On the Offensive: The

Reagan Doctrine and the

Fall of the Soviet Union
PO 326: American Foreign Policy

The Carter Administration

Carters approach to foreign policy seems, at the outset, to

represent an important break from predecessors
General view: Dtente and SALT proved that amicable relations
between US and USSR were possible; US had responsibility not to
perpetuate Cold War by overtly antagonizing USSR
Desires

to reduce defense budget, eliminate nuclear weapons, take

new diplomatic approach reflecting the diminished importance of USSoviet rivalry

In the wake of increasing interdependence, Carter sought to

construct a foreign policy that took seriously the humanitarian
welfare of 3rd world countries
Choice

of staff (Vance, Brzezinski, Young) reflects the goals of human

rights protection, economic interaction and humanitarian aid, etc.
Moralistic foreign policy (Wilsonian)

The Carter Administration

This change in approach was problematic from the outset. In essence,

Carters turn away from containment was complicated by indications
that the traditional (containment) approach was still necessary
Communist involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, elsewhere in 3rd World,
reinforces longstanding notion that communism is dangerously
expansionist

Rise of anti-Americanism and Fundamentalist Islam, culminating in Iranian

Revolution and Embassy crisis, also indicates that greater focus on 3rd World is
more demanding than expected

Several problems regarding Soviets

Problems with Carters human rights stance in 3rd World

Problems with continued China normalization
In SALT II, initially unwilling to submit to far-ranging bilateral cuts in nuclear
arsenals compromise leads to domestic opposition

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 discredits the initial notion

that Soviet aggressiveness is largely imaginary

The Carter Administration

The Soviet invasion, combined with Iranian hostage crisis

and domestic pressures, leads Carter to revert to a much
tougher approach to the USSR and the world
Personal animus at betrayal leads to increased defense spending,
diminished economic assistance, and resumed arms race with
USSR
Provision of Afghan rebels with arms, establishment of rapid
deployment force and naval presence in Persian Gulf, economic
sanctions in retaliation to OPEC embargo

In the end, despite resulting in some successes outside of

the US-USSR rivalry (Camp David Accords), Carters overall
approach to FP is seen as a dismal failure Reagans
overtly hard-line view of the East-West rivalry resonates

The Reagan Revolution

From

the outset, Reagans approach to foreign

policy is reminiscent of the early Cold War

Treatment of Soviets as monolithic enemy that must be

defeated through increased military preparation
negotiation (including SALT) seen, as in NSC 68, as
means to buy time
Vast

increase in defense spending domestic ramifications

Radical conservatism, evangelical approach to the

rivalry

Interestingly,

Nathan and Oliver note that the

groundwork for the Reagan Revolution was laid
by Carters reversion (including Persian Gulf policy)

Reagan and the Soviets

Reagan

sought to revive the notion that the

Soviets were irresponsible at best, and that they
sought only conquest and domination
Questioned intentions in international negotiation
(SALT) and weapons development; made severe
demands and overstated actual Soviet military buildup
Portrays KAL shootdown as indicative of Soviet
barbarism; provides fuel for rhetoric
Fostered belief that nuclear war was more likely
increased international (impact on NATO) and domestic
preparations (MX, FEMA)

Reagan and the Soviets

Given the view that USSR was a dangerous nuclear threat

and that parity had been reached, Reagan seeks to gain an
advantage via SDI (Star Wars)
Success highly improbable, but absorbed most of Defenses
discretionary funds and 48% of research budget
Violation of ABM Treaty, destroyed stability provided by MAD

In the end, Reagans approach solidified Soviet insecurities

about US and relative capabilities; led a nearly bankrupt
country to devote more resources to buildup
When Gorbachev comes to power advocating glasnost,
perestroika, Reagan can no longer play the evil empire
card
Soviets accept US SALT demands, and Reagan is forced to
negotiate; portrays Soviet change as resulting from American
pressure (psychology)
Demise of USSR thus largely credited to Reagan

Reagan on the Periphery: The

Enterprise
Reagans

old-style view of containment extended

to the periphery as well, and he sought to actively
defeat communist elements without reverting to
large-scale intervention. However, his approach
was problematic and, in some cases, illegal
Communist movements in other regions (esp. Latin
America) were symbolic of Soviet strength, must be
countered
Decisional Autonomy: CIA, others bolstered, given
greater discretion in action little accountability
Secretive; manipulated flow of information

Reagan on the Periphery: The

Enterprise
In

Nicaragua and elsewhere, Administration

conducted covert conflict, waged domestic
propaganda campaigns, and backed authoritarian
leaders to stem communist tide
CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors; backing and
bolstering of Contras (unsavory) backing continued
even after defeat certain
Actions lead to destabilization of friendly governments
in region (Honduras)
Even after Congress cuts off funding, Administration
continues effort illegality and Iran-Contra
Nearly destroys Administration, colors posteritys view

American Foreign Policy in the Cold

War A Review

American foreign policy in the Cold War is seemingly

consistent, but appears to be a confusing mlange of
realist power politics, idealistic Wilsonianism, and
overtones of traditional isolationism
Beginning with Kennan and NSC 68, the necessity of
countering Soviet expansionism is undoubtedly the top
priority of nearly all US administrations
By and large, the general foreign policy outlooks of each postwar
president are very similar (strong, shared worldview); the only real
variation we see is in approaches, which are determined by factors
such as the level of Soviet activity, economic concerns, and
domestic pressures

American Foreign Policy in the Cold

War A Review

However, Wilsonianism occupies an uneasy position in this outlook

the moral responsibility of American foreign policy is alternately
ignored, thrust to the fore, or used for power political purposes

American contestation of USSR is, from the Truman Doctrine, predicated

on the threat it poses to free peoples, though the form of that contest is
power political
To confuse matters, even when humanitarianism is the stated keystone of
foreign policy plans (as with Carter), its implementation is unpopular and
counterproductive when it ignores or minimizes the importance of the USUSSR power rivalry which is itself (at least theoretically) based on the
ideal of safeguarding freedom
American involvement in the periphery is seemingly predicated on power
politics in the larger rubric of containment; but the justification for these
actions derives from Wilsons idealistic view of a world safe for
democracy

When it cannot be used as justification (e.g., when the US must back

authoritarian regimes to counter Soviet expansion), Wilsonianism is left aside
ideals such as self-determination are sacrificed in the name of power politics

American Foreign Policy in the Cold

War A Review
When

specific approaches to the rivalry prove

costly especially limited war we see popular
opposition that is largely based on a weaker
version of isolationism

Example of general opposition to Vietnam War is

between Vietnamese, and US has no place inherently
isolationist

In

sum, though the US successfully defeats USSR

without war, the microfoundations of USFP are
muddled this problem becomes more
pronounced when the US lacks a powerful,
identifiable enemy in the 1990s and beyond