Question No.

I
Rommel Padilla filed a petition for the change of his first name (From Rommel to BB Gandang
Hari) and sex (From Male to Female) in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila. He alleged that
he is a male transsexual, and underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. The trial court
granted the petition.
The trial court is one of the opinion that there is no harm or injury that will be caused to anybody
of the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of X, and it is in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity.
Is the judgment of the trial court correct? Will your answer be different if petitioner was born as
an inter-sex individual with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)?
Answer:
No. The sex determined at birth is immutable. There is no law recognizing sexreassignment within Philippine territory. (Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373)
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
However, the Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of
its co-equal branch of government, Congress. (Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No.174689, October
19, 2007)
However, in the case of inter-sex individuals (CAH-Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia),
the court will give due course to the persons preference of which gender to declare. (Republic v.
Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72)
Question No. II
Robin Padilla and Mariel Rodriguez met and became sweethearts in 2012. They planned
to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
September 2012. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 2012, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license has already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated March 15, 2013 stating that they have been living together as husband and
wife for at least 5 years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, Robin and Mariel again went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife. On November 13, 2013, Mariel gave birth to a child, Bella. Since
the child's birth, Marielle has been the one supporting her out of her income as a tv host at TV 5.
Robin does not want to support Bella because he is not sure if Bella is her daughter. Hence,
Marielle filed a complaint for supporting against Robin before the RTC of Makati.
a.)

Was the marriage between Robin and Marielle valid?

b.)

Is Bella the daughter of Robin?

Answer:
a.)
No. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall renderer the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the facts that
Robin and Marielle did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years. However, the affidavit was false because they did not in fact live together as husband
and wife for the last five years.
the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The false affidavit which Robin and Marielle executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. they were
not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license render their marriage void ab initio.
b.)
Yes. Bella is Robin's illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No.
160172, February 13, 2008.)
Question No. III
An American national revokes his will in Japan where he is domiciled. He died in the Philippines
where he has some real properties. The revocation of his will in Japan is valid under Japanese
law but invalid under Philippine law. What law will apply?
Answer:
Under Art. 829 of the Civil Code, a revocation done outside the Philippines, by a
person who does not have a domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to: (i) Lex
loci celebrationis (place of revocation) or (ii) lex domicilii (place of domicile). Here, since the
place of revocation is Japan and his domicile is also Japan, then the governing law is Japanese
law.
Question No. IV
A Filipino couple, Mr. James Yap and Mrs. Kris Aquino-Yap, decided to adopt Baby James, an
orphan from St. Claires orphanage in New York City. They loved and treated him like a
legitimate child for they have none of their very own. However, James Yap died in an accident
at sea, followed to the grave a year later by his sick father, Mr. Tony Yap. Each left a sizable
estate consisting of bank deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the adopted child, Baby
James, inherit from James Yap? May he also inherit from Tony Yap? Is there a difference?
Why? Explain.

Answer: Baby James can inherit from James Yap.

The succession to the estate of James Yap is governed by Philippine law because he
was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the
capacity of the heir to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent and not by the
national law of the heir. Hence, whether or not Baby James can inherit from James Yap is
determined by Philippine law. Under Philippine law, the adopted inherits form the adopter as a
legitimate child of the adopter.
Baby James, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter,
Tony Yap, because he is not a legal heir of Tony Yap. The legal fiction of adoption exists only
between the adopted and the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]). Neither may
he inherit from Tony Yap by representing James Yap because in representation, the
representative must be a legal heir not only of the person he is representing but also of the
decedent from whom the represented was supposed to inherit (Article 973, Civil Code).
Question No. V
The petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based allegedly on the
psychological incapacity of the respondent, but the psychologist was not able to personally
examine the respondent and the psychological report was based only on the narration of
petitioner. Should the annulment be granted? Explain.
Answer: NO. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is
nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder. Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. (JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, G.R. No. 166579, February 18,
2010)
Question No. VI
Cipriano and Lady Miros married each other. Lady Miros then left for the US and there, she
obtained American citizenship. Cipriano later learned all about this including the fact that Lady
Miros had divorced him in America and that she had remarried there. He then filed a petition for
authority to remarry, invoking par. 2, Art. 26 of the FC. Is Cipriano capacitated to re-marry by
virtue of the divorce decree obtained by his Filipino spouse who was later naturalized as an
American citizen? Explain.
Answer: Yes. The reckoning point for Art. 26 par. 2 of the FC to apply is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of their marriage but their citizenship at the time that a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to re-marry.
Although said provision only provides for divorce obtained abroad by the foreign spouse in a
valid mixed marriage, the legislative intent would be rendered nugatory if this provision would
not be applied to a situation where there is a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, one of

whom thereafter is naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, as in this case. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
**The clear legislative intent in the case of par. 2, Art. 26 (the origin of which can be traced to
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139) of the FC is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. This is so notwithstanding that, on its face, the said provision
does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. (Republic v. Orbecido
III, GR. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)
Question No. VII
For five years since 1989, Ricky, a lawyer, and Arlene, an entertainer, lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to marry each other.
Since Rickys salary was more than enough for their needs, Arlene stopped working and merely
kept house. During that period, Ricky was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision.
However, after five years, Ricky and Arlene decided to separate. Who will be entitled to the
house and lot? Explain.
ANSWER:
Ricky and Arlene are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during
the cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and
shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them
consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Question No. VIII
Testator died leaving an estate worth P1,000,000.00. He is survived by five (5) legitimate
children (A, B, C, D and E) and by his spouse (F). Divide his estate.
Answer:
A, B, C, D and E are entitled to P500,000.00 as collective legitime to be divided into five
parts. Each will get P100,000.00.
F will get a share equivalent to the legitime of one legitimate child P100,000.00.
Available part (Free Disposal) of the free portion P400,000.00.
Question No. IX
A testator died leaving cash money in the amount of P11,000,000.00; a car worth P500,000.00,
and a house worth P500,000.00. He instituted B, C and D as testamentary heirs. However,
he specifically provided that the car should go to B and the house to C. How much will each
get from the cash amount? Explain

Answer:
The rule is everything must be computed to complete the entirety of the estate which in turn
must be divided equally into 3 parts. Collating the properties, the estate is worth
P12,000,000.00.
As there is no designation of shares, this amount will be divided into three equal parts, that is,
P4,000,000.00 for each heir.
The heirs will divide the estate as follows
B will get1. P3,500,000.00 in cash plus the car worth P500,000.00.
C will get2. P3,500,000.00 in cash plus the house worth P500,000.00.
D will get3. P4,000,000.00 in cash.
Question No. X
Testator died leaving an estate worth P1,000,000.00. He left an indebtedness of P300,000.00.
When still alive, he gave a donation of P100,000.00 to A, a legitimate son. Testator is survived
by four legitimate children, A, B, C and D. Divide his estate. (10%)
Answer:
P1,000,000.00 value of property of testator at the time of his death;
P300,000.00 to be deducted from said value of property;
P700,000.00 net value of hereditary estate.
P100,000.00 donation to A is to be added being collationable.
Total hereditary Estate is P800,000.00.
Legitime of A, B, C and D is P400,000.00.
Free Portion is P400,000.00.
A, B, C and D will get P100,000.00 each for their legitimes.
Since A got already an advance legitime of P100,000.00 he will not receive anything anymore
as legitime.
Question No. XI
Lorenzo and Paula, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines. Lorenzo later became an
American Citizen. Paula engaged in an adulterous relationship with Llorente, and they bore a
son. Because of this, Lorenzo secured a divorce from a court in Nevada, USA to severe his
marriage with Paula. The divorce is valid under US laws.

Lorenzo then returned to Manila and married Alicia (a Spanish national). They bore three
children. Lorenzo executed a will where he bequeathed all his property located in the US and
Manila to Alicia and their three children. The will was probated in the US and Alicia was
appointed administrator of his estate. Thereafter, Lorenzo died in Manila.
1.

What law will govern the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will? Should the will be reprobated in the Philippines? Explain.

2.

Was the foreign divorce obtained by Lorenzo valid? Explain.

ANSWER:
What law will govern the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will?
The applicable law is the national law (New York, USA) of the decedent Lorenzo.
(Articles 15 and 16 of the Civil Code).
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Was the foreign divorce obtained by Lorenzo valid?
Yes. Lorenzo was already an American citizen at the time he secured the divorce. Thus,
he is no longer bound by Philippine laws, which prohibits divorce.
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. [139 SCRA 139 (1985)], we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals [300 SCRA 406
(1998)], that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as
to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the
trial court.
Question No. XII
Derek Ramsay (a Filipino-American) and Ann Curtis (a Filipina-Australian), met last year
(2011) at Thunderbird Resort in San Fernando, La Union. They became sweethearts and got
engaged. However, Derek insisted that they should get married in Singapore. Ann agreed,
though she was unsure why Derek did not want to get married in the Philippines. They then
secured a marriage license from the Philippine Consulate in Singapore. The wedding ceremony

was celebrated by a mascot at the Universal Studios in Singapore. The marriage is valid under
the laws of Singapore.
Upon their return to Manila, Ann registered their marriage with the NSO. She then
discovered that Derek had been previously married in Manila in 2005 to Angelica Panganiban.
But the records of the NSO showed that the said marriage was already nullified on the ground of
both parties psychological incapacity by a final decision of the California Supreme Court in June
2009. Such annulment is valid under the laws of California.
Ann retains your services to advise her on these questions:
(i)

Is her marriage to Derek in Singapore valid under Philippine law?

ANSWER:
YES. Annulment of marriage based on psychological incapacity is recognized
under Philippine laws. Since the annulment of Dereks marriage to Angelica is valid (and in
conformity) with the laws of California (where it was secured), then it shall also be valid under
Philippine laws (Art. 26, Family Code).
Since Dereks first marriage was already annulled at the time he married Ann in Singapore, then
Dereks marriage to Ann shall also be valid under Philippine laws. It is also of no moment that
the marriage was officiated by a mascot at the Universal Studios. This is because pursuant to
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages celebrated abroad and valid there as such, shall also
be valid here. This marriage does not fall under any of the exceptions to the said rule.
(ii)

Can Derek be prosecuted for Bigamy at the instance of his first wife
Angelica?

ANSWER:
No.
Firstly, there is no crime committed in Philippine territory because the
second marriage was celebrated abroad (in Singapore). Under the territoriality principle, our
courts can only take cognizance of crimes committed within our territory.
Secondly, there is no bigamy because the first marriage has already been annulled before
the second marriage was contracted. The annulment, though secured abroad, has already
been enforced and recognized under Philippine laws because it was already annotated in the
records kept by the NSO.
(iii)

Is the annulment of marriage secured by Derek in California valid under

Philippine laws?

ANSWER:
YES. Annulment of marriage based on psychological incapacity is recognized
under Philippine laws. Since the annulment of Dereks marriage to Angelica is valid (and in
conformity) with the laws of California (where it was secured), then it shall also be valid under
Philippine laws (Art. 26, Family Code).

Question No. XIII

In 2009, Bea Alonzo, a Filipino citizen, married a dirty-old-man, Ronaldo, a British
national, in Indonesia in a wedding ceremony celebrated according to Indonesian laws. Ronaldo
was previously married to Hilda Koronel. When Bea found out that she was made The
Mistress, she was fuming mad and immediately went back home to Manila. One month later,
Ronaldo returned to his native London, and he validly obtained in that country an absolute
divorce from his wife Bea.
After Bea received the final judgment of divorce, she married a Filipino struggling actor
(and the son of Ronaldo), John Lloyd, also a Filipino citizen, in a religious ceremony according
to the formalities of Philippine law. John Lloyd later left for the United States and became
naturalized as an American citizen. Bea followed John Lloyd to the United States, and after a
serious quarrel, Bea filed a suit and obtained a divorce decree issued by the court in the state of
Nevada.
Bea then returned to the Philippines and in a civil ceremony celebrated in Quezon City
according to the formalities of Philippine law she married another actor, Zanjoe, likewise a
Filipino citizen.
a)
Was the marriage of Bea and Ronaldo valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.
Answer:
The marriage of Bea and Ronaldo was void ab initio for being bigamous. Since Ronaldo
was previously married to Hilda Kornoel, and such marriage was still subsisting at the time he
married Bea, then his 2nd marriage to Bea is void for being a bigamous marriage.
Their marriage no longer validly subsists, because it has been dissolved by the absolute
divorce validly obtained by Ronaldo from London. (Art. 26. Family Code).
b)
Was the marriage of Bea and John Lloyd valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.
It depends. If the divorce decree obtained by Ronaldo capacitated him to re-marry, then it will
also capacitate Bea to re-marry. However, Bea must first secure a judicial recognition to
enforce the foreign decree of divorce in the Philippines. Presentation of the divorce decree is
not enough. After the divorce decree is validly recognized, then Bea can validly re-marry.
If Bea married John Lloyd without securing a judicial recognition of her divorce decree with
Ronaldo, then their marriage is void.
The divorce decree obtained by Bea from her marriage with John Lloyd is not valid in the
Philippines because she was still a Filipino at the time she secured the said divorce. Thus,
under Philippine laws, she is still married to John Lloyd.
c)
Was the marriage of Bea and Zanjoe valid when celebrated? Is their marriage still
validly existing now? Reasons.

Answer:
The marriage between Bea and Zanjoe is void because at the time Bea married
Zanjoe, she was still lawfully married to John Lloyd. The divorce decree obtained by Bea from
her marriage with John Lloyd is not valid in the Philippines because she was still a Filipino at the
time she secured the said divorce. Thus, under Philippine laws, she is still married to John
Lloyd.
d)

At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Bea? Reasons.

Answer: John Lloyd is the lawful husband of Bea. The divorce decree obtained by Bea from
her marriage with John Lloyd is not valid in the Philippines because she was still a Filipino at the
time she secured the said divorce. Thus, under Philippine laws, she is still married to John
Lloyd.
Question No. XIV
Pedro and Maria entered into a contract of lease over a parcel of land or a building.
Pedro, the lessee placed machinery for the use of his saw mill business on the land and building
belonging to the lessor, Maria. How do you classify the machinery? Explain.
ANSWER:
The machinery is a movable property since it was planted by the tenant, not the
owner. Immobilization by destination cannot be made by one who is not the owner of the land.
(Davao Sawmills vs. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709)
Question No. XV
Jeff is the owner of a parcel of land adjoining the bank of River Wawa in Bocaue,
Bulacan. It is titled under the name of Jeff. The land has a total area of 10,000 square meters.
After six (6) years, the land received an accretion of 1,000 square meters due to the natural
current of the river. Who owns the accretion? Why? Is the accretion a part of the title? Suppose
Jeff enters into possession of the accretion, can he acquire it by prescription? Why?
Who owns the accretion? Why?
ANSWER:
Jeff is the owner of the accretion. Under the law, to the owner of the land
adjoining the bank of a river belongs the accretion received by such land provided that the
following are complied with:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

it must be the result of the natural current of the river;

the increase is gradual;
the river must be continuous.

Is the accretion a part of the title? Why?

ANSWER:
No. The accretion is not part of the title because the title has a particular
description which does not comprise the accretion.

Suppose Jeff enters into possession of the accretion, can he acquire it by prescription?
Why?
ANSWER:
Jeff is already the owner of the accretion. He does not need to wait for a period
of time to acquire ownership of the accretion.
Question No. XVI
Michael and Tina purchased two (2) adjacent parcels of land from different vendors.
Portions of the buildings and wall bought by Michael were occupying a portion of Tinas land,
hence, upon learning of the same, Michael offered to buy the land. But Tina sued Michael in
connection with the encroachment or occupation by Michaels building and wall of the portion of
her land. What law governs the rights of the parties? Can Tina insist on the removal of the
improvement? Why?
What law governs the rights of the parties?
ANSWER:
The provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil Code will govern the rights of the parties.
In view of the impracticality of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a
just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder to pay for the land. It is the owner of
the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Can Tina insist on the removal of the improvement? Why?
ANSWER:
No. The removal of the improvement is not one of the remedies bestowed by law
upon the owner of the land. This remedy is available only if and when the owner chooses the
builder to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. This has not
taken place. Hence, Tinas options are limited to: (i) appropriating the encroaching portion of
Michaels building after payment of the proper indemnity; or (ii) obliging the latter to buy the
portion of the lot occupied by the structure.
Question No. XVII
Buko, in good faith, has purchased a diamond ring from Gigi, a friend of his. Gigi gave Buko a
bill of sale. Later on, Johnny identified the ring as the one he had lost about a year ago. There
is no question as to the veracity of Johnnys claim. In the meantime, Gigi has disappeared.
What advice would you give Buko in reference to Johnnys demand that the ring be returned or
surrendered to her? (10%)
Answer:
I would advise Buko to return the ring to Johnny, and not expect to be reimbursed
by Johnny the amount he (Buko) had paid Gigi. The law says that one who has lost any
movable or has unlawfully been deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession
of the same, without such possessor being entitled to reimbursement, except if the acquisition
in good faith had been at a public sale or auction (Art. 559), or at a merchants store, fair or
market (Art. 1505, No. 3). (If acquisition was at a merchants store, fair, or market, there can

even be no recovery). Bukos good faith is not material insofar as Johnnys superior rights are
concerned. (Arenas v. Raymundo, 19 Phil 47)
Question No. XVIII
Buko wanted to develop his piece of property which he found to be occupied by several
persons who had been in possession and farming on the land for 12 to 15 years. After a
demand to vacate, Buko entered the property, destroyed the barbed wire fence and bulldozed
the fruit-bearing trees and crops on the land. Buko invoked the Doctrine of Self-Help because
he has a title to the property. Decide.
Answer:
Buko was wrong. The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in this case. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
(German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA, 177 SCRA 495)
Buko should have brought an action to recover possession of the property -- like
ejectment (unlawful detainer), accion reinvindicatoria or accion publiciana as the case maybe.
Question No. XIX
While strolling in a certain street, Ricky finds a purse containing P1,000. Does he
become the owner thereof by his mere possession? If not, how can he become the owner of
the P1,000? Can that be considered a hidden treasure? Explain.
Answer:
No. Mere possession does not make Ricky the owner thereof. If Ricky knows
the owner of the purse, there is no way by which he can become the owner of the P1,000
because according to the law, he must return the purse including its contents to such owner. If
the owner is unknown, Ricky should immediately deposit the movable with the mayor of the
place where the finding took place. There shall then be a public announcement of the finding
for 2 consecutive weeks. Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found shall be awarded to Ricky, after reimbursement of the
expenses. (Art. 719)
If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay Ricky, as a reward, 1/10 of the
amount found. (Art. 720)
(Note: the money found cannot be considered a treasure because it was not hidden
and unknown. Art. 439 states By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and
unknown deposit of money, jewelry or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which
does not appear. Hence, the rules on hidden treasure do not apply.)

1.
Q: After conducting preliminary investigation, a panel composed of state
prosecutors from the DOJ charged Sen. Honasan, together with others, with a violation
of Art. 134-A of the RPC for the offense of coup d'etat. Honasan questions the authority
and jurisdiction of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
ground that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority and jurisdiction to conduct
the same, he being a Senator of the Republic with a salary grade of 31, and that
ultimately, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his case, not the DOJ. DOJ asserts
that pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No., it has jurisdiction to investigate the case
against him, concurrent with the Office of the Ombudsman. Honasan counters that said
circular is ineffective as it was never published. Is OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001
ineffective because it was not published? Explain.
A: No. OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the two offices
which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office
of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. It does not contain any penal
provision nor prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain of penalty. Further, it does
not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. As such therefore, it need not be
published. (146 SCRA 453 and Peo. v. Que Po Lay (94 Phil. 640). (Honasan, II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, June 15, 2004)
2.
Q: Roberto was in Nikko Hotel when he bumped into a friend who was then on her
way to a wedding reception being held in said hotel. Roberto alleged that he was then
invited by his friend to join her at the wedding reception and carried the basket full of
fruits which she was bringing to the affair. At the reception, the wedding coordinator of
the hotel noticed him and asked him, allegedly in a loud voice, to leave as he was not in
the guest list. He retorted that he had been invited to the affair by his friend, who
however denied doing so. Deeply embarrassed by the incident, Roberto then sued the
hotel for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Will Robertos action
prosper? Explain.
A: No. It was held that the version of the hotel coordinator was more credible considering that
she has been in the hotel business for 20 years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated. Consequently, the employer hotel is not liable for damages. Art. 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all
human hurts and social grievances. The elements for this principle to apply are:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) But it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
3) It is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional. In this case, there was no showing at all that the wedding coordinator had acted with
ill-motives. Without such evidence, her act cannot amount to abuse of rights. (Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden v. Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005)
3.
Q:
Ricky donated P1Million to the unborn child of his pregnant girlfriend,
which she accepted. After 6 months of pregnancy, the fetus was born and baptized as
Angela. However, Angela died 20 hours after birth. Ricky sought to recover the P1Million.
Is Ricky entitled to recover? Explain.

A:
Yes. Ricky may recover the donation because the donee, Angela, is not considered to
have been born. Under Article 41 of the Civil Code, if a fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb.
Since the fetus did not acquire any legal personality, it acquired no rights which could be
transmitted to the mother. Ricky, as donor, may recover the money he donated to an inexistent
donee.
4.
Q:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
while Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
Fortune filed a complaint against Vinzons-Chato to recover damages for the alleged
violation of its constitutional rights arising from Vinzon-Chatos issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (which re-classified Fortune cigarettes as locally
manufactured with foreign brands and thereby imposed higher taxes), which the
Supreme Court later declared invalid.
Vinzons-Chato filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that she cannot be held liable for
damages for acts she performed while in the discharge of her duties as BIR
Commissioner. Is she correct? Explain.
A:
NO. A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so
tainted with malice or bad faith.
Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie
of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort
for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. (VinzonsChato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp., GR No. 141309, June 19, 2007)
5.
Q:
The petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
allegedly on the psychological incapacity of the respondent, but the psychologist was
not able to personally examine the respondent and the psychological report was based
only on the narration of petitioner. Should the annulment be granted? Explain.
A: NO. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is
nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder. Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. (JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, G.R. No. 166579, February 18,
2010)

6.
Q:
Maria, wife of Pedro, withdrew P5M from their conjugal funds. With this
money, she constructed a building on a lot which she inherited from her father. Is the
building conjugal or paraphernal? Reasons.
ANSWER:
Code:

It depends. This is known as reverse accession. Under Article 120 of the Family

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts
of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original ownerspouse, subject to the following rules:
(i) When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse
at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
(ii) In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
7.
Q:
Cipriano and Lady Miros married each other. Lady Miros then left for the US
and there, she obtained American citizenship. Cipriano later learned all about this
including the fact that Lady Miros had divorced him in America and that she had
remarried there. He then filed a petition for authority to remarry, invoking par. 2, Art. 26 of
the FC. Is Cipriano capacitated to re-marry by virtue of the divorce decree obtained by
his Filipino spouse who was later naturalized as an American citizen? Explain.
A: Yes. The reckoning point for Art. 26 par. 2 of the FC to apply is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of their marriage but their citizenship at the time that a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to re-marry.
Although said provision only provides for divorce obtained abroad by the foreign spouse in a
valid mixed marriage, the legislative intent would be rendered nugatory if this provision would
not be applied to a situation where there is a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, one of
whom thereafter is naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, as in this case. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
**The clear legislative intent in the case of par. 2, Art. 26 (the origin of which can be traced to
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139) of the FC is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. This is so notwithstanding that, on its face, the said provision
does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. (Republic v. Orbecido
III, GR. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)

8.
Q:
After they got married, Nikki discovered that Christian is having an affair
with another woman. But Nikki decided to give it a try and lived with him for two years.
After 2 years, Nikki filed an action for legal separation on the ground of Christians sexual
infidelity. Will the action prosper? Explain.
ANSWER:
No. While sexual infidelity is a valid ground for legal separation, Nikki is deemed
to have condoned it, as she still lived with Christian even after she discovered his sexual
infidelity. The precriptive period for this ground is five (5) years after the marriage. But Nikki
may no longer file an action for legal separation on the ground of condonation.
9.
For five years since 1989, Ricky, a lawyer, and Arlene, an entertainer, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were
capacitated to marry each other. Since Rickys salary was more than enough for their
needs, Arlene stopped working and merely kept house. During that period, Ricky was
able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Ricky and
Arlene decided to separate. Who will be entitled to the house and lot? Explain.
ANSWER:
Ricky and Arlene are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during
the cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and
shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them
consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
10.
Q:
Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie,
alleging that Stephanie's mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name be changed
from "Astorga" to "Garcia," which is her mother's surname and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," which is his surname. This the trial court denied. Was
the trial court correct in denying Honoratos request for Stephanies use of her mothers
surname as her middle name? Explain.
A: No. The name of an individual has two parts - the given name or proper name and the
surname of family name. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The Civil Code (Arts. 364 to 380) is
silent as to the use of a middle name. Even Art 176 of the FC, as amended by Rep. Act No.
9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father) is silent
as to what middle name a child may use.
An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
As she had become a legitimate child on account of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to utilize the surname of her father, Honorato Catindig, and that of her mother, Gemma
Garcia.
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stepnanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, the High Court found no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.

Note: The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, predicated its ruling upon the statutory
principle that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows a child with legitimate status. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia, G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005)
11.
Spouses Primo and Monina Lim, childless, were entrusted with the custody of two
minor children, the parents of whom were unknown. Eager of having children of their
own, the spouses made it appear that they were the childrens parents by naming them
Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude Lim. Subsequently, Monina married Angel Olario after
Primos death.
She decided to adopt the children by availing the amnesty given under R.A. 8552 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old and Michael, 18. Both Michelle and Michael gave
consent to the adoption.
The trial court dismissed the petition and ruled that Monina should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. Monina, in a Motion for Reconsideration argues that mere
consent of her husband would suffice and that joint adoption is not needed, for the
adoptees are already emancipated.
Is the trial court correct in dismissing the petitions for adoption? Explain.
A:
A: Yes. Section 7 Article 3 of R.A. 8552 reads: Sec. 7 Husband and wife shall jointly
adopt, xxx. The use of the word shall in the abovequoted husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also ensures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Monina, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt with her husband. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by Monina herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. (In Re: Petition for Adoption
of Michelle P. Lim, In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michael Jude P. Lim, Monina P. Lim,
G.R. Nos. 16899293, May 21, 2009)
12.
Jambrich, an Austrian, fell in-love and lived together with Descallar and bought
their house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision. In the Contracts to Sell, Jambrich and
Descallar were referred to as the buyers.
When the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, it was refused because Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. After Jambrich
and Descaller separated, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his
boat from Borromeo. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the AgroMacro properties to Borromeo.
Borromeo discovered that titles to the 3 lots have been transferred in the name of
Descallar. Who is the rightful owner of the properties? Explain.

A: Borromeo. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Certificates of title are not a
source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the
property. When the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the properties for
a valuable consideration, the certificate of title is not indefeasible.
Jambrich was the source of fund used to purchase the 3 lots, thus, he had all authority to
transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to Borromeo.
If a land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or
transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of
the transferee is rendered valid. (Camilo Borromeo v. Antonietta Descallar, G.R. No. 159310,
February 24, 2009)

13.
Siga-an granted a loan to Villanueva in the amount of P540,000.00. Such
agreement was not reduced to writing. Siga-an demanded interest which was paid by
Villanueva in cash and checks. The total amount Villanueva paid accumulated to
P1,200,000.00. Upon advice of her lawyer, Villanueva demanded for the return of the
excess amount of P660,000.00 which was ignored by Siga-an.
1. Is the payment of interest valid? Explain.
2. Is solutio indebiti applicable? Explain.
A:
1. No. Payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for
the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced to
writing (Art. 1956, NCC). The concurrence of the two conditions is required.
The parties did not agree on the payment of interest for the loan. Villanueva accepted Siga-ans
offer of loan, but there was no verbal or written agreement for her to pay interest on the loan.
Also, compensatory interest is not chargeable because it was not duly proven that Villanueva
defaulted in paying the loan.
2. Yes. The principle of solutio indebiti applies where (1) a payment is made when there exists
no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the
payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other
cause. There was no express stipulation in writing on the payment of interest, thus, there was
no binding relation between them as regards its payment. The payment was clearly a mistake.
Since Giga-an received something when there was no right to demand it, he has an obligation
to return it. (Sebastian Siga-an v. Alicia Villanueva, G.R. No. 173227, January 20, 2009)
14.
Eulalia was engaged in the business of buying and selling large cattle. In order to
secure the financial capital she advanced for her employees (biyaheros) she required
them to surrender TCT of their properties and to execute the corresponding Deeds of
Sale in her favor. Domeng Bandong was not required to post any security but when
Eulalia discovered that he incurred shortage in cattle procurement operation, he was
required to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of Eulalia. She sold the

property to her grandniece Jocelyn who thereafter instituted an action for ejectment
against the Spouses Bandong.
To assert their right, Spouses Bandong filed an action for annulment of sale against
Eulalia and Jocelyn alleging that there was no sale intended but only equitable mortgage
for the purpose of securing the shortage incurred by Domeng in the amount of P70,
000.00 while employed as biyahero by Eulalia. Was the deed of sale between Domeng
and Eulalia a contract of sale or an equitable mortgage? Explain.
A: It is an equitable mortgage. In executing the said deed of sale, Domeng and Eulalia never
intended the transfer of ownership of the subject property but to burden the same with an
encumbrance to secure the indebtedness incurred by Domeng on the occasion of his
employment with Eulalia. The agreement between Dominador and Eulalia was not avoided in its
entirety so as to prevent it from producing any legal effect at all. Instead, the said transaction is
an equitable mortgage, thereby merely altering the relationship of the parties from seller and
buyer, to mortgagor and mortgagee, while the subject property is not transferred but subjected
to a lien in favor of the latter. (Sps. Raymundo, et al. v. Sps. Bandong, G.R. No. 171250, Jul.
4, 2007)
15.
Natividads holographic will, which had only one substantial provision, as first
written, named Rosa as her sole heir. However, when Gregorio presented it for probate, it
already contained an alteration, naming Gregorio, instead of Rosa, as sole heir, but
without authentication by Natividads signature. Rosa opposes the probate alleging such
lack of proper authentication. She claims that the unaltered form of the will should be
given effect. Whose claim should be granted? Explain.
A: Neither. Both their claims should be denied. As to Gregorios claim, the absence of proper
authentication is fatal to his cause. As to Rosas claim, to state that the will as first written should
be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of
mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by
law by affixing her full signature. (Kalaw v. Hon. Relova, etc., et al., G.R. No. L40207, Sept. 28,
1984)
16.
John Sagun and Maria Carla Camua, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine
citizenship by naturalization after their marriage. During their marriage the couple
acquired substantial landholdings in London and in Makati. Maria begot three children,
Jorge, Luisito, and Joshur. In one of their trips to London, the couple executed a joint will
appointing each other as their heirs and providing that upon the death of the survivor
between them the entire estate would go to Jorge and Luisito only but the two could not
dispose of nor divide the London estate as long s they live. John and Maria died
tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in 2005. Jorge and Luisito filed a petition
for probate of their parents will before a Makati Regional Trial Court. Joshur vehemently
objected because he was preterited.
Q: Should the will be admitted to probate? Explain.
A: No, the will cannot be admitted to probate. Joint wills are void under the Civil Code. And even
if the joint will executed by Filipinos abroad were valid where it was executed, the joint will is still

not valid in the Philippines. Preterition is not a ground to disallow a probate. In this case, the
ground for disallowance is the fact that it is a joint will.
Q: Are the testamentary dispositions valid? Explain.
A: If a will is void, all testamentary dispositions contained in that will are also void. Hence, all
testamentary provisions contained in the void joint will are also void.
Q: Is the testamentary prohibition against the division of the London estate valid?
Explain.
A: The testamentary prohibition against the division by Jorge and Luisito of the London estate
for as long as they live, is not valid. Art. 494 of the Civil Code provides that a donor or testator
may prohibit partition for a period which may not exceed twenty (20) years.
17.
Ricky and Arlene are married. They begot Franco during their marriage. Franco
had an illicit relationship with Audrey and out of which, they begot Arnel. Franco
predeceased Ricky, Arlene and Arnel. Before Ricky died, he executed a will which when
submitted to probate was opposed by Arnel on the ground that he should be given the
share of his father, Franco. Is the opposition of Arnel correct? Why?
ANSWER:
No, because an illegitimate child has no right of representation. Under Art. 992
of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate children. This is the so-called barrier between legitimates
and illegitimates. (Leonardo vs. CA, Feb. 28, 1983; Diaz vs. Pamuti, G.R. No. 66574, June
17, 1987; Dela Puerta vs. CA, Feb. 6, 1990).
18.
How can RJP distribute his estate by will, if his heirs are JCP, his wife; HBR and
RVC, his parents; and an illegitimate child, SGO?
ANSWER:
1)
2)
3)
4)

It shall be distributed this way:

1/8 for the surviving spouse which shall be taken from the free portion;
1/4 shall go to the illegitimate child;
1/2 shall go to HBR and RVC; and
1/8 shall be freely disposed of. (Art. 899, NCC).