HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, vs. ATTY.

GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in
order to mislead the courts or his clients on the
status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. This is
because he is always expected to be honest and
forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby
merits the condign sanction of suspension from
the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E.
Samonte brought this administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who
had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v.
Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative
complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts
of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to
wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana
made it appear that he had filed Civil Case No.
CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with
their agreement, although the complaint was
actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed
to: (a) file the reply vis--vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed
the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court
beforehand that Samonte could not be available
on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the
plaintiffs
side
an
unexplained
absence
detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c)
submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only
to eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending
the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for
every cash payments made by Samonte for his
court appearances and his acceptance of the
case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte
attached the following annexes, namely:
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of
the complaint on file in the RTC and of the cover
page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished
him;
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16,
1989, and a photocopy of the order issued on
January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that
"[t]he formal offer of plaintiffs exhibits is rather
very late;"3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which
Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other

legal services required of him as the counsel. In

the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana
noted the motion subject to the reservation that
his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty.
Abellana to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty.
Abellana denied the charge of falsification of
documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the
complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988
instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte
had not given enough money to cover the filing
fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and
that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00,
contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on
paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee
in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the
charge of dereliction of duty was baseless,
because he had filed the reply on December 2,
1988
after
receiving
the
answer
with
counterclaim of the defendants on August 2,
1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply
(Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that
it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the
pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his
nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No.
CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either
stranded in another province, or having attended
the arraignment of another client in another
court, the presiding judge had opted not to await
his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte
for his inability to submit the formal offer of
exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had
failed to give the duplicate originals of the
documentary exhibits despite his request
because of the latters absence from the country.
He countered that it was Samonte who had been
dishonest, because Samonte had given only the
filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention
of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00
being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing
fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by
receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no
receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance
fee conformably with the practice of most
lawyers; and that Samonte had not also
demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samontes
submission of a motion to change counsel,8
stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the
courtesy of informing him beforehand on the
intention of not meeting his obligation to him as
the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to
issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of
Court had told him that his motion to change
counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried
Atty. Abellanas conformity as the counsel; and
that he had duly acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samontes
letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying additional

charges of falsification of documents, dereliction

of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and
the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte
noted in the letter that the reply attached to the
comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic
based on the categorical statement of the Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City
to the effect that no such reply had been filed in
behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp
affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty.
Abellana in Samontes behalf was not also the
official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte
denied being the cause of delay in the submission
of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that
the documentary exhibits concerned had been
shown to the trial court during his testimony, with
the opposing party not even objecting to their
authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty.
Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded
damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12
Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of
P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that
he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellanas
services after discovering the latters inefficiency
and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the
Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties
to appear and present their evidence at 10:00 am
on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties
sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset
several times more for various reasons, namely:
on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP
Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams
were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17
on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being
cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the
hearing being cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to
quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty. Abellana,20
seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint
because of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte.
Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had
always sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested
an early hearing by motion filed on February 9,
2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the
administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.

On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria

Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference,
only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified
position papers within 30 days from notice.

Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory

hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August
2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his
own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the
clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a
verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted
his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005,28 in which he represented that although he
had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as
the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused
any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who
had been unavailable at times because of his
work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had
discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid
paying his obligation to him; and that the
complainant filed this disbarment case after he
lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all
the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the
complainant, except the above-stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in
handling certain aspects of his clients case, like
not filing a reply to the defendants answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters
raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to
make it appear that he had filed the reply; and
being considerably late in submitting the formal
offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by
the trial judge in the order dated January 19,
1990. It observed that although the negligence of
Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his
clients case, his lack of honesty and
trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to
falsehood and deceitful practices were a different
matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to
falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it
appear that the complaint had been filed on June
10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the
complaint had been actually filed only on June 14,
1988; and the second being when he had attempted to
deceive his client about his having filed the reply by
producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking
distinctively different from that of the trial courts; that
he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence
adduced against him; that he had explained that the
reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had
been the complainants failure to pay the agreed fees
on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a
reply, without presenting proof of his having actually
filed such in court.

The
IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana,
observing as follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of
portions of the civil case, said respondent has
shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful
practices as a means to cover-up his delay and
lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client.
Taken together as a whole, the respondents acts
are nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
it
is
respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of
law for resorting to false and/or deceitful
practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and
trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors,
albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty.
Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with
modification,
the
Report
and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise
honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of
the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for
reconsideration
based
on
the
following
grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the
suspension of the undersigned from the practice
of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the
alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating
commissioner is not fully supported with
evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not
corroborated by testimonial evidence so that it is
hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed
most of his previous arguments, and stated that
the "enumerations of failures are belied by the
existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were
attached as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position
Paper of respondent."33 It is noted, however, that
Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellanas position
paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834

(Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to

Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation).
Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were
already part of the records of the case, and that
anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of
Court, did not execute any affidavit or certification
tothe effect that both documents were inexistent. He
reminded that Samonte had only said that both
documents "seemed to be falsified documents" based
on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official
rubber stamp of the court.

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty.

Abellanas motion for reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37
Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty.
Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not
refute the charges against him; and noted thatthe
reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in
the case was not even annexed either to his
position paper and motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a
motion requesting to be allowed to submit
certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the
pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early
resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP
Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts,
every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued
with
integrity,
and
trustworthy.
These
expectations, though high and demanding, are
the professional and ethical burdens of every
member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession, thus:
XX Lawyers Oath XX
By the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer enjoined not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct himself according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be
an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It
is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that

honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are

emphatically reiterated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at
court hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to clients
request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his
dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the
RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright
falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order
to mislead Samonte into believing that he had
already filed the complaint in court on June
10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14,
1988, the date when he had actually done so. His
explanation that Samonte was himself the cause
of the belated filing on account of his inability to
remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed
upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his
falsification was not rendered less dishonest and
less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the
later date. He ought to remember that honesty
and integrity were of far greater value for him as
a member of the Law Profession than his
transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellanas perfidy towards Samonte did not
stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in
explaining his mishandling of the latters civil
case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the
Court no less. To counter Samontes accusation
about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he
knowingly submitted two documents as annexes
of his comment during the investigation by the
IBP, and represented said documents to have
been part of the records of the case in the RTC.
His intention in doing so was to enhance his
defense against the administrative charge. But
the two documents turned out to be forged and
spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed
because the rubber stamp marks the documents
bore were not the official marks of the RTCs, as
borne out by the specimens of the official rubber
stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by
Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of
Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely
claiming that "court personnel were authorized to
accept filing of pleadings even without the usual
rubber stamp."44 In these acts, he manifested his
great disrespect towards both the Court and his
client.
The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the
handling of Samontes case was entirely

warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending

the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal
offer of evidence in behalf of his client way
beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could
not deny because the RTC Judge had himself
expressly noted the belated filing in the order
issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate
that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and
liberality by still admitting the belated offer of
evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in
the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented
against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and selfserving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of
substance. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is
required to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.
Preponderant evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.45 In
order to determine if the evidence of one party is
greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may
consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts
and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number
of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.
The complainants evidence preponderantly
established the administrative sins of Atty.
Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted
superimposing the "0" on "4" but justified himself
by claiming that he had done so only because the
complainant had not given to him the correct
amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty.
Abellana filed a spurious document by making it
appear as one actually filed in court by using a
fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed
because the rubber stamp imprint on his
document was different from that of the official
rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended
himself by stating that court personnel accepted
papers filed in the court without necessarily using
the official rubber stamp of the court. He well
knew, of course, that such statement did not fully
justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not
present any proof of his alleged filings, like
certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in
court. His omission to prove his allegation on the
filings conceded that he did not really file them.

And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the

papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he
was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of
his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned
out to be papers different from those he
represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member
of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana,
being aimed at misleading his client and the
Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect
in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its
eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually
finished presenting his client's case; and that the
latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's
engagement as his counsel only after their
relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus,
we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v.
Doronilla, Jr., 46 the respondent lawyer was
suspended for two months from the practice of
law for representing in court that the complainant
had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth
the complainant had made no such agreement.
The respondent admitted the falsity of his
representation, but gave as an excuse his
intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v.
Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double
jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the
complainant had filed a similar case of slight
physical injuries in another court, but his
invocation was false because no other case had
been actually filed. He was suspended from the
practice of law for six months for making the false
and untruthful statement in court. For Atty.
Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice
of law for six months with warning of a more
severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution
dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors subject to the
MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this
decision, with the stern warning that any
repetition by him of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the
personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies

furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for proper dissemination
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant, vs.

ATTY. ANTONIO
respondent.

G.

DORONILLA,

JR.,

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge

Advocate General's Service is before us on a
charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a
falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil
Case No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for
damages filed by complainant Renato M.
Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several
military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as
counsel. At one point during the February 19,
2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing
in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed
before against the same defendants. We had an
agreement that if we withdraw the case against
him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with
that understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence,
presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a
number of clarificatory questions and thereafter
ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in
writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3
Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no
such pleading or anything else to substantiate his
averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint
against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4
The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
"misleading the court through misrepresentation
of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was
referred to a commissioner6 for investigation.
Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any
agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty.
Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two
hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no

such agreement.8 Later he explained in his

memorandum that his main concern was "to
settle the case amicably among comrades in
arms without going to trial"9 and insisted that
there was no proof of his having violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's
oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false
statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of
falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the
case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to
complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a
falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and
recommending that he be "suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a
period of three months."13 This was adopted and
approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors
on August 30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in
requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to
behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.15 The common caricature that
lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to
speak the truth and to act honestly should not
become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon
10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that
complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits,
Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets
of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed
on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law."17
Atty.
Doronilla's
unethical
conduct
was
compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal
to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had
done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained
the untenable position that he had done nothing
wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-9938778. He persisted in doing so even after having
admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of
an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather
than express remorse for that regrettable
incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an illconceived attempt to evade responsibility,

professing that the falsehood had not been meant

for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a
sort of question" to complainant regarding a
"pending proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla,
remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot
absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an
unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain
facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his
just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from
treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as
an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of
his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the
case amicably among comrades in arms without
going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable
to assume that what he really meant to say was
that he had intended the misrepresentation as a
gambit to get the proposed agreement on the
table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it
would have been no justification for speaking
falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a
lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in
any way, makes it necessary under any
circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that
which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to
employ only such means as are consistent with
truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a
tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the
benefit of the doubt and accept as true his
avowed objective of getting the parties to settle
the case amicably, we must call him to account
for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing
provision means only suspension from the
practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with
the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's
suspension from the government military service.
After all, the only purpose of this administrative
case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a
member of the legal profession, not his liability as
a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it
would be improper for us to order, as a penalty
for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's
oath, his suspension from employment in the
Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course,
suspension from employment as a military legal
officer may well follow as a consequence of his
suspension from the practice of law but that
should not be reason for us to impose it as a
penalty for his professional misconduct. We would
be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding
were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the

IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from

the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's
recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few
circumstances
that
mitigate
his
liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting
enough candor to admit, during the investigation,
the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge
Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And
finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense,
he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout
the conduct of this administrative case tells us
that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not
enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time
away from the practice of law to recognize his
error and to purge himself of the misbegotten
notion that an effort to compromise justifies the
sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his
personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate
General's Service.

SO ORDERED.

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs.

CEASAR
G.
BATUEGAS,
MIGUELITO
NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN
Q. SUSA, respondents.
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed
a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment
against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in
court and violating the lawyer's oath.1
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled "People
of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.",
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents
Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused,
filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging

that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to

a person in authority. As such, he is now under
detention."2 Upon personal verification with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where
accused
Arana
allegedly
surrendered,
complainant learned that he surrendered only on
December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate
of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M.
Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management
Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of
RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion
on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing
irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the
lack of notice of hearing to the private
complainant, violation of the three-day notice
rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of
Detention which was referred to in the Motion as
Annex "1".
Respondents filed their respective comments,
declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued
against their client, they filed the Manifestation
with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they
immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and
brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender.
However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the
NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
certificate of detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued
that there was neither unethical conduct nor
falsehood in the subject pleading as their client
has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at
the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing,
they contend that complainant, as private
prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.
Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City
prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of
hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a
motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule
15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.3
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his
comment that he was no longer in court when his
co-respondents filed the Manifestation with
Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III,
received the said Motion and noticed that it was
set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the
Certificate of Detention was not attached.
However, the presiding judge instructed her to
receive the Motion subject to the presentation of
the Certificate of Detention before the hearing.
Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's
calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized
by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by
respondent Susa in faithful performance of his
ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the
instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.

On December 7, 2001, the Investigating

Commissioner,
Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala,
submitted her report and recommendation as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar
G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino be suspended from the practice of their
profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a
period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The
complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the
other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed
for lack of merit.5
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was
adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and in view of
respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood,
Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6
We agree with the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents
Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate
falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore
upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients."8 He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is
to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them.10 While a lawyer has the solemn
duty to defend his client's rights and is expected
to display the utmost zeal in defense of his
client's cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.12

Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the

duties and responsibilities expected from them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion
for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that
it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by
alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered
to a person in authority and was under detention.
Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to
mislead the court and thereby contribute to
injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue
statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous
conduct
that
we
strongly
condemn. They violated their oath when they
resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the
accused's detention was merely a statement of
an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by
evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they
were able to show that their client was already
under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held
on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them.
The fact remains that the allegation that the
accused was in the custody of the NBI on
December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually
surrendered to the police authorities on the same
date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of
the application for bail. To our mind, such
supervening event is of no bearing and
immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge
from administrative liability considering that he
should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons who,
at that point, were devoid of personality to ask
such specific affirmative relief from the court.13
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or
at
least,
he
must
be
asked
for
his
recommendation.14
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served
with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two
days prior to the scheduled date. Although a
motion may be heard on short notice,
respondents failed to show any good cause to
justify the non-observance of the three-day notice
rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent clerk of court
should not be made administratively liable for
including the Motion in the calendar of the trial
court, considering that it was authorized by the
presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his
administrative functions, although not involving
the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to
the prompt and sound administration of justice.16

Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if

he should find any act or conduct on the part of
lawyers which are contrary to the established
rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate
falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the

personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

"f) June, 1987 to August, 1987 Carbon Branch, Cebu

City
"g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 Lapulapu City
Branch, Cebu
"h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 Carbon Branch, Cebu
City
"i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994 Jakosalem Regional
Branch, Cebu City" (Rollo, p. 47)

ALLIED
BANKING
Petitioner, vs.

CORPORATION,

COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.

GALANIDA, Respondents.

Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in

the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as
second in the order of priority of assistant managers to
be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed
in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent
manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod City
in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental
obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would
result if he is away from his family. He then filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive
dismissal.

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the

Decision2 of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8
August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision3 of
18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24
December 1998 of the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98.
The NLRC modified the Decision dated 23 December
1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante ("Labor
Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding
that Allied Banking Corporation ("Allied Bank") illegally
dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida ("Galanida"). The
NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages,
moral and exemplary damages, and other amounts
totaling P 1,264,933.33.

Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private

respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the
Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private
respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994,
petitioner warned and required of private respondent
as follows:

Antecedent Facts

"In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and

uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance
with the Banks order of priority of rotating its
accountants places of assignments, you are well aware
that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for
more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994,
reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan
de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your
objection on the ground of your length of service is
without merit.

For a background of this case, we quote in part from

the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January
1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to
assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was
covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which
provides as one of the conditions of employment the
provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:

"There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact,

among the officers mentioned, only you have refused
the new assignment citing difficulty of working away
from your family as if the other officers concerned do
not suffer the same predicament. To exempt you from
the officer transfer would result in favoritism in your
favor and discrimination as against the other officers
concerned.

xxx

"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the

bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to
other departments or branches of the bank as the need
arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public."

"As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction

concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod
City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII
of the Banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure
[which] provides:

Private respondent was promoted several times and

was transferred to several branches as follows:

XII Transfer and Reassignment

"a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 Tagbilaran City

Branch
"b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 Lapulapu City Branch
"c) June, 1984 Mandaue City Branch
"d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 Tagbilaran City Branch
"e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 Dumaguete City Branch

Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and

reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as
determined by management. The employee shall be
required to comply with the order of transfer and
reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of
employment.
"In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing
within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no

disciplinary action should be meted against you for

your having refused to follow instructions concerning
the foregoing transfer and reassignment." xxx4
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that "(w)hether the
banks penalty for my refusal be Suspension or
Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and fortify
my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7."5 In the
same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination
and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of
Mr. Olveda is managements discriminatory act of
transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu
in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative
when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to
accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy
favorable connection with management. How can the
bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new
officer who had experienced being assigned outside of
Cebu for more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If
the purpose is for check and balance, is management
implying that Melinda Co can better carry out such
function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned and
experienced accountant or any of the Metro Cebu
accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of
management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx6

After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that

Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative in
ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to
transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor
Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision in Dosch v.
NLRC,9 thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an
employee is recognized as an employers exclusive
right and the prerogative of management (Abbott
Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It
has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs.
NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court,
ruled:
"While it may be true that the right to transfer or
reassign an employee is an employers exclusive right
and the prerogative of management, such right is not
absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or
discharge his employee is limited by the paramount
police power xxx for the relations between capital and
labor are not merely contractual but impressed with
public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall
act oppressively against each other.

On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office

communication7 ("Memo") dated 8 September 1994
from Allied Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr.
Leonso C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied
Bank had terminated his services effective 1
September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal
were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred
from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his
refusal to report for work despite the denial of his
application for additional vacation leave. The salient
portion of the Memo reads:

Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered

insubordination where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the
family."10 (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)

Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning

your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to
Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable reason and
constituted violations of Article XII of the Banks EDPP
xxx

The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas

claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment.
The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately
left out Ms. Cos name from the list of accountants
transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks letter
dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor Olveda,
Allied Banks Vice President for Operations Accounting,
testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to the
Tabunok, Cebu branch within the first half of 1994.

In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the

Bank has terminated your services effective September
1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that
you are entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V
Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP
which provides as follows:
"04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the
Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of
the President or his authorized representative as
officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not
be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his
employment with the Bank or to termination pay."
It is understood that the termination of your service
shall be without prejudice to whatever legal remedies
which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or
will undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)8
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer

was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida
would have to incur additional expenses for board,
lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor
Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any
business urgency that would justify the transfer.

Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back

wages because he was not entirely free from blame.
Since another bank had already employed Galanida,
the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the
Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December 1997
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
ordering
respondent
Allied
Banking
Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total
amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos
(P 324,000.00) representing the following awards:
a) Separation pay for P 272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 P 16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 P 16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - P
20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11

The Ruling of the NLRC

SO ORDERED.12

On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank

terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC
agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and
unjustified, considering the family considerations
mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized the
transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem
branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted
Galanida, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant
accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found
unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not
transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC
also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though she
had worked for the bank for less than two years.

Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the

NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December 1998.13

The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal

for lack of due process. The NLRC stated that Allied
Bank did not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared
that Allied Bank failed to send a termination notice, as
required by law for a valid termination. The Memo
merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of
termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed
Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor
practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right
to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws.
On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its Decision
of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which
states:
In this particular case, We view as impractical,
unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both parties
to order reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For lack
of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter
bonus. Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as
counsels for complainant-appellee are from the City
Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 is hereby
MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay
and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and
exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to
herein
complainant-appellee,
POTENCIANO
L.
GALANIDA, the following amounts:
a)

P 336,000.00,

representing separation pay

b>

P 833,600.00,

representing backwages

c>
P 5,333.23
13th month pay

e>

P 50,000.00

f>
P 20,000.00
damages

refund

of

representing moral damages

representing

===========P 1,264,933.33

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing Dosch v. NLRC,14 the Court of Appeals held that
Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders
did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled
that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller
Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a
demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank
did not afford Galanida procedural due process
because there was no hearing and no notice of
termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank
would issue a notice of termination but there was no
such notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in
its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public
respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8 August
2000.16
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate
courts decision and resolution to the Supreme Court.
Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation or
execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution;
(2) declare Galanidas termination as valid and legal;
(3) set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution; (4) make permanent the restraining order
or preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the
costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.

representing proportional 1994

d>
P 20,000.00
representing
Provident Fund Contribution

Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review

questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC
before the Court of Appeals.

exemplary

TOTAL AWARD

All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The

other respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient
basis that they acted in excess of their corporate
powers.

2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONS OF

COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO
WARRANT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT
RECOVER ANY MONETARY AWARD.17
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida
was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal
to obey the transfer orders constituted willful
disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause
for termination under the Labor Code.

On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to

refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for
Galanida filed with this Court, prepared: by Atty. Loreto
M. Durano, again misquoted the Courts ruling in Dosch
v. NLRC, thus xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer
falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983)
quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such as that of being away from the family."18
The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the
Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and,
worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in
Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that
petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
insubordination which respondent Commission
sustained. The only piece of evidence on which
Northwest bases the charge of contumacious
refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28,
1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
formers
memorandum
dated
August
18,
1975,
appreciated his promotion to Director of
International Sales but at the same time
regretted "that at this time for personal reasons
and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept
the transfer from the Philippines" and thereafter
expressed his preference to remain in his
position, saying: "I would, therefore, prefer to
remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until
such time that my services in that capacity are no
longer required by Northwest Airlines." From this
evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest
hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination
on the part of petitioner.19
The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order
cannot be considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such as
that of being away from the family" does not
appear anywhere in the Dosch decision.
Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase
from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of
Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated ("SCRA").
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial
reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions
is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this
Courts decision. The syllabus is simply the work
of the reporter who gives his understanding of
the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for
the convenience of lawyers in reading the
reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts

decision.20 A counsel should not cite a syllabus in

place of the carefully considered text in the
decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and
Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but
substituted a portion of the decision with a
headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they
even underscored. In short, they deliberately
made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear
as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish
them for what is at the least patent carelessness,
if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties
and the courts taking cognizance of this case.
Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of
the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the
Supreme Court accurately.21
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
particularly when they affirm the findings of the
NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule. These
exceptions are: (1) when the findings are
grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial
and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone
beyond the issues of the case and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the
appellate court is premised on a misapprehension
of facts or when it has failed to consider certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (7) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; and
(8) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence on
record.22 After a scrutiny of the records, we find
that some of these exceptions obtain in the
present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee
ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers
prerogatives.23 The employer exercises the
prerogative to transfer an employee for valid
reasons and according to the requirement of its
business, provided the transfer does not result in
demotion in rank or diminution of the employees
salary, benefits and other privileges.24 In illegal
dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
showing that the transfer is not unnecessary,
inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
employee.25

The constant transfer of bank officers and

personnel with accounting responsibilities from
one branch to another is a standard practice of
Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred
branches throughout the country.26 Allied Bank
does this primarily for internal control. It also
enables bank employees to gain the necessary
experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations
for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,27
requires the rotation of these personnel. The
Manual directs that the "duties of personnel
handling cash, securities and bookkeeping
records should be rotated" and that such rotation
"should be irregular, unannounced and long
enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities
or manipulations."28

19. There is no demotion in position/rank or

diminution of complainants salary, benefits and
other privileges as the transfer/assignment of
branch officers is premised on the role/functions
that they will assume in the management and
operations of the branch, as shown below:

Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of

periodically transferring personnel to different
branches. As the Court of Appeals found,
assignment to the different branches of Allied
Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment.
Galanida consented to this condition when he
signed the Notice of Personnel Action.29

20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer

from one branch, to another branch/office is
lateral in nature and carries with it the same
position/rank,
salary,
benefits
and
other
privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the
officer to assume the functions relative to his job
and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be
replaced.

The evidence on record contradicts the charge

that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida
and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer.
Allied Banks letter of 13 June 199430 showed
that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel
from various branches, including Galanida, were
transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not
single out Galanida. The same letter explained
that Galanida was second in line for assignment
outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for
seven years already. The person first in line,
Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in
Cebu for more than ten years, had already
transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City.
We note that none of the other transferees joined
Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his
allegations of widespread discrimination and
favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June
1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu
was not in any way related to Galanidas transfer.
Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry
Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer
has the prerogative, based on its assessment of
the employees qualifications and competence, to
rotate them in the various areas of its business
operations to ascertain where they will function
with maximum benefit to the company.31
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a
demotion. Galanida did not present evidence
showing that the transfer would diminish his
salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied
Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured Galanida
that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or
grade, and that the transfer would involve the
same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda
explained this further in the affidavit he
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:

(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the

branch is responsible for the proper discharge of
the functions of the accounting section of the
branch,
review
of
documentation/proper
accounting and control of transaction. As such,
the accounting functions in the branch can be
assumed by any of the following officers with the
rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.;
Senior
Asst.
Manager/Acctg.;
Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.

There is also no basis for the finding that Allied

Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in
dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate
only to violations of "the constitutional right of
workers and employees to self-organization"32
and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article
248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to
the present case. There is no evidence that
Galanida took part in forming a union, or even
that a union existed in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could
validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground of
parental obligations, additional expenses, and the
anguish he would suffer if assigned away from his
family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the
case of Homeowners Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. v. NLRC,33 we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer
made by an employer for an illicit or
underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an
employees right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize
an employee for union activities cannot be
upheld is self-evident and cannot be gainsaid.
The difficulty lies in the situation where no such
illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be
ascribed to the employer, the objection to the
transfer being grounded solely upon the personal
inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to
the employee by reason of the transfer. What
then?
This was the very same situation we faced in Phil.
Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that
case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier

at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was

directed to transfer to the companys branch
office at Laoag City. In refusing the transfer, the
employee averred that she had established
Baguio City as her permanent residence and that
such transfer will involve additional expenses on
her part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far
place will be a big sacrifice for her as she will be
kept away from her family which might adversely
affect her efficiency. In ruling for the employer,
the Court upheld the transfer from one city to
another within the country as valid as long as
there is no bad faith on the part of the employer.
We held then:
"Certainly the Court cannot accept the
proposition that when an employee opposes his
employers decision to transfer him to another
work place, there being no bad faith or
underhanded motives on the part of either party,
it is the employees wishes that should be made
to prevail."
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts
ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.34 Dosch, however, is not
applicable to the present case. Helmut Dosch
refused a transfer consequential to a promotion.
We upheld the refusal because no law compels an
employee to accept a promotion, and because
the position Dosch was supposed to be promoted
to did not even exist at that time.35 This left as
the only basis for the charge of insubordination a
letter from Dosch in which the Court found "not
even the slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx
insubordination."36
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an
overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be
likened to a transfer from one city to another
within the country,37 which is the situation in the
present case. The distance from Cebu City to
Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City
does not exceed the distance from Baguio City to
Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which
the Court considered a reasonable distance in
PT&T v. Laplana.38
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order
constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order
of an employer.39 Employees may object to,
negotiate and seek redress against employers for
rules or orders that they regard as unjust or
illegal. However, until and unless these rules or
orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or
disobey them at their peril.40 For Galanidas
continued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer
orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida
for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a)
of the Labor Code.41 Galanida is thus not entitled
to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing

To be effective, a dismissal must comply with

Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus
Rules"), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds of termination,
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied
Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice
required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for his refusal
to comply with the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has
held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard.42 An actual hearing is
not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in
which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City
Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave Galanida
an opportunity to respond to the charges against
him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8
September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the
written notice of termination required by the
Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the
Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks
rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that,
"Notice of termination shall be issued by the
Investigation
Committee
subject
to
the
confirmation of the President or his authorized
representative."43 The appellate court and NLRC
held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of
termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the
heading "Transfer and Reassignment," was not
the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show
that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied
Banks decision to dismiss him. The statement,
"please be informed that the Bank has terminated
your services effective September 1, 1994 and
considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are
entitled [to] as forfeited xxx"44 is plainly worded
and needs no interpretation. The Memo also
discussed the findings of the Investigation
Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas

dismissal. The Memo referred to Galanidas "open

defiance and refusal" to transfer first to the
Bacolod City branch and then to the Tagbilaran
City branch. The Memo also mentioned his
continued refusal to report for work despite the
denial of his application for additional vacation
leave.45 The Memo also refuted Galanidas
charges of discrimination and demotion, and
concluded that he had violated Article XII of the
banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned "Transfer and
Reassignment," did not preclude it from being a
notice of termination. The Court has held that the
nature of an instrument is characterized not by
the title given to it but by its body and
contents.46 Moreover, it appears that Galanida
himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination. We quote from the Memorandum for
Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13, 199447 Private RespondentAppellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration
Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A
copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition
as Annex "H";

the employee.51 Allied Bank could not terminate

Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he had
not received as of that date the notice of Allied
Banks decision to dismiss him. Galanidas
dismissal could only take effect on 5 October
1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this
reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the
period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October
1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award
of P 10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts
award nominal damages to recognize or vindicate
the right of a person that another has violated.52
The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice
of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. Allied
Bank should have exercised more care in issuing
the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451
upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of
the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 is
AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral damages
and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for
lack of basis;

5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant

issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of said
letter is attached to the Petition as Annex "N";

2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover

only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994; and

6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/

Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged
illegal
dismissal.
A
copy
of
the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to
the Petition as Annex "O"; xxx 48 (Emphasis
supplied)

3) Awarding nominal
respondent for P 10,000.

The Memorandum for Private RespondentAppellee refers to the Memo as a "Letter of

Termination." Further, Galanida amended his
complaint for constructive dismissal49 to one for
illegal dismissal50 after he received the Memo.
Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to
mean that Allied Bank had terminated his
services.
The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal
rules which required the banks President or his
authorized representative to confirm the notice of
termination. The banks Vice-President for
Personnel, as the head of the department that
handles the movement of personnel within Allied
Bank, can certainly represent the bank president
in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered
from certain errors.1wphi1 Although the Memo
stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas
services as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore
the date 8 September 1994. More importantly,
Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5
October 1994, or more than a month after the
supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a
written notice of termination must be served on

damages

to

private

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for

the computation, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Decision, of the backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to
Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal
was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4
October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty.
Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more
careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the future.
SO ORDERED.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs.

ATTY.
CRISANTO
L.
FRANCISCO,
respondent.
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL;
VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR
MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR
FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF
RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY

ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT

MERIT. The cause of the respondent's client is
obviously without merit. The respondent was
aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking
relief that was consistently denied, as he should
have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of
recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he
was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to
maintain only such actions or proceedings as
appear to him to be just and such defenses only
as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for
money or malice, he has besmirched the name of
an honorable profession and has proved himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an
officer of the Court . . . For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not
only as a punishment for his misconduct but also
as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the
practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the
rights and privileges appurtenant to membership
of the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on
October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the
disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her
husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and
Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel
of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25
years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated
verbal and written demands, Lee refused to
vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee
claimed that he had an option to extend the lease
for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption
over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims
that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco,
commenced various suits before different courts
to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and
that all these proceedings were decided against
Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said
lease contract and involved the same issues and
parties, thus violating the proscription against
forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he
inserted in defense of his client's right only such
remedies as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is
narrated as follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco,
filed a complaint against Garcia and the other
lessors
for
specific
performance
and

reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
of failure to state a cause of action, laches and
prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge
Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through
Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special
and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil
Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge
Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting
this allegation on the ground that the issues
before the two courts were separate and
different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista,
Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed
as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition,
Francisco knew or should have known that it
violated the Rule on Summary Procedure
prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari,
mandamus
or
prohibition
against
any
interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833
was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-893833 was clearly a special civil action and not an
appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera
issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from
proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer
case. Upon motion of the complainant, however,
the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee
did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R.
Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9,
1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case
No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition
was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil
Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and
the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on,
June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a
petition against Judge Singzon and the other
lessors for certiorari and annulment of the
decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with
prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This

was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that
Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the
unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case
No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not
an appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July
13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining
Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that
case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No.
22392. The petition was granted by the Court of
Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground
that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion
for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On
September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed
a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the
hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was
nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October
8, 1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against the Court of Appeals,
Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This
Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992,
and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other
lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
to set aside and declare the writs of execution in
Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on
August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed
a motion for reconsideration. According to
Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this
motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously
without merit. The respondent was aware of this
fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits
summarized above, continuously seeking relief
that was consistently denied, as he should have
expected. He thereby added to the already
clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their
valuable
time.
He
also
caused
much
inconvenience and expense to the complainant,
who was obliged to defend herself against his
every move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the
courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that

had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining

the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just
and such defense only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
he has besmirched the name of an honorable
profession and has proved himself unworthy of
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the
Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a
lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and
experience in the practice of the laws, he should
have known better than to trifle with it and to use
it as an instrument for harassment of the
complainant and the misuse of judicial processes.
For this serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be
sanctioned, not only as punishment for his
misconduct but also as a warning to other
lawyers who may be influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE
YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served
immediately on the respondent and circularized
to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys

fees does not bear complainants conformity, he not
having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to
settle complainants claim, for by letter4 of December
9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his
acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of
complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy
coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when
complainant left for France,5 he, on the advice of
respondent, signed an already prepared undated
Special Power of Attorney6 authorizing respondent
and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan
Insurance for the satisfaction of complainants claim as
well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and
receive payment" from it. The Special Power of
Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which
same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank
Check No. 841172 payable to complainant in the
amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the
claim.7 The check was received by respondent.

DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,vs.

ATTY.
AMADEO
respondent.

E.

BALON,

JR.,

On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a

French national, filed a verified complaint1 against
respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline
to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are
as follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim
with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan
Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As
complainant encountered problems in pursuing his
claim which was initially rejected,2 his friend, a certain
Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the
engagement of respondents services.
By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde
Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine," under
whose care complainant could be reached, respondent
advised complainant, whom he had not before met,
that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the
actual amount being recovered. . . payable upon
successful recovery;" an advance payment of
P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be
deducted from whatever amount [would] be
successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and
conference fee for each and every court hearings,
conferences outside our law office and meetings before
the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be
also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal
expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee,
messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other
miscellaneous but related expenses," to be charged to
complainants account which would be reimbursed
upon presentation of statement of account.

In the meantime, complainant returned to the

Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the
24th of the same month.8 On inquiry about the status
of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what
respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondents
letter9 of March 26, 1999 that the claim was still
pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was
still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan
Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00
representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to
Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the
offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation
On December 6, 1999, on complainants personal visit
to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was
informed that his claim had long been settled via a
December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the
year before.10 Complainant lost no time in going to the
law office of respondent who was not around, however,
but whom he was able to talk by telephone during
which he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of
his claim.11
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a
December 7, 1999 letter12 wherein he acknowledged
having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed
check which he retained, however, as attorneys lien
pending complainants payment of his attorneys fee,
equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of entire amount
collected. In the same letter, respondent protested
what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional
behavior" complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at
respondents office. Respondent winded up his letter as
follows, quoted verbatim:
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you
the aforesaid amount until and unless our attorneys
fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same
manner, should you be barbaric and uncivilized with
your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation for the authenticity of your visa,
Department of Labor and Employment for your working
status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation
compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation
[with] which we have a good network...

While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action

against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case
against you. We will rather suggest if you could request
your lawyer to just confer with us for the peaceful
settlement of this matter. (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied)
As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to
turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to
acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorneys
fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the
administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t
appears that there was irregularity with the check," it
having been issued payable to him, but "and/or
AMADEO BALON" was therein intercalated after his
(complainants) name.141awphi1.nt
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only
P50,000.00 in attorneys fees,15 complainant decried
respondents continued possession of the proceeds of
his claim16and his misrepresentations that the
recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.17
In his Counter-Affidavit18 of February 18, 2000,
respondent asserted that his continued retention of the
proceeds of complainants claim is in lawful exercise of
his lien for unpaid attorneys fees. He expressed
readiness, however, to account for and turn them over
once he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing
the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure,
no pay" adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance
industry as the basis of the amount of his attorneys
fees,19 which to him was justified in the absence of an
attorney-client contract between him and complainant,
the latter having rejected respondents letter-proposal
of October 21, 1998.20
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and
efforts he extended in pursuing complainants claim
and the expenses he incurred in connection therewith.
He went on to assert that his inability to contact
complainant whose whereabouts he did not know
prompted him to encash the check and keep the
proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power
of Attorney executed in his favor.21
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator,
complainant echoed his allegations in his ComplaintAffidavit and stressed that he turned down as
unreasonable respondents proposal in his October 21,
1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount
collected for his legal services.22 And he presented
documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999
letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact
Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and
suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of
Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainants claim at
P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999
letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that
it was made upon Garcias request, intended for a
certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be
Garcias business partner.23
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001
Supplement24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his
explanation that it was on Garcias express request
that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which was
directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.1vvphi1.nt

Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week

of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he
had talked to complainant about respondents
retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance
proceeds for professional fees less expenses,25 he
gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the
amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to
receive less attorneys fees and expenses.26 Thus,
respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of
P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in
Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00,
P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at
his (respondents) former address through his
executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of
P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondents) former
employer Commonwealth Insurance Company through
his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other
payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila Intercontinental
Hotels coffee shop sometime in October 1999.27
Respondent submitted the separate sworn statements
of Leonardo and Roxas.28
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn
over of various payments to Garcia was made,
respondent alleged that there was no need therefor
since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian
and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with
regarding complainants claim.29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected
complainants offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his
services, insisting that since there had been no clearcut agreement on his professional fees and it was
through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably
reconsidered its initial rejection of complainants claim,
he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net
proceeds thereof.30
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with
his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred
representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment
and other representation expenses on various
occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and
gasoline expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00;31
and that his retention of complainants money was
justified in light of his apprehension that complainant,
being an alien without a valid working permit in the
Philippines, might leave the country anytime without
settling his professional fees.32
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and
Recommendation33 of October 26, 2001, found
respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended
that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn
over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00
representing the amount of the P525,000.00 insurance
claim
less
respondents
professional
fees
of
P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, acting on the Investigators Report, issued
Resolution No. XV-2002-40134 on August 3,2002,
reading:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED
and
APPROVED,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondents dishonesty

which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly

unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely
to respondent but the noble profession to which he
belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with the directive to
turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five
Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant
without prejudice to respondents right to claim
attorneys fees which he may collect in the proper
forum. (Underscoring supplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final
action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration35 filed
with
this
Court,
assails
the
Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation as not
supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand
to the Investigator so that Garcia can personally
appear for his (respondents) confrontation.
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts
material to its resolution are either admitted or
documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP
Investigator that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is
able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for
in the Rules of Court.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence in him.
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of
his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his

advantage or that of a third person, unless the client

with full knowledge of the circumstances consents
thereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which
Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of
complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that he may come to
possess. This commandment entails certain specific
acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an
accounting of all money or property received for or
from the client36 as well as delivery of the funds or
property to the client when due or upon demand.37
Respondent breached this Canon when after he
received the proceeds of complainants insurance
claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a
given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact
Garcia who was his contact with respect to
complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December
23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of
March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to
state that the claim was still pending and recommend
"acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00
pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this
letter on Garcias express request is nauseating. A
lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not
commit prevarication, documented at that, on the
mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the
funds he received and held for the benefit of his client,
he committed professional misconduct.38 Such
misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it
was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant
who was kept in the dark about the release of the
check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to
date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings
with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity,
loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also
degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an
honorable profession.39
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for
his attorneys fees did not relieve him of his duty to
account for it.40 The lawyers continuing exercise of his
retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with
the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement or when the client contests that amount
for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must
not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it
desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with
the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.42
In respondents case, he never had the slightest
attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for
judicial determination so that his and complainants
sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an
end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith
held on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of
forcing complainant to agree to the amount of
attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining
lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot
at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money
and property to his client when due or upon demand.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing

a 25% attorneys fees. After he received the check and
after complainant had discovered its release to him, he
was already asking for 50%, objection to which
complainant communicated to him. Why respondent
had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about
one year when all the while he has been in custody of
the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At
any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.

As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement

to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several
occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already
delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance
proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does
not persuade, for it is bereft of any written
memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe that a
lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total
amount of money to Garcia without documenting it,
especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he
and Garcia were not in good terms.43 Not only that. As
stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit of
February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to
complainant unequivocally contained his express
admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in
his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate
himself only aggravates his misconduct. Respondents
claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas
who, acting allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia
some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are
thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent
reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the
Chinabank check that was issued payable solely in
favor of complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan
Insurance44 is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document which respondent resorted to in
order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to
expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a
"good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect,
and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years
respondent has been in possession of complainants
funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The
deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its
discovery by complainant after about a year, his
receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof
in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of good
moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in
his Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already
delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that
complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared
that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant.
Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to
remit complainants funds, and gives rise to the
conclusion that he has misappropriated them.45
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown
that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the
noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is
found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross

misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer

and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant,
Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within
thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to
whatever judicial action he may take to recover his
attorneys fees and purported expenses incurred in
securing the release thereof from Metropolitan
Insurance.
SO ORDERED.

PAAS VS ALMARVEZ
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44
Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas administratively
charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez
with "discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect
in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of
monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil
Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI
No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is
discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and party
litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and
around the court premises despite order to do so, thus
amounting to insubordination; was, and on several
instances, habitually absent from work or made it
appear that he reported for work by signing the
logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office
the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00
to P200.00 before he released to them their Release
Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was
necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the
difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July
11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to
him for the purpose; and divulged confidential
information to litigants in advance of its authorized
release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving
undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).1
Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C.
Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,2 and members of the
court staff,3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez
failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the
court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing
with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's
affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas' allegation that
Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the
morning and thereafter stay out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by
Certification dated August 2, 2000,4 attested that the
alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July
11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails
posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II

Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City
Jail, by their respective affidavits,5 attested that on
several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from
detention
prisoners
P100.00
to
P200.00
in
consideration of the release of their Release Orders.
Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,6 denied
Judge Paas' charges, and alleged that the real reason
why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because
she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty.
Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since
she failed to elicit any information from him, she
resorted to calling him names and other forms of
harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him
the following invectives before the other employees of
the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita,
pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan
mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted that
he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which
he was not able to keep.
Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge
Paas to the following incidents of oppression and abuse
of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the
Judge to her chambers where she berated him as
follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka
nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo
itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng
estafa at falsification;" the next day, the Judge, on
seeing him, told him "Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka
sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him
again to her chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng
mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita
ipinasok dito dahil driver kita."
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he
reported the foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC
Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him
to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court;
and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn
statement-complaint7 against Judge Paas and went to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but
he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her
who then told him that they should forget all about it.
On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever
requesting for money in exchange for the release of
court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and
Macabasag executed their respective affidavits
because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their
respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted
to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a
detainee under his charge; the court's mail matters
were always sealed whenever he received them for
mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the
alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted
on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary
instead of registered mail, because the money given to
him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days
when he was out of the office, he was actually
performing personal errands for the judge and her
husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal
driver and messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior
towards him, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to
undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated
September 7, 2000,8 even if he had no history of drug
abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by
the test results of his examination.9

The Court treated respondent's Answer as a countercomplaint against Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and
referred for evaluation to the OCA, which assigned
them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City
RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a
criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas'
husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his
wife's office as his office address in his law practice, in
support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of
Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City
RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with
respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al.
(GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas'
address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City,10
the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court
which allows the Supreme Court to motu proprio
initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this
Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-1202-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.
In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12
of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted
their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit13 wherein they
vehemently denied the charge that the latter was using
Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office
address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds
office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with
his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit
his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before
the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when he
lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest
during special occasions such as Christmas party and
her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge
Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use of the
court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint
Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty.
Paas' law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and
secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15 attesting that he is
holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and
the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44
court personnel16 attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the
court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he
never used the court in the practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a
Supplemental Affidavit17 wherein she admitted that
Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for
notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 981198, "People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and

Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in

this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the
Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure
and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after
the cases were terminated, all notices were sent
to his office address in Escolta.
By Resolution of February 12, 2002,18 the Court
referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

After the completion of his investigation of A.M.

OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363,
Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation
dated February 28, 2002.19
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report
on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002.20
I. OCA Findings and Recommendations
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the
dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of
exacting money from detainees, violating
confidentiality of official communication, absence
without
official
leave,
discourtesy
and
insubordination. Given Almarvez' unsatisfactory
performance ratings for three rating periods
covering January to June 2000,21 July to
December 2000,22 and January to April 2001,23
however, the OCA recommended that he be duly
penalized for inefficiency in the performance of
his official duties with One (1) Month suspension
without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted
under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his
supervisor having failed to observe the procedure
thereunder for dropping of employees from the
rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later
portion of this decision.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against
Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting
evidence, recommended the dismissal of the
charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal
abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas "had
used her administrative power of supervision and
control over court personnel for her personal
pride, prejudice and pettiness"24 when she
issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum
ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she
had already filed an administrative case against
him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the
purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to
undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to
support the administrative case she had already
filed against him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge
Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in
office, and be penalized with reprimand with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
II. This Court's Findings:
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient
evidence to support the charge of violation of
confidentiality of official communication against
Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge
Paas' complaint-affidavit which reads:

That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails

had divulged informations which is confidential in
nature to party litigants in advance of its
authorized release date before the release of
Court Order and Decision for consideration of a
sum of money thus giving undue advantage or
favor to the paying party detrimental to the due
administration of justice.25
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material
details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet
the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy
and insubordination which were echoed in the
affidavits of court personnel, they are also too
general to support a conviction and are contrary
to what is reflected in his performance rating that
he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly,
with his fellow employees.
On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any
evidence to support the charge, the affiants jail
officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez
receive money from detention prisoners in
exchange for the release of their Release Orders
not having been presented, hence, their claim
remains hearsay, Almarvez' categorical denial
and counter-allegation that these affiants
executed their affidavits only out of fear of or
favor to Judge Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely
sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the
office, again Judge Paas failed to present the
affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr.
While she submitted in evidence a copy of her
October 6, 2000 memorandum26 requiring
Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office
on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5,
2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the
logbook on those dates indicating that he
reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily
explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000,
he submitted himself to drug testing as required
by
her
in
her
September
7,
200027
memorandum, which explanation is supported by
the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P.
Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous
Drug Board.28 As to his whereabouts on October
5, 2000, Almarvez' explanation that he was
actually present in the morning but left in the
afternoon for the Supreme Court29 was not
controverted.
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs
with the following findings of the OCA that he
should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez
for three (3) rating periods covering January to
June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to
April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to
perform his official duties. The fact that
respondent
Almarvez
never disputed
the

performance ratings given him is tantamount to

an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5
Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
quoted as follows:
"Sec.
5.
An
employee
who
expresses
dissatisfaction with the rating given him may
appeal through the established Grievance
Procedure of the Department or Agency within
fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his
performance rating. Failure to file an appeal
within the prescribed period shall be deemed a
waiver of such right."
The performance ratings of respondent for the
said periods are valid grounds to drop him from
the Rolls. However, considering that his
superior/supervisor failed to comply with the
requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular
No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service
Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that
he was able to make up and cure his inefficiency
after he was given the opportunity to improve his
performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC,
Manila, as shown by his performance rating for
the period April to June 2001 with a "very
satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll
will no longer be appropriate30 (Emphasis and
italics supplied.)
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s.
1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings of
the OCA reads:
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
(a) An official or employee who is given two (2)
consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be
dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice
shall mean that the officer or employee
concerned is informed in writing of his
unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is
sufficiently
warned
that
a
succeeding
unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his
separation from the service. Such notice shall be
given not later than 30 days from the end of the
semester and shall contain sufficient information
which shall enable the employee to prepare an
explanation. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month
without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is thus
in order.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

requirement to ensure the highest degree of

productivity of the civil service. However,
considering that the order was issued after Judge
Paas filed the administrative case against
Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a
fishing expedition against him. This is conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for
which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty.
Paas:
By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24,
2002 Supplemental Affidavit,31 she was aware
that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office
to receive court notices and orders in a case
lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it,
"[w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it
could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a
message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge
in the same building and should be given special
treatment by other judges or court personnel."32
The following are instructive in the disposition of
these charges against the judge and her spouse,
Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing
the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and
Promoting Respect for their Officials and
Employers" reads:
As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and
sanctity must, at all times be preserved and
enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the
justice system, court officials and employees
must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which
would constitute grounds for disciplinary action
under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292); and (b) faithfully comply with the norms of
conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2. Zealously guard the public trust character of
their offices;
6. Never use their offices as a residence or for
any other purpose than for court or judicial
functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and

oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to
substantiate the same.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides

that "A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities."
Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:

Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug

test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s.
1997, public employees are required to undergo a
drug test prior to employment to determine if
they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a
pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or

other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not
be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the

impression that they are in a special position to

influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92,33 dated August 31, 1992, of
this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS
OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby
reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used
only for purposes directly related to the
functioning and operation of the courts of justice,
and may not be devoted to any other use, least of
all as residential quarters of the judges or court
personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or
profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie
Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case
involving unauthorized and improper use of the
court's premises for dwelling purposes by
respondent and his family, in which the Court, by
Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found
respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and
improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient
administration of justice and best interest of the
service, and imposed on him the penalty of
SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such
use of the court's premises inevitably degrades
the honor and dignity of the court in addition to
exposing judicial records to danger of loss or
damage. (emphasis supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her
court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas
indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for
purposes of advancing his private interest, in
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct"34 and
of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars,
which violation is classified as a less serious
charge under the Rules of Court35 and is
punishable under the same Rule.36
A judge's official conduct should indeed be free
from the appearance of impropriety; and his
behavior not only in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism
that a Judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal
existence and that upon a Judge's attributes
depend the public perception of the Judiciary.37
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a
fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address
that had no purpose other than to try to impress
either the court in which his cases are lodged, or
his client, that he has close ties to a member of
the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the

use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE
MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that
he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's
case, instead of banking on his relationship with a
member of the bench which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influencing the court,
cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional
and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a
public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by such reprehensible and improper
conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered
excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure
receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty.
Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his
court notices sent to office of Judge Paas,
especially given the fact that for his other cases,
Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no
showing that he failed to receive the notices sent
to that address. While a lawyer should make the
necessary arrangements to ensure that he is
properly informed of any court action, these
should not violate his lawyer's oath or the Code of
Professional Responsibility, nor provide an
opportunity for a member of the judiciary to
breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme
Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent
Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is
hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without
pay;
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge
Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming
of a member of the judiciary and is hereby

REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the

same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely;
(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,
(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC
Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No.
3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a
FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00),
with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely; and
(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with warning that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and appended to respondents'
personal record.

SO ORDERED.

NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD

PANTANOSAS, complainants,
vs.
ATTY.
respondent.

MIGUEL

B.

SABACAJAN,

This resolves the administrative case filed by

Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B. Pantanosas
against Atty. Miguel Sabacajan on February 14,
1995, 1 the verified complaint wherefor alleges:
4. That sometime in October, 1994, complainants
were informed by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants'
owner's duplicate of title covering their lands,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T91735 were entrusted to the office secretary of
the respondent who in torn entrusted the same to
respondent;
5. That respondent admitted and confirmed to the
complainants that their titles are in his custody
and has even shown the same (to) the
complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when
demanded (sic) to deliver the said titles to the
complainant in a formal demand letter, marked as
ANNEX "A," respondent refused and continues to

refuse without any justification to give their titles

(and) when confronted, respondent challenged
the complainants to file any case in any court
even in the Honorable Supreme Court;
6. That respondent's dare or challeng(e) is a
manifestation of his arrogance taking undue
advantage of his legal profession over the
simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the
complainants, one of whom is his blood relative,
his aunt, for which complainants shudder with
mental anguish;
7. That due to his challeng(e), the complainants
sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court for
enlightenment, copy of which is attached as
ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme
Court required 19 legible copies of a verified
complaint;
8. That in spite of repeated demands, request(s)
and pleas towards (sic) respondent, respondent
still fail(ed) and stubbornly refused without
justification to surrender the said titles to the
rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which
act is tantamount to willful and malicious
defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating
from his professional capacity as a lawyer who
had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the
prejudice and damage of the complainants; 2
On March 22, 1995, the Court required
respondent to comment on the foregoing
complaint. In his unverified "Answer" thereto,
respondent
admitted
having
met
Salud
Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection,
"Nicanor Gonzales/Serdan" has never been to his
office. Respondent likewise denied that he
challenged anyone to file a case in any court,
much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that
he referred complainant Pantanosas to his client,
Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City,
for whom he worked out the segregation of the
titles, two of which are the subject of the instant
case. 3
likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is
arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity
and ignorance of said complainants. He contends
that the truth of the matter is that complainants
have been charged with a number of criminal and
civil complaints before different courts. He also
asserts that he was holding the certificates of title
in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4
Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that
"the instant action was chosen precisely to
browbeat him into delivering the Certificates of
Title to them without said certificates passing the
hands of Mr. Samto Uy with whom the
complainants have some monetary obligations."
5
In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for
internal administrative purposes the Court
referred this case to the Office of the Bar

Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report

and recommendation.
From the foregoing proceedings taken on this
matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted
having taken possession of the certificates of title
of complainants but refused to surrender the
same despite demands made by the latter. It
follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon
him to show that he was legally justified in doing
so. Instead, all he did was to inform this Court
that "his obligation to deliver the certificates to
Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said
certificates to anyone else." 7
Respondent attached some certifications to his
"Answer" to support his contention that
complainants are notorious characters. However,
the certifications indicate that most of the cases
stated therein, especially those involving fraud,
have been dismissed. With respect to those still
pending, there is no indication as to the identity
of the party who instituted the same, aside from
the consideration that the remedy thereon is
judicial in nature. At any rate, these aspersions on
the character of complainants have no bearing on
the misconduct of respondent charged in the
present case.
Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of
certain certificates of title in an effort to explain
why he kept the certificates of title of
complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose
of subdividing the property. However, an
examination of the same does not show any
connection thereof to respondent's claim. In fact,
the two sets of certificates of title appear to be
entirely different from each other.
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there
are lawful remedies provided by law to protect
the interests of his client. The records do not
show that he or his client have availed of said
remedies, instead of merely resorting to
unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate
the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be
unaware of the imposable sanctions on a counsel
who resorts to unlawful means that would cause
injustice to the adversaries of his client.
The Court accordingly finds that respondent has
not exercised the good faith and diligence
required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of
their clients. If complainants did have the alleged
monetary obligations to his client, that does not
warrant
his
summarily
confiscating
their
certificates of title since there is no showing in
the records that the same were given as
collaterals to secure the payment of a debt.
Neither is there any intimation that there is a
court order authorizing him to take and retain
custody of said certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon
15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall

impress upon his client the need for compliance

with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead,
he unjustly refused to give to complainants their
certificates of titles supposedly to enforce
payment of their alleged financial obligations to
his client and presumably to impress the latter of
his power to do so.
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present unfounded charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent
has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not
in fact transgressed the same.
On the foregoing considerations, the Court
desires and directs that respondent should
forthwith return the certificates of title of
complainants. To ensure the same, he should be
placed under suspension until he presents to the
Court proof of receipt by complainants of their
respective copies of Certificates of Title Nos. T91735 and T-91736 or a judicial order or
document authorizing or justifying the retention
of possession thereof by respondent or his
aforenamed client.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can
duly show to this Court that the disputed
certificates of title have been returned to and the
receipt
thereof
duly
acknowledged
by
complainants, or can present a judicial order or
appropriate
legal
authority
justifying
the
possession by him or his client of said certificates.
He is further WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar or any other administrative
misconduct will be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the
personal records of respondent and have copies
thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA CIELO B. SUZUKI, represented by

her sister Maria Teresa B. Gabuco,
Complainant, vs.
ATTY. ERWIN L. TIAMSON, Respondent.
In an Administrative Complaint1 dated January 7, 2003
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Maria Cielo
B. Suzuki, represented by her sister, Maria Teresa B.
Gabuco, charged Atty. Erwin L. Tiamson with fraud,
dishonesty and misrepresentation and for violation of
Canons 1 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Praying for the disbarment of herein respondent,

complainant alleges that on August 31, 2002, she
entered into contracts of sale and real estate
mortgage with several persons, namely Arthur
Tumilty, Benjamin Commandante, Jr., Mark S.
Commandante, and Mary Jane S. Commandante,
wherein she bought from them a house and lot
located at No. 2002, Purple Road, Camella Homes
II, Talon 2, Las Pias City, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83217, issued by
the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City, and
subsequently mortgaged the same property in
favor of the sellers as security for the payment of
the said property; the sale and mortgage
transactions were facilitated by respondent who
is the counsel of Mr. Tumilty; the sellers executed
a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
respondent
as
their
attorney-in-fact
and
empowering him to receive payments from
complainant; respondent received in behalf of the
sellers the amount of P500,000.00 as partial
consideration for the contract of sale; respondent
committed to register the documents of sale and
mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias
City but asked from and was given by
complainant P80,000.00 as the latters share in
the expenses for registration; with the end in
view of having the subject documents registered
and the title to the property transferred in the
name of complainant, respondent retained in his
possession the subject deeds of absolute sale and
mortgage as well as the owners copy of the title;
however, respondent never registered the said
documents and did not cause the transfer of the
title over the subject property in the name of
complainant; respondent is guilty of fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and estafa which
are grounds for his disbarment.2
In his Answer dated February 18, 2003, respondent
denied the allegations of complainant. He put up
affirmative defenses contending that sometime in
August 2002, he was engaged by Mr. Tumilty, his friend
and neighbor, to help him in the documentation of the
sale of his house and lot to complainant; Mr. Tumilty
informed respondent that he and the complainant
agreed that the payment of the purchase price for the
property shall be made through installment;
respondent was also informed that complainant, at that
time, was residing in Japan and that she was being
represented by her agent, a certain Jenny Matira; when
respondent communicated with Ms. Matira to discuss

the documentation of the contract, the latter referred

him to their lawyer, Atty. Lorenzo Tejada; respondent
and Atty. Tejada met and subsequently arrived at a
compromise wherein it was agreed that complainant
will execute a promissory note in favor of Mr. Tumilty
covering her obligation under the contract of sale;
thereafter, Mr. Tumilty will execute a deed of sale in
favor of complainant; complainant, in turn, will execute
a real estate mortgage contract in favor of Mr. Tumilty
as security for the payment of her obligation; it was
further agreed that after the new TCT in the name of
complainant is released, the latter shall execute
another contract of real estate mortgage covering the
same property; subsequently, the above-mentioned
documents were executed with the exception of the
second real estate mortgage contract; respondent
admits having received P250,000.00 in cash and
P250,000.00 in check from the representatives of
complainant but he does not admit that this is part of
the partial payment for the real property sold; instead,
he contends that the said amount was part of an
internal agreement between complainant and a certain
Ms. Suzuki, who is her agents mother-in-law residing in
Japan; respondent also admits receipt of P80,000.00 as
complainants share in the expenses for registration;
respondent contends that immediately after the sale,
he submitted the sale documents to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and paid the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp tax and other taxes which enabled
him to get from the BIR a Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR); sometime in September 2002,
representatives of complainant approached respondent
asking him to give them the new TCT covering the
subject property in the name of complainant;
respondent informed them that the transfer of the
property in complainants name is still being processed
and even if respondent secures a new TCT in the name
of complainant, he cannot give complainant the
owners duplicate copy until and unless the purchase
price for the subject property has been fully paid and
the real estate mortgage cancelled; several days after,
the same persons returned to respondents office and
insisted on getting the owners duplicate copy of the
new TCT but respondent refused for the same reasons
mentioned above; nonetheless, respondent handed to
herein complainants representative Gabuco the
documents evidencing the sale, real estate mortgage,
a special power of attorney dated August 31, 2002 as
well as the keys to the house subject of the sale;
respondent was later informed by complainants agent,
Jenny Matira that she is now unsure if complainant will
execute a new real estate mortgage contract much less
pay the remaining balance of the purchase price;
sometime in October 2002, respondent received a
letter from a certain Atty. Federico Ricafort demanding
rescission of the sale with damages on the ground that
he defrauded complainant; respondent was also asked
to release the owners copy of the new TCT; as a
consequence, respondent deferred the processing of a
new title over the subject property in the name of
complainant because he has no longer any assurance
that complainant will comply with her obligation to pay
the remaining balance of the purchase price;
respondent contends that he is merely performing his
duty to protect the interest of his client by refusing to
register the contract of sale with the Register of Deeds
of Las Pias.3
Complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
contending that she was not, in fact, represented by a
lawyer during the transaction and documentation of
the subject contracts of sale and real estate mortgage;

the partial payments she made in the amount of

P1,352,500.00 were not deducted and reflected in the
deeds of sale and mortgage; respondent does not
acknowledge these payments and insists on the
payment
of
the
original
purchase
price
of
P2,150,000.00.4
In an order dated February 10, 2004, Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP-CBD required the parties to
submit their respective verified position papers
attaching thereto documentary evidence and duly
verified affidavits of witnesses, if any, after which the
case shall be submitted for resolution.5
Complainant and respondent submitted their Position
Papers, respectively.6 Both parties also submitted their
Reply to the opposing partys Position Paper.7
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 18,
2004, Commissioner Navarro found that respondent
has no intention of defrauding complainant; instead, he
is only performing his duty of protecting his clients
interest when he held in abeyance the processing of
the papers for the transfer of the title over the property
in complainants name. Consequently, Commissioner
Navarro recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent.8
On June 26, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-260 finding the
recommendation of Commissioner Navarro fully
supported by evidence on record and the applicable

laws and rules and, considering that the

complaint lacks merit, resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Navarro.9
On October 6, 2004, this Court issued a
Resolution which noted Resolution No. XVI-2004260 of the Board of Governors of the IBP and
considered the instant case closed and
terminated.10
On September 8, 2004, complainant filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of IBP Resolution No.
XVI-2004-260.
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the IBP
Board of Governors denied complainants motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the Board
has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve
said motion as it has already endorsed the case
to this Court.11
On March 30, 2005, this Court issued another
Resolution requiring respondent to file his
Comment
on
complainants
motion
for
reconsideration.12 Respondent filed his comment
on May 3, 2005.13
The issue in the present case is whether
respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation
and dishonesty or of any improper act or conduct
which violates his sworn duty as a lawyer in
connection with his dealings with herein
complainant or with any of the latters
representatives relative to the sale of the subject
properties.

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of

dishonesty and misconduct for two main reasons.
First, despite having received the amount of
P80,000.00 from complainant as the latters share
in the registration of the deed of sale of the
subject property, respondent failed to register the
same; worse, he did not pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp tax and all other taxes or
fees due thereon. Second, respondent does not
want to recognize and deduct from the original
purchase price the advance payments made by
complainant
amounting
to
more
than
P1,000,000.00.
As to the first charge, this Court notes that
respondent has submitted a photocopy of a CAR
issued by the BIR to prove that he already paid
the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax
due on the sale of the subject property,
amounting to a total sum of P177,980.83; and
that the BIR had already authorized the
concerned Register of Deeds to effect the transfer
of the said property.14
However, despite such authority, respondent did
not register the deed of sale over the subject
property. Respondent asserts that his only motive
in refusing to register the deed of sale is to
protect the interest of his client. Nonetheless, this
Court notes that his clients interest is amply
protected by the real estate mortgage executed
by complainant. In fact, contrary to what
respondent insists, we see no need to execute
anew a different mortgage contract after the title
over the property has been transferred in the
name of complainant since the original contract
of mortgage contains provisions stating that said
contract shall be annotated at the back of the
new TCT covering the subject property which
shall be issued in the name of complainant.15
The same mortgage contract also states that it
shall not be affected by the cancellation of the
existing TCT in the name of Mr. Tumilty and the
other co-owners.16 We find these provisions as
sufficient security to protect the interest of
respondents client.
Besides, respondent himself admitted that based
on their agreement with complainant, the
condition for the transfer of title over the subject
property in the name of complainant is for the
latter to execute a real estate mortgage and a
promissory note.17 Complainant had already
complied with these conditions.18 Hence, it is
only fair and just that respondent register the
deed of sale over the subject property and have
the title to this property transferred in the name
of complainant.

As to the second charge, complainant presented

documents to prove her contention that
respondents client received certain amounts
from complainant which have been considered as
partial payments for the subject properties sold.

Except for the payment made in September 5,

2003,19 all the other payments were given prior
to the execution of the deed of sale on August 31,
2002.20 Complainant contends that all the
advance payments she made should have been
credited in her favor by deducting the same from
the purchase price agreed upon as appearing in
the deeds of sale and mortgage.
In his Comment to complainants motion for
reconsideration of Resolution No. XVI-2004-260 of
the IBP-CBD, respondent claims that the amount
of P500,000.00 he received from complainant, as
evidenced by Annex "D"21 of the complaint, does
not form part of the agreed purchase price for the
subject properties and, therefore, should not be
deducted therefrom.22 Respondent contends that
this amount (P500,000.00) was paid by
complainant as part of an internal arrangement or
agreement between her and a certain Milet
Wakatsuki who appears to be her agents motherin-law residing in Japan.23 As to the other
amounts which complainant claims to have paid,
respondent insists that he has no knowledge of
these payments as evidence shows that these
sums have been given directly to his client, Mr.
Tumilty.
We are not fully convinced by respondents
explanations.
With respect to the photocopies of receipts for a
total amount of P724,990.00, representative of
the alleged partial payments of the purchase
price for the subject property marked as Annexes
"C-1," "C-2," "C-3," "D-1" and "D-2" of the
complaint, we find that complainant failed to
prove that respondent intervened or had
knowledge of these payments as to render him
liable for fraud, dishonesty or misrepresentation
for his failure to deduct these payments from the
deeds of sale and mortgage over the subject
property. As stated earlier, all these payments,
except that evidenced by Annex "C-1," were
made prior to the execution of the deeds of sale
and mortgage over the subject property. There is
no showing that respondent had knowledge of
these payments at the time of the execution of
the deeds of sale and mortgage that could have
prompted him to reflect these payments on the
said deed. In addition, respondent was not the
one who received these payments. Annexes "C1," "C-2" and "C-3" show that the payments were
received by Ms. Wakatsuki while Annexes "D-1"
and "D-2" show that the sums of money were
received by respondents client, Mr. Tumilty.
Moreover, Annexes "C-2" and "C-3" did not
specifically state if the payments were indeed
given as consideration for the subject property.
Hence, respondent cannot be faulted if he refuses
to consider the amounts of money evidenced by
the above-cited documents as partial payments
for the subject property.
However, as to the amount of P500,000.00, it is
clear from the acknowledgment receipt marked

as Annex "D" of the complaint that the sum of

money was given to respondent as payment for
the subject property. As stated earlier, respondent
admits having received the money from
complainant but claims that the said amount
does not form part of the purchase price; instead,
it was paid by complainant in consideration of her
arrangement or agreement with Ms. Wakatsuki.
However, respondent did not substantiate his
allegation. He did not even explain or elaborate
his assertion. If there is indeed an arrangement,
what kind of arrangement was it? And if the
arrangement is between complainant and
Wakatsuki, why did respondent receive the
money? There is no showing that he is authorized
by Wakatsuki to act as her attorney. On the
contrary, respondent received the money and he
does
not
deny
that
he
signed
the
acknowledgment receipt for and in behalf of his
client, Mr. Tumilty. Hence, based on the evidence
presented in the instant case, respondents
refusal to acknowledge complainants payment of
P500,000.00 as part of the purchase price for the
subject property is simply not warranted.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal. However, the same Canon
provides that a lawyers performance of his duties
towards his client must be within the bounds of
the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires,
among others, that a lawyer shall employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also
obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients
compliance with the laws and the principle of
fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to
unscrupulous practices for the protection of the
supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of
the purposes of the state the administration of
justice.24 While lawyers owe their entire devotion
to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their clients right, they should not
forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of
the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.25 Respondent failed to live up to this
expectation.
Complainant prays for the disbarment of
respondent. However, it must be stressed that
disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only
the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar.26 Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine would accomplish the end
desired.27 Considering that there is no evidence
to prove that respondent misappropriated the
sum
of
P500,000.00
he
received
from

complainant as partial payment for the subject

property, as well as the P80,000.00 complainant
gave him as her share in the expenses for the
registration of the subject deed of sale, we find it
fit to reprimand respondent for his acts of unfairly
dealing with complainant.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the issues of
whether or not complainant had indeed made
payments amounting to an aggregate sum of
P1,352,500.00; if these payments were made,
whether they were intended as part of the
purchase price for the subject property; and,
whether these payments should be properly
deducted from the original purchase price of
P2,150,000.00, are matters that should be
properly resolved in a judicial proceeding
separate and distinct from the present case. The
settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa.28 In
this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in
Berbano vs. Barcelona,29 citing In re Almacen,30
where it was held that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest
is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.31
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the
determination of respondents administrative
liability and our findings herein should not in any
way be treated as having any material bearing on
any other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
is
hereby
REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a
WARNING that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.