Does Globalization Cause Separatism?

A Critical Examination of the Globalization-Separatism Relationship

By
Dean E. McHenry, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University
Claremont, California, USA

A paper prepared for presentation at the 21st World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, July, 2009.

Does Globalization Cause Separatism?

A Critical Examination of the Globalization-Separatism Relationship
By
Dean E. McHenry, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University
Claremont, California, USA

I. Introduction
Few concepts have elicited as much study and commentary in recent years as that of
globalization. The phenomenon manifests itself in the huge increases the
interconnections among states and peoples throughout the world. Trade among them has
increased substantially over the years; the current economic downturn affects virtually all
countries; the proportion of the worlds population linked by communications continues
to increase; the carbon dioxide emissions in one country affect the climate in other
countries; and, so on. One impact of globalization, widely reported, is that it has given
rise to an increasing number of separatist movements.
The purpose of this study is to provide an assessment of the truth of this claim, i.e., to
seek to answer the question: Is there a causal relationship between globalization and
separatism? The question is important for at least two reasons: First, there are
disagreements among scholars on whether the answer is yes or no. Second, the
question seeks an answer which greatly simplifies reality, exemplifying the desire of
scientifically-oriented political scientists to discover a set of simple generalizations
about the world that may constitute part of a theory. This has been a goal of the field at
least since the time of the behavioral revolution. And, both the goal and the methods
used to achieve this goal have been questioned by growing numbers of political scientists.
An answer to the specific question will not only clarify the appropriateness of the
globalizationseparatism relationship, but also provide a basis for assessing the
appropriateness of the simplifications of reality that have become the goal of many
political scientists.
We will seek to answer the question in four steps: First, we will examine the definitions
given to the two concepts, globalization and separatism to gain some understanding
of the phenomena under review. We will find, as others have found, that there is an array
of conceptualizations that contributes to the difficulty of assessing the relationship
between the concepts. Nevertheless, we will seek aspects of the conceptualizations that
will allow us to answer to the research question. Second, we will review the claims
scholars make about the relationship between the two concepts. We will find, once
again, that there is no agreementsome assert there is a positive relationship between the
two and some assert there is no such relationship. Thirdly, we will examine briefly the
causes, identified by scholars, of five cases of separatism in an attempt to determine

whether globalization has been central to their initiation and development. We will find
that most scholars in each case have identified an array of causes that do not include the
major indicators of globalizationor, they relegate such indicators to secondary
importance. Fourth, we will use those findings to reflect upon the appropriateness of the
effort in the discipline of political science to develop generalizations that simplify reality
and can be grouped with other generalizations related to the dependent, or independent,
variable to become parts of theories which store knowledge. We will find that such
efforts lead to conclusions that are of little help in practical tasks of leaders wishing to
ameliorate the human costs that may be associated with separatist undertakings.
II. Concepts: The Meanings of Globalization and Separatism
Concepts are general words, i.e., they are meant to apply to more than a single instance or
case of something. That is an essential characteristic if generalizations are to be made
about them. Both globalization and separatism are concepts. The phenomena to
which they refer are manifested in many instances or cases. Clearly, the building of
knowledge about both concepts is hindered by the fact that scholars do not agree on their
meaning. Why is this lack of agreement a problem?
When scholars amalgamate findings about globalization or separatism, they may be
combining information about quite different phenomena. The result is likely to be a set
of assertions that mistakenly equate findings about these different phenomena and, so,
provide inaccurate information. This is a perennial problem in the social sciences. And,
it is a problem which afflicts findings about both globalization and separatism.
Nevertheless, a review of meanings given to these terms will facilitate an understanding
of why there is disagreement about the relationship between the two phenomena.
A. Globalization
The conceptualizations of globalization range widely. They include phenomena such
as sharing power, interconnectedness, spatial connections and functional
interdependence, mobility of factors of production, a set of interrelated changes,
greater dependence on international trade, and so on. They are used to refer to one
phenomenon or to a multitude of phenomena. Examples of definitions of globalization
given by different scholars are illustrative of the diversity of meanings of the concept.
Here are a few:

Globalization is a term that describes the intensification of social and cultural

interconnectedness across the globe. 1

Globalization refers to nation-states having to share their power with three

groups of global actors: transnational corporations; international, or more
accurately intergovernmental, organizations such as the United Nations; and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 2

Globalization is the transformative growth of connections among people across

the planet. 3

Globalization is the process by which the social relations between human beings
have tended to extend globally, to cover the territorial and demographic space of
the entire planet. 4 He continues, In this more specific sense, the term
globalisation is used to indicate the social process, highly influenced by
technological development, increasingly rapid means of transport and the
information revolution, which has created a truly world-wide web of spatial
connections and functional interdependence. 5

...globalization is the growing mobility of factors of productioncapital, labor,

information, and goodsbetween countries. 6

Globalization...denotes movements in both the intensity and the extent of

international interactions. 7 But, he suggests, also, that no simple and
straightforward definition can be offered of.... globalization. 8

Globalization is an uneven transition process from an international economy

comprised of discrete national units to a global economy of integrated national
economies. 9

Globalization is a set of more or less interrelated changes....Among these

changes are a deepening of international economic integration (itself a
multifaceted phenomenon), developments in communication technologies and
infrastructure, the rise of multiculturalism, global environmental problems,
proliferation of international institutions, agreements and regimes, the rise of
transnational non-state actors, the end of the Cold War, and others. 10

Globalization is interconnectedness of social fates. 11

Globalization refers to the growth of economic and technological connectedness,

the weakening and dissolution of economic barriers and the joining of nation
states to form larger regional unions. 12

Globalization is typically defined as the greater exposure of national economies

to the world market through a greater dependence on international trade. 13 Or,
globalization is increased trade as a percentage of GDP... 14

Globalization refers to the increasing pace and scope of economic and cultural
activities across space. 15

Globalization entails all the sociocultural processes that contribute to making

distance irrelevant. 16

Clearly, there is no single thing to which all refer. At a very general level,
globalization refers to the growth of linkages among people around the world. The forms
of such linkages are many, including communications, trade, investment, travel,
migration, identification with people in other countries, and so on. To determine the
degree to which it is present, one might look for an increase in value of trade as a
proportion of GDP, or increased availability of information about other parts of the
world, or more people travelling, or increased foreign investmentor, similar aspects of
the many phenomena to which globalization refers. We will seek to locate the presence
of these phenomena among the causes of separatism in the five cases we will examine.
B. Separatism
The Wikipedia provides a general definition: Separatism refers to a state of cultural,
ethnic, tribal, religious, racial or gender separation from the larger group, often with
demands for greater political autonomy and even for full political secession and the
formation of a new state. 17 A sense of the breadth of meanings given to the term
separatism necessitates a review of concepts that usually fall within its scope, including
autonomy, self-determination, secession, and, fragmentation.
1. Autonomy
Autonomy refers to the independence of an individual or group from other individuals
or groups. As was the case with the concept of globalization, scholars differ somewhat
in their definitions:

A territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a group

that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the
majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct
identity. 18

Autonomy refers to both individual independence and that of collective bodies

such as nation-states, minority groups within states, indigenous peoples, and
religious movements.... 19 It is related to sovereignty for the greater the
collective autonomy, the greater the sovereignty. 20

Autonomy is the capacity for self-determination and the conditions enabling

it.... 21

Autonomy requires both self-awareness and a capacity to act by the autonomous

person or community. These two dimensions of autonomy correspond to a basic
distinction found in the social movement literature between interest- based
explanations such as resource mobilization theory and identity-based approaches
such as new social movement theory, which focuses on struggles over symbolic
resources and rights to difference....Self-awareness links to identity, while
capacity to act relates to the resource or interest dimension. Autonomous action
therefore cannot be understood without considering both kinds of factors.... 22

2. Self-determination
The concept of self-determination often is used to refer to the right of individuals or
groups to separate and form their own political entity, though some view the right as
subordinate to the maintenance of state sovereignty. Here are some scholars views:

National self-determination can be understood in a strong or weak sense. In the

strong sense it insists that a nation be given statehood, whereas in the weak sense
it requires only that a nation be given some form of self-government. Weak
national self-determination is thus compatible with a multinational state in which
nations are given some political autonomy. 23

The principle of self-determination is best viewed as entitling a people to choose

its political allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, and to
preserve its cultural, ethnic, historical, or territorial identity. Often, although not
always, these objectives can be achieved with less than full independence. 24

In general terms, self-determination is the right of a national group to be

sovereign within a given territory. 25

In international law the concept of pursuing a collective interest is known as

self-determination. 26 Self-determination does not in any manner imply a right
to independence.... it is a concept that international law acknowledges must be
secondary to the integrity of democratic states. 27

3. Secession
The concept of secession is generally, but not always, viewed as a form of separatism,
but not necessarily identical to it. Politically, secession may be an extreme form of
separatism leading to a sovereign political unit. Some scholarly views of the meaning of
secession are:

A separatist movement differs from a secessionist movement insofar as the

demands of the former consist of increased autonomy in one or many areas,
whereas in the latter, full independence is part of the definition of success. 28

Secession does not simply mean separation. In many, perhaps most cases, the
secessionists desire not only independence from the existing state but also
sovereignty for the new political unit they seek to create. 29

Secession is the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally

recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state. 30

Secession is a movement to obtain sovereignty and split a territory or group of

people from another.... 31
6

Secession is the voluntary withdrawal from a state and its central government of
part of its people with their territory, with the remainder of the existing state
maintaining this states legal identity. 32 Furthermore, A groups right of
political self-determination is the right to determine its political status. 33

Secession is the unilateral withdrawal of territory and people from a state. 34

Secession...involves the creation of a new state with sovereign jurisdiction over

its citizens. 35

Secession involves a group of people within an existing nation-state seeking to

form their [own] nation-state.... 36

4. Fragmentation, etc.
A variety of other terms are used and related to separatism. Milica Bookman writes that
The distinction between separatist, irredentist, ethnoterritorial, and secessionist
movements is often blurred, both in fact and in the usage of the terms. 37 She contends
that Ethnoterritorial movements differ from secessionist movements insofar as the
former is broader, and encompass both secession and irredentism. 38 Ian Clark uses the
term fragmentation and suggests it is the opposite of globalization, on the one hand, it
suggests disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure, and isolation; on the other, the
trend is towards nationalism or regionalism, spatial distension, separatism, and
heterogeneity. 39 He says, Fragmentation expresses itself in many ways: autarchy,
unilateralism, disintegration, heterogeneity, and separation. 40
Clearly, both terms, i.e., globalization and separatism, are imprecise and refer to
multiple phenomena. Broadly speaking, globalization refers to greater interconnections
among people, groups and states throughout the world, while separatism refers to efforts
to increase the autonomy of groups from the states with which they are associated.
III. Scholars Findings about the Relationship between Globalization and
Separatism
The relationship between globalization and separatism has been the focus of numerous
scholarly studies, yet consensus on whether the link is a causal one or not is lacking. A
review of some of the arguments and evidence used by each side confirms the claim
that disagreement exists. Those who argue for a causal relationship often insert an
intermediary variable that they claim is the product of globalization and an immediate
cause of separatism. In other words, globalization is identified as the indirect cause of
separatism. Those who argue against a causal relationship cite a variety of mitigating
circumstances that may account for the absence of such a relationship between
globalization and separatism.

1. Claim #1: Globalization causes separatism

Annalisa Zinn has summarized an argument common among those who see a causal
relationship between globalization and separatism. She notes: In 1960 trade was 24
percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). By 1980 trade accounted for 39 percent
of world GDP and in 1999 trades share of global GDP was 45 percent.... 41 And, she
notes, Observation of these simultaneous processes...has led to the popular claim that
economic globalization, especially in the form of increasing trade liberalization, and selfdetermination movements are casually linked in that globalization increases the
frequency and intensity of the demand for self-determination....And there are indeed
multiple examples that seem to substantiate this claim. 42
A brief review of the most common forms of the arguments for a causal relationship is
indicative of the extent, and apparent reasonableness, of the causal claim.
a. Globalization brings economic inequality which produces separatist movements.
Supporting the argument that globalization produces economic inequality which produces
separatism is the work of Guljit Arora. Writing on globalization and the creation of new
states in India, he found that globalisation induced changes produce economic
frustrations among people. And these are easily exploitable into demands for smaller
states by the political class.... 43 In other words, globalisation may influence the entire
socio-economic and political structure of the country further inducing pressures for new
states.... 44
b. Globalization weakens states which fosters separatist movements.
A frequently made argument by scholars of globalization is that this phenomenon
weakens states and weak states encourage separatist movements. Several illustrations
can be given.
William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, writing on the impact of aspects of
globalization, say that These globalizing processes encouraged questioning and
ultimately the broadening of claims to collective autonomy, and this questioning
challenged the states monopoly. 45 They say, the dominance of a given nation-state
society or community in the lives of many diminishes relative to membership in other
communities.... 46 The result is the rise of separatist sentiments.
Natalia Loukacheva, examining peoples in the Danish territory of Greenland and the
Canadian federal territory of Nunavut, suggests that the global involvement of these
communities has given them powers to enhance their autonomy in the countries in which
they are found. Yet, she asserts, this doesnt necessarily threaten the sovereignty of
their respective states. Changes taking place within the Arctic raise the standing of
Greenland and Nunavut within their home states.... 47 In other words, although the status
of Denmark and Canada in the world may not have been challenged by the global

involvement of these territories, their autonomy from the two countries has been
enhanced.
Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson accept the argument that as a result of globalization
States are less autonomous, they have less exclusive control over the economic and
social processes within their territories, and they are less able to maintain national
distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity. 48 They say the states capacities to control
its people and domestic social processes have declined as a consequence. 49 And, they
agree that the decline in the centrality of national-level politics means Subnationalities and regions can assert their autonomy with less fear.... 50
c. Globalization challenges local cultures which encourage individuals to respond
through separatist movements.
Danilo Zolo argues that though globalization may produce uniformity, it also may
produce rebellion. He accepts the argument that ...the pressure to conform can actually
generate resistance, disorder and violence. In some cases it triggers rejection, secession
and isolationism on the part of subjects states, peoples, ethnic or religious communities
driven to defend their identity and assert the autonomy of their local reality in the face
of global contamination and standardisation. 51
Ian Clark contends that we are now in a period of globalization ...that is certain to
intensify heterogeneity and separatism, even if the forces of globalization are not
uniformly resisted or reversed. Globalization evokes an equal but opposite reaction in the
direction of fragmentation precisely because it forces cultures into mutual awareness and
thereby accentuates the identity of difference.... 52
Gerard Delanty says Citizenship involves four components: rights, responsibilities,
participation and identity. 53 He argues, What has come about today, largely as a result
of globalization, is the separation of these components from each other: they are no
longer united into a coherent national framework. 54 The result, he says, is the spectre
of a new nationalism, ranging from violent separatist movements, religious nationalism to
neo-fascism and the more subtle cultural nationalisms which have become an integral
part of late political culture. 55 He believes that globalization has fostered a growing
discord between citizenship and nationality.... 56 He contends that there is a way out:
the adoption of a cosmopolitan identity. To him a cosmopolitan is a universal citizen,
mobile, autonomous and choosing to be transnational. 57 Yet, we remain in a precosmopolitan world where separatism is a response to globalization.
d. Globalization challenges the human desire for autonomy thereby stimulating
separatist efforts.
Louis Pauly suggests that by challenging a basic human desire, globalization stirs the
desire for autonomy or separatism. He says, not only do human beings want to shape
and live in a world that is prosperous, secure, and sustainable, but also that they insist on

one that preserves in principle a high degree of autonomy for themselves and for the
collectivities with which they identify. 58
William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon write similarly. They contend that the
effects of globalization challenge human nature. They argue:
Individuals and communities around the world are becoming ever more deeply
connected to one another. For better or for worse, what happens abroad now
affects us deeply at home. Nevertheless, whether as individuals or as members of
discrete communities, human beings continue to place a high value on their
autonomy. They insist on shaping the conditions of their existence to the fullest
extent possible. 59
A consequence of that desire for autonomy may take the form of separatism.
Nanda Shrestha and Dennis Conway make a similar argument about reactions to
globalization, i.e., that the human desire for autonomy is being channeled into separatism
as a result of an aspect of globalization:
The contemporary trend does not seem to bode well for globalizations relentless
advance.... Despite ongoing cultural homogenization and cultural hybridization as
related to everyday commodities or in the material arena, heightened senses of
cultural identity and resultant cultural conflicts seem to be on the rise, especially
in Asia. Again, this rise is mostly attributed to the public reaction and response to
the cultural relations of dominance and dependence, not so much to the
government policy and cultural behavior of the co-opted ruling classes (vis-a-vis
the West). 60
To Shrestha and Conway, the stimulus activating the human desire for autonomy lies in
unequal power relations embedded in globalization.
e. Globalization imposes the will of the most powerful on others who may react
through separatist movements.
Ian Clark has written of the view, common in the literature, that the more
globalization intensifies, the fiercer will be the pockets of resistance to its intrusive
sway. 61 He says: There are certainly many arguments that explicitly link
fragmentation to globalization: fragmentation is a dialectical response to
globalization. 62 Clark argues that Globalization has been shaped and carried forward
by the most powerful states and for their own ends. It is therefore a tangible expression
of the inequalities of the international system. 63 Who will lead the opposition to
globalization? Clark predicts that those seeking fragmentation will be those who have
the most to lose by continuing globalization. And, he suggests, precisely how the
balance between globalization and fragmentation will be adjusted depends on the new
role that states are able to forge for themselves, and how successfully they manage to

10

mediate between increasingly potent international pressures and the heightened levels of
domestic discontent that will inevitably be brought in their wake. 64
f. Globalization has fostered international criminal activities which have supported
separatist movements.
Christian Allen has emphasized the intermediary role of criminal activity between
globalization and separatism. He notes that Globalization processes have increased the
scale and scope of transnational exchange for legitimate and criminal enterprises alike. 65
He contends: Current and recent insurgencies supported primarily through criminal
activities include Sendero Luminoso (Peru); FARC/ELN (Columbia); and separatist
movements in Myanmar, Chechnya and Kurdistan..... 66 And, he argues, Exploitable
natural resource wealth not only funds civil conflict, but also motivates it. As the
economic and political opportunities of marginalized populations decline, they take to
arms seeking direct control over scarce but exploitable resources like mines, forests or
fields of drug crops. 67
g. Globalization has led to popular insecurity which has fostered separatist
movements.
More generally, the argument has been made that globalization has produced insecurity
among portions of the population and that insecurity has been a motive for separatism.
For example, Ronaldo Munck suggests that
The rise of the new nationalism needs to be seen as both response to, and product
of, globalization. The insecurities generated by globalism, and the perceived
failure of alternative development paths, have generated new nationalisms. But
their reaction to cultural loss and disorientation has taken full advantage of the
benefits of globalization in terms of increasingly accessible international travel
and the communications revolutions. 68
He continues,
Against the social and existential insecurity created by the one big market that is
globalization, nationalism reaffirms the importance of culture, identity and roots.
Nationalism can thus be seen not as some unfortunate hangover from an era
before the end of history was proclaimed but, rather, as an integral element of
the ongoing march of globalization. 69
The contention that globalization causes separatism is widespread and scholars see it
operating through a variety of intermediary factors, including economic inequality,
weakened states, challenges to local cultures, the psychological desire for autonomy,
reactions to the will of the powerful, enhanced criminal activity, and general insecurity.
The bottom line is that globalization directly, or indirectly, causes separatism.

11

2. Claim #2: Globalization does not cause separatism

Nevertheless, many scholars argue the opposite, i.e., that globalization does not produce
separatism. Indeed, they contend that it functions to limit separatist movements. Just as
the arguments and evidence supporting the view that globalization causes separatism
takes a variety of forms, so the argument and evidence that globalization does not cause
separatism takes a variety of forms.
a. Globalization is providing states with new tools to thwart potential separatism.
According to Ian Clark, A.D. Smith ...challenges yet another of the central premises of
globalization theory. The technical accoutrements of communicationthe very nervous
system of all accounts of globalizationmay in fact be more even handed in their impact
on the two processes. ...fragmentation is as likely as is globalization to thrive in the
communications revolution of the late twentieth century. 70 In other words,
communications networks may be used to fight separatism and foster unity in a country.
b. State action will mitigate possible fragmenting impacts of globalization.
Richard Rosecrance concludes that globalization is unlikely to produce secessionist
movements for three reasons:
First, metropolitan governments have themselves embraced globalization,
extending its benefits to potentially dissident provinces. 71 Second and perhaps
more important, dissident elements can no longer legitimately use the threat of
terrorism to gain independence from a reluctant metropolitan government. If they
do so, they lose the support of other nations and the international community as a
whole, undermining their position. Third, existing governments have rewarded
dissident provinces which have remained within the central administrative
fold....The rewards of remaining within tend to exceed the benefits of going
outside. 72
A similar argument is made by Meredith Weiss in her study of the Basque, Catalan,
Punjabi and Kashmiri movements. She concludes that while international context
matters, how states respond to ethnonationalist movements remains more
salient....movements supported significantly by a diasporic population or that invoke
transnational identities may benefit more from globalization than others. 73 She states
these findings in greater detail as follows:
Globalization matters when a diasporic or otherwise-aligned population has
resources and motivation to contribute, when international norms promote a
particular trajectory, when other states are directly affected by the movement, or
when geostrategic alliances require the settlement of distracting domestic
disputes. These conditions and moments, though, are impermanent and have
effect only as they concatenate with state- and local-level forces. 74

12

These cases suggest that states and sovereignty may increasingly find themselves
counterbalanced by supranational institutions and global forces, but retain critical
relevance. How the state responds to ethnonationalist unrest, and especially, what
sorts of institutional outlets are available for protest, nay significantly determine
the timbre and course of the movement how radical the demands expressed are,
what sort of alliances form within or across regions and even with sympathizers
abroad, and how palatable moderation seems to the contenders....Ultimately,
though, despite the rhetoric and reality of economic globalization and
expectations of shifts in the distribution of political power toward a supranational
level, the basic processes of ethnonationalist contention remain much the same as
ever, and both regional and state-level identities and processes retain core
relevance. 75
Thus, some scholars argue that under most circumstances, states will be able to mitigate
frustrations brought by globalization and significant separatist movements will not
develop. Clearly, their arguments are directed primarily against the notion that separatist
movements will develop significantly and/or succeed, rather than against the notion that
they may be fostered or initiated as a result of globalization.
c. Economic development derived from globalization may undermine the potential
economic causes of separatism.
Nicholas Sambanis argues that globalization understood as increased trade as a
percentage of GDP can both fuel and quell self-determination movements under different
conditions.... 76 He notes: According to most theories of secessionism, selfdetermination is typically demanded when the economic benefits of membership to the
predecessor state are low relative to the economic and political gains of independence. 77
Yet, he argues, More democratic states might be better able to resolve conflicts,
increasing the benefits of continued membership (i.e. no secession). 78 And, he
concludes that globalization will have generally positive effects if it increases levels of
income and leads governments to provide social insurance programs to cushion any
external shocks to vulnerable populations. 79 Still, he notes, in some regions with prior
levels of conflict, globalization is likely to exacerbate those conflicts. 80
Like Nicholas Sambanis, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein say although
globalization initially stimulated ethnic discontent by creating inequality, it also provides
the means for quieting discontents down the road within the fold of the state political
system. Distributed economic growth is a palliative for political discontent. 81
Again, globalization does not necessarily lead to separatism.
d. Identity with existing states can not be easily shifted to global identity thereby
weakening identity with the state, so globalizations impact on identity is unlikely to
foster the rise of separatism.

13

A.D. Smith suggests that arguments related to the impact of globalization on identity
necessarily fostering globalization are fallacious. He says, If memory is central to
identity, we can discern no global identity in-the-making... 82 Furthermore, he says,
any globalization of culture, induced by international politics, is skin deep and destined
to pass away with the next shift in international power. It does not have the resilience of
true cultures, based on memory and history. 83 If globalization does not challenge
identity, then it can not be the cause of shifts of identity related to the rise of separatist
movements.
e. Most states are not weakening significantly, so the impetus for separatism is
unlikely to seriously increase.
The argument that globalization weakens states and that weak states invite separatism is
contested by some scholars. Nick Bisley contends that Globalization is said to
discipline states and force them to adhere to a singular model of economic behaviour.
Yet if one looks at the fiscal policy of the richest statesthose most heavily influenced
by globalizationthere is little evidence to support the claims that globalization has tied
their policy hands. 84 That is, globalizations impact on the authority of developed states
is exaggerated by those who see globalization causing separatism. He concludes that
there is little empirical evidence to support the position.... that the state is in decline. 85
f. Empirical studies do not support the globalization-separatism hypothesis.
There are studies which directly refute the globalization-separatism hypothesis. The
work of Annalisa Zinn is among the most thorough.
The starting point for her study is the observation that:
A common notion is that globalization, specifically in the form of trade
liberalization, increases the frequency and intensity of movements for regional
autonomy. That is, it stimulates the formation of new movements and fuels
existing movements, perhaps by increasing voter support for these movements...,
inducing changes in their strategies, or encouraging them to be more active in
their pursuit of greater autonomy. 86
To test the causal relationship, she undertook a multivariate statistical analysis of 116
countries from 1980-1999. She reported that her finding challenges the popular view
that globalization amplifies the intensity of subnational threats to state sovereignty and
suggests that the increasing level of trade between countries is actually curbing parallel
increases in the number of active self-determination movements. 87 She concluded: The
key finding seems to be that recent increases in economic integration and political
separatism are parallel processes and that without the increasing level of trade between
countries, the number of active self-determination movements worldwide most likely
would be higher. 88 In other words, economic globalization decreases, rather than
increases, the frequency and intensity of the demand for self-determination. 89

14

In addition, there are scholars whose findings are mixed, i.e., they partly contradict and
partly support the globalization-separatism hypothesis. Shahadad Naghshpour and
Joseph St. Marie, using multiple regression tools, found, on the one hand, that
globalization does, in fact, increase the incidence of ethnic protest in the sample
countries. 90 Yet, on the other hand, they conclude: Robust findings demonstrate that
economic factors such as trade and GDP growth decrease protest while the balance of
payments and the value added in industry actually increase protest for various
reasons....While some sorts of contact with other countries decrease protest, others
especially membership in Western NGOs increases protest. 91
3. Summary: The globalization-separatism relationship
The simplest conclusion to this review of studies of the globalization-separatism
relationship is that the relationship is ambiguous. Scholars have noted parallel trends in
the two variables. More than a decade ago, Metta Spencer observed, as others have
observed,
The late 1980s and 1990s have been marked by two mutually contradictory
trends. The first is an increasing cultural, economic, environmental, and political
integration transnationally through globalization and the formation of
international political structures, such as the European Union. The second is the
upsurge in separatist movements that aspire, sometimes with success, to partition
states. 92
Yet, she does not claim a causal relationship. The appearance of a relationship because
of this correlation does not mean the reality of globalization causing separatism.
Indeed, several scholars use a coin analogy to identify their relationship. Ronaldo Munck
suggests that Globalism and nationalism are, perhaps, best seen as two sides of the same
coin and inextricably linked. 93 And, Thomas Eriksen suggests that the centripetal or
unifying forces of globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity
politics are two sides of the same coin.... 94 Thus, at a minimum, scholars suggest that
they often appear to be linked, but how they are linked is disputed.
A general conclusion from our review of the arguments that globalization causes
separatism and that globalization does not cause separatism is that no consistent bivariate
relationship exists. Globalization may be causally related to separatism sometimes, but
not at other times. Indeed, that is the implicit or explicit argument of many scholars.
Four examples are illustrative:
In a paper by Ryan Griffiths and Ivan Savic, the conclusion is reached that the process
of globalization may lead to two worlds: one in which separatism leads to the devolution
of power and, ironically, greater regional integration...; the other in which separatism
leads to true fragmentation. 95

15

Richard Rosecrance, Etel Solingen and Arthur Stein argue that globalization may lead to
dissatisfaction. Yet, The dissatisfaction of a province...can lead in two directions:
toward greater dependence on the metropolitan government and an acceptance of lesser
status, or toward independence in hopes that the international economy will treat the
fledgling state kindly. 96 Thus, they conclude, that globalization will not necessarily
produce a separatist reaction in different regions. Why? Much depends on what national
and international authorities (national governments, the IMF, WTO, NATO, ASEAN,
and G-8) do to contain the response. 97
Russell Hardin has suggested that the globalization that finally makes it feasible for
subnational groups to opt out of their home nations without loss of economic
opportunity also makes it less worthwhile to be autonomous. 98
Ian Clark says sometimes globalization has shifted the burden to domestic sectors; at
others, domestic interests have been given priority and international fragmentation has
resulted. None of this is automatic, nor mechanical, but it is explicable in terms of the
working out of political preferences. 99
In order to better sort out the ambiguities and contradictions regarding the globalizationseparatism relationship, we will examine briefly five separatist cases to determine the
importance of globalization as a causal factor. The separatist struggles to be examined
include Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), Eritrea from Ethiopia (1993), East Timor from
Indonesia (2002), Kosovo from Serbia/Yugoslavia (2008), and the Kurds from Turkey
(on-going).
III. The Role of Globalization in Five Separatist Cases
In the following review of the five cases, we will seek to identify what scholars consider
the key causal variable or variables in each of the five cases. We will look for possible
causes that fall into six categories: geographical, cultural, political, economic, leadership
and external factors. Then we will determine the degree to which the causal factors in the
cases studied are related to the concept of globalization. On the basis of that assessment
we will seek an answer to the research question: Is there a causal relationship between
globalization and separatism?
A. East Pakistani Efforts to Separate from Pakistan (1971)
The two territories that became Pakistan were parts of British-ruled India until they were
given independence on August 14, 1947. Grievances developed in what was initially
known as East Bengal but was renamed East Pakistan. They reached a crisis point on
March 26, 1971 when Bengali leaders declared East Pakistan independent from Pakistan.
Military suppression of the separatist movement led to an estimated ten million refugees
fleeing East Pakistan to India, the rise of an India-supported resistance called the Mukti
Bahini, and Indian military intervention in December which resulted in the surrender of
Pakistani troops and Pakistani acceptance of the independence of what became
Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.

16

Scholars who have studied the separatist movement have identified an array of causes
giving rise to, sustaining, and leading to the successful fruition of the effort.
Geographical factors: Pakistan consisted of two parts with the East separated from the
West by 1000 miles of the state of India.
Cultural factors: Although the people in the two parts of Pakistan were linked by the
dominant religion, Islam, they were divided by ethnicity. The dominant group in the East
was the Bengali, while that in the West it was the Punjabi. As we have noted, at
independence, the East was called East Bengal in recognition of the fact that the Bengali
constituted about 98% of the population there. Indeed, the Bengali population is greater
than that of the Punjabi and any other ethnic group in Pakistan. The 1955 change of
name to East Pakistan was a symbolic action which reaffirmed to many Bengali their
inferior status in the country. The Bengali felt disadvantaged in Pakistan, too, because of
language. Urdu became the countrys official language, though most people in the East
spoke Bengali. Indeed, in 1952 there were protests in the East by the Bengali Language
Movement on this issue. These protests were suppressed violently.
Political factors: Although the population of the East was greater than that of the West,
elites of the West controlled the Pakistani government. R.K. Dasgupta suggests that in
post-independent East Pakistan there was a generational change. Among the younger
leaders many came to denounce the Muslim League as an instrument of non-Bengali
tyranny over the Bengalis and hated its Bengali members as loyalist collaborators. 100
Among those leaders was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who, in his Six Point Program of
February 12, 1966, called for greater autonomy for the East. Dasgupta suggests that
Programme began to turn political unrest into violent uprising. 101
In the December 7, 1970 national elections, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for greater
decentralization and complained about the governments failure to help when a cyclone
hit the East the previous month. His Awami League won virtually all the parliamentary
seats in the East and a majority of parliamentary seats in the country as a whole. 102 Yet,
the President, General Yahya Khan, would not allow the party to assume control of the
government of Pakistan. As anger grew in the East, more Pakistani troops were sent
there. On March 25, 1971 the military launched its attack, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
called for an independent Bangladesh early the next morning, and he was captured and
imprisoned. Although the West quickly seized control of the major urban centers and
captured opponents, the action spurred popular resistance and an exodus of millions of
people to India.
External factors: The key external player in the East Pakistani effort to separate from
Pakistan was India, a country with which Pakistan had fought two wars. India had not
been a critical player in the growing estrangement between East and West Pakistan, but
following the military crackdown in March of 1971 it became the refuge of many Bengali
Pakistanis and became more and more involved. And, India was concerned that refugees
in the northeast might spur destabilizing conflict there. As a consequence, India began

17

aiding the resistance forces, i.e., the Mukti Bahini. Yet, it was not until 9 months after
the initial crackdown by Pakistani troops that India became directly involved. Indian
armed forces began occupying territory in East Pakistan on November 21st; Pakistan
attacked Indian air installations in northwestern India on December 3rd; in response, India
declared war on Pakistan that day; the Dhaka offensive was launched by India on
December 5th; and, Dhaka fell December 16th.
Although Pakistan had expected international intervention to restrain India, India was
able to keep that from happening. It made a strong case legitimizing its actions. 103
Economic factors: A continuing grievance used by leaders in the East was that of
economic neglect. Observers suggested the relationship was a colonial one with the West
the colonizer and the East the colonized. 104 Government resources seemed to go
inordinately to the West. And, as noted above, when the disastrous cyclone following
Monsoon flooding hit the East in late 1970, financial assistance from the government was
minimal.
Leadership factors: Commenting on the leadership in Pakistan and India during the brief
Bangladesh war, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose said there was strong and consistent
control in democratic India during the Bangladesh crisis, but relatively weak and
inconsistent control in authoritarian Pakistan. 105 They noted, While Pakistani decision
making before the military crackdown of 25 March was unsystematic in design and
insensitive to consequences, it subsequently became more ad hoc in structure, minimalist
in terms of political reform, and dependent upon external events with respect to
timing. 106 Dasgupta was more colorful in his description of post-election government
formation talks among leaders in early 1971: Constitutionally the talks between the
General Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were not talks between the
Government and a party leader of the same country. They were talks between the
representative of a colonial power and the leader of a rebel province which had virtually
shaken off its colonial bondage. 107 Although the bias is obvious in Dasguptas remarks,
Sisson and Rose have commented critically regarding Pakistans leadership at the
time. 108
Concluding comments: As appears to be true for the other separatist efforts to be
examined, the causes in the Bangladesh case were both multiple and complex.
B. Eritrean Efforts to Separate from Ethiopia (1993)
Italy formally declared Eritrea a colony on January 1, 1890 and ruled it until the British
seized it early in World War II. The British ruled Eritrea from 1941 until 1951. On
September 15, 1948 the British took the issue of the status of Eritrea to the UN for a
decision on its future status. There was disagreement among members, so a year later the
General Assembly appointed a commission to advise it. The commission provided two
alternatives in its June 1950 report. Commission members from Burma, Norway, and
South Africa suggested that Eritrea be a self-governing unit within an Ethiopian
federation, while the members from Guatemala and Pakistan suggested Trusteeship under

18

the UN for ten years and then independence. In December of 1950, the General
Assembly decided to proceed with the former recommendation. A UN Commissioner
arrived to oversee the transfer in early 1951; a year later elections were held in Eritrea for
a Representative Assembly and a constitution was adopted; on September 11, 1952, with
the approval of the Ethiopian Emperor, the federation was established. Yet, in 1961
Ethiopia shut down the Eritrean Representative Assembly and on November 14, 1962
Ethiopia formally annexed Eritrea. A 30 year separatist struggle followed. The struggle
culminated on May 24, 1993 when Eritrea became an independent state.
Geographic factors: Like Pakistan, the territory of Eritrea constituted the Eastern part of
Ethiopia prior to its separation, but, unlike Pakistan, it was contiguous with the rest of the
country. Its position along the Red Sea gave Eritrea strategic importance for it provided
Ethiopia with its surface link to the sea. The boundary in the north divides Tigrinyaspeaking peoples between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a feature which affected the success of
the separatist movement.
Cultural factors: Ethiopia is a country of many ethnicities dominated by a core of
Amharic-speaking peoples. In Eritrea, there are nine major ethnic groups, though the
Tigray and Tigrinya-speakers constitute about 80 % of the population. The population is
said to be equally divided between Christians and Muslims. During the period of the
federation, specifically, in 1956, the two official languages specified by the Eritrean
constitution, Arabic and Tigrinya, were replaced by Amharic. This was followed by the
banning of a separate Eritrean flag. Both actions were viewed as efforts to diminish
cultural symbols of importance to people living in Eritrea.
Political factors: In another attempt to diminish possible separatist activity, Ethiopian
law was imposed on Eritrea in 1959. According to a UN report,
The gradual erosion of Eritreas federal status in the late 1950s had led
independence-minded Eritreans to launch a campaign of resistance to Ethiopian
rule. With the abrogation of the Federal Act in 1962 and the incorporation of
Eritrea into Ethiopia as one of that countrys provinces, the movement for
secession and self-determination was taken up in earnest. 109
Eritrea was not the only part of Ethiopia where grievances against the Addis Ababa-based
government led to both opposition and separatist movements. On September 12, 1974, a
military coup overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie and on February 3, 1977 Mengistu Haile
Mariam became president of the Dergue, the military body that ruled Ethiopia. In the late
1970s, the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed seeking autonomy for
Tigre region and became the most formidable opponent of the central government. It was
helped by the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) that was seeking Eritrean
autonomy. Mengistu fled the country on May 21, 1991. In rapid succession the EPLF
entered Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and a broadened opposition took Addis Ababa, the
capital of Ethiopia. As a result of the EPLFs cooperation in bringing down the Mengistu
government, the new government in Ethiopia accepted the separation of Eritrea.

19

Economic factors: Ethiopias imports and exports depended on trade through Eritrea, yet
Eritreans felt aggrieved by the fact that the government focused investment in other parts
of the country.
Leadership factors: In the post-World War II years, Emperor Haile Selassie led an
authoritarian government that sought to affirm central control throughout Ethiopia. The
demise of the federation angered sections of the Eritrean population. The significance of
the military grew as resistance to central control arose. Haile Selassies overthrow by the
military and the assumption of power by one of its leaders did not change the dominant
position of the Amhara or the resistance of non-Amharic peoples to centralization. The
fractious nature of the country led to leadership that tended to emphasize the use of the
military and the centralization of power.
External factors: Clearly, forces outside Eritrea have had a major affect on the territorys
status. The UNs initial involvement was to foster the establishment of the federal link
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as we have noted. The US backed the Haile Selassie
regime; the USSR backed the Mengistu regime, so the USSRs collapse was a factor in
weakening that regime. What became the major Eritrean opposition force, the Eritrean
Peoples Libesration Front (EPLF), received support from the Eritrean diaspora and, at
times, from governments in Somalia and the Sudan when hostilities grew toward
Ethiopia. Arab states supported the Eritreans at times, too. African states, according to
Ruth Iyob, resisted Eritrean efforts for three reasons: because of fear of balkanization,
Ethiopias role as a champion of African liberation, and Ethiopias successful portrayal
of Eritrean independence as Arabization. 110 The UNs second involvement was at the
invitation of the Ethiopian government to facilitate the separation of Eritrea. The General
Assembly created the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in
Eritrea (UNOVER) which was sent to Eritrea in January of 1993; the vote was held in
April; it was overwhelmingly in favor of independence.
Concluding comments: The causes of the separatist movement in Eritrea are many,
including the historical separation and the sense of grievance felt as a consequence of
several of Ethiopias policies. Ruth Iyob suggests that the causes lie in the particular
convergence of socio-historical, economic, and political factors that shaped events in
post-colonial Africa. 111 Contributing factors working for and against include religion,
geostrategic importance, end of cold war, success at internationalization, UN role,
division within, access to arms, skill in diplomacy, and many others. These are different
for the development of a movement for separation and the success of such a movement.
The causes of the movement are more the former than the latter, though considerations
about the possibility of the latter may affect the former. What is apparent is that those
who seek a simple cause disagree with each other for the causes are complex and the
result of unique features that change over time and are interpreted differently by different
people. That says a great deal about the problem of simplification.

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C. East Timorese Efforts to Separate from Indonesia (2002)

The Portuguese took direct control of East Timor in 1701, though it gained effective
control only in 1913. Japan invaded in 1942 and left in 1945. Portugal then reasserted its
control. On April 25, 1974 a coup occurred in Portugal which resulted in the overthrow
of the Marcelo Caetano government. The new Portuguese regime was concerned
primarily with extricating itself from its African wars and so, essentially, left the East
Timor situation to be worked out by East Timorese. In 1975 there was fighting among
factions in the country, but the most significant one, the Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), declared independence on November 28, 1975.
On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded the territory and took over, formally making
East Timor a province in July 1976. For the next 24 years, the armed military wing of
FRETILIN continued the struggle for the separation of East Timor from Indonesia.
Following the 1997-1998 financial crisis, President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998
and the Vice President B.J. Habibi took over as head of a caretaker government. He
accepted a UN request that a referendum in East Timor be held which would ask citizens
whether they would like autonomy or independence. The United Nations Assistance
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in 1999 for that purpose. The UNsponsored referendum was held on August 30, 1999 with a vote favoring independence.
On May 20, 2002, East Timor, also known as Timor Leste, became independent.
Geographical factors: East Timor constitutes the eastern half of the island of Timor plus
an enclave in the western half. It is located about 400 miles north of the Australian city
of Darwin.
Cultural factors: As a consequence of Portuguese rule, most of the people in East Timor
are Roman Catholic, a fact which distinguishes them from Indonesians who are
dominantly Muslim. Their cultural distinctiveness from other peoples on Timor and from
others in Indonesia is primarily a consequence of their Portuguese colonial history.
Political factors: The political history of what is now formally known as the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste had been described in outline above. An important feature of
this period was the existence of a variety of opposition groups and efforts to unify them.
During the period of Indonesian rule, the military wing of FRETILIN, the Armed Forces
for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), frequently sought to bring
together various factions to oppose Indonesias colonial rule. The diversity of political
tendencies and parties has continued to be reflected in post-independence East Timor,
though FRETILIN remains a significant player. That diversity was viewed as an
obstacle to be overcome during the separatist struggle.
Economic factors: A critical factor in the success of the separatist forces was the impact
of the Asian financial collapse on the Indonesian government. That led to a government
more amenable to working with the United Nations to bring about the possible
independence of East Timor. East Timor itself is poor. The greatest economic potential

21

comes from off shore oil and gas resources, partly shared with Australia, which have
attracted foreign interest.
Leadership factors: During the struggle against Indonesia, the Indonesian governments
arrest and/or killing of resistance leaders led to significant changes in militant leadership.
Factional differences, too, contributed to several leadership changes. The 1996 Nobel
Peace Prize awards to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta gave fame to leaders who were
not involved in the armed struggle. Perhaps, more important to the separation movement
than any of these was the willingness of President Suhartos successor, B.J. Habibie, to
permit a referendum in 1999 on possible separation of East Timor from Indonesia.
External factors: When one looks for causes of the separatist movement in East Timor
and its success, external factors appear to have been criticalmore critical in this case
than in those of Bangladesh and Eritrea. It was the coup in Portugal in 1975 that
prompted the initial declaration of independence which, in turn, led Indonesia to seize
control of the territory. Indonesias action appears to have been encouraged by the U.S.,
fearful that its war in Vietnam might be compromised by an independent East Timor.
Following the Indonesian invasion, on December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council
unanimously voted that Indonesia should withdraw its troops from East Timor, but the
U.S. blocked sanctions to enforce the resolution. Indeed, Indonesias claim that
FRETILIN received support from China and was communist-oriented meant U.S. support
for Indonesias control of East Timor continued. The Nobel Prizes attracted international
attention to Indonesian colonialism. The Asian financial breakdown led to a change of
leadership in Indonesia and a leader willing to allow the UN to step in and support
elections. Australias proximity allowed it to provide the UN forces to carry out the
mission. Thus, the separatist movement was affected greatly by the deliberate activities
of outside countries and the UN.
Concluding comments: The initiation and success of the efforts of those in East Timor
seeking to separate from Indonesia were affected by a wide range of factors, especially
those coming from abroad. They both thwarted and fostered the movement directly
through influence on the colonizer and indirectly through the impact of a financial
crisis on the colonizers leadership.
D. Albanian Efforts in Kosovo to Separate from Serbia (2008)
The area known now as Kosovo was taken from Ottoman control and given to Serbia
after the first Balkan war of 1912. In a sense, that was the start of a separatist struggle
which persisted until recently. In 1974 Kosovo was made an autonomous province of
Serbia, a status very similar to that of a republic. In the 1980s, there were Albanian calls
for its independence but they were met by repression from the Yugoslav government. In
1989, the Serbian constitution was changed and Kosovos autonomy was reduced.
Kosovar Albanians reacted in two ways. One reaction was through non-violence: On
July 2, 1990, an unofficial Kosovo parliament declared the territory independent; the
following year they held an informal referendum on separation; and, in May 1992 they
elected Ibrahim Rugova as President. The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, responded

22

with repression. The other reaction was through violence: By 1996, the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) had become the dominant force in the separatist struggle. The
Kosovo war continued until 1999 when Milosevic withdrew his forces following NATO
bombing. The following year the UN Security Council placed Kosovo under UN
administration (UNMIK) and authorized KFOR, a NATO peacekeeping force. In 2005,
UN negotiations for a permanent settlement of the Kosovo problem failed. On
February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared its independence. To resolve disputes
among major powers, on October 8, 2008 the UN General Assembly asked the
International Court of Justice whether the independence was legal.
Geographical factors: Kosovo is an area located between Albania and Yugoslavia. At
the time of the separatist struggle with which we are concerned, it was a part of
Yugoslavia but most of the people in Kosovo had cultural and religious links with
Albania.
Cultural factors: Kosovar Albanians make up 90% of the population of the Kosovo area,
a proportion that has grown significantly over the last few decades. About 10% of the
population is Serbian. Commenting on the significance of the ethnic make-up of the area,
John Norris says:
While many of the disputes in the Balkans have been mislabeled as ancient
ethnic hatreds, Kosovo probably comes closest to living up to the title. Disputes
between Serbs and Albanians over control of the territory stretch back centuries.
The region has deep symbolic importance to both ethnic communities, and the
twentieth century was marked by a disturbing series of violent ethnic expulsions
and counterexpulsions by both Serbs and Albanians in an effort to
demographically dominate the region. These tensions also often took on religious
overtones, with the majority of Serbs being Orthodox Christian and the majority
of Kosovar Albanians being Muslim. 112
Political factors: As noted above, Milosevic for political reasons curtailed Kosovar
Albanian rights culminating in the revocation of Kosovos autonomous status in July
1990. 113 The struggle in the 1990s involved efforts by the Kosovar Albanians to declare
their independence and set up an unofficial government under Ibrahim Rugova and
efforts by what was called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to use force for the same
purpose. Milosevic responded with even more repression leading to NATOs
intervention and Milosevics withdrawal in 1999, as we have noted. Subsequently, a
dispute developed within the international community over recognition of Kosovos
independence. Western countries generally recognized the separation, while Russia
rejected it. Although there may be a dispute over whether the Kosovar Albanians have
achieved de jure independence, they have achieved de facto separation.
Economic factors: Kosovo was the poorest province in Yugoslavia and is one of the
poorest countries in Europe today. The conflict over separation, the dispute over
recognition, and the absence of significant resources have contributed to this poverty.
And, the poverty may have fostered a desire for separation.

23

Leadership factors: The behavior of leaders has contributed to the rise and fall of
separatist sentiment, too. For example, in July 1966 at the 4th Plenum of the Central
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ousted the Yugoslavian Interior
Minister and Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic an event said to have ended a period of
repression of Kosovar Albanians. And, the rise of Slobodan Miloevi during the 1980s
was due partly to his use of the issue of ethnic persecution. He claimed that Kosovo
Albanians had ill-treated Kosovo Serbs. Indeed, it can be argued that the autonomous
status of Kosovo was revoked in July 1990 justified by Miloevi on the grounds that
Serbia continued to be mistreated by Kosovar Albanians. 114
External factors: The splintering of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War, the horrors of
Bosnia, and the suppression of Kosovos autonomy fostered the conviction that nonviolence would not work, so groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) sprung up
in the mid-1990s. The collapse of the government of neighboring Albania in 1997 then
flooded Kosovo with cheap weapons and triggered harsh crackdowns by Serb police and
paramilitary forces. Both sides continued to radicalize throughout 1998 with a steady
stream of hit-and-run attacks by the KLA and Serb security forces. 115 Western powers
were concerned with the instability Miloevis actions might foster. In March of 1999,
the Rambouillet Accords for the restoration of Kosovos autonomy were signed by the
Kosovar Albanians, but Serbia refused to sign. According to Norris, It was
Yugoslavias resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reformnot the
plight of Kosovar Albaniansthat best explains NATOs war. Milosevic had been a burr
in the side of the transatlantic community for so long that the United States felt that he
would only respond to military pressure. 116 As noted above, NATO forces were
deployed, primarily in a bombing campaign from March to June 1999 which led to
Milosevics agreement to withdraw his forces. The UN authorized a NATO
peacekeeping force. Russia opposed the intervention because it feared it might signal a
future willingness by the Alliance to involve itself in Russias internal affairs without a
UN mandate. 117 And, the legality of Kosovos proclamation of independence is being
adjudicated before the International Court of Justice.
Concluding comments: Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein argue that what happened
in Kosovo is an anomaly. They contend The recent formation of an independent
Kosovo, which has not yet been recognized by various key countries, does not foretell the
similar arrival of other new states....Rather, prospective secessionists, dissuaded by both
central governments and the international community, are likely to hold back. Indeed,
the most plausible future outcome is that both established states and their international
supporters will generally act to prevent a proliferation of new states from entering the
international system. 118 The international communitys use of force in Kosovo to
facilitate its separation from Yugoslavia was a much more important cause than it was in
any of the other cases under study. Yet, a multitude of other factors played a role in
bringing about the separatist movement.

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E. Kurdish Efforts to Separate from Turkey (On-going)

When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came to power in the early 1920s, he sought to build
national unity by creating a Turkish identity. The Kurds were the most significant
minority and resisted incorporation. A range of tools were used in an attempt to replace a
Kurdish identity with a Turkish identity. Yet, Kurdish identity persisted. On November
27, 1978, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was founded linking Kurdish tribal areas and
seeking a separate Kurdish state, that of Kurdistan. Since 1984 the PKK has used
violence against the Turkish state as a means of promoting separation. The leader of the
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Kenya and returned to Turkey in 1999. But, his
capture did not end the separatist struggle. Under pressure from NATO and the European
Union efforts have been made to relax some of the strictures against the expression of
Kurdish ways, allowing the Kurdish language to be used, permitting some broadcasts in
Kurdish, and so on. Although the PKK demand has shifted from independence to a
desire for autonomy or federal status, the demand for a form of separation has not died. 119
Geographical factors: The Kurdish homeland is eastern and southeastern Turkey,
though many Kurds have moved to urban areas where they accept a Turkish lifestyle.
Of particular importance is that Kurds live in the neighboring states of Syria, Iraq and
Iran, so the separatist movement in Turkey is part of a broader irredentist movement.
Cultural factors: At the heart of much of the justification for Kurdish separatism has
been the anguish over the Turkish governments effort to suppress the Kurdish language
and culture. Turkification is a term used to refer to the efforts of the government to
create a common identity among those living in Turkey. It is cited often as a cause of the
Kurdish separatist demand. 120
Political factors: The historically loose structure of the Ottoman Empire gave local
groups power to provide much of their own government. This was changed by Ataturk
when he took power in the early 1920s. Turkification put Kurds at a considerable
disadvantage, forcing them to alter their primary language and give up aspects of their
culture if they wanted to participate as citizens of Turkey. Pelin Turgut has argued that
Turks resist the Kurdish movement because they fear the Kurdish desire to secede and
take with them chunks of the territory so painstakingly saved by Ataturk from European
dismemberment. 121 He believes that the Turkish government has two alternatives for
dealing with Kurdish separatism: guns or policies which address grievances. He
contends that an obstacle to the latter is the army which sees itself as the custodian of
Ataturks achievement and is used to calling the shots on the Kurdish issue. 122 Initially,
the PKK used political means to achieve its goals. Sandrine Alexie says after the coup
of 1980 that set up a military power and started a hard political repression in Kurdistan,
PKK chose to fight as a military organisation.... 123 One factor affecting the form the
separatist movement has taken is the recurring military intervention in the government of
Turkey.

25

Economic factors: The Kurdish parts of the country are poor. According to Dogu Ergil,
Economic backwardness has hampered eastern Turkeys integration into the rest of the
country.... 124 It has provided a grievance that has facilitated recruitment of Kurdish
youth, much as the poverty has affected separatism in other countries.
Leadership factors: On the Turkish side, repeated military seizures of power have meant
that leadership frequently has been relatively authoritarian. Ergil contends that on the
Kurdish side, leadership for a peaceful movement has not developed because of official
repression of anything associated with an ethnic identity other than Turkish. And,
Kurds have not yet taken effective steps to put an end to violence and repression among
themselves and against each other. 125
External factors: Neighboring countries have provided sanctuary and encouragement to
Kurds from Turkey for policy purposes. Sandrine Alexie has written that ...Turkey put
pressure on his neighbours with dams that will deprive Syria and Iraq of water. It is one
of the reasons why Hafez el-Assad, the Syrian president, had sheltered for a long time the
staff and the basis of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), using their presence as
reprisals. 126 More recently, the growth of more accommodationist Turkish policies
toward the Kurds are often attributed, at least in part, to Turkeys desire to join the
European Union and the EUs demand for the protection of human rights and the
protection of minorities for admission.
Concluding comments: For more than three quarters of a century, Turkey has been
striving to create a homogenous nation. This meant that cultural and ethnic diversity had
to be suppressed and Turkishness had to become the common identity of all citizens.
Ergil suggests that The states insistent lust for control of the nation stifled the growth
and maturation of civil society and resulted in a lack of capacity to solve conflicts. 127
Although the Kurdish separatist movement persists, the strength of the Turkish state has
meant that its success has been limited.
F. Globalization as cause summary
This brief review of five cases leads to the conclusion that there is an extremely complex
array of causal factors involved in the creation, development, and success of separatist
movements. If Pakistan had different leadership, the separation of Bangladesh may not
have happened. Without skillful Indian diplomacy, its intervention to support the
separation of Bangladesh might have been thwarted by significant international
resistance. If Tigrayans had not led both the Eritrean and Ethiopian resistance to
Mengistu, Eritrea may not have been able to separate from Ethiopia. If the Asian
financial crisis had not occurred, Habibi might not have become President of Indonesia,
and the Indonesians may not have agreed to the UN referendum in East Timor that
brought success for the separatists. Had Milosevic not been the Serbian leader, there may
not have been as widely supported separatist movement in Kosovo. Had Turkey been
more flexible in its Turkification efforts, Kurdish separatism may not have happened.
This brief list of factors which might have significantly changed the separatist situations

26

in the five countries suggests the extremely complex array of factors involved in
separatist movement initiation and development and their complex interplay.
In none of the cases was there evidence that a significant cause of separatism was an
aspect of globalization. Trade, cross-national communications, declines in state power
relative to that of international organizations, and so on, appear absent or of relatively
minor importance compared with the complex of other factors in causing these separatist
movements. Yes, external factors were often important, but their involvement does not
appear to be something associated with what are widely considered to be aspects of the
form of globalization said to be of increasing importance in the world.
IV. Conclusions and Implications
The question we set out to answer was: Is there a causal relationship between
globalization and separatism? Our conclusion is that there is not a significant causal
relationship between the two. The complexity of causation in each of the cases examined
means that no causal factor appears to determine whether separatism occurs or succeeds.
So many factors are involved in such complex ways that it is not meaningful to identify a
universal cause such as globalization. What are the broader implications of this finding?
Two implications of these findings deserve emphasis: One is related to the concepts we
use and one is related to the effort to simplify reality.
A. The problem of conceptual equivalence
The long list of different conceptions of globalization and separatism itemized above
are indicative of a fundamental problem in studies that seek general knowledge. The
same words often are used to refer to different things. Any time we seek to accumulate
knowledge in the form of a generalization, we are assuming conceptual equivalence.
Conceptual equivalence is a gradational idea, i.e., there may be more or less empirical
similarity in definitions. One of the advantages quantitative studies are said to have over
qualitative studies is that a single definition of a concept is used when data sets are
compiled. I would not dispute the claim that this diminishes the variability in the
meaning of a concept. But, the numerous contingent factors that affect an operational
definition in any particular setting are likely to produce meanings that are not equivalent
across cases. If the meanings of concepts are not the same across cases, findings in one
case may not apply to another case.
B. The problem of causal simplification
The disciplinary goal of seeking simple explanations for complex situations has been
relatively unsuccessful. This situation has been particularly true for efforts to locate a
cause of separatist movements.
Robert Schaeffer writes in the conclusion to his book Severed States of the wide range of
reasons ethnic movements demand states of their own: Some movements have

27

organized to protest the invasion and annexation of their country by neighboring

states....In other countries, ethnic movements emerged in response to discrimination and
assault by indigenous government....There are also ethnic groups with substantial
political power, groups who may even be part of ruling majorities, such as the Czechs in
Czechoslovakia, who see partition as a way to rid themselves of burdensome ethnic
minorities....Although ethnic movements have different reasons for acquiring states, they
all believe that state power will provide tangible benefits. 128
Metta Spencer has provided another summary of proximate causes of nationalist
separatism: emotional resentment, the justified resistance of victims, propaganda
orchestrated for political gain, the power of a dominant ethnic group, economic
motivations, preservation of a threatened culture, and commitment to
modernization. 129 In addition, she cites several structural factors contributing to its rise:
Deep cleavages between segments of the population, centralization or decentralization
of government, the size of the prospective new states, a history of political
annexation or demographic manipulation, the newly democratic nature of the federal
state, and ambiguities of international law. 130
The complexity is immense. A simple extraction of factors which appear to cause
separation from a wide range of studies would show countless elementsand, factors
dependent upon other factors.
Perhaps, the effort expended to determine whether a concept like globalization is the
cause of a phenomenon like separatism would be better devoted to examining
individual cases where the full complexity of causation can be seen and described. This
may involve a shift in emphasis from quantitative to qualitative studies for the former are
closely associated with the drive in the discipline for simplification which we contend
does not provide an accurate depiction of the complex reality involved in phenomena like
separatism. But, it is likely that the nuanced knowledge needed for practical
understanding of such movements would be enhanced.

28

ENDNOTES
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Keith Suter, Global Order and Global Disorder, Globalization and the Nation-State (Westport, CN:
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William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,
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Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford:
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Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford:
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Christian Allen, Unruly Spaces, Globalization and Transnational Criminal Economies, in Dennis
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Ronaldo Munch, Globalization and Contestation, The New Great Counter-Movement (London:
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