Intia vs COA

Facts:
In 1992, pursuant to their charter, the Philippine Postal Corporation (or PPC) Board
issued a board resolution which prescribes for the rate of their Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA). It must be noted said charter provides that the
PPC has the power to fix the salaries and emoluments of their employees
However, being in excess of what is authorized in GAA, respondent auditor
subsequently served Notice of Disallowance covering the RATA.
Issue: Whether PPC board can grant through resolution an increase in allowance
without going to the DBM for review
Held: No because their powers to fix their emoluments as provided in their charter
must be read in conjunction with PD 1597 which requires that their rates must be
approved by the president through the DBM and must conform as closely as possible
compensation and classification system. While their charter is a newer law, it did not
expressly repeal the previous laws, and therefore in the concept of general repealing
clause, those being deemed not inconsistent must be read together.
While it is true that the PPC may fix and prescribe their emoluments, including that
of RATA, which is considered part of emoluments, all of which must still follow the
rule provided in PD 1597
Manalo vs. Gloria
Facts:
In 1988 Manalo was Planning Assistant in the PNRI
In 1987 through an EO the PNRI was reorganized with a new staffing pattern
abolishing certain positions including Manalos position.
Manalo made an appeal to the DOST to place her to any comparable position to
which her qualification would fit and thereafter she was appointed to clerk II, lower
than that of Planning Assistant.
In 1990 a SC decision (Leviste) was released ordering the respondents therein be
retained in the reorganized department under new staffing patter with positions and
salaried comparable or equivalent to their former positions but not lower than their
former ranks and salaries.

Manalo requested for back payment and reinstatement to the same salary grade
Issue: Whether or not Manalo is entitled to back salary and reinstatement to same
rank and salary as she previously held
Held: No because she was not respondent to the said sc decision and that by
voluntarily accepting a new position of clerk 2 bars her obtainment of desired relief
by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel
BITONIO VS COA
FACTS:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV
of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment.
In a Letter dated May 11, 1995 addressed to Honorable Rizalino S. Navarro,
then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, Acting Secretary Jose
S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and Employment designated the
petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA.

Section 11. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. There
is hereby created a body corporate to be known as the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA)

The Board shall be composed of the Director General as ex officio chairman

with eight (8) members as follows: the Secretaries or their representatives of
the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Finance, the
Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of [the] Interior and
Local Government, the National Economic and Development Authority, and
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, one (1) representative from the labor sector,
and one (1) representative from the investor/business sector in the ECOZONE.

Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not less than the amount
equivalent to the representation and transportation allowances of the members
of the Board and/or as may be determined by the Department of Budget and

Management: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per month does
not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings.
As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was
receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years
1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA
disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bitonio is entitled to receive the per diems.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely
by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner
himself admitted, there was no separate or special appointment for such position.
Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner
who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
The petitioners case stands on all fours with the case of Dela Cruz v. Commission on
Audit. Here, the Court upheld the COA in disallowing the payment of honoraria and
per diems to the officers concerned who sat as members of the Board of Directors of
the National Housing Authority. The officers concerned sat as alternates of their
superiors in an ex officio capacity. Citing also the Civil Liberties Union case, the
Court explained thus:
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining

policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."

Jejomar C. Binay vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity)
against Mayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds (RPC A220) and
Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994.
The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in
his incumbency in the year 1987.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6
years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His
arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions.
Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and
further the latters motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed
a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite (benefits) which was later granted and
ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he
was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file
his reply to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner
to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order
after the submission of the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995
so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of
Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its
resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution
denied the petitioners motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.

Issue:
WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.
Held:

YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of
the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are
"local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher.
The contention of Mayor Binay that grades are determined by compensation
and that the essence of grades is pay scales and therefore he is not under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his salary not being within that of the grade 27
during his alleged wrongdoing is wrong because it is the officials grade that
determines his salary and not the other way around
CSC vs De La Cruz
Facts:
In November 1994, De La Cruz was appointed Chief Aviation Safety Regulation
Officer of the Air Transportation Office.
Calamba protested against appointment to the SOTC claiming that De La Cruz did not
meet the four-year supervisory requirement for the position. This was denied. Hence
appeal to the CSC-NCR who considered the protest and opined that De La Cruz did
not possess the required experience but subsequently changed it mind. Calamba then
appealed to the national CSC who disapproved the appointment of De La Cruz and
reverted him back to his former position.
De La Cruz then filed for a petition for review with the CA which nullified the CSC
decision and the MR
Issue: Whether De La Cruz appointment to that of CASRO is valid.
Held Yes because the requirement for said position is 4 years of work experience in
managerial position and/or 4 years of experience in planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations

pertaining to licensing, rating and checking which De La Cruz, the court held deemed
to have. By the words of the statute it is and/or.
Rodriguez vs Tan
Facts: Rodriguez claims that on 30 Dec 1947 Tan usurped the office of Senator of the
Philippines and until 1949 has collected emoluments that to have been duly elected to
office. Rodriguez seeks for reimbursement of salaries paid to Tan. It must be noted
that T was proclaimed and took oath of office and has discharged duties as senator.
Issue: Whether Tan can be ordered to reimburse the salaries he received during his
encumbency?
Held: No because he, having been proclaimed and assumed office only to be ousted by
an election protest, is a deemed a de facto officer who during the time he held office
is entitled to the emoluments provided by the constitution. Emoluments must go to
the person who rendered the service unless the contrary is proved.
Monroy vs. CA digest 20 SCRA 620
Facts: Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal when he filed to the
COMELEC on Sept 15, 1961 his certificate of candidacy (COC) for congressman for
the coming election. 3 days later Monroy filed a letter withdrawing his COC which
the COMELEC approved.
On 21 Sept. Vice Mayor del Rosario took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the
theory that Monroy had forfeited the office upon his filing of COC
The CFI of Rizal held in the suit for injunction by Monroy against del Rosario that (a)
Monroy had ceased to be mayor after his COC was filed and (b)del Rosario became
municipal mayor upon his having assumed office on 21 September and (c) Monroy
must reimburse as actual damages the salaries to which del Rosario was entitled as
Mayor from 21 Sep 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office.
The CA upheld this decision except for the grant of moral damages hence the petition
to the SC
Issue: Whether del Rosario is entitled to the salary of the office from 21 Sept (oath of
office) up to the time he can reassume said office.
Held: Yes because a de facto officer is liable to reimburse salaries received to rightful
incumbent. Where a mayor withdrew his certificate of candidacy for congressman
and then reassumed the position of mayor thus preventing vice mayor from
discharging his duties as mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the vice-mayor, as the
rightful occupant of the position of mayor the salaries which he had received

The withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy did not restore Monroy to his former
position. It does not render the withdrawal void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent
legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn
De La Victoria vs. Burgos
The garnishment or attachment of an officers salary is tantamount to a suit against
the state in its own court, which is prohibited except with its concept.
Facts:
Sesbreno filed a case against Mabanto Jr. among other people wherein the court
decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay former a
definite amount of cash. The decision had become final and executory and a
writ of execution was issued. This was questioned in the CA by the defendants.
In the meanwhile, a notice of garnishment was issued to petitioner who was
then the City Fiscal. She was asked to withhold any check or whatnot in
favor of Mabanto Jr. The CA then dismissed the defendants petition and the
garnishment was commenced only to find out that petitioner didn't follow
instructions of sheriff. She is now being held liable
Issue: Whether the trial court is correct in their order to garnish the checks of
Mabanto Jr. from Prosec De La Victoria
Held: No because check belongs to public funds having not being delivered to
Mabanto Jr and Fiscal de La Victoria cannot comply to the execution as he is merely a
custodian of the checks.
Garnishment is considered as the species of attachment for reaching credits
belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger in litigation.
Emphasis is laid on the phrase belonging to the judgment debtor since it is the focal
point
of
resolving
the
issues
raised.
As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of Mabantos salary is public funds. Under
Section 16 of the NIL, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and
revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the
instrument by the maker or drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and
recognize
him
as
the
holder
thereof.

The petitioner is the custodian of the checks. Inasmuch as said checks were
in the custody of the petitioner and not yet delivered to Mabanto, they didn't
belong to him and still had the character of public funds. The salary check of a
government officer or employee doesn't belong to him before it has been
physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has
no power over it, he cannot assign it without the consent of the government.
*If public funds would be allowed to be garnished, then basic services of the
government may be hampered
People vs Jalosjos
Facts: Jalosjos, then a congressman, was confined at the national penitentiary while
his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed
a motion to be allowed to discharge his duties as a congressman including attendance
at legislative session and committee hearings
Issue: Whether Jalosjos may be allowed to attend congressional sessions and
committee hearings
Held: No because of the following reasons 1. No one is above the law and allowing
him liberty will create inequality 2. Immunity form arrest given to members of
congress cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. While
temporary leaves are allowed for emergency, attending to congress sessions for 5 days
a week is not emergency and will make him virtually a freeman and will be a
mockery of the correction system.

Mecano vs COA
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was
hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of
which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which
he is claiming from the COA. Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses
on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his
7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC

had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely
for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.
Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991
by Secretary Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The
COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative
Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, and as effect will abrogate Mecanos right
for reimbursement?
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for
benefits.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the
new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication
are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Regarding respondent's contention that
recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State
Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by
other agencies of the government."

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

FACTS: Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the
union's demands concerning the implementation of their CBA (Collective bargaining
agreement). SSS filed an injunction contending that the petitioners are covered by
Civil Service laws which prohibits employees of the government from staging a strike.
SSSEA (Social Security Employees Association) on the other hand, argued that the
NLRC has the jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: 1. whether or not the court have jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not employees covered by the Civil Service have the right to strike?
HELD:
1. On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under BP 129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages
and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor
Code do not apply to government employees.
2. On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful
concerted activities. On the other hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service
law and rules governing concerted activities in government service shall be
observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. Referring
to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees, enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officials and employees from staging a strike, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, they are therefore
prohibited from doing so.
Mecano vs. COA

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled
to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC).
Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the
same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored
his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary
Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other
hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioners claim for
benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the
new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication
are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.
Medenilla vs. CSC:

This is a petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the Civil Service
Commission which disapproved the appointment of the petitioner to the position of
Supervising Human Manpower Development Officer.
Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations
Officer II.
In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued
within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing
pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was
issued.
Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising
Human Resource Development Officer.
On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position.
On January 27, 1989, respondents Amparo Dellosa, Rosalinda Juria and Marita
Burdeos together with Matilde Angeles, Catalina Espinas, Alicia Nercelles and Ramon
Racela, all of whom are employees in the Human Resource Training and Material
Development Division, Administrative and Manpower Management Service of the
DPWH, jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization
contesting the appointment of the petitioner to the position.
The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them
should have been appointed to the said position.
On August 2, 1989, the task force on reorganization dismissed the protest. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:
Premises considered, the Task Force on Reorganization Appeals finds
the instant protest of Matilde Angeles, et al. without merit and hereby
recommends to the Honorable Secretary that the appointment of
Ardeliza Medenilla to the contested position of Supervising Human
Resource Development Officer be upheld. (Rollo, p. 26)
Not satisfied, the private respondents appealed the decision to the Civil Service
Commission. The Commission found:

On the onset, it appears that protestee Medenilla does not possess the
required qualifications for the position. . . . Moreover, her eligibility is
PD 907, being a cum laude graduate. Let it be considered appropriate
only for appointment to "second level positions" which require the
application of knowledge and skills within the appointee's field of
study. (Rollo, p. 28-29)
xxx xxx xxx
Further, it also appears that Medenilla is a contractual employee
assigned or detailed with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administrations and Manpower Management (the appointing
authority) as Public Relations Officer II, while protestants are all
permanent employee of the Division (Human Resources Planning)
where the vancancy exist.
Indeed, RA 6656 does not preclude the appointment of contractuals to
a new staffing pattern, however, in the presence and availability of
qualified permanent next-in-rank employees in the organization, the
latter has to be preferred, unless a contractual employee possesses
superior qualifications that could justify her appointment. However, in
this case, we see no superior qualifications or any special reasons for
preferring Medenilla over the protestants. (Rollo, p. 29)
We find merit in the protest. While as earlier mentioned, the
appointing authority is given the wide latitude of discretion, to sustain
the appointment of Medenilla may give the appointing power
unnecessary opportunities to act capriciously and thus thwart the
natural and reasonable expectation of the officer next-in-rank to any
vacant position, to be promoted to it As held in Millares v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-23281, promulgated August 10, 1967, the Supreme Court held:
We, therefore, hold that in the event of there occurring a vacancy, the
officer next-in-rank must, as far as practicable and as the appointing
authority sees it in his best judgment and estimation, be promoted . . .
and that it is only in cases of promotion, where an employee other than
the ranking one is promoted, is the appointing power under duty to
give "special reason or reasons" for his action . . . .
Again, the special reasons advanced by the appointing authority in this
case is (sic) not enough. Considering further that appointee is not

meeting the minimum qualification standards set by his own office, she
could not be said to possess far superior qualification than those
permanent next-in-rank employees of the Department. (Rollo, pp. 3031)
Thus, on February 28, 1990, the Commission promulgated the assailed resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission
resolved to disapprove the promotional appointment of Ardeliza
Medenilla to the position of Supervising Human Manpower
Development Officer. Accordingly, the appointing authority may
choose from among protestants Amparo Dellosa, Marita Burdeos and
Rosalinda Juria who to promote to the said position. The Civil Service
Field Office is directed to implement this resolution accordingly."
(Rollo, p. 31)
The petitioner on March 23, 1990 filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution.
On May 30, 1990 a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration was also filed.
However, prior thereto, the Commission on May 23, 1990 denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the denial are:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Experience of Medenilla
Medenilla alleges that the Commission failed to appreciate her 3 years
and 8 months of experience directly relevant to Human Resource
Development. Looking more deeply into her experience as reflected in
her CS Form 212, we could not distinguish her experience directly
relevant to the field of Human Resource Development. The
certification of a certain Elvira H. Villania stated her duties in the
Guthrie-Jensen Consultants, Inc. in her one (1) year and (7) months as
Research and Publication Officer of working included "providing
research assistance to our Management Consultants in drawing up
performance appraisal system, merit promotion system and conducting
development for our client-companies." Notwithstanding, assuming
that her 1 year and 7 months experience in the company is relevant,
yet, compared to the experience of the protestants in the field of
Human Resource Development, said experience is obviously
outweighed. There is no dispute that Medenilla has experience as a

Researcher but said experience is basically on the field of journalism

and information. (Rollo, p. 35)
xxx xxx xxx
4. Education background and eligibility of Medenilla.
. . . Notwithstanding, we are inclined to reconsider our position that
the educational background is not relevant. AB may therefore be taken
as a relevant degree for purposes of qualifying to the position. As such,
her PD 907 eligibility may be considered appropriate." (Rollo, p. 37)
xxx xxx xxx
Granting for the sake of argument that the DPWH adhered to its rules
relative to reorganization, is at this point, no longer material and
controlling. What is now the issue is whether Medenilla indeed
possesses superior qualifications over any of the protestants. (Rollo, p.
38)
xxx xxx xxx
The edge of 1.30% of Medenilla over Dellosa cannot be considered by
this Commission significant enough to presume and declare that
Medenilla possesses far superior qualifications over the protestant and
to warrant the appointment of a contractual employee over a
permanent employee of the Department. (Rollo, p. 39)
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner interposes the following grounds:
I
The resolutions were issued by the Respondent Commission, without
giving notice to the petitioner of the existence of an appeal filed before
the CSC, thereby denying the petitioner due process of law.
II
The Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in disapproving the appointment of

the petitioner. Its function, is limited only to determine whether the

appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and not
whether another is more qualified than the petitioner.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court on July 10, 1990, issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission from implementing the
assailed resolutions.
Anent the first ground, the petitioner contends that she was not notified by the Civil
Service Commission of the existence of the appeal before it. The resolutions,
therefore, were allegedly issued in violation of the petitioner's constitutionally
guaranteed due process of law.
The public respondent, on the other hand, advances the argument that what due
process abhors is not lack of previous notice but the absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. Since the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, she cannot now
complain that she was deprived of due process.
The petitioner's first contention is without merit.
"Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present
before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and
property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and
to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the
question of the light in the matter involved." (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p.
590)
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is
not always the cornerstone of due process. (Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921 [1966];
Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 [1974]; Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989). What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard. (Tajonero v. Lamarosa, 110 SCRA 438 [1981])
In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
(see De Leon v. Comelec, 129 SCRA 117 [1984])
The second contention of the petitioner alleges that the Commission acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disapproving her appointment.

The public respondent views it otherwise. The Civil Service Commission asserts that
being the Central Personnel Agency of the Government, it is the final arbiter on civil
service matters.
The Commission alleges, that, pursuant to RA 6656, the Commission is authorized to
act on appeals by aggrieved employees in the course of reorganization and, therefore,
it has the power to reverse or modify any decision brought before it on appeal.
The petitioner's second contention is impressed with merit.
The qualification standards for the contested position are as follows:

EDUCATION EXPERIENCE CIVIL SERVICE

REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ELIGIBILITY
Bachelor's degree 2 years of Manpower-Youth
relevant to the job experience in Development
with at least human resource Officer
9 units in post development Manpower
Development
Officer
Relevant RA
1080
Relevant
Second Level
Eligibility
Career Service
(Professional)
First Grade

Supervisor
It is not disputed that the petitioner possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility
and requisite educational background. The public respondent itself, in its resolution
dated May 23, 1990, considered the petitioner's PD No. 907 eligibility appropriate for
the position. (Rollo, p. 37)
The controversy then centers on the experience of the petitioner.
The Commission contends that the experience of Medenilla is basically in the field of
journalism and not in Human Resource Development. The Commission also alleges
that since the petitioner is merely a contractual employee, in the absence of superior
qualifications, the private respondents must be preferred not only for the reason that
they are permanent career service employees but most especially because they are
next-in-rank to the disputed position.
In support of its argument, the Commission cited in the disputed resolution, the case
of Millares v. Subido, 20 SCRA 954 where this Court held:
. . . A vacant position shall be filled by promotion of the ranking officer
or employee. And only where, for special reason or reasons of which
the affected officer or employee will be notified, this mode of
recruitment on selection cannot be observed, that the position may be
filled by transfer, or re-employment, or by getting from the certified
list of appropriate eligibles, in that order.
Finally, the public respondent advances the view that, since the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 now provides that the Commission shall "take
appropriate action on all appointment" its authority, therefore, is no longer limited to
the mere approval or disapproval of appointments submitted to it.
A careful review of the records of the case, will reveal that the petitioner possesses
the requisite experience for the contested position.
The petitioner, not only was a cum laude graduate from the University of the
Philippines, she has also acquired plenty of experience in the field of Human
Resource Development, to wit:
She was rated and ranked number one in the Trainor's Training
Program (120 hours) conducted for the DPWH by the Phil-Tao, Inc., a
private firm. Ms. Dellosa was ranked number 7, Mrs. Juria was ranked
number 10; Mrs. Burdeos did not attend the seminar. This training

program was undertaken to strengthen the capabilities of HRD

personnel, and to make them more effective in the discharge of their
functions.
She is a recipient of a special commendation, given by Executive
Director Remedios I. Rikken of the National Commission in the Role of
Filipino Woman, for her efficiency and exemplary performance as a
facilitator in the conduct of the workshops during the Second Congress
of Women in Government. (Letter of Ms. Rikken addressed to Sec.
Estuar attached as ANNEX "B".).
She obtained in her on-going MBA studies at the De La Salle
University, which she pursued as an entrance scholar, the highest grade
of 4.0, equivalent to "Excellent" in 2 HRD related subjects
Organizational Management which call for the integration of
concepts with concrete experience.
She participated in the preparation and dissemination of the corporate
planning processes installed and institutionalized in the DPWH.
Corporate Planning was introduced by Secretary Fiorello R. Estuar and
is now being implemented in all government offices as instructed by
the President.
She conducted orientation/reorientation courses in DPWH Regional
Offices on (a) Management By Objectives and Results Evaluation, the
Performance Appraisal System, and (b) a specifically designed
Performance Appraisal System for DPWH District Engineers and
Division Chiefs, being officially used by the DPWH.
She participated in the conceptualizing and drafting of the Department
Order on the DPWH Incentives and Awards System, set up in
compliance with RA No. 6713." (Rollo, p. 63)
The public respondent failed to consider that the petitioner, in her one year and
seven months experience with Guthrie-Jensen was engaged in research relating to
performance appraisal systems and merit promotion systems which duties are all
related to Human Resource Development.
Precisely, it was because of her experience with Guthrie-Jensen that the petitioner
was detailed from January 1987 until December 1988 in the Office of the Assistant

Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management, where she was asked to
assist in human resource planning.
The rejoinder filed during the proceedings before the Commission, by the Assistant
Secretary for Administrative and Manpower Management, Carolina Mangawang, is
very revealing. The disputed position requires of the holder of the office, skills in
human resource developmental planning, research and statistics. The petitioner
possesses these skills in more than appropriate quantities.
The argument of the public respondent that the petitioner must possess superior
qualifications in order to be preferred over the private respondents deserves no credit.
It can be readily seen that the petitioner possesses superior qualifications. As earlier
stated, she is a cum laude graduate of the University of the Philippines. She was
ranked No. 1 in the department wide training program handled by a private firm.
Two of the respondents were ranked way below while a third did not even
participate. She was commended for exemplary performance as facilitator during the
Second Congress of Women in Government. She received the highest grades from De
la Salle University in her MBA studies. She helped draft the human resource program
for the entire DPWH. Inspire of her being a new employee, she was assigned to
conduct seminars on Performance Appraisal Systems and on Management by
Objectives and Results for the DPWH. She was precisely drafted from a private firm
to assist in human resource planning for the DPWH. Her work is apparently highly
satisfactory as the top administrators of the DPWH not only appointed her but have
asked the respondent Commission to validate the appointment.
The respondents rely on Section 4 of R.A. 6656, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall
be given preference for appointment to new positions in the approved
staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or if there are not
enough comparable positions, to position next lower in rank.
Undoubtedly, old employees should be considered first. But it does not necessarily
follow that they should then automatically be appointed.
The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a
Department for longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater
dedication to the public service. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does

not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into
the government service. If, after considering all the current employees, the
Department Secretary cannot find among them the person he needs to revive a
moribund office or to upgrade second rate performance, there is nothing in the Civil
Service Law to prevent him from reaching out to other Departments or to the private
sector provided all his acts are bona fide for the best interest of the public service and
the person chosen has the needed qualifications. In the present case, there is no
indication that the petitioner was chosen for any other reason except to bring in a
talented person with the necessary eligibilities and qualifications for important
assignments in the Department.
The reason behind P.D. No. 907 (which grants civil service eligibility to college
graduates with at least cum laude honors) of attracting honor graduates into the
public service would be negated if they always have to start as Clerk I and wait for
hundreds of deadwood above them to first go into retirement before they can hope
for significant and fulfilling assignments.
The Commission's reliance on the dictum in Millares v. Subido, 20 SCRA 954 [19671
is misplaced. The ruling in Millares has already been superseded by later decisions.
We have already held in cases subsequent to Millares that the next-in-rank rule is not
absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion (see Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34
[19691). And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made
known to the next-in-rank. The appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is
allowed to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service
eligibility, not necessarily in that order. (see Pineda v. Claudio, supra; Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]) There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must
be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a
vacancy from among the several alternatives provided for by law.
In this case, the contested position was created in the course of reorganization. The
position appears to be a new one. The applicability, therefore, of the next-in-rank rule
does not come in clearly. Besides, as earlier stated, said rule is not absolute. There are
valid exceptions.
Granting for the sake of argument that the case involves a promotional appointment,
the next-in-rank rule must give way to the exigencies of the public service. The intent
of the Civil Service Laws not merely to bestow upon permanent employees the
advantage arising from their long employment but most specially, it is to foster a
more efficient public service. Any other factor must, therefore, yield to the demand
for an effective government, which necessarily entails the appointment of competent,

qualified and proficient personnel. The deliberation of this Court in the case of
Aguilar v. Nieva, Jr., 40 SCRA 113 [19711 is illuminating, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not enough that an aspirant is qualified and eligible or that he

is next-in-rank or in line for promotion, albeit by passive prescription.

It is just necessary, in order for public administration to be dynamic
and responsive to the needs of the times, that the local executive be
allowed the choice of men of its confidence, provided they are qualified
and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite
reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment.
(Emphasis supplied, p. 121)
The point raised by the public respondent that, pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, it is authorized to revoke appointments, must
necessarily fail.
We have already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee is qualified, the
Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It is not
within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the ground that substituting its
judgment for that of the appointing power, another person has better qualifications
for the job.
Once the function is discharged, the participation of the Civil Service Commission in
the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of attestation is to determine
whether the appointee possesses the requisite civil service eligibility, no more than
that is left for the Civil Service Commission to do. (see Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327
[1986]; Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, 171 SCRA 744 [1989]; Secretary Oscar
Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990; Gaspar v. CSC, G.R. No. 90799,
October 18, 1990).
The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of appointment is essentially
discretionary. The discretion to be granted to the appointing authority, if not plenary
must at least be sufficient.
After all, not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the
administration of the office but he is also in the best position to determine who
among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the
position (see Villegas v. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 [1969]). As between the Commission
which only looks into paper qualifications and the appointing authority who views

not only the listed qualifications but also the prospective appointees themselves, the
work to be accomplished, the objectives of the Department, etc., the Court sustains
the Department Head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions issued by the Civil
Service Commission dated February 28, 1990 and May 23, 1990 are SET ASIDE. The
restraining order issued by this Court on July 10, 1990 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Torio vs CSC
FACTS: Executive Order No. 285 issued on July 25, 1987 abolished the General
Services Administration (GSA) including all offices and agencies under it. The
General Printing Office (GPO) which was under the GSA was merged with the
relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) and out of the
merger arose the National Printing Office (NPO) which was placed under the control
and supervision of the Office of the Press Secretary (OPS).
Melanio Torio, was the Chief of the Production Staff of the Printing Division, PIA,
while the petitioner in G.R. No. 100178, Jaime Espanola, was a Bindery Foreman at
the PIA. They continued discharging their functions in a hold-over capacity after the
PIA was merged with the GSA. in accordance with the new staffing pattern of the
NPO, petitioner Torio was temporarily appointed as Assistant Operations
Superintendent of Printing while petitioner Espanola was appointed as Temporary
Supervising Book-binder. Espanola was issued another appointment as Supervising
Bookbinder with a permanent status. Eventually, the position of both were upgraded.
Toria was given a permanent position as Espanola, while Espanola on the other hand,
was given only a notice of the upgrading of his position inasmuch as he was already
holding it in a permanent capacity.
Prior to the appointments of the petitioners to the permanent items, protests were
lodged with the CSC. The protestants were Efren Camacho and Letty Cangayda, the
private respondents.
The CSC issued a resolution in CSC Case No. 796 revoking the appointment of Torio
and ordering those qualified, including Camacho, to be evaluated for the position.
Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, the CSC rendered another resolution in CSC Case
No. 832 cancelling Espanolas appointment and ordering the reappointment of
Cangayda to the position.

These two consolidated petitions assail the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) revoking the appointment of herein petitioners on the ground that
they lacked the necessary civil service eligibility at the time of the issuance of their
appointments
ISSUE: Whether or not the revoking of the appointment of petitioners by the CSC
were valid

RULING: A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary

appointmentthese are two distinct acts of the appointing authority. The fact that
the appointees in the two appointments are one and the same person is purely
incidental. Any irregularities in the former appointment are not to be automatically
carried over to the latter. If the protest is directed against the temporary appointment,
it would be illogical to carry-over the merits of the protest to the subsequent
permanent appointment.
The preceding ruling should not be construed to mean, however, that by the mere
expedient of appointing the temporary appointee to a permanent status, the
appointing authority can deprive the protestant of an opportunity to question the
appointment. First, the protestant is not precluded from filing another protest
directed against the permanent appointment. Second, if it can be shown that the
appointment was purposely done to moot the protest or is characterized by malice,
then corrective action can be taken and, moreover, the erring officials can be
proceeded against administratively.
It must be emphasized that if a protest filed against a temporary appointment is
carried over to the subsequent permanent appointment to the same position of the
same person, an anomalous situation will arise wherein the permanent appointees
security to his position would be jeopardized by considerations outside of his
permanent appointment.
The questioned resolutions of the CSC should be declared inapplicable to the
petitioners because they refer to the temporary appointments which had already
lapsed when they were issued.

At the time of the temporary appointment of petitioner Espanola, a civil service

eligible who was willing to accept the position was available in the person of private
respondent Cangayda. Apparently, there was disregard of the mandate of the law
when Espanolas temporary appointment was issued. Nevertheless, the petitioner has

correctly pointed out that the protest lodged by private respondent Cangayda had
become moot and academic inasmuch as petitioner Espanolas temporary
appointment had already lapsed on February 28, 1989. It is erroneous for the CSC to
treat Cangaydas protest as a continuing one. The same holds true for the protest
lodged by Camacho.