Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Discussion-Paper 97-01
Stuttgart, February 1997
Contents
1. Introduction
9
11
11
12
13
14
18
20
22
25
27
29
References
32
35
Figure 1:
"Systematic" Research
(Validate/apply models,
Test existing hypotheses,
Cross-sectional, many companies, quantitative data)
Research on the
Globalisation of R&D
and Innovation
"New Paradigm" of
Transnational Innovation
Processes
"Traditional Paradigm"
of International Technology Transfer
Integration Mode
(R&D and Innovation
within Transnational
Corporations)
Cooperation
and Network Mode
(R&D Consortia, Technology Networks, Innovation
Systems)
These deficits in research are repeatedly referred to by various authors. Thus Cheng and
Bolon (1993, 12) in a comprehensive - but still American - oriented - bibliographical
overview, emphasise that research concentrates strongly on economic determinants for
the globalisation of R&D and the driving forces behind geographical centralisation or
decentralisation. More extensive, less US-dominated, empirically relevant surveys on
the management of innovation processes and research issues relating to appropriate
coordination mechanisms within enterprises are only approached in more recent studies
(cf. the literary overview of the internationalisation of R&D by Granstrand, Hkanson,
Sjlander 1993).
Table 1:
Rank
Company
R&D
Intensity
1993 in%
Share of
Foreign
R&D
1993 in %
Degree of
Internationalisation of
R&D
9.2
7.1
6.7
5.7
28
55
2
12
**
***
*
**
Electrical engineering
Computers
Electrical engineering
Consumer electronics
8.0
7.8
6.2
6.2
5.8
10.6
6.7
15.4
5.2
90
3
55
42
6
54
9
60
4
***
*
***
***
**
***
**
***
*
Electrical engineering
Telecommunications
Electrical engineering
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Consumer electronics
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Electrical engineering
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Electrical engineering
14.
15.
Siemens
IBM
Hitachi
Matsushita
Electric
ABB
NEC
Philips
Hoechst
Sony
Ciba-Geigy
Bosch
Roche
Mitsubishi
Electric
BASF
UTC
4.5
5.4
20
5
**
*
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Sandoz
Sharp
Kao
Eisaj
Sulzer
MTU
10.4
7.0
4.6
13.2
3.4
ca. 25
50
6
13
50
27
-
***
*
**
**
**
*
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Advanced engineering/
Aeroengines
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Consumer electronics
Chemical/Cosmetics
Chemical/Pharmaceuticals
Advanced engineering
Advanced engineering/
Aeroengines
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Industry
Examples for a very high R&D-intensity at the corporate level are Roche (15%), Eisaj (13%) and
Ciba-Geigy (11%). Several other firms spend less than 10% of turnover for R&D at the corporate
level, but display very high R&D intensities at the business level. As an example, SulzerMedica
invests more than 10% of ist turnover for R&D, while the average ratio for the Sulzer corporation is
only 3.4%.
of enterprises in this group are not so far advanced regarding their share of R&D
abroad.
Figure 2:
90%
ABB
Foreign
R&D
(% of total R&D)
60%
ROCHE
PHILIPS IBM
CIBA
50%
SANDOZ
EISAJ
HOECHST
30%
30%
SIEMENS
SULZER
BASF
KAO
10%
0%
0%
Source:
MATSUSHITA
BOSCH
SONY
UTC
MELCO HITACHI NEC
3,5%
SHARP
8,5%
R&D Intensity
15%
These internal mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge are at the center of the new research on
information exchange and innovation within transnational corporations. On this aspect see for
instance Bartlett, Ghoshal (1989), Hedlund (1993) and Nonaka, Takeuchi (1995).
10
Recent figures for Germany, as an example, indicate a decline of R&D as percent of GDP from over
2.8 % at the end of the 1980s to less than 2.4% in 1994 (See NIW, DIW, ISI, ZEW 1995).
An R&D intensity equivalent to 10% of turnover, or an annual R&D expenditure which considerably
exceeds the value of annual cash flows, leads sooner or later to severe financial problems. On this
aspect cf. Gerybadze (1997, Chapter 1). For a critical review of the R&D arms race, see von Braun
(1995).
11
Both in public institutions and in private firms, this fiscal consolidation leads initially to
attempts at short-sighted solutions: a stronger application orientation and a
corresponding limiting of fundamental research can be observed in many large
corporations. This has led to a weakening of central research, and has resulted in a
much stronger divisional structure (cf. Arthur D. Little 1991, Gerybadze, MeyerKrahmer, Reger 1997). This applies at least to the majority of large, R&D-performing
enterprises in Western Europe and the USA. Japanese enterprises pursue a strategy
which is somewhat different, but are likewise confronted with strong financial
restrictions.7 In the area of publicly financed R&D in particular, fiscal consolidation has
led to extensive changes in Western Europe, the USA and Japan. In the area of basic
research, at universities and public research institutes, changes in fiscal and policy
priorities have led to short-windedness, and to a deterioration of basic research
capabilities.
The impacts of financial restrictions on the extent, emphasis and financing of research formed part of
our survey (on this aspect, cf. Gerybadze, Meyer-Krahmer, Reger 1997). The change in the
relationship between central research and development in the divisions observed by Arthur D. Little
(1991) has been re-examined in a recent investigation by Roberts (1995a and b), who reaches more
detailed conclusions.
12
forms of joint R&D projects). They spur new, unconventional forms of cooperation
between the public and private sectors (e.g. new forms of vertical, intersectoral joint
projects, and new advisory councils and steering groups). The analysis of globally
distributed product development and innovation forces a re-consideration of the
traditional views of science and technology policy. Multinational firms are no longer
simply optimising production machineries in search for low-cost locations. Rather,
the knowledge-creating company is gaining more and more importance, searching for
options at the leading intelligence centers of the world, and converting these as fast as
possible into successful new businesses (Bartlett, Ghoshal 1989 and 1990, Hamel,
Prahalad 1994, Marquardt, Reynolds 1994). Globally active enterprises are becoming
more mobile and very selective regarding locations. Science and technology policy, on
the other hand, has to create substantial options, and fertile grounds for global learning
and for the enhancement of local knowledge pools.
See, for instance, Cheng and Bolon (1993), Granstrand, Hkanson and Sjlander (1993), De Meyer
(1992, 1993), Westney and Frost (1996).
13
In a first step, they define the basic decision-making unit, for which a coherent
strategy and clear responsibility can be attributed;
in a second step, they define the center(s) of gravity for this unit at a global scale;
this center of gravity is typically the location where critical knowledge and key
resources are located, and where value-added is generated.
Globalisation strategies depend furthermore on the country-of-origin of corporations, on
the industry resp. product group, and on firm specific factors such as corporate culture
and predominant managerial and organisational practices. The firms in our sample can
accordingly be classified into four groups:
R&D driven global players from small European countries. This group includes
enterprises from small but highly developed European countries in which the R&D
basis for research-intensive multinational enterprises is clearly limited from the
outset, so that they participate actively in foreign research pools (for example,
Philips/NL, ABB, Ciba, Roche, Sandoz/CH).
Companies from large European countries with a predominant technology base in
their home country. Many enterprises in Germany, France and the UK, particularly
in the machinery, transportation, and electrical engineering sector still tend to
concentrate a significant part of their research in the country of origin (e.g. Siemens,
Daimler-Benz); chemical and pharmaceutical firms in these large countries are the
only exception, that have attained a high proportion of R&D conducted abroad (e.g.
Hoechst).
In Japan the internationalisation of R&D and innovation has not progressed very far
as yet. Corporations such as Sony, Sharp, Hitachi, NEC and Mitsubishi all still have
values that are clearly below 10% for their proportion of foreign R&D. Kao and
Matsushita have values of only slightly more than 10%. Only Eisaj has a share of
foreign R&D of 50%, but constitutes an exception among the Japanese enterprises.
The US firms that we analysed are too few in number (only two corporations) to be
able to draw significant conclusions. However, they represent two distinct types of
US enterprises. IBM is an example of a corporation which is highly
internationalised, also with regard to R&D. UTC, on the other hand, is representative
of the greater part of American firms, which are strongly centered on their country of
origin.
Empirical research on the internationalisation process of multinational enterprises typically uses FTO
ratios (indicating the share of foreign to total operations). These are only insufficiently recorded for
the internationalisation of R&D, and had thus to be determined in the course of this study on the basis
of data from individual companies.
10 On this aspect, see particularly the overview in Cheng, Bolon (1993) and also Lall (1980), Mansfield,
Teece, Romeo (1979), Ronstadt (1977), Teece (1976) and Kogut, Zander (1993).
15
Figure 3:
Foreign
R&D
(% of total R&D)
40%
Europe
30%
20%
North America
10%
3 Years Ago
Source:
Japan
When deciding to establish or expand R&D units abroad, enterprises are motivated by
the wish to gain access to highly sophisticated resources which cannot be found
anywhere else, and to learn about specific customer requirements, market and
production constellations on the spot. In our survey, the following motives for the ongoing globalisation of R&D and innovation activities were given particularly often:
1. Companies locate R&D in the most dynamic and forward-driving markets. The
motive of acquiring impulses for innovation processes by presence on the spot,
learning in lead markets and adaptation to sophisticated customer requirements.
2. R&D is located close to the point-of-sale, at places where cash-flow is generated,
and where new product concepts can be tested according to a probe and learn
process.
3. The formation of dominant designs and standards plays an increasingly strong role.
Active presence in locations where regulatory conditions, licensing procedures and
standardisation agreements are decided, is a driving force for R&D location; specific
regulatory environments provide impulses for innovations and subsequently bring
16
international competitive advantages for enterprises that have been active in these
regulatory niches from the start.
4. For certain sophisticated products, close linkages between R&D, advanced
manufacturing and an efficient supplier network are decisive. Several companies
highlight the motive of integrating high-quality production and simultaneous
engineering on the spot with local R&D capacities, in order to secure advantages of
cost, performance and flexibility.
5. Finally, research intensive companies in particular fields (e.g. genetic engineering,
integrated circuit design etc.) emphasise the access to unique resources and leading
research results and talents in particular centers of excellence with a high
international reputation.
Qualitative factors and dynamic upstream and downstream-interactions are increasingly
driving R&D location decisions. Thus the motives and aims underlying the
internationalisation of R&D do not relate primarily to exploiting the cost advantages of
globally distributed R&D units, but emphasise more the value-added effects of
transnational learning processes along the whole value-added chain (research,
development, production, integration into supply chains and logistic networks,
marketing/sales and services relationships).
The decisive indicator for the intensity of transnational processes of learning and
innovation is the relative value of knowledge generation activities as a percentage of
value-added within the corporation. Although there are few accurate methods for
measuring or quantifying this parameter, more and more enterprises are conscious of the
strategic value of these intangible assets and activities. Toshiba assigns a 40% share of
corporate value-added to the generation of knowledge, and Asahi Glass a share of 28%.
The globalisation of R&D, product development and innovation is thus relatively far
advanced in those sectors and product segments where there is a high degree of
generation of knowledge and a high degree of country-specific differentiation. Up to
now, the enterprises pursuing globalisation have been mainly in specific segments of
the chemical/pharmaceutical industry (biotechnology and genetic engineering) as well
as the information technology industry (semiconductors, EDP, telecommunications,
consumer electronics). The subsectors of industry, by contrast, which tend to lag behind
in R&D globalisation are those in which production and assembly activities are the
main constituents of value-added and in which research, product and process
development, as well as manufacturing are still relatively easily decomposible. Modular
product architectures and a geographical decomposition of lead-marketing,
manufacturing and R&D are still valid for the automotive industry, for aerospace and
for mechanical engineering. Even in these latter industrial sectors, however, the
increasing importance of knowledge, the influence of information and communication
technologies, and the requirement of simultaneity in research, design and production are
all stepping up the process of globalisation in the 1990s.
17
and
Focusing
on
The globalisation of R&D is not necessarily associated with a universal scattering and
global distribution of innovation activities. Economists pointed out repeatedly that the
pool of technological knowledge is very unevenly distributed (Machlup 1962, Kuznets
1966, Teece 1981). With increasing sophistication of markets and research systems, this
inequality tends to increase. The more specialised the area of competence that an
enterprise wishes to acquire, and the more important its links with complex knowledge
(e.g. research, production competence, user competence) the fewer high performance
centers tend to arise worldwide. Most of the companies distinguish between:
Leading-edge or pre-eminent locations; only one or two centers in the world
classify as such.
Advanced locations (typically the major markets and research systems in the
developed countries).
Less developed locations, i.e. less sophisticated and non-dynamic markets and
research systems.
Business processes, R&D units and competence centers, which require presence in the
leading-edge locations, tend to be concentrated at one pre-eminent center. Other
business processes and functions are increasingly outsourced to the less sophisticated
locations. Large transnational corporations are restructuring their portfolio of activities,
and tend to consolidate their innovation-driven parts of the value-chain at the most
advanced locations. They are incurring high costs for the search, evaluation and
selection of the most sophisticated centers of excellence, for the building-up of
networks and for the coordination of tasks with other groups and locations. There was a
period of uncontrolled jungle growth in the 1980s when - often following acquisitions
- many companies increased the number of globally distributed R&D laboratories. This
has now been succeeded by a phase of R&D consolidation. Thus, in the mid 1990s we
are looking at an on-going process of internationalisation accompanied at the same time
18
strengthen their position (in particular, these include a few, large research universities in
the USA). By contrast, universities and research institutes that do not make use of this
combined catalogue of measures and do not have the required strength of international
presence drop further down the list in the - largely subjective - assessments of
international managers.11
MIT, Stanford) with a view to building up their reputation, many European research centers and
universities, for example, are relatively poorly positioned with regard to the big multinational
corporations. They do not have a sufficient presence abroad, even vis--vis enterprises, in terms of
pro-active marketing, acquisition activities, alumni networks, etc. There is a danger that in the long
term they will not be able to keep up with the movement of global concentration currently taking
place.
20
Netherlands (e.g. Philips) and from Switzerland (e.g. A, Ciba-Geigy, Roche and
Sandoz), but also increasingly in enterprises from the larger industrialised countries,
there is a continuous process of transfer of R&D activities to centers of excellence in
other countries, with the declared aim of concentrating core technologies abroad.
The key question is: where is the center for gravity for the medium to long-term
expansion of a corporations business? If the center of gravity coincides with the
location of headquarters, core technologies may remain concentrated here for a long
time. If the center of gravity is increasingly in another, more dominant and dynamic
location, core technologies will be concentrated at this foreign location, and
headquarters will often become reduced to a legal or financial entity. This tendency is
clearly pronounced for some transnational corporations from Sweden, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands. But similar developments are also occurring at some multinational
corporations from larger countries.
In large international corporations, the strategy of globalisation of R&D and its
concomitant processes of global coordination of innovation activities are also associated
with substantial adaptation measures in organisation and management. The absorptive
capacities of an organisation, which are a prerequisite for its ability to derive lasting
benefits from centers of excellence, depend largely on its ability to maintain a sufficient
concentration of knowledge on the spot, with the local unit receiving sufficient support
from headquarters in terms of resources and decision-making competence. Many R&D
units abroad, however, do not attain the critical mass and are thus not viable in the
long term. In the 1980s the combination of internationalisation and decentralisation led
to a great deal of duplication, sub-critically equipped R&D units and squabbles about
competence. For this reason many enterprises (including Sandoz, Philips and Hoechst,
for example) have gone over to the principle of focusing core activities as far as
possible in one place and assigning them as clearly as possible to specifically
responsible groups at specific locations.
This development results in the establishing, as far as possible, of one leading house
for a specific product group or technology within the corporation. In the meantime,
strong internal power struggles have broken out for world product competencies and
recognition as worldwide centers of competence within the enterprise. Typically, the
divisions of the corporation that are successful in this struggle are those which
have very high research competencies/know how;
if possible, have a very strong product of their own which offers impulses for R&D;
are profit centers generating their own cash flow, and
whose management occupies a very strong position in the hierarchy of the
corporation.
The three latter factors are at least as important, if not more so, than the first point of
research competence. Trying to strengthen the position of a location simply by
increasing its technological competencies is not sufficient, in view of the importance of
21
subsequent value-added steps and the necessity for researchers and managers to
successfully negotiate complex intra-coporate deals resp. arrangements. In the future,
the strong centers within a corporation will be those which have unique technologies,
which control sophisticated production capabilities, and which have close access to lead
markets. Isolated research islands will increasingly go under and their importance
will decline.
Our empirical investigations outlined in sections 2 to 4 of this paper have shown that
R&D and innovation activities are - to a large extent - globally dispersed. Several
companies in our sample indicated that they will perform more R&D abroad in the
future, and that they are willing to be present in the most dynamic, innovationenhancing foreign markets. Increasing global dispersion of activities, however, does not
necessarily lead to greater decentralisation of ownership and control. Corporations want
to benefit from multiple centers of learning on a global scale, but they tend to
concentrate ownership and control of their most critical resources in only one country,
or in a very small number of a few dominant innovation centers. The following
framework may serve as a basis for analysing predominant patterns of globalisation, and
to assess the related coordination and control issues in transnational corporations.
generalisations are useful. If different businesses display different regimes, a detailed analysis at SBU
level is required.
22
Less Dynamic,
Slow Innovation
Regime
Dynamic, Fast
Innovation Regime
Coupling of
Lead-Marketing,
R&D and
Innovation
Science and
Research-based
Innovation
Important Lead
Market in Home
Country
Lead Market
Outside the
Home Country
Dynamic, fast innovation regimes have often been described synonymously with
science-based and technology-push types of innovation. Our study shows that this
connotation is no longer valid. While some dynamic business segments can still be
considered as science-based (e.g. biotechnology), an increasingly large share of
innovations is generated through demand articulation (Kodama 1995), i.e. through an
23
(von Hippel 1988), demand articulation (Kodama 1995), or probe and learn innovation (Lynn et
al. 1996).
24
(1966), and is a major theme in the new literature on the geography of innovation (see Audretsch
and Feldman 1996, and Gersbach and Schmutzler 1996).
25
follow the strategy of locating R&D and innovation activities near the most dynamic
markets and customer groups. Companies from large countries with a highly developed
lead-market and a strong R&D base at home find a suitable climate for innovation and
concentrate most of their activities close to the headquarter. This is the case for the
majority of LCD innovations at corporations like Sharp, Hitachi or Canon. UTC
concentrates most of its aeroengine development within the U.S. A significant share of
R&D and innovation in the fields of automotive supply, mechanical engineering or
energy of German firms is still pursued in Germany. C type innovation primarily
involves the setting-up of 1 or 2 dominant R&D and innovation centers in the home
country, and the effective linkage of R&D and product units. Innovation activities
abroad are just a supplementary activity.
Figure 5:
Patterns
of
B
Small
Home
Country
and/or
Critical
Assets in
Foreign
Locations
Dominant
A
Large
Home
Country
and/or
Large Share
of Critical
Assets in
Home
Country
their
Coupling of Lead-Marketing
and Innovation
This is different for corporations based in small countries, as well as for companies
from large countries with lead market deficiencies. Innovative companies from Europe
that are active in optoelectronics or semiconductors perform a significant part of R&D
26
and innovation activities in the lead countries, i.e. in Japan or the U.S, depending on the
specific business segment. A D type innovation strategy requires to concentrate major
investments and capabilities outside the home country. Very few companies in our
sample have demonstrated a strong track record with D type innovation activities.
Clark 1992). System-focused R&D and its effectiveness have been outlined in Iansiti (1993).
27
dynamics of the business, and that it is capable and willing to mobilize enough critical
resources.
Type B innovations are characterized as science- and research-based innovations with a
lack of critical assets in the (small) home country. Transnational firms need to get
access to critical assets abroad; they often have to organise R&D as a network of
several R&D laboratories at different locations in the world. This requires effective
global team management; team members with different cultural as well as educational
backgrounds have to be socialised and integrated, This can partly be attained through an
effective corporate R&D and technology strategy. In addition, corporations with strong
performance in type B innovations often display coherent corporate cultures, and they
often emphasize corporate visions, mental maps, and globally integrated technology
portfolios.
Figure 6:
Large
Home
Country
and/or
Large Share
of Critical
Assets in
Home
Country
Small
Home
Country
and/or
Critical
Assets in
Foreign
Locations
28
Coupling of Lead-Marketing
and Innovation
29
A
Large
Home
Country
and/or
Large Share
of Critical
Assets in
Home
Country
B
Small
Home
Country
and/or
Critical
Assets in
Foreign
Locations
The observed changes and our proposed concepts will also affect innovation policy,
which has overemphasized supply-side R&D capabilities in the past.16 Since R&D
capabilities and science-based innovation tend to be only one, often less important
driver of global innovation, more emphasis has to be placed on downstream-related
processes, effective national lead-markets, and on the enhancement of national systems
of demand articulation (Kodama 1995). Furthermore, national policy has to prevent
simple Me-too strategies, and has to emphasize sustainable national leadership
positions, based on R&D capabilities, dynamic national firms, effective clusters of
business activity, as well as on dynamic lead markets. Figure 7 may serve as a useful
characterization of innovation policy in response to the four different types of
innovation.
Finally, we would like to suggest more theoretical as well as empirical research on the
globalisation process of R&D and innovation. Additional research should address the
following topics:
16 For a more detailed critique see Branscomb (1993), Kodama (1995) and Gerybadze et al. (1997,
Chapter 7).
30
31
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34
Table 1:
28
35
4
8
16
23
26