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ARTICLE

Copyright 2005 SAGE Publications (www.sagepublications.com)

ISSN 1469-6053 Vol 5(3): 338355 DOI: 10.1177/1469605305057571

Spiritual materiality
Heritage preservation in a Buddhist world?
ANNA KARLSTRM
Department of Archaeology and Ancient History, Uppsala University, Sweden

ABSTRACT
This article explores the role of Buddhism in current heritage preservation discussions and practice. Buddhism deals to a great extent with
materiality, but the notion of the impermanence of matter implies that
the decay of a material world is inevitable and necessary for the continuation of life and rebirth. This forms the platform for a critique of
contemporary conservation strategies that privilege originality and the
idea that our common heritage and archaeological resources should be
preserved for the future and preferably forever. The result is a demand
for a broader outlook among the scholars involved in heritage studies
and research concerning archaeological resource management.
KEY WORDS
animism Buddhism heritage management impermanence Laos
materiality preservation spirituality

INTRODUCTION
Is it relevant, or even possible, to impose modern scientific principles of
conservation and preservation in a Buddhist context? That is, a context
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where the Buddhist notion of material impermanence governs the perception of reality:
O monks, all karmically constituted things are impermanent; they are not
fixed, not comforting, and are characterized by constant change . . . For all
beings, all creatures, all living things, life is limited by death; for them there is
no termination of death and rebirth. (translation from Anityatasutra;
Strong, 2002: 91)

One of the three characteristics of existence in Buddhism is the impermanence of matter. Matter, or the material, is essentially what archaeologists
deal with. We talk about things that bear meanings of ideological, political
and economic character according to their contemporary social context.
These things are also the main concern in cultural heritage management,
which embraces the practices and approaches involved in treating archaeological remains. Thus our approaches fluctuate and change, depending on
ideological orientation. Nevertheless, the problem remains that these strategies always take Western worldviews as their point of departure. The
purpose of this article is therefore to challenge current heritage management praxis, with preservation as its core, by viewing the latter in the light
of Buddhist ideology.
Preservation in Buddhist ideology is a contradiction in terms. By
focusing on this, my aim is not to suggest an extremist, non-preservationist
Buddhist alternative but, instead, to point at fundamental problems in
recent scientific principles of heritage management. The Buddhist extreme
is thus used here as a tool, to demonstrate considerations omitted from
todays heritage management debates.
Recent debates in heritage management are interdisciplinary and
include interest groups other than archaeologists themselves (Lowenthal,
1985, 1998; Skeates, 2000). It is well known that when protecting some
things, others are destroyed (Layton et al., 2001), and it is also suggested
that destruction is necessary for the appreciation of certain heritage
expressions (Holtorf, forthcoming). Still, the modernist ideal, namely that
things from the past must be maintained unaltered, is the foundation of
discussion on the archaeological heritage. Preservation is the core of
heritage management and seen in contrast to threatening destruction and
decay the Utopian ideal would be to preserve everything (Darvill, 1999:
305). Such a formulation contains the implicit understanding that total
preservation is an impossibility, though worth striving for. According to
Buddhist ideology, decay is a constant reminder of death and essential for
any celebration of life. Thus decay is crucial for rebirth and finally
enlightenment, the ultimate goal.
I consider current preservation ideology and its desire to protect vulnerable material things as one extreme. Buddhist ideology and its inherent
notion of all matter as impermanent is another extreme. Consequently

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there are two opposing Utopias, dealing with the same material things. By
examining motives for preservation and motives for non-preservation, this
article aims to challenge the conservationist ideal rarely challenged in
heritage management, and propose a more nuanced approach in which
plurality not only means balance between preservation and exploitation of
material things, but also takes into consideration the existence of nonpreservationist ideals.
As archaeologists and heritage managers we talk about things that have
survived from a distant or recent past down to modern times. As archaeological remains we call these things material culture, a concept well established and used for nearly two centuries (Buchli, 2002: 2). For the purposes
of this article I choose to replace this concept with materiality, which in my
view allows the reader to appreciate the materiality of cultural life and to
approach objects as things embodied, as material characters. It also allows
us to bring to the surface materialitys corollary, or rather complement,
namely spirituality. In paraphrasing the term material culture, we would
find its equivalent in immaterial culture, which is more in opposition to
material culture than spirituality is to materiality.

AT THE OUTSET
Four years ago, when I was about to finish an archaeological fieldwork
season in Southeast Asia, I first got the idea to write this article. I was in
the initial phase of my PhD research project, in which I aimed at investigating the practice of archaeological heritage management in Vientiane, the
capital of Laos. Investigating urban development, mapping archaeological
sites and identifying threats to cultural heritage was part of my objectives.
The dense forest north of Vientiane was almost impenetrable, except for
some limited areas that had recently been burned to clear for new rice fields
or gardens. Finding archaeological remains and mapping sites through
systematic field walking was impossible. Instead most of the time was spent
conducting interviews with residents of the villages in the area. What from
the beginning seemed an unproblematic investigation became immediately
problematic when confronting the material past. I became aware of a multitude of conceptions about these remains. Some were easy to understand,
others were not.
Working with Lao archaeologists means working with professionals who
are assumed to be able to speak for parts of a non-Western population. The
Lao archaeologists and I share much of a common language of archaeology as they represent a sort of social elite, often educated in the West.
Initially we shared the belief that in general human beings both value and
need the material remains of their past. But as the fieldwork proceeded we

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also came to share an interest in local religious systems, which in Laos mix
Theravada Buddhism, animism and Hinduism. Even if Buddhism officially
constitutes the primary religion,1 the distinction between canonical and
popular Buddhism is here of great importance. In canonical Buddhism,
which is more or less institutionalized, materiality is a matter of no concern,
whereas in popular Buddhism materiality becomes extremely significant as
people gain merit and tangible benefits through constantly performing
material acts, such as offerings. Thus the prevalent religious reality is better
represented by these complex and individual mixes in popular Buddhism.
Buddhas teachings on impermanence are not strictly observed among lay
Buddhists, although they permeate peoples perceptions and worldviews in
general. What also is significant in a Buddhist context (whether canonical
or popular) is the circular perception of time, as opposed to a linear one.
In such a context heritage is quite differently defined by comparison with
the Western archaeological discourse if it is defined at all. It is a context
in which the material remains of the past are not necessarily perceived as
archaeological. Being part of the Lao archaeologists everyday life and
reality, these religious systems had never previously been vocalized, or
taken officially into consideration in their professional lives, and they were
therefore not seen as important or even relevant to our work. In the interview situation these salient worldviews became quite obvious for me as an
outsider. I found this idea of plurality compelling, and so my original set
of interests changed.
Archaeology and heritage management are both research fields arising
from, and thus perpetuating, Western scientific knowledge. These are disciplines born out of imperialist structures in which particular ideologies and
politics occupy positions of authority. Only by raising the level of awareness of the conceptual structures involved is it possible to realize change.
Even though archaeology and heritage management are practised in parts
of the world where people consider themselves as Buddhist, the impossibility of preservation is seldom taken into consideration, or even discussed.
Buddhist archaeology primarily focuses on materiality concerns in early
Buddhism: its origin, art and architecture, and socio-political relationship
to the non-Buddhist world. More rare are discussions on how Buddhist
ideologies, cosmologies and values spirituality are related to perceptions
of heritage. However, Denis Byrne claims, in his paper in a World Archaeology issue on Buddhist archaeology, that current conservation practices
prioritize original, physical structures and fabric over local religious practice
(Byrne, 1995: 26681). This results in an exclusion of other discourses, which
might not even regard the objects as archaeological. I also agree with Byrne,
in his claim that religious monuments and objects are primarily spiritual in
nature and have little to do with the physical continuity of that religions
structure and form (Byrne, 1995: 267). In such a discourse, spirituality must
be considered and focused upon when developing conservation ethics or

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heritage management programmes. This might lead to a situation where the

World (read: Western) Heritage Project becomes gradually overthrown or
at least dramatically changed, resulting in greater balance between different discourses, and between materiality and spirituality.
In this article, I depart from Western heritage discourse by exploring
motives for preservation. The following section describes in philosophical
terms the Buddhist idea of impermanence, according to canonical
Buddhism. I am not advocating this ideal as the solution to many of the
problems faced in present archaeological heritage debates, but find it
relevant and challenging to use for discussing larger issues concerning
preservation. Buddhist ideology is based on the canonical ideal, but
includes alternative worldviews, as I have already mentioned. And it is this
popular Buddhist reality that saves us from uncritically adopting an extremist non-preservationist attitude, which will be discussed in the final part of
my text.

WHY PRESERVE? WESTERN MOTIVES

Despite the great variety of motivations for preserving ancient remains,
they nevertheless all derive from modernity, the idea that history was not
structured by destiny, and that reality is not timeless and universal. Physical
remains became crucial to historical understanding in the modernist
project, and this historicity reflected a self-image (Cleere, 1989: 13; Lowenthal, 1985: 38996). The urge to preserve in our own time is based on these
motives, but has changed and shifted continuously. Motives for preservation
in the heritage management process today have been discussed and
analysed over the years (Carman, 1996; Cleere, 1989; Darvill, 1999; Fowler,
1992; Lipe, 1984; Lowenthal, 1985; Smith, 1993). I consider three different
kinds of preservationist motives to be relevant to the objectives of this
article: political, academic and social. Of course, different motives cannot
be separated from one another, but I have done so here in an attempt to
clarify them and to gain a greater insight into the theoretical and conceptual bases for, and meanings of, preservation in todays heritage management. These foundations are bases, which are structured and maintained by
Western scientific knowledge.
Political and instrumental motives revolve around the use of heritage to
legitimize and promote group identities and political alliances. Laws and
regulations manifest the belief that information contained in archaeological sites and things from the past can be lost or damaged or misused, and
that this implies an irreplaceable loss to the public. Senses of belonging to
a place or a tradition, that is national and/or ethnic allegiances, require
symbolic links with the past (Lowenthal, 1985: 396). The need for links to

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the past might be universal. If so, I think this need must be expressed in
different ways, as links with the past must appear quite differently if ones
time perception is linear or circular. Today this need is fulfilled by the
preservation of things, physical remains, whose original form and fabric
remind us of our idea of the past. To fulfil this need through preservation
only reflects Western scientific needs, based on value systems and ideas
about relative importance that are not at all universal. As an illustration, I
will now discuss the creation of links with the past, expressed on global as
well as local scales.
Heritage has become an important pawn in the globalization game,
dependent on economic power. It has become a commodity to exploit.
Globalization might represent Westernization and means a threat to local
cultural variation. This global extreme is represented by international
organizations, preserving heritage in order to rescue it from damage and
potential destruction. Heritage is on this level considered to be property
belonging to all nations and all peoples of the world, and is ascribed
universal value that applies to the whole of mankind. The key to this global
rhetoric is the notion that preservation saves. It stops the disappearance of
items, which otherwise causes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of
all the nations of the world (UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2005).
Items worth preserving, says UNESCO, are so because they constitute our
heritage and are key sources of information about an important stage in the
development of the human species. In that sense, we can all claim them to
be part of our common world heritage (Aplin, 2002: 9). The knowledge of
the existence of heritage, any heritage, is sufficient in order to feel a link with
the past (Lowenthal, 1998: 1347). And so the need for the preservation of
something as part of this world heritage, the desire for eternal existence, is
now motive enough to claim preservation. Preservation implies participation
of everyone, applied to the international community as a whole. Crucial for
such a project is a view of the world as a homogeneous entity at least on
one level, concerning perceptions of heritage. Rhetorical subtlety is a significant factor in arguments on this global scale, recognized by a scientifically
oriented audience, by those in authority, and also has a considerable impact.
On the other hand, globalization might provoke a strong localist
reaction, reflected in a growing interest in local history, traditions and
cultural identity (Logan, 2002: xvii). This other extreme is well exemplified
by governments who promote the local, for a number of reasons. Governments often strive to distort collective memory a distortion strategically
aimed at directing the collective by manipulating its history (Kohl and
Fawcett, 1995: 911). This is done by explaining history in such a way as to
win support for particular sets of policies or for the maintenance of their
hegemonic power in the present social order. This deliberate distortion has
its most obvious impact when it is politically used for nationalistic purposes.
The past legitimizes. The past gives a more glorious background to a

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present that doesnt have much to celebrate (Hobsbawm, 1997: 6). The
invented past does it even better:
Myth and invention are essential to the politics of identity by which groups
of people today, defining themselves by ethnicity, religion or the past or
present borders of states, try to find some certainty in an uncertain and
shaking world by saying, We are different from and better than the Others.
(Hobsbawm, 1997: 910)

Even though there are contradictory opinions about the effects of globalization on heritage, the effects are arguably obvious. This is in itself a fascinating paradox. When we agree to focus on the local, the indigenous and
the values of the intangible in the heritage management process, we never
cease to place it on the world agenda. A significant example is UNESCOs
latest proclamation, that includes Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible
Heritage of Humanity on the World Heritage List. One of the explicit aims
of that proclamation is to protect a specific variety of human culture, but
in so doing it becomes an integral aspect of the very process of globalization that UNESCO views as a threat to the complexity of the cultural
inventory and the collective memory of people (Fog Olwig, 2002: 1456).
The question is then how a global organization, which operates according
to general guidelines, can recognize and appreciate the complexity and
diversity of the cultural expressions that it seeks to protect (Fog Olwig,
2002). I therefore repeat my opening question, but on a more general level.
Is it at all possible to preserve an intangible heritage an intangible heritage
valued because of qualities that are inherently difficult to value? It becomes
a contradiction in terms when such a distinctive character is valued by a
system which in itself implies homogeneity.
Academic motives derive from the idea that physical remains from the
past are crucial for historical understanding. This notion is close to that
behind the origins of the preservation ethic, but it has continuously changed
and shifted. The archaeological database must be protected (Cleere, 1989:
9), and consequently the focus is on physical remains, their original form
and fabric and their materiality. Today this is partly a reaction against the
increasing evanescence of things and the speed with which we pass them
by (Lowenthal, 1985: 399), in a society where destructive change is rapid
and has accelerated. The more the past is destroyed and left behind, the
stronger the need to preserve (Lowenthal, 1985: 399). There is a tendency
to think that preserved remains stay unaltered in museums or as cultural
or natural reserves, forever frozen and permanent, eternal sources of
information about our past. Preservation is, however, an active process of
materialization, where materiality is anything except an empirical reality
(Buchli, 2002: 145). It produces rather than preserves. This perspective is
crucial for better understanding the essential Buddhist notion of impermanence, which I will focus on in the following part of this article.

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These motives are also connected to and result from nostalgia for the
past. As modern life becomes increasingly abstract and impersonal, a
common reaction is a growing nostalgia back to the past (Chase and Shaw,
1989). This has its roots in the late eighteenth century, when people started
to ascribe positive values to societies very different and distanced from their
own, and recognized the past as a foreign country (Lowenthal, 1985: 233).
A longing to return to the past was developed from this interest. Common
grounds during this period were evolutionist and linear ideas of a world
developing from the simple to the complex, beginning in savagery and
ending in perfectly rational and civilized society. If parts of the past could
be preserved, we were thereby to be continuously reminded of our excellence and sovereignty. The sympathy and nostalgia for the past was thus an
important part of Romanticism. It was an admiration for past achievements,
where the spirit of the Romantics own past was confirmed and highly
valued, simply because it was their own. The basis for this worldview was
the linear perception of time. Even though Romanticism passed a long time
ago, the idea has been inherited and still today directs us towards heritage
preservation projects.
What I choose to call social motives for preservation include ideological,
psychological and spiritual motives. Following my argument that spirituality is to a great extent neglected in heritage discussions, I deliberately
include it among the social motives. If we assume that motives for heritage
preservation are of a social character we then have to consider heritage as
identity, as a wider cultural expression, taking place everywhere and always
socially situated. Heritage as identity requires open definitions, which interconnect with history, continuity, anchorage and memory. Heritage as
identity means that it is situated, and cannot exist in isolation. Or, as Gary
Edson puts it:
[. . .] it may be better to view heritage not as a historical truth (fact) but only
as conditional and hypothetical reasoning calculated to explain the nature of
things (and people), and not to determine the origins of traditions or
practices. If it is assumed that heritage has no empirical reality, then the
process of identification is greatly altered and simplified. (Edson, 2004: 343)

Attitudes to heritage must be inclusive, whereby each individual or group

is given the right to speak for their own identity in their own language. The
concept of heritage is general and should be so. It is then easier to consider
non-preservationist ideas when continuing heritage management debates.
It is also possible to depart from an approach where we assume that
cultural homogenization and globalization result in an intuited loss of
identity. I consider the fear of such a loss of identity as being the most
important motive for contemporary heritage preservation. The past that we
try to keep alive by preserving its remains is an imagined one, expressed in
societal traditions and held in social memory. Motives for preservation

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could thus be explained in two ways. One is the desire to feel united and
affiliated with the past by imagining that one has already experienced something when it is actually experienced for the first time, for example when
walking around in a museum looking at preserved heritage objects in showcases and imagining a continuity or a sense of origin from the person or
group who once produced and used those objects. Another explanation is
that the heritage creation process is important in itself. At the very moment
of preservation we create our own imagination of the past (Edson, 2004:
339). By formalizing and ritualizing heritage in this way, we master it. That
could well be sufficient motive for preservation.
Memory is another concept that could help us to better understand the
motivations for preservation. Awareness of the past is always based on
memory (Lowenthal, 1985: 193). Memory is also related to the loss of
identity, or rather the fear of it. Our contemporary society is dominated by
an increased flow of information. To become a good citizen or a person with
a strong character, one must remember all this information. The more we
remember, the better. Simultaneously, with increasing information flow, the
demands on remembering as much as possible are also increasing. The more
information we need to keep in our memory, the more difficult it is to keep
it there implicitly, inside the mind. We must therefore collect things or
objects that can help us remember and move our memories in an explicit
direction, outside of the mind, to the outside world (Derwinger, 2005;
Yates, 1966). This is an explanation as to why we so desperately seek to
preserve the past and its objects. It is here not only interesting but crucial
to note the fact that while we in the Western part of the world force
ourselves to remember as much as possible, others practice the art of forgetting. According to the art of forgetting, to best remember the essentials, it
is desirable to have an implicit in-the-mind-memory. It has been argued, by
Australian aborigines, that people in the Western part of the world do not
know what to remember and what to forget, and that their uncertainty as
to how to relate to the past is a reason for preservation (Lowenthal, 1998:
29). In China, permanence is appreciated through words exalting others
enduring thoughts, rather than through things (Lowenthal, 1998: 20).
Consequently, forgetting means that what is remembered is not recalled
through materiality, but in ones mind, through emancipated physical
remains. At the risk of crude generalization, I want to emphasize this point,
as I will return to related ideas in the last part of this article. I also want to
bring it up because almost all of what I have examined so far evolves from
Western perspectives. Even with the best of intentions and a holistic
approach in current heritage debates (where local communities are
involved and indigenous groups teach heritage managers how to identify
and manage heritage, and where we emphasize small scale features instead
of monumentality as the predominant reason for preservation), we assume

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that all people in the world live in a reality where, for example, the Buddhist
notion of the impermanence of matters does not exist.

WHY NOT? THE BUDDHIST DILEMMA

Together with unsatisfactoriness and absence of a Self, impermanence is
central in Dharma the teachings of Buddha. These three characteristics,
or marks, of existence can serve as separate doctrines, but are also closely
interdependent.
Unsatisfactoriness (duhkha) is at the core of the central conception of
Buddhism. The entire teaching of Buddha evolves from an understanding
of the unsatisfactory nature of all phenomenal existence and an understanding of the way out of this unsatisfactoriness (Strong, 2002: 324). This
course, called the Four Noble Truths, covers definitions of unsatisfactoriness, how and why it arises, how to end it and finally the way to achieve this
objective the path to purification and deliverance through right understanding, thought, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and
concentration. It is a framework for grasping the processes of experience
in life, and the Four Noble Truths are best understood as phenomenological categories in those processes (Robinson and Johnson, 1997: 3442).
The doctrine that there is no Self in individuals, called absence of a Self
(anatman), means that there is no permanent I or mine. There is seeing,
feeling, experiencing etc., but not an unchanging never-ending Self or Soul
behind the scene. Body and soul are two sides of the same matter. Between
they who die and they who are born is continuity, but no identity. This could
be applied not only to the life of people and things but also to the life of
thoughts.
Impermanence (anitya), or inconstancy, is an attribute of all conditioned
phenomena. It simply means that all beings and all things arise, live and
pass away, in circular motion, until the final extinction is reached. This
ultimate goal, nirvana, is attained when the being or the thing is free from
or has relinquished the unsatisfactory state. The term nirvana can also be
equated with enlightenment and implies a freedom from desire, and a
destiny not to be reborn again (Bechert and Gombrich, 1984: 789, 15970;
Robinson and Johnson, 1997: 3442; Strong, 2002: 902, 106).
The interrelation between unsatisfactoriness, absence of a Self and
impermanence could further be summarized as follows (albeit generalized):
Happiness in life is dependent on unsatisfaction to the extent that both
happiness and life are impermanent. That is, things are unsatisfactory
because they are impermanent. They do not last forever, or even for a
moment, but are in a constant state of change. As a consequence of this,

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neither feelings, thoughts, things nor life are completely under control and
therefore cannot be regarded as ones identity, as identity denies the existence of a Self underlying the phenomenon of experience.
If, as it is concluded above, in accordance with Western notions of
heritage management the fulfilment of desire often is the motive for
preserving or inventing heritage, then it should not be possible to perceive
of heritage in a strictly Buddhist context. Inherent in the heritage idea is a
desire for eternal existence, an insatiable search, a craving for pleasures or
challenges fuelling the life flame. In Western societies this desire is encouraged, whereas in a strictly Buddhist worldview such desire is one of the
main reasons for unsatisfactoriness. The ongoing thirst for possession and
satisfaction of desires, the search for pleasure without realizing that there
are no objects or ideas that will ever satisfy the senses or the mind, has to
be eliminated. Otherwise, those governed by desire will forever be bound
to the wheel of existence and will never reach the goal of final extinction
(Strong, 2002: 1003). Consequently, from a strictly Buddhist perspective,
desire would be considered the primary motive for preserving heritage. The
three characteristics of existence therefore make heritage preservation
irrelevant or even impossible.

IN REALITIES
A significant distinction between canonical and popular Buddhism
concerns materiality. Although they consider themselves pious Buddhists,
most people in Laos have enthusiastically adopted capitalist materiality.
Primarily this holds for those living in and around the main cities, a group
that includes approximately half the population of the country (Sisouphanthong and Taillard, 2000: 36).
Materiality not only forms a distinction between canonical and popular
Buddhism, but also a common interest for Buddhists and heritage
managers. I will here take up materiality (decay and consumption included)
to illustrate the discrepancy between Western perceptions of heritage
preservation and Buddhist ideology including Dharma, even when it is not
used in its extreme.
In February 2004, I excavated a temple site, together with staff from the
Lao authorities and residents of the village where the investigations were
carried out. The site is located in Ban Viengkham, 70 km north of Vientiane. After we had finished the work, we wanted to bring one of the excavated sema stones to the National Museum in Vientiane to include it in an
exhibition about recent archaeological work in ancient Ban Viengkham. It
did not take long before we understood that this was impossible. The
villagers did not dare to let anything leave the ancient temple site. After

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attending numerous meetings in the village we were finally allowed to

borrow the stone, and include it temporarily in the exhibition. Later on, as
part of my interview investigation, I discussed the incident with monk
Sayadeth Khampee from Vat Ong Teu in Vientiane together with Mr Kanda
Keosopha, a former monk now employed as an archaeologist at the
National Museum. Let us catch a glimpse of what was said in our discussion
about materiality on that occasion.
AK:

[. . .] the villagers did not allow us to take the stone to Vientiane.

SK:

Yes, because people believe that there are spirits in there and they
worship the spirit, the secret things . . . it has not very much to do with
Buddhism, it is animism. Because the Lao people have believed in
animism for a long time before the Buddhist came in.

AK:

But if this group of people in the village, who did not allow us to take the
stone without making a ceremony first, if they were Buddhist monks all
of them, what do you think would have happened?

SK:

Buddhist monks are not afraid of the spirits, but they do agree to the
people, to the tradition. Before we do something with the sacred things,
we have to ask the villagers [. . .] We care, we care about the material if
it is very old or if it is an image of the Buddha for example. Yes, we care
for it.

AK:

So, a Buddha image is more important than a stone?

SK:

Yes.

KK:

If in the doctrines of the Buddha something is said to be important, then

you have to care for it. If you exactly follow the Buddha, no problem to
take away anything. What you want you can take, because the material
was not important for Buddha. The material is in your mind . . . in
Buddhism spirituality is the most important.
[. . .]

SK:

Materiality for me is the statue of the Buddha. It is a very important

symbol when I pray or conduct a ceremony. Because the statue is the
representation of the Buddha . . . but the most important is spirituality.

Evident in this discussion is the distinction between villager and monk,

between popular and canonical Buddhism but also that together they are
inseparable. Societal Buddhism is based on the existence of them both and
cannot function without one or the other. And, as monk Khampee points
out, materiality may be a matter of concern, if it is considered a symbol or
a representation.
The first Buddha image is said to have been produced 400 years after
the death of Buddha, but legends indicate that depictions had already been
fashioned during his lifetime. There is, for example, one tale in the Pannasajataka that tells of King Pasenadi of Kosala, who made a sandalwood image

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so that the inhabitants of Sravasti would have something to worship when

the Buddha was out of town (Strong, 2002: 3941). Buddha images are used
not as idols, but as objects of representation. When a Buddhist is offering
flowers, or lighting a candle before the Buddha image, it is not an act of
worship because the Buddhist is not praying to anyone. Flowers that soon
fade and flames that die speak to the Buddhist and remind her or him about
the impermanency of all conditioned things. The image serves as a medium
for concentration in which inspiration to find the right way can be found.
This applies not only to the Buddha image, but also to many sorts of objects
or actions that create moments of inspiration. Thus inspiration is connected
to material things in our surroundings or to a change of states in which
different materials are involved.
Materiality is essential in merit making as well. The ethic of merit making
in Buddhism aims to obtain a better situation either in this or a future
lifetime (Strong, 2002: 2831, 7880). Merit making forms the basic framework for the everyday life and practice of a lay Buddhist, and is acquired
through generosity, virtue and meditation (Robinson and Johnson, 1997:
77). The primary way to make merit is giving, a reciprocal action between
laity and the community of monks and nuns (sangha). The laity give
material things, such as food and other supplies, to members of the sangha,
who in turn give the laity teachings of Buddha (Dharma). Even though only
one of ten different ways of making merit concerns material matters, it is
still the act that most obviously permeates the laypeoples everyday lives.
By constructing a religious monument, for example a temple or a stupa (that
is, a mound built of brick or stone, originally to enshrine the relics of
Buddha but today built as burial or memorial monuments in general), the
constructer (who could be an individual, a family, a village or any other
collective) makes merit. The more costly the act, the better are the chances
for increased merit.
In December 2000, the old sanctuary (sim) at Vat Ou Mong in Vientiane
was being replaced by a new one, as an act of merit making. The village had
saved money for years and finally the plan could be realized. This is how
Alan Potkin, freelance consultant in environmental planning and at the
time resident in the same village, Ban Ou Mong, describes what happened
that day:
Between 11 and 13 December, 2000, at the full moon of the winter solstice,
the people of the village (ban) gathered for the festive demolition of the old
image hall at Vat Ou Mong, to be replaced with a new sim; seen to be a
merit-making activity that would much enhance the beauty and prestige of
the temple compound. The un-reinforced masonry building, which dated to
the 1920s, was cracked in several places, some of the woodwork was
termite-damaged, and the roof structure and tiles had been rapidly
deteriorating. But the interior, which was completely covered with wonderful
nave murals illustrating the Phralak-Phralam (the Lao Ramayana)

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painted during only thirteen days in 1938 by the talented but inexperienced
draftsman-monk, Thit Panh, with the help or hindrance of seven boy novices
was still perfectly intact. (Potkin, 2001)

Potkin documented the frescoes and preserved a few fragments. This sim
was one of only a few rare structures comprising depictions of the beloved
epic, and one of the oldest in Vientiane. During the process of demolition,
which was also documented by Potkin, the villagers who were gathered at
the temple site seemed quite happy about the pulling down of the structure, shouting and clapping their hands.
Which approach to heritage preservation is here the most appropriate?
Is it possible to bridge the obvious divide between a sophisticated preservationist sensibility where the Lao cultural patrimony should be conserved
(Potkin, 2001), and the perceptions and priorities of the local community
where the old sim is laid in ruins, the villagers make merit and by doing so
take part in and hand over the intangible and ever changing heritage of a
Buddhist community? If it is possible, how can we then bridge this divide,
to best meet as many demands as possible? Or is it desirable to even try?
This is an example of the difficulties in discussing preservationist ideals
aimed at conserving a heritage and the ethic of merit making as alternative
solutions to the same problem, as their respective frameworks are mutually
incompatible. The framework for discussing preservation is that the sim in
question is considered archaeological. In the case of merit making the sim
is not conceived or constructed in this way at all.
Decay, following Buddhas final lesson on impermanence, is inevitable.
Restoring a ruined religious monument is similar or equivalent to building
a new monument. Restoration is also an act of making merit. But this
restoration is meant in a totally different way than is implicit in recent
scientific principles of conservation and preservation. It is a restoration of
an idea of the prestige of the original, rather than of the physical form of
the original. In a Buddhist context, abandonment, decay and impoverishment are continuously balanced against the process of maintenance and
restoration (Byrne, 1995: 2745). Suddenly a monument is considered to be
worn out and of no use for merit making. What remains then are the sacred
objects, objects animated with power through rituals impregnated by
Buddhist as well as animist ideas, but free for anyone to plunder. Plunderers are often pious Buddhists, seeking sacred objects or amulets to use in
their everyday religious life, and should be seen rather as relievers than
plunderers. The plundering could be seen as a releasing of the amulets,
which allow them to pour forth into the greater world (Byrne, 1995: 276)
and be of further use, because the amulet itself holds more value than the
fact that it was buried under a monument.
Buddhism encourages spending rather than saving, which is reflected in
economic systems examined by Melford E. Spiro in the 1960s. His case

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study was Burmese, but Buddhist notions are more generally applicable.
He introduces his article in American Anthropologist as follows:
The Buddhist world view, and especially its notions of rebirth and karma,
provide a cognitive orientation within which religious spending is a much
sounder and much more profitable investment than economic saving . . .
(Spiro, 1966: 1163)

By spending, and directing the surplus towards merit making, the spender
becomes a consumer. Consequently, in this case, consuming heritage
becomes the prerequisite for maintaining its value. Heritage consumption
is the act, which some may call destruction and some conservation, that we
all agree on forms a crucial part of the heritage management process.
Conservation and preservation may delay decay, but death and decay await
us all, people and objects alike. In common we have our materiality
(Pearson and Shanks, 2001: 93). Materiality is the main concern that we
must gather around as creators of the past, Buddhist as well as nonBuddhist. In a Buddhist world, spirituality is experienced through materiality. In a non-Buddhist world, identity is preserved through materiality.
The teachings of Buddha, the true Dharma, were themselves subject to
the laws of impermanence (Strong, 2002: 89). What Buddha taught was
therefore supposed to be changed and reinterpreted, or even lost and
forgotten. It would have been easy to suggest that when working in a
context where the notion of impermanence is valid for all things, there
should be no point at all in bothering about the history of that specific
context. But the fact that Buddhas teachings themselves were impermanent saves us from leaving any of those areas out of research in history or
archaeology. What further saves us from ignoring them is the fact that they
are in most cases not purely Buddhist. Buddha cannot be seen as a protector, but rather a refuge or a converter (Strong, 2002: 219).
In Laos, this means that Buddhism co-exists with animism, as already
discussed. Buddhism admits polytheistic traditions and has done so from
the very beginning. In animism, spirits function as protectors of different
things, villages, trees or houses. The relationship between the practice of
Buddhism and the worship of spirits is in one way very complex, but in
another way very simple and without contradictions. They might well be
mixed or run parallel. In this context, animism is on a par with Buddhism,
with which it forms an integral whole. Animism means simply to furnish
material things with a spirit, a soul or a self. If simply extreme animism is
followed, this might lead us back to our point of departure, the one that
calls for unquestioned heritage preservation. But by illustrating that different ideologies and worldviews co-exist in one and the same reality, unquestioned perceptions on heritage preservation become impossible. This is one
of the conclusions that can be drawn from the present attempt to challenge

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present scientific principles of preservation, rather than advocating nonpreservationist ideals delivered through Buddhist ideologies.
Even though intangible heritage is taken into consideration and conservation strategies are formulated in consultation with indigenous groups, the
fundamental aim and necessity of preservation is still unquestioned. So,
learning from the Buddhist example where heritage preservation is impossible, we cannot simply turn back to unquestioned preservation, even though
the real situation involves a blend of true Buddhism, animism and other
beliefs. I think general alternative strategies for dealing with a heritage that
is constantly changing are difficult to easily find. We might rather be able
to continue debating preservation ethics in a somewhat more humble way,
where a situated, particular and non-essentialist approach is argued for.
What is needed is imagination and sensitivity, to put heritage management
into practice in a constructive and intelligent way, so that the people
involved recognize their rights in justifying the same values as they consider
important and sacred.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Anna Klln for inspirational discussions all along the way,
which have encouraged me to develop ideas and arguments for this article, and for
her perseverance in commenting on the text at different stages. Thanks are also due
to Peter Schalk for generous contributions to my understanding of the Buddhist
world. I am most grateful to Timothy Darvill and Johan Hegardt, for their valuable
suggestions and comments on earlier drafts, and to the four anonymous reviewers
who helped me to finalize the text by offering their critical comments. Warm thanks
to Neil Price, for the loan of his English and for making the thoughts behind the
sentences clearer. Finally, I wish to thank Cornelius Holtorf, whose elaborate
comments and critique have been crucial.

Note
1 There is a complex multi-ethnic population in Laos, represented by the Lao and
a minimum of 131 different ethnic minorities (Chaze, 1999). Cultural and
religious diversities make a study of the country as a whole impossible, or at
least extremely difficult. Therefore I have chosen to focus on that part of the
population (6585% according to various official sources), who consider
themselves Buddhists.

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ANNA KARLSTRM is a PhD candidate at the Department of

Archaeology and Ancient History, Uppsala University, Sweden. Her
primary research interests include heritage studies in general, but are
based on experience of working in Laos over the last 10 years, and with
heritage management projects in Sweden.
[email: anna.karlstrom@arkeologi.uu.se]

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