans. Freezing the infected otter or its tissues will not
kill the fungus, even in -80C. In addition, bones, fur or other samples collected from infected animals as souvenirs
can transmit this fungus to humans. According to the Center of Disease Control and Prevention-Department of
Health and Human Services, C. immitis infection can pose a severe threat to human health. Because of this
concern, we incinerate the carcasses of all sea otters with known or suspected C. immitis infection. In
summary, the potential for human exposure to zoonotic organisms like

Coccidioides immitis during wildlife conservation efforts cannot be taken lightly.
When officials ask the public not to touch, harass or feed wildlife, they are trying
to protect the health and well-being of both animals and humans . Our training,
knowledge, and experience help minimize our risk of exposure to zoonotic pathogens. So please enjoy the sea
otters from the safe viewing distance of 50 yards (150 feet) on land and 100 yards (300 feet) on water per the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. And please leave handling of sick or dead marine wildlife to trained
personnel. Thank you!
Disease spread -> Extinction

Disease spread risks extinction.
Skelding 10
(Julia Skielding- University of Toronto Clinical Ethics Fellow, contributions from Ross Upshur
(also at Toronto), SARS, Pandemics and Public Health, The Integrated Assessment Journal
10.1, 2010, p41-50, http://journals.sfu.ca/int_assess/index.php/iaj/article/viewFile/291/254,
accessed 3-24-12)
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases are newly or previously identified
diseases that are increasing in incidence or changing in geographic range
(Lederberg et al., 1992). Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian
influenza are two of the most prominent recent examples of such diseases. It has
been apparent for the better part of two decades that a host of interacting
factors are causally linked to this emergence, including ecological changes,
changes in human demographics and behaviour (particularly the explosion of air travel
in the past twenty years), technology, and industry, and microbial adaptation and
change. More importantly, deficiencies in public health infrastructure coupled
with globalization have diminished the capacity of public health systems to
respond adequately to the threat of infectious diseases. Authoritative scholars have
issued warnings about viral emergence and detailed the steps necessary for civilization to
respond. These seemingly dire and apocalyptic warnings have, in fact, come partly
true. The emergence of infectious disease is an enduring aspect of human
existence, one neglected at our peril.
Specifically, zoonotic diseases (diseases transferred from animal to

human) lead to extinction
Casadevall 12 Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of
Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (The future of
biological warfare, Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)
In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known
existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale
thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To
this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is
deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the
association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes
recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain
pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has
traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid
fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et
al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause
of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their
hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant.
However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from
the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal
pathogens. For those types of hostmicrobe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off
every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its
natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats
environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic
microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if
some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or
bioengineering.
Shipping
Mapping is a pre-requisite
Plan cant resolve Mapping which is critical to US Arctic Maritime
Domain Awareness
Perry and Andersen, 12 (Charles and Bobby, vice president and director of studies at
the IFPA, research analyst at IFPA, 2012, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, NEW
STRATEGIC DYNAMICS in the ARCTIC REGION, Implications for National Security and
International Collaboration, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf/ ,
AS)
One key capability gap that will likely continue to hamper Arctic operation s in the
coming decades is in maritime domain awareness in the polar region. MDA the
effective ability of U.S. forces to locate, identify, and track vessels or any other
activity in the maritime domain that could affect national security interests remains
extremely limited, largely because of the remoteness of the region, inadequate Arctic
Ocean and weather data, lack of communication and navigation infrastructure, insufficient intelligence
information, and the lack of a consistent U.S. government presence in the High North.327 Given the very limited
sensor coverage of the area, great distances from main bases, and harsh, rapidly changing atmospheric
conditions, even collecting and maintaining a basic awareness of other ships, submarines, and aircraft in the Arctic
becomes a nearly impossible task.328 Not long after the start of the Coast Guards 2008 summer deployment in
the polar region, for instance, District 17 officials based in Alaska complained of a worrying lack of Arctic domain
awareness that severely con- strained the services ability to fully understand the risks of operating in or monitoring
the icy waters around Alaska and beyond. As a senior U.S. Coast Guard official pointed out after the agencys 2008
operations, We had almost no idea, no maritime domain awareness, of what was actually happening on the
waters of the Arctic.329 A major impediment to achieving better domain awareness in the High North
is the current lack of accurate data or Arctic navigation, including nautical charts
for areas previously covered by ice, shoreline mapping, tides, water levels, currents, sea-ice conditions, and
meteorological information. Experts agree that there is still very little knowledge about the
Arctics unique and ever-changing ocean patterns, especially since only less than 5 percent of
the polar area has been mapped to current standards.330 Nautical charts of the Alaska region, for example,
are of low resolution and mostly based on soundings from the 1940s or 1950s,
showing vast areas that have not been surveyed using modern instrumentation or
have never been surveyed at all.331 The problem of producing reliable nautical
charts for the Arctic is further compounded by Americas insufficient number of
hydrographic survey vessels and their limited capability when it comes to operating in and around the
ice.332 The lack of real-time information on weather, ocean conditions, and ice char- acterization (for example,
depth or thickness) has had a particularly negative effect on the Coast Guards ability to conduct routine and
emergency missions in the polar region, as smaller pieces of sea ice are frequently missed by current technology,
posing a significant threat to most ships observed in the area, including the Coast Guards fleet of non-icebreaking
boats. For their part, icebreakers attempting to operate in the deeper reaches of the Arctic Ocean are themselves
extremely vulnerable to so-called sea-ice pressure ridges, formed when massive sheets of ice collide with one
another, and in the absence of reliable data, even experienced mariners may be
unable to sufficiently assess the deceptive appearance of sea ice, as illustrated by Coast Guard
cutter Healys experience during its summer 2008 operations off Barrow, Alaska, when it struck what to the crew
appeared to be thin, first-year ice only to discover that it was a fifteen-foot thick ice- berg of multi-year ice, well
beyond the ships icebreaking capabilities.333
Plan cant solve mapping which is key to navigation of the Arctic.

GAO, 14 (Government Accountability Office, March 2014, MARITIME
INFRASTRUCTURE Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S.
Arctic over the Next Decade, http://gao.gov/assets/670/661761.pdf, AS)
The USCG is conducting a Waterway Analysis and Management System assessment along
the western and northern coasts of Alaska in order to understand the extent and type of
aids to navigation needed; however, officials we spoke with indicated that there were no
current plans to expand deployment of aids to navigation in the Arctic region. According to
federal government sources, there are a number of challenges to such deployment in the
Arctic. First, hydrographic surveying and mapping must be completed before the
USCG can install aids to navigation in an area, and as noted in table 3, a large
amount of the U.S. Arctic remains uncharted or mapped.40 The USCG is currently
in the preliminary phase of a new polar-icebreaker acquisition project including
development of a formal mission need statement, a concept of operations, and an
operational requirements document. Second, aids to navigation are particularly
challenging to operate north of the Bering Strait due to the freeze-thaw cycle and likelihood
of sustaining damage from floating sea ice.
Mapping enables us to have Arctic operations allows safe

maneuvering of ships.
Kendrick 14 (Kendrick, Lyle-Reporter at Barents Observer. "Map Shortcomings Could
Hinder Northern Sea Route Growth."Barentsobserver. N.p., 28 June 2014. Web. 16 July 2014.
<http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/06/map-shortcomings-could-hinder-northernsea-route-growth-28-06>. XM)
Melting ice allowed the region to open up shipping routes in Arctic waters that are mostly
under Russian control and cut significant transit time between Europe and Asia. Use of the
route has steadily grown since ships began using it in 2010. According to data from the
Northern Sea Route Administration, four vessels used the route in 2010, 34 used it in 2011,
46 used it in 2012 and 71 used it last year. China will be releasing a guide to Arctic shipping
in July for ships sailing through the Northern Sea Route to Europe. But the current weak
satellites in the area and poor sea maps are like bottlenecks preventing the kind
of massive Arctic transit speculated by some, said Jan-Gunnar-Winther, director of
the Norwegian Polar Institute, to the BarentsObserver. Satellite communication with
ships in the High North is weak which means ship operators cannot adequately take realtime high-resolution images for other vessels to use, Winther said. These kinds of images
give information about sea conditions which allow efficient and safe maneuvering
in water that is partly covered in ice, he said. The area is particularly dangerous
to navigate without sufficient mapping data because there is limited
infrastructure for search and rescue operations. Vessels are safest on the route
when following icebreakers which can help navigate frozen Arctic patches and be
a first line of support in a search and rescue operation, said Gunnar Sander, an
Arctic sea ice researcher with the Norwegian Polar Institute, to the
BarentsObserver.
Territorial Disputes
Northwest Passage inaccessible due to lack of infrastructure and
territorial dispute.
Byers 13 (Byers, Michael is professor of Global Politics and International Law at the
University of British Columbia. "How the Arctic Ocean Could Transform World Trade."
Aljazeera. N.p., 27 Aug. 2013. Web. 31 July 2014.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/201382273357893832.html>. XM)
US-Canada dispute Shipping through the Northwest Passage has also increased, but
at a slower rate. In 2012, there were a total of 30 transits, none of which involved
large cargo ships or tankers sailing to other countries. This is at least partly due
to the Canadian government's lack of investment in its northern infrastructure,
and its failure to provide icebreaking services for commercial vessels. Further
complicating the situation, the US opposes Canada's claim that the Northwest
Passage constitutes "internal waters" which foreign ships require permission to
enter. Instead, the US insists the waterway is an "international strait" through
which foreign ships may pass without constraint. However, on the two occasions that
US ships have sailed the Northwest Passage without seeking permission, they either
accepted assistance from a Canadian icebreaker or agreed the voyage would not affect the
legal dispute. In 1988, the two countries agreed that the US would always seek
permission for transits by its coastguard icebreakers, which Canada would then
always grant. Still, the US-Canada dispute casts a cloud of uncertainty over the
Northwest Passage that, until resolved or otherwise clarified, will contribute to
keeping international shipping away.
Disputes over the northwest passage prevent arctic trade

Dufresne 08 (Dufresne, Robert-International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division. "Canada
and the United States: Arctic Sovereignty." Parliament of Canada. N.p., Dec. 2008. Web. 31
July 2014. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0834_13-e.htm>. XM)
Canada and the United States disagree on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, a maritime path connecting
the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay in the east to the Bering Strait in the west. Canada considers that the
waters of the Northwest Passage are internal waters; the United States claims
that the Passage is an international strait. Which qualification prevails has
implications for the rights and powers of Canada as a coastal state. States are fully
sovereign in internal waters: they can regulate activities and enforce their laws therein, and
foreign states and ships enjoy no maritime rights under international law. By contrast,
foreign states and ships enjoy a right of transit through international straits, meaning that
they would not have to request Canadas permission to navigate the Passage if it were
considered to be an international strait. Canada invokes two alternative legal bases in
support of its position: the waters are internal (1) by virtue of historic title, and/or (2) by
virtue of their being on the landward side of straight baselines drawn around the entire
Arctic Archipelago in 1985. For the most part, the former basis is considered by experts to be
weak, whereas the latter is regarded as compelling in international law. Moreover, it has
been suggested that the increased US concern for continental security might lead the United
States to regard Canadian sovereignty over the Passage as more palatable, especially if
accompanied by proper policing by Canada. The United States has not, however,
altered its formal view on this matter. The US argument that the Passage is an
international strait entails that the Passage meets geographical and functional
requirements, i.e., that it is a water corridor linking two bodies of the high seas or
other waters, and used for international maritime traffic. Some observers
consider the US argument to be weak, given that the Passage has seldom been
used for international traffic. However, an increase in maritime traffic through the
Passage, which climate change could facilitate, could raise the possibility of its gradual
internationalization. A third option would be to consider the North-west Passage part of

Canadas territorial waters, rather than an international strait or internal waters enclosed
within Canadas straight baselines. This would give foreign states the right of innocent
passage.
Free Trade Does Not Solve War

Globalization increases the propensity for war- nation polarization,
autocratic backlash, an proliferation of increasingly powerful
weapons.
Echevarria, Director of Research @ Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College, 2003
[LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II, March, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATURE OF WAR, Strategic
Studies Institute, ISBN 1-58487-118-0, chip]
Despite its apparent positive impact on the spread of democracy and free-market
economies, globalization might produce a more dangerous and unpredictable
world, especially if the cultural backlash it has generated thus far gathers more
momentum. This world might be characterized by shifting power relationships, ad
hoc security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between the richest and
poorest nations.8 A number of new democracieslacking strong traditions for
maintaining checks and balancesmight, for example, collapse after only transitory
successes. Transnational threats, such as international crime syndicates, terrorist
networks, and drug cartels, could continue to grow in strength and influence,
thriving among autocratic, weak, or so-called failed states. And, ethnic rivalries,
nationalism, religiousbased antagonisms, and competition for scarce resources,
including water, could go unresolved. Thus, serious crises would undoubtedly arise,
especially as the worlds population continues to grow. On the other hand, globalization
could give rise to a more stable world in which national interests merge into the general
aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity.9 In this world, the rule of law
and the existence of pluralistic political systems would continue to spread; and the number
of free-market economies would expand, distributing economic prosperity still further. Even
if this Utopia should materialize, a number of crisessome of which will
undoubtedly require military interventionwill most likely have had to occur
beforehand, since most autocratic regimes will probably not surrender power
without a fight. Moreover, as the 1999 Kosovo crisis demonstrated, even relatively small
states armed primarily with conventional weapons can pose significant security
challenges to a superpower and its strategic partners.10 The world need not devolve
into a clash of civilizations or a coming anarchy, therefore, in order for military power to
continue to play a significant role in the future.11 In any case, globalization will surely
continue and may even accelerate if data concerning the rate of technological change are
any indication.12 As numerous studies and strategic papers have pointed out,
globalization is already changing how wars are being fought in the 21st century,
making them more dangerous than in any previous era.13 At a minimum, the
greater mobility of people, things, and ideas will mean increased mobility for
nonstate actors, weapons of mass destruction, and radical fundamentalism of all
types. In fact, the U.S. Department of State currently reports that more than 60 active
terrorist groups exist (with some 100,000 members); and over one-third of them
have the capacity for global reach.14 Furthermore, todays terrorists have proven
very adaptive, learning from previous generations, and changing their tactics in
response to new anti-terrorist measures.15 Globalization clearly offers them some
extraordinary capabilities to communicate and coordinate their efforts.
Globalization also facilitates the proliferation of destabilizing capabilities, such as
weapons of mass destruction or mass effect. Eleven countries currently have nuclear
weapons programs; thirteen more are actively seeking them.16 More than 25 countries now
possess ballistic missiles, and over 75,000 cruise missiles are in existence, with the number
expected to rise to between 80,000 and 90,000 by 2010.17 Also, at least 17 countries
including the so-called Axis of Evilcurrently have active chemical and biological weapons
programs, and the number is rising.18 As the Assistant Secretary of State for Non-
proliferation recently explained, despite the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons conventions,
proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive/high
yield weapons continues worldwide: There is an intense sort of cooperation that goes
on among countries that are trying to acquire such weapons.19 For example, China and
North Korea have long contributed to the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, both for strategic leverage against the United States and for economic
advantages.20 Thus, globalization assists some powerful motives that run counter to
nonproliferation efforts. Biological weapons, especially, pose a serious threat not only
to human populations, but also to agriculture and livestock. Unfortunately, U.S. crops
lack genetic diversity, rendering them vulnerable to disease. Furthermore, the nations
centralized feeding and marketing practices make livestock extremely vulnerable to a
biological attack. If such an attack were to occur, a devastating ripple effect would surely
spread throughout the global economy since the United States produces 30-50 percent of
the worlds foodstuffs.21 Globalization has also introduced a new form of warfare: cyber-war.
More than 30 countriesincluding Russia, China, and several so-called rogue
stateshave developed or are developing the capability to launch strategic-level
cyber attacks.22 The interconnectedness of many nations infrastructures means
that a successful cyber attack against a single sector in one country could result
in adverse effects in other sectors within the same country, or those of its neighbors.
Indeed, intended (and unintended) adverse effects could well travel globally.23
Globalization lowers the threshold for war, states fight to protect

their economic interest
College, 2003
The war against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups of global reach represents the
first conflict of the 21st century in which the characteristics of globalizationthe
enhanced mobility of people, things, and ideashave come into play. It is certainly a war
that neither side can afford to lose. The political objectives of the combatants reflect that
realization, even if neither side has fully mobilized all of its forces to date. Sources indicate
that, even though it is not necessarily bent on the immediate total destruction of the United
States, Al Qaeda will never compromise and will continue to fight until all religious apostasy
is eliminated, all illegitimate or corrupt Islamic regimes are replaced by a unified Muslim
polity and Caliphate, and all infidels are driven from Muslim holy lands. 48 The United States
is seen as a major source of support for apostatic regimes and, hence, weakening it
politically and economically is essential for success. In order to ensure ultimate success,
however, it might be necessary to have a final showdown with the great Satan. For its
part, the United States will not accept anything less than the complete neutralization, if not
destruction, of Al Qaeda. Contrary to what historians such as Martin van Creveld have
argued, therefore, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
emergence of powerful nonstate actors, such as Al Qaeda, do not mean the end of
decisive warfare or of major wars among states.49 Instead, we find a general shift
toward less overt and more protracted forms of conflict, while, at the same time,
major powers such as the United States emphasize a greater willingness to take
unilateral preemptive action or to respond to attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction in any manner deemed appropriate, to include massive retaliation against
major states.50 Moreover, instead of culture displacing politics as the primary force
behind conflict, globalization has actually increased the latters role , both in
determining the purpose for and influencing the actual conduct of war. Both
President George W. Bush and terrorist leader Osama bin Laden have released statements
that link their actions to very explicit political agendas. Both are clearly using war to
achieve political ends, rather than to satisfy a cultural impulse to wage war, as
Keegan argues. To be sure, culture and politics are inextricably linked in this conflict.
Al Qaedas leadership might have sought to provoke a massive U.S. military response to the
attacks of September 11, which it could then portray as an assault on Islam. This general
assault, it was hoped, would inspire the entire Islamic world to rise up against the West.51
Indeed, the West, conscious of this possibility, has taken great pains to portray the conflict
as a war against terror tactics rather than a war against Islam. And, it must continue to do
so. Otherwise, the conflict between Al Qaeda and the West may indeed escalate into a more
dangerous clash of civilizations. Nonetheless, the fact remains that both sides are
using war as a political instrument, that is, they are subordinating its conduct to
the achievement of political ends. Political leaders on both sides can also have real-time
access to military actions as they unfold, though one would hope that in the case of Al
Qaeda the access would be less secure.52 Still, both sides can more or less communicate
their intentions to their operatives in the field and thus influence the course of events
throughout every phase of a military operation, no matter where it occurs. This capability
means that political direction of a campaign can span time and distance to influence the
smallest of details, not that it should. Moreover, the public statements by President Bush
and bin Ladens periodic releases of video messages through Al Jazeera demonstrate that
each can address his support base to give it guidance or motivation, or to garner further
support, while at the same time challenging or vexing his opponents. Hence, the conflict
remains thoroughly political at every level and, thus far at least, throughout every
operational phase. Furthermore, this trend does not appear likely to reverse itself.
In the global war on terrorism, the element of blind natural force is playing the decisive role.
Globalization has, among other things, contributed to the creation of fertile
breeding grounds for terrorism as some groups try to resist its encroachment. Al
Qaeda has associated the United States with the spread of globalization, which it
sees as a form of decadence. Building on the perception that Islamic societys
current political and economic problems are the result of the Wests decadent
values and duplicitous policies, Al Qaeda has penetrated Islamic nongovernmental
organizations and woven itself into the social, political, and religious fabric of
Muslim societies. Consequently, it has managed to create a substantial support base that
may enable it to regenerate itself indefinitely.53 Despite the arrest of hundreds of operatives
in North America and abroad since the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, Al
Qaeda has created new cells and reconstituted older ones.54 While operations in
Afghanistan and elsewhere have led to the killing or capture of some 16 of its 25 key
leaders, Al Qaedas ideology remains intact and will probably continue to draw young
Muslims.55 Evidence also suggests that Muslim extremism, or Islamism as some authorities
identify it, has been moving from the margins of the Islamic political spectrum toward the
center, so that bin Laden and other key terrorist leaders may enjoy considerable empathy, if
not sympathy, regarding their words and actions.56 The Islamists mindset is that the
current war is one in which Gods warriorsthe mujahidinare heroically fighting the forces
of Satan: U.S. troops.57 In this war, civilian populations of both sides are more than a
manifestation or a reservoir of blind natural force. They have become the primary
target in both a physical and a psychological sense for Al Qaeda and a psychological sense
for the United States. With what has been described as a virus-like ability to infect
indigenous groups, Al Qaeda has turned itself into an ideological weapon that evidently
excels in the generation of propaganda to support its cause.58 By comparison, the U.S.
populace, which lacked any deep-seated feelings of hostility prior to September 11, 2001, is
now being psychologically prepared (one can argue how well) by its political leadership for a
long fight in which conditions might get worse particularly if an attack on Iraq or other
rogue states occursbefore they get better. Indeed, some of the current political rhetoric
of the administration and its supporters likens the war against terrorism to World War IV.59
In other words, the war against global terrorism is foremost a battle of ideasideas powerful
enough to provoke violent emotions. Consequently, it is within this arena that the war will be
won or lost.
Globalization decreases escalation management

College, 2003
If the war on terrorism is any guide, globalization is changing the nature of war in
several ways. First, it is strengthening the role that politics will play in war by
affording it the capability to exert greater real-time control over military
operations. Of course, this control will vary depending on the personalities
involved as well as a combatants ability to interdict its opponents
communications. Second, globalization is increasing the criticality of the element
of hostility. Political leaders can now mobilize hostile passions more quickly and
over a larger area than hitherto, particularly in areas suffering from the spread
of globalization. Images and the ideas they convey may now be more decisive than the
sword. Yet, it may prove more difficult to cool such passions than it did to ignite them.
Finally, globalization means that opponents (even if they are neighbors) can now fight
each other across global distances, in new dimensions, and with a broader array
of weapons. These changes may amount to a net increase in the dual element of chance
and uncertainty at all levels of war. It remains to be seen whether information technology
will reduce or exacerbate this expansion. Certainly, skillful commanders and well-trained
militaries still matter. Yet, as has been shown, even with the rapidly spreading and
intensifying effects of globalization, war remains essentially Clausewitzian in nature. It
is still a dynamic expression of political wills in conflict, colliding via the means of
organized violence with multinational populations serving both as resources and as targets.
The forces of Islamic terrorism are fueled by volatile extremist ideas and, hence, the global
war on terrorism remains at heart a conflict of opposing ideas. The United States and its
strategic partners must take the fight to the enemy on that front and win there decisively.
Free trade causes military conflicts to open markets and gain

resources
McDonald, associate professor in international relations theory and
international political economy @ UT Austin, 2004
[Patrick J. McDonald, Aug., 2004, Peace through Trade or Free Trade?, The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 547-572, Sage Publications,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149808, chip]
By focusing on the aggregate benefits of commerce, most variants of commercial liberalism
risk assuming that all individuals within society receive income gains from trade and that
these same individuals will lobby their government to enact a peaceful foreign policy to
realize these economic goals. As the political influence of the beneficiaries of
commerce and trade expand in relatively equal proportion, then larger aggregate
trade flows should promote peace (Domke 1988, 48). These mechanisms linking the
economic interests of society to preferences over foreign policy decisions on war
and peace need to be refined for several reasons. I have already discussed how
revisions in standard trade theory illustrate that all factors or sectors in an economy do not
receive income gains from trade. Consequently, economic interests can lead some societal
groups to favor the closure of national markets to international trade. For example, scarce
factors of production are likely to lobby for protection to reduce imports and prevent the
erosion of their income (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). This proposition similarly implies
that economic interests can lead certain groups to support any policy , including
the use of military force, which reduces commerce and import penetration.'0 At the
very least, protectionist interests are less likely than other groups to lobby the state for
peace when conflict threatens to interrupt trade. Sectors relying on protection may even
actively support aggressive foreign policies for two reasons. First, by reducing imports
and foreign competition, military conflict may create income gains for these
sectors by expanding their share of domestic markets. Second, military expansion
can also provide concentrated income gains to these groups by enlarging a
protected domestic market through conquest and the integration of another
economy. Similar to the standard arguments linking imperialist interests to conflict, an
important distinction separates this claim from more traditional ones. The extent to which
economic interests rely on regulatory protection from the state to remain profitable plays a
critical role in their support of military force for economic expansion. Sectors that do not rely
on the state for protection while surviving in international markets can generate new
markets for simple efficiency reasons. Their goods penetrate new overseas markets because
they are cheaper than those of international competitors. Given that the use of military
conflict may carry the risk of additional costs to these sectors, they should be
unlikely to support such a policy if it were to achieve the same outcome (of new
overseas markets) they could achieve without the use of force. At the same time,
sectors that are less competitive in international markets may be more willing to risk
recovering any costs of war in new markets that they otherwise could not acquire without
the use of force." These possibilities demand that any claim that commerce reduces
military conflict must account for the relative political strength or veto capacity of
societal groups unlikely to support liberal commercial policies and peace for
economic reasons.12 Apart from understanding the role of protectionist interests in
decisions to use military force, one must also examine the influence of their societal
opponents-those favoring peace for economic reasons-in this domestic struggle. The
primary beneficiaries of free trade face significant organizational hurdles in their
lobbying efforts pursuing both free trade and peace. Studies of the domestic politics
of commercial policy (e.g., Alt and Gilligan 1994) illustrate that gains from trade, whether in
the form of reduced prices for consumer goods or new export markets, are often diffused
throughout society. This diffusion reduces the willingness of these groups to undertake costly
lobbying activity for the relatively small benefits of greater openness to trade. At the same
time, the costs of economic integration, whether in the form of factory closures or job losses,
are often more concentrated in specific industries or firms. Organizational advantages thus
help those groups most hurt by international trade to overcome the collective action
problem and mobilize support for protective policies that insulate their sectors from
international competition. Similar organizational difficulties may reduce the
effectiveness of societal constraints on a government's efforts to use military
force as an instrument of foreign policy (Gowa 1999). The aggregate benefits that stem
from avoiding the costs of war may be spread evenly across society to prevent individuals
from undertaking the costly lobbying activity necessary to restrain a government from using
force. These twin possibilities suggest that the income gains from trade may not
always provide sufficient incentives to prevent conflict i f their beneficiaries
possess relatively weak domestic influence. To understand the conditions when trade
activates these societal interests to produce peace, we need to assess the relative political
strength of these groups. Just as bat- tlefield outcomes reduce ambiguities about the prewar
balance of military power and resolve between states (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000), trade
policy outcomes can indicate the relative balance of political strength between societal
groups fighting a domestic battle over commercial policy. Greater levels of protection in an
economy indicate that import-competing sectors have successfully lobbied the state to
enact regulatory barriers and possess relatively more political influence than the
beneficiaries of trade within the domestic political game. The level of protection in an
economy thus provides one means to assess the relative strength of domestic economic
interests in favor of war or peace. As the size of protected sectors increases, the domestic
political influence of these groups on the state and the potential for military conflict should
also increase. Conversely, smaller levels of protection indicate that free trade lobbies likely
to oppose military aggression possess relatively more domestic political influence.
China Defense
Chinese are backing away from Arctic imperialism.
ORourke 6/15
Some analysts, however, believe that Chinas general approach toward the Arctic will
remain decidedly low-key: To date China has adopted a wait-and-see approach to
Arctic developments, wary that active overtures would cause alarm in other countries
due to Chinas size and status as a rising global power. China is believed to be keen on
resolving through diplomacy the national interests of both littoral and nonArctic
states in the high north. Toward that end, it has sought permanent observer status on the
Arctic Council.177
China wont militarize-its only an observer country and relies on

investing.
Reuters 14 ("Chinese Army Think-tank Says Arctic Energy Would Help Economy." Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, 18 June 2014. Web. 31 July 2014.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/18/china-arctic-idUSL4N0OZ36720140618>. XM)
(Reuters) - Oil and gas resources in the Arctic are an important resource to guarantee
China's sustained economic growth and the country should actively look at developing it,
state media on Wednesday cited a Chinese military think-tank as saying. The Arctic
Council agreed in May last year to admit emerging powers China and India as
observers, reflecting growing global interest in the trade and energy potential of
the planet's Far North. The organisation, which coordinates Arctic policy, is gaining
influence as sea ice thaws to open up trade routes and intensify competition for oil and gas estimated at 15 percent and 30 percent respectively of undiscovered reserves. The Defence
Policy Research Centre of the Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army
singled out the Arctic as one of the chapters of an annual strategic assessment. "The Arctic
region has rich oil and gas resources and quick and convenient shipping
conditions, which has important meaning for ensuring the sustained development
of China's economy," the centre said in its report, according to excerpts published
by the official China News Service. "The Arctic region could become an important supply
base in the future for China's overseas oil. China will ... open cooperation with Arctic
countries with energy supplies." China relies on overseas oil to help power its
economy, now the second-largest in the world, and has long fretted about
security of its supplies as so much of it has to flow through the narrow Malacca
Strait, linking the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. China has been active in the polar
region of late, becoming one of the biggest mining investors in Greenland and
agreeing a free trade deal with Iceland. Shorter shipping routes across the Arctic
Ocean would save its companies time and money. China already has mining links with
Greenland and trade ties with Iceland. Greenland may have the world's biggest deposits of
rare earths, used in smart phones and green technology.
China is not militarizing the arctic-its all speculation

Wright 12 (Wright, David C. is an associate professor of history and senior research fellow
at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. "Claiming the
Arctic." Defense News. N.p., 1 July 2012. Web. 31 July 2014.
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120701/DEFFEAT05/307010006/Claiming-Arctic>.
XM)
Could this eventually lead to a Chinese naval base on Iceland? This seems
unlikely, at least at present. The actual content, style and direction of the new
Sino-Icelandic coziness is unclear and will perhaps only emerge as the
relationship develops. In mid-June 2012, a Chinese military newspaper
(www.chnmilitary.com) published a piece about time being ripe for the return
of Mongolia to China because, among other things, controlling Mongolia would
put China that much closer to the Arctic. This is absurd because, among other
reasons, the northernmost extents of Chinas Heilongjiang province and Chinas
Inner Mongolia are both farther north than any part of Mongolia. Such nonsense
naturally incites suspicion in Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. When it comes to the Arctic,
China clearly has its diplomatic and international PR work cut out for it. It seems that Chinas
approach regarding the Arctic has neither extended beyond the mere pursuit of it nor
matured beyond what Linda Jakobson predicted in 2010 it would be in a paper written for
SIPRI: The notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be expected to be repeated in
articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese officials until it gradually begins
to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs. American diplomats and international
lawyers I have spoken with assume that China can effectively do little or nothing
about its Arctic ambitions because it has no Arctic littoral and no voting position
on the Arctic Council. But China can throw its economic, political and diplomatic
weight at individual states it sees as impeding its Arctic interests. One American
panda slugger insisted to me in Washington in May that the Chinese military is
behind the scenes manipulating and orchestrating Chinas preoccupation with the
Arctic. But the Chinese militarys involvement in Arctic affairs is based more on
speculation than hard evidence.
Solvency
UNCLOS = Alt Cause

Failure to ratify UNCLOS means the US cant operate in the Arctic
Peters 14 (Peters, Douglas L., Truman Veterans Leadership Academy Graduate, "UNCLOS:
How Were Missing Out on Arctic Opportunity."Truman National Security Project. Truman
Project, n.d. Web. 14 July 2014. < http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/unclos-how-weremissing-out-on-arctic-opportunity/>, XM)
Russia, Canada, and Denmark have already made claims on waters stretching to
the North Pole. Disputes have even arisen between the U.S. and Canada over an
emerging Northwest Sea Passage. The U.S. has argued that the potential sea route is neutral
territory, but Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has threatened to place military icebreakers in the area to
assert sovereignty and take action to protect [Canadas] territorial integrity. Yes, even our polite neighbors to the
North get a little confident when it comes to claiming new territory. Despite this competition to our
North, the U.S. is the only Arctic State that is not a party to the U.N Convention
on the Law of the Sea a well-established international treaty designed to codify
navigational rights, protect domestic economic development from foreign
harassment, and referee territorial claims among nations. Our domestic industries
view U.S. accession to the Convention as an opportunity to mine seabed mineral
resources, tap oil and gas fields, and lay fiber optic cables with international legal
protection. The Pentagon, and particularly the U.S. Coast Guard, also views accession to the Convention as an
opportunity, but as an opportunity to address critical issues of national security, sovereign rights, and
environmental protections in the increasingly wet Arctic Ocean. In fact, the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral
Robert Papp, recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. accession to the Convention
is needed to ensure Americas Arctic future. If theres one thing that business leaders and
military planners hate alike, it is being at a competitive disadvantage for no

reason. Until the U.S. accedes to the Convention, it cannot have the true
boundaries of its expansive continental shelf internationally recognized by the
Conventions Continental Shelf Commission. Recognition on the extent of its
continental shelf would allow the U.S. to claim exclusive rights to natural
resources on and beneath the Arctic seabed out to 600 miles from the Alaska
coast, which is well beyond the 200 mile exclusive economic zone that is
customarily given to nations. Right now, other Arctic nations are gaining the competitive advantage by
filing extended continental shelf submissions with the Continental Shelf Commission to perfect their territorial
claims. The sooner their territorial claims are recognized, the sooner their domestic industries will begin to develop
natural resources and create jobs. As frustrated as our domestic industries are with U.S.
political complacency towards the Convention, the Coast Guard is also feeling the
burden of a weakened U.S. negotiating position on other Arctic agreements . The
Coast Guard has robust statutory authority to police the Arctic and will be
Americas first responder to environmental emergencies. The Convention is
already serving as the umbrella for other discussions among Arctic nations on
oil pollution preparedness and a maritime search and rescue agreement . Admiral
Papp testified that the U.S. negotiating position on these agreements would be
much stronger if the U.S. was a party to the Convention. The U.S. will not have the luxury of
complacency when it comes to the competition in the Arctic . All that our domestic industries are
asking for is the protection the Convention provides before they will invest the
billions of dollars necessary to develop Americas natural resources and create
jobs. All the Coast Guard is asking for is a better opportunity to prepare itself for
the challenges and dangerous situations it will inevitably face as Americas Arctic
responders. The melting Arctic ice demonstrates how quickly the world is
changing, and how quickly the U.S. needs to solidify its rights under the
Convention in order to become a competitive Arctic nation.
Infrastructure Issues
No solvency
DOD 11- (report to congress on arctic operations and the northwest passage, May 11,
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/stwddes/desports/assets/pdf/dodreport_arcticops.pdf)//MSO
Because of the range and severity of Arctic conditions , climatic, hydrologic,
topographic, and geographic factors must all be considered in site selection for
any infrastructure in this region. The environment desired inside buildings is usually
drastically different from ambient conditions, placing additional stresses on building
components. Some important considerations for infrastructure in the Arctic include:
condensation control, structural design ventilation, snow load, snow accumulation and
drifting potential, and roof drainage, among others detailed in the Unified Facilities Criteria
manuals. When infrastructure is sited along the coast, erosion, silting, sea ice
variability, and coastal dynamics must also be considered. The ice movement
means that conventional pier construction is rarely feasible. An additional
consideration is the months of almost continuous daylight in summer, followed by
winter months of almost complete darkness, a variation that becomes more
extreme as one goes further north. Construction in the Arctic is seasonal and
skilled labor is usually in short supply; therefore, costs for both construction and
maintenance are high. The need to provide room and board at remote locations, decreased
efficiency of workers and machinery in extreme environmental conditions, and the
difficulties, costs, and risks in shipping materials and equipment add to the challenge.
Because of the short construction season, outside work must be accomplished
quickly, dictating a high degree of expensive prefabricated construction. During
ice-free periods, the most economical means of transportation is by barge. During the
winter, transportation over frozen rivers and lakes may be more economical than
air transportation. But delays in shipping equipment due to weather can result in
prolonged construction times and expensive emergency air freight costs. Construction in
the Arctic costs, as a rule of thumb, three to five times more than comparable infrastructure
in lower latitudes. Another challenge to bear in mind is the risk to existing
infrastructure posed by thawing permafrost. As the permafrost thaws, it loses
strength and volume, leading to failure of foundations and piling. The warming climate
will also accelerate the erosion of shorelines and riverbanks, threatening
infrastructure located on eroding shorelines.
Construction inhibited by weather, lack of skilled labor, lack of

daylight, transportation, permafrost and its really expensive.
DoD 11
Department of Defense (Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, May
2011; < http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf>)//AB
Construction in the Arctic is seasonal and skilled labor is usually in short supply ;
therefore, costs for both construction and maintenance are high. The need to provide
room and board at remote locations, decreased efficiency of workers and machinery in
extreme environmental conditions, and the difficulties, costs, and risks in shipping
materials and equipment add to the challenge. Because of the short construction season,
outside work must be accomplished quickly, dictating a high degree of expensive
prefabricated construction. During ice-free periods, the most economical means of
transportation is by barge. During the winter, transportation over frozen rivers and lakes
may be more economical than air transportation. But delays in shipping equipment due
to weather can result in prolonged construction times and expensive emergency air
freight costs. Construction in the Arctic costs, as a rule of thumb, three to five
times more than comparable infrastructure in lower latitudes. Another challenge to bear in
mind is the risk to existing infrastructure posed by thawing permafrost. As the permafrost
thaws, it loses strength and volume, leading to failure of foundations and piling. The
warming climate will also accelerate the erosion of shorelines and riverbanks, threatening
infrastructure located on eroding shorelines.
Alaskan infrastructure fails; massive maintenance costs, erosion,

weather, lack of daylight, etc..
DoD 11
US Department of Defense (Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage May
Because of the range and severity of Arctic conditions, climatic, hydrologic, topographic, and
geographic factors must all be considered in site selection for any infrastructure in this
region. The environment desired inside buildings is usually drastically different from ambient
conditions, placing additional stresses on building components. Some important
considerations for infrastructure in the Arctic include: condensation control, structural
design ventilation, snow load, snow accumulation and drifting potential, and roof
drainage, among others detailed in the Unified Facilities Criteria manuals.17 When
infrastructure is sited along the coast, erosion, silting, sea ice variability, and coastal
dynamics must also be considered. The ice movement means that conventional pier
construction is rarely feasible. An additional consideration is the months of almost
continuous daylight in summer, followed by winter months of almost complete
darkness, a variation that becomes more extreme as one goes further north.
Construction in the Arctic is seasonal and skilled labor is usually in short supply;
therefore, costs for both construction and maintenance are high. The need to
provide room and board at remote locations, decreased efficiency of workers and
machinery in extreme environmental conditions, and the difficulties, costs, and
risks in shipping materials and equipment add to the challenge. Because of the short
construction season, outside work must be accomplished quickly, dictating a high degree of
expensive prefabricated construction. During ice-free periods, the most economical means
of transportation is by barge. During the winter, transportation over frozen rivers and lakes
may be more economical than air transportation. But delays in shipping equipment due to
weather can result in prolonged construction times and expensive emergency air freight
costs. Construction in the Arctic costs, as a rule of thumb, three to five times more than
comparable infrastructure in lower latitudes. Another challenge to bear in mind is the risk to
existing infrastructure posed by thawing permafrost. As the permafrost thaws, it loses
strength and volume, leading to failure of foundations and piling. The warming climate will
also accelerate the erosion of shorelines and riverbanks, threatening infrastructure located
on eroding shorelines.
Plan will require constant dredging.

Northern Economics 11
Largest professional economics consulting firm in Alaska; report prepared for

Army Corps of Engineers and Alaska Department of Transportation (Alaska Regional Ports: Planning for Alaskas
Regional Ports and Harbors: Final Report January 2011; <
http://www.dot.state.ak.us/stwddes/desports/assets/pdf/regionalports_finalreport0111.pdf>)//AB
Dredging is needed on a regular basis to maintain access to a number of ports in

Alaska. River ports have issues with deposition of sediment along their facilities, and in
some cases the deposited material can be the result of erosion of barge landings and other
improvements upstream. Glacier-fed rivers also contribute a great deal of sediment
that ports must dredge. Reasons often cited for the need to dredge include additional
demand at the port that cannot be served due to shallow water along dock faces, access to
existing facilities that is impeded by shallow water or build-up of sediment, and increased
vessel sizes that require deeper water or a larger space for maneuvering or docking. Two
examples of the effect of sediment on port activities are seen with the Port of Anchorage and
the Port of Dutch Harbor. At the Port of Anchorage, regular dredging is required to maintain
the approach up Cook Inlet to access port facilities. At the Port of Dutch Harbor,
containerships often have to operate at weights below their full capacity to access port
facilities. As shipping companies employ larger containerships in the future, the need for
dredging will increase.
K Links
Arctic geopolitics is constructed through a discursive synthesis of
neo-realist and liberal paradigms of thought.
Dittmer et al, 11 (Jason, Sam Moisio, Alan Ingram, Klaus Dodds, Department
of Geography, University College London, Pearson Building, Gower Street,
London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom
b Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland
c Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, United
Kingdom, Science Direct 2/4/11, Have you heard the one about the
disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics, AS)
The focal point of this paper is the discourse of Arctic geopolitics, through which, we
suggest, the upsurge in space-making practices in the region takes place. These
space-making practices are evident in a wide variety of intercessions by foreign ministries,
militaries, intergovernmental organizations, corporations, scientific bodies, academic
researchers, self-styled explorers and think-tanks. In contrast to prevailing neo-realist
(and even liberal) formulations of the Arctic, we offer a reflexive exploration of the
ways in which the Arctic is emerging as a space of and for geopolitics. Our
argument vis--vis the emergent spaces of the Arctic builds upon but also goes beyond
recent interventions by geographers (Dodds, 2008, Dodds, 2010, Nicol, 2010, Powell, 2008a
and Steinberg, 2010) who have highlighted the multiple interests and high stakes at play in
the rapidly growing interest in the Arctic Ocean. In particular, we show how a geopolitical
analysis attuned to embodiment, the resolutely translocal, and the everyday can
contribute to a richer understanding of how, and why, the Arctic is suddenly so
prominent in national, inter-national and circumpolar politics. While we retain the
concept of discourse as a central element of critical geopolitical investigation, we
use this to signify more than the reproduction of geopolitics via representational practices
(McConnell, 2009 and Thrift, 2000). We conceptualize discourse as an iterative
interplay between representational, embodied and performative practices and the
materialization of space (Mller, 2008 and Pain and Smith, 2008). Thus, we see Arctic
geopolitics as neither environmentally determined by climate change and the
melting of ice (as many neo-realist accounts would have it Borgerson, 2008) nor
constructed solely within the power/knowledge networks of statecraft (as earlier
versions of critical geopolitics might suggest); rather we see Arctic geopolitics emerging
as a discourse a relatively organized assemblage of power/knowledge via the dynamic
assembly and networking of multiple elements across a wide variety of sites. While we trace
the widely reproduced story of Arctic geopolitics through climate change, the melting of
polar ice, increasing competition for resources and the like, we weave through this a
discussion of three examples (two Arctic exhibitions in London; the Russian Polar expedition
of 2007 and sovereignty patrols by Canadian Rangers) that complicate those orthodox
accounts found within academic and media circles. We identify two kinds of spatial ordering
entwined in the prevailing discourse of Arctic geopolitics. The first is of the Arctic as a space
as such. Here we draw attention to the various ways in which the Arctic is imagined and
performed as a distinct or exceptional space with its own properties. In particular, we
highlight how the Arctic Ocean (and the broader Arctic region) is constructed as an
opening and thus indeterminate zone in terms of particular environmental,
imaginative and affective characteristics, and especially in terms of a frontier
masculinity and paternal sovereignty (Gunn, 2008). This spatial ordering is
entwined with another ordering of the Arctic, as a space of and for state-building
and international relations (Koivurova, 2010). Here we highlight how the national and
international politics of the Arctic are produced as an uneasy synthesis of neorealism and liberalism. In this paper, both neo-realism and liberalism refer to
schools of thought in international relations which broadly assume an anarchic world
composed of states in competition with one another. While neo-realists and liberals
disagree over the capacity of the state to co-operate with others, both are vexed by the
absence of world government and the anarchical condition of world politics. Liberals tend
to be more interested in the possibilities of cooperation through regimes (Keohane &
Nye, 2000), while neo-realists are preoccupied with states and their national
security interests (Waltz, 1979). Thus, on the one hand, the re-opening of the Arctic
from the confines of Cold War spatial orderings was read during the 1990s as an
unprecedented opportunity to establish a new political order regulated via
democracy, freedom and markets, in uneasy tandem with concepts of sustainability,
demilitarization and human security. On the other, we show how the Arctic is
increasingly read in terms of the resurgence of neo-realism as geopolitical actors
allegedly scramble to reterritorialize an opening Arctic space (and especially the
Arctic Ocean) in pursuit of national security interests and resource competition.
The uneasy synthesis between liberalism and neo-realism, which feeds off and
animates the first ordering of the Arctic, presents a richly textured set of possibilities
and threats to a wide variety of actors across the region and beyond.
Realist discourses of the Arctic enable geopolitical interventions actors
securitize environmental issues to produce territorial sovereignty.
We identify philosophies of realism as underlying Arctic geopolitics; the existence of
the Arctic as a space, and its essential difference from other parts of the world (including
Antarctica), is remarkably taken-for-granted, as are the notions of an Arctic-specific
geopolitics and Arctic fragility (AHDR, 2004). Realism, as distinct from the aforementioned
neo-realism, is here used to signify faith in science and a philosophical
commitment to a reality that can be approached, if never completely comprehended
through empirical observation (Bird, 1998). This slippage between a term used in in
international relations (called here neo-realism) and one describing an approach to
science (called realism) is suggestive in an Arctic context. The discourse of Arctic
geopolitics carries within it a sense of the Arctic as a space distinguishable from others with
regard to the practices of geopolitical actors within it. For instance, it is a commonplace that
the Arctic is discernible from other spaces as a result of its extreme climate and
relative inaccessibility. Changes in this circumpolar environment and assessments of
relative inaccessibility are then seen to produce and perhaps even force changes in
the behaviour of geopolitical actors. However, if current theorizations of space
hold that space is produced relationally, it follows that the Arctic, as an exceptional
space, results from relationships between human actors and their networks. This
simple insight dovetails with well-established geopolitical understandings of power
and discourse: the designation of spaces as exceptional, or not, enables particular kinds of
interventions. Therefore, it is not climate change and Arctic exceptionalism that
produce geopolitical interventions, it is the identification of climate change as a

security issue, and the subsequent identification of the Arctic as a space of
exception, that enable geopolitical intervention as the region is re-staged as a state
of emergency. No discussion of Arctic geopolitics and the regions fragility is complete
without recounting the changing seasonal extent of Arctic ice, the opening of the NorthWest
Passage and Northern Sea Route in 2007 and projected dates for the Arctic to become ice
free in summer, along with the latest estimates of oil and gas reserves (framed as unproven
potential by the US Geological Survey) and outstanding legal disputes and uncertainties over
the delimitation of the Arctic outer continent shelf. All of these elements underscore the
extent to which scientific practices such as mapping and surveying are central to the
geopolitical constitution of Arctic space. Indeed, recent years have seen a veritable
boom in Arctic-related scientific research (Powell, 2008a). However, as work by geographers
has shown, research in the Arctic has long been constituted via constellations of
emotional and embodied practices as well as epistemic ones, and involved complicated
relationships between activities which were construed to be scientific whilst also
allowing some sort of demonstration of territorial sovereignty (Powell, 2007:
1796). This centrality of science instantiates a sense of the Arctic as a space of
the real a zone in which expert natural scientific knowledge provides an
authoritative guide that politics must follow. Despite the salience of science (as
manifested in the International Polar Year 20079) in close tandem with legal argument in
Arctic geopolitics, however, current understandings of the Arctic are also bound up with a
variety of gendered cultural images, fantasies and projections. It is crucial to take these, and
the popular cultures and colonial legacies with which they are bound up, into account if we
are to understand the constitution of Arctic geopolitics.
Emphasizing the potential of the Arctic is neo-realisms way of

pursuing its destructive fantasy.
The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further
highlights the dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical
discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus
forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the Russian flag-planting in 2007). We
suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to justify a strengthened
military presence in Arctic waters in the name of national security along with a range of
futuristic possibilities ( Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neo-realism feeds off the idea of
the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic space. It thus has an
affective as well as descriptive quality invoking a mood change and associated
calls to arms ( Dodds, 2010). This theme of fearing the future has emerged periodically
within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen Harpers famous use it or lose it dictum
traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of incursion by
the Soviets or the United States ( Dodds, in press, Head, 1963 and Huebert, 2003). The
disaster argumentation ( Berkman & Young, 2009) also underwrites liberal calls for a new
multilateral Arctic legal agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit
Arctic resources. In these representations, multilateralism denotes peace, prosperity,
stability and environmental rescue whilst national control and interest denote increasing
tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic openness is central to the

performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean
coastal states. The regions coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine
exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty
of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where
overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages
can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As
we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of
the North West Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is
also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of states
towards conflict over resources, sovereignty and so on ideas that have been
subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being
rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the
foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It
might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for
state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being
reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neorealist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions.
Accepting the premises of Arctic geopolitics risks both obscuring the liveliness of
Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling
the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives
have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it
once again.
The distinction between the status quo and the plan is a false one
either future remains embedded in philosophical realism.
It is perhaps a short step from the empiricist realism of Arctic science to the neorealism of much contemporary IR, which sees Arctic states in competition to assert
and exercise sovereignty over an opening and hence geopolitically undefined space.
Another small step leads to a neo-liberalism that sees opportunities (and
challenges) in such an opening for the extension of democracy, markets and freedom.
By this we mean that debates around global climate change policy are largely
framed through scientific discourse. Proponents of climate change policy
emphasize the role of scientific evidence and mechanistic understandings of
change (see, for instance, ACIAR, 2004). Opponents of policies intended to mitigate
climate change engage in this discourse through the introduction of contradictory
scientific claims or obfuscation about the nature of scientific consensus, never
directly disputing scientism. Discussions of climate change-related topics, such as
Arctic geopolitics, remain embedded in philosophical realism. This either takes the
form of mechanistic understandings of geopolitics and neo-realism, or a statecentric (neo)liberalism that sees state action in the Arctic as necessary to an ontology of
capitalist development. Arctic geopolitics is caught between such imaginations of
international affairs. Arctic liberalism forms one important organizing frame whereby
different political actors may observe and analyze Arctic affairs. Following Barnett and Duvall
(2005: 5), we suggest that Arctic liberalism revolves around the belief in the
possibility, although not the inevitability, of progress; that modernization processes
and interdependence (or, now, globalization) are transforming the character of global
politics; that institutions can be established to help manage these changes; that
democracy is a principled objective, as well as an issue of peace and security; and
that states and international organizations have an obligation to protect individuals, promote
universal values, and create conditions that encourage political and economic freedom.
Following the end of the Cold War, representations through which the extension of liberal
free-market reforms will bring peace and prosperity to the Arctic became increasingly
salient. A significant portion of contemporary geopolitical representations of the Arctic are
thus predicated upon the belief that the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity to
create a more desirable Arctic via a new normative consensus based on fundamental
liberal values and international agreements. This Arctic liberalism sat uneasily with
visions emerging from environmental and indigenous groups that suggested a
deeper questioning of the implications of political and economic modernization for the Arctic
(Dalby, 2002). Nonetheless, during the 1990s a geopolitics of hope (Sparke, 2005) was
frequently articulated in relation to the region. This was predicated upon the ending of the
Cold War, a reduction in the role of militarism in constituting Arctic spaces and the
establishment of new institutions (notably the Arctic Council). As the AHDR (2004: 208)
stated, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the rebirth of connections between
northern peoples and societies, and the dawning of a new era of Arctic international
cooperation. Military competition was supposed to have been sidelined by regional
and intergovernmental cooperation and the pursuit of sustainable social development
facilitated by circumpolar institution building such as the Arctic Council. At least in some
geographical contexts (Finland and Sweden, most notably), the geopolitical arguments of
liberals (usually international lawyers) have become dominant. These liberals highlight the
role of international law in Arctic politics and point out that the actions of the governments in
the Arctic strictly follow the rules of international regimes. Liberals usually straightforwardly
critique the neo-realist interpretations of Arctic politics, the famous Russian flag-planting for
instance, as premised on incorrect understanding of international politics in the Arctic.
Accordingly, it is international law, not climate change, that guides contemporary Arctic
politics; not confrontation but cooperation and stability (Koivurova, 2009). The implicit point
in many liberal arguments thus is that the neo-realist threat images concerned with the
Arctic are not only false but also potentially dangerous. Within Arctic geopolitics the
neo-realist and liberal rationalities co-exist and are partly co-constituted. Both of
these rationalities are nonetheless predicated upon a view that the Arctic is
experiencing environmental change that inescapably leads to new geopolitical
reality. For the neo-realists this new reality forces states to adapt in a manner aping
earlier neo-Darwinian readings of international politics (Borgerson, 2008). This form of
reasoning is more than a journalistic conceit; it has gained currency in policy circles and is
consequently well-supported in academic institutions, think-tanks (e.g. Geopolitics in the
High North, 2008) and inter-state political agendas. The geopolitical dilemma for the
Arctic is frequently articulated in terms of whether the future will be
characterized by a conflict-driven race for Arctic resources and trading routes or
increasing international cooperation and indigenous self-determination.
Russia Link.

Another sign of neo-realist rationalities is the assumption that the region is
characterized by dangerous anarchy. One commentator has suggested that the Arctic
condition is dangerous because there are no overarching political and legal structures
that can provide for the orderly development of the region (Borgerson, 2008: 71). The Arctic
Council, created in 1996, is (as neo-realists remind audiences) a soft-law institution that
merely advises the member states and does not address military issues. As another US
commentator asserted, if ground rules are not agreed, the areas oil, gas and other as yet
undiscovered resources could spark conflict (Cohen, 2009: 2). Arctic geopolitics thus
recapitulates not just IR realism but the implicit determinism of environmentsecurity and climate-security discourses more generally (Barnett, 2000). The concept
of ground rule refers to an understanding that a great game is taking place in the Arctic.
In such a view, circumpolar states do not necessarily commit themselves to the rules of the
free-market world and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); the Arctic
appears as a test site for the international relations of the future characterized by scarcity of
energy resources. As the New York Times put it, the the free-market democracies with
scarce resources will confront free-market authocracies (authoritarian systems that fall short
of dictatorships) rich in oil, gas and other raw materials in the Arctic ( Cohen, 2009: 2).
Free-market authocracies of course refers primarily to Russia: actors who lean towards
political realism often cite the 2007 Russian scientific expedition (which was mostly
privately-funded by a Swedish businessman) as an attempt by the Russian government to
maximize its sovereign rights over hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic, or, alternatively, as
an invitation to a new anti-liberal geopolitics characterized by military means and the
claiming of territories (e.g., Peter MacKay, cited in Allick, 2010). We suggest that this
glosses over how Russias and indeed all Arctic geopolitical interventions
emerge out of embodied, performative and somewhat improvised processes of
state- and identity-building (see Dodds, 2010 and Steinberg, 2010). Russia is often
portrayed as an exceptional Arctic stakeholder, a circumpolar Other which is
partly following the ground rules of international community while simultaneously
creating its own path of political development that resonates with state-building
strategies in China, Iran and Venezuela. However, Russia (as distinct from the USSR) is a
relative late-comer to the region, with a discernible Arctic policy only emerging in 2007
2008. China, another plausible superpower in the Arctic, also seems determined to play a
role in the far north: China carried out Arctic research in 1999 and 2003, and in 2004 built
an Arctic satellite observation centre at New Olson, Spitsbergen Island, in Norway. The
construction of such centres has been permitted by the Norwegian government to the
original signatories to the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, and China, Japan, Germany, Italy,
France, South Korea [and the UK], among others, have taken advantage of the opportunity.
Chinas application to the Arctic Council for permanent observer status, however, was turned
down in 2009[.] (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009: 1230) As we discuss below, neo-realist
accounts that would attribute the much-discussed 2007 polar expedition to some sovereign
geopolitical master-logic must contend with a more complex picture that highlights
how the expedition was improvised, with its supposed geopolitical meaning and
significance emerging afterwards (Baev, 2007). This further underscores the
emergent, performative character of geopolitics and sovereignty, not just in Russia
or the Arctic, but everywhere.
Chuchki Specific Enviro Justice Link

Oil expansion in the Chukchi sea destroys native lifestyles and local
wildlife
Northern Alaska Environmental Center, 2008
(Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Alaska Native and Conservation
Groups Challenge Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193, 1/31/2008,
http://northern.org/media-library/document-archive/arctic/arctic-oceanreports-fact-sheets/alaska-natives-and-conservation-groups-challengechukchi-sea-lease-sale-193/view, accessed 8/2/14 bh@ddi)
Alaska Natives and conservation groups joined forces today to fight oil drilling in
the Arctics Chukchi Sea. Thirty million acres of key polar bear, walrus, and whale
habitat in the Chukchi Sea are sche duled to open to oil and gas companies on February
Juneau, AK -
6, when the U.S. Interior Depart ments Minerals Management Service (MMS) plans to hold bidding for drilling
leases. A coalition made up of the Native Village of Point Hope, the City of Point Hope, the
Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope, REDOIL (Resisting Envir onmental Destruction on Indigenous
Lands), the Alaska Wilderness League, Center for Biological Diversity, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Oceana, Pacific Envi ronment, Sierra Club, and The
Wilderness Society filed suit in federal district court in Alaska today, arguing that in making its decision to
hold the lease sale, MMS did not adequately weigh the impacts oil and gas activities would
have on wildlife like polar bears, or on native villages along Alaskas North Slope. The organizations
are bei ng represented by Earthjustice, a nonprofit environmental law firm. The Chukchi Sea serves as
the lifeblood for communities like the Native Village of Point Hope, where residents have
relied on the sea for cultural and nutritional subsistence for thousands of years.
The Chukchi Sea is our garden. Weve hunted and fished in the ocean for
thousands of years said Jack Schaefer, president of the tribal council of the
Native Village of Point Hope. The ocean is what our history and culture is based on. One oil spill
could destroy our way of life. The Chukchi Sea is also home to one-tenth of the worlds polar bears,
along with walruses and endangered bowhead whales. Pola r bears are currently under consideration for listing as
threatened under the Endange red Species Act. Earl ier this month, the Interior Department announced it would
delay it s decision on whether or not to list the bear for approximately one month. The dela y allows just enough
time for the Chukchi lease sale to move forward on February 6.
Politics Link
Arctic operations are unpopularRepublicans believe climate
change is a political ideology
Benen 7/25 (Steve Benen, American political writer, 7/25/2014, GOP lawmakers balk at
Pentagons climate concerns, http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/gop-lawmakersbalk-pentagons-climate-concerns || Alice)
In general, when Defense Department leaders alert Congress to a national-security threat,
we expect Republican lawmakers to take it seriously. Rebecca Leber reported this week,
however, Pentagon concerns about climate change affecting military operations
are being ignored by GOP officials. At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing [on Tuesday], a Department of Defense representative laid out how climate
change is exposing its infrastructure in coastal and Arctic regions to rising sea
levels and extreme weather, and that its even impacting decisions like which types of
weapons the Pentagon buys. This is only the latest in a series of recent warnings from the
military, which raised the issue as far back as George W. Bushs second term. In March, the
Pentagon warned, in its Quadrennial Defense Review, that the effects of climate
change are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty,
environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions conditions that can
enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence. In other words, increased drought and
water shortages are likely to trigger fighting over limited resources. Whats striking is the
Republicans indifference. In fact, its worse than indifference GOP lawmakers
arent just ignoring the Pentagons concerns about climate and national security;
theyre actually pushing hard in the other direction. Kate Sheppard noted a few
months ago that House Republicans passed an amendment to the National
Defense Authorization bill that would bar the Department of Defense from
using funds to assess climate change and its implications for national security.
Rep. David McKinley (R-W.Va.), the sponsor of the measure, argued at the time, The
climate is obviously changing; it has always been changing. With all the unrest around the
[world], why should Congress divert funds from the mission of our military and
national security to support a political ideology? The answer, of course, is that
climate change and national security, whether the right chooses to acknowledge this or not,
are inextricably linked. Telling U.S. military leaders they must bury their heads in the sand
because congressional Republicans say so wont help.
Tradeoff DA Link
Plan trades off with other defense programs.
DoD 11
US Department of Defense (Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage May
The near-term fiscal and political environment will make it difficult to support significant
new U.S. Government investments. This is an assumption, but also serves as a
constraint on action. Agencies will only operate in the Arctic to the level to which they are
resourced, meaning that new efforts will likely have to be funded through
reallocation of existing resources. The Arctic is currently seen as a peripheral
interest by much of the national security community, a situation not likely to change
significantly in the next decade or more, absent some external forcing event, such as a
major environmental or human disaster or activity in the Arctic viewed as threatening U.S.
interests in the
Canada DA
Economy recovering now but sustained growth key
Altman 14 (Altman, Roger- is an American investment banker, private equity investor and
former United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury who served under Bill Clinton.
"Surprise: The Economy Isn't As Bad As You Think." Time. Time, 17 July 2014. Web. 29 July
2014. <http://time.com/3000991/surprise-the-economy-isnt-as-bad-as-you-think/>. XM)
Nearly seven years after the onset of the Great Recession, the national mood remains troubled. Surveys find
entrenched pessimism over the countrys economic outlook and overall trajectory. In the latest NBC News/Wall
Street Journal poll, 63% of respondents said the U.S. is on the wrong track. Its not difficult to see why. Set aside the
gridlock in Washington for a moment and appreciate the weakness of the economic recovery: Households whose
finances were too weak to spend. Large numbers of unemployed workers who couldnt do so either. Younger
Americans who couldnt afford their own homes. Banks that were too broken to lend. Yet nearly a year ago, I wrote
an essay for TIME suggesting that the economy could surprise on the upside. That hypothesis looks even more valid
today. Despite the pessimistic mood, America is experiencing a profound comeback. Yes, too
many Americans are out of work and have been for far too long. And yes, we have a huge amount of slack to make
up. In fact, if the 2008 collapse had not happened, the U.S. GDP would be $1 trillionor more than 5%higher than it
is today. But in terms of the growth outlook, the news is good. Goldman Sachs and
many private-sector forecasters project a 3.3% growth rate for the remainder of
2014. The first half of 2014 saw the best job-creation rate in 15 years. Total
household wealth and private employment surpassed 2008 levels last year. Bank
loans to businesses exceeded previous highs this year. And income growth will
soon improve too. America is finally returning to where it was seven years ago. As
halting as the U.S. recovery has been, the economy is now leaner and more capable of
healthy, sustained growth through 2016 and beyond. Our outlook shines
compared with that of the rest of the industrialized world, as Europe and Japan
are stagnant. The 2008 economic crisis and Great Recession forced widespread restructuring throughout the
U.S. economynot unlike a company gritting its teeth through a lifesaving bankruptcy. Manufacturing costs are
down. The banking system has been recapitalized. The excess and abuse that defined the housing market are gone.
And its all being turbocharged by an energy boom nobody saw coming. Its not
just economic trends that are looking up: crime rates, teen pregnancy and carbon
emissions are down; public-education outcomes are improving dramatically;
inflation in health care costs is at a half-century low. That points to something I
did not foresee last year: that the social health of America seems to be mending.
Americans may still feel discontented, but winter is finally over.
US-Canada tensions over Northwest Passage high now and

increasing
Meyer 12 (Meyer, Julia-writer for IDN which offers news analyses and viewpoints on a wide
range of topics that impact the world and its peoples. "The Arctic: Simmering Tensions
Between Canada And US - Analysis." Eurasia Review. IDN-InDepthNews, 30 July 2012. Web.
31 July 2014. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/30072012-the-arctic-simmering-tensionsbetween-canada-and-us-analysis/>. XM)
The focus of international attention on melting polar ice is hiding simmering
tensions between Canada and the USA two of the eight states with Arctic
territory which need be urgently resolved to avoid complications in a new
emerging geopolitical situation, says a new study. Both countries need to pay attention to the
challenges in the Arctic but should also be wary of how their domestic posturing in the region is affecting their
international relations, including with each other, says the study by the prestigious Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI).Authored by Kristofer Bergh, the study says: The abilities of Canada and the USA to
pursue their interests in the region will rely on them cooperating closely, not least because from 2013 they will hold
successive chairmanships of the Arctic Council. Canadian-US relations will thus be an important
factor in the future of a changing Arctic. Resolving key disagreements and

identifying common priorities would strengthen both countries positions in the
region.
Together with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Canada and the USA are members
of the Arctic Council. The Council, which includes the representatives of the regions indigenous populations, has
evolved into a decision-making organization with a permanent secretariat and budget. Subsequently it attracts
more attention from the rest of the world. Since 2006, three successive chairmanships of the Council have been
held by Nordic states Norway (2006-2009), Denmark (2009-2011) and Sweden (20112013) which agreed on a
common set of priorities to pursue. From 2013 it will be chaired by Canada for two years (2013-2015) and then the
United States (20152017). The study, titled The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United
States: Domestic Motives and International Context cautions that the lingering
disagreements between Canada and the USA would undermine their ability to
pursue their interests in the Arctic region. In fact the future of the Arctic will
require close cooperation between Canada and the USA, not least if human
activity in the area increases as it becomes more accessible. Increased traffic in
the Northwest Passage will present a challenge to both Canadian and US capacity
to operate in the region, not least if responsibilities in the area are unclear. Bergh
continues: While the USA has not particularly distinguished itself in the
international cooperation over the Arctic although it seems that this is now
changing Canada has repeatedly made clear that it is seeking a leadership role.
The arctic is key to US-Canadian relations-going into the Northwest

passage would collapse them
Oran R. Young; Canada Artic Resources Committee Senior Fellow of the Center for Northern
Studies; 28th July 2010Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the "Special
Relationship" http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2.htm zp
The Arctic today is recognized as a strategic arena of vital significance, a fact that poses a mounting challenge to
the "special relationship" that has characterized interaction between Canada and the United
States during this century. The United States is expanding its military presence throughout
the arctic region and exerting growing pressure on Canada to co-operate with its
plans for the defence of North America against ballistic missiles fired from submarines sheltered in arctic waters and cruise missiles launched from
manned bombers operating in arctic airspace. In contrast, Canada is poised between the superpowers
in a region of rising strategic importance to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Canada must
also contend with the pervasive, though implicit, threat to its effective occupancy
of the Far North arising from the burgeoning U.S. presence in the Arctic.
Confrontations between the two countries over arctic issues could well become
severe enough to cause a considerable erosion of the "special relationship". In fact,
developments along these lines are almost certain to occur unless the United
States abandons its traditional attitude of benign neglect toward arctic politics
and the sensibilities of its northern allies, and unless Canada transcends its propensity to respond in a highly
emotional fashion to specific arctic incidents, like the passage of the U.S. ice-breaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage in August 1985. At the
the emerging arctic agenda also offers significant opportunities for

constructive dialogue between Canada and the United States if the leaders of the
two countries recognize the importance of arctic issues and move briskly to agree on
same time,
imaginative procedures to handle their arctic concerns.
Collapse of US-Canada relations causes economic collapse.

Burney and Hampson, Derek and Fen, Burney was Senior Strategic Advisor of Norton Rose, former Chief of Staff in
the Office of the Prime Minister, and Canadian Ambassador to the US, Fen is the Chancellors Professor & Director of NPSIA,
Professor of International Affairs, How Obama Lost Canada: Botching Relations With the United States Biggest Trade
Partner,June 21st,
2012.
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/howobama-lost-canada. JMC.) Accessed 7/10/12.

Economically, Canada and the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is
the others number-one trading partner in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and
services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or China and trade
with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet
the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to
combat the Buy American provision in Congress stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded
Canadian participation in infrastructure spending.
The impact is global nuclear war

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting
the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the
result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of
outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a
growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to
believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that
period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think
Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think
League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the
twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for
greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed
the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up
on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the
Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most
dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of
descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the
absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most
dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,
worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security
arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their
own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that
existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the
Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under
a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines
between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals
combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems
also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending
nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile
flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather
than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises
Consult Canada CP
Notes: The plan would cause shipping in the Northwest passage. If US ships just go in, it
would sour Canada relations (Canada disad). We need to negotiate our right to use the
Northwest passage before building the port which would facilitate trade.
You should probably bring this map into round to show that Arctic Trade is impossible (why
else would you need a port there?) without the Northwest Passage (might only show up in
printer page layout (not web layout))
The United States federal government should first negotiate with

Canada and recognize that the Northwest Passage is part of
Canadas internal waters in exchange for the right of free access
and then fund the development of deep-water Arctic ports in the
Beaufort and Chukchi seas in Alaskas North Coast
Canada says yes-right political climate
Byers 11 (Byers, Michael is professor of Global Politics and International Law at the
University of British Columbia. "Guest Column: Time, Canada, to Negotiate the Northwest
Passage." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, 05 July 2011. Web. 31 July 2014.
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/guest-column-time-canada-to-negotiate-the-northwestpassage-1.1047758>. XM)
The time is ripe Washington is also working within the Arctic Council and International
Maritime Organization to develop co-operative mechanisms for oil spill clean-ups and
fisheries management, as well as on safety standards for polar shipping. At the same
time, the U.S. appears to understand that Harper's Arctic rhetoric has always
been aimed at Canada's electorate and not necessarily its international partners.
As a U.S. diplomat explained in a cable released by WikiLeaks: "The persistent
high public profile which this government has accorded 'Northern Issues' and the
Arctic is unprecedented and reflects the PM's views that 'the North has never
been more important to our country' although one could perhaps paraphrase to
state 'the North has never been more important to our Party.'" Perhaps now, with
a majority government and a bit of partisan breathing room, the prime minister
can finally pursue the opening created by Cellucci six years ago. It's time to
negotiate the Northwest Passage dispute; to talk about the commitments on
access, policing and search-and-rescue that the U.S. might wish from Canada,
in return for recognizing our claim to this passage as "internal waters."
The net benefit is Russia War:

Russia is insistent on establishing military capabilities to back up its
unreasonable territorial claims.
Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research Fellows and
PhDs in Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International Energy Security, Oct 30 2008,
The Heritage Foundation The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic)
After its invasion of Georgia, Russia has clearly hardened its international posture
and is increasingly relying on power, not international law, to settle its claims.
Moscow has also intensified its anti- American policies and rhetoric and is likely to
challenge U.S. interests whenever and wherever it can, including in the High
North. Russia takes its role as an Arctic power seriously. In 2001, Russia submitted to the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea a formal claim for an area of 1.2 million square
kilometers (460,000 square miles) that runs from the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and
Mendeleev Ridge to the North Pole. This is roughly the combined area of Germany, France,
and Italy.32 The U.N. commission did not accept the claim and requested additional data
and information.33 Russia responded by sending a scientific mission of a nuclear-powered
icebreaker and two ously organized media event, the mission planted the Russian flag on the
oceans floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil samples that supposedly prove
that the ridge is part of the Eur- asian landmass. During the mission, Deputy Chair- man of
the Russian Duma Artur Chilingarov, the veteran Soviet explorer heading the scientific
expedition, declared, The Arctic is ours and we should demonstrate our
presence.34 Such statements run counter to the spirit and potential of
international cooperation and seem inappropriate for a scientific mission.The U.S.
has objected to these claims and stated that they have major flaws. Professor Timo Koivurova of the University of Lapland in Finland stated that oceanic ridges cannot be claimed
as part of the states continental shelf.35 Russia intends to resubmit its claim by 2009.36
Russia is also moving rapidly to establish a physical sea, ground, and air
presence in the Arctic. In August 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law
that allows the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental
shelf without auctions. The law restricts participation to companies with five years
experience in a regions continental shelf and in which the government holds at least a 50
percent share, effectively allowing only state-controlled Gazprom and Ros- neft to
participate.37 President Medvedev also featured the Arctic prominently in the new Russian
Foreign Policy Concept, which states: In accordance with the international law, Russia
intends to establish the boundaries of its continental shelf, thus expanding opportunities for
exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.38 During 2008, Russian
icebreakers have constantly patrolled in the Arctic. Russia has 18 operational
icebreakers, the largest flotilla of icebreakers in the world.39 Seven are nuclear, including
the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.40 Russia is planning to build new
nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015. Experts estimate that Russia will need to build
six to 10 nuclear icebreakers over the next 20 years to maintain and expand its current
level of operations.41 Russias presence in the Arctic will allow the Kremlin to take
de facto possession of the underwater territories currently in dispute. In addition
to icebreakers, Russia is constructing an Arctic oil rig in the northern shipbuilding
center of Severodvinsk, which will be completed by 2010. The rig will be the first of its kind,
capable of operating in temperatures as low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (minus 58
degrees Fahrenheit) and withstand the impact of ice packs. The new rig was commissioned by the state-controlled Gazprom and demonstrates that Russia is serious about oil
exploration in the Arctic.42 Russias Polar Saber Rattling In August 2007, shortly after
sending the scientific expedition to the Arctic ridge, then Russian President Vladimir Putin
ordered the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean. Strate- gic
bombers including the turboprop Tu-95 (Bear), supersonic Tu-160 (Blackjack), and Tu-22M3
(Backfire) and the long-range anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft Tu-142 have flown
patrols since then.43 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu- 95 bombers refueled inflight to extend their operational patrol area.44 Patrolling Russian bombers penetrated the
12-mile air defense identification zone surrounding Alaska 18 times during 2007.45 Since
August 2007, the Russian Air Force has flown more than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic,
and Pacific Oceans.46 The Russian Navy is also expanding its presence in the Arctic
for the first time since the end of the Cold War.47 Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, head of the Defense Ministrys combat training department, said that the Russian
Navy is increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleets submarines and that
Russias military strategy might be reoriented to meet threats to the countrys interests in
the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf. Shamanov said that we have a
number of highly-professional military units in the Leningrad, Siberian and Far
Eastern military districts, which are specifically trained for combat in Arctic
regions.48 On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced that its fleet has
resumed a warship presence in the Arctic. These Arctic naval patrols include the
area of the Spitsbergen archipelago that belongs to Norway, a NATO member. Russia refuses
to recognize Norways right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone around
Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an anti-submarine warfare destroyer followed by a guidedmissile cruiser armed with 16 long-range anti-ship cruise missiles designed to destroy
aircraft carriers.49 The resumption of Cold Warstyle patrols and increased naval
presence in the Arctic is in keeping with Moscows more forward posture and is
intended to increase its leverage vis-a-vis territorial claims . Moscow is taking a
dual approach of pro- jecting military power while invoking international law.
Regarding the naval deployments near Spits- bergen, the Russian Navy stated: Sorties of
warships of the Northern Fleet will be made periodically with a necessary regu- larity. All
actions of the Russian warships are fulfilled strictly in accordance with the international
maritime law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.50 At a meeting of the
Russian governments Mari- time Board in April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
backed a policy of settling territorial disputes in the region with the countries bordering the
Arctic through cooperation. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is now deputy
prime minister, stressed at the meeting that Russia observes the international law on the
matter through adherence to two international conventions: the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, signed by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., and the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.51 While paying lip service to international law,
Russias ambitious actions hearken back to 19th- century statecraft rather than
the 21st-century law- based policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin
believes that credible displays of power will settle the conflicting territorial
claims. By comparison, the Wests posture toward the Arctic has been irresolute and
inadequate.
US- Russia war causes extinction a mere political crisis can trigger
a nuclear exchange.
Caldicott 2002 (Helen- Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The new nuclear
danger, p. 7-12)
The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous
radioactive facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton
bomb (1 megaton) landing on a standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely
radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would permanently contaminate an .' area the size of
western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive
terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human and animal alike-will rot, infected
with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal. Trillions of insects,
naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the living,
to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation.
Rodents will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases
now controlled by immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping
cough, diphtheria, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a
fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays
sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated that perhaps older people should be sent outside
to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop malignancies from the fallout (cancer and
leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that manages to grow will be toxic
because plants concentrate radioactive elements.*/ Finally, we must examine the systemic global effects of a
nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a
blanket of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will
be required for light and temperature to return to normalper-"r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to
more than its , , usual intensity, enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer .
Subfreezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for

civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document
published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, " the total loss of human
agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all
humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this
vulnerability is an aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant
countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of
nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty between Russia and America, even if it were implemented,
would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on alert." The threshold for nuclear winter? One
thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given current capabilities and targeting
plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected signals from an
American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the
Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US.
submarines could launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian
officials assumed that America had initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer
containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how
to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute interval to make a decision. At the last
moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If Russia had launched its
missiles, the US. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to Cheyenne
Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make
his launch decision, and America's missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within
minutes of global annihilation that day. ,' Today, Russia's early-warning and nuclear command
systems are deteriorating. Russia's early-warning system fails to operate up to

seven hours a day because only one-third of its radars are functional, and two of
the nine global geographical areas covered by its missile warning satellites are
not under surveillance for missile detection.9 TO make matters worse, the equipment
controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic devices
and computers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According
to the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely
disrupted when robbers tried to "mine" critical communications cables for their copper!'" This vulnerable
Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political

crisis, when the danger of accidental or indeed intentional nuclear war would
become very real. And the U.S. itself is not invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for
example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new computer system to deal with
potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency "blind" for
days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part
of
America's nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a
year." (At that time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially
dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches. Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would
function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such a
situation has the potential for catastrophe. If America cannot observe what the
Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons-or vice versa-especially during a serious
international crisis they are likely to err on the side of "caution," which could mean that something as benign
as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet.
US-Canada cooperation key to deter Russia.

Staalesen 14 (Staalesen, Atle-is BarentsObserver staff writer and Adviser in the
Norwegian Barents Secretariat. He has a degree in Russian from the University of Oslo and
has studied journalism at the Moscow State University. He has worked with BarentsObserver
since its establishment in 2002.. "Hillary Warns against Russia in Arctic." Barentsobserver.
N.p., 3 Apr. 2014. Web. 29 July 2014. <http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/04/hillarywarns-against-russia-arctic-03-04>. XM)
The firmly enrooted spirit of Arctic peace and cooperative efforts could be in
jeopardy as new cold winds are blowing over East-West relations. At least if
judging from Hillary Rodham Clinton. From Crimea to Arctic Speaking in Montreal
this week, Clinton threw a burning American torch into the Arctic discourse,
indicating that Russian expansionist approaches could include also the high
north. According to the prominent politician, east-west relations in the vast
northern region will not stay unaffected by Russias annexation of the Crimea.
Canada and the USA should forge a united front against Russia in the region , she
argued. In front of an audience of more than 4000, Clinton said that Putin is trying to
rewrite the boundaries of post-World War II and that other countries will get similar
treatment if Russia is allowed to get away with it, the Globe and Mail reports. Theres a
lot at stake here, she stressed, and highlighted Russias recent major build-up of
forces and military bases in remote Arctic sites. Clinton has been a noted
proponent of an enhanced American engagement in Arctic affairs and was the
first U.S. secretary of state to attend an Arctic Council session. A warning signal?
Commenting on developments, a leading Norwegian researcher on the Arctic does
not exclude a policy change in Russian Arctic affairs. The annexation of the
Crimea does send a warning signal that also Russian policies on the Arctic could
change, Geir Hnneland from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute says to
BarentsObserver. Like the Crimea, the Arctic has a major place in Russian
identity, he adds.
Alaska CP
Text: The Alaskan Department of Transportation should fund the
development and construction of its deep-water ports.
CP solvesAlaska just signed a bill to fund Arctic Infrastructure
Alaska Senate 7/16 (Alaska Senate Majority, 7/16/2014, Infrastructure Package To Boost
Investment in Arctic, http://alaskasenate.org/senate/press/news/mcguire-arcticinfrastructure-bill-signed || Alice)
ANCHORAGE-Today, Governor Sean Parnell signed Senate Bill 140, sponsored by
Senator Lesil McGuire (R-Anchorage), which is designed to boost infrastructure
development in the Arctic. SB140 creates incentives to attract private investment
to build much needed ports, roads, emergency and telecommunications projects in the
Alaskan Arctic. SB140 came out of the work by the Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (AAPC),
co-chaired by Senator McGuire and Representative Bob Herron (D-Bethel). Over the last
year-and-a-half of meetings with the Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (AAPC), we
had vast discussions regarding how we can craft an Arctic policy for Alaskans, and
what that policy will look like. All things pointed to infrastructure as the
foundation, and all of the identified steps forward required a financing
mechanism, said Senator McGuire. This is that mechanism. It will attract the
private investment that we need while sending the message to the Federal
Government that we feel fortifying and strengthening our assets in the Arctic is
critical and we are not afraid to lead this massive undertaking. SB 140 expands
the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authoritys (AIDEA) tool bag by
extending the same authority for loans, loan guarantees, bonds and bond
guarantees that it currently utilizes in the energy sector via the Sustainable
Energy Transmission and Supply Development Fund (SETS) fund in order to
develop Infrastructure in the Arctic. The SETS fund was created by Senator McGuire in
2012 under Senate Bill 25 and includes financing tools that are currently leading to the first
commercialization of Alaskas North Slope natural gas while bringing much needed energy
relief to Interior Alaska in the form of LNG trucking to Fairbanks. This bill gives AIDEA the
tools it needs to reach out to the people who are looking to invest in the North.
Right now, there is an estimated $100 billion of private capital that is looking for
investment opportunities in the Arctic, said Senator McGuire. Alaska is what makes
the U.S. an Arctic Nation. This bill helps establish Alaska, and by extension the
U.S., as a leader in the Arctic and positions us to capitalize on the massive new
opportunities and challenges coming our way such as shipping, tourism, safety, and
responsible resource development.
Alaskan Department of Transportation solves best.


Port and harbor projects can be financed at the state level in the form of
partnerships, grants, loans, legislative appropriations, or bonds. Funding may come
directly from the state or be federal funds that are administered by or channeled through
state agencies and programs. The following subsections describe state level funding
available in Alaska for the purpose of port and harbor development. The Alaska
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (ADOT&PF) provides several
means of assisting locally-owned port and harbor facilities. ADOT&PF partners with
local communities and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the planning, design, and
construction of port and harbor facilities and channel navigation improvements, thereby
maximizing the federal investment in Alaskas marine facilities. This program has allowed
the construction of navigation improvement projects that have significant local investment,
are economically justified, and are environmentally acceptable (Alaska Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities 2008). ADOT&PF also supports harbors through a
Municipal Harbor Facility grant program established in 2006. Subject to an annual legislative
appropriation, this harbor grant program matches local government funds, dollar for dollar,
with state general funds up to a limit of $5 million, for municipal port and harbor
rehabilitation and improvement projects (Alaska Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities 2008). The grant program consists of two tiers. Harbor facilities that were transferred from the state to
local ownership, especially those in need of major maintenance and repair, are given priority and a Tier I status. All
other municipal harbor facility projects are considered Tier II projects. A harbor facility may only receive one Tier I
grant, but may apply for multiple Tier II grants (Alaska Department of Transportation 2010). Applications for funding
from the Municipal Harbor Facility grant program are scored by committee. Within the annual funding limit, Tier I
applications are given priority. Tier I applications receive funding, within the funding limit each year, in descending
order of their score. Once adding a Tier I application would bring the total over the appropriated amount, no further
Tier I applications are added and the Tier II applications are then added to the request, up to the programs limit. No
partial funding is allowed, so funding is all-or-nothing. Facilities eligible for Tier I status are not obligated to apply
under that tier. Due to the ability to choose the tier under which to apply and the method by which projects are
selected for funding, communities have developed strategies to try to obtain necessary funding. A funding request,
based on the selected applications, is submitted to the legislature. The legislature is not obligated to fund requests,
and thus far financial support for the program has been inconsistent. As shown below in Table 19, the program was
fully funded in 2008, but in 2009, no projects were funded (Lukshin 2010b). Applications to the Municipal Harbor
Facility grant program are due approximately one year before the year in which funding is requested. For fiscal year
2012, applications are due by July 15, 2010, which is the start of the 2011 fiscal year (Lukshin 2010a). ADOT&PF
has several entities supporting port and harbor development (Taylor et al 2010). The Coastal Engineering section in
Anchorage provides interdepartmental support for coastal transportation projects including roads, airports, dock
and harbors, barge landings, and marine transportation. This support group also provides coastal engineering
support to other state and federal agencies and local municipalities on issues such as coastal erosion108 The other
primary entity within ADOT&PF is the Ports and Harbors program management function, located in Juneau. This
includes administration of municipal grants, harbor transfers from state to municipal ownership, managing
partnership agreements with municipalities and federal government, and overall management of existing state
ports and harbors infrastructure. , shore protection, and preliminary engineering and design of ports and harbors.
The Coastal Engineers also act as liaisons and perform in-kind services for the state, coastal communities and other
non-federal sponsors, on USACE projects. Additionally, there is a marine design group in departments Southeast
Region that provides design support for the Alaska Marine Highway System, as well as port or inner harbor design
work.
Alaskan funding for ports isnt unprecedented.


Alaskan communities and organizations may receive direct sponsorship for projects by
appealing directly to the state legislature. Legislative grants, once awarded and approved by
the Governor, are administered by ADCCED (ADCCED 2010b). As discussed in section 3.1.4,
legislative funds from the collection of cruise vessel passenger taxes are available
specifically for cruise vessel related projects. In the past, legislative appropriations
have been used to support the ongoing expansion project at the Port of
Anchorage.
Alaskan AIDEA solves best overcomes budgetary constraints.


As shown in Section 3.1, the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority
(AIDEA) has played a prominent role in the financing of various port facilities in
Alaska, particularly those supporting the states mining industry. The mission of the
public corporation is to promote, develop, and advance economic growth and diversification
in Alaska by providing various means of financing and investment. AIDEA has assisted
Alaska business through its ability to develop, own, and operate basic installations and
facilities within the state, with the purpose of advancing the prosperity of a region
(Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority undated). AIDEA can provide funding
for port and harbor facilities. AIDEA does not provide grants; instead, they finance programs
considered commercially viable and able to produce revenues to cover costs (AIDEA 2010a).
The public corporation administers three relevant credit programs: the Loan Participation,
Development Finance, and Conduit Revenue Bond Programs. AIDEAs Loan Participation
program provides permanent financing to borrowers for the purpose of developing,
acquiring, or enhancing Alaska business enterprises. AIDEA does not originate loans, but
instead purchases up to 90 percent of a commercial loan (up to a maximum of $20 million)
on which it is able to extend the loan term, giving the borrower the benefit of lower
scheduled payments (AIDEA 2010b). In 2008, the loan participation program provided
assistance to the Ketchikan Dock Company by financing 90 percent of a $13 million
business loan to build the infrastructure required to host world class cruise vessels.
AIDEA also aids in the development, ownership, and operation of projects within Alaska
through the Development Finance program. Ports, roads, and other infrastructure and
facilities are eligible for this program if they are economically advantageous to the
state and public welfare, contribute to economic growth, and are economically and
financially able to produce revenue to repay the amount financed (AIDEA 2010b). AIDEA
financed the Delong Mountain Regional Transportation System (DMTS), which connects the
Red Dog mine to its port site on the Chukchi Sea, with this program. AIDEA has invested
more than $250 million in DMTS, making the development of the mine possible (AIDEA
2010b). A third program resource for port and harbor development funding is the AIDEA
Conduit Revenue Bond Program, which assists businesses or nonprofit corporations in
issuing tax-exempt and taxable revenue bonds to obtain project financing. In this program,
AIDEA assets and credit are not at risk, and the underwriting and placement of the bonds are
based on the creditworthiness of the project and borrower strength (AIDEA 2010b). Though
the conduit bond program has not yet been used for port or harbor development projects, it
is a resource that can be considered going forward (Walker 2010). Outside of these
programs, other financing arrangements have been made in the past. As mentioned in
Section 3.1.3, the Ballyhoo dock in Unalaska, Alaska was partially financed through AIDEA
bonds. Bond issuance and debt financing are discussed further in section 5.2.3.2.
Canada CP
Bring this map into the round. Their Dlouhy 4/25 evidence indicates that 1,000 miles is that
maximum for an effective port to prevent spills. The map clearly indicates that Canadas
northwestern territories is less than 1000 miles away from the beaufort and the chukchi sea
(this map may only show up when you are not on the web lay out)
Text: The Dominion of Canada should build deep water ports in its
Northwestern Arctic territories.
Canadian-American military cooperation in the Arctic exists now
Canada can build the facilities.
ORourke 6/15
In December 2009, it was reported that U.S. and Canadian defense officials are studying
emerging gaps in their awareness of Arctic activities, seeking to boost North American
Aerospace Defense [NORAD] Commands maritime-warning mission and crafting a new
threat assessment for the region. The effort would reportedly involve both NORAD and a
Canadian-American advisory board called the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.216 In May
2010, it was reported that American and Canadian defense officials are bolstering
collaboration on military exercises, investment plans and technology
development related to the Arctic. The report stated that U.S. and Canadian
intelligence officials have created a classified joint utilization assessment for the Arctic
looking out to 2020, which will be continuously updated. It also stated that American and
Canadian defense officials have just started implementing a new five-year work plan that
contains specific initiatives and requires concrete deliverables, Stockton said, noting the
Arctic received special attention in the plan. The plan also covers defense critical
infrastructure protection, defense support to civil agencies and defense cooperation in
the Americas.217
AW Russia Cooperation
Russia Relations
No Arctic War
An ice-free Arctic incentivizes co-operation not competition.
Jakobson, 10 (Linda, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
5/24/2010, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?
id=917301, AS)
It is important to note, however, that Arctic issues have thus far been approached in a
spirit of cooperation, with outstanding disputes managed peacefully.51
International cooperation in the Arctic has for the most part been multilateral.52
Media reports of competition in an ice-free Arctic that emphasize potential disputes
and a scramble for the Arctics resources give rise to scenarios of armed conflict breaking
out in the region, especially a conflict involving Russia. However, there is no evidence
that Russia is not playing by the rules or that it would not want to find
multilateral solutions to disputes regarding sovereignty.53 While the melting of the
Arctic ice could create tension in ChinaRussia relations, the new opportunities that
will arise as a result of an ice-free Arctic could deepen cooperation among East Asian
states. As non-Arctic states, China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea are all in the same
boat. Each of them stands to benefit enormously from shorter commercial shipping
routes and possible access to new fishing grounds and other natural resources. A
unified Arctic strategy would be in their mutual interest. Find- ing ways to jointly use an
ice-free Arctic has the potential to create a genuine winwin situation for both
China and Japan, the two East Asian powers which in so many other areas find it difficult to
find common ground. From Chinas viewpoint, an ice-free Arctic will increase the value
of strong ties and broader cooperation with the Nordic countries that otherwise
struggle to be noticed by the rising great power that is preoccupied by global challenges.
China already has the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik, in anticipation of Iceland
becoming a major shipping hub.54 By actively persisting to further engage Chinese
officials and academics on Arctic issuesranging from climate change and polar research
to commercial shipping routes and maritime rescue operationsNordic countries can
already start laying the foundation for a special Arctic- orientated relationship with China.
Norway, with its deep-sea drilling expertise, has an advantage if it wants to forge a unique
Arctic relationship with China. Finding ways for Chinese and Norwegian companies to
cooperate in Arctic energy resource extractionin, for example, the ongoing project
in the Shtokman field55would be of great interest to Chinese companies and would
undoubtedly strengthen ChinaNorway relations.
No Arctic race development will be slow, cooperative, and peaceful

Perry and Anderson 12 (Charles Perry, Vice president and director of studies at the
Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, and Bobby Anderson, Research associate at the
Institute for Foreign Policy, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic region,
2/1/12, /http://www.atlcom.nl/ap_archive/pdf/ AP%202012%20nr.%206/Perry%20en
%20Andersen.pdf)
That said, time, cost, and technology constraints appear to be working against
any competitive rush to the Arctic, fueled in part by the lure of an oil and gas
bonanza beyond compare, as some have suggested. Far more likely is a slow and
methodical push into the High North, not the least because there is so much yet
to learn (or, in some cases, to relearn) about operating safely in the harsh Arctic
landscape, so little infrastructure already (or soon to be) in place to support such
operations, and such limited capacity even among the Arctic Five to undertake
and sustain Arctic operations of any kind, be they commercial or military in
nature. Moreover, while access to if not control over offshore Arctic resources
remains a strategic goal shared by quite a few influential countries located both
within and beyond the Arctic region, the probability of serious interstate rivalry
or, in the worst case, open conflict in pursuit of this objective seems quite low, at
least in the near- to mid-term future. In the first place, the vast majority of
hydrocarbon deposits locked in the Arctic seabed are concentrated within the
sovereign territory of one or another of the Arctic Five, where ownership is clear
and undisputed. Secondly, while there are disagreements over who owns various
resource-rich areas where two or more exclusive economic zones and potential
ECSs appear to overlap, the 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia over
how best to divide a sector they both claimed in the Barents Sea, together with a
commitment by the Arctic Five in 2008 to abide by procedures set forth in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for determining the dimensions of
each countrys ECS, suggest that a peaceful settlement of any territorial dispute
is more likely than not. Third, and finally, the sheer expense and technical
challenges involved in extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources from the
Arctic ocean floor argue for a joint, collaborative effort among interested parties,
Arctic and non-Arctic alike, as opposed to a go it alone, unilateralist approach.
No Russia War
No Russia War three reasons
Aron 07, Resident scholar and the director of Russian Studies at AEI, 6/29 (Leon, The United
States and Russia, http://aei.org/publications/pubID.24606,filter.all/pub_detail.asp)
Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains very
remote for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries geopolitical
assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear
nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground
and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the restorationist foreign policy
notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the
foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear
superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of
one of the worlds great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a
worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to
cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the
attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to
ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end. Lastly, despite the muscular
rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and
China today, Russia is not a revisionist power. It does not seek radically to reshape
the geopolitical balance of forces in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is
unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different
ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in todays Russia flush with
petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten
times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia
that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every
revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity,
Russias defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what
the U.S. spent ($522 billion).[18]
Our nuclear deterrent checks conflict.

Lieber and Press 06 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, from Foreign Affairs, March/April
2006, The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-us-nuclear-primacy.html
For almost half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a
military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the
nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and
sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by
launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount
to committing suicide. [LEIBER AND PRESS CONTINUE PARAGRAPH LATER] This debate may
now seem like ancient history, but it is actually more relevant than ever -- because the age
of MAD is nearing an end. Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States
stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for
the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with
a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a
series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous
decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear
forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase
the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will
live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.
US-Russia war doesnt go nuclear. Nuclear weapons prevents

conventional conflict and miscalculation
Madison 06 - US Navy Lieutenant, (Peter N ,THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: REGIONAL
REACTION TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN, 3/1 Naval Postgraduate School Thesis,
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445779)//BJ
Owing to the vast destruction nuclear weapons can generate, they have ironically
guaranteed security for the nations that possess them. Any attack against a nuclear
state carries the risk of provoking a devastating response. Consequently, the benefits
and dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation have been debated for decades. Perhaps the
most debatable point is whether more nuclear states advance or weaken world security.
Naturally, this issue remains moot. Yet, one must concede that the world has judiciously
avoided the use of nuclear weapons for sixty years, suggesting the avoidance is
attributable to more than luck. Professor Jan Breemer of the Navy War College
asserts that at some point, luck loses its random nature and reflects skill.10 / 1.
Nuclear Optimists: More May Be Better11 / Nuclear Optimists advocate a gradual
increase in the number of nuclear states. They argue that a cautious increase does
not correspond to an increased likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. They
further contend that this gradual spread is far better than if it were rapid or
nonexistent.12 Supporters point to over sixty years in which deterrence helped prevent
nuclear conflict. According to Professor Kenneth Waltz of the University of California
at Berkeley, The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had
been known in modern history.13 Indeed, there has been no general war in this
period, in spite of a variety of confrontations that could lead to rapid escalation
and conflict.14 Instead nuclear weapons made nuclear war an unlikely
possibility.15 / Professor Waltz argues that if deterrence produces the ideal, then the
opposite must be correct: not having a clear balance of terror preventing a misstep
leads to uncertainty of action by a state. He states that defeated countries like
Germany following World War II, which fought conventionally, will at the very
worst survive with limited suffering. Nuclear deterrence assures a totality of
defeat; therefore, no rational actor will risk destruction.16 Instead of instability
and uncertainty, nuclear weapons increase stability and certainty, making
miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent predictions easy.17
Russia needs Western technology to exploit Arctic Oil ensures Arctic peace.
Pate 10 US Air Force Major, Master of Arts in Security Studies (Chad P., Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic
Solution, writing for Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010; http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038)//AB
With the United States emerging from a recession, there is little chance that that the military
buildup outlined in NSPD-66 and the Navy Arctic Roadmap will come to fruition. Businesses
in the United States stand to gain from investment overseas, yet Russia has traditionally
made such investment difficult and unpredictable.49 A key issue with Arctic oil and natural
gas exploration is that Russian industry technology lags at least 10 years behind its Western
counterparts.50 Because of this lag, Russia has in the past allowed Western
corporations to share in its energy resources in exchange for technological
assistance only to mistreat the investors later on and force them out. As will be explained in Chapter
III, Russias energy resources are dwindling so it is essential that the state bring new
production locations on line as soon as possible. Because of this need, the Russian
leadership may consider reducing the barriers to investment and accept that the
nation will reap fewer rewards as Western corporations share their technology.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential for establishing a capitalist peace
between Russia and its Arctic neighbors against the backdrop of Russias declining
hydrocarbon extraction capabilities. The works hypothesis is that there is little potential
for conflict in the Arctic due to Russias inability to harvest the newly uncovered
hydrocarbons on its own. With Western corporations possessing the necessary
technology, Russian aggression in the North would likely block the inflow of FDI
and harm the states long-term economic viability. If economic
interconnectedness is established, the resultant capitalist peace would likely ease
tensions in the region and the United States may not be forced to increase
significantly its military presence in the North, thereby allaying realist concerns
regarding the imbalance of Arctic military power. Intentional or accidental
encroachment by the enlarged Russian military into sensitive U.S. areas would be less likely
to escalate beyond diplomatic exchanges with the nations linked by economic bonds.
Without the ability to counter the Russian military directly should tensions escalate, relying
on globalized production platformswhat Brooks argues is a reserve stabilizer may offer
an alternative means of maintaining the security of the United States northernmost
border.51 48
Russia wont go to war with the US it would kill their industry.
Pate 10 US Air Force Major, Master of Arts in Security Studies (Chad P., Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic
Solution, writing for Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010; http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038)//AB
In sum, interstate relationships based on economic bonds have proven to be effective

deterrents to fatal conflict initiation. The strongest deterrent force occurs between dyads
that experience high levels of FDI with one another. Still significant, however, is how the
desire to attract FDI prevents potentially aggressive states from initiating conflict even
outside of the FDI-sending and receiving relationship. The destabilizing effect of war makes
investment risky, thereby causing states not directly involved in the conflict to be reluctant
to invest in such an environment. Russias stock market, for example, dropped to its lowest
level in two years as a result of Russias 2008 conflict with Georgia.47 If significant FDI is
established between Russia and the United States, the potential for the nations to engage in
a military dispute may be reduced. If such investment cannot be established, Russia may
still be reluctant to initiate conflict with the United States because doing so might
deter other states from investing in Russias industry.
Binding legal agreements prevent Arctic conflict their evidence is based on

a flawed assumption of Russian hostility.
Holtsmark, 09 is the Deputy Director at the Norwegian Institute for Defense studies. (Sven G., Towards
cooperation or confrontation: Security in the High North, Research Paper, Research Division NATO Defense
College, Rome No. 45, February 2009 // JH)
Moreover, Western policy makers should set for themselves the ambitious goal of developing the area into a source
of stability, community of interest and cooperation between Russia and the West. A recent analysis of NATO-Russia
relations noted that, in order to cooperate, the two sides must shift their focus from "tactical differences" to
"broader strategic aims and first-order issues. Their first-order ambition should be to agree on "a desired end
state" reflecting commonly identified shared objectives. The Arctic Ocean area, where numerous arenas for
comprehensive cooperation are still open, represents a chance to put these guidelines into practice. The shared
objectives in the High North must include final and permanent solutions to unresolved issues of territorial
delimitation and natural resources management and exploitation. There are, in fact, several factors that contradict
the often repeated pessimistic scenarios for the Arctic Ocean. As mentioned above, some of the most
promising potential petroleum reserves are in areas of undisputed national

jurisdiction. Even where this is not the case, there is agreement among the littoral states,
including Russia, about the need for multilateral solutions to regional challenges .
This includes support for UNCLOS as the overarching legal framework. The Ilulissat declaration points exactly in this
direction. The long history of successful regional cooperation on resources
management in the region, even between cold war foes, gives cause for optimism .
Apart from defining the framework for the resolution of delimitational disputes, this
approach calls for the further development of robust regimes for the handling of
issues such as ecological safety and living resources management , the challenges of
opening and operating new SLOCs, and the handling of security threats emanating from outside the Arctic Ocean
region. The list of challenges that can only be handled through cooperation between all the Arctic states can easily
framework regimes are already in place, so there is no need start from

a "blank sheet". Alarmist scenarios are often linked to pessimistic predictions of
be expanded. In most cases,
Russian behavior , and certain aspects of Russian rhetoric and action give legitimate reasons for concern.
So does the fundamental weakness of the Russian regime in terms of domestic legitimacy, and the ability and will
to withstand pressures towards authoritarian solutions. Up until now, however, Russian foreign policy
statements and strategy documents regularly emphasize the primary role of

international law and multilateralism in international relations . Despite the harsh tone,
this message was at the core of then President Putin's much-discussed Munich
speech in February 2007," and less confrontationally in President Medvedev's proposal in the summer of
2008 of new European security architecture." Such statements should not be routinely dismissed as simple
expressions of a fundamentally anti-American and anti-Western agenda. It may well be that Russian policy makers
realize that adherence to international law and collective solutions are in fact in Russia's own vital interest. If so,
this would be in line with the traditional behavior of middle-sized powers or powers with limited power projection
capabilities." Even the military operation against Georgia in August 2008 does not necessarily contradict this
interpretation of Russia's fundamental foreign and security policies. However controversial and possibly misguided,
legal arguments have been at the forefront of Russian justifications of their

actions towards Georgia. The preferred Russian comparison between Kosovo and South Ossetia is not
altogether without relevance. Stating this does not imply any sympathy with Russia's instrumental use of the South
Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, or the behavior of Russian troops in the field. However, given that the
Russian interpretation of the events leading up to and following NATO's (1999)

and Russia's (2008) interventions diverge substantially from the dominant
Western view, and not merely for instrumental reasons, it is important to remind
oneself of the importance of sometimes elusive perceptions as a key factor in
state actors' policies. This being said, lingering uncertainties about the future Russian posture is one reason
why there is more to High North security than creating frameworks for regional cooperation.
Wars Inev Negotiations Impossible

Arctic negotiations impossible-too many issues
Young 13 (Young, Oran R- Professor and Codirector of the Program on Governance for
Sustainable Development at the Bren School of Environmental Science and Managemen.
"The Evolution of Arctic Evolution Governance." (272): n. pag. Aug. 2013. Web.
<http://ewcbookstore.org/arctic/2013arctic-08governance.pdf>. XM)
Given the speed of change in the Arctic in recent years and the prospect that
change will trigger a rapid growth in efforts to exploit the region's natural
resources and make use of its potential shipping routes, a number of observers
have called for the negotiation of a legally binding Arctic Treaty to ensure that
these activities develop in a peaceful and sustainable manner (Huebert and Yaeger
2006; Rayfuse 2007; Koivurova and Molenaar 2009). Such a treaty would take the provisions
of UNCLOS as a point of departure and build a more focused and integrated regime on this
foundation, addressing a range of Arctic-specific issues. However, there is little prospect
of such a treaty being negotiated, much less entering into force, during the
foreseeable future (Young 2011b). The Arctic states, and especially the AS, have
stated flatly and repeatedly that they are opposed to any such initiative. Efforts
to develop an Arctic Treaty would encounter knotty problems, even if the A5 were
not set against it. Among other things, issues would arise regarding criteria for
membership, the treatment of sensitive issues like the status of the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the rights and responsibilities of nonArctic states, and the status of indigenous or aboriginal peoples. Inevitably,
negotiations would be protracted; the U.S. would be unlikely to ratify such a
treaty, even if others were willing to participate
Wars Inev Russian-Canadian Tensions

Russia and Canada are locked in a struggle even if Arctic conflict is
resolved
Makuch 14 (Makuch, Ben-editor for VICECANADA. "Are Canada and Russia in a New Cold
War?" VICE. N.p., 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 18 July 2014. <http://www.vice.com/en_ca/read/arecanada-and-russia-in-a-new-cold-war>. XM)
A top Russian deputy in the Duma says Canada is in a new war without words
with Russia in a return of Cold-War era relations with the former Soviet Empire. As
tempers flare between the two nations dont be confused by one recent Global News
report inferring Russian military aggression toward Canada: If youre hoping to grab
your hockey helmet and granddads rusty .22 to go guerilla in the woods because of some
Red Dawn invasiondont expect a war anytime soon. The Crimean invasion of Ukraine
shows Russias increasing disrespect for Western drawn borders doesnt mean the Russians
are about to start WWIII by fighting a NATO country like Canada, whose very safety
implicates Americas own national security. That being said, things are actually
deteriorating between Canada and Russia in the diplomatic arena, which may
threaten Canadian national interests down the road. Prime Minister Stephen Harper
sanctioned members of Putins inner retinue and clamoured for Russias permanent ejection
from the G8, with the ex-KGB agent responding with his own list of banned Canadian
officials. Amidst the sabre rattling thousands of Russian troops are amassing along the
Ukrainian border, poised for an invasion, while Polish fears of convenient Russian army
exercises on the Kaliningrad border are growing. One concern outside of Europe for
Canada is its own, very real geopolitical conflict brewing with Russia over
disputed Arctic borders and the race to carve up the natural resources under the
ocean crust. One Kremlin insider is touting a list of Putins own red lines that, if
crossed, would trigger a sharp response from the superpower. In an article in
Vzglyad, Russian journalist Yevgeny Krutikov cites any further militarization of the
Arctic by rival states intended to reduce Russias power, as one of those lines for
Putinand thats a direct gesture to Canada and its powerful NATO allies. Canada has
kicked the tires on beefing up its aging navy and expanding Arctic capabilities
with stuff like stealth snowmobiles, but its nothing compared to Russian resolve.
Ironically, while Putin condemns western militarization of the potentially resource rich Arctic,
hes buying super-sized icebreakers, 40 new naval vessels, new nuclear attack submarines,
revamping his intercontinental ballistic missile system, and refurbishing old Soviet military
bases on the Arctic coast. We are seeing a much more assertive Russia. As soon as that was
happening, Canada needed to be prepared for Russia to play hard ball, says Rob
Huebert, an Arctic expert at the University of Calgary. While Huebert thinks Russia has
no interest in annexing land that isnt theirs in the Arctic, they may begin to
develop oil and gas along Arctic boundaries they consider their own, without
international consultation. The other thing is what Huebert calls increased
securitization of the Arctic to Cold War levels. In those days, NORAD bombers and antiballistic missile systems protected against possible warheads passing through Arctic
airspace. Youre going to see increased military activities in the Russian Arctic,
which they can do, and theyll be apologists about it and say: Russias got the
right to do it. Naturally the latest Crimean aggression is making critics wonder
where Putins appetite for land will lead next, with the Arctic offering the most
lucrative option: Estimates state there are currently 90 million barrels of oil sitting untapped
in the North Pole, and almost 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Like Ukraine, Canada
could never pose a serious military threat to Russia. In fact, beyond plans to build a new
refueling base in Nunavut for ships (which will only be manned in the summer months),
theres only a training facility housing 150 soldiers in the Arctic. In terms of Canadian
Arctic sovereignty, Huebert says Canadians shouldnt worry, but long-term,
Canada needs to start doing what we say were going to do, or risk land
integrity. That means actually building Arctic offshore patrol vessels and finally upgrading
the F-18 fighter jets (thats stalled because of the F-35 fiasco) for effective air patrols, things
the Harper government has been promising since time immemorial
Russia Says no
No guarantee of Russia alliance several Arctic options.
Campbell 12 (Caitlin, USCC Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs and Energy, China and the
Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles, 4/13/12,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-andtheArctic_Apr2012.pdf)
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic contains up
to 30 percent of the worlds undiscovered gas and 13 percent of the worlds
undiscovered oil resources.14 These untapped resources will become more readily
accessible as Arctic sea ice melts. According to the USGS, most of the potential oil and
gas resources in the region are located within the territorial jurisdiction of Arctic
states, and will thus be subject to the management and legal oversight of those
countries.15 Chinas territorial disadvantage, combined with its lack of cold-water drilling expertise, will
preclude any substantive energy acquisitions by China in the Arctic, according to several
analysts.16 Still, there will be attractive opportunities for Chinese energy investments in the
region. A promising destination for these investments is Russia.
China and Russia already have
extensive energy ties and could cooperate on Arctic energy
as well.** Speaking at the
2010 Shanghai Expo, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region in Russia - a coastal region which
accounts for over 90 percent of Russian natural gas production - welcomed resource
cooperation with China, saying *w+e are ready to act as intermediaries between an investor country
and the oil and gas sector and create a good investment climate.17 Another potential partner for
Chinas Arctic energy ambitions is Canada. In recent years, Chinese energy

investments in Canada have grown significantly, with Chinese state-owned
companies purchasing minority and controlling stakes in Canadian oil and gas
projects worth $16 billion in 2010 and 2011. 18 Meanwhile, Canadian policymakers seem to be
looking to Asia to diversify the countrys energy trade away from the United States (which is the destination for the
vast majority of Canadian energy exports).19 Norway is another likely partner on energy. During meetings
of the Bilateral Dialogue on Arctic Issues between China and Norway, discussions have been held on energy and
resource issues. Norways cold-water drilling expertise will likely be targeted by
Chinese energy firms looking to gain know-how and investment . However, some reports
suggest that current diplomatic tensions between Norway and China might hinder these collaborative efforts. Since
the Oslo-based Nobel Committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, China has
stalled or halted economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries.It has been reported that in response
to Chinas behavior, Norway might block Beijings attempts to gain permanent observer status in the Arctic Council,
a high-level intergovernmental regional forum that addresses environmental, resource, and climate issues in the
Arctic.These reports contradict a recent foreign policy address by Norways Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressing
support for Chinas application for permanent observer status.21 While gaining permanent observer status will not
allow China any decision-making powers in the region, it would grant China unrestricted access to Arctic Council
meetings.22
War inevitable. Russia-Canada tensions over north pole has gone

too far
Harding 13 (Harding, Luke-award-winning foreign correspondent with the Guardian.
"Russia to Boost Military Presence in Arctic as Canada Plots North Pole Claim." The Guardian.
Guardian News and Media, 11 Dec. 2013. Web. 18 July 2014.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/russia-military-arctic-canada-north-pole>.
XM)
The political temperature in the Arctic rose on Tuesday when Vladimir Putin
vowed to step up Russia's military presence in the region in response to a claim
by Canada to the north pole. In typically trenchant style, the Russian president
told his defence chiefs to concentrate on building up infrastructure and military
units in the Arctic. He said the region was again key to Russia's national and
strategic interests, following a retreat in the post-Soviet period. His comments

were a direct and rapid riposte to Canada, a rival Arctic power. On Monday
Canada's foreign minister, John Baird, said his government had asked scientists to
work on a submission to the UN arguing that the outer limits of Canada's territory
include the north pole, which has yet to be claimed by any country. The submission
will further assert that Canada owns the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea mountain range
between Ellesmere Island, Canada's most northern landmass, and Russia's inhospitable east
Siberian coast. Russia insists that it is the ridge's true owner. In 2007 Russian scientists
carried out a mission to the region and came back claiming the shelf for the Russian
Federation. Divers even planted a flag on the seabed. Last week Canada applied to the
UN commission on the limits of the continental shelf to increase its nautical
borders. Currently the five nations with territories near the Arctic circle Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US are allotted 200 nautical miles from their
northern coasts. Canada is seeking to extend its territory by about half a million
square miles .
Russia has too much interest to make concessions.

Anishchuk 14 (Anishchuk, Alexei-Reuters correspondent in Moscow. "Russia's Putin Wants
Beefed-up Presence in Arctic." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 22 Apr. 2014. Web. 18 July 2014.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-russia-putin-arcticidUSBREA3L1BN20140422>. XM)
(Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that Russia should step up its
presence in the Arctic and challenge other nations in exploring the world's largest
untapped natural reserves, days after it started shipping its first oil from the
region. Russia's ambitions in the Arctic have for some time been raising eyebrows
among other states vying for a presence there, but the Kremlin's annexation of
Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula is likely to put its Arctic plans under greater scrutiny.
Russia has staked its future economic growth on developing the Arctic's vast energy
resources and reviving a Soviet-era shipping route through the ice. The United States,
Denmark and Norway are also pressing for access to what they consider their fair
share of the Arctic's massive oil and natural gas reserves. Russia loaded its first
crude tanker from an oil platform in the Pechora Sea last week. "Over decades, step by
step, Russia has built up, strengthened its positions in the Arctic," Putin told a
meeting of his Security Council in the Kremlin. "And our goal is not only to regain
them, but also to qualitatively strengthen them." Moscow and the West are in the
middle of their worst standoff since the Cold War. The row centers on Russia's
annexation of Crimea and its support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern
Ukraine. Last year Putin ordered the reopening of a Soviet-era Arctic military base
in the Novosibirsk Islands, two decades after abandoning it, and Moscow has sent
10 warships and four nuclear-powered ice breakers there in a demonstration of
force.
Russia cant cooperateEU wont provide technical help

Lewis & Guarascio 7/23 (Barbara Lewis, Reuters Deputy Energy Editor for Europe,
Middle East, Asia, and Francesco Guarascio, Reuters European Affairs Reporter, 7/23/2014,
UPDATE 2-EU says could halt technology for Russia to develop Arctic oil and gas,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/ukraine-crisis-eu-arctic-idUSL6N0PY4EA20140723
|| Alice)
BRUSSELS, July 23 (Reuters) - The European Union should not give Russia technical
help to develop Arctic oil and gas fields if Moscow fails to help to defuse the
Ukraine crisis, EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger said on Wednesday. EU

officials have always said energy should not be used as a weapon in attempts to solve the
crisis over Russia's actions in Ukraine. While stopping far short of targeting physical energy
supplies, EU ministers for the first time this week raised the idea of restricting Russian
access to oil and gas technology. "If they don't try for peace in the east of Ukraine
... If they don't decisively try to do something to prevent escalation, then there is
no reason for us to help promote the growth of their industry and develop new
resources for gas and oil and therefore to put this equipment on the list of
sanctions," Oettinger told a news conference. "The Russians see offshore oil and gas
in the Arctic, for example, as a good potential for the future. But this can only be
developed by hardware and software from the West, by drills and ... equipment
that their industry cannot supply." A western halt in supporting Russia's
ambitious Arctic oil and gas developments could deal a blow to Russian gas company
Novatek, the country's second biggest gas producer after state-controlled Gazprom.
Novatek, which has seen one of its shareholders hit by U.S. sanctions, is the main developer
of the Arctic Yamal peninsula liquefied natural gas (LNG) export project. Novatek's Yamal
LNG project, which plans to export 16.5 million tonnes of LNG a year, is so far in the
Arctic North that it requires the use of specialised technology, often provided by
western partners.
Russia wont cooperateit looks eastward for Arctic development

first
Yedlin 7/29 (Deborah Yedlin, business reporter for the Calgary Herald, 7/29/2014, Yedlin:
Russia sanctions may be good news in Canada,
http://www.calgaryherald.com/Yedlin+Russia+sanctions+good+news+Canada/10071918/sto
ry.html || Alice)
Whether or not European and American sanctions affect Russias plans Arctic oil
and gas development, increasingly, Russia is turning eastward . The country
is looking to Asia not just for export markets for its fossil fuels, but also for investors
and technology providers for its Arctic oil and gas projects. Consider the Yamal LNG
project under development in coastal central Siberia. China National Petroleum
Corporation, with which Gazprom signed the long-awaited $400 billion, 30-year
gas deal in May 2014, holds a 20 percent stake in the project. Frances Total holds
another 20 percent stake, while independently-owned Russian company OAO Novatek holds
the remaining 60 percent stake. In July 2014, it was announced that South Korea
company Daewoo would build the nine LNG tankers that will be needed to
transport the resource to and from the gas field. Japanese company Mitsui O.S.K.
has already signed up to buy and operate three of these tankers. As such, Yamal
exemplifies the increasing participation of China, South Korea, and Japan in the
Russian Arctic oil and gas sector participation which sanctions will not affect. As
South Korea makes plans to turn into an oil hub for the Asia-Pacific, Russia could have even
more reasons to send its oil and gas east along the Northern Sea Route instead of west, at
least when ice conditions allow. Problems ahead for Arctic cooperation on environment, SAR
In short, commercial interests are facilitating Arctic cooperation as geopolitical
tensions freeze partnerships elsewhere. This is worrying for polar search and rescue
and the Arctic environment because its states rather than corporations that partner on
these matters. For instance, in March, events in Crimea put the planned Northern
Eagle search and rescue exercise between the U.S., Russia, and Norway, on hold
indefinitely. And in April, Canada, the current Arctic Council chair, boycotted the
intergovernmental forums working group meetings in Moscow. Those meetings were over
black carbon and methane, pollutants that threaten to have an increased impact on the
Arctic as industrial activities in the region increase.
New sanctions block cooperation

sthagen 4/30 (Andreas sthagen, Director for Norway at the Arctic Institute and
program coordinator/fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), 4/30/2014,
Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation?,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/04/impact-of-ukraine-crisis-on-Arctic.html || Alice)
First, the immediate and direct impact of decisions taken outside of an Arctic
context could hamper Russias strongest interest in the Arctic, namely economic
development. Sanctions put in place by the European Union and the United States
have the potential to affect the multitude of European and American companies
engaged in developing the vast resource potential in the Yamal, Nenets and Kara
Sea regions. Highlighting this, on April 28 sanctions were put in place by the US on
Rosnefts president, Igor Sechin [2]. This summer ExxonMobil alone is scheduled to conduct
some of the most expensive exploratory drillings in the history of offshore oil and gas
development in the Kara Sea through its joint venture with Rosneft [3]. BP is similarly
dependent on Rosneft after TNK-BP was incorporated into the Russian oil giant in 2013,
leaving BP with 19.5 percent of Rosnefts shares [4]. Should further sanctions be put in
place limiting western companies dealings with Russian energy companies, from
either the Russian or the EU/US side, Arctic economic development in Russia will
take a hit. Cancelling Cooperation In terms of direct cooperation in the Arctic sphere,
exclusion of Russia or the boycotting of various Arctic meetings by one or several of the
Arctic states have the potential to derail the relatively well-established modes of
collaboration that have developed in the Arctic. Canadas decision not to attend the Arctic
Council task force meeting in Moscow last week is a minor, but still significant symbol of how
Arctic cooperation is affected by the international crisis further south [5]. Similarly, Russian
officials were not invited to take part in a pre-meeting to the North Atlantic Coast
Guard Forum in Sydney, Novia Scotia on March 31, where the establishment of an Arctic
Coast Guard Forum was discussed. The planned Northern Chiefs of Defence (CHODs)
meeting scheduled for June in Iceland seems likely to be postponed as well, as could be
expected. The Northern CHODs forum is one of the few arenas, in addition to the Arctic
Security Forces Roundtable, where all the Arctic states convene to discuss hard security
matters. Consequently several of the informal and formal arenas where civilian and military
issues in the Arctic are discussed are put on hold.
No US-Russia cooperationgeopolitical tensions and sanctions

Fox News 7/17 (Fox News and the Associated Press, 7/17/2014, Russia slams latest US
sanctions over Ukraine as 'bullying', http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/07/17/russiaslams-latest-us-sanctions-over-ukraine-as-bullying || Alice)
Russia reacted strongly Thursday to new unilateral sanctions announced the day
before by President Barack Obama, with a spokesman for the country's Foreign Ministry
decrying what it claimed were "bullying" tactics by Washington. "We consider the
new round of American sanctions against Russia as a primitive attempt to take
vengeance for the fact that events in Ukraine are not playing out to the tune of
the script of Washington," the Ministry said in a statement. Earlier Thursday, Russian
President Vladimir Putin said in televised comments that the sanctions are "driving into
a corner" relations between the two nations as well as the interests of American
companies and "the long-term national interests of the U.S. government and
people." Putin warned Washington that the sanctions will backfire against
American companies working in Russia. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in televised
remarks said the sanctions are throwing Russia's relations with the West "back to the 1980s"
and added that Russia "will have to pay more attention to military and security spending."
The penalties announced by Obama Wednesday targeted target two major Russian energy
firms, Novatek and Rosneft, and a pair of leading Russian financial institutions, Gazprombank
and VEB, restricting their ability to access U.S. capital markets. Eight Russian arms firms
responsible for the production of small arms, mortar shells and tanks also were hit with
sanctions. Included on the sanctions list were four individuals: Putin adviser Igor Shchegolev,
Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Sergei Neverov, Ukrainian separatist leader Aleksandr
Borodai and Sergey Beseda, an official with Russia's Federal Security Service, the
intelligence agency that replaced the KGB after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S.
penalties, however, stopped short of the most stringent actions the West has
threatened, which would fully cut off key sectors of Russia's oil-dependent
economy. But officials said those steps were still on the table if Russia fails to
abide by the West's demands to stop its support for the pro-Russia insurgents
who have destabilized eastern Ukraine. Russia's benchmark MICEX index was down 2.6
percent in early afternoon trading Thursday, with Rosneft down nearly 5 percent. Moscowbased investment bank Sberbank-CIB said in a note to investors that Russian companies
cannot replace long-term loans from the U.S. immediately. "While Asian and Middle Eastern
money can step in to fill the gap, we expect that this will take time," the note said, adding
that borrowing will also cost more. Rosneft has a multibillion-dollar deal with ExxonMobil,
which among other things allowed Exxon to develop lucrative oil fields in Russia. "We gave
this American company the right to work on the shelf," Putin said in Brazil, referring to
Exxon's potential exploration on the Russian Arctic shelf. "So, what, the United States does
not want it to work there now?" Putin made no mention of the additional sanctions levied
Wednesday by the 28-nation European Union, which urged the European Investment Bank to
sign no new financing agreements with Moscow and was suspending operations in Russia
financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. European nations have
much closer energy and other economic ties with Russia and have not imposed as tough
sanctions as the United States. But the foreign ministry did lash out at the EU's new
sanctions, accusing Europe of "giving in to the bullying of the U.S. administration." Igor
Sechin, Rosneft's CEO and a close confidante of Putin, dismissed the U.S. sanctions as
"unfounded, subjective and unlawful," adding that his company "had no role in the events in
Ukraine."
No cooperationsanctions prevent financial transactions

Forger 7/23 (Pat Forgey, reporter for the Alaska Dispatch, a news organization based in
Anchorage, AK, 7/23/2014, Russia's Rosneft won't be a partner in Pt. Thomson gas field,
http://www.adn.com/article/20140723/russias-rosneft-wont-be-partner-pt-thomson-gas-field
|| Alice)
JUNEAU - Russia's Rosneft oil company, facing U.S. sanctions following Russia's
seizure of part of neighboring Ukraine, won't be buying part of the huge Point
Thomson natural gas field on Alaska's North Slope, Exxon Mobil said Wednesday.
Rosneft, one of the world's top oil producers along with Exxon, received the option earlier
this year as part of an agreement the two companies signed to expand their strategic
cooperation in the Arctic. But now, Exxon says Rosneft won't be part of the
development of Point Thomson. "Rosneft had evaluated the opportunity, and elected not to
participate," said Kimberly Jordan, an Exxon spokeswoman for the company segment that
includes Point Thomson and other Alaska operations. Russia has become increasingly
controversial lately, especially with the shooting down of a Malaysian passenger
airliner, apparently by pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine. But the new U.S.
sanctions this week stem from earlier Russian actions, including its seizure of the
Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula, according to the U.S. Department of State. Earlier
sanctions had targeted individual Russians, including Igor Sechin, president of Rosneft as an
individual, but not the company. Sechin is reported to be a close ally of Russian President
Vladimir Putin, and Rosneft is majority-owned by the Russian government. The latest
sanctions now target Rosneft itself, and limit some financial transactions it may
make, complicating its ability to conduct business in the world outside of Russia.
Department of Natural Resources Commissioner Joe Balash said that before
Rosneft, or any other company, can control Alaska leases, it needs state approval.
Even before the U.S. sanctions, Balash said Alaska would have looked particularly closely at
Rosneft because of its role not just as a investor, but also a potential competitor.
Russia says no-policies are way too anti-US

Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research
Fellows and PhDs in Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International
Energy Security, Oct 30 2008, The Heritage Foundation The New Cold
War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic)
inadequate.
Hegemony
US Cant Compete
The US cant pursue its claims independently cant compete with
the Russians.
Mitchell, 14 (Jon, Foreign Policy Journal, 4/23/14, Russias Territorial Ambition
and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic,
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/04/23/russias-territorial-ambition-and-increasedmilitary-presence-in-the-arctic/, AS)
Although the Arctic holds a mass of the worlds oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location
makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on
developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the countrys continental shelf. In addition, Russia
is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking
in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to

display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian
domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant
budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the
United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology. Putin and the Russian
Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation
for a potential military buildup in the Arctic provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient
budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up
vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements
for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic
Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must
be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as
search and rescue. The United States will not be able to fully compete with a country
that is heavily investing in the Arctic region particularly due to budget constraints and lack of
Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial
claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council not by
entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.
Too late
Too lateChina and Russia have already signed an Arctic gas deal
Bennett 7/4 (Mia Bennett, Arctic writer, 7/4/2014, China-Russia Gas Deal Win for Arctic,
The Maritime Executive Magazine, The Maritime Executive Magazine || Alice)
The $400 billion, 30-year China-Russia gas deal signed in Shanghai on May 21 has
sparked a lot of excitement about hydrocarbons in the Russian Arctic and subArctic. Under the agreement, which had been in the works for a decade, Gazprom will supply China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) with 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually beginning in 2018. The deal fulfills Russias goal,
as outlined in its Energy Strategy to 2030 (in English), to increase exports to Asia.
By 2030, the strategy envisions that eastern-bound exports of oil will constitute
22-25 percent (as opposed to the current 6 percent), and gas 19-20 percent as
opposed to the current 0 per cent. (Note: Since Russia already exports natural gas to Japan and South Korea
from Sakhalin, I am not sure why the reports current figure for natural gas exports to East Asia is 0 percent.) Much of this gas will be
delivered through a new pipeline that Gazprom is constructing from the Siberian gas fields of Kovykta (Irkutsk) and Chayanda
(Yakutsk) to the Chinese border. A couple of other pipelines will also need to be built, as this handy map from the Washington Post
illustrates. Reflecting the hype surrounding the potential for Russian energy exports to the east, bookings for the Sakhalin Oil and
Gas conference, happening later this year in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, are already four times what they were last year. It may be these
resources in sub-Arctic areas like Sakhalin that are developed thanks to the China-Russia gas deal not yet the ones in the offshore
Arctic. As Elizabeth Buchanan writes over at the East Asia Forum, the deal allows for the delay in SinoRussian exploration of
offshore Arctic energy reserves a challenging and environmentally hazardous endeavor, which will require more time to develop
the necessary technology. In the meantime, the large gas reserves in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East can sooner be
So perhaps the biggest consequence of the China-Russia gas deal is

increased development of sub-Arctic oil and gas fields in the Russian Far East in
the short term while setting a precedent for cooperation between the two
countries that can be expanded to the Arctic in the long term. With its stillbooming economy, China is hungry for not just Russias oil and gas resources, but
those of the wider Arctic region, too. Several state-owned Chinese oil companies have interests in Arctic
brought onstream.
hydrocarbon development. CNPC has a 20 percent stake in the Yamal project, which is in the Arctic. Once Yamal is up and running,
during the summer months, gas will be transported east along the Northern Sea Route to Asia (in ice-class 7 LNG tankers to be built
by South Korean company Daewoo). In winter, the LNG will travel west to Europe. CNPC is also partnering with Rosneft to explore
three fields in the Barents and Pechora Seas. And in Iceland, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is partnering with the
countrys Eykon Energy to explore the Dreki oil field off the islands northeast coast.
Chinese linkages between

energy, defense, and the north Reflecting the linkages between energy security,
defense, and the Arctic for China, earlier this month, a Chinese military think tank
issued its 54,000-word Strategy Assessment 2013, which has a definite focus on
the Arctic, among other regions. I havent been able to locate the assessment online, but this article from China
News (in Mandarin) by reporter Tao Shelan sums up its polar content. While Taos entire article is worth reading or running through
Google Translate, one particularly important section explains the Arctics geoeconomic potential for China: China
is
located in the northern hemisphere and has an important strategic interest in the
Arctic related to the sustainable development of the national economy and
national security. The rich oil and gas resources in the Arctic and convenient shipping conditions for ensuring sustainable
economic development in China are important. The future of the Arctic is expected to become Chinas important energy supply base
overseas. China will follow the equality and mutual benefit, cooperation and win-win principle, countries with Arctic energy
cooperation.
China is concerned about the potential impact of accelerated melting of

Arctic ice on the global economy and trade. The Arctic route may constitute a
huge impact on Chinas future maritime shipping, hope and pragmatic
cooperation with Arctic countries, mutual benefit and win-win. It may be win-win,
but with many analysts thinking China got the better end of the deal in
negotiations with Gazprom, some countries will win more than others . China: No fear of
pipelines to Russia With its long, eastward facing coast and land borders with multiple hydrocarbon-producing countries, Chinas
ability to pursue numerous oil and gas options gives it an immense amount of flexibility and leverage in negotiating deals. Vladimir
Portyakov, deputy director of the official Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Moscow, stated in an interview with the Christian Science
Monitor, Its an issue of national security for China. Sea routes for oil and liquefied natural gas are vulnerable. Much better to have
it directly delivered in pipelines from a neighboring state. China, however, is likely acting more out of a desire to simply diversify its
sources of oil and natural gas rather than shift away from maritime transport of hydrocarbons. Regardless, Chinas deal with Russia
shows its continued faith in building pipelines to Russia and through the restive autonomous province of Xinjiang to Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan despite the geopolitical insecurities inherent within these fixed infrastructures that make many smaller
European countries uneasy. Just as China invests more in pipelines, countries like Lithuania (100 percent reliant on Russian gas
imports) are seeking to move away from them and instead build LNG import terminals such as Klaipda on the Baltic Sea. And for
Russia, the gas deal exemplifies the energy sectors pivot to Asia, which is happening for both political and geographic reasons. One,
as noted above, many countries in Europe are increasingly viewing Russian gas supplies with wary eyes, even as they remain highly
dependent on them. Two, the fields in western Siberia that supply Europe are being depleted. As the Russian energy strategy
explains (p. 75), the depletion of the main gas deposits in the Nadym-Pur-Taz district of the Tyumen Region has led to the
necessity of developing new gas-producing centers on the Yamal Peninsula and continental shelf of the Arctic and Far Eastern seas,
in the Eastern Siberia and Far East. Russia has to look to Asian countries to buy the gas from these areas not Europe. Luckily,
China is not too worried about building pipelines to Russia, unlike much of Europe. Consequences for North American hydrocarbon
exports The Russia-China gas deal also affects prospects for North American oil and gas exports. Chinas deal with Russia could put
downward pressure on LNG prices in East Asia, where they are generally the highest in the world. Unlike oil, which is sold on a global
market, the market for LNG is regional. The deal between Gazprom and CNPC is rumored to be between $10 to $10.50 per million
As Reuters suggests, the

relative bargain that China won from Gazprom means that other countries like
Japan and South Korea, which are also interested in Arctic LNG and even gas via
pipelines to Russia, might not have to pay as high prices. This could spell bad
news for Canada and the U.S., which are eager to capitalize on high Asian gas
prices by exporting their surplus gas. Unlike Russia, their resources are trapped. They cant easily lay
Btu, which is almost 25 percent cheaper than the current $13 spot price in Asia.
pipelines across the wide Pacific Ocean. Canada has conditionally approved the Northern Gateway pipeline, which would send oil
and gas from Alberta across British Columbia to Asia but it will likely never actually get built in part due to indigenous and
environmental protest. And in the U.S., although the federal government has been issuing more permits lately to allow the export of
natural gas to countries with which the U.S. does not have a free trade agreement, these projects, such as the Jordan Cove LNG
liquefaction terminal in Oregon, wont be up and running until at least 2017. The winners: Asia and maybe the Arctic At the end of
the day, it looks like China and Asia are the winners. Russia has to settle for accepting a relatively low price for its gas the same
North America will have to settle for the crumbs if they ever
manage to build the pipelines and LNG export terminals necessary to export their
overflowing resources east across the Pacific. In the near term, the Arctic
environment may also be a winner. With the attention of China and other
investors now on East Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Gazprom-CNPC gas
deal could see some Arctic offshore projects put on hold. Then again, one should
never underestimate the ability of China to juggle multiple projects at once by
all means necessary.
price that Europe pays on average.
Oil
No oil spills from Gazprom
Lossan 4/24 (Alexei Lossan. reporter for Russia and India Report, Gazprom begins
extracting oil in the Arctic despite Greenpeace efforts, April 24, 2014,
http://in.rbth.com/economics/2014/04/24/gazprom_begins_extracting_oil_in_the_arctic_despit
e_greenpeace_effo_34767.html)
According Gazprom, the first batch was purchased by one of the largest energy companies in
Europe and the raw material was sold by direct contract. It is not clear, however, which
company this was. Gazprom had earlier provided assurances that oil under the new ARCO
brand would be supplied to the port of Rotterdam. !! Largest oil field
in 20 years discovered in Russia The field is located deep in the Pechora Sea, 37.28 miles
from the shore, meaning that getting to it would not be so simple in the event of an oil spill.
Specialized icebreakers maintain constant vigil next to the platform and a special
accident complex has been built on the shore in the village nearest to the
platform. Gazprom has issued reassurances that the construction features
completely preclude an oil spill during extraction, storage, or shipment. The oil is
stored in a special compartment with three-meter concrete walls a gigantic storage
chamber that can hold up to 94,000 tons of oil. Moreover, in the event of an oil
spill, the platforms interlock system should activate within seven seconds, and the
choice of mooring of a tanker depends on the wave conditions of the sea, the ice drift,
currents, and wind. Two new tankers, which can move astern (backwards) through ice, were
built in order to supply the oil; they were named in honour of the famous Russian actors
Mikhail Ulyanov and Kirill Lavrov.
Gazprom tech hurts Russian econoil extraction costs too high

Digges 4/23 (Charles Digges, editor at Bellona foundation, Russia opens oil sluices in
Arctic as rickety Prirazlomnaya platform begins production, April 23, 2014, Bellona,
http://bellona.org/news/fossil-fuels/oil/2014-04-russia-opens-oil-sluices-arctic-ricketyprirazlomnaya-platform-begins-production)
The cost of the project doesnt seem to balance out either. The cost of a barrel of oil
on the platform itself is $40, said Krutikh in his interview with TV Rain. Transporting it in
small tankers is very expensive and geometrically raised the price of the oil. If the
price of oil per barrel falls to $80 or $90, the project will not be profitable at all.
Nick Cunningham, an analyst for oilprice.com, wrote that Putin clearly believes that the
Arctic is an essential ingredient in its ability to maintain its position as one of the worlds
largest oil producers, adding that the Prirazlomnaya field is poised to backfire
economically. Russias Arctic prize wont be as big as many think, he wrote, adding that,
The project is costly and would not have been economical if the Russian
government had not granted it special tax breaks. But, even with heavy
backing by the government, Cunningham continued, Gazprom estimates that the
field will only be producing 120,000 barrels of oil per day, beginning in 2020. That
would only add about 1% to Russias oil production. Cunningham concluded that
the Arctic suffers from high costs, severe weather and a lack of infrastructure, all
of which will make it exceedingly difficult to turn the region into a major source of
oil production. Both Chuprov and Krutikh agreed that the rush to bring a tiny amount
of substandard crude to market from the Prirazlomnaya platform was sooner a
political than an economic move.
Solvency
The US hasnt ratified UNCLOS and thus cant develop the Arctic
Ocean.
Alaska Dispatch 11 ("Failure to Ratify U.N. Arctic Treaty Threatens U.S.
Sovereignty." Alaska Dispatch. 6 October 11. Web. 14 July 2014.
http://www.adn.com/article/failure-ratify-un-arctic-treaty-threatens-us-sovereignty, XM)
The melting of Arctic ice as a result of global warming has set off a race to capitalize on the
polar regions suddenly accessible resources and expanding navigable waterways. Yet even
as Canada, Russia and others stake their claims to this potential bounty of
economic and trade opportunities, the U.S. is choosing to sit on the sidelines.
Why? Because it wont sign on to the rules of the game: the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The opponents justify their obduracy by citing
a nonexistent threat to national sovereignty. The greater threat to the U.S. lies in
its continued failure to ensure it will have a central role on this new frontier.
Status quo solves scientific community and universities

Jorden 13 (Teri L Jordan, US Coast Guard Commander, IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. POLICY IN
THE ARCTIC, 2013, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and
General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pdf)
Perhaps the strongest and most robust US involvement in Arctic research comes
from independent researchers such as graduate students and universities using
USG grants. The University of Washington has a Polar Science Center. The University of
Colorado, Boulder has an Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research. The International Arctic
Research Center is at the University of Alaska Fairbanks.123 Additionally, the NSF
supports numerous Arctic research projects such as the one at the University of
Maryland Center for Environmental Science in which scientists deployed aboard
the USCGC HEALY and USCGC POLAR SEA.124 With all these different universities, both
in the US and abroad, it became apparent that collaboration of research was necessary to
document fully the tremendous changes occurring in the Arctic. During the mid-1990s, a
professor from the University of Washingtons Polar Science Center began reaching
out to other institutions and individual scientists to form a group that later
became the Study of Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH) program. With the
NSFs backing, SEARCH became an internationally recognized Arctic research
program.125 Together these programs have far surpassed the tasking in NSPD
66 HSPD 25 to [s]trengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and
build upon the relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other
nations. 126 Overall, the scientific community is doing an outstanding job
at implementing US policy. In this arena the US government did not lead

the way , yet, the Government eagerly embraced opportunities presented from
universities and independent research scientists and provided grant money. 127 As the
Arctic rapidly changes, so too does the nations academic community. Keeping the US active
in the international arena regarding scientific research and cooperation requires scientists
to deploy to the Arctic, often aboard an icebreaker.
Only a new treaty would solve the laundry list of issues in the arctic.
Watson 09 (Watson, Molly-University of Maine School of Law. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." (n.d.): pag. 333334. 2009. Web.
<https://www.mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/oclj/pdf/vol14_2/vol14_oclj_307.pdf>. XM)
While the opening of shorter navigational routes and the increasing accessibility of natural
resources, including oil, coal, and gas, may be advantageous to the economies of the Arctic
States, the melting of the polar ice caps will also result in global and regional climate
changes, increased sea levels worldwide, and detrimental consequences for the Arctic
environment and its native marine populations, which are of vital significance to the rest of
the world.186 Much of the dispute over territory in the Arctic stems from
uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge and scientific data regarding this longoverlooked region of the world. Each of the five Arctic States asserting claims to
the region are doing so on a variety of bases, from historical claims to scientific
claims, unsure of which will prove effective under international law. While UNCLOS
has been the international legal framework utilized in the Arctic to date, it will be insufficient
in addressing all the concerns that plague the Arctic, regardless of whether the United States
ratifies the treaty. The Arctic requires its own system of governance that can
address its unique features, as [n]o one wins if the region remains a lawless
frontier.187 The Arctic is too valuable and too significant to processes
throughout the world to allow it to remain unregulated. If the sovereignty dispute
is somehow resolved through UNCLOS or some other process without an Arctic
treaty in place, the entire world will be at the mercy of a few States. Whichever
States gain sovereignty rights will be free to fully exploit the region with the rest of the world
helpless to stop them. An Arctic treaty, however, can strike a balance between
preserving the Arctic of yesterday and developing the Arctic of tomorrow .
K Links
Arctic geopolitics is constructed through a discursive synthesis of
neo-realist and liberal paradigms of thought.
The focal point of this paper is the discourse of Arctic geopolitics, through which, we
suggest, the upsurge in space-making practices in the region takes place. These
space-making practices are evident in a wide variety of intercessions by foreign ministries,
militaries, intergovernmental organizations, corporations, scientific bodies, academic
researchers, self-styled explorers and think-tanks. In contrast to prevailing neo-realist
(and even liberal) formulations of the Arctic, we offer a reflexive exploration of the
ways in which the Arctic is emerging as a space of and for geopolitics. Our
argument vis--vis the emergent spaces of the Arctic builds upon but also goes beyond
recent interventions by geographers (Dodds, 2008, Dodds, 2010, Nicol, 2010, Powell, 2008a
and Steinberg, 2010) who have highlighted the multiple interests and high stakes at play in
the rapidly growing interest in the Arctic Ocean. In particular, we show how a geopolitical
analysis attuned to embodiment, the resolutely translocal, and the everyday can
contribute to a richer understanding of how, and why, the Arctic is suddenly so
prominent in national, inter-national and circumpolar politics. While we retain the
concept of discourse as a central element of critical geopolitical investigation, we
use this to signify more than the reproduction of geopolitics via representational practices
(McConnell, 2009 and Thrift, 2000). We conceptualize discourse as an iterative
interplay between representational, embodied and performative practices and the
materialization of space (Mller, 2008 and Pain and Smith, 2008). Thus, we see Arctic
geopolitics as neither environmentally determined by climate change and the
melting of ice (as many neo-realist accounts would have it Borgerson, 2008) nor
constructed solely within the power/knowledge networks of statecraft (as earlier
versions of critical geopolitics might suggest); rather we see Arctic geopolitics emerging
as a discourse a relatively organized assemblage of power/knowledge via the dynamic
assembly and networking of multiple elements across a wide variety of sites. While we trace
the widely reproduced story of Arctic geopolitics through climate change, the melting of
polar ice, increasing competition for resources and the like, we weave through this a
discussion of three examples (two Arctic exhibitions in London; the Russian Polar expedition
of 2007 and sovereignty patrols by Canadian Rangers) that complicate those orthodox
accounts found within academic and media circles. We identify two kinds of spatial ordering
entwined in the prevailing discourse of Arctic geopolitics. The first is of the Arctic as a space
as such. Here we draw attention to the various ways in which the Arctic is imagined and
performed as a distinct or exceptional space with its own properties. In particular, we
highlight how the Arctic Ocean (and the broader Arctic region) is constructed as an
opening and thus indeterminate zone in terms of particular environmental,
imaginative and affective characteristics, and especially in terms of a frontier
masculinity and paternal sovereignty (Gunn, 2008). This spatial ordering is
entwined with another ordering of the Arctic, as a space of and for state-building
and international relations (Koivurova, 2010). Here we highlight how the national and
international politics of the Arctic are produced as an uneasy synthesis of neorealism and liberalism. In this paper, both neo-realism and liberalism refer to
schools of thought in international relations which broadly assume an anarchic world
composed of states in competition with one another. While neo-realists and liberals
disagree over the capacity of the state to co-operate with others, both are vexed by the
absence of world government and the anarchical condition of world politics. Liberals tend
to be more interested in the possibilities of cooperation through regimes (Keohane &
Nye, 2000), while neo-realists are preoccupied with states and their national
security interests (Waltz, 1979). Thus, on the one hand, the re-opening of the Arctic
from the confines of Cold War spatial orderings was read during the 1990s as an
unprecedented opportunity to establish a new political order regulated via
democracy, freedom and markets, in uneasy tandem with concepts of sustainability,
demilitarization and human security. On the other, we show how the Arctic is
increasingly read in terms of the resurgence of neo-realism as geopolitical actors
allegedly scramble to reterritorialize an opening Arctic space (and especially the
Arctic Ocean) in pursuit of national security interests and resource competition.
The uneasy synthesis between liberalism and neo-realism, which feeds off and
animates the first ordering of the Arctic, presents a richly textured set of possibilities
and threats to a wide variety of actors across the region and beyond.
Realist discourses of the Arctic enable geopolitical interventions actors
securitize environmental issues to produce territorial sovereignty.
We identify philosophies of realism as underlying Arctic geopolitics; the existence of
the Arctic as a space, and its essential difference from other parts of the world (including
Antarctica), is remarkably taken-for-granted, as are the notions of an Arctic-specific
geopolitics and Arctic fragility (AHDR, 2004). Realism, as distinct from the aforementioned
neo-realism, is here used to signify faith in science and a philosophical
commitment to a reality that can be approached, if never completely comprehended
through empirical observation (Bird, 1998). This slippage between a term used in in
international relations (called here neo-realism) and one describing an approach to
science (called realism) is suggestive in an Arctic context. The discourse of Arctic
geopolitics carries within it a sense of the Arctic as a space distinguishable from others with
regard to the practices of geopolitical actors within it. For instance, it is a commonplace that
the Arctic is discernible from other spaces as a result of its extreme climate and
relative inaccessibility. Changes in this circumpolar environment and assessments of
relative inaccessibility are then seen to produce and perhaps even force changes in
the behaviour of geopolitical actors. However, if current theorizations of space
hold that space is produced relationally, it follows that the Arctic, as an exceptional
space, results from relationships between human actors and their networks. This
simple insight dovetails with well-established geopolitical understandings of power
and discourse: the designation of spaces as exceptional, or not, enables particular kinds of
interventions. Therefore, it is not climate change and Arctic exceptionalism that
produce geopolitical interventions, it is the identification of climate change as a

security issue, and the subsequent identification of the Arctic as a space of
exception, that enable geopolitical intervention as the region is re-staged as a state
of emergency. No discussion of Arctic geopolitics and the regions fragility is complete
without recounting the changing seasonal extent of Arctic ice, the opening of the NorthWest
Passage and Northern Sea Route in 2007 and projected dates for the Arctic to become ice
free in summer, along with the latest estimates of oil and gas reserves (framed as unproven
potential by the US Geological Survey) and outstanding legal disputes and uncertainties over
the delimitation of the Arctic outer continent shelf. All of these elements underscore the
extent to which scientific practices such as mapping and surveying are central to the
geopolitical constitution of Arctic space. Indeed, recent years have seen a veritable
boom in Arctic-related scientific research (Powell, 2008a). However, as work by geographers
has shown, research in the Arctic has long been constituted via constellations of
emotional and embodied practices as well as epistemic ones, and involved complicated
relationships between activities which were construed to be scientific whilst also
allowing some sort of demonstration of territorial sovereignty (Powell, 2007:
1796). This centrality of science instantiates a sense of the Arctic as a space of
the real a zone in which expert natural scientific knowledge provides an
authoritative guide that politics must follow. Despite the salience of science (as
manifested in the International Polar Year 20079) in close tandem with legal argument in
Arctic geopolitics, however, current understandings of the Arctic are also bound up with a
variety of gendered cultural images, fantasies and projections. It is crucial to take these, and
the popular cultures and colonial legacies with which they are bound up, into account if we
are to understand the constitution of Arctic geopolitics.
Emphasizing the potential of the Arctic is neo-realisms way of

pursuing its destructive fantasy.
The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further
highlights the dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical
discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus
forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the Russian flag-planting in 2007). We
suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to justify a strengthened
military presence in Arctic waters in the name of national security along with a range of
futuristic possibilities ( Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neo-realism feeds off the idea of
the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic space. It thus has an
affective as well as descriptive quality invoking a mood change and associated
calls to arms ( Dodds, 2010). This theme of fearing the future has emerged periodically
within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen Harpers famous use it or lose it dictum
traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of incursion by
the Soviets or the United States ( Dodds, in press, Head, 1963 and Huebert, 2003). The
disaster argumentation ( Berkman & Young, 2009) also underwrites liberal calls for a new
multilateral Arctic legal agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit
Arctic resources. In these representations, multilateralism denotes peace, prosperity,
stability and environmental rescue whilst national control and interest denote increasing
tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic openness is central to the

performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling sabre-rattling by the five Arctic Ocean
coastal states. The regions coding as a feminine space to be tamed by masculine
exploits provides an arena for national magnification. The remoteness and difficulty
of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where
overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages
can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As
we shall see, this is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of
the North West Passage. In this way the discursive formation of Arctic geopolitics is
also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent tendencies of states
towards conflict over resources, sovereignty and so on ideas that have been
subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but which are being
rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in which the
foundational myths of orthodox international relations are being reasserted. It
might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for
state politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being
reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it amenable to neorealist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions.
Accepting the premises of Arctic geopolitics risks both obscuring the liveliness of
Arctic geography (Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling
the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and their civilian and military representatives
have previously enjoyed security via effective territorial control and may establish it
once again.
The distinction between the status quo and the plan is a false one
either future remains embedded in philosophical realism.
It is perhaps a short step from the empiricist realism of Arctic science to the neorealism of much contemporary IR, which sees Arctic states in competition to assert
and exercise sovereignty over an opening and hence geopolitically undefined space.
Another small step leads to a neo-liberalism that sees opportunities (and
challenges) in such an opening for the extension of democracy, markets and freedom.
By this we mean that debates around global climate change policy are largely
framed through scientific discourse. Proponents of climate change policy
emphasize the role of scientific evidence and mechanistic understandings of
change (see, for instance, ACIAR, 2004). Opponents of policies intended to mitigate
climate change engage in this discourse through the introduction of contradictory
scientific claims or obfuscation about the nature of scientific consensus, never
directly disputing scientism. Discussions of climate change-related topics, such as
Arctic geopolitics, remain embedded in philosophical realism. This either takes the
form of mechanistic understandings of geopolitics and neo-realism, or a statecentric (neo)liberalism that sees state action in the Arctic as necessary to an ontology of
capitalist development. Arctic geopolitics is caught between such imaginations of
international affairs. Arctic liberalism forms one important organizing frame whereby
different political actors may observe and analyze Arctic affairs. Following Barnett and Duvall
(2005: 5), we suggest that Arctic liberalism revolves around the belief in the
possibility, although not the inevitability, of progress; that modernization processes
and interdependence (or, now, globalization) are transforming the character of global
politics; that institutions can be established to help manage these changes; that
democracy is a principled objective, as well as an issue of peace and security; and
that states and international organizations have an obligation to protect individuals, promote
universal values, and create conditions that encourage political and economic freedom.
Following the end of the Cold War, representations through which the extension of liberal
free-market reforms will bring peace and prosperity to the Arctic became increasingly
salient. A significant portion of contemporary geopolitical representations of the Arctic are
thus predicated upon the belief that the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity to
create a more desirable Arctic via a new normative consensus based on fundamental
liberal values and international agreements. This Arctic liberalism sat uneasily with
visions emerging from environmental and indigenous groups that suggested a
deeper questioning of the implications of political and economic modernization for the Arctic
(Dalby, 2002). Nonetheless, during the 1990s a geopolitics of hope (Sparke, 2005) was
frequently articulated in relation to the region. This was predicated upon the ending of the
Cold War, a reduction in the role of militarism in constituting Arctic spaces and the
establishment of new institutions (notably the Arctic Council). As the AHDR (2004: 208)
stated, the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the rebirth of connections between
northern peoples and societies, and the dawning of a new era of Arctic international
cooperation. Military competition was supposed to have been sidelined by regional
and intergovernmental cooperation and the pursuit of sustainable social development
facilitated by circumpolar institution building such as the Arctic Council. At least in some
geographical contexts (Finland and Sweden, most notably), the geopolitical arguments of
liberals (usually international lawyers) have become dominant. These liberals highlight the
role of international law in Arctic politics and point out that the actions of the governments in
the Arctic strictly follow the rules of international regimes. Liberals usually straightforwardly
critique the neo-realist interpretations of Arctic politics, the famous Russian flag-planting for
instance, as premised on incorrect understanding of international politics in the Arctic.
Accordingly, it is international law, not climate change, that guides contemporary Arctic
politics; not confrontation but cooperation and stability (Koivurova, 2009). The implicit point
in many liberal arguments thus is that the neo-realist threat images concerned with the
Arctic are not only false but also potentially dangerous. Within Arctic geopolitics the
neo-realist and liberal rationalities co-exist and are partly co-constituted. Both of
these rationalities are nonetheless predicated upon a view that the Arctic is
experiencing environmental change that inescapably leads to new geopolitical
reality. For the neo-realists this new reality forces states to adapt in a manner aping
earlier neo-Darwinian readings of international politics (Borgerson, 2008). This form of
reasoning is more than a journalistic conceit; it has gained currency in policy circles and is
consequently well-supported in academic institutions, think-tanks (e.g. Geopolitics in the
High North, 2008) and inter-state political agendas. The geopolitical dilemma for the
Arctic is frequently articulated in terms of whether the future will be
characterized by a conflict-driven race for Arctic resources and trading routes or
increasing international cooperation and indigenous self-determination.
Russia Link.

Another sign of neo-realist rationalities is the assumption that the region is
characterized by dangerous anarchy. One commentator has suggested that the Arctic
condition is dangerous because there are no overarching political and legal structures
that can provide for the orderly development of the region (Borgerson, 2008: 71). The Arctic
Council, created in 1996, is (as neo-realists remind audiences) a soft-law institution that
merely advises the member states and does not address military issues. As another US
commentator asserted, if ground rules are not agreed, the areas oil, gas and other as yet
undiscovered resources could spark conflict (Cohen, 2009: 2). Arctic geopolitics thus
recapitulates not just IR realism but the implicit determinism of environmentsecurity and climate-security discourses more generally (Barnett, 2000). The concept
of ground rule refers to an understanding that a great game is taking place in the Arctic.
In such a view, circumpolar states do not necessarily commit themselves to the rules of the
free-market world and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); the Arctic
appears as a test site for the international relations of the future characterized by scarcity of
energy resources. As the New York Times put it, the the free-market democracies with
scarce resources will confront free-market authocracies (authoritarian systems that fall short
of dictatorships) rich in oil, gas and other raw materials in the Arctic ( Cohen, 2009: 2).
Free-market authocracies of course refers primarily to Russia: actors who lean towards
political realism often cite the 2007 Russian scientific expedition (which was mostly
privately-funded by a Swedish businessman) as an attempt by the Russian government to
maximize its sovereign rights over hydrocarbon resources of the Arctic, or, alternatively, as
an invitation to a new anti-liberal geopolitics characterized by military means and the
claiming of territories (e.g., Peter MacKay, cited in Allick, 2010). We suggest that this
glosses over how Russias and indeed all Arctic geopolitical interventions
emerge out of embodied, performative and somewhat improvised processes of
state- and identity-building (see Dodds, 2010 and Steinberg, 2010). Russia is often
portrayed as an exceptional Arctic stakeholder, a circumpolar Other which is
partly following the ground rules of international community while simultaneously
creating its own path of political development that resonates with state-building
strategies in China, Iran and Venezuela. However, Russia (as distinct from the USSR) is a
relative late-comer to the region, with a discernible Arctic policy only emerging in 2007
2008. China, another plausible superpower in the Arctic, also seems determined to play a
role in the far north: China carried out Arctic research in 1999 and 2003, and in 2004 built
an Arctic satellite observation centre at New Olson, Spitsbergen Island, in Norway. The
construction of such centres has been permitted by the Norwegian government to the
original signatories to the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, and China, Japan, Germany, Italy,
France, South Korea [and the UK], among others, have taken advantage of the opportunity.
Chinas application to the Arctic Council for permanent observer status, however, was turned
down in 2009[.] (Ebinger & Zambetakis, 2009: 1230) As we discuss below, neo-realist
accounts that would attribute the much-discussed 2007 polar expedition to some sovereign
geopolitical master-logic must contend with a more complex picture that highlights
how the expedition was improvised, with its supposed geopolitical meaning and
significance emerging afterwards (Baev, 2007). This further underscores the
emergent, performative character of geopolitics and sovereignty, not just in Russia
or the Arctic, but everywhere.
Politics Link
Treaties tank PC
Alaska Dispatch 14 ("Failure to Ratify U.N. Arctic Treaty Threatens U.S.
Sovereignty." Alaska Dispatch. 6 October 11. Web. 14 July 2014.
<http://www.adn.com/article/failure-ratify-un-arctic-treaty-threatens-us-sovereignty>, XM)
Submitted to the Senate both by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and
recommended for Senate approval twice by the Foreign Relations Committee, the
treaty has yet to come to the Senate floor for a vote. It has repeatedly died
because of a small but vocal opposition that, arguing it undermines American
sovereignty, has made the treaty politically radioactive. President Barack Obama has
put little effort into supporting the measure.
Cooperation with Russia is unpopular in Congressrecent Malaysian

flight considered an act of terror
PressTV 7/19 (PressTV, English language news organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting (IRIB), 7/19/2014, Members of Congress accuse Russia of 'act of terror',
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/07/19/371954/congress-accuses-russia-of-act-of-terror ||
Alice)
Members of US Congress call the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 an act of
terror by Russia and demand tougher sanctions against Moscow. The Boeing
airliner was en route from the Dutch capital, Amsterdam, to Kuala Lumpur when it crashed
Thursday near the Russia- Ukraine border, killing all of the nearly 300 people onboard. Even
though evidence is still lacking as who was responsible for the crash, US officials have been
quick to point the finger at Russia. In remarks from the White House on Friday, President
Barack Obama said that the US believed the plane was brought down by a surface-to-air
missile shot from territory controlled by pro-Russian activists in eastern Ukraine.
Representative Eliot Engel, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, said the incident was an act of terror and that he would support
tougher sanctions against Russia if it is confirmed that the Kremlin had any
involvement. Senator Carl Levin, (D-MI) chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, called the attack on the flight an act of war. Sen. John McCain, a
hawkish Republican from Arizona and a vocal critic of President Obamas foreign policy,
suggested that more US involvement in the Ukrainian crisis would have prevented the
tragedy. For months McCain has called on the Obama administration to provide
weapons to Ukrainian forces to fight the pro-Russian protesters and impose stronger
sanctions on Russia. If we had given them weapons, perhaps they could have taken that
part of Ukraine back and that attack never could have been mounted from what apparently
was a base where they captured these anti-aircraft missile capabilities, the senator said on
Fox News. He also said that the US should move some of our troops into areas that are
being threatened by [Russian President] Vladimir Putin. Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), said
the missile came from Russia or it was from the separatists, and called for
stronger sanctions on Moscow similar to those imposed on Iran. "I think that this is a
crime. This is beyond a crime, she said. This is an act of terrorism, and that needs to be
held to accountability. Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) laid the blame squarely on Russia and said the
United States should bring one hell of a wrongful death suit against Moscow. The US
should make sure there is a significant cost paid by Russia for this action of
shooting down an international airliner with a weapons system that is directly
related to the Russian forces, Kirk said in an interview with CNN. The senator added
that intelligence indicated that pro-Russian forces in Ukraine would not be able to operate
the missile system without Russian assistance. That would mean that Russian armed forces
are directly involved in this wrongful death of roughly 300 people, Kirk said. Kirks comment
was in line with the Pentagons assessment that it was hard to believe that pro-Russian
activists acted alone. It strains credulity that it [the missile system] could be used by
separatists ... without some measure of Russian support and assistance, said Pentagon
press secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby. Kirby said the Pentagon had very strong evidence
that the flight was shot down by a surface-to-air missile from an SA-11 Russian-built system.
Arctic operations are unpopularRepublicans believe climate

change is a political ideology
Benen 7/25 (Steve Benen, American political writer, 7/25/2014, GOP lawmakers balk at
Pentagons climate concerns, http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/gop-lawmakersbalk-pentagons-climate-concerns || Alice)
In general, when Defense Department leaders alert Congress to a national-security threat,
we expect Republican lawmakers to take it seriously. Rebecca Leber reported this week,
however, Pentagon concerns about climate change affecting military operations
are being ignored by GOP officials. At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing [on Tuesday], a Department of Defense representative laid out how climate
change is exposing its infrastructure in coastal and Arctic regions to rising sea
levels and extreme weather, and that its even impacting decisions like which types of
weapons the Pentagon buys. This is only the latest in a series of recent warnings from the
military, which raised the issue as far back as George W. Bushs second term. In March, the
Pentagon warned, in its Quadrennial Defense Review, that the effects of climate
change are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty,
environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions conditions that can
enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence. In other words, increased drought and
water shortages are likely to trigger fighting over limited resources. Whats striking is the
Republicans indifference. In fact, its worse than indifference GOP lawmakers
arent just ignoring the Pentagons concerns about climate and national security;
theyre actually pushing hard in the other direction. Kate Sheppard noted a few
months ago that House Republicans passed an amendment to the National
Defense Authorization bill that would bar the Department of Defense from
using funds to assess climate change and its implications for national security.
Rep. David McKinley (R-W.Va.), the sponsor of the measure, argued at the time, The
climate is obviously changing; it has always been changing. With all the unrest around the
[world], why should Congress divert funds from the mission of our military and
national security to support a political ideology? The answer, of course, is that
climate change and national security, whether the right chooses to acknowledge this or not,
are inextricably linked. Telling U.S. military leaders they must bury their heads in the sand
because congressional Republicans say so wont help.
Consult Russia CP
Some notes: They cant read Russia says no because their case says Russia will say yes. The
argument is that not consulting with Russia would risk war.
CP Text: The USFG should consult Russia and then establish a

scientific hydrocarbon development mission in the Arctic to
facilitate cooperation with the Russian federation.
War Net Benefit:
Arctic cooperation key- unilateral action leads to confrontations with Russia
and risks war.
Cohen et al, 8 (Ariel Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D., and Jim Dolbow, Senior Research Fellows and
PhDs in Russian and Eurasian Studies Aand International Energy Security, Oct 30 2008,
The Heritage Foundation The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic)

inadequate.
Canada DA
Economy recovering now
Altman 14 (Altman, Roger- is an American investment banker, private equity investor and
former United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury who served under Bill Clinton.
"Surprise: The Economy Isn't As Bad As You Think." Time. Time, 17 July 2014. Web. 29 July
2014. <http://time.com/3000991/surprise-the-economy-isnt-as-bad-as-you-think/>. XM)
Nearly seven years after the onset of the Great Recession, the national mood remains troubled. Surveys find
entrenched pessimism over the countrys economic outlook and overall trajectory. In the latest NBC News/Wall
Street Journal poll, 63% of respondents said the U.S. is on the wrong track. Its not difficult to see why. Set aside the
gridlock in Washington for a moment and appreciate the weakness of the economic recovery: Households whose
finances were too weak to spend. Large numbers of unemployed workers who couldnt do so either. Younger
Americans who couldnt afford their own homes. Banks that were too broken to lend. Yet nearly a year ago, I wrote
an essay for TIME suggesting that the economy could surprise on the upside. That hypothesis looks even more valid
today. Despite the pessimistic mood, America is experiencing a profound comeback. Yes, too
many Americans are out of work and have been for far too long. And yes, we have a huge amount of slack to make
up. In fact, if the 2008 collapse had not happened, the U.S. GDP would be $1 trillionor more than 5%higher than it
is today. But in terms of the growth outlook, the news is good. Goldman Sachs and
many private-sector forecasters project a 3.3% growth rate for the remainder of
2014. The first half of 2014 saw the best job-creation rate in 15 years. Total
household wealth and private employment surpassed 2008 levels last year. Bank
loans to businesses exceeded previous highs this year. And income growth will
soon improve too. America is finally returning to where it was seven years ago. As
halting as the U.S. recovery has been, the economy is now leaner and more capable of
healthy, sustained growth through 2016 and beyond. Our outlook shines
compared with that of the rest of the industrialized world, as Europe and Japan
are stagnant. The 2008 economic crisis and Great Recession forced widespread restructuring throughout the
U.S. economynot unlike a company gritting its teeth through a lifesaving bankruptcy. Manufacturing costs are
down. The banking system has been recapitalized. The excess and abuse that defined the housing market are gone.
And its all being turbocharged by an energy boom nobody saw coming. Its not
just economic trends that are looking up: crime rates, teen pregnancy and carbon
emissions are down; public-education outcomes are improving dramatically;
inflation in health care costs is at a half-century low. That points to something I
did not foresee last year: that the social health of America seems to be mending.
Americans may still feel discontented, but winter is finally over.
Russia and Canada are competing over the Arctic.

Borgerson, 9 (Scott G, International Affairs Fellow at the Council of Foreign
Relations, 3/25/09, Foreign Affairs, The Great Game Moves North
As the Arctic Melts, Countries Vie for Control,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-movesnorth, AS)
Given the high stakes and pace of Arctic climate change, countries that border
the ocean are working to extend their sovereignty in the region. After its
controversial flag-planting on the North Pole seafloor in 2007, Russia moved to further
bolster its Arctic presence in 2008. In addition to strategic bomber flights to the edge of U.S.,
Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish airspace, the Russian navy began patrolling Arctic
waters last summer for the first time since the Cold War. On the eve of President Barack
Obama's first visit to Canada in late February, the Canadian air force scrambled fighter
jets to intercept Russian long-range bombers . The Russian federal government plans
to invest more than a billion dollars in the northern port of Murmansk, doubling the port's
capacity by 2015. Moscow also pledged last summer to build at least three new
nuclear icebreaker ships to join what is already the world's largest icebreaker
fleet. And much to the chagrin of environmentalists, Moscow completed a reactor vessel for
the first floating nuclear power plant in October 2008. Russia has developed a muscular
new national security program that views the Arctic as a strategically vital
territory. Last September, Nikolai Patrushev, the former head of the FSB (the successor
agency to the KGB) and current secretary of the Russian Security Council, declared that
"the Arctic must become Russia's main strategic resource base," and a forthcoming
Russian plan for developing the Arctic over the next decade reportedly threatens that it
"cannot be ruled out that the battle for raw materials will be waged with military
means." Russia is not alone. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper held a cabinet
meeting last August in the Arctic town of Inuvik, more than 2,500 miles north of Ottawa, to
pledge his commitment to defend Canadian Arctic sovereignty. In 2008, Canada conducted
its largest military exercise ever in the region and blocked the sale of Canadian
radar technology to a U.S. buyer on national security grounds.
The arctic is key to US-Canadian relations

Oran R. Young; Canada Artic Resources Committee Senior Fellow of the Center for Northern
Studies; 28th July 2010Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the "Special
Relationship" http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2.htm zp
The Arctic today is recognized as a strategic arena of vital significance, a fact that poses a mounting challenge to
the "special relationship" that has characterized interaction between Canada and the United
States during this century. The United States is expanding its military presence throughout
the arctic region and exerting growing pressure on Canada to co-operate with its
plans for the defence of North America against ballistic missiles fired from submarines sheltered in arctic waters and cruise missiles launched from
manned bombers operating in arctic airspace. In contrast, Canada is poised between the superpowers
in a region of rising strategic importance to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Canada must
also contend with the pervasive, though implicit, threat to its effective occupancy
of the Far North arising from the burgeoning U.S. presence in the Arctic.
Confrontations between the two countries over arctic issues could well become
severe enough to cause a considerable erosion of the "special relationship". In fact,
developments along these lines are almost certain to occur unless the United
States abandons its traditional attitude of benign neglect toward arctic politics
and the sensibilities of its northern allies, and unless Canada transcends its propensity to respond in a highly
emotional fashion to specific arctic incidents, like the passage of the U.S. ice-breaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage in August 1985. At the
the emerging arctic agenda also offers significant opportunities for

constructive dialogue between Canada and the United States if the leaders of the
two countries recognize the importance of arctic issues and move briskly to agree on
same time,
imaginative procedures to handle their arctic concerns.
Collapse of US-Canada relations causes economic collapse.

Burney and Hampson, Derek and Fen, Burney was Senior Strategic Advisor of Norton Rose, former Chief of Staff in
the Office of the Prime Minister, and Canadian Ambassador to the US, Fen is the Chancellors Professor & Director of NPSIA,
Professor of International Affairs, How Obama Lost Canada: Botching Relations With the United States Biggest Trade
Partner,June 21st,
2012.
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/howobama-lost-canada. JMC.) Accessed 7/10/12.

Economically, Canada and the United States are joined at the hip. Each country is
the others number-one trading partner in 2011, the two-way trade in goods and
services totaled $681 billion, more than U.S. trade with Mexico or China and trade
with Canada supports more than eight million U.S. jobs. Yet
the Obama administration has recently jeopardized this important relationship. It failed to
combat the Buy American provision in Congress stimulus bill, which inefficiently excluded
Canadian participation in infrastructure spending.
The impact is global nuclear war

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting
the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the
result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of
outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a
growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to
believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that
period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think
Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think
League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the
twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for
greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed
the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up
on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the
Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most
dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of
descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the
absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most
dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,
worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security
arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their
own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that
existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the
Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under
a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines
between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals
combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems
also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending
nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile
flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather
than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises
China DA
Arctic Link
Interest is growingthe plan crowds them out
Tiezzi 14 (Shannon Tiezzi is an Associate Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on
Chinas foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the
U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M.
from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua
University in Beijing. China Sees Arctic Race Heating Up http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/china-sees-arctic-raceheating-up/ Feb 21 2014)
Last Friday, the United States announced that it plans to appoint an ambassador to the Arctic region Secretary of
State John Kerry said in a statement that President Obama and I are committed to
elevating our attention and effort to keep up with the opportunities and
consequences presented by the Arctics rapid transformationa very rare
convergence of almost every national priority in the most rapidly-changing region
on the face of the earth. This week, Chinas media picked up the story, framing the
move as a U.S. gambit in what China Daily called a regional race to access newly accessible
natural resources. A Peoples Daily article tied Kerrys announcement to other recent signs of U.S. interest in the
Arctic, including last years Arctic National Strategy and plans by the U.S. Coast Guard to expand cooperative
relations in the region. Chinese media also noted recent Russian and Canadian
maneuvers. In December, Canada began working on submitting a claim of sovereignty over the North Pole
causing a Russian Federation Council member to respond, We will not give the North Pole to anyone . Against
this backdrop of growing competition, Chinese media were quick to assert Chinas
interest in the region. Though China has no territory in the Arctic, it has been trying
to boost its presence in the region. China recently was named an observer to the
Artic Council, whose members include the eight states with territory in the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. In addition to China, other observer states include
European powers such as France, Germany, and the UK, and the Asian nations of India, Japan, South Korea, and
Singapore. In addition to taking up observer status in the Arctic Council, China has been actively
seeking increased diplomatic and economic ties with Arctic states, hoping to
stake a claim to some of the resources becoming accessible as the Arctic ice
melts. But recent Chinese media articles are trying to counter accusations that
China is planning a resource grab. The articles emphasize that Arctic states welcome Chinas
presence in the region. A China Daily piece entitled Bigger Chinese Role Sought in the Arctic featured an interview
with Greenlands Deputy Foreign Minister Kai Holst Andersen. Andersen told China Daily that Greenland is in
discussion with two Chinese mining companies, and he hopes these negotiations could be an example for other
Chinese companies that want to cooperate with Greenland. He added that Greenland is definitely a mining nation
of the future, and he made it clear that Chinas help would be welcome in boosting Greenlands mining industry.
The Peoples Daily article on the increasing competition in the Arctic was actually
titled Arctic nations look forward to cooperation with China (an interesting switch from
the original Chinese title, which could be translated as Arctic Contest Heating Up). The piece ended with a brief
assertion from a Swedish researcher that China will make an important contribution to the [Arctic] Council. In the
wake of Kerrys announcement of new U.S. Arctic Ambassador, Chinese media made sure Chinas own stake in the
Arctic was clear. China will continue to seek increased cooperation with Arctic states
to secure a role in developing newly exposed natural resources. China has also
emphasized its scientific interest in the region, and the need for multinational
cooperation in solving Arctic issues. Whatever happens in the Arctic, China wants
to be a part of the decision-makingand to get a piece of the pie. Its more proof
that Chinas interests have truly gone global.
China is targeting the arctic

Struzik 13 (Ed Struzik, Canadian author and photographer, writing on the Arctic for three decades for Yale
Environment 260. Chinas New Arctic Presence Signals Future Development Jun 4 2013
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_new_arctic_presence_signals_future_development/2658/)
When China along with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, and Italy was granted
permanent
observer status in the Arctic Council last month, it left many experts wondering
whether a paradigm shift in geopolitics is taking place in the region. Until recently,
security issues, search and rescue protocols, indigenous rights, climate change, and other environmental priorities
were the main concerns of the intergovernmental forum, which includes the eight voting states bordering the Arctic
and several indigenous organizations that enjoy participant status. But the admission of China and other
major Asian economic powers as observer states is yet another strong sign, experts say, that the
economic development of an increasingly ice-free Arctic is becoming a top priority

of nations in the region and beyond. Five or six years ago, most people would have reacted
skeptically to the suggestion that China, for example, would become a major player in the Arctic, says Rob
Huebert, associate director of the Center for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and a board
member of Canadas Polar Commission. But in the past few years, China has been investing
considerable resources to ensure it will be a major Arctic power. Like other countries now
looking northward, it wants to exploit the emerging shipping opportunities and the
largely unexploited energy and mineral resources in the region. Of those non-Arctic
states admitted as observers to the council last month, China dwarfs the others in terms of its
economic reach and its global track record of making deals for resource
development from Asia, to Africa, to Iceland twice rejected a Chinese proposal to buy a huge farm, fearing it
was part of a plan to build an Arctic port. South America. To date, Chinas economic ambitions in the Arctic have
been largely thwarted by Arctic states wary of the countrys claim that the Arctic is the inherited wealth of all
mankind, and that China has a role to play in its future because it is a near-Arctic state. Iceland, for example,
twice rejected a Chinese plan to buy a 115-square-mile farm along its northern coast for a proposed golf course
resort; the island nation, which is located at the confluence of the North Atlantic and Arctic oceans, feared that the
proposal was part of a thinly veiled plan to build an Arctic port. And last year, European Union Vice President
Antonio Tajani flew to Greenland and offered hundreds of millions of dollars in development aid in exchange for
guarantees that Greenland would not give China exclusive access to its rare earth metals. Tajani unabashedly called
it raw mineral diplomacy. Canada has also been unsettled by Chinas reluctance to recognize its assertion of
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. But Malte Humpert, executive director of the Arctic Institute in
Washington, D.C., says Chinas interests in the Arctic should not be viewed as fundamentally different than those of
major Western nations. I dont think theres any more reason to be concerned about Chinas ambitions than there
is about anyone elses ambitions in the Arctic, he says. When it comes to environmental track records, it is easy
to forget that a lot of the major environmental disasters, such as oil spills, have been caused by Western firms.
Still, the consensus in granting China observer status in the Arctic Council, when a similar application from the
European Union was rejected, is I dont think theres any more reason to be concerned about Chinas ambitions
than there is about anybody elses. evidence of the growing importance of resource exploitation in the Arctic and
Chinas role in that development. Established in 1996, the Arctic Council plays an advisory role by promoting
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic States. As a permanent observer, China does not
have a vote on the council, but its mere presence means that its voice will be
heard. Its not because the Arctic countries have stopped being suspicious of Chinese ambitions, explains
Huebert. The reality is that China is too ambitious and too big to ignore. The fear is that
they would just continue going after what they wanted in the Arctic even if their
application was rejected. Who is going to stop them? How effectively members of the Arctic
Council will be able to influence or constrain the ambitions of China and other Asian powers in the Arctic is an open
question. The Chinese know that they need us for the resources, but they have also
made it clear that when it comes to their core interests, it doesnt matter who
their friends and allies are they will do what they need to do, observes
Huebert. Officially, China, whose northernmost territory is as close to the Arctic as Germanys is, says it does
not covet the Arctic for its resources, but rather has a genuine interest in the fate of the region. Chinas activities
are for the purposes of regular environmental investigation and investment and have nothing to do with resource
plundering and strategic control, the state-controlled Xinhua news agency wrote last year. But most experts are
skeptical of that contention. China, many experts agree, is eyeing the Arctic for three main
reasons, each of which has profound environmental implications. Chinas economy is heavily
dependent on exports. Rapidly melting Arctic sea ice is raising the possibility that
a much shorter sea route through the Northwest and Northeast passages will
save the country billions of dollars in shipping expenses. The distance from Shanghai to
Hamburg, for example, is 2,800 nautical miles shorter via the Arctic than via the Suez Canal. In addition to vast
reservoirs of oil, coal, uranium, and rare earth minerals, 30 percent of the worlds technically recoverable natural
gas and 13 percent of the technically recoverable oil lie above the Arctic Circle. Like other nations, China views
those resources as a means to fuel future growth. China is also by far the worlds largest fishing
nation. With sea ice disappearing, the Arctic may become a new and important
fisheries frontier. China hasnt been biding its time waiting to hear how its application to the Arctic Council
would be decided. In spite of Icelands rejection of the real estate deal, China recently
signed a free trade agreement with the tiny North Atlantic country and built a
new embassy there. Chinese resource companies have invested $400 million in
energy and mining projects in Arctic Canada and theyre promising to invest $2.3 billion and
3,000 Chinese workers in a mammoth, British-led mining project in Greenland. Chinese icebreaker Wikimedia
China has
increased its funding for Arctic research, set up a polar institute in Shanghai, and
in 2012 sent the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long through the Northeast Passage
above Russia and Scandinavia, presumably to determine the suitability of using
that route as a commercial waterway. It is currently building another icebreaker
and planning three Arctic expeditions for 2015. Oran Young, co-director of the Program on
Commons A crew decamps from the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long in the Arctic Ocean. Whats more,
Governance for Sustainable Development at the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, says many of these developments are an unavoidable fact of life that reflect
both the growing global economic importance of the Arctic and Chinas position as a pre-eminent economic force.
The Chinese are proceeding in the Arctic in much the same way they are proceeding in other parts
of the world, which is largely through economic initiatives, he says. They develop
connections that offer them the chance to develop natural resources. This is
especially evident in western Canada, where a third of all investments in tar sands projects since 2003 have come
from China. Responding to Canadian concerns, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper last December placed
restrictions on future foreign investments in the oil industry. Suspicious as some Arctic countries may be of Chinas
ambitions, each has signaled in its own way that the time for exploiting the Arctic has come. Norwegian and Danish
officials said as much at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, as did Canadian Leona Aglukkaq when she
assumed The Arctic Councils Leona Aglukkaq said a key focus will be on natural resource development in the
circumpolar region. chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May. A key focus, she said, will be on natural resource
development in the circumpolar region. The statements of U.S Secretary of State John Kerry has been a notable
exception. At the Arctic Council meeting last month, he told his colleagues that the Obama Administration was
making climate change and protecting the environment one of its top priorities. The U.S. National Strategy for the
Arctic Region lays out a plan that tries to be all things to all interests, including Alaska natives and
environmentalists; but it leaves no doubt that economic development in the region is now a priority, although it
vows to exercise responsible [environmental] stewardship. The fast-moving developments in the Arctic worry
environmental groups such as Greenpeace and WWF, which have pointed out that Arctic states have not adequately
addressed the risk of an oil spill and other environmental disasters in the Arctic if resource development and
shipping escalates. There are also fears that China which catches 12 times more fish beyond its own waters than
it reports, according to a recent study by the University of British Columbias Fisheries Center could quickly
exhaust an Arctic resource that hasnt even been quantified. That said, Scott Highleyman, international director of
the Pew Foundations International Arctic Program, suggests that it is wiser to bring China into the discussions than
to exclude it. Unlike Greenland which can reject Chinas plans to build mines, no one can tell China that it cant fish
in the high seas of the Arctic, said Highleyman. Oran Young agrees that a more inclusive approach is required if the
fragile environment of the Arctic is to be protected. The Arctic gold rush that many people were predicting a few
years ago is cooling a little thanks to developments such as shale gas exploration, he says. That doesnt mean
that the Arctic is not going to be subject to development, but now we at least have a little breathing space to
explore a number of different mechanisms that allow non-Arctic states with interests in the region to be consulted.
It is probably a good thing that China has been granted observer status in the Arctic Council. In that role, it cant
vote, but its voice and its intentions can be heard. To the Arctic Institutes Humpert, bringing China into the
discussion of the Arctics future is important. Allowing China into the Arctic Council is a way of including China in
the cooperative debate of the council, he says. Overall, I think there should be less focus on China and its, after
all, legitimate economic interests, and more focus on ensuring that any development, be it Chinese or otherwise, is
conducted to the highest environmental standards.
China influence triggers Russian responseshipping and resource

extraction
Junichi 14 (Takeda Junichi. Foreign policy and national defense journalist. Graduated from the Tokyo University
of Foreign Studies. Chinas Rise as a Maritime Power: Ocean Policy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping
http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/a00011.pdf Apr 23 2014)
In the Arctic, the Xuelong conducted five observation missions from 1999 through
2012, and in 2004 China established an observation base , Huanghe Station, on Norways
Svalbard Island. The Chinese are probably taking advance moves with a view to the
opening up of Arctic seaways as a result of the receding of the polar ice cap and to
participation in resource exploitation. The fifth mission made a round trip to
Iceland in the summer of 2012, passing through the Sea of Japan and Soya Strait to the Okhotsk Sea, sailing by
the island of Paramushir in the northern Kurils to the Bering Sea, and taking a coastal route through Russias EEZ.
On its return trip, as the melting of the Arctic ice cap had progressed faster than expected, the Xuelong was
able to take the shortest route through the central Arctic Sea on its return,
passing close to the North Pole; the vessel concluded its trip by passing through the Tsugaru and
Tsushima Straits. It has been suggested that Russia is concerned, in terms of both
security and economic rights, at the fact that the mission passed through the Sea
of Okhotsk on its outward leg and that it did not follow a coastal route through
the Arctic on its return leg.
Chinese Arctic expansion leads to conflictalliance is key to check

escalation
Rainwater 12 (Shiloh, senior Political Science major at Pepperdine, Race to the North: Chinas Arctic Strategy
and Its Implications https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/Race-tothe-North--China-s-Arctic-Strategy-and-Its.aspx)
Chinese grand-strategy literature, in short, suggests that Chinas Arctic strategy has
the potential to lead to conflict, albeit under limited circumstances. If at some point Chinas
economic momentum becomes heavily reliant on Arctic resources and shipping
lanes, a supply disruption could lead the PRC to deploy significant naval forces to
the region to secure its interests in order to avert domestic social unrest. Still, it will
be quite some time before the Arctic could become a key strategic theater for Chinas economic interests, providing
an opportunity for the Arctic states to formulate in advance policy in response to Chinas entrance into the High
North. CHINA LOOKS NORTH Chinas global resource strategy has led the PRC to the far corners of the earth, from
Venezuelan oil fields to energy-rich Siberia. Now, as a consequence of accelerating climate
change and the melting of the polar ice cap, China is increasingly looking to the
Arctic Circle for new resource-extraction and maritime-shipping opportunities.
Current estimates as to when the Arctic could be seasonally ice-free have varied greatly from as early as summer
2013 to as late as 2040; in any case, the Arctic is evidently thawing more rapidly than most climate models initially
predicted.46 In August 2012, for example, the National Snow and Ice Data Center observed
that Arctic sea-ice extent had reached the lowest level on record, prompting concerns
about the exponential speed at which the polar ice is disappearing.47 Chinese leaders are keenly
aware of this trend and are making calculated preparations to exploit an ice-free
Arctic. Since the mid-1990s, Chinas extensive polar research program has
spearheaded its Arctic policy. Under the direction of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic
Administration (CAA), the mammoth Ukrainian-built icebreaker Xuelong has conducted five
Arctic research expeditions since 1999, reaching the geographic North Pole for the first
time during its fourth expedition, in 2010. In 2004 the Polar Research Institute of China established a permanent
Arctic research station at Ny-lesund, in Norways Svalbard Archipelago, to monitor Arctic climate change and its
effects on Chinas continental and oceanic environment.48 The Huanghe (Yellow River) station serves as a physical
indicator of both the global scope of Chinas scientific interests and its entrance into the polar club.
Impressive as is Chinas polar research apparatus in its current form, Beijing is

eager to augment its operations in the Arctic. Chinas twelfth five-year plan
(201115) reflects this ambition, announcing three new Arctic expeditions

to be conducted before 2015. 50 Moreover, by 2014 China intends to launch the first of a series of
new icebreakers to join Xuelong, thus enabling the CAA to conduct more frequent polar exploration and research
missions.51 When the 1.25-billion-yuan ($198 million), eight-thousand-ton vessel sets sail, China will possess
icebreakers that are larger than and qualitatively superior to those of the United States and Canada.52 In addition
to constructing an icebreaker fleet, the PRC is acquiring various technologies essential to exploiting new economic
opportunities in the Arctic. China is building ice-strengthened bulk carriers and tankers
capable of commercial Arctic navigation, as well as planes that can fly in harsh
polar weather conditions, in order to expand Beijings aviation network into the
Arctic and assist in emergency rescue missions.53 Soon China may also be capable of
polar oil extraction, as it recently acquired deepwater drilling technologies,
although the Arctics residual ice sheet will greatly complicate such operations.
Arctic resources are key to Chinas economy
Sun 14
(Kai Sun, Associate Professor, School of Law and Politics Ocean University of China China and the Arctic:
Business and Beyond https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Faculty/Derek-Reveron/Workshops/Maritime-Security,Seapower,---Trade/Maritime-Working-Papers/sun-china-and-arctic.aspx)
Chinas interest in the Arctic has grown in the past two decades, and this interest is only expected to increase in
coming decades. Chinas primary interests in the Arctic are not only in real-world
practice, which includes the economic interests and business opportunities of a

changing Arctic, but also in academia, with more research projects on Arctic
social and natural sciences, and more publications in academic journals.
In recent
years, there has been an increase in Chinese writings on Arctic affairs from the social science perspective. To some
degree, this growing academic interest also relects the growing interest of Arctic
issues from the Chinese government. In a recent paper, David Wright (2011a)
summarizes Chinese academic writers on this topic, citing several prominent
authors who are vocal about Arctic studies in China: Guo Peiqing and Liu Huirong from the
Ocean University of China, who write on Arctic political and legal issues; Lu Junyuan from Suzhou University, who
writes on Arctic international relations; Li Zhenfu from Dalian Maritime University, who writes on Arctic passages;
and several others researchers in Shanghai who are studying Arctic governance. The rise of Chinas academic
interest in Arctic affairs is also shown through its institutional building in the past two to three years. For example,
in 2010, Ocean University of China founded the Research Institute of Polar Law and Politics, which is one of the irst
institutes dedicated to polar social science research. There are also polar research institutes at Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, Fudan University and Wuhan University. Chinas national social science research fund, managed by the
National Planning Ofice of Philosophy and Social Science (NPOPSS) is the highest level of funding agencies in the
country. Its suggested project topics are usually regarded as the barometer of Chinas governmental focus. Both
Arctic studies and Russias Arctic Policy and Its Regional Impacts are among the funding agencys 2012 suggested
project topics, and Arctic studies is also among the funds suggested project topics in 2013 (NPOPSS 2011; 2012).
Chinas State Oceanic Administration is another major source of funding, with a

Polar Strategic Fund set up in 2006, which provides funds for natural science and
social science polar research projects. In recent years, the funded projects include
more research from social science disciplines. In June 2013, The First China-Nordic
Arctic Cooperation Symposium was held in Shanghai with sponsorship from the
Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) and Chinas State Oceanic Administration
(China Daily 2013). The symposium was attended by more than 70 practitioners and scholars, and as a
result, a China Nordic Arctic research centre will be established. The research centre will cover studies on Arctic
climate change and its impacts, as well as the policy and legislation related to the Arctic. The melting of the Arctic
and the opening of Arctic passages and resources have also attracted quite a lot of interest among Chinese
businessmen. The most signiicant headline-maker is billionaire Huang Nubo, a
Chinese real estate developer, and his ongoing investment plan in Iceland. Huangs
investment in Iceland the purchase of a 300-km2 area in Iceland for a tourist resort, including a luxury tourist
centre with a golf course, villas and other attractions was irst announced in September 2011 (Mei 2012). The
original plan has met with dificulties from Icelandic Parliament and was changed from a land purchase into a land
rental agreement for 99 years development. Huang was expected to sign the contract in October 2012 (ibid.);
however, this changed plan was thwarted again by Icelandic oficials in late 2012 (Fontaine 2012). As Wright (2011a)
states, China is quite aware of the U.S. Geological Surveys estimates that 25% of
the worlds undiscovered hydrocarbon resources are found there, along with 9%
of the worlds coal and other economically critical minerals. So property development
opportunities, such as that envisioned by Huang Nubo, are but one kind of opportunity that the opening Arctic can
offer to Chinese companies. Beyond tourism, there are signiicant opportunities to develop Arctic resources in
partnership with companies from Arctic countries. Chinas state-run oil companies are pioneering in this regard,
joining the bids for Arctic resource development and investing strategically in Arctic resources.
General Link
Maritime trade and naval influence are key to Chinas economy
U.S. crowds them out
Tao 13 (Tao Haiqing, People's Daily Online Establish China's Marine Economy Development Systems
http://en.theorychina.org/xsqy_2477/201306/t20130611_270465.shtml Nov 6 2013)
On March 7, 2012the State Oceanic Administration announces that the State Council has formally approved the
National Marine Functional Districts (2011-2020) to determine the tone and goals of the development, control and
comprehensive management of Chinas ocean space in the next 10 years. At present, 95 percent of China's
foreign trade has been completed through sea, with more than 100 million tons of
imported oil through sea being been imported into this country. Ocean traffic has
become China's strategic economic artery. Meanwhile, China is also an important part of the
Pacific Rim Economic Circle. China Sea is a significant part of the North Pacific route via the Pacific Ocean up to five
continents. In addition, its offshore is a vital traffic line between Northeast Asia and
Southeast Asia. Sea lanes make China's economy closely link with the world
economy. Statistical data shows that China's 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters contain about 24
billion tons of oil and about 14 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. As an important growth pole in the national
economy, China's coastal areas, driven by marine economy, created 60 percent of the gross national product by
using of its land area that accounts for 13.4 percent of the country. Therefore, China should construct its
marine economy development system by actively coordinating the exploitation of

marine resources in accordance with people-oriented principle and with sea as its
source. Establish an integrated management system and break the region separation The ocean, a treasure
trove of biological resources and a cornucopia of mineral resources, is considered to be the second space of human
existence. The coastal countries, such as the United States and Japan, not only raise the ocean economy to the
national strategy, but also are equipped with a Ministry-level department to co-ordinate and manage the ocean. In
the 12th five-year-plan, China raised marine economy to the national strategy,
and clearly states that "promote the development of marine economy, adhere to
the land and sea to co-ordinate development, formulate and implement marine
economy development strategy, improve marine development, control, and
comprehensive management ability. This indicates that the economic development
of China's coastal areas has exceeded its land boundaries, extending to the waters and to
enter the co-ordination era of land and sea. But as to the present situation, China's existing marine management
system lacks integrated management. The fragmented phenomenon in China's marine economy development is
serious, such as the Bohai Bay, with 5800 km coastline and over 60 ports, owning a port on average less than 100
kilometers. Isomorphism causes regional repeat construction and significant waste of resources. Therefore, China
should establish Special Coordination Committee in charge of the marine economy at the level of Central
Government, intensify and draft the marine economic development plan covering all industries and regions, in order
to improve the ability of marine resources exploitation, to break the region separation, so that the development of
marine economy in all regions will promote in harmony, forming a new pattern of ocean management. Establish the
legal protection system and publish the Basic Law of the Ocean As the world's economic center is now transferring
to the Pacific, coastal states have set marine strategies and policies. Canada in 1996, the United States in 2000,
and Japan in 2007, issued their National Marine Basic Law to protect its own interests. The United States
comprehensive ocean legislation system has been in a leading position in the field of the world's oceans. In 2000,
the U.S. Congress passed the Marine Act 2000, set up an ocean policy assessment committee to reconsider and
formulate U.S. ocean policy . In 2004, the U.S. National Ocean Policy Committee submitted 21st Century Ocean
Blueprint report, which made by far the most thorough assessment of U.S. ocean policy and depicting the new
blueprint for the U.S. maritime industry and development in the 21st century. Subsequently, the United
States released the U.S. Ocean Action Plan to put forward specific measures to
implement the blueprint. Looking back at China, under The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and other relevant laws, China has jurisdiction
over more than 3 million square kilometers of ocean. In the Declaration on the Territorial Sea
promulgated in 1958, China issued over 80 ocean-related laws and regulations for 50 years, but China still lack the
basic principles throughout the entire marine legal system. Overall, China has no one similar to
Japan's Basic Law of the Ocean, to the disadvantage of managing national marine
affairs and safeguarding national maritime rights and interests. Wang Zhenmin, dean of
Tsinghua University Law School, said that the research foundation of the current domestic marine law is weak and
the talents are short. The future international competitions, whether on land or sea, will eventually be solved by
legal forms. As a maritime country, to really implement marine development strategy, and to change the current
sea situation segmented and controlled by many law enforcement forces, and properly handle the intricacies of
maritime rights and interests disputes, China must use the Basic Law of the Ocean to manage all the things. It is an
urgent task to publish the Basic Law of the Ocean as soon as possible. Establish the science and technology
innovation system and seize the commanding point in the marine economy The Marine economy competition is
essentially a technologic and talent competition. The Chinese government should increase investment in the marine
scientific and technological innovation, establish and perfect a stable growth inputting mechanism in the financial
marine science and technology. At the same time, start a project to train marine high-level innovative talent,
promote the marine talent strategy. Moreover, it is a top priority of the ocean science and technology innovation to
increase the research and development on key technologies of marine economy, capture research projects that has
a significant impact on the development of the marine industry. Liu Cigui, director of State Oceanic Administration,
believes that marine science and technology dominate the discourse of power and initiative in a new global ocean
race, determine the depth and breadth where a country develops and utilizes the marine. Marine science and
technology turns to lead and support the scientific development of marine economy and marine cause from the
"Eleventh Five-Year" period upholding the development of marine economy and the marine-based, and actively
boost the marine ecological civilization construction. In the "12th Five-Year" period, the contribution rate of the
marine science and technology on the marine economy will rise by 54.5 percent in the "Eleventh Five-Year" period
to 60 percent. To this end, China should actively develop biotechnology, information
technology and regulatory technology to seize the commanding point of marine

living resources in the sustainable development; Ocean high-tech industry
development should be in priority, through developing ocean high-tech park, technology and the sea
demonstration area, as well as marine science and technology business incubators, to nurture marine high-tech
leading enterprises; especially, accelerate the high-tech industry development in the
marine biology medicine, new energy, marine port advanced equipment

manufacture, form the marine characteristic industry with the core
competitiveness; by 2020, the overall strength of China's marine science and
technology will achieve above the average level of developed countries, forming
the system of marine science and technology development in line with the needs
of the socio-economic development.
Expansion Now
China is becoming a maritime power
Junichi 14 (Takeda Junichi. Foreign policy and national defense journalist. Graduated from the Tokyo University
of Foreign Studies. Chinas Rise as a Maritime Power: Ocean Policy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping
http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/a00011.pdf Apr 23 2014)
The international community has been viewing Chinas recent moves relating to
the seas as representing maritime expansion, and the Chinese themselves have
come to talk about making their country a maritime power. In the political report he
delivered in the autumn of 2012 to the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which stands
at the top of the countrys power structure, General Secretary Hu Jintao declared, We should
enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine
economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard Chinas
maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power. 1 This was Hus
final report as the top leader of the CPC; after delivering it he stepped down from his posts as general secretary and
chairman of the Central Military Commission and was succeeded by Xi Jinping. And at the National Peoples
Congress, in March this year, Xi was elected to succeed Hu in the largely ceremonial post of state president. But
the leadership transition did not change the commitment to building China into a
maritime power, which has been set as a medium- to long-term strategic
objective. So what do the Chinese mean when they speak of becoming a maritime power? Liu Cigui,
director of the SOA, or State Oceanic Administration, has offered this explanation:
Building China into a maritime power is an essential path on the way to the
sustained development of the Chinese nation and [achievement of the status of a] global
power. A maritime power is a country that has great comprehensive strength in
terms of the development, use, protection, management, and control of the
seas.2 Ocean policy is the embodiment of this sort of maritime strategy. Chinas latest
white paper on ocean policy, Chinas Ocean Development Report (2012), explains the relationship
between strategy and policy and their respective scopes as follows: Ocean policy is a code of
behavior established for the states strategy, course, development plans, and
external relations concerning the seas; it is a basic policy embodying the
intentions and interests of the state. It encompasses policies concerning
development and use of the seas, including utilization of sea areas,

development and protection of sea islands, protection of the marine
environment, marine science and technology, marine industry,
publicity/education, and human resources development. Marine industry
includes
such fields as
transportation, travel /tourism, fisheries, oil and gas
development, and manufacturing of engineering equipment. 3 The concept of

policy in China differs from that of parliamentary democracies, but its scope is similar in general terms. The SOA
is the government organ in charge of ocean policy, but it does not have total authority in this area. As far as I can
surmise from the fragmentary coverage in the Chinese media, there are at least more than 30 diverse party and
state organs involved in various aspects of ocean policy. There are also moves among the provincial tier of local
governments along the coast, of which there are 11 (the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan; the province-level municipalities of Tianjin and Shanghai; and the autonomous
region of Guangxi), and the jurisdictions under them. The National Peoples Congress in March 2013 approved a
proposal from the State Council for an overhaul of the state organs handling ocean policy, which made certain
adjustments with respect to two points.4 First, in order to strengthen the setup for integrated planning and
comprehensive coordination of oceanic issues, a new National Oceanic Commission is to be established as a highlevel adjustment organ. It will unify and adjust research on the formulation of the states medium- to long-term
ocean development strategy and the handling of important matters relating to the seas. The practical operations of
this commission will be conducted by the SOA. Second, in order to achieve unified maritime law enforcement, four
existing organsChina Marine Surveillance (under the SOA), China Coast Guard (Ministry
of Public Security), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Ministry of Agriculture), and Antismuggling Bureau (General Administration of Customs)are to be consolidated under unified
management by the SOA, which is to safeguard Chinas maritime rights and
interests and carry out maritime law enforcement activities under the name of
China Maritime Police Bureau and the operational direction of the Ministry of Public Security.
China gets mad

China marine expansion increases the risk of conflictmilitary
power and economic collapse
Kaplan 14 (Robert D. Kaplan is chief geopolitical analyst for Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm. He is
the author of fifteen books on foreign affairs and travel, including his latest work Asia's Cauldron: The South China
Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. He has been a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic for nearly three decades.
In 2011 and 2012 he was named by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the worlds Top 100 Global Thinkers. China's
Budding Ocean Empire http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-budding-ocean-empire-10603?page=2 June 5
2014)
China is starting to build a commercial empire-of-sorts throughout two oceansthe
Western Pacific and the Indian. In regards to the Indian Ocean, trade, rather than military expansion,
will be at the heart of it. Empire building is often not the stuff of conscious grand strategy.
It occurs gradually, over decades, by experimentation. And the end result is never clear at the
beginning or even in the middle. To wit, the Venetian empire in the Eastern Mediterranean began as a limited
expedition against pirates in the northern Adriatic. The beginnings of the Dutch and British East
India companies were similarly circumscribed. Chinas attempts at port building

and/or financing from Myanmar to Tanzania are very much in this spirit. Beijing is
attempting to do in the East and South China Seas in the early twenty-first century what the United States
successfully accomplished in the Greater Caribbean in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It has
attempted to take effective strategic control of the blue water extension of its own continental land mass. This is
Chinas path to a significant presence in the Indian Ocean. For just as the Greater Caribbean
unlocked dominance of the Western Hemisphere for the United States, the South and East China Seas
can unlock a vast naval footprint for China in the navigable, southern Rimland of Eurasiafrom
the Horn of Africa to the Sea of Japan. This is a drama that could take decades to play out. As China and
India develop more capable military power, it is likely that there will be a strategic
competition between them of a significant degree. The two countries are already
playing a kind of game for influence in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Myanmar. This could be entirely upended by either the implosion of the Chinese
economy, the implosion of the Indian economy, or both. Such a circumstance is
certainly possible, but looks unlikely at this juncture. It is true, for example, that China sits atop an
immense credit bubble. But muddling through over the coming years is still more
likely than an economic-political-social collapse or epic upheaval inside China. The
atmospherics of Chinese-Indian relations could well be positive, buttressed by mutually beneficial trade and
commercial relations and the political need of its leaders to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs. But pay less
attention to the statements of leaders at summits than to the trajectory of

surveillance satellites in space, the movement of warships on the high seas, or
the stronger alliances that India builds with Japan and other rivals of China. India
and China, with exceptions such as the spread of Buddhism in antiquity and the Opium Trade in early-modern and
modern times, have had relatively little to do with each other over the course of history, separated as they are by
the high walls of the Himalayas and Karakorams. But the advance of military technology has
shrunk distance, making geography more claustrophobic and therefore, more important than ever. So a
new strategic geography of competition between India and China has emerged that
never existed before. In such a scenario, U.S. naval and air power will be crucial to
keeping the peace. The level of internationalism in U.S. foreign policy is rarely a matter
of engaging in this or that intervention. Rather, it is a matter of the size and
deployment of the American Navy and Air Force across the globe , and the heft that this
provides to U.S. diplomacy. Land forces are for unexpected contingencies; sea and air
forces project power daily and keep sea lines of communication open. In this spirit, a
world with a 300-ship U.S. Navy is a very different world than one with a 250-ship U.S. Navy. The latter
circumstance means more instability and anarchy and more chance of deadly
interstate rivalries in Asia. A peaceful Greater Indian Ocean region, therefore, requires robust American
military power in the future.
China perceives the South China Sea as Zero SumIndia proves
A Chinese government think-tank researcher has warned India against participation

in oil projects with Vietnam government on the disputed islands of South China
Sea. Indian oil companies cannot get cooperation from China in gas pipeline and
oil exploration projects if they continues to work in the region, Liu Qian said in an
article in the State-controlled Global Times. Liu is a researcher with the Academy of Chinese Energy Strategy with
the China University of Petroleum in Beijing. "If India insists on exploiting the resources in the South China Sea with
Vietnam regardless of warnings from China it is hard to see how China can be motivated to cooperate with India,"
Liu sad. China and Vietnam are locked in a dispute over ownership of the oil bearing
islands. Describing India and China as "natural rivals" in the global energy
industry, Liu said the two countries should try to forge greater cooperation instead
of getting involved in intense rivalry. In most cases Indian companies lose out to
Chinese firms which is why they respond with "hot fighting words", Liu said. But China finds that the cost of
intense competition is unbearable and wants cooperation with India. Intense competition is forcing Chinese
companies to pay higher premium for oil assets in third countries like Kazakhstan, Angola and Ecuador, the article
said. "But this (high premium) is not sustainable for Chinese firms. And Indian companies also need to
avoid too much competition to save money. This offers room for cooperation
between China and India," Liu said. India and China are wary about each other's
attempt to exploit gas reserves in Turkmenistan. China is expected to seek a portion of the gas from
the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, Liu said. "The current problem lies in how to avoid
unnecessary competition and excessive speculation between the two and how to establish a coordinating
mechanism for bilateral cooperation," the article said while calling on the governments of the two countries to bring
about cooperation between cross-border oil companies. Chinese companies has won against
Indian firms in competition for overseas oil projects because they offer more
favorable returns which includes financial payments, technology support,
infrastructure construction, management experience and staff training, it said.
To tag
While officially China is committed to peaceful development in order to achieve great-power
status and usher in an era of multipolarity, Chinas actions with respect to preserving the
integrity of its core interests seem to complicate that narrative.42 In particular, China has
not hesitated to employ naval force to enforce its sweeping territorial claims in the resourcerich South China Sea, claims that extend its borders more than a thousand miles from the
mainlandsubstantially farther than the two-hundred-nautical-mile limit of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).43 Examples include the 1974 battle of
the Paracel Islands, the 1988 Johnson Reef skirmish, and the 2005 scuffle with Vietnamese
fishing boats near Hainan Island, as well as a series of recent clashes over sovereignty
between units of the PLAN and vessels from Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and the
Philippines. According to PLA doctrine, If an enemy offends our national interests it means
that the enemy has already fired the first shot, in which case the PLAs mission is to do all
we can to dominate the enemy by striking first. Under this logic, China could resort to
armed force to maintain its economic and political core interests. At the heart of Chinas
political culture is a deep insecurity over sustaining the nations rapid modernization,
pointing to an intrinsic relationship between Chinas core interests of regime maintenance
and economic development, on one hand, and the CCPs legitimacy, on the other, the latter
resting on the partys ability to keep unemployment low while satisfying the Chinese
peoples demands for rising living standards.45 Economic health is therefore the cornerstone
of social stability and, subsequently, CCP legitimacy. To maintain social harmony and hold on
to power, the CCP could utilize military force to secure economic interests in the event of a
supply disruption or shortage. As demonstrated by Chinas brutal suppression of the
Tiananmen Square protests in the spring of 1989, the CCP will resort to any means
necessary for the stability of its regime.
Zero Sum
Territorial disputes are zero-sum
ISN 12 (The International Relations and Security Network China's Zero-Sum Game in the South China Sea
Rattles its Neighbors http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=153342 Oct 4 2012)
Beijing's 'China takes all' approach to its territorial disputes in the South China
Sea continues to complicate its relations with other states. If tensions are to decrease
across the region, Beijing needs to realize that boundary disputes cannot be solved by hard power alone, argue
Theresa Fallon and Graham Ong-Webb. By Theresa Fallon and Graham Ong-Webb for ISN There are three worrying
developments in China that risk derailing any resolution to the disputes over the South China Sea. The first is
Beijings inflated perception of its own power, which has led it to adopt a
confrontational stance toward the Philippines and to flout international law and
norms. Indeed, China has ceased cooperating with other South China Sea littoral
states (as well as stakeholders such as the United States) in working towards the kind of binding
regional code of conduct that may be necessary to ensure peace and stability in
the long-term. The second development is Beijings squandering of the soft power
it acquired over the last decade, through its diplomatic charm offensive in the
early 2000s and its hosting of the Olympics in 2008. In fact, Chinas conduct in the South and
East China Sea disputes is losing it friends at such a rate that future multilateral mechanisms for managing or
resolving the disputes are now likely to be less than equitable to China. While, in the short-term, China
possesses the hard power to maintain the status quo in the region, this decline in
its soft power means that it will be less able to realize its long-term strategic
goals without high military and economic costs. With the regional barometer already indicating
growing frustration, it will be interesting to see what the diplomatic tenor of the third ASEAN Maritime Forum in
Manila this week is going to be like. The third development is Beijings inability to come to terms with the fact that
its China-takes-all approach to the dispute will not wash with its regional neighbors and the international
community. This is not only because Chinas historical claims seem incredible to the
other parties but because of the difficulty of untangling the competing territorial
demands of Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. If
the various issues involved in the dispute are to be resolved, claimant states will ultimately have to
approach the South China Sea as a maritime commons, and this cannot happen
unless China plays ball. China must therefore come to accept that the South China Sea is not its exclusive
"coastal real estate" but must instead be parceled out among the various claimants. In fact, if control of the South
China Sea is essential to Chinas naval strategy of offshore defence i.e., to challenging the forward naval
presence of the United States in the region what better way to win over potential partners such as Vietnam (and
its newly acquired kilo-class submarines) than by softening its stance in this way? The point here is that there are
other approaches to national strategy that can help resolve the South China Sea dispute in Chinas favor. Beijing
must first accept, however, that the China-takes-all model will not work. Clearly,
any definitive resolution has to be based on compromise and will fail as long as
the parties involved remain hard-headed. For such a resolution to be possible,
Beijing must also provide security assurances, adhere to mutually agreed codes
of conduct, adopt a resource-sharing mindset, and re-learn how to exercise soft
power. After all, as is frequently observed, every country in the region desires a close relationship with Beijing.
With the right approach, therefore, Beijing could take the first steps toward establishing a Chinese-led regional
orderwhich would be even more valuable than the South China Sea itself. Instead, however, Beijing has done the
opposite -- announcing, for example, in August, that was sending out nearly 9,000 fishing boats from southernmost
Hainan province into disputed waters, to increase its fishing presence in the South China Sea. Analysts say the
massive push is another attempt by Beijing to strengthen its sovereignty claims over the contested waters and is
likely to further fuel tensions in the region. The reality, of course, is that China throws its weight around in the
region at every opportunity and the claims it stakes to oil and gas fields also function as a means of asserting its
power. In June, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) opened bidding on nine oil blocks to foreign
companies. These controversial blocks, however, overlap existing blocks claimed by Vietnam. In addition, Beijing
uses its fleet of maritime patrol ships to project power. Although these non-military craft are in theory less
threatening than the PLA Navy, they nevertheless raise concerns about gun-boat diplomacy. In order to monitor
its coastal seas, China operates more than 300 marine surveillance ships (as of May 2011), with 30 of them
weighing over 1,000 tons. According to the China Marine Surveillance authorities, 36 more ships will be added to
this fleet by 2013. In addition, China also operates 10 planes and four helicopters for surveillance purposes in its
coastal waters and contested areas in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Chinas traditionally ambiguous stance on
these issues designed to buy time has been challenged by the economic necessity, on the parts of Vietnam and
the Philippines, to develop the oil and gas resources they claim. Vietnamese oil production, for example, peaked in
2004, and the countrys declining resource base has led it to further develop its offshore energy resources.
According to EIA estimates, Vietnam consumed 320,000 bbl/d of oil in 2010 with demand forecast to increase to
over 400,000 bbl/d in 2013. The EIA estimated that Vietnams energy consumption levels surpassed production in
2011. Vietnams approach to tensions in the region has been to internationalize" its position by creating strategic
partnerships with foreign energy companies. National Oil Corporations (NOCs) that it has partnered with include:
India's ONGC, Malaysia's Petronas, Japans Nippon Oil, Thailand's PTTEP, and Koreas National Oil Corporation
(KNOC); and multi-nationals include: ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Total. The oldest and largest producers in Vietnam,
however, are Russian, including Vietsovpetro (VSP), established in 1967 as a joint venture between PetroVietnam
and Zarubezhneft of Russia, Lukoil, Gazprom and BP-TNK. Until recently, Russian companies appeared to be immune
to Chinas complaints about investment in Vietnams offshore fields. Beijings lawyers declared recently that the
delineation of exploration blocks by CNOOC strengthened Chinas claims to jurisdiction. Additionally, the legal basis
for Beijings opposition to Vietnam's activities in these waters was improved. Beijing can now claim that resource
development off the coast of Vietnam violates Chinas domestic resource development laws. China has never
officially stated the extent of its claims in the South China Sea or specificied what the U-shaped line, sometimes
referred to as the cows tongue (as it appears to lick-up about 80 per cent of the region) apparently means. After
decades of legal conferences held throughout the world no one is quite sure yet whether China claims just the
water or the land features within the line of the South China Sea or both. In addition, no one knows what rights
China claims within the area. Some have characterized this position of studied ambiguity as "lawfare" or "legal
warfare. Perhaps Chinese legal experts understand that the moment they do take a position, the other littoral
states will respond with their counter-claims and thus start the process of clarification and negotiation. Apparently,
Chinese policy is to pursue and prolong their ambiguous stance to the

exasperation of the international maritime community . China appears to consider calls for
respect of the rule of law, the UN Convention on the Law the Sea, international norms and responsible stakeholder
behavior to be empty rhetoric. Recently, China has refused a request by the Philippines to
refer their bilateral dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS). International legal mechanisms are available to solve maritime boundary
disputes: not only ITLOS, but also the arbitral tribunals under the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS and the International Court of Justice. However, for these legal mechanisms to work
China must first come to the realization that the South China Sea boundary dispute cannot be solved by military
and economic power alone, that it needs to exercise soft power to win friends and exert leadership in the region and
that it needs to adopt a resource-sharing approach.
Impacts
Chinese economic collapse will trigger nuclear war
Mead 98, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy at Council on Foreign Relations
[Walter Russell, Rule 1: Dont Panic. Rule 2: Panic first. Esquire, Oct, ProQuest]
Few Americans understand just how explosive the situation in China is. As the
country undergoes the biggest economic revolution in world history, it is also in for the
wildest ride in world history on the roller coaster of revolutionary capitalism. Stateowned rust-bucket industries from Maoist times are slowly collapsing, putting heavy demands on the national
treasury. Yet China's banks-which may have the worst balance sheets in the world
would go bankrupt if the state cut off subsidies to the indebted state industries.
And if these industries lay off workers faster than the private economy can find
them jobs, China faces mass unrest in the big cities. This is what the Chinese government
fears most, and it has good reason. Already, millions of Chinese, uprooted from the rural areas where they were
born, are flooding into the coastal cities, looking for work. Many of them are young men-the most volatile group in
any society. And in China today, they are especially volatile. Thanks to the government's one-child policy, many
Chinese families have aborted female fetuses to ensure that their one child is a boy. This preference has led to no
boys being born for every loo girls. Here's a Chinese nightmare: millions of young, poorly educated
men who have no jobs and no girlfriends. It's almost unthinkable that China can
escape a prolonged Asian slowdown. China has also based its whole plan on
exportled growth working far into the future; with the failure of that strategy
China's economy must slow dramatically. To survive, the Chinese government will
have to play the nationalist card, taking a tougher foreign-policy line on issues
like Taiwan and whipping up public support by talking about foreign (read: American)
threats to China. Alternatively, China could fall apart as it did earlier in the twentieth
century, going through a period of civil war and anarchy-in a country with nuclear
weapons-before a new and probably very unpleasant government establishes
control.
U.S. China war goes global

Farley 14 (Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International
Commerce. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns
and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat. Asia's Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621 Jun 9 2014)
The United States and China are inextricably locked in the Pacific Rims system of international
trade. Some argue that this makes war impossible, but then while some believed World War I
inevitable, but others similarly thought it impossible. In this article I concentrate less on the operational and tactical
details of a US-China war, and more on the strategic objectives of the major combatants before, during, and after
the conflict. A war between the United States and China would transform some
aspects of the geopolitics of East Asia, but would also leave many crucial factors
unchanged. Tragically, a conflict between China and the US might be remembered
only as The First Sino-American War. How the War Would Start Fifteen years ago, the only
answers to How would a war between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States start? involved
disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South
Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war. This has changed. The
expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision

several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the
United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea
scenario, but now also involve disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well
as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors
are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional
security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. As
long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure. Whatever the trigger, the war does not
begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US military
would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships,
it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs
associated with climbing the ladder of escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first
blow. This doesnt necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese
missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of
Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it can begin engaging Chinese
forces. If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the
United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly
prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a bolt from the blue strike is unlikely. Instead, a
brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of
steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is
genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia
from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China
will need to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side,
Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a
multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any cobelligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across
the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will
also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in
industrial production.

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***ARCTIC NEGATIVE-MASTER

American National Academies (Cumulative Environmental

Long-term effects of oil spills are minor.

Alaskan oil spill spurs economic growth empirically proven.

Arctic oil infrastructure itself will collapse marine ecology.

American National Academies (Cumulative Environmental

No cleanup measures most of the timedark waters and no open

Arctic ice cant be cleaned upextreme cold conditions make

and prolonged darkness in winter . Moreover, the materials and techniques

Arctic cleanup too difficulttheir authors dont assume weather

Response efforts hindered by extreme weather and low visibility

Safety Precautions now

Shell solving problems now

Arctic comparatively safer and less risky to drill in

Angeles Times. N.p., 17 May 2010. Web. <http%3A%2F%2Flatimesblogs.latimes.com

Migratory birds spread disease

Migratory birds spread disease

Sea Otters spread disease

with zoonotic organisms by inhaling aerosolized droplets containing the

summary, the potential for human exposure to zoonotic organisms like

Disease spread -> Extinction

Specifically, zoonotic diseases (diseases transferred from animal to

Plan cant solve mapping which is key to navigation of the Arctic.

Mapping enables us to have Arctic operations allows safe

Disputes over the northwest passage prevent arctic trade

internationalization. A third option would be to consider the North-west Passage part of

Free Trade Does Not Solve War

Globalization lowers the threshold for war, states fight to protect

Globalization decreases escalation management

Free trade causes military conflicts to open markets and gain

China wont militarize-its only an observer country and relies on

China is not militarizing the arctic-its all speculation

UNCLOS = Alt Cause

military planners hate alike, it is being at a competitive disadvantage for no

Construction inhibited by weather, lack of skilled labor, lack of

Alaskan infrastructure fails; massive maintenance costs, erosion,

Plan will require constant dredging.

Largest professional economics consulting firm in Alaska; report prepared for

Dredging is needed on a regular basis to maintain access to a number of ports in

produce geopolitical interventions, it is the identification of climate change as a

Emphasizing the potential of the Arctic is neo-realisms way of

tension, environmental degradation and conflict. Arctic openness is central to the

c Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, United

Chuchki Specific Enviro Justice Link

http://northern.org/media-library/document-archive/arctic/arctic-oceanreports-fact-sheets/alaska-natives-and-conservation-groups-challengechukchi-sea-lease-sale-193/view, accessed 8/2/14 bh@ddi)

US-Canada tensions over Northwest Passage high now and

factor in the future of a changing Arctic. Resolving key disagreements and

The arctic is key to US-Canadian relations-going into the Northwest

the emerging arctic agenda also offers significant opportunities for

imaginative procedures to handle their arctic concerns.

Collapse of US-Canada relations causes economic collapse.

(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137744/derek-h-burney-and-fen-osler-hampson/howobama-lost-canada. JMC.) Accessed 7/10/12.

The impact is global nuclear war

The United States federal government should first negotiate with

The net benefit is Russia War:

Subfreezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for

systems are deteriorating. Russia's early-warning system fails to operate up to

Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political

US-Canada cooperation key to deter Russia.

Alaskan Department of Transportation solves best.

Largest professional economics consulting firm in Alaska; report prepared for

Alaskan funding for ports isnt unprecedented.

Largest professional economics consulting firm in Alaska; report prepared for

Alaskan AIDEA solves best overcomes budgetary constraints.