Case # 28 Icasiano vs.

Icasiano

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Notes: (from business dictionary)
Definition of duplicate copy
The two classifications are: (1) copies produced for information purposes only and which may be
destroyed after use, and (2) copies that have administrative, fiscal, legal, or historical value.
Definition of duplicate original
A copy that has all the essential aspects of the original, including signatures.
Notes
A duplicate original of a letter may be created and sent by different routes to increase the
likelihood that at least one original copy arrives to the addressee.
FACTS:
1. JosefaVillacorta executed her last will and testament in duplicate on June 2, 1956 and she
died on Sept. 12, 1958. The will was:
* attested by three instrumental witnesses- Justo Torres Jr., Jose Natividad and VinicioDy
* acknowledged by the testatrix and the three instrumental witnesses on the same date
before Atty. Ong, Notary Public
* the will was actually prepared by Atty. Samson who was present during the execution
and signing of the decedents last will and testament.
* pages of the original and duplicate were duly numbered
* the attestation clause contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and
signed by the attesting witnesses
* will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix (Tagalog)
* will was executed in one single occasion in duplicate copies
* both original and duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before the Notary Public on
the same date.
2. The will consisted of five pages and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not
contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose Natividad on page 3 thereof; but
the duplicate copy attached was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in each
and every page.

ISSUE: Does the failure of one of the attesting witnesses to sign on one page of the original
invalidate the will, and hence, denial of the probate?
HELD: NO.
1. The inadvertent failure of one of the witnesses to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify the denial of the probate. The impossibility of substituting this page is cured
since the testatrix and two other witnesses signed the defective page, and that the document bears
the imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by the
testatrix and all three witnesses.
2. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account
of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control, where the purpose
of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existence, and the evidence on record attests to the
full observance of the statutory requisites.
3. Despite the literal tenor of the law, the Court has held that in other cases that;
a. a testament with the only page signed at its foot by the testator and witnesses but not in the
left margin could be probated(Abangan vs. Abangan)
b. despite the requirement of correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the
first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro).
These precedents exemplify the Courts policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith, but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
4. The appellants also argued that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed the probate of the original because of the
lacking signature on page 3, it is easily discerned that the oppositors-appellants run into a
dilemma. If the original is defective and invalid, then in the law, there is no other will but the
duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be
probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous
and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in
the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

Case # 29 - Cruz vs. Villasor

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
Civil Code Provisions:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them. (n)
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court
FACTS:
1. The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of this case hinges, is
whether the supposed Last Will and Testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Cruz) was executed in
accordance with:
Art. 805- which states at at least three credible witnesses must attest and subscribe to the
will and
Art. 806- requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.
2. Of the three instrumental witnesses on the supposed Last Will and Testament of Cruz, one of
them, Atty. Angel Teves (Teves), acted also as the notary public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. The petitioner argues that as a result thereof, the will has
only two witnesses who appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
3. The respondent, Lugay, who is supposed to execute the will, stated that there was substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of three attesting witnesses, even if one of them acted as a
notary public based on American jurisprudence.

ISSUE: Can the notary public be considered as the third attesting witness?
HELD: No. The probate of the Last will and Testament of Cruz is declared not valid and set
aside.
1. The notary public cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the
third witness is the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit as his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split
his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will.
2. The function of a notary public is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That would be defeated if he was also the attesting witness. He would be interested in
sustaining the validity of the will, as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
3. American jurisprudence cannot be used here for we are in Philippine jurisdiction. In the
U.S., the notary public and witnesses referred to in several jurisprudence merely acted as
instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses and not as acknowledging witnesses.
Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also as acknowledging
witness.
4. In allowing the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witness, would have the effect of only two attesting witnesses to the will
which is violative of Art. 805 requiring at least 3 witnesses and Art. 806 which requires
the testator and the required number of witnesses to appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.

Case # 49 Roberts v. Leonidas

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS V. HON. LEONIDAS, MAXINE TATE-GRIMM ET AL, 129

SCRA 33 (1984)
FACTS: Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was
survived by his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children
from a 1st marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce
1. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his 2 nd wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
2. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in March 1978.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel
in January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two wills and a codicil for
probate in April 1978, and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the
lawyers fro Maxine and Ethel
3. In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement provided that
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators)
of Grimms Philippine estate and that Maxines conjugal share in the estate should be
reserved for her which would not be less than $1.5 million plus the homes in Utah and
Sta. Mesa.
4. Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the
opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record. The
estate was partitioned.
5. In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was
already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside,
and that Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of the Ethel, that the compromise agreement was
illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so the partition
was contrary to the decedents wills.
6. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for
lack of merit
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethels motion
to dismiss

HELD: No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

ROBERTS v LEONIDAS
No. L-55509, 27 April 1984
129 SCRA 33

Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will may pass property. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that "it is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered the consolidation of the testate
and intestate proceedings, and for the judge hearing the testate case to continue hearing the
consolidated cases.

In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed and in fact enforced the
compromise agreement between a stepson and his stepmother, despite the fact that the tenor of
the compromise agreement is not consistent with the tenor of the will of the testator. It is important
to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja and the ruling in Roberts. Based on the
dictum of the Supreme Court in these two cases, is it lawful for the heirs to divide the estate in
accordance with a freely negotiated compromise agreement and in the process disregard the
terms of the will? Or will such a compromise agreement result in an "anomalous" situation
deplored by the Supreme Court in Roberts?

Aquino, J.:

Antecedents - Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati

Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm,
and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which
ended in divorce.

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
The second will deposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the
will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm
Morris, or my daughter Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar
Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County,
Utah. uanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California, and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon city were notified of the probate proceedings.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate
the two wills and the codicil. It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 14, 1978
"by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E.
LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts.

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete, as the
first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the
second parties, without knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. x x x.

Intestate Proceeding No. 113024 - At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days
after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughters of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through
lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of
First Instance intestate proceedings no. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named
special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara Law Office, filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency in Utah of a
proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.
x x x.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new
lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg), withdrew the opposition and

motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers
Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in
his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate
and one eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12 1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in
that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio
del Callar as their lawyer, who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The
court considered the motion moot and academic considering that it had already approved the
declaration of heirs and project of partition.

After November 1979, or a period of more than five months, there was no movement or
activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980, Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed
a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer, was notified of that motion.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding no. 134559 - On September 8, 1980,
Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara Law Firm, in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38
of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah),
that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that
the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to
the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his
order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court,
praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.

Ruling - We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed."

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings
sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served
with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No

Costs.

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and de Castro, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr. and Abad
Santos, JJ., no part. Escolin, J., in the result.

Case # 50 Nepomuceno v. CA

NEPOMUCENO V. CA, 139 SCRA 206 (1985)

DOCTRINE: While the general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry
is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practical considerations may
compel the probate court to pass upon matters of intrinsic validity. In
particular, where a testamentary provision is void on its face, a probate
court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v Nuguid, pass upon such
provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity

FACTS: In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and
appointed the petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of
his estate.
It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before
the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire
estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
1. ThepetitionerfiledapetitionfortheprobateoftheWill,
butthelegalwifeandchildrenfiledanopposition.
2. Thelowercourtdeniedtheprobateofthewillontheground
that the testator admitted to cohabiting with Nepomuceno.
Thewillsadmissiontoprobatewasdeemedanidleexercise
sincebasedonthefaceofthewill,theinvalidityofthe
instrinsicprovisionsisevident.
3. Theappellatecourt,however,declaredthewilltobevalid
exceptthatthedeviseinfavourofthepetitionerisnull
and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
butsuchwasdenied.
ISSUES:
1. WONtherespondentcourtactedinexcessofitsjurisdiction
when after declaring the last will and testament of the

testator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the

intrinsicvalidityofthetestamentaryprovisioninfavorof
hereinpetitioner.
2. Isthedispositioninfavorofthepetitionervalid?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: The court acted within its jurisdiction
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
SECOND ISSUE: Validity of the disposition to the petitioner:
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of
adulteryorconcubinageatthetimeofthedonation;
(2)
Those made between persons found guilty of the
samecriminaloffense,inconsiderationthereof;
(3)
Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendantsandascendants,byreasonofhisoffice.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith on
the part of Nepomuceno:
a. Thelastwillandtestamentitselfexpresslyadmitsits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
betweenthetestatorandpetitioner,thedevisee
b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil
statusofthetestator,whichledprivaterespondentsto
present contrary evidence. In short, the parties
themselves duelled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacygiveninthewilltopetitionerbythetestatorat
thestartoftheproceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived
with as a husband, was already married was important . When the court
ruled that Jugo and the petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it
was a finding that the petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended
to be.

The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons
who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot given even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

Case # 51 Pascual v. De La Cruz

PASCUAL V. DELA CRUZ, 28 SCRA 421 (1969)

DOCTRINE: Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are
grounds to disallow a will. These twin grounds were invoked in this case. While
the Court considered only the issue of improper influence and pressure, and
summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally important to consider the effect
of alleging undue influence and pressure simultaneously with fraud.

FACTS: On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any

surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at
San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of
her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres
Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent.
1. PedrodelaCruzand26othernephewsandniecesofthelate
CatalinadelaCruzcontestedthevalidityofthewillonthe
grounds that the formalities required by law were not
compliedwith;thatthetestatrixwasmentallyincapableof
disposing of her properties by will at the time of its
execution;thatthewillwasprocuredbyundueandimproper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through
fraud.

ISSUE: WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and
influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.

HELD: No.

Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased

Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she
considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de
la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him
with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also
her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and
Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the
jurisprudence on this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano,
L-18979, 30 June 1964.

The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish

actual undue influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the
proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of
his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew
it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants,
that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title
in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in
bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that
proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of
the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to
the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to
recourse to the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr.
Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue

influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult
for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative or friend
is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her
will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her,
thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged
person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of
a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
during her lifetime.
Pedro de la cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la
cruzfell short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence.
Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the
extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her
sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.

The probate of the will was allowed.

Case # 56 Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by
the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should
be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir
and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an
act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in
full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads:
"Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition
"cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by

designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of
the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of
the following decision) with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate
children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants

1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries
were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)
which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central
Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceaseds
estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised
of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where
Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting
a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the
intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her
will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses
of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that
my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following,
whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her
seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the
differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who
were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project
of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half
of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes
of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy
and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter,
and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs
cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions
by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will.
Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before

I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to
said deceased."

COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the entire
estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.

CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in
the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion
of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Case # 57 De Roma v. CA
G.R. No. L-46903

July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian
of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
FACTS:
1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.1
2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is

whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims
she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should
be reduced as inofficious.
3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to the free portion of
Candelarias estate. The CA reversed the decision holding that the deed of donation contained no
express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It ordered the collation and the equal
division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated property between Buhay and
Rosalinda.
4. The deed of donation stated:
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga
kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng
mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,
ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking
ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat
magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na
ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.
ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate
HELD: No express prohibition to collate.
1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and equivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than such express

prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the
decedents estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious.
2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from
the collation required under Art. 1061. We surmise that We agree with the respondent court that
there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does
not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language
of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had
been the donor's intention.
4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.

Case # 60 Aznar v. Duncan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN,
ADOLFO AZNAR (EXECUTOR) V. LUCY DUNCAN AND HELEN CHRISTENSEN, 17
SCRA 590 (1966)
DOCTRINE: The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this
case. While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory
heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given
a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory
heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.
One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen of the State
of California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator was
distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account the fact that Article 854 was made
to apply. This point needs clarification.

FACTS: Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the Philippines.
When he died he left a will which alleged that he had only one child (Lucy Duncan), and that he
was giving a devise of P3,600 to Helen Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).

1. In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of the deceased
and that the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally between Helen and Lucy
pursuant to the project of partition submitted by the administrator.
2. Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art 906 NCC which
states that: Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same may be fully satisfied. Moreover,
considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his
relationship with Helen, but left her to a legacy although less than the amount of her
legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC.
Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled to her legitime, and not to a share
equal to that of Lucy
ISSUE: Whether the estate should be divided equally among the two children (Art 854) OR
whether Lucys share should just be reduced to meet the legitime of Helen (Art 906)

HELD: Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition. Manresa defines
preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming him at all, or while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, not assigning to him some part of the properties.

The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left
all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In
the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a
legacy of P3,600.00.

Case # 61 Nuguid v. Nuguid

NUGUID V. NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449 (1966)

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the
testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it
should appear on the face of the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity,
and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the
testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for
practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the
court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in
the questioned will is the institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of
the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification
of the will itself.

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without

descendants, legitime or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.

1. OnMay18,1963,petitionerRemediosNuguidfiledintheCourt
of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguidsome 11 years before her demise.
Petitionerprayedthatsaidwillbeadmittedtoprobateand
that letters of administration with the will annexed be
issuedtoher.
2. On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid,
concededlythelegitimatefatherandmotherofthedeceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of
her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institutionofpetitionerRemediosNuguidasuniversalheirof
thedeceased,oppositorswhoarecompulsoryheirsofthe
deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally
preteritedandthatinconsequencetheinstitutionisvoid.
3. OnAugust,29,1963,beforeahearingwashadonthepetition
for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to
dismissonthegroundofabsolutepreterition.
4. OnSeptember6,1963,petitionerregisteredheroppositionto
themotiontodismiss.
5. Thecourt'sorderofNovember8,1963,heldthat"thewillin
question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacyoftheestateofthedeceasedRosarioNuguid"and
dismissedthepetitionwithoutcost.
ISSUE:WONthewillisacompletenullity.
HELD: Yes.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and

memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby
give, devise and bequeath all of the property which I may have
when I die to my beloved sister RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing
with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my
name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred and
fifty-one.

Sgd. (Illegible)
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which,
in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the

compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x xx

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void

or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Citations
omitted.)

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line - her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz
SalongaNuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. They thus

received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their

legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anularasiempre la
institucion de heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento," referring
to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will
here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir - nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court
says that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says
Manresa:

The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'the devices

and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Legacies and
devices merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a
will.

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the

institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and
void. And, intestate succession ensues.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition

The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article 854
of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering,
however, that the will provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir,
and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Case # 62 Reyes v. Barreto-Datu

REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967)

DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs

in the direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or
born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds that omission
from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be a total omission,
such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line received something from the
testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be considered
preterited

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan.
1. WhenBibianoBarrettodiedonFebruary18,1936,intheCity
ofManila,helefthisshareofthesepropertiesinawill
toSaludBarretto(Salud),motherofplaintiff'swards,and
Lucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as
legaciestohistwosistersRosaBarrettoandFelisaBarretto
and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond
situated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above
mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed
administratrix.Byvirtuethereof,shepreparedaprojectof
partition,whichwassignedbyherinherownbehalfandas
guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of
partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila.Thedistributionoftheestateandthedeliveryof
the shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence,
SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the original certificates of
titleandtheissuanceofnewtitlesinherownname.
2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered
that she executed two will. In the first will, she
institutedSaludandMilagrosasherheirs. Inthesecond
will,sherevokedthesameandleftallherpropertiesin
favourofMilagrosalone. Thelaterwillwasallowedand
thefirstrejected.
3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,
husbandofthedeceasedSalud,asguardianofthechildren,
itwasdeterminedbythelowercourtthatSaludwasnota
child of Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This

rulingwasappealedtotheSupremeCourt,whichaffirmedthe
same.
4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of
Maria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiffnowfallsbackupontheremnantoftheestateof
thedeceasedBibianoBarretto,whichwasgiveninusufructto
his widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, this
actionfortherecoveryofonehalfportion,thereof.
5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estateofBibianotobenullandvoidabinitiobecausethe
Distributee,SaludBarretto,wasnotadaughteroftheSps.
The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of the
CivilCodeof1889whichprovidedthat:
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without
being so, has been been included, shall be null and void.
The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under
the project
of partition.
ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab
initio and that Salud did not acquire title thereto

HELD: NO
1. SaludBarrettoadmittedlyhadbeeninstitutedasanheirin
thelateBibianoBarretto'slastwillandtestamenttogether
with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
themcouldnotbeonesuchhadwithapartywhowasbelieved
tobeanheirwithoutreallybeingone,andwasnotnulland
void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081)
does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs(without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestateones),andthefactthatSaludhappenednottobe
adaughterofthetestatordoesnotprecludeherbeingone
of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
BibianoBarrettowasatlibertytoassignthefreeportionof
his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share ()
assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary
heirofBibianoBarretto.

2. Wherethetestatorallottedinhiswilltohislegitimate
daughterasharelessthanherlegitime,suchcircumstance
would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an
heir,sincetherewasnopreteritionortotalomissionof
theforcedheir.
3. Whereapartitionwasmadebetweentwopersonsinstitutedas
heirsinthewill,andoneofthemwasfoundoutlaternot
tobethetestatorsdaughter,whiletheotherwasreally
his daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was a
voidcompromiseonthecivilstatusofthepersonwhowas
notthetestatorsdaughter.Atthetimeofthepartition,
thecivilstatusofthatpersonwasnotbeingquestioned.
There can be no compromise on a matter that was not an
issue. While the law outlaws a compromise over civil
status, it does not forbid a settlement by the parties
regardingthesharethatshouldcorrespondtotheclaimant
tothehereditaryestate.
4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the
distributionofthehereditaryestate,whichthecourtmay
accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the persons
entitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree of
distributionthatveststitleinthedistributees. Ifthe
decreewaserroneous,itshouldhavebeencorrectedbyan
opportuneappeal;butonceithadbecomefinal,itsbinding
effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless
properlysetasideforlackofjurisdictionorfraud.Where
thecourthasvalidlyissuedadecreeofdistributionand
thesamehasbecomefinal,thevalidityorinvalidityofthe
projectofpartitionbecomesirrelevant.
5. Adistributioninthedecedentswill,madeaccordingtohis
will should be respected. The fact that one of the
distributeeswasaminor(Milagros)atthetimethecourt
issuedthedecreeofdistributiondoesnotimplythatthe
court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. The proceeding for the settlement of a
decedentsestateisaproceedinginrem.Itisbindingon
the distributee who was represented by her mother as
guardian.
6. Whereinapartitionbetweentwoinstitutedheirs,oneof
themdidnotknowthatshewasnotreallythechildofthe
testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other
heirwhowasthetestatorsdaughter. Atanyrate,relief
onthegroundoffraudmustbeobtainedwithin4yearsfrom
itsdiscovery.WhenMilagroswas16yearsoldin1939,when

thefraudwasallegedlyperpetratedandshebecameofagein
1944,andbecameawardofthefraudin1946,heractionin
1956tosetasidethepartitionwasclearlybarred.

Case # 64 Balanay v. Martinez

BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 454 (1975)
DOCTRINE: Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless the
nullity of the will is patent on its face, the probate court should first pass
upon the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its substantive
validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and Nuguid
Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the husband's
right to waive his hereditary right with respect to the estate of the deceased
spouse, and his right to waive his half share in the conjugal estate, pursuant to
the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code, the court was silent on
the validity of the husband's conformity to the distribution of the conjugal
estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the wife. Obviously, the court
assumed the validity of the renunciation of the husband of his share in the
conjugal estate. Such waiver, however, may fall into one of two possible
categories, i.e., inter vivos or mortis causa. If it was a waiver effective inter
vivos, then it would have amounted to a donation to inter vivos to the wife.
That would have been illegal under existing laws. On the other hand, if it was a
waiver mortis causa, then the formalities of a will should have been observed,
failing which, the waiver would be void. Furthermore, the waiver mortis causa
would have required the wife to survive the husband. In either case, the
alleged waiver by the husband of his half share in the conjugal estate resulted
in a transmission of property to the wife. And consequently, a characterization
of such waiver along the parameters mentioned above is necessary and
inescapable. The fundamental question, therefore, that demands an answer is
whether or not a husband or wife could waive his or her share in the conjugal
estate in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a
waiver resulting from a successful petition for separation of property, and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the absolute
community of property) resulting from the issuance of a decree of annulment
or a decree of nullity.

It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be assumed,

properly or improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the provision of
Article 784 which categorically states that the making of a will is strictly a
personal act, and that the exercise of testamentary discretion cannot be
delegated by a person to another. In any case, Balanay leaves many questions
unanswered. Let alone the fact that the decision did not discuss why the
husband was not preterited within the meaning of Article 854.

FACTS: Felix Balanay Jr. Appelaed the order of the CFI, declaring illegal and
void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding notice to creditors
1. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12,
1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children, namely,
Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
2. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition.for the probate of his
mother's notarial will.
3. In paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he
was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be
divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.
She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned
by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the
conjugal assets.
4. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will
on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence,
preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal
estate.
5. Felix Balanay, Jr. attached an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18,
1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and
affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of
Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested
that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced" his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
6. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the
affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower
court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for

hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr.
7. Another lawyer appeared in the case, Atty. David O. Montana, claiming to
be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a motion dated
September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged
will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate
estate proceeding." Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, thorugh
Atty. Jose B. Guyo, manifested their conformity with the motion for the
issuance of a notice to the creditor.
8. The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montana and Atty. Guyo
assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montana and Guyo that the will was void. It
dismissed the petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding.
9. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a
verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the
lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty.
Montana had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of
the will.
ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the
will void.

HELD:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, 1974 that
the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 it gave
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation
of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will
does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where
some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will
be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the
intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner
thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that
illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half
share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar
as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his onehalf share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1050(1), Civil Code), it should be subject
to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion
of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it
does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and
partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and
the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to

his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal
share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the
effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without
prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making
of the will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the
time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention." Under article 930 of the Civil Code, "the legacy of devise of a thing
belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that
the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging
to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his by whatever
title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband
intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph
V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will her half of the conjugal
estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may
be probated. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse.
His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity
to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the
will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided
and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language
of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
Case # 66 Acain v. CA
CONSTANTINO ACAIN V. IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSA
DIONGSON, 155 SCRA 100 (1983)
DOCTRINE: Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse
could be preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved
that an adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while given the same
rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. It
must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not entitled to the right of
representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the

provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an
adopted child finds greater support.

FACTS: In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed with RTC Cebu a petition for the
probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the
decedent Nemesio left a will in which petitioner and his siblings were
instituted as heirs.
1. ThewillwasallegedlyexecutedbyNemesioinFebruary1960
whichwaswritteninBisayaandwasnotopposedbyprivate
respondents
2. Inthewill,Nemesiobequeathedallhispropertiestohis
brotherSegundoontheconditionthatifSegundopredeceases
Nemesio,saidpropertieswillbegiventoSegundoschildren
(hereinpetitioner)
3. SegundopredeceasedbeforeNemesio.Thus,itisthechildren
ofSegundowhoareclaimingtobeheirs,withConstantinoas
petitioner
4. Privaterespondents,Virigina(legallyadopteddaughterof
thedecedent)andRosa(decedentsspouse)filedamotionto
dismissonthefollowinggrounds:
a. The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said
proceedings
b. Petitionerismerelyauniversalheir
c. Thewidowandtheadopteddaughterhavebeenpreterited
5. Saidmotionwasdeniedbythetrialjudge.
6. On appeal, IAC granted private respondents petition and
orderedthetrialcourttodismissthepetitionforprobate
ofthewillofNemesio
7. Petitionerarguesthat:
a. The authority of the probate court is limited only to
inquiringintotheintrinsicvalidityofthewillsought
to be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic
validitytherofbeforeitisadmittedtoprobate
b. The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers to
preteritionofcompulsoryheirsinthedirectlineand
does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsoryheirsinthedirectline.Thus,theiromission
shallnotannultheinstitutionofheirs
ISSUE: WON private respondents have been preterited

HELD: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein,
or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854 NCC may not apply as
she does not ascend or descend from the testator although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing
cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia Fernandez, whose
legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner.
Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were
a legitimate child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this
is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to

intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no
hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o donacion" The only provisions
which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will
for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any
other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of
the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies nor
devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The
effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a

total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.

ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at
this state of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one
of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. The trial court have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved

Case # 67 Edroso v. Sabalan

EDROSO VS. SABLAN (1913)

Marcelina Edroso, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, opponents-appellees
DOCTRINE: A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The
reservor, having inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof,
subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and may
institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case.
It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should
intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly
inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of registration, may in the
proper case extinguish the reserva.
Mariano

Ma. Rita

Victoriano

Marcelina

Pedro

FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro
who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father.
1. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance toh i s m o t h e r. H e n c e t h e h e r e d i t a r y t i t l e w h e r e u p o n i s
b a s e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r registration of her ownership.
2. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or
if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the
registration of each parcel.
3. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a
r e s e r v a b l e property.

HELD:

A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
(gratuitous title), and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which
he had acquired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from another ascendant,
his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them
intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
The person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has
the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and recoverable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or
formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it.
The SC reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the application, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her.

Case # 68 Seines v. Esparcia

CONSTANCIO
SIENES,
ET
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellee

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

Doctrine:
The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2)
the survival of the reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to
the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any
event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate the
reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the timeliness or
untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to herein
from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem
fairly clear that the reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said sale,
she was the registered owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale executed
by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective. Since the reservor was still alive at
the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could not have validly sold the same
parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the parcel of land,
then the sale should properly be construed as a conditional sale - the condition being the survival
of the seller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to
construed this sale of the reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence
the subject matter of the sale would not be the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees
thereto, which is conditional.

Teresa

Sps. Esparcia

FACTS:

Saturnino

Agaton
Fernando
Paulina
Cipriana

Andrea

Francisco

Sps. Sienes

1. Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso (origin). With his first wife, Teresa Reales,
he had 4 children, named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana.
2. With his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco (propositus).
3. Upon Yaesos death, said lot was left to Francisco and title was issued in his name. Because
Francisco was then a minor, his mother administered the property for him and declared it in her
name for taxation purposes.
4. When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, Andrea Gutang
(reservista) as sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of
the Sps. ConstancioSienes and GenovevaSilay (Sps. Sienes).
5. Thereafter, the Sps. Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband, Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of the original certificate of title (which was in their possession). The latter refused.
6. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios), the surviving half-sisters of Francisco as such,
declared the property in their name and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor of the Sps.
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Sps. Esparcia), who in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured title in their name.
7. ConstancioSienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by
Paulina and Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.
8. Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea
Gutang in favor of the Sps. Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was void since
Andrea had no right to dispose of the property.
9. The trial court declared that the sale of Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was void and that the
sale by Paulina and CiprianaYaeso to the Sps. Esparcia was also void. The land in question was
reservable property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve
it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any, survived her.
10. The records show that the lone reserve surviving was CiprianaYaeso.
ISSUE:
WON the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whether the reservoir or the reserve can
alienate the same
HELD: Yes, the lot is reservable property.

1. On Franciscos death, unmarried and without descendants, the property was inherited by his
mother, Andrea Gutang, who was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any, survived her.
2. Being reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutory conditions:
a.

the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and

b.
the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came.
In connection with this, the court has held that the reservista (reservor) has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. Hence, he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservista, the right acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatorios (reserves) at the time of the death of the reservista .
3. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was
still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor
of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive
ownership to Cipriana.
4. On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the
Sps. Esparcia was subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale
was made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition.

Case # 69 Florentino v. Florentino

ENCARNACION
FLORENTINO,
ET
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO G.R. No. L-14856

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

November 15, 1919

Doctrine:
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation
accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if he
himself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the
theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of strangers, then the reserva is
not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property was devised or willed by the
reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable
nature of the property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that the reservable
property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his demise. Third, there is an affirmation
that the title of the reservor to the reservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, by
reason of the reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to the validity of
this proposition in the light of the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is
a mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing
the title of the reservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory
condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an
error in the distribution of the reservable property.
Antonia

Apolonio II
+Jose
Ramon
Miguel
Victorino
Antonio
Rosario

Juan
+Maria
Encarnacion
+Isabel
+Espirita
Emilia
Jesus
Lourdes
Caridad
Dolores

Gabriel
+Pedro
Jose
Asunsion

Magdalena

Severina
Mercedes
Apolonio III

FACTS:
1. ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino II married Antonia Faz, with whom he had 9 children. When his
wife died, Apolonio married Severina, with whom he had 2 children- Mercedes and Apolonio III.
2. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and the ten children, Apolonio III,
being born after Apolonio II died.
3. He was able to execute a will instituting as universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous
Apolonio III and his widow, Severina, and declaring that all of his property should be divided
among all of his children in both marriages.
4. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given 6 parcels of land and some personal
property of Apolonio II.
5. Apolonio III later died and his mother, Severina, succeeded to all these properties. She
subsequently died, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes.
6. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
including the property inherited by Severina from Apolonio III, which is said to be reservable
property. Accordingly, Mercedes had been gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
7. The children of Apolonio II by his first wife, as well as his grandchildren by the first
marriage, instituted an action for recovery of their share of the reservable property. The
defendants contend that no property can be reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a
forced heiress and the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect the legitime.
8. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of
strangers has been avoided.
ISSUE:
WON the property is subject to reserve troncal or not
HELD: Yes, it is subject to reserve troncal
1. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her only daughter and forced heiress,
nevertheless, this property has not lost its reservable nature. The posthumous son, Apolonio III,
acquired the property by lucrative title or by inheritance from his legitimate father.
2. Although such property was inherited by Severina, nevertheless, she was duty bound to
reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree of the
line from which such property came. Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment , use and trust merely for the reason that the law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve the same for certain designated persons, who on the death of said ascendants- reservoir,
acquire the ownership of said property in fact and operation of law in the same manner as forced
heirs.

3. There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III,
to wit:
a.

Apolonio IIs 3 children from his first marriage

b.

The children of Apolonio IIs deceased children, 12 in all

c.

Mercedes, Apolonio IIIs sister.

All of the plaintiffs are relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree (four as halfsiblings and 12 as his nephews and nieces). As the first four are his relatives within the third
degree in their own right and the others by right of representation, all are entitled as reservees.
4. The properties in question came from the common ancestor, Apolonio II, and when, on the
death of Apolonio III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his
legitimate mother, Severina; it became reservable property with the object that the same should
not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of the property.
5. Severina could have disposed in her will all her own property in favor of her only living
daughter, Mercedes, as forced heir. But the provision concerning the reservable property
reducing the rights of the other reserves is null and void inasmuch as said property is not her own
and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the right to deliver the same to the
reserves.
6. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives the same from his descendant, therefore, it does not form part of his
property nor become the legitimeof his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case all
the relatives of his descendant died, in which case, the said reservable property loses such
character.

Case # 70 Padura v. Baldovino

PADURA vs. BALDOVINO
No. L-11960
December 27, 1958
DOCTRINE: The division of the reservable property among the reservees is the subject matter of
the following decision. The court rejected the theory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish
commentators such as Scaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy. The
reason for rejecting the first theory is clearly discussed below.

Gervacia

Agustin
Manuel
Dionisia
Felisa
Flora
Cornelio
Francisco
Juana
Severino

Benita
Fortunato

Candelaria
Cristeta
Melania
Anicia
Pablo

FACTS: The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction)
co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcel of land subject matter of the suit.
ISSUE: In a case of reserve troncal where the only reservatorios (reserves) surviving the
reservista and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?
HELD: The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the New Civil Codes
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the
reserve vindal and the reversion legalof the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservistas lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
thereservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right; and for this
purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the

reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultamar, Arts. 168, 199: Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but
from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject of
the condition that they must survive the reservista (Sanchez Roman, Vol. Tomo 2, p. 286:
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp274, 310). Had the nephews of whole and half blood
succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full- blood would undoubtedly receive a double share
compared to those of half blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.), why then should the latter
receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by interregnum
of the reserve? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is
no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.
It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished
commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Roman (Estudios, Vol. 6, Tomo
2, p.1008) and MuciusScaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, p.342). The reason given by these
authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because they
belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically
pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all reservatarios,
as a class and in equal shares, regardless of line and degrees. In truth, such as the theory of
reserve integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ., p. 332 et seq.). But as we have seen, the Supreme Court
of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property
should be succeeded to by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules
of intestacy.

Case # 71 Chua v. CFI

Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, petitioners,
vs.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V and Susana De La Torre, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre
DOCTRINE: The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the
origin of the reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a
certain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment
obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in nature.
Patricia

Jose
Ignacio
Lorenzo
Manuel

Consolacion
Juanito

FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage
with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.
3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating,
among others, the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of
Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said
adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion
and Juanito.
4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's
time, Consolacion executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor
the pro- indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole
lot was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate
leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.
5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the
first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint

before the respondent CFI of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the
latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question
was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.
6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father,
Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not, in relation to first requisite of reserve troncal
HELD: Yes
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of theperson making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the
property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous.
In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, by operation of law. When Consolacion de la
Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving
the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death
of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous
The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally
by the deceased Jose in his last will and testament but by an order of the court. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased

himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. The order of the court
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. As far as the
deceased Jose is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This being
the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891.

Case # 72 Gonzales vs. CFI

BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)
DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal.
Among other things, it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate of the
reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As such, the reservor
cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will, nor can the reservor choose who
or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable
property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura
v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable
property among the reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in
Florentino and quotes substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to
note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers
from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.
Benito Legarda Tuason
Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz

Filomena Roces
Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito
Alejandro
Jose

Carmen Legarda y Fernandez

Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Filomena Legarda y Lobregat
Jaime Legarda y Lobregat
Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat
Jose Legarda y Lobregat
Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito I), died
and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children. The real properties left by his
deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito IIs sisters and his heirs
pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena vda de Legarda
1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties she inherited
from her daughter as a result of which she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of
the properties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda executed 2
handwritten documents disposing of the properties which she inherited from her daughter
in favor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and
her 6 surviving children partitioned the co-owned property
2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of
her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in the inventory of the properties inherited from
Filomena, the deceased daughter, on the ground that said properties were reservable and
should be inherited by Filomenas 3 sisters and 3 brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren of
Mrs. Legarda, or Filomenas nephews and nieces. She also filed an action securing a
declaration that the properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
3. It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable properties because
only relatives within the third paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda
willed the properties to her grandchildren, who are third degree relatives of Filomena and
who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that should otherwise have remained therein.
ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16 grandchildren (reservees
within the third degree) to the exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)
HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16 grandchildren the
reservable properties she inherited from her daughter because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservoir.
Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
within the third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda. She
could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable properties should be given and deprive
the other reservees of their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of Art
891, this cannot be allowed.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the disposition is
in favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operation of
Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas 6 children as reservees within the second degree from

Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.
The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there were reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of
the properties should be made in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the reservors
holographic will.
Case # 73 De Papa v. Camacho

DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281
DOCTRINE: Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b)
a niece of the prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution of
the reversionary estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate
succession which govern the distribution of the reversionary estate. Please note that brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces rank fourth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the
other hand, the uncles and aunts (collectively referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree) rank fifth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, following the
order of preference, those who rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this
is a reaffirmation of the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.
Marciana
Francisca
Manuel
Nicolas
Toribia

Eustacio
Faustino

Balbino . . . . . Romana

Trinidad
Dalisay

Narvasa, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal,
was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of
Facts and Partial Compromise:"

FACTS:
1.

The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs Francisca Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.

2.

Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3.

Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four(4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."

4.

Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance
of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5.

In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes "C' and "C-1" were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,
the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

6.

In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio
Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B", "B-1",
"C" and "C-1."

7.

In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land above-mentioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant
Primo Tongko.

8.

On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived by his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9.

The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of
all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10.

Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the
said seven parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the law on intestate succession; but the
plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited
by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels ofland, by
virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11.

The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of
whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7)
parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share
therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7)
parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12.

In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice
in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other
than legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem
proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties.

ISSUE:
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower court,
all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
HELD:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of

designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that
of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. x x x
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunts and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece,
the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.
x
x x
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside, and the
complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

Case # 76 Austria v. Reyes

AUSTRIA V. REYES, 31 SCRA 754 (1970)

DOCTRINE: The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall be
disregarded, unless it is proved that the testator would not have made such
institution had he been properly appraised of the truth. Aside from the fact that
the false cause must be stated in the will, the opponents of the will are likewise
mandated to prove by substantial evidence that the testator would not have
made such a disposition had he known the true state of affairs. Therefore,
inferences and conjectures are not sufficient to invalidate a provision which is
challenged as one made on the basis of a false cause.
Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make a
particular testamentary disposition is treated in the same way as a mistake,
which in contract law, vitiates consent.
FACTS: On July 7, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a
petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate
was opposed by the petitioners, Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Austria Mozo and still others who, like petitioner are nephew and nieces
of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate of the will allowed
after due hearing.
1. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, was destined under the will to pass on
to respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto
Cruz, and Luz Cruz Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
2. April 23, 1959 two years after the probate was allowed Basilia died.
Perfecto Cruz was appointed as executor without bond in accordance
with the provisions of the decedents will.
3. November 5, 1959 Petitioner filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest

of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents, Perfecto Cruz, et.al, had
not fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law. The court
then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court
delimited to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of
in the will and disregarded the matter of the genuineness of adoption.
4. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed
before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the
annulment of the lower courts orders restricting their intervention.
ISSUE: WON the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there
exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
HELD: No
Article 850 of the Civil Code provides:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity
of such cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites:
1. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will
2. The cause must be shown to be false
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause
Even if Basilia have used the terms sapilitang mana and sapilitang
tagapagmana there is no indication that had she known that the respondents
were not her adopted disposition of the free portion was largely at Basilias
discretion and she had given a large part to the respondents while giving a
relatively small legacy in favor of the petitioners. The decedents will does not
state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs. The Court cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain
implications.
Article 850 of the Civil Code is positive injunction to ignore whatever false
cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of
the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution of he had
known the cause for it to be false.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy
should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

The legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be

assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack.

Case # 78 Palacios v. Ramirez

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

DOCTRINE: Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a
fideicommissary substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because
both the first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The
beneficial use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at
most, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law requires that the first and second
heirs must be one degree apart from each other. This limitation became the objective of two
divergent views. One view holds that the one degree apart rule refers to one transfer. Ramirez
settled the controversy by holding the more restrictive view.

In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership
of land does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a
ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a compulsory
heir?

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only a widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila
1. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain
2. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en pleno
dominio in satisfaction of her legitimee; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez en nuda propriedad. Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is
charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
3. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the
fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: WON the fideicommissary substitutions are invalid.

HELD: Yes, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void.
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.

The word degree was construed as generation and this interpretation has been followed in the
present Code, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted. The Code this clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and

be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree
from the fiduciary.

There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties of
the subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners.

The Court ordered to distribute the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez as follows:
thereof to his widow as her legitime;
thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.

Case # 77 Crisologo vs. Singson

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO V. MANUEL SINGSON, 4 SCRA 491

(1962)
DOCTRINE: Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissary substitution is the
imposition of an obligation on the part of the first heir to preserve and to transmit the
property to the second heir upon the former's death or upon the happening of a particular
event. The obligation to preserve and transmit must be done in an expressed manner
either by calling the substitution fideicommissary, or by imposing upon the first heir the
absolute obligation to preserve and deliver the inheritance to the second heir. In the
absence of either, the substitution would at best be considered simple or vulgar.
Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, it inferred that if
Consolacion were instituted subject to a fideicommissary substitution, her rights would be
limited to that of a usufructuary. This is error, because the first heir in a fideicommissary
substitution acquires title to the property, subject merely to the resolutory term of the
substitution. Second, while the court ruled that the substitution is simple, it stated in the
penultimate paragraph that the substitution shall take place whether the death of
Consolacion takes place before or after the death of the testatrix. There seems to be
something wrong with the statement. Substitution was premised precisely upon the death
of Consolacion, and for no other cause. Therefore, if Consolacion survives the testatrix, as
in fact she did survive, then the substitution becomes academic. To allow the substitution
even if Consolacion were to survive the testatrix would be to give effect to a
fideicommissary substitution, which the same court overturned. The resulting conclusion
would be in contradiction with the finding that no fideicommissary substitution was
intended by the testatrix.
FACTS: Dona Leona Singson died testate, leaving a property in Ilocos Sur to her brothers
(Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Crisologo) and her niece, petitioner Consolacion Florentino.
1. Petitioners filed an action for partition against respondent Manuel Singson in connection
with a property located in Ilocos Sur. They alleged that the subject property was coowned in share by both parties (Consolacion and Manuel) by virtue of the probated
will of the testator Dona Leona Singson.
2. Singson, on the other hand, contended that Consolacion was a mere usufructuary and not
a co-owner of the property, and hence, was not entitled to demand partition

ISSUE: WON the testamentary disposition in the testators will provided for sustitucion vulgar
(vulgar substitution) or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria (fideicommissary substitution)
HELD: The last will of the decedent established a mere vulgar substitution, the substitution
Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective upon the death of
Consolacion, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause shows that the substitution is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does not contain a clear statement that Consolacion, during her
lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, since naked
ownership was vested to the brothers of the testatrix. The provision in question merely provides
that upon Consolacions death, whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix, her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN VULGAR SUBSTITUTION AND FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION
If the clause in the will created a vulgar substitution, the result would be that Consolacion, upon
the death of the testatrix, becomes the owner of the undivided of the property. But if the clause
provided for a fideicommissary substitution, Consolacion acquires only usufructuary rights over
the pro-indiviso share.
In fideicommissary substitution, the fiduciary does not acquire full ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to
deliver said property to the fideicommissary; it is obvious that the nude ownership is passed to
another person other than the fideicommissary.
To constitute fideicommissary substitution, there must be an obligation imposed on the first heir
(fiduciary heir) to preserve and transmit to another (fideicommissary heir) the whole or part of
the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For
this reason, Art 785 Old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no
effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first
heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.

Case # 83 De Los Santos v. De La Cruz

DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)
DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the
more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is
barred from exercising the right of representation.
FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against Maximino de la Cruz, alleging
that she and several co-heirs, including defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement
over a portion of land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to the defendant in addition
to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake the development of the estate,
all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the 3 lots.
1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the agreement
was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz,
deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement
by mistake.
2. Defendants counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her share in the estate
and that extrajudicial partition agreement being void as to the latter, he is entitled to of
the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent
Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the extrajudicial agreement was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died instestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a nephew
of the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiffs mother died on September
22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de
la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation, much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit
in her own right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Itturalde said:
In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot participate with a
niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant
grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain
beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters.
In the case at bar, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial
partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action did not confer upon her
the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
in representation of her deceased mother.
It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiffappellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such heir,
the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.
The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not
be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on a
void contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.

Case # 85 Diaz v. IAC

DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645 (1987)

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate
collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There was no
showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity. It
must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants other than
the illegitimate children who were excluded from her inheritance.

FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present
controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero

5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD: No
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and

incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person
to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants
may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at
bar, the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the
word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was
used in a more restrictive or limited sense.

Case # 86 & 92 Abellana-Bocayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo

ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)
DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only in
the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only
in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned. When such
nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which their predeceased
or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of
representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees remote from the
decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of representation is that the
nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces
will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent.
It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree relatives,
nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are likewise
relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate succession
which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of succession, whereas other
collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise
of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families
under Article 992.
In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice
Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.
Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles and/or
aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral relatives, namely Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedents father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
by Gaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who predeceased the decedent.
2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent,
exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason that the former are nearer in degree
(2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation,
while the aunt is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives
are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of relationship as the oppositors
(3 degrees removed from the decedent) and that under 975 of the New Civil Code, no
right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do
not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her?
HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from
the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending to the heir
(Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided by Art.
975.
The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009, the absence
of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we
can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under

the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives,
for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.

Case # 87-88 Corpus v. Corpus

TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF TEODORO
YANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)
DOCTRINE: Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is excluded from the
inheritance of an illegitimate relative.

FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were: (a) his half-brother Luis Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife of
Miguel Osorio; (c) children of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and (d) Juanita Corpus; daughter
of his half-brother Jose Corpus
1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (widow of Tomas
Corpus). Before her marriage with Luis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2 of
which were Pablo and Jose.
2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted but this
was opposed.
3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus and the estate of Luis
R. Yangco appealed. A compromise agreement was entered into thereafter
4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging that
he received from the Yangco estate P2,000.
5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to recover the supposed share in
Yangcos intestate estate. He alleged that the dispositions in Yangcos will imposing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Art 785 Old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and as such, the estate should be distributed according to
the rules of intestacy

ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir of Yangco
HELD: No.To determine Juanitas right to inherit, it is necessary to ascertain Yangcos filiation.
Luis Rafaels will states that Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate following the principle of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio, that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful
marriage.
Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate) and Juanita was the legitimate
child of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus, petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of action
for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother in Yangcos estate. Juanita was
not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
Art 992 NCC provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. This rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and
seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:
a. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
b. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandfather
c. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother.

Case # 89 Leonardo v. CA
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CAILLES, 120
SCRA 890 (1983)
DOCTRINE: The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of determining his
qualification to inherit from a deceased person. In Leonardo, the Court found after looking into the
birth certificate of the petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article 992 to
claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother.

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who
predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra died in 1949.
1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint
seeking to:
a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca, entitled to share in the
estate of the deceased jointly with defendant Maria
b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him and Maria
2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and
alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation
3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision
and dismissed the complaint
ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit by representation to Franciscas estate
HELD: No.

To determine petitioners successional rights to the decedents estate, his filiation must first be
ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation; the name of the child described in the birth
certificate presented as evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a certain Alfredo Leonardo who
was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol. Other than his bare
allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that Alfredo Leonardo
mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that he was born outside of
wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were
not yet married; and his alleged fathers first marriage was still subsisting. As such, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca.

Case # 90 Santillon v. Mirandan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON V.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)
DOCTRINE: Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestate shares of a surviving spouse
concurring with one legitimate child. In addition to the arguments clearly stated in the text of the
decision, it may be stressed at this point that commentators who insist on a 3/4 - 1/4 sharing in favor
of the legitimate child adhere to the theory of preference. In short, there the order of intestate
succession listed the legitimate children as having first priority in the intestate estate of the deceased
parent, and the spouse as fourth, then the law must be interpreted as having given a preference to the
legitimate child or children with respect to the hereditary estate, after the legitime of all other
compulsory heirs shall have been paid. Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and
adopted the theory of concurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude each other shall
ratably share the inheritance. Since preference is not inferred from the order of intestate succession,
then the free disposal (after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) must be distributed in a
manner that would result in the least disproportion between or among the respective shares of the
concurring intestate heirs.
Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the free disposal might be mentioned.
Under the theory of equality, the free disposal is divided equally among the concurring intestate
heirs, regardless of the order of intestate succession. Another theory advanced by other
commentators is that the free disposal must be proportionately distributed among the concurring
intestate heirs based on their respective legitime.

FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
During his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land

1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother,
Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which
Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses
Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouses estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to declare shares of heirs and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro
insisted that after deducting Perfectas share from the conjugal property, the remaining
property shall be divided as: for Perfecta and for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another of
the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is
entitled to of Pedros estate and the remaining is given to Claro
ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?
HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.
Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes under
the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot
rely on Art 892 to support his claim to of his fathers share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime
of the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.
In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.
The theory of commentators sharing Claros position are premised on the following arguments:
a. Art 996 speaks of children therefore it does not apply when there is only one child
and as such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and
analogy
b. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only while in testacy,
she would get shares

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such,
children in Art 996 also refers to a child.
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art 834
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two
contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where
the widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for
the second situation, it can be deemed that the legislators intent was to promulgate only
one general rule applicable to both situations.