Carmelito Valenzona vs Fair Shipping Corporation

659 SCRA 642 Labor Law Social Legislation Permanent Total Disability; When
present
In May 2001, Carmelito Valemzona was recruited and hired by the FairShipping
Corporation to work as an engineer for Sejin Lines Company Limited. He was assigned to
work aboard the M/V Morelos ship. Before he embarked, he was declared fit to work by the
company doctor.
But in September 2001, Valenzona got sick while aboard the ship. In October 2001, he was
confined at a hospital in Mexico. In the same month, he was repatriated by Sejin to the
Philippines. Upon reaching the Philippines, Valenzona was treated by the company doctor
(Dr. Nicomedes Cruz). He was treated continuously for six months until April 2002.
But in April 2002, Valenzona sought a second opinion from a certain Dr. Magpapala and the
latter diagnosed Valenzona with a cardiovascular disease. Later that same month,
Valenzona demanded from Fair Shipping and Sejin that he be paid his sickness allowance
and permanent disability benefits. Instead of paying him, the company did not as in fact, the
company made a declaration that after the 6 months testing, Valenzona was found to be fit
to work.
To prove his claim, Valenzona sought another independent doctor (Dr. Rodrgigo Guanlao).
Guanlao concurred with the findings of D. Magpapala as he determined that Valenzona is
unfit to work in any capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valenzona should be declared to be inflicted with permanent total
disability.
HELD: Yes. Under their Employment Contract, as well as under the POEA contract which is
deemed integrated in said Employment Contract between Valenzona and Fair
Shipping/Sinjen:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no
case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
Also, the Labor Code provides:

Art. 192. Permanent total disability. x x xx x x x

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided for in the Rules; xxxx
Thus, permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than
120 days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. What determines
a claimants entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more
than 120 days.
In this case, it is undisputed that after repatriation, Valenzona was not able to work for more
than 120 days (in fact for 199 days counted from day of repatriation to date when he was
declared fit to work by the company doctor). This is also notwithstanding the fact that
Valenzona was ultimately declared fit to work by the company doctor the fact still remains
that he was not able to work for 120 days due to illness and under the law, he was already
permanently and totally disabled hence entitled to permanent disability benefits of
$60,000.00.

Benjamin Ting vs Carmen

Velez-Ting
582 SCRA 694 Civil Law Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity
Personal Examination by Psychologist Not a Condition Sine Qua Non
Note: This reinforced the case of Te vs Te which relaxed the application of the Molina
Guidelines.
In 1972, Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school. In 1975, they
married each other.

In 1980, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital
(owned by Carmens family).
Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after 18 years of
marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that
Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated.
She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that
Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby;
that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness (Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate) to prove Benjamins
psychological incapacity. However, Oate merely based her findings on the deposition
submitted by Benjamin. Oate was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at
that time, Benjamin was already working as an anesthesiologist in South Africa.
On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness (Dr.
Renato Obra) to disprove Carmens allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine
Benjamin but he also evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oate. Also, Benjamin
submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. A.J.L. Pentz) and the
transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same.
Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Tings psychological incapacity was proven.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the evidence presented to be lacking in order to
support a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Benjamin. Said the Supreme
Court:
we are not condoning Benjamins drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts
against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Benjamin must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes
the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds Carmens testimony, as well as the totality of
evidence presented by Carmen, to be too inadequate to declare Benjamin psychologically
unfit pursuant to Article 36.

Carmen failed to prove that such attitude by Benjamin is psychologically rooted so as to

make Benjamin unaware of his marital obligations. It should be remembered that the
presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Anent the issue that Benjamin was not personally evaluated by the psychologists which
deviates from the Molina Guidelines, the Supreme Court ruled that as early as the case
of Te vs Te, theMolina Guidelines were already relaxed. Cases involving Article 36 must be
tried on a case-to-case basis. Each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. The Supreme
Court however emphasized that the Molina case was not abandoned, its application was
merely relaxed.

Republic of the Philippines

vs Laila Tanyag-San Jose
517 SCRA 123 Civil Law Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity
Joblessness and Irresponsibility is not Psychological Incapacity
When examination of the alleged psychologically incapacitated spouse is needed
In 1988, Laila Tanyag, then 19 years old, and Manolito San Jose, then 20 years old, got
married to each other, albeit knowing each other for only a short period. The next year, they
had a daughter.
Their marriage turned out to be not an ideal one, however. Manolito refused to get himself a
job. He spent most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and
gambling activities. It was Laila who had to work in order to support the family. Laila gave
Manolito all the chances to change but Manolito never did.

In 1997, Laila gave birth to their second child, a boy. Laila thought this would be the
beginning of change for Manolito but that change never happened. Thus, in 1998, Laila filed
a petition to have their marriage be declared a nullity on the ground that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated due the fact that he was oblivious of his marital obligations.
Laila submitted herself to psychological evaluation under Dr. Nedy Tayag. Laila described
Manolito to Tayag as a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with
friends. Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and
prohibited drugs as well. Ultimately, Tayag concluded that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated this was even without actually examining Manolito. The RTC denied Lailas
petition but on appeal, the Court of Appeals gave weight to Dr. Tayags expert testimony and
the appellate court reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manolito San Jose was proven to be psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. It is true that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs Court of Appeals and
Molina did not require that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
to arrive at such declaration. In fact, if such incapacity can be proven by independent
means, there is no reason why the same should not be credited. However, in this case, the
findings, and ultimately the testimony in court, of Dr. Tayag is merely hearsay. The
doctor had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been
relayed to him by Laila. Tayag was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable. This is more so because the questioned CA decision was solely
grounded on Tayags expert testimony (which was merely based on the information fed to
him by Laila) there was no other independent evidence which will support a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on the part of Manolito.
And based on Lailas description of Manolito, whcih she gave to Tayag, Manolitos alleged
psychological incapacity was merely premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well
as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition. Manolito merely has a difficulty if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations but not psychological incapacity.

Republic of the Philippines

vs Lolita Quintero-Hamano
428 SCRA 735 Civil Law Family Code Article 36 Psychological Incapacity
Irresponsibility; Abandonment
In 1986, Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano met in Japan. They had a love affair which
resulted to a child.
In 1988, they married here in the Philippines. But only a month after their marriage, Toshio
went back to Japan. He only gave financial support to Lolita for the first two months but
thereafter, he stopped sending money to Lolita. Lolita wrote Toshio but he ignored those
letters.
In 1991, Toshio returned to the Philippines but he never even bothered seeing his family
here.
In June 1996, Lolita filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio.
She alleged that Toshio is psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities; that his indifference to his wife and child is a clear manifestation of
immaturity and insensitivity.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lolita. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In its ruling,
the CA stated that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs Court of Appeals and
Molina are not applicable to this case because one of the spouse, Toshio, is an alien
(Japanese). In short, the CA ruled that the said case is not applicable to mixed marriages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. The court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

Anent the issue of Toshios psychological incapacity, Lolita was not able to prove the same.
The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped Lolitas case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness

Lorna Guillen Pesca vs

Zosimo Pesca
356 SCRA 588 (408 Phil. 713) Civil Law Family Code Article 36; Psychological
Incapacity Emotional Immaturity and Irresponsibility Are Not Psychological Incapacity
In 1975, Lorna Guillen and Zosima Pesca met each other. They only knew each other for
three months when they decided to get married in the same year. They had a great start
and they even had four children. However, in 1988, Lorna noticed some changes in Zosimo
as the latter became cruel, violent, and a habitual drinker. He would hurt her and the
children. He would have drinking sessions from late in theafternoon until early morning
regularly. This went on until 1994 when Lorna decided to leave Zosimo for good and she
also filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground that
Zosimo is psychologically incapacitated by reason of his emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility.
The trial court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals reversed the said ruling. The CA
ratiocinated that based on the earlier cases ofSantos vs CA and Republic vs Court of
Appeals and Molina, the allegations of Lorna failed to prove Zosimos psychological
incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not emotional immaturity and irresponsibility may be equated to

psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity.
As the CA observed, Lorna has not established the following: That Zosimo showed signs of
mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant,
as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has
preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility
is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.