The moral economy of peasants has been, a controversial concept

in economic anthropology for several decades now (Hyden 1985;

Scott 1976; For a critical review of relevant literature, see
Lcmarchand 1989)* It has been defined hy Scott as an economy in
which a subsistence ethos guarantees at least minimal provisioning to all households" (Scott 1976, in Ensmingcr 1992; 2).
However, the operationalization of moral economy" (or an
economy of affection" as it has been alternatively called) has
proved notoriously difficult. In many accounts moral economy has
been opposed to self-interested, accumulating behavior. Lemarchand (1989) has asked how an economy of affection can be
demarcated from a market-oriented economy. Talk of moral economy
has frequently been colored in terms of values and affection.
Kinship and friendship are pointed to as the guidelines of
economic behavior. In the same vein, Scott talks of a subsistence ethos" rather than of production and exchange as such.
Hence, it has been overly difficult, when talking about moral
economy, to correlate individual interests and social
institutions. Why are successful actors interested in a continuation of a moral economy? Why are paupers retained in
exchange circuits for such a long time, even though they bring no
discernible benefits to the group? It is the aim of this paper to
explore qualitative and quantitative aspects of distribution
within a moral economy. This will be done from a theoretical
standpoint that combines an individual actor perspective (Why are
actors interested in exchange?) and a societal approach (What
institutions do actors use to facilitate exchange?). The
theoretical paradigm underlying this approach is the New
Institutional Economics (NIE) (Bates 1989; North 1990}. One major
trajectory of NIE is the belief that institutions directly
affcct economic outcomes {distribution and growth), that
individuals realize this, and that they attempt to change
institutions to serve their ends more effectively, whether these
ends be ideological or materiaftstic (Ejisminger 1992: XIII). (n
other words, the institutional foundations of a moral economy are
worth maintaining for actors engaged in exchange as long as the
benefits to them outweigh their costs, While
many features of moral economy remain fuzzy, a consensus has
emerged that its major benefits lie in its obvious capacity to
minimize risk in an unpredictably varying natural and political
environment (Wiessner 1982).
Recent anthropological research on livestock-based systems in
Eastern Africa has shown that pastoral nomadic actors in an
unpredictably varying environment primarily seek security, not
the accumulation of livestock resources (Dyson- Hudson 1983;
Dyson-Hudson & McCabe 1985; Fratkin 1991; Johnson 1990; McCabe
1990a; for comparative material on West African herders, see

Legge 1989; White 1991). In good times herders exchange economic

assets (livestock) in return for both social capital (affinal kin
and stockfriends) and symbolic capital (prestige) (for the
theoretical foundations of this approach, see Bourdieu 1983,
1987; Coleman 1990; Smart 1993). The transfer of different forms
of capital may be identified as a cornerstone of the pastoral
economy; social and symbolic forms of capital may be put to use
in times of need - and periods of stress are frequent in the East
African savannah. McCabe (I990h:96) lists the following years as
times of major droughts for northern Kenya in this century: 191819, 1928-29, 1933-39, 1943^45, 1958-59, 1970-73, 1975-76. I979-8L
and 1983-84, Herds can decrease rapidly in one or two bad seasons
(Bollig 1994; Homewood & Lewis 1987) or in a single epidemic or
raid (Bollig 1990a. 1991a, 1993; Fukui & Turton 1979; Gartrell
1985). The neighboring Ngisony- oka Turkana lost 60-90% of their
livestock in the 1979-81 drought (McCabe I9H7. J990a), and Dahl &
Hort (1976:115) report estimated domestic animal losses ranging
between 88% (cattle) and 69% (camels) in Ethiopia during the 1973
disaster. In the East African savannah, livestock herds are a
means of production which promises high returns in good times but
is very vulnerable in bad times. To engage oneself in widespread
exchange networks is one strategy for coping with environmental
and political variability. Although These networks are mentioned
in nearly every ethnography on East African herders, they have so
far not been systematically explored. Rather, work has
concentrated on showing how networks of mutual indebtedness were
threatened by increased dependency on larger markets. Ensminger
(1990) and Henren (1991) showed how pastoral elites look for ways
to ensure their high-risk livestock capital outside the herding
economy. These pastoralists opt for market exchanges (instead of
reciprocal gifts) in order to ensure security and sustainability
of household and herd.
Taking one northern Kenyan pastoral society as an example,
this paper will
1. describe the institutional frame of such exchange networks.
2. show how these networks arc used in a drought.
3. pinpoint the social structures that mold exchange under
stress,
4. outline the conditions under which such a moral economys
viability is endangered.
These topics link up to some important theoretical issues. The
social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) of transactions like
bridewealth and stock-friendship turns out to have been
overemphasized - i.e., economic transactions have been
These topics link up to some important theoretical issues. The
social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) of transactions like
bridewealth and stock-friendship turns out to have been

overemphasized - i.e., economic transactions have been

interpreted as being dominated by the specific norms and values
(e.g., kinship, age-set solidarity) of a pastoral culture. Little
attention has been paid to the material benefits individuals reap
from reciprocal exchange (cf. Bonie 1990:56; Lem arc hand 1989;
Wicssner 1982). The approach taken here tries to show how actors,
motivated by a blend of self-interest and moral obligation,
continually invest a considerable amount of their surplus produce
into exchange networks in order lo create and enforce their
social network and earn the reputation of *i generous herder.
Anthropologists working on East African pastoral]sis have frequently emphasized the risk-minimizing functions of widespread
networks (next to spatial mobility, diversification of productive
strategies, and ritual activities that safeguard against the
worst). However, there is little empirical evidence 011 how
networks are utilized during periods of stress. While there is
plenty of information on declining intracommunity exchange
{Ensminger 1990, 1992; Herren 1991; Hjort 1989; Hogg 1986; Lcgge
1989; While 1991), information on qualitative and quantitative
aspects of working intracommunity exchange networks remains rare
(but see Johnson 1990).
THE POKOT
Pokot herders make use of a semiarid habitat to graze large herds
of camels, cattle, goats, sheep, and donkeys (cf. Schneider 1953;
Conant 1966; Dietz 1987; Dyson-Hudson et al. 1990). In the face
of various risks (droughts, epidemics, raiding), the Pokot try to
protect themselves through herd diversification, dispersal of
household herds, flexible labor allocation, spatial mobility, and
widespread exchange networks (for a fuller discussion of riskminimizing strategies, see Bollig 1994). While pasture and
waterholes are communally owned, livestock is private property,
and there are considerable differences in the sizes of livestock
herds. However, such economic alternatives as trade, handicrafts,
and wage labor are of little importance, and rich herders rarely
invest capital outside the livestock sector (Ahuya & Odongo
1991). The social organization of the pastoral Pokot rests on
dispersed patrilineal descent groups as well as on age sets and
generation sets. Informal neighborhood councils (kokwo)
coordinate the collective use of pastures and wells. There is, in
contrast to other Kenyan pas- toralist groups, no pastoral elite
that dominates other herders economically or politically.
Absentee ownership of herds (Hogg 1986) is practically
nonexistent. An egalitarian ideology permeates the discourse of
age sets, descent groups, and internal conflict regulation.
INSTITUTIONS OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE

Almost all transfers of livestock between two herders imply longterm relations between them. This includes the promise of further
exchanges of livestock, the transfer of other commodities, and
strong emotional ties. Livestock may be exchanged on many
occasions (e.g., lifecycle rituals and compensations), but
bridewealth exchange, bridewealth distribution, stockfriendships, distribution within the descent group, and exchanges
between two fixed descent groups (either due to preferential
marriage or adoption) are the major institutions of reciprocal
exchange.
Bridewealth exchange
Marriages can only be legitimized through the exchange of animals
(kanyoy). As yet. money is not accepted as an alternative to
payments made in livestock. At a formal meeting (aloto), the
brides and husbands male kin fix the amount of bridewealth to
be paid. The first part, usually about half the total
bridewealth, is paid before the bride takes her place in her
husbands homestead. Over the following years the remaining part
of bridewealth is paid in smaller installments (cf. Hakansson
1990 for comparative material on systems of protracted bridewealth payment in eastern Africa). The last payment is marked by
a ritual (ko- yogh), which certifies the definitiveness of the
marriage. The last installment of the bridewealth payments
removes the bridc-taker from a situation where he is indebted to
the bride-giver. The relation is now regarded as heavy (nikis),
and both men involved, the brides father (plus his closest
agnatic relatives) and the son-in-law (plus his closest agnatic
relatives) may now exchange livestock voluntarily. Bridewealth
payments are not rigidly fixed; the average is about 12 heads of
cattle, 2-3 camels, and 30 goats plus some sheep. But if a rich
herd owner (or the son of a rich herd owner) wants to marry,
discussions on bridewealth may drag on for as long as the brides
kin try to claim more animals. It is significant that this is
done openly. There is no bad feeling about pressing for a high
bridewealth, insofar as it is commonly accepted that rich people
should pay more for their brides. On the other hand, bridewealth
requirements may be reduced considerably for poor bridegrooms.
Bridewealth distribution
Whereas bridewealth payments have to be borne mainly by the
bridegroom or by his father, incoming bridewealth payments are
distributed throughout the personal network of the recipient.
There is a moral obligation not to keep large numbers of
livestock received as bridewealth payment for ones daughters or
sisters but, instead, to give away many of these animals to
relatives and friends. The father of the bride - and after his
death, his brothers or his eldest son - will keep only a fraction
of the livestock which was received for the daughter or sister.

In the 36 bridewealth distributions recorded, there were always

at least eight people participating in the distribution. About
70% (n = 165) of all cattle distributed were given away to
members of the patrilineage; of these, 19.0% remained with the
brides father and 23.7% were given to his brothers, whereas
17.2% went to the brides brothers and another 10.7% to more
remote paternal relatives (especially the brides fathers
fathers brothers and their sons). Affinal
Social structures
The marriage system is a social institution (next to many others,
like neighborhood-based rituals or age-set celebrations)
organized in such a way as to permit the actor to maximize the
number of his affinal relatives. Next to patrilineage and
patrician exogamy, there are a number of other rules governing
the spread of affinal relationships. (These rules do not apply to
ones kapkoyogh lineage, in which marriages are frequent. See
Figure 7.1.) A man may marry women neither from his physical or
classificatory mothers and paternal grandmothers patrilineages
nor from the same lineages as the wives of his brothers (of the
same mother). A man should not marry women from the same lineages
as the wives of his half-brothers (different mothers, but the
same father); nor should he marry women from the lineage of his
paternal and maternal grandmothers, from the lineage of his
mothers mothers mother or fathers fathers mother, and from
the same lineages as his sons wives (of course, an elder may
still
marry additional wives after his sons have married); nor finally - should he marry women from lineages his sisters have
been married into. Hence, every marriage ideally initiates a
relationship with a set of people which ones own descent group
has not yet had any relations with. Paradoxically, there is one
other rule which almost seems to negate the emphasis on spreading
affinal relationships. Almost every lineage is able to claim a
preferential marriage relationship (kapkoyogh) with one other
lineage. Whether this paradox is the result of complex historical
pathways or is a functional correlate to the diversification of
marriage partners (in the sense that individual security is
enhanced if both rules apply simultaneously) is not yet clear.
The diversification of exchange relations is enhanced by
numerous other institutions. One should not engage in stockfriendship with in-laws. This prohibition prevents the doubling
of affinal and friendship ties. The rules of stock-friendship
have been discussed above; I will just point to yet another rule
which says, If you already engage in stock-friendship with a
person from one locality, look for your next friend in another.
Finally, there are numerous minor occasions that oblige actors to
exchange livestock (e.g., male circumcision). Everybody

circumcised has to give the circumciser a goat. Then the

initiated person has to borrow clothes from a woman outside his
own family. When he returns the clothes, he has to give the woman
one female sheep. However, on handing over the sheep, the husband
or the eldest son of the woman has to promise a goat or cow to
the newly initiated man.
The network, of course, does not consist only of institutions
and social relations, it is also shaped by the emotive and
normative frames the actors invoke when dealing with each other.
The individual network is structured by the concept of tilyai
(cf. Schneider 1953); in such a network the tilyai of one actor
include those relatives and friends he has exchange relations
with. This concept does not denote abstract kin categories but
only those persons an actor actually has contact with. The
concept tilyonton is the set of norms and values conferring
mutual solidarity between exchange partners. However, this
concept involves more than just standards of proper conduct; it
actually signifies intense emotional ties between two men. The
exchange of livestock implies kongityo (friendship). If there is
to be tilyonton between two people, there must also be chomnyogh
(affection, love), kalxa (trust, peacefulness, ease) and - in
times of need - kisyondi (compassion). The absence of exchange partners gives rise
to choykonot (loneliness), a feeling every person fears. And if,
after a long dry season, one goes to visit ones stock-friends in
distant places, one feels emo, a strong longing for close
friends. There are various ways to put pressure on a herder who
is not willing to enter into exchange relations. Such a man might
easily be accused of witchcraft (Bollig 1992:162ff). Men who have
become sick frequently claim that the deeper reason for their
disease was the bad will (ghoityo) and envy (ngatkong) of others,
to whom they had denied livestock presents. Hence, coordination
of exchange is deeply rooted in the concepts of the emotional
self.
Furthermore, the distribution of livestock and the collecting
of livestock debts are cornerstones of male identity. The value
system encourages men to invest surplus livestock in exchange
relations. Whereas a young herder will primarily aspire to a
reputation as a ferocious and courageous raider, middle-aged men
and elders are determined to build up the image of a kapolokyon.
In accordance with this ideal, they aim to increase their herds,
marry many wives, obtain many stock-friends, and successfully
mediate all types of quarrels.
THE EXCHANGE NETWORK PUT TO TEST: TRANSACTIONS DURING A DROUGHT1
The principal aim in studying these networks was the idea that
they demonstrate an important strategy of risk minimization.
After observing from 1987 to 1989 the networks under extremely

good circumstances, in the dry seasons of 1991 and 1992 1 had the
chance to sample information on exchange in two very bad years
(cf. SALTLICK 1991). The years 1990 and 1991 were marked by low
rainfall, a dreadful livestock epidemic, and the flaring up of
interethnic hostilities. Most of the 37 actors I had consulted
before in connection with a network analysis (Bollig 1992)
sustained heavy losses of livestock (Bollig 1991b). However,
losses were unequally spread. Whereas some lost about 50% of
their cattle, some lost only a few head (Bollig 1994). I met some
herders who had lost almost their entire cattle herd. In a
desperate move they had migrated to the Leroghi Plateau and had
used pastures there which were fully under the control of
neighboring Samburu herders. They took a high risk, knowing that
the possibility of conflict over scarce pastures was high and
that epidemics of East
Coast Fever were frequent on the plateau. In 1991/92 most of
those who migrated paid for their risk-prone strategy with heavy
losses, whereas others, who opted for more risk-averse strategies
and who remained in the overgrazed but disease-free lowlands, did
considerably better (Bollig 1994). For goats interhousehold
variation of losses was similar, with some herds losing about 30%
and one herd growing by 11%. All camel owners of the sample
suffered from an outbreak of an epidemic (probably
Trypanosomiasis congolensis) which killed up to 70% of all camels
in the research area. The impact of increasing interethnic
hostilities was generally felt by all households, insofar as
grazing grounds in the northern parts of Pokot land from 1990
onward could only be marginally used - if at all. The decrease in
available grazing land brought indirect costs: Animals died of
emaciation, whereas many others became sick on heavily
overstocked pastures. Furthermore, actual losses due to raiding
were experienced by some (few) households.
In 1992 I canvassed each of the 37 household heads to learn
whether they had appealed to one of the 36 others for help or had
assisted any of them. Help
had been rendered in various ways: Men were invited for meat
feasts (asiwa)\ they were presented goats to upgrade the
nutritional level of their households (ornisyd moning); or goats
and sheep were donated for the performance of healing rituals
(tapa). While neither asiwa nor tapa rituals are necessarily tied
to periods of stress, the data clearly indicate that the number
of such rituals quickly rises during the early stages of a
drought. Due to high mobility and labor demands at the height of
a drought, asiwa rituals at this time are few in number; the
prevailing form of distribution in such times is to ask for
omisyd moning. Because each mode of transaction involves very

different kinds of help and. as a result, different modes of food

distribution, I will take a brief look at all three of them.
1 These data were gathered in a total of 31 months of field
research in northern Kenya. I was fortunate to be able to
spend good (1988. 1989). had (1991, 1992), and 'normaT* years
(1987, 1993) among the Pokot.
Omisyd moning (food for children): If a man is short of a goat to
sell to obtain maize or else to slaughter for his family, he can
turn to an exchange partner and ask him for omisyd moning literally food for children.* If he is given a goat or a sheep,
he can decide freely how he wishes to use it for his family. He
may either slaughter or sell it. If slaughtered, the meat is
distributed entirely within the family. If the animal is sold,
the money is at the disposal of the household head. Donations of
this sort rarely result in a debt - i.e., somebody given omisyd
moning will generally not have to return a reciprocal gift in
future.
Asiwa (meat feasts of the neighborhood): The men of a
neighborhood may ask one of their compatriots to slaughter a goat
or an oxen for them. If the man agrees, he will choose one lad
from the audience, or, more often, somebody volunteers to
slaughter the animal. This man then has incurred a debt to the
donor. During the drought almost all animals slaughtered in asiwa
are either goats or sheep. The meat is entirely distributed among
- and eaten by - the men present on the occasion. Only the man
who spears the goat is allowed to take the head and neck back
home to his family. Men are obviously advantaged here, insofar as
they share a great deal of meat, to which women and children have
no access.
Tapa (healing ritual): The tapa ritual purifies and cures a sick
or weak person. A ritual specialist (toptopin) diagnoses whether
such a ritual should be performed for the sick person. During a
drought many people feel sick or weak, and, accordingly, numerous
animals were slaughtered in tapa rituals during 1991/92. Of these
many were borrowed from friends or relatives. While some of these
tapa donations had to be returned, others were straightforward
presents without any return obligations. The meat was fairly well
distributed in the community. Most of the intestines and some
special parts of the meat go to the sick person. The woman whose
goat (or cow) is slaughtered takes the head and neck. The other
wives of the household share the back and intestines. The
neighbors take part of the rump and both hindlegs. Married
daughters of the household may take both frontlegs. Boys and men
of the household and neighborhood will
distribute the breast amongst themselves. Finally, the ritual
specialist conducting the ritual, usually a woman, takes the
skin, the remaining parts of the rump and, if the animal was a

sheep, the fat tail. It is easy to understand not only why this
ritual strengthens the person undergoing the ritual but also why
the entire social environment profits from the meat which is
distributed. Hence, these rituals improve nutritional standards
within the entire community during the leanest months of the
year.
The help accorded to actors by their networks between 1990 and
early 1992 was substantial. The 37 household heads gave about
three (3.24) heads of small livestock (very few donations were
cattle, and none were camels) within the local network for ritual
and food assistance. Each person additionally donated 1-2 goats
(1.68) in meat feasts like the asiwa. all goats being slaughtered
for public (primarily male) welfare. Taking into account that all
actors interviewed maintain a much broader range of relationships
than the local 37 X 37 network (see Table 7.1) amounts to, we can
conclude that mutual help is indeed sub
stantial during the periods of stress.
The question of who is able to consult w'hom for help is of
considerable importance. Are only wealthy people donors, or are
only poor herders recipients of gifts? Table 7.2 shows that rich
households were contributing proportionately more to exchanges
under stress. Although this group amounted to only 27% of the
sample population, its members gave 44.2% of all gifts. Mediumsized households (54.1% of the sample) gave 46.7%, and poor
households gave least (they numbered 18.9% of the sample and only
gave 9.2% of all gifts).
The poor profited disproportionately from gift exchange under
stress. They received 28.3% of all gifts, whereas the rich only
received 23.3%. However, on the recipient side the three
wealthier groups participated more evenly than on the donor side,
where rich households were proportionately much more deeply
involved than the other two groups. It may seem odd that the rich
also seek help during a drought (in fact, they did not get much
less help than the poor). In fact, rich herders appear to ask for
omisyd moning, for example, in order not to slaughter their own
stock. As far as I can see, the Pokot are not particularly
critical of such a practice. Perhaps this is one of the tricky
points of the system, for in times of crisis rich people have to
look for assistance too. A lack of livestock is bitterly felt not
only when stomachs go hungry but also when obligations like
bridewealth payments cannot be met. Rich men usually have big
families, which are not easy to feed. Hence, rich people look for
the help of their tilyai-partners as much as poor people do.
However, rich people are more frequently solicited for presents
than are poor herders, and it is obvious that successful
individuals during a crisis give more than they receive.
Apparently, there need to be rewards to keep the rich well

integrated into the exchange system - insofar as many other

accounts of pastoral exchange systems show that the rich in
particular may be lured away by the national economy, where security of another kind, like bank accounts, land speculation, or
trade investthe way for just asking a partner for a goat (see Figure 7.2).
Frequently, people giving livestock away during the drought
simply said ki'som kile" - he just came and asked for it (so 1
gave). Thus, exchange relations such as those depicted earlier
should be seen as larger circuits in which minor transfers are
nested during times of need. Bridewealth donation, bridewealth
distribution. and stock-friendship create a framework for
coordination and facilitate exchange in a crisis. In spite of
smaller transactions, the debt relation is not canceled: If you
owe me an ox, I will ask you not to return that ox but to help me
out with a goat for the time being. The debt of an ox remains. Of
course, it would be highly irrational from an economic point of
view to ask for the ox during a period of stress. What if I
obtain the ox and the animal dies only a few days afterwards? If
the ox stays with my debtor, he bears the risk. Even if many of
his oxen die, he will still owe me that one ox. The data show
that it is important to differentiate between the insurance of
household survival and livestock. Social capital helps people to
tide over actual food shortages; but it is economic capital, as
stored in relations of mutual indebtedness, that is used for herd
reconstitution.
In order to systematically analyze the correlation between
transactions before drought and exchange during drought, the predrought exchange network was subdivided into partial networks of
patrilineally founded exchange, bridewealth exchange, bridewealth
distribution, kinship (with no exchange of livestock), and stockfriendship. The exchange network during the drought was
subdivided into parts representing food and ritual assistance on
the one hand and gifts for meat feasts on the other. Then the
correlations between pre-drought exchange networks and the
drought exchange networks were tested. The aim was to find out
with what kind of relations actors were most likely to find
support. In the test these networks were handled as discrete
entities and were only lumped together at a later stage. The
analysis - comparing the network structures - was done by the QAP
module of UCINET. a program developed for formal network analysis
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman 1992). The hypotheses to be tested
were as follows (see Table 7.3):
Table 7.3. Correlation between Partial Networks in Relation to a
Drought Support Network.

Hypothesis
(1)
(2)
(3)

M
N

(4)
(5)

0
c
p

(6)

(7)
(8)

W1
WJ

(9)
(10)

W2
W2

Observed r

Average
Random
Correlation Statistical
Significance

R
R
R

.078

R
R

.044
.145

* 145

,000
.000

>

1
R

.114
.114

-.001
001

.008*
.002*

I
R

.031
.031

.002

.312
.284

->

.101
.058

.000
-.00!

.010*
.002*

.001
-.001

,010*

.001

.934
.000*
.000*

^statistical significance high; ^statistical significance very

high
1. Close kinship as precondition for exchange under stress:
Somebody will only gel help from another herder in a crisis if
he has a close patrilineal or affinal relation to the donor.
This hypothesis assumes that close kinship, accompanied by
stock exchange (bridewealth exchange or bridewealth
distribution. Network M), is a necessary precondition for
obtaining support under stress (Network R).
2. Extended kinship accompanied by livestock exchange as
precondition for exchange under stress: Somebody will only get
help in a crisis (Network R) if he has a close kin or
extended-kin relation to the donor, one which has been
strengthened by livestock exchange (Network N).
3. Kinship with and without livestock exchange as precondition
for exchange under stress: Somebody will only get help from
another herder in a crisis (Network R) if he can trace some
sort of kin relation to the donor (Network O). Livestock
exchange in this case does not necessarily accompany the
kinship relation.
4. Kinship without livestock exchange as precondition for
exchange under stress: Somebody will only get help from
another herder in a crisis (Network R) if he can trace some
sort of kin relation to the donor (Network C). The relation
need not be accompanied by lifestock exchange. Kinship alone
is a sufficient precondition for support.
5. Stock-friendship as precondition for exchange under stress:
Somebody will only get help from another herder in a crisis

(Network R) if he has initiated a stock-friendship relation

with the donor (Network P).
6. Prior exchange relation as precondition for exchange under
stress: Somebody will only get help from another herder in a
crisis (Network R) if he has some sort of exchange relation
(kinship, stock-friendship) with a potential donor (Network
Q).
7. and 8. Rich actors only exchange among themselves: Obviously,
the rich are the crucial factor in an economy of affection. As
long as they participate in reciprocal exchange, the system
will work. It is assumed that the rich form an alliance and
exchange livestock only with other rich herders. In the first
hypothesis (7), the rich are assumed to be the donors (giving
only to the rich; Network W1 > Network I);
in the second (8) they are hypothesized to be the recipients
(receiving only from the rich; Network W| Network R).
9. and 10. Actors from rich and medium wealth categories protect
their resources and only exchange with reliable (rich and
medium-wealth) herders: Rich and medium- wealth herders are
interested in protecting their capital and only interact with
people who are themselves rich or medium-wealth livestock
herders. Only the poor are excluded from exchange. In the
first hypothesis (9). households from the two upper- wealth
categories are assumed to be the donors (giving only to the
rich and medium-wealth groups; Network W2 -> Network I); in
the second (10) they are hypothesized to be the recipients in
both cases (receiving only from the rich and medium-wealth
herders; Network W2 Network R), while the poor are
excluded.
The analysis shows that none of the hypotheses is verified by
high-correlation coefficients. However, the figures on the
statistical significance of correlation coefficients vary widely.
Hypothesis 4 can be dismissed outright. Kinship alone (not
accompanied by livestock exchange) is not enough to guarantee
support under stress. Hypotheses 1 and 3 show that as soon as a
kinship relation is enforced by exchange of livestock gifts, the
probability of getting help improves (though networks M and O
still contain kinship relations without exchange of gifts). If
livestock exchange and kinship networks are taken as excluding
any kinship relation without livestock exchange, the results are
especially good. Similar results are obtained for hypotheses 5
and 6. The idea for each hypothesis was that a relation had been
found on the basis of stock exchange undertaken prior to the
search for support in a moment of crisis. Hence, any Fokot herder
in good times would be advised to invest livestock in many sets
of people - but not to invest solely in kin or friends of
whatever kind. Spread your livestock exchange partners and

reenforce existing kinship relations through livestock exchange"

would be the counsel to give. Obviously, there is no single type
of relation an actor can trust in. He can never tell if his
chances to obtain help are better with a patrilineal relative,
with an in-law, with a distant affine, with his mothers brother,
or with a stock-friend. The only thing he may safely assume is
that the probability that one or two of his exchange partners
might help him is quite high.
Wealth does not have a particularly important impact on
exchange during drought. There seems to be a tendency for rich to
interact with rich; however, they do not do so at the expense of
the poor. Here it has to be added that out of the ten households
classified as rich, seven belong to the same generation set.
Hence, a concentration of exchange may as well reflect
comradeship within an age group.
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A MORAL ECONOMY
Pokot pastoralists act in a moral economy. Rarely is somebody
excluded from the benefits of reciprocal exchange. Every actor is
involved in a network of exchange relations guaranteeing mutual
support. A herder has to pay bridewealth and he also receives
bridewealth; he distributes incoming bridewealth to relatives
and friends; and he engages in formal stock-friendships and
presents stock to closely related patrilineal relatives (kapor)
and affines (kapkoyogh).
Although it is a cultural goal in Pokot society to accumulate
large herds of livestock, actors are also eager to uphold
standards of reciprocity - insofar as this mode of exchange is
the only way to create individual security. Looking at the
literature on African pastoralists. we see that pastoral
economies can present many different economic patterns nowadays.
The land of the commons has been totally (Tswana) or partially
(Somali. Maasai, Orma) privatized. Livestock has become a
commodity used to interact with national markets. Absentee herd
ownership is widespread, and rich herders invest in various other
economic sectors (Ensminger 1992; Hogg 1986). At the same time
these systems are known to lead to the decline of reciprocal
exchange. Networks of solidarity are turned into patron-client
relations. Of course, it is impossible to stipulate exactly at
what point an economy of affection turns into a market economy.
However, the studies of Jean Ensminger (1984, 1990, 1992) on the
pastoral Orma and that of Urs Herren (1991) on the Mukogodo
Maasai offer some insights. Obviously, rich herders lose interest
in accumulating social capital within their society as soon as
incentives to invest in other sectors of the economy become
available. When land becomes a commodity, when capital savings
offer an alternative to storing meat on the hoof, or when trade
emerges as a viable alternative to livestock herding, rich

herders will invest surpluses in those sectors. In times of

stress they find their security outside their own society and
outside the livestock sector. According to the New Institutional
Economics, economic change may be attributed to changing
transaction costs, which include resources used to gather
information, negotiate, monitor, and enforce property rights and
contracts. Transaction costs are incurred whenever people try to
measure the quality of wanted goods or services and to monitor
the performance of agents (employees), to find trading partners,
or to enforce contracts. Ensminger (1992) analyzed the reduction
of transaction costs over the last decades and its consequences
on Orma market exchanges. A conversion to Islam brought with it
binding institutional structures with outside traders. The
opportunity to gain credit from shopkeepers further facilitated
exchanges with the national economy. As a further means of
reducing transaction costs, standardization of weights and
measures as well as improved transportation and communication
facilities are mentioned
by Ensminger (1992: 624). Many of these changes have not taken
place in northwestern Kenya. Pokot still have to do most of their
livestock market transactions through local Somali traders or
itinerant Tugcn livestock traders. Relations with both groups are
strained, and the Pokot are able to cite many occasions in which
they were cheated. The Tugen traders, who have more and more
monopolized the livestock trade between pastoral producers and
urban centers over the last two decades, have lowered prices
wherever they could. The weekly livestock market at Nginyang, one
small trading center in Pokot land, somewhat alleviated this
situation. However, the Pokot frequently voice their fears that
Tugen traders agree upon fixed buying prices before going to
market.
At the market there is no opportunity to weigh livestock so that
divergent estimates of the weight of animals may result in
squabbling between trader and producer. Insecurity has been
rampant over the last two years. Especially after a trader was
shot, livestock traders were reluctant to go to Nginyang market
for a while. Transport of livestock is cumbersome, and people may
walk some 50100 km with livestock in order to bring it to the
market. Information on going prices is bad, and a herder usually
only learns about them when he gets to the livestock market. As
long as such high transaction costs hinder market exchange,
insurance of livestock capital via gift exchange through
institutions like bridewealth exchange, bridewealth distribution,
and stock-friendship remains a more cost-effective alternative.
CONCLUSION
Paraphrasing the English proverb dont put all your eggs in one
basket, we might say that the risk-spreading strategy adopted

here might be dubbed dont put all your cows in one corral. The
rational pastoralist tries to involve partners from different
sets of people in his personal network. He tries to incorporate
patrilineal relatives, close and remote affines, and friends.
There is no preferential set for an actor to rely on during times
of stress. Although everybody can hope for substantial help, no
one can be sure about where he will obtain assistance.
Kinship and friendship - the comerpieces of the moral economy
- are continually created and enforced by the material
transactions of self-interested herders. In the absence of any
other means of creating material security, herders find that the
cooperating framework of a moral economy seems to fit their
personal interests best. Rich herders invest livestock in order
to gain social and symbolic capital. These modes of capital can
be accumulated in the same way as economic assets (Bourdieu
1987:349; 1983) and may be drawn on in times of need. As long as
transaction costs for interacting with larger markets remain high
for the
pastoral elite, it may be hypothesized that the institutions of
reciprocal exchange will remain the more cost-effective means of
insurance. Although the moral economy is largely defined by a set
of values - by norms and kinship structure - I have attempted to
show that it is also the product of self-interested and rational
interaction. In this respect the economy of affection is not
fundamentally dissimilar to any other form of economy. In a
stochastic context in which other means of insurance are
nonexistent, the economy of affection is the most useful
framework for coordinating exchange.
Moral economy and self-interest: Kinship, Frienship and
Exchange among the Pokot (noreste de Kenia) Michael Bolling