Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 309

THE REFORM OF THE MOUDAWANA:

THE ROLE OF WOMENS CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANIZATIONS IN CHANGING THE PERSONAL
STATUS CODE IN MOROCCO
ORIANA WUERTH
Abstract
The relationship between society and law is dynamic and complex, as
laws are both the reection of the society that creates them and the sculptor of the society over which they rule. These two forces exert constant
pressure on one another, and if law and society do not adequately mirror
each other, tension is likely to result. Law is not a static entity, but rather
must adapt itself to society as changes occur within that society; similarly,
as law changes, society too will evolve. This process can be seen in
Morocco, where the Moudawana, or Personal Status Code, viewed by
many as an inherently discriminatory text, has been undergoing a process
of reform. The reforms in January of 2004 were both an attempt to
increase womens rights and participation in society and a result of womens
increased economic and political participation.

Introduction
A signicant number of Moroccan women are entering the formal
workforce, the majority as a result of economic necessity. It is estimated that women comprise close to 35 percent of the workforce
today, compared with less than 10 percent in the 1970s.1 Women
share the economic responsibility of the household, a reality that
was not reected in the Moudawana until last year. Women are
also becoming more active within the political sphere, both as government ocials and also within the context of civil society. In
order to reect these changes, and to ensure the improvement of
womens status that is crucial to the improvement of Moroccans

1 The United Nations Development Program estimates that women comprised

35% of the workforce in 1998. From www.undp-pogar.org/countries/morocco/
gender.html.

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005

Also available online www.brill.nl

HAWWA 3, 3

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

310

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 310

oriana wuerth

status in general, law needs to reciprocate. If the legal system of a

country is inherently discriminatory against women, how can society
not discriminate against women?
The current King of Morocco Mohammed VI has publicly stated
his commitment to improving the status of Moroccan women.
According to Rajaa Naji Mekkaoui, who in November of 2003
became the rst woman to give a religious sermon in the royal
presence during the holy month of Ramadan, Mohammed VI frequently has expressed unconditional support for the aspirations of
Moroccan women.2 The national plan to improve womens status
is outlined in the National Strategy for the Integration of Women
in Development, a program launched in March of 2000 with the
support of the World Bank.
The 2004 reforms to the Moudawana are part of this broader
initiative and represent the legal component of a national plan that
seeks to ameliorate many aspects of Moroccan society. Legal reforms
on their own are unlikely to signicantly change the status of women,
as changes within any legal framework must be supported by social
action. At the same time, no lasting political or social change can
occur without the legal structure to support these changes; both
processes need to occur simultaneously. Civil society has the potential to play a key role in ensuring this coordination, as many womens
organizations have been involved in eorts to both to implement
social and to eect legal reform.
Although external factors cannot be ignored, womens civil society
organizations in Morocco have played a signicant role in pressuring
the government to adopt reforms of the Moudawana, both in 1993
and more recently in January of 2004. This has had signicant
eects both for the ongoing eorts to improve womens status and
for the strengthening of civil society in general. This article examines
the development of the womens movement in Morocco, the role
of womens organizations in bringing about the reform of the
Moudawana, and details what could be limitations to womens
organizations ability to eect political and social change in the
future. Additionally, it will examine remaining barriers to the
improvement of womens status that prevent women from enjoying
2 Delphine Soulas, Morocco Pushes Womens Rights, The Washington Times,
November 26, 2003.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 311

the reform of the moudawana

311

the full rights guaranteed to them by the Moroccan Constitution,

which grants equal political rights to women as equal citizens of
the state. Finally, the article makes recommendations toward increasing
the eectiveness of womens organizations, which have the potential
to improve the status of Moroccan women and also Moroccan civil
society.
What is also signicant in the participation of womens organizations
in pressing for the reform of the Moudawana is their commitment
to working within an Islamic framework, a commitment shared by
many opponents of the reforms. For some, this is a matter of religious belief, but for all, it is also recognition of the political reality
that exists in Morocco. As Asma Barlas writes, no meaningful
change can occur in [Muslim] societies that does not derive its
legitimacy from the Qurhns teachings, a lesson secular Muslims
everywhere are having to learn to their own detriment.3 Therefore,
this article highlights the use of Islamic discourse and sources by
various political actors, including womens organizations, within the
context of reform of the Moudawana.
Background: Origins of the Legal System and the
Moudawana
The Moroccan legal system has been inuenced and shaped by
various sources, including Sharaa (Islamic law), French and Spanish
legal traditions and customary Berber law. As in many other Muslim
countries, Sharaa is applied only to issues of family law and personal
status; other areas such as business and trade are based on secular
law derived mainly from the French and Spanish colonial legal systems. Much of the legislation enacted during the Protectorate remains
codied in Moroccan law, some of which directly contradicts Sharaa.
For example, only in 1995 did the Government reform a section
of the 1913 Law of Engagements and Contracts, which stipulated
that married women must obtain permission from their husbands
in order to open a business or sign a commercial agreement. This
provision derived from the Napoleonic Code and clearly conicts

3 Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the

Qurhn, p. 3.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

312

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 312

oriana wuerth

with the economic rights granted to women by Islamic law.4 In

addition to the varied sources of domestic law, Morocco is also
party to a number of international treaties and conventions. This
diverse variety of sources of law has resulted in a rather incoherent
legal system that contains inconsistencies and even contradictions,
as the above example shows.
The only body of law that is said to be derived exclusively from
Islamic law is the Personal Status Code, or Moudawana. This has
made it especially dicult to reform, as the law itself is thought of
by many as a sacred, unalterable text. The Moudawana was codied
between 1957 and 1958 immediately following independence,5 in
an aim to abolish the multiple customary codes and tribal councils
that had been encouraged under the French Protectorate.6 The
Moudawana was drafted by a royal commission made up of ten
men, all religious authorities and prominent ocials from the Ministry
of Justice, and was quickly adopted into law by ahr (royal decree).
The new code was based upon the Mlik School of Islamic law
and borrowed extensively from the Tunisian Personal Status Code
of 1956. Fatima Mernissi describes the Moudawana as no more
than a brilliant transposition of Imam Maliks graceful and anecdotal
al-Muwaah into a series of articles, sections, and sub-sections in the
concise Napoleonic tradition.7 In this process of codication, the
exibility and adaptability of Islamic law were sacriced in order
to make the new code t within the modern legal framework and
judicial system of the new state. Prior to 1993, the Moudawana
contained provisions that stated that men are responsible for the
family; women must obey their husbands; polygamy is legal; women
are subject to the guardianship of a male member of the family;
and men have the right to divorce their wives by unilateral
repudiation.
As Ziba Mir-Hosseini notes, The grafting of Mlik law onto a
modern legal system in Morocco has created a situation in which
the patriarchal elements of the Sharaa are reinforced, while the
classical leeways are reduced.8 The result was a conservative fam4
5
6
7
8

Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, p. 61.

Morocco gained independence in March of 1956.
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law, p. 26.
Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. 11.
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law, p. 198.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 313

the reform of the moudawana

313

ily code that is explicitly discriminatory against women, but which

is legitimated based on an understanding of the Moudawana as a
divine text, rather than a human product arrived at through qh
(Islamic jurisprudence). Thus, it is an error to equate family law,
as applied in todays Muslim countries with the classical Sharaa.
It is true that everywhere in Muslim countries family law is derived
at least nominally from the Sharaa, but it is equally true that its
substance and mode of application are no longer the same.9 Still,
most peopleespecially those whose power and legitimacy are based
on the perpetuation of the Moudawana as a sacred, unalterable
textfail to make the distinction between the process of qh and
the body of laws that is the Shar aa, thus up until recently the
Moudawana remained unchanged and untouchable.
In her work Beyond the Veil, Fatima Mernissi concludes that eorts
to reform the Moudawana, as of 1975, have been fruitless as a
direct result of the texts perceived sacred nature:
Although many material things have changed dramatically in Muslim
societies, there has been no cultural upheaval at all. All attempts to
bring about serious breaches in traditional ideology or to abandon
traditional cultural models concerning the family are denounced as
atheist deviations (given the religious character of the Mudawwana, an
extension and incarnation of the sharaa), as bidaa (innovations, the connotation being negative), and as betrayals of ala (authenticity).10

Although some of the data that Mernissi analyzes is out of date,

her above assertion still holds true for many Muslim countries,
although there are a number of other political and economic factors that contribute to the perpetuation of the status quoreligion
is not the sole force at work. Additionally, it is important to note
that it is political actors and religious gures use of religion to
legitimate their own political agendas that is to blame here, not
Islam, a distinction that Mernissi does not make in Beyond the Veil.
What, then, and who made the reforms of the Moudawana in
1993 and in 2004 possible, given the sacred nature of the text?
The answer includes a combination of factors and a diverse group
of political actors, including Moroccan womens organizations. These
organizations campaign in 1993 to reform the Moudawana, while
9
10

Ibid., p. 13.
Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. 136.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

314

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 314

oriana wuerth

in itself only marginally successful, was a key step as it desacralized the Moudawana and renewed the possibility of ijtihd (independent reinterpretation); this allowed for the more progressive
changes in January of 2004 to occur. The next section will trace
the development of the womens movement in Morocco, and evaluate the role of womens organizations as an impetus for legal,
political and social change.
History of the Womens Movement
Womens activist groups have a long and active history in Morocco
and their roots can be traced back to the independence movement
of the 1940s and 50s, in which women fought side by side with
men to liberate the country from the French Protectorate. As
recounted by Malika Al Fassi, the sole woman signatory of the
Manifeste de lIndpendence in 1943, la femme participait tout:
aux manifestations et mme se battre avec les armes.11 In general, however, the organizations formed during this period focused
on social and charitable worknot on womens rights, per se. These
organizations also tended to be directed by men.
In 1969, King Hassan II created the Union Nationale des Femmes
Marocaines (UNFM), intended to head the national eort to improve
womens social and economic status, led by a number of women
from the royal family. According to Lalla (princess) Aicha, the
Kings sister and the Unions honorary president, the role of the
UNFM was to see to it that the reforms concerning women remained within the framework of Islam and had the consent of the
aulamh (religious scholars).12 Not surprisingly, given its direct ties
to the government, since the 1960s the UNFM has not initiated
any especially novel reforms; rather, their eorts have focused on
social and professional training for women, and there has been no
eort made to promote legal or other types of reform. Additionally,
it seems that the UNFM has even been a barrier to improving
womens rights, as it is often in competition with other womens

Women participated in everything: in the manifestations and even in ghting with weapons.
Entretien avec Malika Al Fassi, signataire du manifeste, LOpinion, January 10,
2004. (Please note that all translations are my own.)
12 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, p. 47.
11

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 315

the reform of the moudawana

315

organizations and has at times blocked their eorts to promote

reform.13
What is important to note about the UNFM is its designation
as a utilit publique, a status that allows organizations to engage in
fundraising and exempts them from certain taxes and customs duties.
In theory any organization may apply for this designation, but in
practice, only those organizations whose agendas are not in opposition
to the agenda of the state receive it; this has shaped, to a degree,
the development of civil society in Morocco.14 As we will see,
womens organizations have been trying to bring legal and social
reform to Morocco for decades, but it is only in the last ten years
that these eorts have been successful. These organizations have
been able to capitalize on a combination of economic and political
factors in Morocco, including economic stagnation, political liberalization and pressure from external actors, including both state
and non-state actors, in order to further their own agenda: improving
Moroccan womens rights and status.
There have been calls for reform of the Moudawana since the
1970s, but these were blocked by the aulamh, who argued that the
Moudawana was a sacred text that could not be altered. During
the 1980s, Morocco was facing a nancial crisis, and the late King
Hassan II agreed to a program of structural adjustment, followed
by a series of economic and human rights reforms.15 During this
time, the trend of political liberalization in the country allowed for
all types of political organizations to be more active, and there was
a surge of activity among womens organizations; additionally, a
number of new organizations were formed. Before 1970, there were
only ve womens associations; between 1970 and 1984, 27 new
associations were formed.16 Many of the womens organizations that
originated during the 1980s were formed from political parties.
These include lAssociation Dmocratique des Femmes Marocaines,
formed in 1985 from the Organisation de lAction Dmocratique
Populaire (OADP); lUnion de lAction Fminine, formed in 1987
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 48.
15 Public Broadcasting Service documentary transcript, Hopes on the Horizon:
Africa in the 1990s, www.pbs.org.hopes/morocco/transcript.htm.
16 Acha Belarbi, Femmes et socite civile, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au
Maghreb, p. 256.
13
14

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

316

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 316

oriana wuerth

from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS); and LOrganisation

de la Femme Istaqlienne, formed in 1988 from the nationalist
Istaqlal party. These groups were later forced to become independent entities when their objectives exceededor clashed with
the dominant political agendas of the various parties from which
they originated.17
Currently, these organizations receive few if any directives from
their respective parties, but they continue to be aliated with them
ideologically.18 Many point to this aliation with political parties
as a weakness, as it can be argued that this limits the autonomy
of womens organizations.19 Others argue that this political link is
one of the strengths of womens civil society groups, as connections
with already established political parties initially provided funding,
structure and legitimacy, and continue to provide direct access to
political actors that can have some inuence in eecting political
change. Additionally, this aliation often enables womens organizations to establish branches and local service programs in various
cities throughout the country,20 thereby expanding the womens
movement from its initial urban, elite roots.
During the early 1990s, the King tried to liberalize the political
system even further and to encourage the growth of civil society,
which led to an explosion of activity among Moroccan associations,
including social and political activists. What led to the process of
political liberalization that made it possible for womens activist
groups to become more active? In her book Women, the State, and
Political Liberalization, Laurie Brand argues that this was the direct
result of King Hassan IIs desire to overcome malaise in both the
economic and political systems . . . and an attempt to reach out to
constituents that were perceived to be of growing importance domestically and internationally, given his desire for full membership in
the European Union.21 The role of external actors will be discussed
in more detail below, but what is important to recognize here is
Souad Eddouada, Feminism and Politics in Moroccan Feminist Non-Governmental Organisations, p. 1, from www.postcolonialweb.org.
18 Acha Belarbi, Femmes et socite civile, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au
Maghreb, p. 259.
19 Rkia El Mossadeq, Consensus ou Jeu de Consensus?, p. 131.
20 Iman Ghazalla, Sculpting the Rock of Womens Rights, p. 3.
21 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, pp. 2489.
17

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 317

the reform of the moudawana

317

that these conditions allowed womens activist groups to become

more active than ever before, and provided the necessary climate
for them to nally achieve what they had been advocating for over
the last two decades: reform of the Moudawana.
One Million Signatures Campaign: 1993 Reforms to the
Moudawana
In 1990, the Union de lAction Fminine (UAF), a coalition of professional middle-class women, launched a campaign to gather a million signatures on a petition to lobby for reform of the Moudawana.
This was at a time when the government was seeking to reform
the Constitution and government institutions, and womens organizations were able to take advantage of the climate of reform in
order to lobby for their own changes.22 Over the next two years,
members of the UAF lobbied other womens organizations and
individuals around the country to sign the petition. The UAF and
their partners sought to eliminate many of the discriminatory elements in the Moudawana, and their campaign sought to outlaw
polygamy; end a husbands right to unilateral divorce by verbal
repudiation; eliminate text stating that a husband is superior and
has ultimate authority over his wife; eliminate the need for a wl
(guardian), required in order for a woman to enter a marriage contract; and raise the legal age of marriage for women. In their
attempts to reform the Moudawana, the UAF, an organization that
has always expressed its commitment to Islamic principles,23 emphasized the need to take Islam into consideration. In their petition,
they argued that their demands for reform were based on two
sources: an Islamic referent based on ideals of equality embedded
in religion and a western legal referent rooted in the universal declaration of human rights . . . asserting that their demands are based
on the principles of Sharaa that emphasizes justice, equality and
tolerance.24
In spite of the UAFs clear attempts to work within an Islamic
framework, the campaign met lots of opposition, particularly from
the religious establishment, and a counter-petition was quickly put
22
23
24

Julie Combe, La condition de la femme marocaine, p. 30.

Iman Ghazalla, Sculpting the Rock of Womens Rights, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 5.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

318

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 318

oriana wuerth

into circulation opposing any reforms to the Moudawana. A fatw

(non-binding religious opinion) was issued stating that those who
were leading and participating in the campaign were trying to
destroy Islam and thus deserved to be killed.25 Ultimately, the aggressive opposition campaign only increased UAF activity, and their
petition was signed by well over a million people. In order to end
the elevating tensions in society between those in favor of and those
opposed to reforms, mainly between the religious establishment and
womens organizations, King Hassan II asked female leaders of the
movement to send him their demands, and he formed a royal commission to look into the possibility of reforming the Moudawana.
The commission included religious scholars, lawyers, law professors, and government ocials, including one woman from the royal
cabinet.26 This commission ultimately recommended a series of
changes that included the following: women who reach the age of
maturity and are orphans are allowed to contract marriage for
themselves;27 the phrase the woman does not contract her own
marriage was changed to the woman delegates her wl to contract the marriage for her; the husband was now required to inform
his rst wife of his desire to take a second wife; some minor constraints were placed on unilateral repudiation by the husband; and
the presence of both parties was now required to register a divorce.
A wls right of jibr (coercion) with respect to minors in certain
circumstances was also revoked.28 These reforms were put into law
by ahr (royal decree) in 1993. Many of the demands that the UAF
campaign had made were not met, thus in terms of eecting real
change their eorts were only partially successful.
What is signicant, though, is that this was the rst time that
the Moudawana had been altered at all since its creation, a process
25 Ibid. While not legally binding, fatws have been used by various governments to legitimate their own policy agendas. The often close relationship between
the aulamh (religious establishment) and the government can provide a convenient
vehicle for political leaders to use religion to further their own political agendas,
as the latter often have a good deal of inuence over the aulamh.
26 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, p. 75.
27 This is a reection of one of the central themes of the Maliki school, which
refers to a fathers ownership of his daughters, a right that is his alone. Thus,
if a girl is without a father, it no longer becomes necessary to seek the approval
of her owner before she gets married.
28 Ibid., p. 76.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 319

the reform of the moudawana

319

that eectively made the Personal Status Code less sacred and
cleared the way for future reforms. Latifa Jbabidi, president of the
UAF, highlights the importance of abolishing the sanctity of the
Moudawana, while still working within an Islamic, Moroccan context:
We made the Moudawana not so sacred. This Moudawana that was
considered like the Qurhn became more like secular law, more open
to debate. We must open the door for creativity and scholarly research,
research that is not foreign to Moroccan culture. So we started from
our tradition, including values that are positive and egalitarian.29

According to Amina Lamrini of the Democratic Association of

Moroccan Women, the only positive result of the 1993 reform was
to make the Code less sacredstill, a signicant step and a crucial one before any additional changes could be made.30 Even though
their eorts to fundamentally reform the Moudawana had been
met with erce oppositioneven death threatswomens organizations continued to work for further reform of the Moudawana
and for the improved political and social status of women. In 1999,
their continued pressure forced the government to adopt the rst
National Plan of Action for the integration of women in the economy, an unprecedented initiative that included plans to combat
female illiteracy and violence against women.31
Azzedine Bennis, a university professor and member of the
Organisation Marocaine des Droits de LHomme,32 points out that
the governments 1993 reform of the Moudawana was the rst time
that the government has paid attention and responded to the
demands of a civil society organization.33 This point has been echoed
by a number of other scholars, who point to this as a key event
in the development of civil society in Morocco. The more recent
reforms in January of 2004 also illustrate the key role that womens
civil society organizations can play in lobbying for legal reform.
Public Broadcasting Service documentary, Hopes on the Horizon: Africa in
the 1990s, transcript from www.pbs.org/hopes/morocco/transcript.htm.
30 Delphine Soulas, Morocco Pushes Womens Rights, The Washington Times,
November 26, 2003.
31 Public Broadcasting Service documentary transcript, Hopes on the Horizon:
Africa in the 1990s, www.pbs.org/hopes/morocco/transcript.htm.
32 Moroccan Organization for Human Rights.
33 Leila Chafai, Le mouvement des femmes, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au
Maghreb, p. 313.
29

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

320

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 320

oriana wuerth

January 2004 Reform: Creation of the New Family Code

Womens groups have been active in campaigning for additional
reforms to the Moudawana since 1993, and the gradual but hesitant
recognition of the womens movement by the state can be seen at
various levels.34 This is illustrated by the inclusion of several female
representatives from womens organizations on King Mohammed
VIs royal commission to review the Moudawana. The King met
with a number of additional womens organizations to get their
input on the reforms and the creation of the new Family Code. In
2001, King Mohammed VI assembled a commission of womens
activists, aulamh and legal scholars to review the Moudawana and
to make recommendations for reforms in line with the National
Plan for Integration and Development. A signicant number of
these recommendations were adopted. Among the most signicant
reforms that explicitly address the rights of women are the following:
Equality in terms of family responsibility and with respect to rights
and responsibilities (omitted the statement that the wife should obey
her husband); women are no longer subject to the guardianship of
a male wl, once they come of age; the minimum age for marriage
is set at 18 for both men and women (it was formerly 15 for women); repudiation and divorce are to be the prerogative of either
the husband or the wife (formerly left to the discretion of the husband only); polygamy is still allowed, but is subject to judges
authorization and to stringent legal conditions.35
The inclusion of religious scholars on the reform commission
illustrates the importance of making legal reform within an Islamic
framework. The King, as a result of his title amr al-muhminn
(Commander of the Faithful) and his status as a descendant of the
Prophet, is deemed responsible for guiding and ultimately deciding
on matters related to religion. The King both uses Islam to legitimate his authority and at the same time uses his political authority to legitimate a particular version of Islamin the case of King
Mohammed VI, a progressive, egalitarian interpretation of the reli-

Raba Naciri, The Womens Movement and Political Discourse in Morocco,

from www.pbs.org.hopes/morocco/essays.html.
35 List of the major improvements introduced in the new Family Law as compared to the current provisions.
34

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 321

the reform of the moudawana

321

gion. At the opening of the Parliaments Fall Session in October

of 2003, King Mohammed VI announced the new reforms, and
he demonstrated the compatibility between Islam and each of the
new reforms, quoting verses from the Qurhn and hadith to legitimate them.36 This proves the expediency, if not necessity, of making legal and political changes within an Islamic framework.
It is likely that the Kings commitment to improving human
rights in general, and those of women in particular, has at least in
part been inuenced by pressure from various external actors, especially as Moroccos bid to become a full member of the European
Union is ongoing, and Morocco and the United States recently
negotiated a Free Trade Agreement.37 Morocco also has a free
trade agreement with the European Union. These agreements bring
with them social and economic provisions that place new pressures
on the Moroccan government to implement reforms.38 Just after
the reforms to the Moudawana were announced in January of 2004,
Human Rights Watch, the World Bank and the government of the
United States all publicly stated their support and congratulations,
suggesting that the 2004 reforms to the Moudawana are in line
with western ideals; however, this in itself is not enough evidence
to condemn these reforms as being merely the exercise of political
will by international and external actors. While it is important to
recognize external pressures and the role of international actors,
the role of Moroccan womens organizations in pressuring the government to adopt these reforms also cannot be discounted.
Many scholars of Moroccan civil society have highlighted the
need for popular support in order for reforms to have signicant
and lasting eects on the popular level. In the case of the 2004
reforms, there appears to have been both broad public support and
heated debate within the political sphere. According to a survey
undertaken in June of 2000 by lAssociation Dmocratique des
Femmes du Maroc, an independent womens association, there was
broad support for reforms to the Moudawana among women: more
36 Speech delivered by King Mohammed VI at the opening of the Parliament
Fall Session, October 10, 2003, from www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/speech/2003/FallSession101003.htm.
37 The FTA between Morocco and the United States was concluded in March
of 2004.
38 USAID/Morocco Country Strategic Plan: 20042008, February 15, 2004, p. 5.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

322

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 322

oriana wuerth

than 60 percent were in favor of raising the legal age of marriage;

70 percent agreed that tutorship is unnecessary once a woman has
reached the age of maturity; and 85 percent of women surveyed
were opposed to polygamy.39 Additionally, 60 percent of both men
and women surveyed were in favor of providing both the husband
and wife with equal access to and means of divorce.40 However,
there has also been a signicant amount of debate over the issue.
The division within public opinion was illustrated in March of 2000,
when the Plan was announced, as there were two rival demonstrations
in Rabat and in Casablanca, the former in favor of and the latter
opposed to the Plan, each numbering somewhere above 200,000
people.41 It is dicult to gauge the exact percentages of people who
are in favor of or opposed to the reform of the Moudawana, as
many surveys typically focus more on urban areas than rural ones,
and thus represent only a certain sector of society. Much of the
public debate between the two sides has taken place between political
leaders, thus it is dicult to get a feel for where general public
opinion lies.
In spite of the Kings and womens organizations eorts to use
Islam to legitimate the reforms, it is clear that many do not espouse
the same version of Islam, and there has been a great deal of opposition to these reforms. Many Islamist groups have expressed their
general opposition to the National Plan for the Integration of Women
in Development, which they criticize as the imposition of a foreign
agenda on the Moroccan people.42 This belief has also been expressed
in relation to the Moudawana reforms in particular. Leading the
opposition are a number of Islamist groups, including the womens
organizations Munaamat Tajdd al-Waay al-Nish (The Organization
LEconomiste, Dossier: le statut des femmes, www.leconomiste.com.
Ibid. Prior to 2004, men could divorce their wives by unilateral repudiation,
even via a third party; women have no equivalent right and must prove harm
suered in some form (including absence, abuse, etc.) before they can obtain a
divorce.
41 Moroccans and Women: Two Rallies, New York Times, March 13, 2000,
p. A8. In Casablanca, protestors, half of whom were women, chanted: We protect Islam with our bodies and souls; in Rabat, No to reactionaries and My
rights, my rights.
42 The King and the Sheikhs daughter, BBC News Correspondent, from
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1899478.stm.
39
40

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 323

the reform of the moudawana

323

for Renewing Womens Awareness). Jamila Messala, a member of

this organization, argues that the plan of action uses the ideology
of human rights and the umbrella of the United Nations to destroy
Islamic specicity.43 One of the main opposition groups, al-aAdl
w-al-Isn ( Justice and Charity), initially expressed opposition to
the reforms in principle, based on the idea that the proposed reforms
were coming from outside. Nadia Yassine, daughter of Sheikh
Abdesalam Yassine44 and spokeswoman for the Justice and Charity
movement, a popular Islamist group that is currently illegal in
Morocco, acknowledged that the Moudawana was in need of reform,
but maintained that these reforms should not come from Western
sources.45 Instead, she urged reformers to look within Islam, as she
maintains that the Prophet Mohammed was himself a feminist and
that Islam is a religion based on equality between the sexes.46 She
argues that these reforms have been elaborated in response to the
desires of foreigners and the feminist movement, but not to produce any real change in womens lives.47 What both sides seem
to agree on is that the womens movement and womens organizations have been instrumental in bringing about the reforms to
the Moudawana, and that legal reforms alone are not enough. The
next section will examine the remaining legal, social and economic
barriers to improving the status of Moroccan women.
Remaining Barriers to Improving the Status of Women
There remain a number of social and economic factors that may
prevent the successful implementation of the new Family Code and

Iman Ghazalla, Sculpting the Rock of Womens Rights, p. 1.

Sheikh Yassine is the leader of the Islamic group Al-aAdl Wal-Isn ( Justice
and Charity), who was recently released from prison by King Mohammed VI.
The current Kings father jailed Yassine more than 20 years earlier after the
Sheikh wrote a letter to Hassan II accusing him of supporting corruption and
Western-style moral decay.
45 Moudawana: les ractions de Nadia Yassine et Abdeilah Benkirane, Menara,
October 13, 2003, from www.menara.ma.
46 The King and the Sheikhs daughter, BBC News Correspondent, from
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1899478.stm.
47 Interview with Giles Tremlett, Morocco boosts womens rights, The Guardian,
January 21, 2004.
43
44

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

324

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 324

oriana wuerth

the improvement of womens status, factors that have prevented

women from taking full advantage of the rights granted to them
by the Constitution and even by the original Moudawana. For
example, since its inception the Moudawana has included a provision
that enables women to include conditions in their marriage contracts,
such as a clause stating that a woman will be granted a divorce if
her husband decides to take an additional wife. However, in practice this rarely occurs, as many brides face a great deal of social
and familial pressure not to include such conditions in their marriage
contracts, and many men are unwilling to accept them. This illustrates that there is often quite a large gap between law in theory
and law in practice; social realities may impede the application and
realization of the law as it was intended.
In spite of the Moroccan Governments announcement of a campaign to inform citizens about the new Family Code, it remains to
be seen how this will be implemented and how eective it will be.
Many women in less developed areas are more concerned with fundamental needs such as access to potable water and electricity than
with legal reform. Although urban women are likely to have more
access to information about the new reforms, there are still social
factors that might inhibit them from taking full advantage of their
rights. There are a number of factors that may prevent women
from engaging in society politically or from joining the workforce,
including familial pressures, the risk of sexual harassment and the
high incidence of violence against women.48 Although more and
more women are entering the workforce in order to help support
their families, this is not always a voluntary choice. Finally, in spite
of many literacy campaigns being implemented in Morocco, the
nation-wide illiteracy rate is close to 60 percent among women and
estimated at 85 percent among rural women.49 There is a need to
address these above factors before there can be any eective and
enduring improvement made in the status of Moroccan women.
There are also remaining legal barriers that prevent women from
achieving full legal equality with men. Article 418 of the Penal
Code allows for the consideration of extenuating circumstances if

LEconomiste, Dossier: le statut des femmes, www.leconomiste.com.

Tremlett, Giles, Morocco boosts womens rights, The Guardian, January 21,
2004.
48
49

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 325

the reform of the moudawana

325

a man kills or assaults his wife when he nds her engaged in an

act of adultery; there is no parallel right mentioned for women.
Within the Labor Code, there is a long list of restrictions on employment that apply to women. A woman who has a child out of wedlock can be imprisoned for up to six months, if she tries to register
the child and no father claims it.50 As of January 2004, the Family
Code now allows for additional forms of evidence to be introduced
to prove the childs paternity (formerly this required twelve witnesses), but the burden of proof remains on the mother. Additionally,
a married woman needs a judges consent to le a civil suit against
her husband. She also needs her husbands consent to obtain a
passport. On a more optimistic note, in 2002 King Mohammed
VI proposed a new law, approved by Parliament, which designates
at least 30 seats in Parliament for women. In 2002, 35 women
were electeda dramatic increase from 1993 when there were only
two female Members of Parliament. Hopefully, the new quota will
encourage even more women to run for oce in the future. If
elected, these women can work in conjunction with womens organizations to exert continued pressure on the Government to continue to improve the status and lives of Moroccan women.
In addition to the political and economic barriers that may impede
the improvement of womens status in Morocco, there are also
some signicant logistical barriers to the eective implementation
of the new Family Code. First, there is the question of whether or
not the local judiciary will adhere to the new laws. There is currently no system in place to assure that all courtsand judges
are adhering to the constitution and various codes that make up
Moroccan law. There is the risk that certain judges who object to
the recent changes to the Moudawana, or who are merely trying
to bolster their individual power and autonomy, may not follow
the proceedings necessitated by the new Family Code. Secondly,
Moroccos rural landscape and poor infrastructure may pose a challenge to the public information campaign announced by the King.
It may be very dicult to reach people in more isolated parts of
the country due to the lack of infrastructure, which makes any sort
of media campaign dicult.

50

Abortion is also illegal, but still practiced.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

326

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 326

oriana wuerth

In order to eectively inform people about the new reforms, the

government could aim its media campaign at local mosques, as this
is one place where most members of the community come together
regularly. It would be much easier to leave information at one
mosque per village rather than trying to contact everyone individually,
especially as many peoples homes are situated far apart in agricultural
communities. The government can work through the Ministry of
Islamic Aairs, and the various religious scholars who participated
in the advisory council on Moudawana reform, to devise a media
campaign that illustrates the compatibility of the new reforms with
Islam. This will enable the government to work in conjunction with
local religious leaders to inform people about the new changes, a
strategy which may be more eective, and which will make local
religious leaders less likely to oppose or ignore the new reforms.
Womens organizations can also play a signicant role in this process,
as many already have oces established in rural areas. Potential
barriers to their successful involvement are discussed in the next
section.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Womens Civil Society
Organizations
Although womens organizations, particularly the UAF, played a
decisive role in pressuring the government to reform the Moudawana
in 1993 and in 2004, scholars of Moroccan civil society have also
pointed to a number of limitations on womens organizations that
may be a barrier to their continued eectiveness in advocating political and social change. Among these limitations are nancial contributions from external actors, funding from the Moroccan government,
as well as aliations with political parties, all of which are thought
to limit the autonomy of womens groups. The latter factor has
been discussed in detail above. Additionally, the womens movement is often described as an elite movement, at least in terms of
its leaders. It is argued that these organizations lack legitimacy as
a result and thus cannot be eective guarantors of an improvement
in the status of womens rights, as consensus is needed before legal
reforms can result in eective and lasting social change. It is certainly true that the majority of leaders of womens organizations
come from the middle or upper classes, but this seems to be more

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 327

the reform of the moudawana

327

the result of economic factors. For the most part, only women who
are relatively well o financially will have the time and nancial
capability to spend a signicant portion of their time on non workor family-related activities.51 This does not necessarily mean that
these organizations only represent the interests of elite women.52
Finally, critics point to the lack of coordination between womens
organizations as a critical weakness in their eorts at reform, and
this last factor is potentially the most serious impediment to the
womens movement. These critiques are analyzed below.
The role of external actors in the Moroccan womens movement
is controversial. Some argue that local womens organizations are
a pawn of Western intentions in the Arab world; others argue
instead that womens organizations have agency independent of
their international counterparts and are instead using external
actors to further their own agendas. Many organizations receive
funding from international actors, including the World Bank, the
United States Agency for International Development, the European
Development Bank and the United Nations, external European
NGOs, such as the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung organization,
and Western governments, including the United States.53 These
external actors have helped to reinforce domestic demands for
greater respect for human rights in general, including womens
rights.54 Claims that Moroccan organizations are merely puppets
of Western actors and their broad economic and secularizing agendas seem to be an overly simplied view of the situation, as many
51 The same economic barriers to activism exist in the United States and other
developed nations, to a degree; not everyone has the luxury of being able to
allocate time and resources to additional causes outside of supporting their own
livelihoods.
52 In Morocco, where there is such a huge disparity between socio-economic
classes, the notion of the elite is somewhat dierent than in countries such as
the United States. I do not wish to suggest that women who are politically active
are all rich women who do not have to work; however, it is likely that a number of these women will have more white-collar jobs which give them more
economic and logistical resources than women who are working in the agriculture
sector, for example.
53 A number of womens organizations also receive funding from the Moroccan
government, which may prevent them from pursuing agendas that are a potential
threat to the status quo and to the state.
54 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, p. 45.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

328

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 328

oriana wuerth

womens organizations were active in advocating for reform long

before Western agencies took an interest in the struggles of Moroccan
women.55 The majority of external funding for reform-related activities has been contributed after the 1993 reforms to the Moudawana
were achieved, reforms which were mainly the result of the eorts
of a single womens organization, the UAF. Since then, womens
organizations have been able to manipulate the political and economic climate to their own advantage and have successfully channeled external forces towards their own agendas. Morocco is party
to a number of international treaties and conventions, and Moroccan
womens organizations have been able to exert pressure on their
government at a time when they know it is looking to strengthen
ties with Europe and the United States.
Additionally, it is important to note that the majority of womens
organizations in Morocco do not advocate either the complete rejection of Sharaa or of Islam as the state religion; instead, these groups
are working to eect change within an Islamic framework. It is
dicult to generalize about the position of womens organizations,
as the womens movement encompasses a broad spectrum of groups
from all political leanings, who espouse dierent views on the relationship between Islam and society. However it is clear, that all of
these womens organizations have had to position themselves in
relationship to religious actors in Morocco, which have become
more and more inuential in both social and political spheres since
the 1980s.56 Without exception, all major womens organizations
arm that their base of reference is Islam and present a positive
interpretation of womens role and rights in Islam, and many look
to specialists in Islamic studies to assist them in structuring their
agendas and arguments within an Islamic framework.57 The majority of womens organizations reject secularism in principle, as this
concept is considered a sacrilege by many and goes directly against
the very ideological base of the Moroccan state. Still, certain womens
organizations clearly have a more secular agenda than others; how-

55 Souad Eddouada, Feminism and Politics in Moroccan Feminist NonGovernmental Organisations, p. 1, from www.postcolonialweb.org.
56 Acha Belarbi, Femmes et socite civile, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au
Maghreb, p. 267.
57 Ibid.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 329

the reform of the moudawana

329

ever, this is rarely stated explicitly, as it would detract from these

groups social and political legitimacy.58
Another criticism of womens organizations is that they represent
the agenda of only elite women and as a result lack popular support
and legitimacy. This is seen as an impediment to their success in
eecting change, as noted by Julie Combe, who argues that the
recognition of the problems faced by women and the active struggle
to combat these problems is being undertaken if not by a marginal
group, then by an elite group.59 According to Combe, this risks
blocking future change, as consensus among womens organizations
appears to be the only possible means of reform.60 This claim is
countered by Souad Eddouada, a professor at Mohammed V
University in Rabat, who argues that Moroccan womens organizations
are currently in the process of modifying into more grassroots-based
organizations, which can then serve an important function as mediator
between women from various communities and the government.61
Combes argument is further weakened by the success of the 1992
UAF campaign to reform the Moudawana, which at the very least
forced the government to begin to discuss and publicly address
womens issues, as this campaign was successful due in large part
to broad popular support.62 This position is shared by Laurie Brand,
who makes the case that activity of a non-top-down nature is
increasing in Morocco. Although much activity is based in Rabat
and Casablanca, there is an ongoing expansion of nation-wide activities aimed at encouraging the political participation of all women,
be it through activism, political candidacy or informed voting.63
Still, womens organizations activity remains very limited activity
in rural areas,64 a factor that may ultimately weaken their ability
to serve as the legitimate representatives of womens interests.

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 179.
60 Ibid.
61 Souad Eddouada, Feminism and Politics in Moroccan Feminist NonGovernmental Organisations, p. 2, from www.postcolonialweb.org.
62 Ibid., p. 3.
63 Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization, p. 260.
64 Leila Chafai, Le mouvement des femmes, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au
Maghreb, p. 308.
58
59

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

330

4:17 PM

Page 330

oriana wuerth

Finally, the lack of coordination among various womens groups,

and even competition between them, is also a potential barrier to
their eectiveness in promoting eective social and political change.
This is evidenced by the fact that the womens movement does not
have a unied strategy. As Amina Tafnout, member of lAssociation
Marocaine pour les Droits Humaine65 states, il nexiste pas de
mouvement des femmes, il ny a que des associations mais pas un
mouvement.66 What is signicant, though, is that womens organizations have recognized the need for coordination, both between
womens organizations themselves and also between elite women
political leaders and the general population, an important rst step
towards improving the eectiveness of the womens movement.67 In
order for future reforms to be eective, it is necessary for activism
on the part of elites to be mirrored by activism on the popular
level; otherwise, legal reforms are not likely to bring any eective
or lasting change at the societal level.
Conclusions
Moroccan women are not looking to import Western feminism in
its entirety; instead, these women are in the process of identifying
and outlining their own form of feminism, which seeks to promote
womens rights and status in an Islamic, Moroccan context. The
2004 reforms to the Moudawana illustrate the methods and strategy of these women and show that progress is being made as a
direct result of the involvement of womens organizations. Although
the new Family Codeand law in generalcannot guarantee
womens social, political and economic equality, legal reforms of
this nature are an important step, and an essential one, before the
slow process of change at the social level can occur in Morocco.
Moreover, in addition to the importance of the end result, womens
increased participation in the political sphere, be it through the
Parliament or through civil society, will also contribute to an improveMoroccan Association for Human Rights.
No womens movement exists, there are just womens associations, but no movement. Leila
Chafai, Le mouvement des femmes, Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au Maghreb,
p. 309.
67 Ibid.
65
66

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

4:17 PM

Page 331

the reform of the moudawana

331

ment in womens status. Through this increased participation, women

not only gain self-empowerment, but may also gain political inuence
that will allow them to continue to put pressure on the government
and other social and political actors to continue the process of
change and improvement of womens rights that is clearly underway.
The remaining social and economic barriers to womens achievement of equal status with men prove that legal reforms alone are
not enough to eect meaningful change in the lives of women;
however, legal change is a crucial step. We have seen that Moroccan
womens organizations have played a signicant role in bringing
about these legal reforms, a fact which has important repercussions
both for women and for civil society in Morocco in general. The
reforms to the Moudawana in 1993 and 2004 provide two of the
only examples in which civil society has forced the government to
eect political change. This suggests that the activities of womens
organizations may have a positive eect on the Moroccan political
system as a whole, resulting potentially not only in the improvement
of womens status and womens social and political freedoms, but
also in an increase in social and political freedoms for all Moroccans.
In order for this process of democratization to continue in Morocco,
and in order to build on the progress that has already been made,
womens organizations must work to better coordinate their activities.
These groups could be a lot more eective working together, rather
than working against each other.
In order to work towards improving womens rights and status
more eectively, womens organizations need to set aside political
dierences and power struggles and work to create a unied agenda.
It would be benecial for these groups to create a national federation
of womens organizations, which would enable them to coordinate
their eorts and activities, and which would also give them some
more political weight. These groups must work to build grassroots
support, in order to increase their social legitimacy and their
eectiveness, and they must continue to expand their activities and
base of support into rural areas of the country, as approximately
half of all Moroccans live in rural areas. The current King
Mohammed VI has so far made good on his promise to address
the problems faced by women and to work to increase womens
rights; womens organizations must now work to make the new
legal reality a social reality.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/16/05

332

4:17 PM

Page 332

oriana wuerth

Bibliography
Amato, Andra. ed. Droits de Citoyennet des Femmes au Maghreb. Casablanca: Editions
Le Fennec, 1997.
Barlas, Asma. Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qurhn.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.
Brand, Laurie A. Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North
African Experiences. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
Combe, Julie. La condition de la femme marocaine. Paris: LHarmattan, 2001.
Eddouada, Souad. Feminism and Politics in Moroccan Feminist Non-Governmental
Organisations. Conference on Post Colonialisms and Political Correctnesses.
Casablanca, April, 2001, from www.postcolonialweb.org.
El Mossadeq, Rkia. Consensus ou Jeu de Consensus? Pour le Rajustement de la Pratique
Politique au Maroc. Casablanca: Imprimerie Najah el Jadida, 1995.
Ghazalla, Dr. Iman. Sculpting the Rock of Womens Rights: The Role of Womens
Organizations in Promoting the National Plan to Integrate Women in
Development in Morocco. Center on Women and Public Policy, University
of Minnesota, 2001, from www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/wpp/iman.htm.
Kaf, Meryam. Code de la famille: une rforme qui consacre la dignit et la
responsabilit de la Femme. Le Matin, from www.lematin.ma.
Mekouar, Aziz. Islam and Democracy. The Washington Times, March 15, 2004.
Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society.
(Revised Edition.) Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987. (First
published 1975.)
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law. (Revised Edition.)
London: I.B. Taurus Publishers, 2000.
Public Broadcasting Service. Hopes on the Horizon: Africa in the 1990s. Transcript
of PBS documentary on Morocco, www.pbs.org/hopes/morocco/transcript.htm.
Ridouan, Khadija. S.M. le roi souligne le caractre universel des droite de
lHomme. Le Matin, February 27, 2004, from www.lematin.ma.
Soulas, Delphine. Morocco Pushes Womens Rights. The Washington Times,
November 26, 2003.
Tremlett, Giles. Morocco boosts womens rights. The Guardian, January 21, 2004.
United States Agency for International Development. USAID/Morocco Country Strategic
Plan: 20042008, February 15, 2004.
United Nations Development Program. www.undp-pogar.org/countries/morocco/
gender.html.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, adopted on September 13th, 1996, from www.
mincom.gov.ma/english/generalitites/state_st/constitution.htm.
List of the major improvements introduced in the new Family Law as compared
to the current provisions.
Speech delivered by King Mohammed VI at the opening of the Parliament
Fall Session, www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/speech/2003/
FallSession101003.htm.
Moroccan Ministry of Communications website. Women in Morocco, www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/mwoman/women.htm.
Entretien avec Malika Al Fassi, signataire du manifeste. LOpinion, January 10,
2004, from www.lopinion.ma.

Hawwa 3,3_f5_309-333II

11/14/05

5:51 PM

Page 333

the reform of the moudawana

333

Initi par le Cercle europen la communaut marocaine. Le Matin, January

1, 2004, from www.lematin.ma.
Moroccans and Women: Two Rallies. New York Times, March 13, 2000, p. A8.
The King and the Sheikhs daughter. BBC News, March 28, 2002, from
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1899478.stm.
Moroccan women split over new legislation. Middle East Times, from www.metimes.
com/2K/issue200012/reg/moroccan_women_split.htm.
Moudawana: les ractions de Nadia Yassine et Abdeilah Benkirane. Menara,
October 13, 2003, from www.menara.ma.