1 |] icerLe L. RICE, SBN 235189 Cont GnMeD copy mica Facies KORY & RICH, LLP eugene 2 |]9300 Wilshire Bivd., Suite 200 Gountvot os angers Beverly Hill, Calisinia 90212 Telephone: 010) 285-1630 MAY 26 2015 Facsimile: (310) 278-7641 Shea Gane: eave otc ]BERGMAN LAW GROUP 5 lite asec. ope 21600 Oxaaed Stet, Suite 1100 ‘Woodland Fils, CA91367 6 |} Teepe: (818) 999-9100 resin (B18) 999-9184 Attomeys for PLAINTIFFS LEONARD NORMAN COHEN; 8 || LEONARD COHEN INVESTMENTS, LLC 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES -CENTRAL DISTRICT u ‘ASE NO: BC 338322 \TED CASE NO. BC 341120 LBONARD NORMAN COHEN, an individual; 12 || LEONARD COHEN INVESTMENTS, LLC, a ‘Delaware Limited Liability Company, Assigned to the Hon. Robert L. Hess; B ep 24 14qf vy. 15 RICHARD A. PLAINTD®RS’ POINTS AND AUTHORITIES through 50, IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S, 16 {OTION FOR TERMINATING AND. {OTHER SANCTIONS; OPPOSITION TO v7 Defendants, 1OTION FOR DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT 18 » Hearing Date: June 23, 2015 20 Time: 8:30 A.M, ep: 24 a Complaint fled: August 15, 2005 2 23 || TO THE COURT AND DEFENDANT AND MOVING PARTY IN PRO PER: 24 Plaintiffs Leonard Norman Cohen and Leonard Cohen Investments, LLC hereby oppose 25 || Defendant Kelley Lynch's Motion for Terminating and Other Sanctions fled with this Court on 26 || March 17, 2015 (2015 Motion”). ‘The Opposition is based on the attached Points and Authorities, 27 ||the Court file in this matter, and upon such evidence as may be introduced at the hearing 28Mt. ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . wl LYNCH’S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND SHOULD BE, DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY , ‘A. Lynch's Motion Styled as a “Motion for Terminating Sanctions” is Not ‘A Valid Postjudgment Motion and Violates California Rules of Court, vein B. California Code of Civil Procedure §1008 is the Sole Authority Allowing A any Sok Reconsideration of n Orde or Reno a Previously Denied Motion. err : 1 Lynch's 2015 Motion Socks an Order for the Same Relief [Vacating the Default Judgment] as Her 2013 Motion, Therefore, It Should Be Construed sa Renewed Motion Vase Covered byte Stato Remiremens of CCP §1008. 2. CCP §1008 Bars Repetitive Motions Seeking Same Relief, Unless Moving Fay Can Show New ot Diffent Fats, Cheumsanes or nw That Could [Not Have Been Presented Before... 3. Lynts Renewed Maint Vente Does Not Met Sno Reirment of CCP §1008 and Should be Denied. a : 6 2 Lynch's Declaration Dos Not Mette Remuiements of CCP §1008(b). eee : 7 The Additional Declarations Lynch Submits are Not Competent Evidence Because the Declarations are Fither Unsigned or the ‘Signatures Appear to be Fabricated... LYNCH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED FRAUD UPON THE COURT OR ANY MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF OR HIS ‘ATTORNEYS. . see ‘A. Lynch's Own Case Authority Shows That a Court in Equity Will Set Aside a Final Jadgment After the inet Appel Has Exped Only Upon aDemonstnton of Extrinsic Fraud. ..oe.o B, Lynch Has Not Demonstrated Extrinsic Fraud. LYNCH'S REQUEST FOR “CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUOUS JUDGMENT” IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND HAS NO STATUTORY OR JURISDICTIONAL BASIS. . . 2 Plaintifs Oppoiton to Defendant's Motion For Terminating and Otber Sanctions10 n 2 B “4 15 16 "7 18 9 un a 4 2s 6 n A. Lynch Shows No “Clerical Errors” in the Default Jadgment Requiring Comesion; The Deft gent the Heal Judgment Which he ‘Trial Court Intended to Render. .oj.o0n B, The Default Judgment is Clear and Unambignous.. CONCLUSION... Pinte Opposition to Defenden’s Mtion For Terminting and Other Sanctions0 u 2 18 “4 18 16 v 18 » a 2 25 7 28 ‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES California State Cases, Baldvin v. Home Savings of America, 59.Cal. App. 1192 (Cal. CX App. 1997), Belly. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 135 Cal. App. "1138 (Cal. CL App. 1" 2006), Buesa . City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 4® 1537 (Cal. Ct. App. 22009). California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. x. Virga, 181 Cal, App. 4" 30 (Cal. Ci, App. 1" 2010)... [Cedars-Sinai Medical Center ». Superior Court, T8 Cal. 1 (Cal, 1998) cs snrsersne Crow». Drader, 50 Cal, App. 4%765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1" 1996)... Darling, Hall & Rae » Kritt "75 Cal. App. 4 1148 (Cal. Ct App. 2° 1999), Gate». Witt 31 Cal, 24 362 (Cal. 1948), Grea y, Hejmadl, ‘58 Cal. App. 4 674 (Cal. CL App. 1# 1997). Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4” 1494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1" 1995), Hammell», Britton, 19 Cal, 24 72 (Cal. 1941)... Home Insurance Company v. Zurich Insurance Company, ‘96 Cal. App. 417 (Cal, C. App. 3% 2002). in Re Margarita D, ‘T2.Cal. App. 4" 1288 (Cal. Ct. App. 41998). Kerns» CSE Ins. Grovp, 106 Cal. App. 4” 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1" 2003). Page Number(s) 1,12 45,6 12 Phin’ Opporion to Defendant's Motion For Terminating nd Other Sanctions10 n 2 13 “4 1s 16 "7 18 1» 2» au n 23 25 26 a 28 ‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Le Francois v. Goel, 35 Cal 4* 109 (Cal, 2005). |New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 4” 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 22008). Preston v. Wyoming Pacific Oil Co., 197 Cal. App. 24 517 (Cal. Cl. App. 2" 1961)... Rappleyea v. Campbell, 8 Cal. 4.975 (Cal, 1994).. Rochin v. Pat Johnson Meomfacturing Co., (67 Cal. App. 4 1228 (Cal C1. App. 2" 1998)... San Francisco v. Maller, 177 Cal. App. 24 600 (Cal Ct. App. 1* 1960). Smith v. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc, ‘242 Cal. App. 2a 23 (Cal, Ct. App. 2" 1966). [Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Ine. 126 Cal. App. ® 1294 (Cal. Ct. App. 4® 2005)... Taylor v, Varga, 37 Cal. App. 4° 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 1995), United States v. Throckmorton, 98 US. 61 (1878)... Walter H. Leimert Co. . Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 1954). Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal. 24 393 (Cal. 1942) United States Distriet Courts, California [Rendon v, Fresno Police Deparment, 2006 WL 2694678, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 71170 (E-D. Cal, 2006)... Plait’ Oppason to Defendant's Motion For Teniting and Other Sanctions | California State Cases age Number(s) a sol 4,6 10,11 4 uM‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Statutes Page Number(s) California Civil Code §2223., 14 0204. 14 California Code of Civil Procedure 4 cecentee af 14 13 1008... events 2,3,4,5,6,7,13 §1008()... .2,4,5,6,7 §1008(a).... 4 g1008¢). . cectseetemnretinenned California Penal Code gus. st18@), - veo California Roles of Court BATTOG). cose 2 7 3 3.11130). 3.1113). 3.1113(n). 8.11150)... . . 3 Pst Opposition to Defendant's Motion Por Terniting end Other SanctionsMEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In an attempt 10 overcome the statutory time limits imposed for vacating a default [judgment under California Code of Civil Procedure §473, Lynch first sought equitable relief from the May 15, 2006 Default Judgment in August 2013 on the grounds of extinsi ftaud with regard to an allegedly false proof of service of the summons and complaint (2013 Motion”). At the January 17, 2014 heating on Lynch's 2013 Motion, the Court found that the service of the summons and complaint were proper, that Lynch had not demonstrated extrinsic fraud, and had not shown that she was entitled to relief on any equitable basis. Certified Hearing Transcript, p. 14, lines 7-11 ¢*Transovipt"). The Court also found Lynch's 2013 Motion “not even colorably meritorious,” Id. at p. 18, ines 18-19. Lynch now launches a second motion, in a transparent attempt to avoid statutory strictures prohibiting repetitive motions, once again seeking equitable fticf fiom the Default Judgment, but this time under a different theory of fraud. Lynch now claims fo be entitled to equitable relief from the Default Judgment due to alleged misconduct on the part of Plaintiff and his attorneys, conduct which constitutes, according to Lynch, “fraud upon the Court.” (“2015 Motion”). In what can only be viewed as a desperate, all out, last ditch effort to seek equitable relief ffom the multi-million dollar Defiult Judgment entered against her nine years ago, Lynch now attempts to set aside the Default Judgment by falsely accusing Plaintiff and his attomeys of a wide array of litigation misconduct including: perjury, feandulent misrepresentations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, presenting fraudulent financial data to support the Default Judgment, and suppression and concealment of evidence. [Lynch's requested relief should be denied in its entirety because: () Lynch's 2015 Motion is procedurally defective and violates California Rules of Court and for these reasons alone should Lynch's 2015 Motion styled as one for “terminating sanctions” is an be dened in its entirety; invalid posudgment motion; (i) despite its spurious title, Lynch's 2015 Motion seeks an order for the same relief (an order vacating the Defeult Jadgment) as her 2013 Motion, but does not mect the statutory requirements of Code of Civil Proceduse §1008, which i the sole authority “1 Plait’ Opporon to Defendant’ Motion For Terminating ad Other Senctions8 4 1s 16 ” 18 a n 23 u 26 27 llowing a party to renew a previously denied motion; i) Lynch's declaration fled in support of hor 2015 Mton does ot meet stastory requirements of $1008(t) in that she demonstrate 0 new or diferent facts, circumstances, of law and offers no excuse as 10 why she could not have vanced her altemate legal theories or presented thee fics inher 2013 Motion and therefore she has not demonstrated the requisite diligence; (y) Lynch has not demonstated fraud upon the Court or any misconduct on the part of Plaintif or his attorneys asa basis for granting equitable relief (vt) Lynch's own case authority, desided under California law and procedure, shows that a cout ting in equity will st aside a final judgment after the time to appeal has expired only upon @ showing of extinsic faud; (vi) Lynch has not demonstrated extinsic Saud, only clims of ly intrinsic fraud; (vill) Lynch’s “Request for Clarification of Ambiguous Judgment” is proced defective and has no statutory or jurisdictional basis; (it) Lynch shows no “clerical erors” in the Default Judgment requiring correction; and (x) the Default Judgment is clear and unambiguous. 1, _-LYNCH’S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY A. Lynch's Motion Styled as a “Motion for Terminating Sanctions” is Not a Valid Postjudgment Motion and Violates California Rules of Court The procedural posture of this ease (postudgment)presludes Lynch from fling a motion for teminating sanctions to dismiss Pisiniff" undedying, complaint without having fast successfully vacated the May 15,2006 Default Judgment. Lynch cites no stattory basis by which 10 move for terminating sanctions post judgment. Rather, Lynch argues that “Plains conduct warrants dismissal sanctions under the Court's equitable inberent power.” 2015 Motion, p. 7, lines 23-24. Lynch's ease authority supporting her request fr terminating sanctions ell involve a court's abiliy to impose tenminating sanctions pre-judgment, Lynch's cited eases, most of which were decided under federal law and procedure, which is inapplicable here, illustrate that pre- judgment terminating sanctions can inctude the dismissal ofthe complaint or the entry of default Lindement against the offending party for flute to comply witha court order, fling to comply With discovery requests or other discovery misconduct, 2015 Motion, pp. 7-9 and eases cited therein, While seeking “terminating sanctions” to dismiss Paintite’ underlying complaint, Lynch :2- Plsintif? Opposition t Defendant's Motion For Terminating end Other Sanetions10 n 2 B “4 8 16 uw 18 19 20 a n 23 25 26 an 28 also now seeks to file a Proposed Answer to Plaintiffs" Complaint that she filed to file with her }2013 Motion (See 2015 Motion, Exh. 1; Transcript, p. 3, lines 23-25). Lynch's 2015 Motion is procedurally defective and violates California Rules of Court, and for these reasons alone, merits outright denial without consideration B. California Code of Civil Procedure §1008 is the Sole Authority Allowing a Party to Seek Reconsideration of an Order or to Renew a Previously Denied Motion, ‘After this Court denied Lynch's 2013 Motion to Vacate wit arsiudice, the only avenue available to Lynch to challenge that adverse ruling was to seek reconsideration under California allowing a party to seek Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. Section 1008 isthe sole author reconsideration of an order or to renew a previously denied motion. CCP §1008(¢). Section 1008(¢) provides in relevant part “This section specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to ll applications to seconsider any order ofa judge or court, oF forthe renewal of @ previous motion, whether the order deciding the provious matter or motion is interim or final. No application 10 reconsider any order or for the renewal of @ previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” CCP §1008 (e), emphasis supplied, Subdivisions (c) and (e) of seotion 1008 were added in 1992, effective January 1, 1993. Le Erancois v. Gosl, 35 Cal 4 1094, 1098 (Cal. 2005). Legislative findings state that the 1992 amendment was intended to clarify that no motion to reconsider may be heard unless it is based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and thet the Legislature found it desirable “to reduce "i volition of Ctforia Rules of Court 3.1113(0 Lynch's Memorandum provides no fc or analysts to support ber gel arguments, forcing Pits and the Court oul” ané"tl” support for herp egument fam her voluminous Hing tomlin over 1,100 pags. Lynch's Memorandum also vastly exceeds page liao imposed in Rule. 1113(@ by imperssby incorporating by reference nat ony the 66-age "Case Mistry” Med with her 2013 Maton, but sls her new 109-page deslrton, ta which Lynch tached 0 exibie (See 2015 Natio, Memorandum, p.1 wherein Lynen sates tat te fat in sport of her laa arguments are aderesed ore lyn sh declarations and exits atached hereto and mde a par eeot”). Ip vohton of Rate 3.1113(n), ges Proposed Orders ached to he Mocon ands not wseprae document adged with he Cour eure. in ‘Volaton of Rule 3.1110 equsng tat “notice of meion must sate inthe opening paragraph the ature of the order beng sought and the grounds fr istanoe of bat order” Lynch eck “lrieaton” of the Deft Judgment snd cretion of purprtd “elerieal errs." Memorandum, pp 3-15, er request for he Com’ “laifemion” of, te Deft Judgment snot ited inher Nosce of Motion wd viosios Rule 3.1110(9. fa vilaton of Rae &1115(¢, Lynch ets oan unpublished Court of Appeal opaio ner Memavanda ap. 12 (Lazo v, Laz). <3. Plain" Opposition to Defendant’ Mation For Terminating ad Other Sanctions10 u 2 3 a4 1s 16 ” 18 » 2 4 2s 26 a 28 the mumber of motions to reconsider and renewals of previous motions heard by judges in this state.” Subdivision (@) of Section 1008 provides in pertinent part that “a violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7." CCP §1008(4);, See also; Taylor v. Varga, 37 Cal. App. 4 750, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 2” 1995)sanctions award against lessees for renewed request to vacate a default under “section 1008 and alternatively, section 128.5" was based upon “duplicative requests previously denied, misciting of facts and law, and failure to follow applicable law.”) 1, Lynch's 2015 Motion Seeks an Order for the Same Relief [Vacating the Default Judgment] as Her 2013 Motion, Therefore, It Should be Construed as a Renewed Motion to Vacate Governed by the Statutory Requirements of CCP §1008(b). Lynch's 2015 Motion seeks, in effect, the same relief as her 2013 Motion, equitable relief stom the Default Judgment, albeit under different theories of favd, In her Notice of Motion, Lynch seeks an order “dismissing [sic] the default judgment, snd requesting terminating and other sanctions on the grounds that the default judgment (and the January 17, 2014 denial of Lynch's Motion to Vacate) was procured through fimud on the court (and other egregious misconduct)’ [Notice of Motion, p. 1. Lynch's “[Proposed} Order on Motion For Terminating Sanctions” seeks Jan order: “1) That terminating sanctions are entered against PlaintiTs and this ease, together with the May 15, 2006 default judgment is dismissed [si] with prejudice.” Proposed Order, Vol. IV}. Since “terminating sanctions” are not a form of relief available to Lynch due to the procedural posture of the ease, Lynch, in her new motion, is essentially attempting a “second bite atthe apple” in requesting an order to vacate the default judgment. Taylor v. Varga, 37 Cal. App. 4% at 761 (denying second motion for relief from default brought under Section $85 as an inappropriate motion for reconsideration brought six months after denial of motion for relief from fault under Section 473). ‘The nature of a motion is determined by nature of relief sought, not by the label attached to it, Colifornia Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga, 181 Cal. App. 4" 30, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 2010)°CCPOA”Xsecond motion for attomeys fees was a renewed motion governed by 4. Plait" Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Terminating and Other Sanctions10 un a 13 “ 15 16 1" 18 19 a 4 as ca §51008(b) because it sought the “same order” for identical relief in both motions (attomeys fees), albeit under different statutes; parties may not make “seriatim” motions seeking same relief); San Francisco v, Muller, 177 Cal. App. 24 600, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1" 1960). 2. CCP §1008 Bars Repetitive Motions, Unless the Moving Party Can Show New or Different Facts, Circumstances or Law That Could Not Have Been Presented Before Lynch's 2015 Motion was filed fourteen months after the denial of her 2013 Motion to vacate the default on the basis of extrinsic fiaud. The redundancies between Lynch's 2015 Motion [compared with the 2013 Motion make it clear that she seeks reconsideration of this Court's adverse ruling on the 2013 Motion. Both the 2013 Motion and 2015 Motion seak equitable relief from the Default Judgment; both motions seek the dismissal of the underlying. complaint; both motions argue thet the Court did not obtain fundamental jurisdiction over her due to the alleged failure to effectuate service ofthe summons and complaint; both Motions allege fraud ~ the 2013 /Motion alleged “extrinsic fraud” due to the purported lack of service of the summons and complaint; the 2015 Motion alleges “fraud upon the court” as the basis of equitable relief. In her 2015 Motion, as in her 2013 Motion, Lynch repeatedly reiterates her assertion that [she was not personally served. Lynch “contends that she was not served the Summons & | Complain; continues to maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction over her (including with respect to the denial of Defendant's Motion to Vacate)” (2015 Motion, p. 1, fines 16419.) In her Memorendum Lynch argues “no judgment of a court it due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction inthe court, or without notice to the party.” 2015 Motion, p. 13). In Motion Exhibit HHH, a 4I-page document entitled “Schedules of Periuy”, a [document which purports to list evidence of the alleged statements of Plaintiff and his attorneys ‘which are purportedly false, Lynch, in response to the Declarations of Robert Kory, Michelle Rice, Scott Edelman, and Leonard Cohen submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Lynch's 2013 Motion, repeatedly continues to challenge service. (2015 Motion, Exh. HHHH, $f 4,7, 9,14, 16, 18, 19,21, 32, 72-74), In the same exhibit, Lynch also reiterates her assertion that the Default Fasgment is void due to lack of service and “extrinsic fraud” in paragraphs 19 & 33 -5- Phan’ Oppostion to Defendant's Motion For Termlating and Other Sanctions0 u 2 13 “4 1s 16 ” 18 19 0 a 4 25 7 28 in paragraph 19 oa page 7, Lynch argues “the default judgment is evidence of theft..The judgment of the California Court is void due to the fact that T vas not served the suramons and complaint and the proof of service i evidence ofextvinsi aud.” And again in paragraph 33 on age 19: “The judgment is void and that means that Judge Bubcock's Onder in Colorado is void as well” (2015 Motion, Exh, HHH, pp 7,19, Vo. IV), 3. Lynch's Renewed Motion to Vacate Does Not Meet Statutory Requirements of ‘CCP §1008(b) and Should be Denied Subdivision (b) of section 1008, as amended in 1992, provides, in relevant pat: “A. party ho originally made an application for an order wich was refused...may make a subsequent application forthe same order upon new oF diferent fects, circumstances, or law in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and whet new or diffrent facts, circumstances, or law are claimed 10 be shown.” CCP §1008(o\emphesis added), Case law has included an editional requirement that the party seeking to renew a previously denied motion based upon new or different fects “must provide a satisfactory explanstion forthe failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.” New York Times Co, v, Superior Court, 135 Cal, App. 4 206, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 2% 2005); See also CCBOA, 181 Cal. App. 4 at 46-47, fa 15. ‘The “diligence” requirement for “new facts” has also been applied to motions brought under different case law or legal theories. See, eg. Baldwin Home Savings of America, $9 Cal. Ct. App. 4 1192, 1200 (Cal, Ct. App. 1" 1997); Taylor v, | Varga, 37 Cal. App. 4 at 761; CCPOA, 181 Cal. App. 4 at 48. If the predicate requirements set forth in CCP §1008 subdivision (b) are not amet, the tial court lacks jurisdiction to consider the renewal motion. See, ¢g., Kerns v. OSE Ins. Group, 106 Cal, App. 4" 368, 383-391 (Cal. Ct. App. !* 2003). Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008 gives a court no authority when deciding whether to grant a motion to reconsider to “reevaluate” or reanalyze” fects and authority already presented in the earlier motion. Crotty, Trader, 50 Cal App. 4° 765, 771 (Cal CL App. 1* 1996). A court may grant reconsideration only if presented with “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” Id. Pleiotits" Opposition to Defeadant’s Motion For Terminating and Other SanctionsSection 1008 is designed to conserve the cour’s resources by constraining litigants who [would attempt to bring the seme motion over and over. Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kuit, 75 Cal. App. }4° 1148, 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 1999); See aiso Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4° 1494, 1500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1* 1995); San Francisco v. Muller, 177 Cal. App. 24 at 604, a, Lyneh’s Declaration Does Not Meet the Requirements of CCP §1008(b) Lynch's declaration, while extremely lengthy, fils to meet the stetutory requirements of ‘Section 1008(b). Lynch fails to show “What new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” CCP §1008(b). Lynch’s 2015 Motion is at least in part based upon “facts” resented before in that she incorporates by reference the 66-page “Case History” filed with her 2013 Motion. 2015 Motion, Memorandum, p. 1, lines 23-24, Lynch's new 109-page declaration [contains a section with a heading entitled “Background” beginning at page 11, which purports to relate the history between the parties in roughly chronological order dating back tothe late 1980's. 12015 Motion, Lynch Decl, Exh. 4, Even if some of the “Background” provided in her new declaration contains @ mote exemplified description of her “Case History” fled previously, Lynch also fails to show wity she could not have presented this information in her previous motion, ‘The fuets that Lynch seeks to introduce in her new declaration, consisting of Lynch's own, declared “personal knowledge”, were obviously always within her possession, so they are not new." See Gavcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4% 674, 690 (Cal, Ct. App. 1* 1997)(Finding that Garcia's declaration did not meet §1008 requirements because the information consisting of | Garcia's own declared knowledge was obviously alweys within his possession, and no satisfactory explanation appeared for not bringing it out earlier). Lynch also submits additional declarations fiom her son, Rutger Penick and Paulette /Brandk, her housemate, who both provided declarations in support of Lynch’s 2013 Motion. In ‘addition fo Penick and Brandt, Lynch also submits dectarations from her mother, Joan Lynch, and three other individuals, all long time friends of Lynch (Surkhang, Ronge and Meade). Lynch fails to explain why these addtional individuals were not available to provide declarations when she led her 2013 Motion and she therefore does not meet the requisite diligence requirement Palas" Opposon to Defendant's Mation For Terminating and Other Sanctions0 u 2 B “ 15 6 "7 18 9 20 a n 2B 25 2 28 b, The Additional Declarations Lynch Submits are Not Competent Evidence Because the Declarations are Either Unsigned or the Signatures Appear Fabricated All ofthe additonal declarations submitted in support of Lynch's 2015 Motion purport offer additional “fects” surrounding the alleged lack of service of the summons and complaint. (See Joan Lynch Decl, Exh, 5, “Addendum” at 8, p. 61; Penick Dec, Exh. 6, 92-125 Brandt Decl, Exh. 7, 17, 19; Surkhang Dec, Exh, 8, $78; Ronge Decl, Exh, 9, 446-10; Meade Decl, Exh. 10, 411). Strikingly, however, the signature on Penick’s March 9, 2015 declaration is radically different fom his May 23, 2013 declaration and does not appear to be authentic, (Compare 2013 Motion, Penick Decl. (May 23, 2013) with 2015 Motion, Penick Decl. (March 9, }2015), Exh. 6, p. 5). The signatures that appear on Meade’s and Ronge’s declarations also appear tobe from the same hand and ae similar to Lynch's own handwriting, (Compare signatures on Meade Decl, Exh, 10 at p. 5, Ronge Decl, Exh, 9 at p. 3, with Lynch Decl. Exh. 4 at p. 109) Suekhang’s decleration isnot signed. Instead, she “verbally authorized Kelley Lynch to exeeute this declaration on my bebal:” Srkhang Deck, Exh. 8, p. 2. The 16 page “addendum” to Joan Lynch's declaration i signed by Paulete Brandt, Joan Lynch Deel, Exh. 5, p. 71 Notably, of equal concer, Brandt appears to have materially changed ber testimony with regard to facts surounding service ofthe sunmons and complaint on August 24, 2005, aparently in response to Plaintiffs? Opposition to Lynch's 2013 Moon. In her 2013 decertion, Brandt oclred to be merely “in touch with Kelley dusing the summer and fall of 2005." 2013 Motion, Brandt Dec, (3. incredulously, in a handwriten paragraph (ts authenticity also suspect) below tne signature line, Brandt now decteres that she was not only prsent in Lynch's residence onthe day of service (August 24, 2005, but that she had dyed Lynch's hur a dark (almost black) shade of brown, (2015 Motion, Brandt Dec, Exh 7,19). Brant elso now claims to have been inthe residence on the morning of August 24,2005 and declares that no ne came tothe door. Id I, LYNCH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED FRAUD UPON THE COURT OR ANY MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF OR HIS ATTORNEYS. Lynch contends in her Notice of Motion that the “default judgment (and the January 17, ‘2014 Denial of Lynch’s Motion to Vecate) was procured through fraud on the court (and other -8- Plants" Opposition o Defendant's Mation For Tenniting snd Other Sanctions10 2 1B “4 8 16 7 18 rt a 2 4 2s 26 a [egregious misconduct)” (Notice of Motion, p. 1, lines 20-22). The alleged acts constituting fraud upon the court” include Lynch's belief that Plaintiff and his atomeys have engaged in @ litany of misconduct, including: “excessive and knowing use of perjured statements, fabricated 8.” O15 Motion, Hinancial data, concealed evidence, and fraudulent misrepresent Memorandum, p. 1, lines 4-5). A. Lynch’s Own Case Authority Shows That a Court in Equity Will Set Aside a Final ‘Judgment After the Time to Appeal Has Expired Only Upon a Demonstration of Extrinsic Fraud ‘The California Supreme Court in Westphal v. Westphal set out the rule that a “final judgment of 8 court having jurisdiction over persons and subject matter can be attacked in equity afer the time for appeal or other direct attack has expired only ian alleged fiaudl or mistake is extrinsic rather than intinsi” Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal. 2d 393, 397 (Cal. 1942); In Re MawgaitaD. 72 Cal. App 41288, 1294 (Cal, CL App. 4" 1999). Further, the faud sufficient ustify equitable relief from a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral to the questions examined or determined. Hammell v. Briton, 19 Cal, 2d 72, 82 (Cal, 1941). Finely, because of the importance of finality of judgments, when a default judgment has been entered, equitable reli is given only in exceptional circumstances. Rapaleven v. Campbell, § Cal. 4° 975, 981 (Cal, 1994). Ectinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present a claim or defense to the court asa result of being kept in ignorance ar in some other manne, other than irom his or her own conduct, being fraudulently prevented fiom fully partisipating in the proceeding. Home Ins. Co. v, Zwvich Ins. Co., 96 Cal. App. "17, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 3" 2002) Bxtinsic frand is distinguishable from intinsc fraud, “[which) goes to the merits of the prior proceeding and is nota valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice ofthe action and hes had an opportunity to present his case and to protect htself from any mistake or faud of his adversary but has unreasonably neglected to do so.” In Re Maxgevia D, 72 Cal. App. 4" at 1295 (emphasis added), Westphal, 20 Ca. 2d at 397 Lynch cites t0 several Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions decided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(6X3), which provides for relief fom a judgment based upon fend -9- sine’ Opposion to Defeadsee’s Motion For Tarmiating and Other Sanetiont10 2 B “4 15 16 ” 18 19 a ey 6 ” (whether inns or extensic), misrepresentaton, or misconduct by an opposing party. See ERCP. 60(6)0); 2015 Motion, pp. $-7 nd cases lied therein, However, a motion for relict from a judgment made under F.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) must be brought within one year of the entry of the | udament. RCP, 60(91). These ederel cases desided under Re 60() ar napposite because era law and procedure are inapplicable to these sate court proceedings. Lynch's cited case authority decided under California law and procedure, all older decisions, demonstate the prneple that in equity ajudgmen wil beset ssde ater the ime for appeal has expire only upon a showing of extinsi, not itis, fad, 2015 Motion, p. 6. Ia | McGuinness v. Superior Court, a widow was able to set aside a final decree of divorce six months after its entry upon a showing that the decree was obsined by extrinsic Fieud, Ie MoKeverv Superior Cour, the husband was found gully of laches and denied equitable relief ftom the judgment when he sought reli ninetein months ar its entry, eventhough he was able demonstrate both inns and extinsio fraud. Unlke the lack of gence show by the movant in Mokcovs, the wits in Miller v. Millor was able to oct aide a final deoree bed upon the elle affidavit of her husbend, bt ezlly, she movod within 6 months of entry of tht deere. That is clearly not the case in the instant proceeding. Lynch is moving nearly nine years after the entry of the judgment and is guilty of laches like the movant in McKeever. Lych also sites tothe United States Supreme Court eases of U.S. v, Throckmorton abd Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, v, HarifordEmpie.Co, 2015 Motion at p. 6. Thrackmorton, followed by Catitornia decisional authority, cleanly distinguishes between intinsic versus extrinsic fraud, ‘holding that equitable relicf will be granted only on the ground of extrinsic fraud which “practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment...that party has been prevented from [presenting all of his case to the cour.” U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66 (1878). | Throckmorton also established that it is “well settled that the court will not set aside @ judgment because it was founded on a ftaudulent instrument, or perjred evidence, or for any other mater hich was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed.” Id, The only published California Appellate decison to consider Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v, Hartford-Empire Co, in @ non- criminal case, declined to follow i, instead citing to the law pertaining to vacation of judgments ~19- Plitii" Opposition 19 Defendeat's Motion For Tomniating and Other Santons“frst lid dow in United States v. Throckmorton,” Smith v. Great Lakes Airlines, Ine, 242 Cal ‘App. 24 23, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 1966). Throckmorton’s “harsh rule” has been adopted by this state and is followed “by an unbroken line of decisions.” Id. B. Lynch Has Not Demonstrated Extrinsic Fraud Lynch has not demonstrated extrinsic fraud because she has not shown how the alleged acts of misconduct by Plaintiff and his attomeys prevented her from presenting her claim or defense in the original action. In Re Margarita D., 72 Cal. App. 4" 1288, 1294 (Cal. Ct. App. 4* 1999)(Extrinsic fraud is one party's preventing the other from having his day in court), Spom ¥, USA, Ine, 126 Cal. App. 4" 1294, 1300 (Cal. Ct, App. 4* 2005). Having had an opportunity to protect her interest, she cannot attack a judgment once the time has elapsed for appeal or other direct attack on the basis of intrinsic fraud. Westphal, 20 Cal. 24 at 397 ‘The acts that Lynch believes constitute “fraud upon the court” (concealment, falsification, and suppression of evidence, providing fraudulent financial data to support the Default Judgment, Perjury, “fraudulent misrepresentations’ in Plaintiffs” Complaint) all savolve issues that go to the merits of the action and could have been decided in the prior proceeding, and are therefore jintinsic. In Re Margarita D., 72 Cal. App. 4! at 1295, ‘The alleged acts are not “extrinsic or collateral to the questions examined or determined”, but are intertwined with the merits of the underlying case, Hammell, 19 Cal. 2d at 82 Lynch cites California Penal Code §118 as a basis for relief for the alleged perjury of Pleat and is atiomeys in her 2012 criminal tral for violations of Cohen's Permanent Restraining Order and in declarations submitted in support of Plaintifs’ Opposition to her 2013, Motion. 2015 Motion, Notise of Motion, p. 1. There is no private right of ation for perjury under Cal, Penal Code §118. Rendon v. Fresno Police Department, 2006 WL 2694678 #23, 2006 [US. LEXIS 71170 #67 (ED. Cal, 2006). ‘With respect to Lynch's belie that Plains” declarations contained false statements, the California Supreme Court tated the rule in Gale v, Wit that: “ts uniformly held that petjury is invinsic, not extinsic fraud, and therefore does not form a basis for equitable flit from the default judgment” Gale v, Wit, 31 Ca. 24 362, 366 (Cal, 1948) See also Buese v. City of Los wth Paint Opposition o Defenn’s Motion For Tenniatng and Other Sanctions10 2 rey 1“ 1s 16 1” 18 ty a 2B 25 6 an 28 Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 4 1537, 1546 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 2008)allegedperjured declaration intrinsic, not extrinsic fraud); Hammell, 19 Cal. 2d at 82 (false or perured testimony is not extrinsic fraud). Lynch slso fils to show how the alleged perjured statements made by Plaintiff and his attorneys in the April 2012 criminal jury trial against Lynch for violations of Cohen's Permanent Restraining Order operated to prevent her ftom presenting her case or her defense when Plaintiffs" Complaint was originally filed in August 2005, nearly seven years before the 2012 criminal ta. Further, with regard to Lynch’ allegations of falsification or concealment of evidence in Plaintiffs’ forensic accounting analysis submitted to support Plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages: “Its setled inthis state that a judgment will not be set aside because it is based upon Perjured testimony or because material evidence wes concealed or suppressed, that such fraud both as to the court and the party against whom judgment is rendered isnot faud extrinsic to the ecord for which relief may be had.” Preston v. Wyoming Pacifie Oil Co., 197 Cal. App. 2d 517, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 2" 1961); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Supetior Comt, 18 Cal. 4 1, 10 (Cat, 1998). The California Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court stated that the iong recognized rule against vacating judgments onthe ground of false evidenes or intrinsic fraud rested on the important interest of finality of adjudication. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 18 Cal. 4¥at 11, Ifsuch a rule did not exis, there would be “endless litigation.” Id. Lynch also cites the equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a basis for reli from the [Default Judgment. (Notice of Motion; Memorandum, pp. 11-12). Lynch raises unclean hands as an affirmative defense in her Proposed Answer. (2015 Motion; Exh. 1, Proposed Answer, Affirmative Defense No. 10.) A party is not entitled to equitable relief ftom a judgment on rounds that could have bean a defense tothe origina action. Hammell, 19 Cal 2d at 80. IV. _ LYNCH’S REQUEST FOR “CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUOUS JUDGMENT” 1S PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND HAS NO STATUTORY OR JURISDICTIONAL BASIS In a section of Lynch's Memorandum entitled “Clatification of Ambiguous Judgment” and its associated Exhibit 11 entitled “Request for Judicial Clarification of Ambiguities in Default -12- Paint" Oppostion to Defendants Motion For Terminating and Othe Snctons0 n 2 B “4 1s 16 ” 18 19 a 23 4 as 26 n 1” Jujgment Filed May 15, 2006, Lynch argues that court has “inherent power to comet clerical evor in its esonds, whether made by the cout, cletk or counsel, at anytime so as to conform its records tothe truth.” 2015 Motion, p13, Lynch also argues that a clerieal mistake’ may include an ambiguous provision ina judgment which seemingly changes what was actually agreed to and ordered in open court” Id. By arguing that the Default Judgment is ambiguous and needs “clricaon”, Lynch is attempting to cloak a renewed motion to vacts the Default Judgment under the guise ofa “request for clarification.” Id, pp. 13-15. Lynch's “request” s also violative of Section 1008 in that Lynch shows no new facts; she shows no new lew and i impermissibly seeking 10 reitigate issues that have been finally determined and embodied in the Default Judgment ‘A. Lynch Shows No “Clerical Errors” in the Default Judgment Requiring Correction; The Default Judgment is the Identical Judgment Which the Trial Court Intended to Render A judgment isa final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding. |CCP §577. Once a judgment has been entered, the trial court loses its unrestricted power to Jchange that judgment. Rochin v. Pet Johnson Manufeturing Co., 67 Cel. App. 4° 1228, 1237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 1998). ‘The court does retain power to correct clerical errors in « judgment under its inherent power, Id, The court's inherent power to correct clerical errors includes errors made in the entry of the judgment or due to inadvertence of the court, Bell v. Farmers Ins Exchange, 135 Cal, App. 4! 1138, 1144 (Cal. Ct, App. * 2006), However, it may not amend suck a judgment to substantially modify it or materially alter the rights of the parties under its authority to corect clerical error. Rochin, 67 Cal. App. 4" at 1237, Unless the‘challenged portion of the judgment was entered inadvertently, it eannot be challenged post judgment under the guise Jof correction of clerical error. Bell, 135 Cal. App. 4M at 1144, Lynch fails to show any “clerical errors” that resulted from the inadvertence ofthe Court. B. The Default Judgment is Clear and Unambiguous The Attachment to. Judgment, Item 6 (“Attachment”), clearly and unequivocally extinguished all of Lynch's interests in Cohen’s entities. (2015 Motion, Bxh. 11). The equitable remedy of a constructive trust was created and imposed “on the money and property that Lynch “13 Paint" Opposition o Defendant's Motion For Terminating and Other Sanctions" 2 B 1“ 15 16 7 18 » a 2 2s 6 [wrongfully took andlor transferred while acting in her capacity as trustee for the benefit of Plaintiff Leonard Norman Cohen (“Cohen'),” 1d. A constructive trust may be imposed when one has acquired property to which he is unjustly entitle, if it was obtained by actual fraud, mistake or the like, or by constructive fraud through violation of some fiduciary or confidential relationship. | Walter. Leimert Co. v. Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186, 191 (Cal. Ct App. 2" 1954); Cal. Civ, ‘Code §§2223, 2224. A constructive trust isan equitable remedy, which arises by operation of law and no writing i necessary. Walter H, Leimert Co,, 125 Cal. App. 24 at 191 (emphasis added). Lynch's own confusion regarding the operation of the constructive trst remedy granted 10 JCohen through the Default Judgment does not create ambiguity where none exists. Lynch's confusion regarding the constructive trust remedy is apparent in her declaration regarding her assertions with respect to Traditional Holdings, LLC that “there was and remains no trust ‘agreement related to a trust, or any discussion, once Cohen elected to use Traditional Holdings, in trust for Leonard Cohen.” LLC, about potential ‘rst. I didnot hold my shares of this et Jiynch Decl, 465). Lynch's confusion is also apparent in Exhibit 11, wherein she request identification of “what Trust or other document was submitted tothe Court proving that Lynch etd her shares as truste for Cohen's equitable title” with regard to Blue Mist Touring Company, Ine, and Traditional Holdings, LLC and Olé Ideas, LLC, (2015 Motion, Exh 11, $413). ‘The second pangraph of the Attachment declares tht “Lynch is not the eightful owner of any assets in Traditional Holdings, LLC, Blue Mist Touring Company, Ine., ot any other entity related to Coben” (emphasis added) is not ambiguous because it fails to specifically enumerate all lof Cohen's entities, ie., Old Ideas, LLC. (See Lynch Decl. 483 wherein she argues that the Judgment is “silent” with regard to Old Ideas, LLC.) Lynch asserts, despite the clear and unambiguous language of the Attachment, that she continues to hold ownership interests in Cohen's legal entities. (Exh. 11, (41-3; Lynch Decl. $448, 58, 61, 83-84,109). Particularly, Lynch asserts 2 continued 15% “oumership interest” in Blue Mist [Touring Company, Inc. and Old Ideas, LLC and a 99.5% ownership interest in Traditional Holdings, LLC. Id, The Default Judgment extinguished all sights Lynch formerly held in JCohen’s entities, The language of the Attachment is clear: “It is FURTHER ORDERED, -14- Platte’ Opposition to Deendsn’s Notion For Terminating ad Other Sanctions10 n 2 3 “4 15 16 " 18 19 20 a 2 Py 2s 26 an 28 ADIUDGED AND DECREED that Lynch is enjoined ftom...exercising her alleged rights in these legal ents." (emphasis added, Lynch is estopped from asserting any sights to o interest in Traditional Holdings, LLC (CTHLLC). In multi-year (2005-2008) litigation between Cohen, Lynch and his former investment advisors at Agile Group in the District of Color, Hon. Lewis Babeock, constved tie May 15, 2006 Default Judgment in ruling on Cohen's Motion for Summary Judgment end istrbuted the THLLC remaining fonds that had been interplead int the Distvet Counts Registry by the investment advisor to Cohen, (Plintiffs" Opp, To 2013 Motion, Rive Decl, 120, Exb Hp. 3). Lynch never made an appearance in that ease and did not oppose Cohen's Suramar Judgment Motion regarding ownership of the remaining THLLC funds, Id. at 413-21, Lyne also asserts that Cohen owes her for unpaid management commissions “for services rendered and owed for ‘future commissions." Exh. 11, $5; Lynch Decl. {83 (asserting a 15% jcommission “in perpetuity for items created and released during the period she} served as manager”). Again, the language of the Attachment cou aot be clearer with regard to Coten's obligations to Lynch - it unequivocally and unambiguously states that Cohen “has no obligations or responsibilities to her." (emphasis added). lv. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs pray that the Court deny Lynch's requested relief in its entnety with prejudice, DATED: May 29, 2015 Respectfully submitted, i a C MICHELLE L. RICE KORY & RICE, LLP ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS -15- Pini’ Opposition e efendan’s Motion For Tenminstng and ter SanctionsMichell L. Rice, Esa. (SBN 235189) [ Kory & Rice, LLP 2300 Wile Bia, Suite 200 Boveri His, CA 8212 vaumnere 310295690 aa suns sn cODKONHee corn “soon Loonard Norte Cohen; Leonard Cohen Investments LLC [suremion couRr oF cauronwa, counry or tos Angeles fcrsnce fTY Rl Sook GTIMORERDE Los Angeles, CA 90012 Hi Conirl Dict Stanley Mosk Courthouse ‘RANTEFPETTIONER Leonard Noeian CohenLorard Cohen investment lozrenownrmesrenoen: Key Lynch arc ‘PROOF OF SERVIGE—CWML scsoas22 check method of service (only one): J eyeenons sonics} Byttst CZ wy ovemiptoatiy | ace Hon, Robert Hess [i ytmeeagersoriee lovee] oy tiearone serie vers 24 (Ge not use Bis proof of sence show sere ofa Summons and compli) 1. Attar of sro was oer 18 ours of go ené nots party to ths acon. 2. My roses er usnas actos ‘8300 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 200, Bevery Hills, CA 90212 3.1 Tefen aterm nas emi ened econ 8 ome sae ashy er 40 finn May 28, 2015 mat a ng dacumanta aac ZI. the anemone sted nthe Atachmento Proof Senice-Ci(Docunant arog (om POS-04(0). 5, seed th documents on fe parson oF parsons boy tlw ‘2 Name oprso saved: Kelley Lynch ZI (comps sensco was by parsana save, mo, veg doe, ormassnger ones) Busines or sional adeose where person a sre 1754 N. Van Ness Avenue, Hollywood, CA 90028 © (Compl serie wa yf or elector sores) (9) Faxounbaror ecto once exes were parson we sa1ed- (2) Tine faeries: [7 tre nares, atresas ant ter aplateomaton abou pesos snes on the Aachment to Froatah ‘Sriorcht (reson: Sond) farm FORO). 4. The documenta ere serves byte faoweg mean (asa 1. (7) By personal serie. personaly delved te doctmerts oe parson ate aserosaes ted ner, (1) Far IC epoca by a atey. evry was mags otter ea he aloe oes by eevig te doce Fon crete apse dea abcd len the aera bali ores wa rections oan nadia ‘hare of ese, tween ne ous ofienhe moming as een he even. 2} Fara pany every was made {in party arty eave ba cocurent te pa feadence win come poren ol Younger an 18 years ofege botween Be hur ain he meri an an eve "Saeaomer ‘PROOF OF SERVIGE—CWvIL naga AI REA Pai a (Proof of Service)‘senard Neenan Cohen:Leonsrd Cohan tnvasinensv Kaley Lynch s0s08322 {6b LJ6y Unted States mall lercleaa the dooumenta ne rend enalpeorpaiage sdsersd io the perane ae ‘ese nia § (pee orek (0) eepotos to sealed enoe wth th Untod Sats Post Sani, th ba postage fully resi (2) pace te emcee fo clecon and alr, owing ar ay business pracows, | am reac friar {eth he bunest pace cooing nd presen careapondenes fe ing On ssa ay at ‘eroepenono epee tr etocon ad matings poses me ery couse of Duos Wh ie Ud Ste Post Santon a seabe envecpa ay pouane Way bop. | ana eld orenpoesinte coon tee hs zed Th rele plage wa pnt maa (ety an st) © CZ By owmght dee ered domain an evra aca oe an ei every othe prensa th osrasee mtu placate onolos or acre ft clecion Se semi acy stan coer salad opie oe seca 4.) By messanger serves. | sored ne dooms by paca thom nan eneips or prcaze asreszestothe pean toe catosoe eh tom 8 na pontang Wen 9 preteens reounger Senso fa sane. (Ac son by ‘ermossongr mus acoonpany be Pot of Soto eb contained nie Bacar essongr blo) ©. 57 fa ranemiesion: Based on an agreent of he patos o accept sania by fx Hanan, axed documents tethe persone tho lx runber edn fen. No sre was oped yf tx machine ts used. Acay of ie ‘cor lib fa tanemsson hh ped ot aacbad £1 By etn sre, gard ona crt rr saan oth pars screens, aed tan 64 brace, dca Bae msl be ery epal cnt fo emseger mate stsch) DECLARATION OF MESSENGER [1 by persona service personaly otared ne emlopo ox pactagercaved fom tho decranabove the persons athe _dersens edn (1) Fara epretovedby sv any, dey vas rate e somey or ee eorneys the docunata ah envelop or oateg, hich wa dene to ory he mcney bong saree, shes y ag ra receptors an vif ctge of eof, butneen De urs fine nha morn end ve he eerig: For ary very wos moe party oy ea the cocaine atte pay’srosuence wih some prea nt Younger ‘han fb youre of age betwen thous of ght ine mong an ane eer. ‘Alita sn fern, es ore 18 yer of ge, am nota pry the above eferenced legal poco, served ne envelope or package, a see soe one: dele une pansy of party deo laws oth Sse af Calon ha rege Ite and cae. ate Facormaa ‘PROOF OF SERVICE—CWL (Proof of Service)Pos.0ca0) SHORT Fite Leonard Norman Coben, Leonard Cohen Investments v— Po==NEHE L Kelley Lynch, ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF SERVICE—CIVIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED) (his Atoohment ifr sew fem POS. 040) locuiments that were served are as follows (describe each ieeeeterees freNATING AND OTHER SANCTIONS, OPPOSTTION TO MOTION POR DISMISSAL OF IcomPLAmNT INTO DEFENDAI [TERMINATING AND OTHER SANCTIONS [Pearvrirrs!opPOsITION 70 DUTENDANTS MOTION FOR TERMINATING AND OTHE (CTIONS NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL "SRS, ATTACHMENT To PROOF OF SERVICE-CIVIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED) po Led roltatiporiaon (Proof et Service)Pos.oso | Mente. Res, Ea (SBN 296465) tonya ice tL sot tance oh, Sue 200 every Hs, Ga et? ranoeie 02861680 sense unseen ven @keye.con “remeron sonar Nomen Cater Léonard Coan lvesrents LLC [GUPEMOR COURT OF cALIFORNA couNry oF {58 Angsies ther sarane 444 NH Seat amore Los Angeles, CA 90012 ‘moc Coe Set Soney Mosk Cour PLANTERPETTIONER: Leonard Neeman Cohen: Leanetd Cohan Investnanis| loerexouvtmesroNnen Kally Lynch PROOF OF SERVICE —clviL check method of service (only one): eyrowonasenee CZ) Bynian I yovrgnt onary TD oyriavenserseven _E-) oye TJ ey neni arco (Do not use hi prof of sence show sardes of «Summons and compat) 4. Atte tine of once wat over 18 year fag and nota pry fis action. 2 Myrosdanee or busneos estos 9300 Wilshire Blvd., Sulte 200, Boverly Hills, CA 90212 3:[) the tecounbar oc aeconi sen ede om uhich sere be dimen ie Compl if sas was by fcr ‘etn sae) 4 on aay May 28, 2015 ecs38a22 “asst Hon. Robert Hoss ors 28 eae ne town document saci ‘Te docuants re se na acon to Fra of aries-C(Oocuents Sora) frm POS-O4D). 5 sed th documents on th person or persons toby 5 ows: 2. Name ofperen sored: Kelloy Lynch (ZI (empl it erice wae by porns, mal, veil dora, ormessongor sas) ‘sine or sional aden ware peso wes served 1754 N, Van Ness Avenus, Hollywood, CA 90028 © CConplte sonics was by accretions) (1) Facramteror sectors snice arse where personas sted 2) Time oso: [Tre names, aatease, and ote spoebenfonraton aout parsons served onthe Atochmant Frat ef ‘SorvtoCi (Persone Sond em POS 00°). ‘5. The documons were srvod bythe flonng mans (p02) «8 [By parsona servic, | pasonalydvered ns daamars othe partons athe noses te inten 5.) Fora ‘li veseni by at Srna, lier wae mage oe tamey or te tomy’ ace b avin he decent, lan envelope or pacape dost labo ley hay bur served, wih areca or anal ia lai Lagke SS SATS com tn ove cached bor mu Be canada capa can en amen mo each) DECLARATION OF MESSENGER [1 by personal service. | prsonalydefverd fe enon or pacaga recived fom te delat shove oe parsons at ie ‘rccos tn iam 5 (1 For at reresurnd yet sora, every was ae oi atoey othe storeys bic by bag cotumari ah anion or postage hich ws eal leu orth ney tpg een, ta espe ran raul shag eth fee stween te owe frei morn ard fete ening (2) ‘era par calvery was mace foe pat oy levi th cuanto pars resnce NE se an YOUN ‘an iB yoo of apo betnean We hou of aihin herman axe even ‘Ath ine of evi, was ovr 18 years ofp. lam nat pay he above refroncnd eal posting. ervad n erlope or package a8 tte above, on | declare under nay lpr undrth nus fh Si of Cafe thal the froging ite ad ec Date: PROOF OF SERVICE —cWIL (Proof of Service)OS.040(0) [Or Lesnac Nae ake Leck Coin eine pone [ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF SERVICE—CIVIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED) (itis atachnant sous wt fo FOS-40) ‘The documents that were served areas follows (describe each document specifically): TIFFS" POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR |TERMINATING AND OTHER SANCTIONS; OFPOSITION TO MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF TAINTIFFS OPPOSILION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR TERMINATING AND OTHER (CTIONS, [NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL "sgiexs2enu" ATTACHMENT TO PROOF OF SERVICE—CWIL (DOCUMENTS SERVED) estan (Proof of Serve}