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2
The Cognitive
Science of Deduction
30
Chapter2
programs
that
confronted
logic
make
discrepancies
. Psychologists
experimental
in
order
what
the
it
mind
: A
What
happens
that
they
duce
a novel
from
some
times
how
of
it
have
and
from
account
of
they
formal
based
work
Computational
make
on
their
these
dis -
deduction
might
be
carried
to
out
one
is
of
states
from
to
them
a single
to
action
. Their
to
true
be
of
affairs
is to
given
In
many
of
affairs
,
pro
, they
arrive
that
is
and
some
practical
and
their
at a valid
their
argue
, though
state
aim
. Typically
another
is a perceived
answer
observations
conclusion
point
bound
short
perceptual
imagined
follows
? The
proposition
starting
, which
a deduction
, or
that
from
Level
information
, beliefs
is a course
starting
con
point
is
.
long
are
depends
trary
of
( see
Spinoza
defended
because
extraneous
people
all
, there
anism
. The
leads
naturally
logic
( Leibniz
the
is some
the
, 1765
view
).
1800
attributed
that
the
In
in
an
: deduction
to
recent
years
mind
is furnished
authors
an
other
,
Henle
, or
import
asserts
( 1981
"
with
( Henle
) has
con
mech
. This
, impressed
, " which
- processing
) . These
claims
them
fault
, she
reasoning
at
con
advo
be
from
reasoning
information
be
so
been
seems
faulty
, and
seems
has
, " she
which
content
inference
L . J . Cohen
cannot
, 1854
What
errors
to
of
).
idea
, re - interpret
philosopher
to
any
, it
a valid
found
competence
; Boole
. This
suspect
premises
malfunction
to
might
. Mistakes
never
cases , the
underlying
Kant
extent
is impossible
infallibly
than
view
forget
be
such
to
1677
. " I have
unambiguously
) . In
more
a similar
material
error
psychologists
nothing
the
applying
, as you
( and
is
logical
principles
that
philosophers
) has
that
concerns
principles
sense
inference
premises
say
universal
these
common
by
invalid
controversy
. Some
a set
exercises
to
cated
- standing
logical
on
everyone
curred
the
propositions
, their
people
1978
inference
review
theories
some
conclusion
One
could
people
with
merely
clusion
occur
when
initial
conclusion
( 1962
at
, statements
inferences
will
theories
a preliminary
outline
Theory
start
memories
philosophers
algorithmic
. We
to
, like
everyday
proposed
establish
is , and
and
Deduction
true
to
between
have
investigations
ciplines
show
by
deductions
doctrine
an
inborn
by
the
31
The CognitiveScience
of Deduction
human
invention
think
of
rationally
logic
The
Psychologism
Mill
that
is
1843
judge
to
is
not
Freud
mind
seems
Yet
view
is
its
idea
discovery
relations
properly
no
so
logic
but
it
between
principle
but
and
stances
possible
mistakes
. g
they
are
intuitions
self
of
logic
are
they
are
is
not
1975
is
of
the
however
computational
ally
thinking
examination
level
them
able
with
Dosto
can
intellectual
to
it
Laird
in
People
not
concede
Evans
they
for
checking
discipline
the
point
The
prepare
requires
no
logical
have
the
validity
result
problem
make
1982
where
they
valid
circum
as
them
certain
only
that
1972
deduc
made
errors
to
in
valid
have
these
pushed
rational
make
forgetting
be
because
methods
are
they
away
to
important
an
Revlis
theories
deductions
or
it
as
that
their
people
that
explain
prepared
conscious
full
that
know
refute
Johnson
are
of
not
reasoning
1974
but
the
to
They
premises
that
even
and
that
these
at
invalid
could
Wason
of
is
can
is
attempt
make
observation
do
theorists
manoeuvre
Erickson
makes
sometimes
the
this
deduction
practice
also
misunderstanding
with
. g
competence
in
authors
Freud
they
course
Human
behaviour
of
conclusion
any
and
They
Of
human
that
follow
their
theories
never
The
of
logical
fallible
Nietzsche
ways
not
that
of
the
competence
in
does
valid
it
moreover
deduction
account
of
logical
It
logical
foibles
of
behave
merely
draw
repudiate
view
and
Dostoyevsky
proposed
because
Nietzsche
about
premises
might
Our
but
view
follies
irrationality
or
irrational
separate
they
yevsky
interests
may
rational
provide
have
of
tions
it
They
consequences
with
the
with
best
inherently
1977
the
disagree
thought
by
darker
stressed
psychologists
people
Evans
much
reconcilable
their
guided
render
development
Stuart
inferences
this
for
objective
impossible
rational
Some
to
the
serve
of
invariably
invention
John
those
attacked
contemplates
have
desire
optimally
logical
mind
one
who
this
may
when
hard
those
incapable
see
1884
concerns
take
Indeed
it
and
beings
must
of
human
it
commentators
humanity
of
logic
view
generalization
Frege
the
matter
Other
and
people
of
century
is
valid
that
laws
nineteenth
on
argue
the
competence
not
be
subjective
proposItIons
are
logic
depend
thought
related
that
ultimately
mathematics
of
believed
people
may
and
laws
done
so
These
meta
way
for
Thus
logicians
the
the
to
32
Chapter 2
about
the
status
of
an inference
. Individuals
do
sometimes
cognitive step is made, it becomes possible to reason at the meta- metalevel, and so on to an arbitrary degree. Thus , cognitive psychologists
and devotees of logical puzzles (e.g. Smullyan, 1978; Dewdney , 1989)
can in turn make inferences about meta - cognition . A psychological
theory of deduction therefore needs to accommodate deductive
ways
computational
exist
to
characterize
level . Many
deductive
competence
at the
(1847 ) to Mac -
namara (1986)- have supposed that logic itself is the best medium .
Others , however , have argued that logic and thought differ . Logic is
monotonic, i .e. if a conclusion
follows
it . Further
has a bacterial
infection
case that :
common
- sense dictates
that
the conclusion
should
be withdrawn
33
The CognitiveScience
of Deduction
information . There have even been attempts to develop formal systems of reasoning that are non -monotonic (see e.g. McDermott and
Doyle , 1980). We will show later in the book that they are unnecessary. Nevertheless, logic cannot tell the whole story about deductive
competence.
A theory at the computational level must specify what is computed , and so it must account for what deductions people actually
make. Any set of premises yields an infinite number of valid conclusions. Most of them are banal. Given the premIses
,.
~.
Ann is clever.
Snow is white .
the following conclusions are all valid :
Ann
is
clever
Snow
is
They
must
vidual
when
and
white
be
apart
more
true
given
constraints
The
The
of
that
1964
; johnson
Joe
is
at
an
conveys
more
affairs
Joe
is
which
at
only
home
in
Joe
is
valid
decrease
deductions
1983
Mary
) .
Thus
at
her
is
of
its
must
at
be
least
indi
Hence
guided
three
extra
information
which
false
can
be
of
( see
Bar
conjunction
office
away
traced
possible
- Hillel
such
and
back
to
states
of
Carnap
as :
information
one
they
proportion
sane
the
as
no
them
semantic
out
that
throw
on
Yet
(i .e .
constituents
rules
out
more
states
of
turn
disjunction
semantic
than
to
drawing
life
conclusions
not
rules
and
daily
true
of
suggests
depends
assertion
home
in
their
white
are
dream
information
is
premises
evidence
semantic
- Laird
snow
would
deduction
The
is
philosophy
affairs
the
constraint
concept
medieval
and
that
govern
first
clever
logician
a
logic
white
is
make
than
logical
is
Ann
from
reasoners
by
snow
and
conveys
more
semantic
information
than
the
inclusive
at
home
or
Mary
deduction
it
is
at
cannot
One
that
datum
do
decrease
her
increase
in
support
semantic
office
or
both
semantic
of
information
the
information
constraint
but
is
,
such
as
that
:
it
can
valid
34
Chapter2
Joe is at home .
Therefore , Joe is at home or Mary is at her office , or both .
seem odd or even improper
A second constraint is that conclusions should be more parsimo nious than premises . The following
Ann is clever .
Snow is white .
Therefore , Ann is clever and snow is white .
In fact , logically
conclusion
untutored
individuals
draw a conclusion
(1975 ) argued , there is no need to state the obvious . The develop ment of procedures for drawing parsimonious
conclusions is a chal -
stated in the
new . In
naive individuals
35
e . g . Johnson
is wrong
- Laird
ises . The
three
are
point
is
constraints
straints
or
play
no
that
reasons
, Ch
posits
in
, an
Formal
Rules
Three
main
been
proposed
1 . Foffilal
of
the
that
Fonnal
assumed
rules
are
used
the
role
to
argued
.
children
and
Piaget
operations
No
to
further
the
soning
There
are
demonstrated
pure
logic
in
there
is
as the
rule
Jean
to
deduction
mental
have
) of
originally
containing
ponens
to
e . g . Piaget
actions
set
by
models
logic
modus
own
a
develop
mental
psychologist
of
emphasize
and
early
about
the
, which
, 1953
) . He
reflect
" formal
their
unequivocal
be
introduced
to
the
algebra
than
grounds
order
conclusion
. Theorists
( see
their
to
( or
for
first
yields
) are
Piaget
need
more
that
is
on
operations
teens
,"
. lnhelder
nature
of
formal
inherent
is nothing
constraints
deduce
dominant
. The
late
supposed
operations
calculus
that
internalize
write
of
To
a new
of
conclusions
been
, such
, p . 305
. They
process
interpretations
to
ultimately
are
( 1958
for
long
the
process
( Johnson
search
conclusions
was
children
This
which
inference
logic
that
them
inference
have
derive
of
in -
.
of
question
of
quite
Level
the
counterexamples
theories
may
competence
a set
to reach
con
. They
them
the
the
for
to
Algorithmic
about
way
themselves
, and
of
deductive
, and
for
scientists
that
are
without
formal
theory
conform
rationality
draw
the
any
prem
meets
aware
, which
of
response
any
that
are
in
theory
, to simplify
at
rules
procedures
premises
of
people
inference
3 . Semantic
that
, our
from
conclusions
people
deduction
deductions
cognitive
- specific
of
, the
follow
represented
summary
of
by
valid
that
process
Theory
speaking
that
no
claim
awareness
classes
rules
2 . Content
the
information
: A
) . Logically
mentally
that
semantic
is
not
yields
conclusions
maintain
there
. 3 ) . In
rationality
the
, 1984
conclusions
do
are
part
dependent
, 1983
that
they
direct
Bara
always
. We
Laird
on
and
. There
the
for
deductive
to
since
of
propositional
rejecting
out
this
banal
operations
though
. In
short
, rea -
itself
account
must
correspond
logic
calculus
competence
rule
these
propositional
: we
depend
valid
have
on
,
already
more
conclusions
than
.
36
Chapter2
Moreover
, Piaget
1975
in
; Braine
and
sufficient
detail
for
had
genius
ments
to
is
it
so
to
asking
,
even
great
the
from
that
he
in
to
a
and
vagueness
of
have
; Ennis
his
. He
experi
theory
The
masked
effort
energy
theory
inventing
his
.
no
1960
program
for
himself
often
describe
computer
questions
Piaget
readers
Parsons
failed
modelled
right
but
( see
) , and
be
the
them
Form
more
tics
in
to
left
to
its
under
detect
its
and
Keenan
1969
, 1971
had
in
is
of
quantifier
of
films
equivalent
Some
to
of
his
scope
Everybody
is
two
different
two
quantifiers
Everybody
is
we
the
predicate
For
any
and
can
not
natural
by
loved
by
is
by
some
y .
. As
( see
these
logic
accounts
conform
in
1970
to
the
, a universal
outside
has
, such
no
in
scope
of
negation
clear
- cut
devices
the
relative
for
as :
depending
mean
the
on
scopes
of
somebody
grammar
language
paraphrase
calculus
loved
admired
can
Such
somebody
. It
of
; Lakoff
) . What
of
rules
them
1970
quantifiers
indirectly
linguis
form
fonnal
from
, 1972
quantifier
sentence
of
- Laird
negation
interpretations
x , there
is
admired
are
loved
the
of
in
logical
transformational
English
only
scope
existential
. A
has
which
an
logic
indicating
that
found
the
derived
; Jackendoff
notion
are
films
unlike
by
be
of
existence
be
; Johnson
quantifiers
the
his
the
to
1969
, 1972
the
logical
within
all
can
analyses
inspired
Seuren
; Harman
common
behaviour
Not
analysis
deductions
originally
logical
proposed
presupposed
enable
were
Leech
to
have
often
that
analyses
But
guide
linguists
sentences
e .g .
Linguistics
orthodox
Many
inference
is
for
idiosyncratic
1983
Logical
A
perhaps
it
flaws
was
Rumain
answer
inadequacy
stand
' s logic
or
other
" Loglish
"
( the
is
language
that
resembles
as :
y , such
that
if
a person
then
is
a person
37
The CognitiveScience
of Deduction
It can also mean :
There is somebody whom everybody is loved by .
of logical form
linguistic
frameworks , including
emerged within
38
Chapter2
Chomskyan
general knowledge
can playa
role in determining
the relations it
of the sentence :
theory of deduction
notion
of reasoning as the
Intelligence
knowledge
(e.g.
no procedure
that an argument
is to try to mini -
mize the search problem for valid deductions by reducing the number
of formal rules of inference . In fact , one needs only a single rule to
make any deduction , the so- called
1965 ) :
A or B , or both
C or not - B , or both
... A or C , or both .
" resolution
39
The CognitiveScience
oj Deduction
2 .1 summarizes
proving , which
showing
the
main
steps of
resolution
theorem
leads to a
come part of " logic programming " - the formulation of high level
programming
languages in which
rules
of inference
for
each
connective
. The
programs
maintain
clear distinction between what has been proved and what their goals
are, and so they are able to construct
chains of inference
working
40
Chapter2
Table
simple
example
The
of
deduction
Mary
All
to
is
has
read
( Psychologist
For
any
Not
the
read
some
books
books
into
aim
of
deduction
the
Mary
Step
For
showing
reductio
ad
that
the
absurdum
resultant
set
. e
of
negate
the
propositions
is
"
all
"
Psychologist
all
"
Any
the
"
Some
be
is
by
its
read
its
( Read
Mary
into
have
as
( Read
deleted
replaced
psychologist
book
&
connectives
can
"
&
( Book
psychologists
given
books
some
some
variables
( for
Translate
quantifiers
disjunctions
work
is
function
done
books
returns
( f
so
"
and
by
( the
some
argument
of
Skolem
value
the
presence
called
requires
eliminate
the
function
function
consisting
of
which
some
( Psychologist
Mary
( Not
( Psychologist
( Not
( Read
Step
clauses
is
not
cancels
( Psychologist
they
to
in
simulation
1983
the
logical
common
enable
desired
be
assertion
inconsistent
disjunctions
to
leave
Assertion
of
to
the
the
empty
resolution
set
follows
at
once
in
this
way
because
its
Theories
advocated
as
psychologists
1975
it
these
fonn
for
of
the
both
. g
forward
an
up
their
most
plausible
Braine
1986
posit
premises
make
differences
to
the
Macnamara
theories
their
readers
application
absurdum
been
many
of
further
reduced
conclusion
ad
uses
All
outweighs
to
by
is
reductio
Laird
program
Rips
containing
to
Psychological
by
Johnson
premises
in
assertions
has
logic
The
deduction
mental
any
assertions
out
of
Rules
1975
ing
set
inconsistent
Natural
to
cancel
led
disjunct
Mary
had
Read
both
second
rule
assertions
Fortnal
of
the
Whenever
negation
or
for
Mary
are
resolution
( Psychologist
two
necessary
out
Not
These
rule
( fMary
the
it
Mary
Apply
thus
them
proving
some
with
evaluated
theorem
Translate
InconsIstent
. g
"
have
Mary
conclusion
.
be
resolution
psychologist
psychologists
. .
Step
"
and
we
what
they
outline
least
of
will
minds
Osherson
at
process
Indeed
own
1978
and
backward
initial
but
account
one
chaining
recover
have
three
in
of
The
Cognitive
Science
Johnson
soning
Deduction
Laird
partly
in
of
( 1975
based
Table
. 2
on
along
introducing
41
proposed
natural
with
those
disjunctive
theory
of
deduction
of
the
conclusions
Its
two
propositional
rules
rea
are
other
summarized
theories
The
rule
000
or
leads
( or
to
both
deductions
infonnation
this
If
it
is
I t
is
frosty
frosty
Johnson
or
rules
such
fail
Rumain
ways
their
P2
Second
played
P1
next
make
' t
throw
semantic
many
the
won
"
for
people
inference
be
Yet
played
the
"
the
according
up
of
They
their
differ
and
"
or
the
can
are
from
is
Table
1978
the
to
make
of
forI
. 2
rules
of
has
) 1al
and
formal
number
is
Braine
Johnson
any
in
pri
exploit
series
Braine
format
rule
. g
connect
first
theory
it
for
consequences
approach
in
"
his
its
like
way
for
described
( see
others
the
procedures
to
follow
( and
prepare
Where
have
heart
. 2
and
and
P2
and
avoids
then
to
rule
to
the
Laird
' s
in
proposi
following
the
above
includes
step
example
rule
He
At
the
only
deduction
Braine
used
colleagues
theory
disjunctive
or
game
that
be
natural
so
Therefore
to
to
the
ponens
his
be
and
Table
First
and
in
' t
can
the
on
in
form
then
modus
then
1983
presented
remarked
difficult
proposed
that
and
based
If
won
as
Braine
theories
rules
foggy
assumption
tions
have
unacceptable
be
therefore
one
hypothetical
is
we
seem
would
game
Laird
rule
two
as
thus
it
it
the
auxiliary
ing
mary
and
rule
Therefore
P1
that
away
without
an
for
n .
need
by
for
some
building
their
example
the
auxiliary
effects
rule
rules
directly
into
such
as
the
the
main
Therefore
again
antecedent
allowing
for
This
any
idea
number
is
also
of
adopted
propositions
by
Sperber
in
and
the
Wilson
disjunctive
( 1986
42
Chapter 2
Table 2.2
The principal fonnal rules of inferenceproposedby three psychological
theoriesof deduction
Johnson
-Laird Braine
Rips
Conj unctions
A , B
A
... A
& B
&
... A
Disj unctions
A
or
.' . A
B , not - A
or
... B
Conditionals
If A then
If A
A
or
~ B
B , A
B then
.' . B
C , A
. ' . If A then
,' . C
B
Negated conjunctions
not (A & B ) , A ... B
not (A & B ) 0.. not - A or not - B
negations
not - A
. 0. A
ad absurdum
~ B &
not - B
. . . not - A
Dilemmas
A
or
B , A
~ C , B ~ C
... C
or
B , A
~ C , B ~ D
. . . C or
Introduction of tautologies
. .. A
or
not - A
Notes
" + " indicates that a rule is postulated by the relevant theory .
" A ~ B" means that a deduction from A to B is possible. Braine 's rules
interconnect any number of propositions , as we explain in the text . He
postulates four separate rules that together enable a reductioad absurdumto
be made. johnson - Laird relies on procedures that follow up the separate
consequences of constituents in order to carry out dilemmas.
43
is either
There
a C or an H , then
there
is a P .
is a C .
Therefore
, there
is a P .
The subjects' task was to judge the truth of the conclusion given the
premises. The study examined two potential indices of difficulty the number of steps in a deduction according to the theory , and the
" difficulty weights " of these steps as estimated from the data. Both
measurespredicted certain results: the rated difficulty of a problem ,
the latency of response (adjusted for the time it took to read the
problem ), and the percentage of errors. Likewise , the number of
words in a problem correlated with its rated difficulty
of response
he has simulated
in a program
called ANDS
(A Natural
are summarized
given conclusions
evaluates
the
assertions
that
it
has
derived
. Certain
rules
are
treated
as
auxiliaries that can be used only when they are triggered by a goal , e.g.:
A , B
Therefore
, A and
lfthe program can find no rule to apply during a proof , then it declares
that the argument is invalid . Rips assumes that rules of inference are
, C
44
Chapter 2
had
higher
worth
nothing
called
for
these
the
that
problems
major
are
rules
that
ought
to
apply
from
assign
It
leads
is
content
Content
It
one
out
is
of
Conversely
14
information
content
assertions
use
logic
of
. Yet
is
what
once
it
formal
the
rules
been
rules
argue
interpretation
of
,
radical
of
inference
at
the
they
has
information
premise
(, f
That
,
during
formal
problem
additional
to
on
deductive
proponents
import
make
of
only
form
based
of
of
The
to
reasoners
experiment
Only
chance
theories
form
his
semantic
content
influence
logical
that
than
regardless
reasoners
different
however
specific
its
ponens
logical
content
exerts
away
maintained
the
the
modus
in
thrown
performance
apply
to
of
deductions
be
which
by
their
content
premises
valid
chance
for
affected
rule
better
,
than
are
that
abstracted
the
evaluated
difficulty
rules
:
simple
to
problems
better
people
formal
of
was
16
evaluated
that
half
the
information
other
were
than
semantic
16
of
is
availability
or
to
alternative
that
,
have
- Specific
Rules
Second
Theory
Algorithmic
Level
Content
- specific
artificial
intelligence
gramming
that
each
rely
series
of
leads
to
made
Hence
of
Mary
Paul
on
the
is
is
Mark
which
is
( Programmer
of
can
derived
PLANNER
simple
1971
is
gone
in
much
- like
assertions
such
series
of
Mary
in
Mark
the
following
the
plans
way
proof
actions
goal
proof
- base
before
to
data
de
gone
as
a
pro
many
leading
has
notation
in
hypothetical
and
represented
its
has
same
language
as
and
what
before
the
and
be
workers
in
It
proofs
from
plan
has
) .
programmer
Paul
by
implemented
following
what
be
in
linguist
originally
between
each
by
psychologist
( Psychologist
( Linguist
pioneered
( Hewitt
resemblance
can
set
were
were
conclusion
plan
They
assertions
written
sisting
inference
PLANNER
possible
program
of
language
scendants
is
rules
.
con
A
-
45
The
assertion
to
this
data
All
psychologists
are
expressed
base
are
formulate
not
such
the
if
has
Mary
is
first
( Goal
a
The
goal
tence
rules
of
inference
One
way
to
to
infer
the
goal
truth
base
the
consequent
that
of
for
in
is
is
that
is
psychologist
an
If
the
matches
and
an
to
above
with
sets
assertion
the
up
in
experimenter
"
of
with
conclusions
assertion
base
that
and
effect
so
it
sentence
the
to
following
It
looks
be
goal
fails
for
eval
) )
- chains
supplemented
specific
data
that
by
an
the
matches
Mary
satisfied
Another
is
data
satisfied
inference
specific
the
base
too
using
such
heuristic
advice
formulate
and
which
The
rules
so
the
sen
program
about
con
can
how
to
way
(x )
in
which
to
its
Mary
is
derive
content
- specific
rule
is
is
This
an
to
experimenter
has
program
.
satisfied
by
an
input
assertion
such
as
springs
The
rules
is
psychologist
response
x )
x ) ) )
antecedent
procedure
Mary
( Psychologist
( Experimenter
Wherever
(x )
( Assert
even
( Antecedent
such
data
above
backward
follows
base
the
consequent
is
certain
satisfy
assertion
rule
" Mary
structs
the
can
( Psychologist
This
be
its
an
with
uated
as
experimenter
such
rule
x )
evaluate
searches
find
but
procedure
program
it
to
an
( Experimenter
enables
program
as
by
such
x ) ) )
experimenter
to
is
( Psychologist
which
assertions
rule
(x )
( Goal
assertions
experimenters
as
( Consequent
it
General
life
and
asserts
that
is
an
experimenter
the
effect
can
of
construct
adding
the
forward
further
- chains
assertion
of
to
inference
the
data
using
as
46
Chapter2
47
schema
is intended
to govern
actions
that
occur
within
a frame
similar
schemas
account
for
certain
aspects of deductive
performance.
Content plays its most specific role in the hypothesis that reasoning is based on memories of particular experiences (Stanfill and Waltz ,
1986 ) . Indeed , according to Riesbeck and Schank 's (1989 ) theory of
decide
what
to do on the
basis
of this
case . These
theorists
allow
repre -
Level
Neither formal rules nor content - specific rules appear to give complete explanations of the mechanism underlying deduction . On the
one hand, the content of premises can exert a profound effect on the
conclusions that people draw , and so a uniform procedure for extracting logical form and applying formal rules to it may not account
for all aspects of performance . On the other hand , ordinary individ uals are able to make valid deductions that depend solely on connec -
tives and quantifiers, and so rules with a specific content would have
to rely on some (yet to be fonnulated ) account of purely logical
48
Chapter2
of
to understand the
The CognitiveScience
of Deduction
49
50
Chapter2
Figure2.2
The Euler circle representation of a syllogism .
Deductions from singly- quantified premises, such as "All psychologists are experimenters," can be modelled using Euler circles
(see Figure 2.2). Psychological theories have postulated such representations (Erickson , 1974) or equivalent strings of symbols (Guyote
and Sternberg, 1981). These deductions can also be modelled using
Venn diagrams (see Figure 2.3) or equivalent strings of symbols, and
they too have been proposed asmental representations (Newell , 1981).
A uniform and more powerful principle , however , is that mental
51
The CognitiveScience
of Deduction
Figure2.3
The Venn diagram representation
of a syllogism .
models have the same structure as human conceptions of the situations they
represent (Johnson - Laird , 1983 ) . Hence , a finite set of individuals
set of mental
tokens
. A
similar
notion
of a " vivid
" representa
structure
of the
models
. This
structure
, which
we
will
examine
in
52
Chapter
2
of mental
to the conclusions
that they
model
theory
adherents of formal
memory
pro -
(Baddeley , 1986 ) .
has attracted
considerable
criticism
from
unclear ,
response here
inadequate :
Conclusion
We have completed
three algorithmic
theories
of deduction . Despite many empirical findings , it had proved impos sible to make a definitive
53
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