Evidence - Cases

1.
People vs Samus
[G.R. Nos. 135957-58. September 17, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GUILLERMO SAMUS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
While it is true that the confessions of appellant were made without benefit of
counsel, they are still admissible in evidence because of appellants failure to make
timely objections before the trial court. If only the defense had proffered them on time,
the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard a major portion of the prosecutions case at a late stage
during an appeal goes against the norms of fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is
dispensed not only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be that as it may, and
even if we now affirm appellants conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with
the trial courts imposition of the death sentence, because the proven aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the Information.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision [1] dated October 8, 1998, issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, in Criminal Case Nos.
5015-96-C and 5016-96-C. The trial court found Guillermo Samus guilty beyond
reasonable of two counts of murder. The decretal portion of its Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE:
A. With respect to Criminal Case No. 5015-96-C for the killing of Dedicacion Balisi,
the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of, after appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up to 20 years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi the amount
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for her death and another FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as and for moral and actual damages and cost of
suit.
B. With respect to Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C for the killing of John Ardee Balisi, this
Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of, after appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, death.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee Balisi the amount
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for his death and another FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as and for moral and actual damages and cost of
suit.[2]
Two separate Informations,[3] both filed on November 27, 1996, [4] charged appellant
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 5015-96-C
That on or about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of September 2, 1996 at San Ramon de
Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold the neck, strangle and thereafter
bange[d] the head on the concrete pavement floor of one DEDICACION BALISI Y
SORIANO, a 61 years of age, woman, thereby inflicting upon her fractured bones,
serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death, to the damage and
prejudice of the surviving heirs of the said Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano.
That in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength were in attendant and
ordinary aggravating circumstance committing a crime with disregard of respect due the
offended party by reason of her age and sex.
Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C
That on or about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of September 2, 1996 at San Ramon de
Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold the neck, strangle and thereafter
bang[ed] the head on the concrete pavement floor of one JOHN ARDEE BALISI Y
SORIANO, a six year old boy, thereby inflicting upon him fractured bones, serious and
mortal wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
surviving heirs of the said John Ardee Balisi y Soriano.
That in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength were in attendan[ce].
[5]
When arraigned on May 28, 1997, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty.[6] In due course, he was tried and found guilty.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the
prosecution in this wise:[7]
Appellant was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay
Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old Dedicacion Balisi and
her grandson, six (6) year old John Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of appellants
father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna.
At 4:20 P.M. on September 2, 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia
was at his office at the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp
Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he received an order from his superior to
investigate the murder of the two victims. Their office had received a telephone call
from a local barangay official informing them of the victims deaths.
Arriving at the victims residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang,
Calamba, Garcia and his team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the
relative positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime scene and taking
pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his
superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants,
a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the
house. A pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from
her body by her daughter, Nora B. Llore[r]a.
The victims bodies were brought to the Funeraria Seerez de Mesa in Calamba where
Senior Inspector Joselito A. Rodrigo, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, performed an autopsy. His findings showed that John sustained three (3)
contusions, one of which lacerated his liver, caused by a blunt instrument, while
Dedicacion suffered four (4) contusions, also caused by a blunt instrument.
On that same day, September 2, 1996, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of
Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of appellant, happened to meet
appellant at Sammy Pachecas house in the same barangay where appellant asked
Ponciano to accompany him to Poncianos wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Poncianos
wife was mad at first but upon Poncianos prodding, gave appellant P300.00 with no
interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, appellant received
another P250.00.
At 6:00 P.M. on September 10, 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation
Group received information that appellant was the principal suspect in the killing of the
two (2) victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly and Josie
Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team
composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario
Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay
authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house, which was
granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside,
they saw appellant crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly
jumped from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle
and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on
appellant who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from
Rolly Vallejo.
Appellant was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was
informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of
September 11, 1996, appellant, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement
admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle driver
Rafael Baliso, the victims relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and witness Mary
Arguelles, who saw appellant enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi.
On the same day, September 11, 1996, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra
took fingerprint samples from appellant. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints
found at the crime scene on September 2, 1998. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was
able to recover the pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3
Malabanan. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Alleging denial and alibi as defenses, appellant presents his version of the incident
as follows:[8]
Mrs. Fe Vallejo testified that she knew Guillermo Samus. At about 6:00 p.m. of
September 10, 1996, Guillermo Samus was in their house. It was then that CIS
operatives together with their Brgy. Captain entered their house, arrested and
handcuffed Guillermo Samus. It was not true that accused Guillermo Samus hid himself
on the roof of her house. When the accused was arrested by the CIS men, together
with the barangay officials, the other persons present were the witness and her 3
children. The police were not armed with a warrant of arrest or search warrant.
Accused Guillermo Samus denied the accusations against him. He testified that he
was a farmer, working on the land of one Miguel Completo at Brgy. Niugan,
Cabuyao. From 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of September 2, 1996, he was harvesting palay
with Eligio Completo; that he never left the farm. He took his lunch at the hut of Miguel
Completo; that he arrived home at 6:00 in the afternoon, took his dinner then went to
sleep.
He further testified that on September 10, 1996, he was at the house of his friend, Rolly
Vallejo at Brgy. Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, when a group of CIS operatives arrived
and arrested him inside the same house. It was not true that he jumped from the roof of
the house. The CIS people did not have any warrant for his arrest. His kumpadre Rolly
Vallejo was not present at that time. He was brought to Camp Vicente Lim where he
was tortured until he lost his consciousness. On the same night, he was brought to a
hospital, was given medicine, then brought back to the cell where he was handcuffed at
the door of the cell. The CIS got hold of the medical certificate. He was forced by the
CIS to admit the killing of the victims and the sale of jewelry by means of torture and
threat.
He also testified that he was forced to execute a document admitting the killing. He
was forced to sign said document. He did not know Atty. Juliano and did not talk to
him. The victims were the neighbors of his father in the province. He had been in the
house of Dedicacion Balisi. He was known to Dedicacion Balisi and her household;
and, that the last time he visited the house of Dedicacion Balisi was on August 30,
1996. He was given food by Dedicacion and he later washed dishes, swept the floor,
and put dirt in the trash can. He left at 12:00 p.m. that same date and returned to his
house in Brgy. Niugan.
On cross-examination, he testified that from Brgy. Niugan to San Ramon de Canlubang
it took less than 15 minutes to travel, and he also mentioned that the media interviewed
him 2 days after his arrest. He and his relatives in Laguna did not have the capacity to
hire/secure the services of a lawyer.
The defense also presented Exhibit B (and submarkings), the transcript of

stenographic notes of the testimony of Atty. Juliano, given before the Municipal Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna on December 1, 1997 in connection with [C]riminal [C]ase
[N]o. 26099, also against Guillermo Samus for theft (of the earrings). The prosecution
admitted the existence of said exhibit and the presentation of the witness who was
supposed the identify the same was dispensed with. (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Rejecting his alibi for being unreliable and
uncorroborated, it convicted him of homicide for the death of Dedicacion Balisi; and of
murder, with dwelling as aggravating circumstance, for the death of John Ardee Balisi.
Hence, this automatic review.[9]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:[10]
I
The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimonies of police officers to
the effect that the accused tried to escape when he was arrested and that he readily
admitted responsibility for the crimes.
II
The lower court gravely erred in admitting and considering evidence that were obtained
in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights.
III
The lower court gravely erred in holding that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to warrant the conviction of the accused.
IV
The lower court gravely erred when it ruled that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the killing of John Ardee Balisi.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Arrest of Appellant
As a general rule, the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the witnesses
is accorded great respect, if not finality. In the present case, however, there are cogent
reasons to disregard its findings with respect to the arrest of appellant on September
10, 1996.
The police officers version of the arrest is incredible. Not only are their allegations
uncertain and inconsistent, they are also contrary to human experience. We find it hard
to believe that anyone would jump from the roof of a two-story house to escape and,
after landing on the ground without any broken bones, make a complete turnaround and
just meekly surrender without further ado. Even if this story were true, jumping from a
roof is not a crime that would justify the warrantless arrest of appellant.
It is undisputed that when the CIS team went to the Vallejo residence on the
evening of September 10, 1996, it had no warrant of arrest against appellant. Yet, they
arrested him. Under the Rules,[11] peace officers may, without a warrant, arrest a person
under any of these circumstances: (a) when, in their presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense;
(b) when an offense has just been committed, and they have probable cause to believe,
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another, or from a penal establishment
where he or she is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while the case is
pending.
None of these circumstances was present when members of the Criminal
Investigation Group (CIG) arrested appellant. He was not a prisoner. The killing of
Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi was not done in the presence of the arresting
officers. Since it took place on September 2, 1996, it could not have been considered
as having just been committed. Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant on
September 10, 1996. When they did so, we cannot ascribe to them the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions, contrary to the court a quos finding.
Considering that the arrest of appellant was unlawful, the apprehending officers
uncertainty and reluctance in admitting it becomes understandable. In their Joint
Affidavit executed on September 11, 1996, they alleged that he had voluntarily
surrendered to them. On the other hand, he had allegedly been merely invited by Chief
Inspector Jose Pante, according to SPO3 Alex Malabanan. It was only upon being
pressed that the police officers admitted that they had indeed made the arrest. [12]
We now proceed to the alleged confession. In their Joint-Affidavit, the arresting
officers said that after appellant had initially jumped from a two-story house to escape,
they closed in on him and he voluntarily surrendered. At the same place where he did
so, they conducted a preliminary interview, during which he readily admitted killing
Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi.
But during their testimonies, the police officers denied questioning appellant after
arresting him. Instead, they claimed that it was Rolly Vallejo who had conducted the
preliminary interview in their presence as follows: Pare totoo ba ang sinasabi nila
tungkol sa iyo na ikaw ay pinaghihinalaan nilang pumatay sa mag-lola sa
Canlubang[?]; to this question appellant allegedly answered, [T]otoo nga pare, ako
nga. No further questions were allegedly asked by the law enforcement
officers. Instead, they immediately brought appellant to Camp Vicente Lim for further
investigation.
SPO3 Mario Bitos, on the other hand, stated in his Affidavit, also dated September
11, 1996, that during the conduct of the preliminary interview, appellant admitted that
the victims pair of earrings made of gold was taken by him after the incident and x x x
sold to Mr. Jhun Pontanos y Matriano, a resident of Bgy. Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna, for
the amount of five hundred (P500) pesos.
During his testimony, however, Bitos denied that they had conducted any
investigation.[13] Instead, he claimed that upon their arrival at Camp San Vicente Lim, an
interview was conducted by the media in the presence of Major Pante, SPO3 Bitos and
SPO3 Malabanan (the investigator). [14] From this interview, the team was able to cull
from appellant that he was responsible for the killings, and that he had stolen the
earrings of Dedicacion Balisi and sold them to Pontanos for P500. This information was
allegedly verified by Bitos upon the order of Major Pante.
Thus, the apprehending officers contend that the constitutional rights of appellant
were not violated, since they were not the ones who had investigated and elicited
evidentiary matters from him.
We are not persuaded. The events narrated by the law enforcers in court are too
good to be true. Their Sworn Statements given a day after the arrest contradict their
testimonies and raise doubts on their credibility.
We find the claims of appellant more believable, supported as they are by Fe Vallejo
who testified that he had been arrested inside her house, and that Rolly Vallejo was not
around then.
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself -- such as [that which] the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of
judicial cognizance.[15]
Second Issue:
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody
cannot be admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, the
turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto
should be excluded for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
We clarify. After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial
investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence.
In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that appellant was subjected to
a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt
this issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned appellant, and that
they were merely present during the interview.
However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the
folly of their crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. SPO4 Arturo Casis
testified as follows:
FISCAL:
Q: And after that what did you do with the accused Guillermo Samus?
WITNESS:
A:
He went with us voluntarily in Camp.
Q: Camp what?
A:
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna.
Q: After arriving at Camp Vicente Lim what happened there?

A:
We turned over him to our investigator CIS.
Q: To whom in particular?
A:
SPO3 Alex Malabanan, sir.
Q: What was the purpose for your turning over the accused to Alex Malabanan?
A:
To ask him question and to investigate him.
Q: Before that when you arrived at the camp, did you see many people at the
camp?
A:
I noticed some reporters were there.
Q: Where were the reporters at that time?

A:
In our office.
Q: Do you know the reason why these reporters were there at that time?
A
They used to hang out at our office because they have a press office holding in
our office.
Q: Did you notice these press people when you brought Guillermo Samus to the
camp?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q: What did they do when you arrived?

A:
They keep on asking who is this fellow we have arrested.
Q: Did anyone answer them?

A:
Its up for the investigator and Maj. Pante.[16]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: And the apprehending team did not ask question regarding the alleged
involvement of Guillermo Samus to the kiling?
A:
At the office, sir.[17]
On the other hand, SPO3 Bitos declared:

Q And you said that in your earlier testimony that Guillermo Samus was
immediately brought to Camp Vicente Lim which is your headquarters after his
arrest on September 10, 1996, is that correct?
A
Yes, sir.
And you said that the purpose of bringing Guillermo Samus to your headquarters
on that day after his arrest was for further investigation, is that correct?
Yes, sir.
The member of the CID once Guillermo Samus was there in your custody at
Camp Vicente Lim he was immediately investigated right then and there in the
headquarters, is that correct?
He was interviewed by the media people upon the arrival of said suspect. We
were not able to conduct the investigation because of the media people who was
also asking question from him, sir.
Who authorized the media people to propound questions to Guillermo Samus

when he was at your headquarters in the night of September 10, 1996?
I think nobody has given the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation with
Guillermo Samus that is why we were bother our investigation because these
media people were conducting immediate interview with that suspect, sir. [18]
xxx
xxx
xxx
For his part, SPO3 Malabanan gave the following testimony during his crossexamination:
Q By the way, what time did Guillermo Samus finish giving the statement to the
media people on the night of September 10, 1996?
I cannot recall the exact time as to when he finished but I think it is past 8:00
oclock, sir.
If you know the reason, can you tell us why Guillermo Samus had to be
presented to the media first before you as an investigator assigned to the case
actually take his statement?
May I request, your Honor that the statement of the witness transpired in the
vernacular be quoted (sila na po and nag-interview).
Because when we arrived at that time the press people were already there and
we can no longer prevent from asking or conducting an investigation or interview
because the case is already on public knowledge.
ATTY. MANALO:
Q
So, after 8:00 p.m. when Guillermo Samus had already finished giving his
statement to the media, do you know where Guillermo Samus was brought?
WITNESS:
A
Yes, sir.
Can you tell us where?
Yes, sir. After that Guillermo Samus was brought to our office and Maj. Pante
talked to him, sir.
And do you know where Guillermo Samus spent the night?
Yes, sir.
Can you tell us where?
In our stockade, sir.[19]
The above testimonies do not tie up. Casis categorically stated that appellant had
been turned over to SPO3 Malabanan. Appellant noticed reporters in their office, but he
did not answer their questions. SPO3 Bitos alleged that the interview by the media
could not have been prevented, because it was an ambush interview. Meanwhile,
SPO3 Malabanan claimed that when he arrived at the camp, there were already
reporters questioning appellant. Malabanan further narrated that after 8:00 p.m.,
appellant was brought to the office where Major Pante talked to him.
In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly
interviewed appellant, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and
led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated appellant
and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the
Affidavits they executed on September 11, 1997, as well as by their testimonies on
cross-examination.
Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under
the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellants failure to make
timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense
failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is
deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. [20]
Can the testimony of Pontaos and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the
turnover receipt, which appellant identified during his testimony, be considered
inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and hence be disregarded at this stage of
appeal?
Upon examination of the records, we find that during the entire examination in court
of Prosecution Witness Pontaos, appellant did not question or object to the
admissibility of the formers testimony. Worse, the latters counsel even freely crossexamined the witness without any reservations. Having made no objection before the
trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal. [21] The
evidence having been admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject it.
If only appellant had made a timely objection to the admissibility of the said
testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional
evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case
at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that
which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
Third Issue:
Circumstantial Evidence
No one saw who killed Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi. However, to prove
appellants culpability for their deaths, the prosecution presented the following
circumstantial evidence:
1. Finger and palm prints matching appellants own were found near bloodstains
at the scene of the crime.
2. Dedicacion Balisi owned a pair of earrings that she wore every day. Those
earrings were missing from her dead body. Appellant pawned those same
earrings to Ponciano Pontaos wife on the afternoon of September 2, 1996.
3. Appellant admitted killing Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi, whose dead
bodies were found inside their residence on the afternoon of September 2,
1996.
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction, if (a) there is more than
one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences have been derived are
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such that it produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one
other, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be that the
accused is guilty. They must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically
believable, that pinpoints the accused -- to the exclusion of others -- as the perpetrator
of the crime and thereby sufficiently overcomes the presumption of innocence in his or
her favor.[22]
In the present case, it is indisputable that someone entered the house
of Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi, and that someone killed them and left the house
with Dedicacions earrings.
The left palm and right thumb prints of appellant near the bloodstains found on the
kitchen tiles, together with other blood-smudged fingerprints, lead to no other
reasonable conclusion except that he was in the house in the afternoon when the victim
died. Considering that the former had bloodstained hands, it can reasonably be
deduced that his hands were responsible for producing the flow of blood (shown in the
pictures marked as Exhibits E to 7) from the heads of Dedicacion and John Ardee
Balisi.
The act of appellant -- pawning the earrings of Dedicacion Balisi on the same
afternoon of her death -- is consistent with, and further supports the conclusion that he
was at the crime scene around the time of her killing.
The absence of any indication of the presence of any person other than appellant at
the locus criminis around the time of the victims deaths further bolsters the hypothesis
that he, to the exclusion of all others, was the one who killed them.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent
with one other, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom is that
appellant is guilty of killing Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi.
The prosecution evidence, taken together with the extrajudicial admissions of
appellant, passes the test of moral certainty and establishes beyond reasonable doubt
that he was the person who killed the victims.
Alibi
Appellants uncorroborated alibi -- that he was at the farm in Cabuyao, Laguna -was correctly debunked by the court a quo. We have nothing to add to the trial courts
short and straightforward discussion of the matter, which we reproduce hereunder:
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Torrifiel, 326,
Phil. 388). By the accuseds own admission, the distance between his alleged
whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offense and the scene of the crime
was a fifteen minute drive. To the mind of this court, the accuseds presence at the
scene of the crime is not impossible.[23]
Fourth Issue:
Crime and Punishment
The testimony of Salvacion Balisi, as well as the Birth Certificate of John Ardee
Balisi (Exhibit II),[24] prove that John was only six (6) years old at the time of his
death. As correctly ruled by the court a quo, the killing of [the] child [was] characterized
by treachery because the weakness of the victim due to his tender age resulted in the
absence of any danger to the accused. [25] Indeed [i]t has time and time again been
held that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be
expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner
of attack was not shown.[26] Indubitably, treachery qualified the killing of six-year-old
John Ardee Balisi as murder.
As for the death of Dedicacion Balisi, however, none of the qualifying circumstances
alleged in the Information was proven by the prosecution. Hence, appellant can be
convicted of homicide only.
In either of the two cases, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be
appreciated against appellant, simply because it was not alleged in the Information. [27]
There being no aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty for the
homicide[28] of Dedicacion Balisi is reclusion temporal in its medium period. In this case,
appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the same
reason, reclusion perpetua -- not death -- is the correct penalty that should be imposed
on appellant for the murder[29] of John Ardee Balisi.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
(Branch 36) is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS : in Criminal
Case No. 5015-96-C, the maximum of the penalty is reduced to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal medium; in Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C, the penalty is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
2. Rico vs. People
[G. R. No. 137191. November 18, 2002]
BEN B. RICO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision[1] dated June 15, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19764, affirming the judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City which found the petitioner guilty of five counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and the resolution [3] dated January 7,
1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Ben Rico was a pakyaw contractor who used to purchase construction
materials on credit from private complainant Ever Lucky Commercial (ELC),
represented by Victor Chan, Manager. Petitioner made payments either in cash or by
postdated checks. On several occasions, he issued checks to ELC, which were
dishonored by the bank upon presentment for payment for insufficiency of funds or
closed account, as follows:
CHECK NO.
DATE
04142
Nov. 5, 1990
1759806
Apr. 19,
1990
Apr. 20,
1759808
DATE
OFDISHONO
R
Nov. 13, 1990
Apr. 20, 1990
Apr. 23, 1990
REASON
FORDISHONO
R
Insufficient
funds
Insufficient
funds
Account Closed
AMOUNT
P 81,800.00
25,000.00
4,834.00
1759810
1759812
1759811
1990
Apr. 11,
1990
Apr. 11,
1990
May 2,
1990
Apr. 16, 1990

Apr. 16, 1990
May 3, 1990
Insufficient
funds
Insufficient
funds
Account Closed
TOTAL
39,000.00
15,250.00
12,550.00
P178,434.00
Consequently, petitioner was charged under several informations docketed as

Criminal Cases Nos. 5796, 5797, 5798, 5799 and 5800 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. The information in Criminal Case No. 5796 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 1990, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue Check No. 04142 in the amount
of Eighty One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P81,800.00), dated November 5, 1990,
drawn against the Philippine Commercial and International Bank, Laoag City Branch, in
favor of the Ever Lucky Commercial, as payee, in payment of construction materials
which he purchased on credit from the said Ever Lucky Commercial, located at Brgy.
No. 12, Gen. Segundo Ave., Laoag City, of which Mr. Victor Chan is the Gen. Manager,
knowing fully well that he had no sufficient funds deposited with the drawee bank to
cover the payment thereof, as in fact it was dishonored when presented for payment to
the drawee bank on November 13, 1990, on the ground that it was drawn against
insufficient funds, and the accused, despite due notice to him of the dishonor of said
check had not paid the amount thereof nor had he made arrangements for its payment
in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the Ever Lucky Commercial in the amount
ofP81,800.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The other informations are similarly worded, except for the check number and their
amounts and the dates of issue which are hereunder itemized as follows:
CRIMINAL
CASE NO.
5797
5798
5799
5800
CHECK NO.
1759806
1759808
1759810
1759812
1759811
DATE
Apr. 19, 1990
Apr. 20, 1990
Apr. 11, 1990
Apr. 11, 1990
May 2, 1990
AMOUNT
P
P
P
P
P
25,000.00
4,834.00
39,000.00
15,250.00
12,550.00
The five informations were consolidated by the lower court. Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges, and trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that petitioner, who used to purchase construction
materials on credit from ELC, issued the above-cited checks as payment for the
materials and that they were dishonored upon presentment for payment to the bank
either for insufficient funds or account closed. After the checks were dishonored,
ELC demanded payments from petitioner, who failed to make good his undertaking to
replace the checks. No formal written demand letter or notice of dishonor, however,
was sent to the petitioner. It was also established by the prosecution that ELC, through
its manager, issued several receipts covering several payments in various amounts
made by petitioner as replacement of some dishonored but returned checks as well as
for payment of materials purchased. No official receipts covering the materials
purchased, however, were presented in court as evidence. [5]
In his defense, petitioner did not deny that he issued the subject checks and that
they were dishonored upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank. He
claimed, however, that he already paid the amounts covered by the checks,
totalling P284,340.50, including interest. In support thereof, he submitted as evidence
the following official receipts issued by ELC [6]
OFFICIAL RECEIPT
NO.
3290
3298
3411
3683
3866
TOTAL
DATE
AMOUNT
Apr. 24, 1990

Apr. 27, 1990
May 3, 1990
Sept. 4, 1990
Jan. 5, 1991
P 65,000.00
90,733.50
10,000.00
68,607.00
50,000.00
P284,340.50
According to petitioner, the difference between the total amount as reflected in the
receipts and the total amount covered by the subject checks represented interest. [7] He
also admitted that he did not retrieve the dishonored checks as they were not yet fully
paid.[8]
On March 13, 1996, the trial court rendered its judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 5796, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of
ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P81,800.00;
SIX (6) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P25,000.00;
THREE (3) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P4,834.00;
ONE (1) YEAR Imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P54,250.00; and
SIX (6) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P12,550.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In convicting petitioner, the trial court noted that petitioner had admitted the
issuance and dishonor of the subject checks, and he could not escape criminal liability
as it found his defense of payment off-tangent. [10] It ruled that the alleged payments do
not apply to the subject checks but for the other materials purchased, and granting they
were applicable, they could only affect his civil liability.[11] Further, the trial court
concluded that a mathematical computation of the payments made by the petitioner visa-vis the subject checks did not give credence to the stance of petitioner. The trial court
found it illogical for petitioner to have paid more than the amounts covered by the
subject checks without a single alleged payment matching any of the amounts written in
the subject checks, and with petitioner paying more than his outstanding liabilities at
some point.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals found petitioners defense of payment
untenable and not proven by clear and convincing evidence. It further stated that even
if there were payment, petitioner failed to prove that it was made within five days from
receipt of notice of dishonor.[13] In relation thereto, it ruled that the testimonial evidence
of private complainant declaring that immediate demands to pay were made on
petitioner is in themselves notices of dishonor.[14] Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1999.
Hence, this petition raising issues based on the alleged errors of the appellate court.
MAIN ISSUE:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IN THE FIVE (5) CRIMINAL
CASES IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE VIOLATION OF BP
BILANG 22 AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY IMPOSED
THEREIN.
SUB-ISSUES
I
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SHIFTING UNTO THE PETITIONER THE
BURDEN OF PROVING HIS OWN INNOCENCE INSTEAD OF LAYING THE BURDEN
UPON THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF PETITIONER BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENSE OF PAYMENT BY
PETITIONER DID NOT OVERTHROW THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF
THE CHECKS AND THAT THE DEMANDS FOR PAYMENT MADE TO PETITIONER
ARE IN THEMSELVES NOTICES OF DISHONOR.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING
THAT THE PAYMENTS MADE BY THE PETITIONER TO THE EVER LUCKY
COMMERCIAL (ELC) AS EVIDENCED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPT ISSUED BY ELC
REFER TO OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND ELC AND
NOT TO THE DISHONORED CHECKS.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS ANALYSIS
DEBUNKING PETITIONERS DEFENSE OF PAYMENTS.[15]
In our view, the principal issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioners guilt
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner contends that he should be acquitted of all charges because he already
paid his obligations to Ever Lucky Commercial. He likewise avers that the prosecution
failed to establish all the elements of the crime, particularly that he had knowledge of
the insufficiency of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks. This failure,
according to petitioner, can be traced to the prosecutions inability to prove that notices
of dishonor were sent to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for appellee, argues that the payments
made by petitioner refer to different transactions and not to those covered by the checks
subject matter of this case. The OSG also avers that the verbal demands made by
private complainant are more than enough to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks.
At the outset, we must stress that as a general rule, the factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect and finality, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or palpable error,[16] or when the trial court failed to appreciate
certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the
result of the case.[17] We find that the exceptions rather than the general rule apply in
this case. We also find the petition meritorious.
The law enumerates the elements of violation of B.P. 22, namely (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [18]
The first and third elements of the offense are present and proved in these
consolidated cases. But we find that the second element was not sufficiently
established.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of
a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. [19] In several cases,
[20]
we have ruled that to hold a person liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough to establish
that a check was dishonored upon presentment. It must be shown further that the
person who issued the check knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment. Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In King vs. People,[21] we held:
The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
check or makes arrangement for its payment within five banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for its payment.[22]
Here, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court relied solely on the testimony of
prosecution witness Danilo Cac to the effect that private complainant immediately
demanded payment of the value of the checks after they were dishonored. Aside from
this self-serving testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the giving and
receiving of such notice. The nature and content of said demands were not
clarified. Even the date when and the manner by which these alleged demands were
made upon and received by petitioner were not specified. Worse, the records do not
show that formal and written demand letters or notices of dishonor were ever sent to
petitioner.
Where the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds does not arise due to
the absence of notice of dishonor of the check, the accused should not be held liable for
the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22. [23]
As held in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals[24] a notice of dishonor personally
sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be held liable under
B.P. 22. In that case, we stated thus:
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the
prima facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot
apply. Section 2 of BP Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the
mere fact of drawing, making, and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing
that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or
drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the
criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. xx xx The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice
of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the
basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP Blg.
22. (Underscoring supplied.)
In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the
maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of
B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial fiveday period.[25]
As stated earlier, the prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by petitioner of
any notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any indication that written formal
demand letters or notice of dishonor were actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases,
we had the occasion to emphasize that not only must there be a written notice of
dishonor or demand letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but
there must also be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere
registered receipt and/or return receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals,[26] while Section 2 of B.P. 22

indeed does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in
conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of
dishonor or refusal. A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be
insufficient for conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the
Bouncing Checks Law require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the
accused issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the accused has actually been
notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes must
be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. In Victor
Ting vs. Court of Appeals,[27] we stated that when service of a notice is sought to be
made by mail, it should appear that conditions exist on which the validity of such service
depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of
service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove
receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by petitioner
of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five banking
days within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.
However, while petitioner is acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should be ordered
to pay the face value of the five dishonored checks plus legal interest in accordance
with our ruling inDomagsang vs. Court of Appeals.[28] There, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish a case to warrant conviction, but clearly proved petitioners failure
to pay a just debt owing to the private complainant. Thus, petitioner was ordered to pay
the face value of the check with 12 percent legal interest per annum, reckoned from the
filing of the information until the finality of the decision. It is well settled that an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate
civil action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. To require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned.[29]
Finally, we agree that petitioners alleged prior payment is untenable. As found by
the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, it is unnatural and illogical for petitioner to
have paid more than his outstanding obligations. It is also unlikely that he would pay
substantial amounts of interest when nothing had been agreed upon on this matter. It is
quite striking how he could have generously paid more than what was due from him
when he could hardly pay private complainant in cash, and had to issue post-dated
checks. Moreover, he could have asked for the return of the checks as a matter of
sound business practice and procedure if indeed he already paid all the dishonored
checks. The fact that these checks remained in the possession of private complainant
contradicts petitioners allegation of payment.[30]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19764 is
MODIFIED. Petitioner BEN RICO is ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of B.P. 22
on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, he is ordered to pay private complainant
the face value of the checks in the total amount of P178,434.00, with 12 percent interest
per annum, from the filing of the informations until the amount due is fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. People vs. Pabillo
[G.R. No. 122103. November 4, 2003]
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
PABILLO, accused-appellant.
vs. WILFREDO
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilfredo Pabillo together with his father and co-accused
Alfredo Pabillo were charged with the crime of simple homicide before Branch IX of the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Palo,Leyte,
8th
Judicial
Region,
under
an Information[1] dated April 22, 1987. Before the accused could be arraigned, the
prosecution amended the Information upgrading the crime of homicide to MURDER by
alleging treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The accusatory portion of the Amended
Information[2] reads:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1986 in the Municipality of Alangalang,
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with intent to kill and with treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, attack, assault, stab and wound one Francisco Ipil with the use of long bolos
which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the body of the said Francisco Ipil which
caused his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
On October 10, 1988, the two accused pleaded Not Guilty to the charge.
Accused Alfredo (hereafter, Alfredo) however died during the pendency of the case or
before any judgment could be rendered by the lower court; [4] thus, only
appellant Wilfredo Pabillo (hereafter, Wilfredo) elevated the judgment to this Court.
[3]
The prosecutions version of how the killing occurred differs from that of the
appellants. Hereunder is the Peoples version.
At
about 8:00
oclock in
the
evening
of November
30,
1986,
Francisco Dador (hereafter, Dador)
was
at
the
house
of
his
cousin
Eduardo Taborada at Sitio Guintadcan, Brgy. Salvacion,Alangalang, Leyte,
on
the
[5]
occasion of the 40th day prayers for the latters deceased wife. While he was waiting
for
supper
to
be
served,
the
deceased
Francisco Ipil (hereafter, Ipil)
[6]
arrived. Dadorinvited him in. Thereafter, the Pabillo father and son arrived. Both men
were armed with unsheathed bolos.[7]
Baludo,[8] please come out because I have an important matter to discuss with
you, Alfredo called out.[9] Ipil slowly went out. As soon as Ipil neared the duo who were
then standing side by side, Wilfredo pushed Ipil forward with his left hand.
[10]
Ipil struggled and stumbled forward. Suddenly, Wilfredo hacked him on the head
with the long bolo he held with his right hand. When Ipilstarted to fall down, he was
hacked on the left arm, this time by Alfredo. Ipil started to run but Wilfredo struck again,
hitting Ipils back. Ipil managed to run towards the back of Eduardos house, and
subsequently fell into the creek. [11] Alfredo was heard to have uttered, Never mind him
because he is going to die. [12] Subsequently, the father and son tandem fled the scene
towards the ricefield.[13]All of these Dador, the prosecutions main witness, saw with the
aid of the light coming from the house and the flashlight carried by the accused [14].
When everything quieted down, Dador went to the creek to look for Ipil. He found
him lying on his back. He pulled Ipil from the creek and put him on dry ground.
Thereafter, he went to seeConstancia Ipil, the victims mother, to inform her of the
incident. Constancia then requested her other son, Samuel, to go with Dador.[15]
Ipil was lying face up and was still breathing when Samuel reached him. He
asked Ipil who hacked him and the latter answered, Sammy, I was hacked
by Wilfredo Pabillo and Alfredo Pabilloand bring me to the hospital because I might
die.[16] Samuel and Dador put Ipil on a sledge and they proceeded to bring him to the
hospital. Unfortunately, Ipil expired before reaching the National Highway.[17]
The Post-Mortem Examination Report[18] prepared by Dr. Edilberto Trinidad showed
that Ipil died of hemorrhage due to the following hacking injuries:
1. Hacking wound, 6 inches long, 2 inches wide and 3 inches deep located on
the left elbow cutting muscles, blood vessels and the bone.
2. Hacking wound, 5 inches long, 1 inch wide and 3 inches deep located on the
head, right frontal region cutting muscles, blood vessels, skull and the brain.
3.
Wound, 1 inches long, inch wide and inch deep located at the left
scapular region cutting muscles and blood vessels.
On the other hand, the defense weaved a different tale.

Testifying on his own behalf, Wilfredo made this narration: At approximately 8:00
oclock in the evening of November 30, 1986, Wilfredo, together with one
Rodrigo Caones, was visiting DadoyAporadas daughter, Belinda Aporada at their
house situated at Sitio Guintadcan, Barangay Salvacion, Alangalang, Leyte.[19] Alfredo
was also in the same house attending the 40th day prayer for the deceased wife
of Dadoy Aporada. Alfredo was having a drinking spree with Dadoy Aporada, Ipil who
was Alfredos nephew by affinity, and some other men.[20]
Wilfredo heard his father and Ipil arguing so he went downstairs. [21] He did not know
how the argument started or what they were arguing about. [22] He proceeded to pacify
his father and convinced him to come with him. Ipil, together with
Rogelio Brizo and Eleazar Sabela, left ahead of them.[23]
While they were walking away from the house, Ipil came back and challenged his
father to a fight.[24] Wilfredo tried to calm them down but he failed. He ran to the
neighboring house to ask for help but the occupants were also afraid to intercede so he
came back alone.[25] On his way, he met his father who admitted having inflicted wounds
upon Ipil.[26] They also met Dador, who inquired from Wilfredo what had happened. He
explained that his father and Ipil had a fight. Dador left them and proceeded
to Dadoys house.[27] His father surrendered to the authorities the following day.[28]
Clara Biso also testified for the defense. She narrated that in the evening
of November 30, 1986, she was at the house of Dadoy Tampurada attending a rosary
prayer. Also present were Ipil, Alfredo and Wilfredo.[29] When she went home, Alfredo
and Wilfredo were with her in a group.[30] Suddenly, she heard a commotion and people
ran in different directions. She had no knowledge about the incident subject of the case
because she did not see to which direction Wilfredo had ran.[31]
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of murder in
a Decision[32] dated January 14, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Wilfredo Pabillo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to off-set the same, the Court hereby imposes upon said accused the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Francisco Ipil the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the latter and to pay the costs. The
bail bond of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and the convicted accused is
hereby ordered committed emmediately (sic) to jail pursuant to the Supreme Court
Circular to that effect.
SO ORDERED.
Wilfredo elevated to this Court the RTC judgment and assigned as sole error the
following:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AS ATTENDANT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME.[33]
We do not entertain any doubt that Wilfredo delivered the fatal bolo blows on Ipil in
the evening of November 30, 1986. This conclusion can be drawn from the direct,
positive and categorical assertions made by prosecution witness Dador regarding the
identity of the assailants, the details of the assault, and the weapons used.
Dador narrated that when Ipil reached the duo, Wilfredo suddenly got hold
of Ipils arm, pushed him towards the front, and hacked him on the head. This was
followed by Alfredos hacking blow on Ipils left arm when the latter was about to fall.
When Ipil tried to run, he was again hacked at the back by Wilfredo. This straightforward
account of how Ipil was killed very closely corresponded with the descriptions
of Ipils wounds as detailed in the Post-Mortem Examination Report[34] as follows:
hacking wound located on the left elbow, hacking wound on the head, right frontal
region, and wound at the scapular region. This physical evidence speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses. [35] Consistent with the testimony of the principal
prosecution witness, it establishes beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of accusedappellant.
Moreover, the ante-mortem statement of the victim, made under consciousness of
imminent death, pointed to Wilfredo and his father as the perpetrators of the crime. The
trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim Sammy, I was hacked
by Wilfredo Pabillo and Alfredo Pabillo and bring me to the hospital because I might
die as Ipils dying declaration. The Court in a number of cases [36] consistently upheld
the admissibility of a dying declaration, the requisites of which are: that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of thedeclarants death; that at
the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and, that the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.
The established facts in this case show that all these requisites concur. When he
made the statement, Ipil was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned
not only from his insistence that he should immediately be brought to the hospital, but
also from the serious nature of his wounds and the fact that he died shortly afterwards.
It is well to point out that at the trial, Wilfredo firmly maintained that he did not
participate in the killing of Ipil. He claimed that he was a mere spectator and
conveniently shifted the blame to his father Alfredo, whose lips have already been
sealed by death. The trial court therefore soundly rejected his version of denial as a
plain afterthought, a devised plot to escape punishment that cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the physical evidence that supports
the judgment of conviction. Now on appeal, he no longer contradicts the theory of the
prosecution that he and his father confederated in the attack on Ipil and that he inflicted
the fatal injuries which led to death of the victim. Instead, he assigns as the sole error
the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery
beyond reasonable doubt. This change of strategy merely accentuates the strength of
the prosecution evidence which sufficiently rebutted the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Wilfredo has been charged with and convicted of the crime of murder. Article
248[37] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that to be liable for murder,
the prosecution must prove that the accused committed the killing of another person
under any of the attendant circumstances specified therein. Of these circumstances, the
prosecution alleged in the Amended Information[38]the qualifying circumstance of
treachery to elevate the killing to murder. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to discuss
the presence or absence of treachery in the body of the decision although obviously, it
was considered in qualifying the killing and convicting the accused of murder.
Nevertheless, such a lapse is not fatal to the validity of the decision. An appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all errors, by commission
or by omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. [39] A painstaking scrutiny of the
evidence in this case leads us to agree with the trial court that the accused-appellant is
guilty of murder.
Under substantive law, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. [40] Two conditions must then
concur for treachery to be present, viz., (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and; (2) the
deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. [41]
Upon the facts established by the prosecution, we agree with the trial court that the
crime committed by Wilfredo was accompanied by alevosia. In this regard, the Solicitor
General[42] agrees that this circumstance has been correctly taken into account in
qualifying the crime to murder.
On this point, Wilfredo avers in his appeal brief that the prosecution failed to show
that the assault made upon the person of Ipil was not sudden and unexpected as to
have caught the deceased unprepared to meet the assault, noting that when Ipil went
out to face his assailants, he already sensed the danger upon seeing that both of them
were armed with unsheathed bolos. We disagree.
Ipil had no foreboding of the danger he would be facing when he went down to meet
Alfredo and Wilfredo. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the duos manner
and behavior, when they requested him to come down, was in any way threatening.
Alfredo was his uncle by affinity, while Wilfredo was his relative by consanguinity. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Ipilcould not have anticipated that they
would hurt or kill him at a place where so many people could witness the crime and
where prayers were being held for a departed soul. [43]
The testimony of the eyewitness, Francisco Dador, sufficiently established the
presence of treachery. The following was Dadors testimony:[44]
...
Q: What happened after the two accused both surnamed Pabillo arrived?
A:
Alfredo Pabillo called Francisco Ipil to go out of the house.
Q: Who actually called Francisco Ipil alias Baludo?

A:
Alfredo Maam.
Q: Who is this Baludo?

A:
Francisco Ipil maam. He was the one.
Q: What did Alfredo said to Francisco Ipil when he called him to go out of the
house?
A:
He said, Francisco Ipil alias Baludo said (sic), please come out because I
have an important matter to discuss with you.
Q: Where was Alfredo when he called for Francisco Ipil?

A:
He was in the yard of the house.
Q: Did you see if Alfredo had anything with him while calling for Francisco Ipil?
A:
I saw that he was carrying something.
Q: What was he carrying?

A:
A bolo.
Q: How was the bolo held?

A:
He was holding the bolo with his right hand.
Q: At the time Alfredo was calling Francisco where was he? Wilfredo also?
A:
They were standing side by side.
Q: Did you see if Wilfredo was carrying anything also?

A:
Yes maam.
Q: What was he carrying?

A:
A long bolo.
Q: How did Francisco Ipil react when he was called by Wilfredo?

A:
He went out of the house slowly.
Q: To what direction?
A:
Towards the front of Wilfredo Pabillo.
Q: What happened after Francisco Ipil went out of the house?

A:
He was pushed by Wilfredo using his left hand. (witness demonstrating)
Q: To what direction was he pushed?

A:
Towards the front.
Q: What happened to Francisco after he was pushed?

A:
He struggled.
Q: Then, what happened?

A:
He was met with a hacking thrust towards the head.
Q: By whom?
A:
Wilfredo Pabillo.
Q: What did Wilfredo Pabillo used in hacking?

A:
A long bolo.
Q: How long was the bolo?

A:
39 inches, more or less to (sic) and a half feet.
Q: Was Francisco Ipil hit?

A:
On his forehead.
...
Q: What happened after Francisco was hit?
A:
When he was about to fall down he was hacked on his left arm.
Q: Who hacked him on his left arm?

A:
Wilfredo.
...
Q: Was he able to retaliate?
A:
No maam.
Q: Was he carrying anything at the time he was hacked?
A:
No maam.
Q: What happened after he was hit on the left arm?

A:
While Francisco Ipil was about to run, this Wilfredo Pabillo again hacked
him hitting on his back.
Dadors straightforward account of the events on that fateful night was consistent
even during the cross-examination:[45]
Q: Did you see any danger when you saw the two holding their bolos while
they were calling Francisco Ipil to come down?
A:
No, sir.
Q: So you did not mind (sic) of any danger?

A:
No, sir.
Q: And you know these two Pabillos?

A:
Yes, because we are barangay mates.
Q: You did not invite them to the house for supper?

A:
No, sir.
Q: You also did not see any danger when you saw Francisco Ipil being pushed
by Wilfredo?
A:
I was looking at them and I did not say anything.
Q: Of your own knowledge, was there any grudge between them?

A:
No, sir.
Q: How did Wilfredo push Francisco Ipil?

A:
By using his left hand towards the front of Francisco.
Q: Did you not say that he was holding with his right hand the bolo?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q: And this Francisco and Wilfredo were facing each other?

A:
They were adjacent to each other.
Q: And with the left hand holding the flashlight he used that flashlight to push
Francisco?
A:
Yes, it was his knuckles that hit Francisco.
Q: When he was pushed was it backwards or to the front?

A:
Towards the front.
Q: Who hacked first?
A:
Wilfredo sir.
Q: And as Francisco staggard (sic) forward he was met by Wilfredo?

A:
He was met with a hacking thrust by Wilfredo.
Q: And what happened to Francisco?

A:
He fell down.
...
Q: And Francisco did not say anything while he was being hacked?
A:
No, sir.
Q: Neither did you hear any word from Wilfredo and Alfredo?
A:
No, sir.
Q: You mean there was no noise that you heard while the hacking blows was
(sic) going on?
A:
Alfredo said something.
Q: What did he say?

A:
Never mind him because he is going to die.
Q: Is that all what (sic) you heard?

A:
That was after Francisco was hit in the head.
Q: And the hacking blows were delivered successively one on the elbow, on
the forehead and at the back and then Francisco fell to the creek?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q: And you said that you saw Francisco run?

A:
Yes, sir.
Q: Even if it was dark you still saw him running?

A:
Yes, because the light inside the house illuminated around the house.
...
The foregoing testimony clearly established the presence of the requisites of
treachery. The attack by Alfredo and Wilfredo on the victim was sudden, unexpected,
without warning, and without provocation. Ipils action of going out of the house to meet
the duo shows that he never expected an assault from them. He did not know what was
coming. He was pushed, and immediately hacked without a word being uttered. He was
totally unprepared. Thus, he was unable to put up a defense. All that he was able to do
after the two (2) mercilessly hacked him on the head and left arm was to run. Without
remorse, Wilfredo attacked him from behind.
It is also obvious that the accused-appellant and his deceased father employed
means or methods in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim
might have made. The combined, unrelenting attack was executed against an unarmed
victim in such a manner that the latter had no chance of defending himself, albeit the
attack was frontal.
In United States v. Cornejo,[46] this Court ruled that it is proper to consider treachery
as a qualifying circumstance of murder if the attack was sudden and unexpected and
not preceded by any dispute and the deceased was unable to prepare his defense
though he was face to face with his assailant. In said case, the victim was requested by
the two (2) accused to come down from a house. He descended as he was told. One of
the accused told the victim that he needed the latter and they, with the other accused,
went out of the house. After they had gone a few yards, one of the accused, without
uttering a word, turned halfway and struck the victim a blow on the head with
a palma brava club and followed it up with two more blows. As the victim stooped over,
the other accused struck him several blows in the face with a bolo and then the
assailants fled. They were convicted of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by
premeditation.
In People v. Basadre,[47] we likewise found the attack made by the assailant face to
face with the victim while the latter was leaning on a joke-box scanning the list of
musical selections available to play to be qualified by treachery, considering that the
latter was unarmed, was totally unaware of the coming attack and was not in apposition
to defend himself. So is the killing In People v. Ablao,[48] where the accused, after
detaching himself from the cluster of people, walked to where the victim was, put his left
arm around the victims shoulder and then whipped out a stainless, pointed, bladed
knife and repeatedly stabbed the victim on the front portion of his body.[49]
In this case, all the elements of treachery as defined in Article 14, paragraph 16, of
the Revised Penal Code were likewise established beyond doubt.
On the matter of appellants civil liability ex delicto, it has been the ruling of the
Court to outrightly award P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim. [50] Thus, we
uphold the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as damages. Moreover, as ruled in People
vs. De Los Santos,[51] an additional award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is
justified in the absence of proof for the award of actual damages, and a further
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Nicolas.
[52]
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
decision
of
the
RTC
convicting Wilfredo Pabillo of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim Francisco Ipil the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity and
damages is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of Francisco Ipil the additional amount of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
4. C and S Fish Farm vs CA

[G.R. No. 122720. December 16, 2002]
C&S FISHFARM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULSEN
AGRI-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and PABLO G. SEN, JR., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the November 27, 1995 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36401 [1] reversing the January 11, 1995
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC for brevity) of Pasig (Branch 67) in SCA No.
603. The RTC affirmed the February 2, 1994 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC for brevity) of Taguig (Branch 74) in Civil Case No. 888 which ordered Paulsen
Agri-Industrial Corporation (Paulsen for brevity) and Pablo Sen, Jr. (Sen for brevity) to
vacate and relinquish possession of a fish pen located at Taguig, Bicutan, Laguna Lake
to C & S Fishfarm Corporation (C & S for brevity).
The petition stems from an ejectment suit instituted on May 10, 1993 by C & S, thru
its General Manager, Pedro Siochi, Jr., (Siochi for brevity) against Paulsen and Sen for
the recovery of a fifty (50) hectare fish pen located at Taguig, Bicutan, Laguna Lake.
C & S alleged in its complaint that it is the holder, grantee, licensee or permittee of a
right, grant, license or permit to operate a fish pen within the said area; that sometime in
1992, Sen proposed to C & S through its manager, Siochi, that they enter into a joint
venture agreement with respect to the subject fish pen, the principal condition of which
is that the net profits of the sale of the cultivated and/or cultured fishes derived from said
fish pen shall be divided between the parties with Paulsen getting eighty percent (80%)
while C & S twenty percent (20%); that while negotiations were going on between Siochi
and Sen the latter was able to convince C & S to allow Paulsen to take possession of
the subject fish pen under the assurance that pending execution of a formal contract
under their joint venture agreement, the 80%-20% sharing agreement shall be
respected by Paulsen; that the parties failed to consummate their proposed joint venture
but Paulsen continued to be in possession of the fish pen and was able to harvest
cultured fish, appropriating to itself the entire proceeds in violation of the condition by
reason of which Paulsen was able to gain possession of said fish pen; that C & S
demanded for Paulsen to vacate the subject fish pen and pay the share of C & S in the
cultured fish harvested by Paulsen, conservatively estimated at Four Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00) worth of fish, twenty percent (20%) of which C & S is entitled to
receive; that when Paulsen refused to comply with the written demand, C & S filed the
complaint for ejectment.[2]
In their Amended Answer, Paulsen and Sen denied the allegations of the complaint
and raised as defense that the complaint states no cause of action; that during the
period from 1987 to February 1992, C & S had no permit to operate the subject fish pen
for it failed to pay the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the required yearly
license fee for operating; that it was Siochi who approached Sen for the construction,
development and financing of a fish pen in Taguig, Bicutan, Laguna Lake, of which C &
S is alleged to be the holder of a right or permit to operate from the LLDA; that Siochi
and Sen verbally agreed for a transfer of rights of C & S in favor of Sen, subject to four
(4) conditions, to wit: (a) Sen will pay the unpaid license fees from 1987 to February
1992 of C & S due with the LLDA; (b) Sen will also construct, develop and finance said
fish pen, without expenses on the part of C & S; (c) Sen will undertake the stoking of the
fish pen area with fingerlings; and (d) C & S will receive twenty percent (20%) and Sen
will receive eighty percent (80%) of the net profit after accounting of expenses; that Sen
complied with the foregoing terms and conditions, but Siochi failed and refused to make
the transfer of rights and execute the necessary documents; that they deny that the
proposed joint venture agreement was a failure because they performed their part as
agreed upon though Siochi did not sign anymore the agreement. [3]
Furthermore, defendants contend that sometime in October to December 1992,
Siochi committed acts inimical and obstructive to the operation of the business venture;
that on February 27, 1993, Siochi went to the fish pen with armed persons who turned
out to be policemen from Taguig Police Station and barred the workers of Sen from
entering the fish pen, and even brought four of the workers to the police station; that
verification revealed that Siochi is not the president of C & S, but a certain Alfredo Cruz;
that another agreement was entered into by Paulsen with C & S on March 17, 1993. [4]
On February 2, 1994, the MTC of Taguig (Branch 74) rendered its decision in favor
of plaintiff C & S and against defendants Paulsen and Sen, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering:
1.
defendants to vacate the fish pen mentioned in the complaint and

relinquished (sic) complete possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum equivalent to 20% of

the P4,871,980.60 as compensation or rental of the use and occupation of
said fish pen from February 1992 to December 1993, and
thereafter,P50,000.00 per harvest season every four (4) months until the
defendant fully vacated (sic) said fish pen;
3. defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus
the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Dissatisfied, Paulsen and Sen appealed to the RTC of Pasig (Branch 67) which
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC of Taguig.
Undaunted, on February 9, 1995, Paulsen and Sen filed before the Court of Appeals
a petition for review with prayer for a temporary restraining order.[6]
On November 27, 1995, the appellate court rendered its decision reversing the
decisions of the lower courts and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
ejectment. It likewise ordered the possession and operation of the subject fish pen
restored to Paulsen and Sen without prejudice to the pursuit of other legal remedies as
may properly be available to the parties in pursuance of their joint venture agreement. [7]
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS(SIC) ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER CORPORATION HAS NO POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT
PREMISES;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY ENTITLEMENT TO THE SUMMARY REMEDY OF
EJECTMENT;
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SUPPOSED
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IS A PERFECTED CONTRACT; AND
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS USE AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PREMISES. [8]
Petitioner ascribes grave error upon the Court of Appeals in ruling that C & S is not
the holder, grantee, licensee or permittee of a right, grant, license or permit to operate
the subject fish pen. Petitioner emphatically claims that the private respondents are
estopped from questioning the lawful right of the petitioner as a grantee, licensee or
permittee to operate the subject fish pen inasmuch as private respondents have
admitted that petitioner is the lawful licensee, grantee and/or permittee of the subject
fish pen in the March 17, 1993 document private respondents rely upon to show
existence of their right to possession, although said document was denounced by the
Board of Directors as an ultra vires act of Alfredo Cruz, President of C & S.
Petitioner staunchly contends that there is no binding, legal and perfected contract
of joint venture with private respondents, notwithstanding the joint venture agreement
was signed on its last page by Siochi for and in behalf of the petitioner, inasmuch as
Paulsen is not a privy or party to the contract. The second party referred to in the
contract or the assignee of the right referred to Reliable Fishfarm Corporation, not
Paulsen, although both companies have a common president in the name of private
respondent Pablo G. Sen, Jr..
Petitioner submits that it has sufficiently established how the private respondents,
through fraudulent scheme and machinations, were able to gain possession of the
subject property, and therefore, it is entitled to the summary remedy of ejectment.
It is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court. [9] The
exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [10]
Petitioner failed to show that its case falls under any of these exceptions.
Actori incumbit onus probandi.[11] This is a well-known postulate echoed by Section
1 of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. In civil cases the burden of proof to be
established by preponderance of evidence [12] is on the plaintiff who is the party asserting
the affirmative of an issue. He has the burden of presenting evidence required to obtain
a favorable judgment,[13] and he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no
evidence were given on either side.[14]
Petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing elementary precept has apparently
escaped petitioners recollection. Inasmuch as petitioner is the proponent of the view
that it is entitled to the summary remedy of ejectment, it had the burden of showing that
the private respondents entered the fish pen by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, or that it is the landlord, vendor, vendee or other person whose possession of
the property has been unlawfully withheld by private respondents. As revealed by the
extant evidence, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Since ejectment is a possessory action, the plaintiff must show a right of possession
that is present or immediate in the property sought to be recovered. Unless
established, the defendant will prevail. [15] Plaintiffs in ejectment must show their right to
possession at the time the suit was instituted. [16] Ejectment can be maintained only by
one having a present exclusive right to possession. [17]Petitioner failed to show that such
allegation is an existent fact at the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment. It
offered no evidence on the current state of its alleged right, grant, license or permit to
operate. Thus, we are convinced that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in finding that petitioner is not the holder, grantee, licensee or permittee of a
right, grant, license or permit to operate the subject fish pen. Petitioner failed to
establish this material allegation in its complaint.
On the other hand, private respondents presented uncontradicted evidence of their
payment of petitioners overdue license fees, penalties and other charges for the
renewal, reactivation and reissuance of petitioners permit or license to operate the
subject fish pen, as well as Fishpen Permit No. 93-0193 dated July 7, 1993, issued in
favor of private respondent corporation by the LLDA, [18] thus proving that private
respondent is now the current recognized holder, grantee, licensee or permittee to
operate the subject fish pen.
Petitioner exposed what it perceived as weakness in private respondents defenses
rather than relying on the strength of its own evidence. It alleged estoppel on the part of
private respondents, based on the March 17, 1993 document done in ultra vires.
It must be stressed that the doctrine of estoppel should be resorted to solely as a
means of preventing injustice and should not be permitted to defeat the administration
of the law, or to accomplish a wrong or secure an undue advantage, or to extend
beyond the requirements of the transactions in which they originate. [19] Since estoppel
operates to prevent showing the truth, and is more or less in the nature of a forfeiture, it
has often been characterized as not favored in the law. [20] It is to be applied rarely, only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. [21] It must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.[22] It should not be given effect beyond
what is necessary to accomplish justice between the parties. [23]
We cannot apply the doctrine of estoppel in the instant case since the facts and
circumstances, as established by the record, negate its application. Petitioner failed to
show an exclusive right to possession at the time of the institution of the suit for
ejectment. It was not a current holder of a right to operate the subject fish pen. Thus,
petitioner cannot seek refuge in the doctrine of estoppel when truth, gleaned from
evidence, contradicts the alleged estoppel of private respondents.
That Reliable Fishfarm Corporation is named as the second party in the contract
and not Paulsen, has never been the point of contention even in the court below. It was
never raised by petitioner below and it cannot be voiced out now. What is significant is
that petitioner did in fact enter into a joint venture agreement with private respondent
Sen, and that private respondent Sen complied with its terms, by paying the due
accounts with the LLDA, supplying the fingerlings, etc. [24] These facts remain
unrebutted. Thus, we agree with the appellate courts conclusion that there is a joint
venture agreement.
Besides, petitioner actually affirmed and recognized the existence of the joint
venture agreement when it prayed in its complaint for ejectment that it be paid the
twenty percent (20%) share in the cultured fish harvested by private respondents.
[25]
Such is contrary not only to petitioners contention of the non-existence of any joint
venture agreement but also to its prayer for ejectment. In ejectment cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property.[26] Considering that the only issue raised in
ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the
loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. [27]
In view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in its challenged Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36401 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
5. People vs LLavore
[G.R. No. 133892. August 12, 2003]
THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOVITO LLAVORE Y

BARRIENTOS, JOEL LOBATON Y ORETA, RODOLFO FUENTES Y
CASTILLO (At Large) and DANIEL GUILLERO Y ALVAREZ, accused.
JOVITO LLAVORE Y BARRIENTOS, JOEL LOBATON Y ORETA[1] and DANIEL

GUILLERO Y ALVAREZ,[2] accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Jovito Llavore y Barrientos a.k.a. Boy, Joel Lobaton y Oreta a.k.a. Imbong, Rodolfo
Fuentes y Castillo a.k.a. Nene, Daniel Guillero y Alvarez a.k.a. Moran and one Galoy
Longno were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 60, of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, in an information that averred:
That on or about 6:30 in the afternoon of May 23, 1991 at the reclamation area, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
treachery, evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and kill with the use of firearm and knives one
Danilo Malata, a tricycle driver, in order to rob, steal and take away with intent of gain
and without the consent and against the will of the owner the motor tricycle belonging to
Erna Tancinco which cost more or less P53,000.00 and inflicting upon the person of
Danilo Malata, the following wounds, to wit:
Stabbed wound, immediately below the left nipple; 2 cm. in length, 7 cm. depth
projecting upward;
Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, about 4 cm. from the midline; 4 cm. in length with
omentum protruding outward;
Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, midclavicular line; 2 cm. in length with omentum
protruding outward;
Stabbed wound, through and through, deltoid area; 3 cm. in length, left upper arm;
Stabbed wound, through and through, 2 cm. in length, left upper arm about 8 cm.
below the upper wound;
Stabbed wound, through and through, posterior chest, left postaxillary line; 4 cm. in
length with exit at the left axilla;
Stabbed wound, left elbow, superficial; 4 cm. in length;
which directly caused the death of the said victim Danilo Malata, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said victim in the amount, to wit:
1. P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim;
2. P144,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such
amount to be fixed by the court.[3]
Jovito Llavore and his co-accused, Joel Lobaton and Rodolfo Fuentes, entered a
plea of not guilty at their arraignment. Fuentes thereafter escaped from prison. Daniel
Guillero was later arrested and, when arraigned, also pleaded not guilty. Galoy
Longno remained at large.
The case for the prosecution. -
On 23 May 1991, about six-thirty in the afternoon, Danilo Malata was found dead in
a reclamation area along Hitalon Bridge in Cadiz City. Malata was last seen alive
driving a tricycle[4] belonging to his sister Erna Malata-Tancinco and her husband
Hernani Tancinco. At around five-fifteen on the afternoon of 30 July 1991, a unit of the
Cadiz City Philippine National Police (PNP) apprehended Joel Lobaton and Perlito
Pastrano in connection with another attempted robbery case involving a tricycle owned
by a certain Francisco Gerongan. During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Jerry
Montecino and SPO3 Sofronio Neri, Lobaton confessed that he, along with Jovito
Llavore, Daniel Guillero, Rodolfo Fuentes, and Galoy Longno, had killed Danilo Malata
and took away the latters tricycle which they then brought it to the house of LLavore.
On 31 July 1991, police officers saw Llavore driving a tricycle along Gustilo
Boulevard in Cadiz City. When confronted, Llavore voluntarily went with the officers to
the police station using the tricycle.[5] While Llavore was being interrogated by SPO3
Neri, SPO3 Montecino, and SPO3 Tayco in the presence of Hernani Tancinco, the latter
observed that the top cover of the tricycle was identical with the top cover of his tricycle
which Malata was driving at the time he was killed. Llavore admitted his involvement in
the crime. SPO3 Belcezar Javier and Tancinco thereupon proceeded to the house of
Llavore in Crossing, Cadiz City. At the backyard of the house, they saw a marooncolored tricycle without its top cover.[6] Tancinco immediately recognized the same to be
his tricycle based on its windshield, cover of the side wheel, and its decorations. When
the maroon paint of the tricycles sidecar was scraped, the vehicle showed an orange
paint which was its original paint. Tancinco identified the markings he placed on the top
cover of his tricycle like the hole where he inserted a wire and a brace of 3/8 steel
bar. Some parts of the tricycle had been removed. The tricycles motorcycle was still
painted red, although the motor and chassis number had been defaced. Tancinco
pointed to other distinguishing marks on the motorcycle of his tricycle such as the
welding marks on the hub, the two uneven holes on the fender where he had attached a
break light, the spline of the original transmission which was replaced with a shorter
one, the epoxy steel on the leaking tank, and the cut steel on the fork.
SPO3 Javier repaired to Talisay and invited Rodolfo Fuentes for
questioning. Fuentes executed an affidavit, dated 5 August 1991, [7] at the police
precinct. In a sworn confession, dated 12 August 1991, [8] taken by SPO3 Sofronio Neri
in the presence of one SPO3 Melzasar Tayco, Fuentes, with the assistance of Atty.
Reginaldo Conol, admitted his participation in stabbing Malata to death and then
bringing the tricycle to the house of Llavore. SPO3 Javier said Fuentes tagged
Lobaton, Guillero, and Longno as being his companions.
Dr. Joy Gladys T. Guanzon conducted a postmortem examination on the body of

Danilo Malata. The autopsy report, dated 24 May 1991, contained the following
findings:
"Stabbed wound, immediately below the left nipple; 2 cm. in length, 7 cm. in
depth projecting upward;
"Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, about 4 cm. from the midline; 4 cm. in
length with omentum protruding outward;
"Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, midclavicular line; 2 cm. in length with
omentum protruding outward;
"Stabbed wound, through and through, deltoid area; 3 cm. in length, left upper
arm;
"Stabbed wound, through and through, 2 cm. in length, left upper arm about 8
cm. below the upper wound;
"Stabbed wound, through and through, posterior chest, left postaxillary line; 4
cm. in length with exit at the left axilla;
"Stabbed wound, left elbow, superficial; 4 cm. in length.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiac Tamponade and pneumo-hemothorax secondary
to multiple stabbed wounds."[9]
Dr. Guanzon testified that the stabbed wounds were caused by a sharp bladed
instrument. The stabbed wound immediately below the left nipple, 2 cm. in length and
7 cm. in depth projecting upward, was fatal.
The version of the defense. In seeking an exoneration of those indicted for the crime, the defense anchored
itself on denial and alibi.
Jovito Llavore, a tricycle driver by occupation, testified that he was the owner of a
tricycle which Rodolfo Fuentes borrowed sometime during the first week of July
1991. When Fuentes returned the tricycle, its top cover had been damaged. At about
six oclock on the morning of 23 July 1991, Llavore was in Cadiz City plying his usual
route when Fuentes went to his house and left a tricycle with his wife. Llavore
presumed that the tricycle belonged to Fuentes and that it was intended to secure the
latters debt of P2,400.00. At noontime of 28 July 1991, when he and his wife were not
home, Fuentes came to their house and took back the tricycle. When the tricycle was
returned to him later in the day, he noticed that the top cover of his tricycle had been
replaced with the top cover of the tricycle earlier brought by Fuentes. The tricycle which
he thought belonged to Fuentes happened to be the same tricycle recovered from his
house by the police officers on 31 July 1991. Llavore denied knowing at that time Daniel
Guillero and Galoy Longno but admitted being acquainted with Rodolfo Fuentes, who
used to borrow his tricycle in transporting lumber, and with Joel Lobaton, a former
student in Hiyang-Hiyang Elementary School in 1984, who worked in the lumber
business of Nestor Lobaton. LLavore disclaimed any participation in the killing of Danilo
Malata when he, together with Fuentes and Lobaton, underwent an investigation
conducted on 31 July 1991 by the police. He claimed that at around five oclock on the
afternoon of 23 May 1991, he and his wife were buying some goods at the public
market in Cadiz City from where, about an hour later, they went back home and stayed
in the house up to seven oclock in the evening. LLavore stated that he was confined
on 31 July 1991 without any warrant of arrest and was released only the following
morning. He was later asked to go with police officers SPO1 Rogelino Caniedo, SPO3
Montecino, PO3 Santiago Solatorio, PO2 Mario Jarina, PO3 Remy Tio, PO3 Zaldy
Esperancilla, and SPO1 Regulus Blancaflor and one CAFGU to Hacienda El
Paso. The place was about two kilometers away from his father's house where some
missing parts of the tricycle, placed in a sack, were recovered. Thereupon, Llavore was
again arrested.
Nilda Llavore, the wife of Jovito Llavore, corroborated the latters testimony. She
added that her husband did not leave the house after dinner and that they went to bed
soon thereafter.
Daniel Guillero stated that he, his wife and the latters parents were residing
at Hacienda Lau-ang, Barangay Luna, in Cadiz City. He denied any involvement in the
crime with which he was charged and said that, on 23 May 1991, he was a watchman at
the hacienda of one Dr. Diez where he reported for work from six oclock to eleven
oclock in the morning and then from one oclock to five oclock in the afternoon. From
work, he went home, had dinner at seven oclock in the evening and did not leave the
house. Guillero denied knowing Rodolfo Fuentes, Joel Lobaton, and Galoy Longno.
Joel Lobaton testified that during the months of May and July 1991, he was staying
in Villa Barbas, Cadiz City, and working in the lumber business of his brother Nestor
Lobaton in Sto. Nio Village, Cadiz City. At about five-fifteen on the morning of 31 July
1991, he was with one Perlito Pastrana when they were arrested somewhere in
Crossing, Cadiz City, in connection with the attempted robbery of a tricycle belonging to
one Francisco Gerongan. The police officers recovered from each of them a
knife. Lobaton denied having been acquainted with Galoy Longno or Daniel Guillero
but knew LLavore, his former teacher in Hiyang-Hiyang Elementary School, and
Rodolfo Fuentes who used to deliver lumber in Sto. Nio Village. He negated any
involvement in the crime and asserted that between seven oclock to eleven oclock on
the morning of 23 May 1991, he and Perlito Pastrana were busy cutting coconut trees
in Barangay Mabini, Cadiz City. After partaking of lunch, they resumed their work up to
six oclock that afternoon.
The decision under review. On 27 February 1997, the court a quo rendered its decision[10] finding Jovito Llavore
y Barrientos and his co-accused guilty of robbery with homicide. The trial court held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused, JOVITO
LLAVORE Y BARRIENTOS alias `Boy (detained), JOEL LOBATON Y ORETA alias
`Imbong (detained), RODOLFO FUENTES Y CASTILLO alias `Nene (Escapee and in
absentia), and DANIEL GUILLERO Y ALVAREZ (detained) all GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of `Robbery with Homicide as charged in the Information,
and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA including
its accessory penalties as provided for by law.
With respect to accused alias `Galoy Longno (at-large) not having been arrested and
arraigned, the case against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED and shall be
automatically revived upon his arrest.
The accused are further ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Danilo Malata
the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the latter, and in addition to pay
jointly and severally Hernani Tancinco the sum of P53,000.00 as indemnity for the value
of the motorcycle without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance
with paragraph 3 of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
The accused being detained are entitled to the full credit of their preventive detention
as per R.A. No. 6127.
The Jail Warden of the BJMP, Silay City, PNP in the case of accused Jovito Llavore
and the Jail Warden of the BJMP, Cadiz City PNP for accused Joel Lobaton y Oreta
alias `Imbong and accused Daniel Guillero y Alvarez are all hereby ordered to commit
all the said accused to the National Penitentiary for Service of their sentence as per
Supreme Court Circular No. 4-92-A dated April 20, 1992.
Let an alias Warrant of Arrest be immediately issued against accused Rodolfo Fuentes
(Escapee) for his immediate arrest, and the officer-in-charge of the Warrant and
Subpoena Section of the PNP, Cadiz City is hereby directed to explain within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy of this decision why up to the present the said two (2)
accused have not been arrested despite the lapse of more than six (6) months after the
issuance of the alias Warrant of Arrest against alias `Galoy Longno (at-large) and the
accused Rodolfo Fuentes from the time of the latters escape from jail.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the officer-in-charge of the Warrant and
Subpoena Section of the PNP, Cadiz City and the private complainant in accordance
with Supreme Court Circular No. 7-92 dated October 12, 1992. [11]
Jovito Llavore, along with his co-accused Joel Lobaton and Daniel Guillero,
appealed from the decision; Lobaton and Guillero, however, later withdrew their
respective appeals.
Appellant Llavore contends that the trial court has erred (1) in convicting him of
robbery with homicide despite the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of his
co-accused Rodolfo Fuentes; (2) in not declaring the arrest of appellant as illegal and
the seizure of the tricycle by the police officers as a ground for its inadmissibility in
evidence; and (3) in rejecting the claim of appellant that he did not know the identity of
his co-accused.
Llavore maintains that the extrajudicial confession of Fuentes implicating him
(Llavore) and his co-accused should not be made the basis for his conviction as being
merely hearsay. The Office of the Solicitor General, echoing the argument of appellant,
explains that indeed the trial court should not have considered against Llavore the
extrajudicial confession of Fuentes. The Court agrees. Fuentes has not been presented
to the witness stand, and there can be no way of being assured on the veracity of his
statements. Most importantly, Llavore has not been accorded an opportunity to conduct
a cross-examination; the law grants him that right.
A review of the evidence on record, nevertheless, would still warrant an affirmance
of the trial courts judgment of conviction. The crime of robbery with homicide,
penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof that (a) the
taking of personal property is done through violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is done
with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) the commission of homicide (in its generic
sense) occurs on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof. [12] There must be an
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing but, once shown, it matters not
whether both crimes be committed at the same time or one be prior or subsequent to
the other.[13]
Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the commission of the crime; a conviction can
thus only rest on circumstantial evidence. Rule 133, Section 4, of the Rules of Court
provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if - (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not
the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt,
[14]
and facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence
can well constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may not too
infrequently even surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. [15]
In this case, the circumstances established, in the considered view of the Court,
would adequately support the finding of guilt pronounced by the trial court. (1) On 23
May 1991, the tricycle belonging to Hernani Tancinco was stolen; (2) the tricycle was
later found in the house of appellant Llavore, and no satisfactory reason was given to
explain his possession thereof;[16] (3) some parts of the vehicle had been removed,
changed, or replaced and the motor and chassis number had been defaced; (4) on the
occasion of the unlawful taking of the property, Danilo Malata, then driving the tricycle,
was stabbed to death; (5) the postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Guanzon on
24 May 1991 showed seven stabbed wounds on different parts of the victims body; and
(6) a sack containing the missing parts of the tricycle were found about two kilometers
away from the house of appellants father in Hacienda El Paso.
The bare denial of appellant and his defense of alibi cannot overcome the evidence
adduced by the prosecution. Denial by itself is an intrinsically weak defense. [17] Neither
can the claim of alibibe given weight. For alibi to prosper, not only must the person
invoking it prove being in another place at the time of the commission of the crime, but
also that it would have been impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the
appointed time.[18] Appellant himself has confirmed that the public market in Cadiz City
where he claims to have been with his wife is only about five meters away from the
scene of the crime, i.e., the reclamation area in Hitalon Bridge, Cadiz City. The house
of appellant, upon the other hand, is within the same barangay where the killing has
occurred.
Appellant would assail the legality of his arrest and the consequent seizure of the
subject tricycle solely on the basis of the inadmissible extrajudicial confession of
Fuentes. The argument would be non sequitur. In any event, any objection, defect, or
irregularity attending an arrest or its consequences should be made before an entry of
plea in the arraignment; otherwise, the objection would be deemed waived. [19] The
records would show that on 01 October 1991, appellant and the other accused, Lobaton
and Fuentes, entered a plea of not guilty[20] without assailing the validity of his arrest.
[21]
Indeed, on 25 November 1991, appellant filed a Motion to Admit Accused to
Bail[22] setting the hearing of the motion on 29 November 1991. The trial court required
the prosecution to file its comment on the motion. [23] After the prosecution submitted its
opposition,[24] the trial court later granted the motion of appellant and required him to
post a bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00 for his provisional liberty. [25] Appellant
posted a property bond amounting to P80,000.00, secured by two parcels of
land[26] which the trial court approved.[27] Appellant filed an Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Postponement.[28] After the prosecution had rested its case, appellant filed
two Motions with Express Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence, one by the
Public Attorneys Office and the other by his private counsel. [29] He even opposed the
prosecutions formal offer of exhibits.[30] After the trial court had denied his earlier
motion,[31] appellant participated in the trial of the case by testifying in his own behalf
and by presenting other witnesses as evidence for the defense. It would, therefore, be
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after the accused was
arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered
against him.[32]
Appellant contends that he has been falsely implicated by persons who are not
even known to him. Given the circumstances heretofore narrated, that, too, would be
hard to believe. In any case, it is not necessary in crimes of this nature that the coperpetrators have known each other. What should instead matter would be the
evidence of his participation in the commission of the crime and the weight that is aptly
due to it.
The trial court ordered appellant, together with the two other accused, Joel Lobaton
and Daniel Guillero, to jointly and severally pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity to the heirs
of the victim Danilo Malata and awarded P53,000 to Hernani Tancinco for the value of
the tricycle. The award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
is in keeping with the prevailing jurisprudence. [33] In addition to the indemnity, appellant
Llavore should now also be ordered to pay P50,000.00 moral damages pursuant to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [34] The award of P53,000.00 to Hernani Tancinco
representing the value of the stolen tricycle cannot be sustained; the records would
show that in a receipt, dated 31 July 1991, [35] Erna M. Tancinco, wife of Hernani
Tancinco, executed a receipt in the presence of two witnesses [36] which acknowledged
the return of the vehicle from the Office of the I & I Section of the Cadiz City Police
Station.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, finding appellant Jovito Llavore y Barrientos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, said appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Danilo Malata the amount of P50,000.00 moral
damages. The award by the trial court of P53,000.00 to Hernani Tancinco insofar as
appellant is concerned must be, as it is hereby, DELETED for lack of basis. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
6. PEOPLE VS. MOLE

[G. R. No. 137366. November 27, 2003]
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Romeo Mole y Santos, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143,
finding appellant Romeo Mole y Santos guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
The accusatory portion of the Information[2] charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent.
On motion of the prosecution, the accusatory portion was later amended to read:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent, while dizzy or
otherwise unconscious. (Emphasis supplied.)
Culled from the documentary and the testimonial evidence for the prosecution
consisting of the testimonies of the following witnesses, to wit: private
complainant Emerita Reyes (Emerita); AureaVillena, the Medico-Legal Officer from the
National Bureau of Investigation; SPO4 Lilia R. Hogar, the police investigator;
and Wildredo Reyes, the husband of Emerita, are the following:
On April 11, 1997, the then 34-year old Emerita, her husband Wilfredo and their
three children consulted appellant, Romeo Mole, an albularyo (quack doctor), in the
latters house, they having been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies. Appellant,
diagnosing the Reyeses to be victims of kulam (witchcraft), asked for and was
given P935.00 for the purchase of 17 black candles which he needed to insulate them
from the spell. Appellant asked them to return the next day for treatment. [3]
As advised, the Reyeses returned to appellants house the next day, April 12,
1997. On appellants instructions, the Reyeses removed their clothes upon which
appellant massaged their bodies one at a time with cotton dipped in oil. [4]
After the treatment, the Reyeses repaired home, accompanied by appellant who
brought with him two black candles. Upon reaching the Reyeses house, appellant lit the
candles and placed one at the main door and another near the door of the kitchen. He
then invited Emeritas husband Wilfredo to drink gin while waiting for the candles to burn
out. After three shots, Wilfredo became dizzy and passed out. Appellant thereupon
brought Wilfredo to the only bedroom of the house and blew something on his
(Wilfredos) chest.[5]
At about 11:00 p.m., appellant left the Reyeses residence after asking for and
receiving the amount of P350.00 representing payment for his services. [6]
Emerita then went to sleep. At about 12:00 midnight, however, she heard someone
knock at the main door. Clad in a duster, she opened the door and saw appellant who
was looking for her youngest son, he saying that the sorcerer will take and kill him and
to
save
him
(the
son),
appellant
needed P2,500.00.
Panicky
and
crying, Emerita immediately gave the said amount to appellant who thereafter went to
the bedroom and sprinkled a pungent liquid on Wilfredo and their three children.
Appellant also sprinkled the same liquid on Emerita, blew something on her chest and,
while looking at her eyes, mumbled as if in prayer at which point Emerita instantly felt
weak and dizzy.[7]
Appellant then dragged Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the floor and removed
her underwear. She felt appellant, who was naked from the waist down, lie on top of her.
While she wanted to resist she was too weak and dizzy and eventually lost
consciousness.[8]
Before losing consciousness, however, Emerita felt something heavy on her breast
as appellant lay on top of her.[9]
When Emerita regained consciousness, appellant had left and her entire body,
including her vagina, was aching. She was later to declare in the course of her
testimony in court, when asked why her vagina was aching, that appellant raped her.[10]
The next morning, or on April 13, 1997, Emerita, without the knowledge of her
husband, reported her experience to the police. [11] Her husband, however, was informed
by a neighbor that Emeritawent to the police station, prompting him to follow her. On
arrival at the police station, he was unable to talk to his wife, and it was only on her
return home at around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. of that day thatEmerita related to him the
incidents that occurred the night before, albeit he could not remember if Emerita ever
mentioned to him that she became unconscious, because there have been a lot of
things which then occupied his mind.[12]
On April 14, 1997, Emerita was physically examined by Dr. Aurea Villena who found
multiple lacerations on her hymen which are secondary to child birth [13] and noted the
following:
1. No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time
of the examination.
2. Hymen, reduced to myrtiformis.[14]
At the witness stand, the doctor disclosed that the seminology examination
conducted on Emerita yielded negative result, and that there was no medical basis to
conclude that she had been subjected to sexual abuse. [15]
From the Final Investigation Report [16] of SPO4 Lilia Hogar to whom the case was
referred for investigation, the following datum appears:
xxx
07. Suspect ROMEO MOLE when apprised of his constitutional rights admitted
raping EMERITA and also told the same admission to the PRESS people
who interviewed him.
xxx
SPO4 Hogars testimony in court was dispensed with after the prosecution
stipulated that appellant was investigated and gave the statement to her. [17]
Appellant on the other hand denied the accusation. He claims that it was his
wife Adoracion Mole,
not
him,
who
treated Emerita; that
both Emerita and Wilfredo were awake when he returned to their house on the night of
April 13, 1997; that he merely fell asleep on the Reyeses sofa in the living room; and
that when he awoke at around 8:00 the following morning, Wilfredo even offered him
breakfast which he turned down as it was already late. He, however, admitted that there
is no reason why Emerita would file a complaint for rape against him.[18]
Appellants testimony was corroborated by his wife Adoracion Mole.[19]
Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on Romeos verbal admission
to SPO4 Hogar of having raped the victim, as reflected in the aforementioned datum in
the Final Investigation Report, the trial court convicted appellant of rape by the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Romeo Mole y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. Accordingly, accused Romeo Mole y Santos is hereby
sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to INDEMNIFY private
complainant Emerita Reyes y Tamayo in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.[20]
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court:
1. . . . In deciding the case by mere confusion or supposition, and in failing to
consider certain unrebutted substantial matters of facts tending to show the
non-occurrence or at least a doubtful occurrence of rape.
2. . . . In failing to apply the rule that in case of doubt, the same must be
resolved in favor of the accused.[21]
In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with
clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.[22]
And the credibility of the private complainant is of vital importance for, in view of the
peculiar nature of rape, conviction or acquittal rests entirely upon her. [23] It has thus
become doctrine that the accused may be convicted even solely on the basis of the
victims testimony provided that the testimony is clear, credible, convincing, unshaken
by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points.[24]
Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and not disturbed on
appeal,[25] inconsistencies in the testimony of Emerita put serious doubts on her claim of
rape, compelling this Court to reverse appellants conviction.
Thus, on direct examination, she related that appellant, who was naked from waist
down, lay on top of her after removing her underwear, whereupon she lost
consciousness; and that after she regained consciousness, her entire body, including
her vagina, was aching. She thus concluded that she was raped:
Q
You mean Madam Witness that after your panty was removed and accused
was able to l[ay] you down [o]n the floor you lost consciousness and you
dont remember anything?
Yes, sir.
Prior [to] you[r] los[s of] consciousness, what was the accused doing
[to] you that you could remember?
I just felt that there was something heavy on my breast, sir.
xxx
Q
What was the condition of your body when you regained consciousness?
I felt pain all over my body, sir.
What particular portion of your body was aching or suffering from pain?
My whole body and also my vagina, sir.
Do you know of any reason why your vagina is aching?
Yes, sir.
What was that?
He raped me, sir.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, Emerita gave the following account:

ATTY. OLIVA
Q
You testified Madam Witness on direct examinatio[n] that the last time you
were conscious that you felt that the accused was on top of you, is that
correct?
Yes, sir.
You also testified that you lost consciousness and that when you
regained consciousnes[s] the accused ha[d] left already, am I right, Madam
Witness?
Yes, sir.
Now, my question, Madam Witness, when did you lose your

consciousness?
A
Q
When he was halfway [with] what he was doing to me, Sir.

Are you referring to the . . .[m]ashing of your breast and kissing of
your lips, Madam Witness?
Yes, Sir.
xxx
Q
Miss Witness, can you possibly tell the Honorabl[e] Court if there was
actual penetration of the sexual organ of the accused to you?
WITNESS
A
Yes, sir.
COURT
Q
Why do you know that there was [f]ull penetratio[n] Madam Witness?
Because Your Honor, when I regained consciousnes[s] and he already

left the house, I felt that my vagina was somewhat forced and it was
very painful, Sir.
xxx
Why do you know that he was able to have sexual intercourse with
you?
WITNESS
A
Because my organ was wet, Sir.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
When, also on during cross-examination, she was questioned by the trial court, she
gave the following statement:
COURT
Q
What was that thing that he did which you felt the accused was doing to
you?
WITNESS
A
I felt that he put his sexual organ on top of my body, Sir.
COURT
Q
On top of your body?
[Q] Where did the accused plac[e] his sexual organ, Madam Witness?
[WITNESS]
[A] On my vagina, Sir.[28] (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony of Emerita prompted the defense to propound the following
question which elicited the following answer:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q
Madam Witness, you made several inconsistent statements during your

direct examination that you lost consciousness and that you learned that
you were raped after you regained consciousness. Likewise, when asked
by this Honorable Court when you came to know that you were raped, you
also said that you learned that you were raped because when you woke up,
your sexual organ was painful and when you were finally asked when for
the first time you c[a]me to know that you were raped, you changed your
testimony that you felt that the accused inserted his sex organ into your
vagina, which is which now, Madam Witness?
I lost consciousness after he was finished having sexual intercourse

with me, Sir.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When asked to clarify her statements, Emerita did not give categorical answers:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q
When the accus[ed] was holding your breast and kissing your lips, in the
middle of that, you lost consciousness, Madam Witness?
I felt what he was doing to me but because my body was very weak, I tried
to move my head around so he could not kiss me, Sir.[30]
xxx
COURT
Q
When [did] you know that your organ was wet?
WITNESS
A
When he was gone already, Sir.
COURT
Q
In other words, you only came to know tha[t] there was sexual intercourse
after the accused has already left the premises[,] is that correct?
WITNESS
A
No, Your Honor, because when he dragged me, I already felt weak and
dizzy but I felt all those things that he did to me.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
Emeritas vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the test of

consistency. This Court is thus put on guard as to the veracity of her claim. For while
minor inconsistencies do not detract from the actual fact of rape, [32] those
in Emeritas testimony may not be considered minor for they relate to the fact of
commission of the offense charged.
A woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her
defloration during that state, and her violation may be proved indirectly by other
evidence.[33] Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of rape need only testify in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in
her testimony to convict the accused.[34]
While this Court has held in numerous rape cases that no person would subject
herself to a rape trial given the attendant embarrassment of a medical examination and
the stigma of a sexual assault unless the accusation be true, [35] it is gathered from those
cases that the victim was able to clearly and categorically impute the crime on the
offender.
In the case at bar, save for Emeritas inconsistent testimonies as noted above,
there is no other evidence showing that appellant did have carnal knowledge with her.
The testimony of Wilfredo merely dwelt on events that occurred before and after the
alleged rape, while the result of the medical examination showed no physical
manifestations of sexual intercourse. While Dr. Villena did not rule out the possibility of
sexual intercourse, her testimony could hardly be characterized as consistent and
unwavering, having first ruled out the possibility of sexual intercourse, only to later
retract upon being scrutinized by the trial court.[36]
As for the trial courts reliance on the investigative report-Exhibit E of SPO4
Lilia Hogar in this wise:
Incidentally, the defense did not interpose any objection to the admission of Exhibit E,
the Investigation report. SPO4 Lilia Hogar, the Investigator-on-Case, stated in the said
report that ROMEO, when interviewed by the media people admitted raping EMERITA,
[37]
the same report showing that appellant admitted having raped Emerita is inadmissible in
evidence. The admission was not in writing and there is no showing that appellant was
assisted by a competent and independent counsel of his choice when he made such
statement in accordance with Section 2 (d) [38] of Republic Act 7438[39] in relation to
Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution.[40]
The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Moles guilt for rape
notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable for the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness.
The records clearly show that appellant lay on top of the victim, mashed her breasts and
kissed her lips, acts from which appellants lewd design was evident. Although the
information filed was for the crime of rape, appellant can be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape. [41]
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged in the information
or proven during trial, the penalty of prision correccional[42] shall be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant must suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2)
Months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE,
the
July
15,
1998
Decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Romeo Mole y
Santos is CONVICTED of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to
Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
7. Flaviana vs People
G.R. No. L-7448 April 11, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. FLAVIANA TALAO
PEREZ,Defendant-Appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancena
for appellant.
Joaquin P. Yuseco, Jr, and Federico B. Moreno for appelle.
ENDENCIA, J.:
In the above-styled cse, on November 27, 1953, after conducting the preliminary
investigation required by law, Assistant Fiscal Gregorio T. Lantin of the City of Manila
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an information for attempt estafa through falsification of a public document
against Flaviana Talao, Perez, worded as follws:
The undersigned accuses Falviana Talao Perez of the crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of a public document, committed as follows:chanrobles virtual law
library
That on or about the 18th of May, 1940, and for sometime prior to subsequent thereto,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, having filed claims for
compensation, pension and insurance benefits as a dependent and relative of the
deceased veteran Delfin Perez y Orense who died on May 18, 1942 at Camp O'Donnell,
Capas, Tarlac, with the Manila office of the U.S. Veterans Administration a branch or
instrumentallity of the United States Government for the military services and death of
said Delfin Perez y Orense, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to defraud, falsify or cause to be falsified an affidavit which is a public document
and other written statements and documents relating to said claims for compensation or
pension and insurance benefits in the following manner, to wit; the said accused
Flaviana Talao Perez in her desire to obtain from the Government of the United States
through the Veterans Administration payment for compensation or pension and
insurance benefits resulting from the death of Delfin Perez y Orense, a soldier of the
Philippine Army who died in the O'Donnell Concentration Camp Capas, Tarlac on May
18, 1942, filed with the Veterans Administration the corresponding claims or applications
for compensation of pension and insurance benefits and falsely pretended and
fraudulently represented herself therein to be the foster or step-mother of the said
veteran and as such had taken care of and supported said veteran from May 9, 1987 to
November 1941 and therefore entitled to receive such benefits and in support of such
applications of claims executed an affidavit to that effect and which affidavit was duly
sworn to and subscribed before Romualdo T. Saclayan a duly appointed and qualified
Notary Public for the City of Manila and acting as such and which document was
registered in the Notarial Book of said Notary Public as Document No. 156, Page 55,
Book 5, series of 1949 when as said accused fully knew the same was false and untrue
and made solely to secure the payment of the pension, compensation and insurance
above mentioned, thus making untruthful statements in a narration and statements were
falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused Flaviana Talao Perez with
intent to defraud, commenced the commission of the crime of estafa directly by overt
acts, to wit: the said accused Flaviana Talao Perez, of the U.S. Veterans Administration
that the facts in the said documents were true, filed them in the said office and
demanded from the personnel of the U.S. Veterans Administration payment for the
same but the said accused Flaviana Talao Perez did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some causes other than her voluntary desistance, to wit" the
fraud was discovered by the personnel of the U.S. Veterans Administration on time and
so payment was refused.
Upon motion filed by counsel for the accused on the ground that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the offense charged therein, the lower court, on December
19, 1953, found the motion to be well founded and dismissed the case through an order,
the pertinent portions of which are as follows:
Before arraignment, the accused, through her counsel, presented a Motion to Quash,
dated December 2, 1953, on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an
offense. The prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Gregorio T. Lantin, filed his answer to
said Motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Apparently the information charges the accused of attempted estafa through falsification
of a public document for making untruthful statements in narration of facts in an affidavit
which was duly subscribed and sworn to before Romualdo T. Saclayan, a duly
appointed and qualified Notary Public for the City of Manila. There is no allegation in the
infromation specific enough to show the contents of the affidavit in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that the essense of the charge is dependent upon the supposed affidavit
which was subscribed and sworn to by the accused before a Notary Public of Manila,
the Court believes that the contents thereof showing untruthful statements in narration
of facts must have to be asserted with sufficient clarity that the accused might be
appraised of the nature of the accusation against
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information as worded, charges the accused of falsification of a public documents
but at the same time, mentions not only one affidavit but a series of documents and
papers wherein the accused supposedly represented herself as the foster or
stepmother. The allegation in the information that she "falsely pretended and
fraudulently represented herself' and `thus making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts under which she is indicated not of conclusions made by the prosecutor as to
her culpability in a given set of unidentified
circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the attempted estafa charged, this Court notes that no amount whatsoever is
mentioned in the information. The element of `damage' is required by law in cases of
estafa to enable the Court to determine what penalty it shall impose, considering that
estafa is punished according to the amount involved, like in theft. It is the considered
opinion of this court must have to fail by its own amount own weight as no penalty can
possibly be meted out to the accused.
Therefter, the Assistant City Fiscal asked the Court to reconsider the aforequoted order
but in vain. Hence, the present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is now contended by the Solicitor General that the lower court erred: (1) in holding that
the allegation in the information were not specific enough to describe the crime charged;
(2) in holding that the accused Flaviana Talao Perez is not guilty of falsification of public
documents because she had no legal obligation to make a narration of facts in the
document in question; and (3) in holding that the failure to specify the amount of
damage in the information was a fatal defect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Upon a careful examination of the aforequoted information, we find that although its
language is not clear and simple and that it is repetitious, yet in essence it clearly
charges the appellee with having falsified an application filed with the U.S. Veterans
Administration to claim for compensation, pension and insurance benefits resulting from
the death of Delfin Perez y Orense and with having executed an affidavit stating therein
that she is the foster mother of said Perez, but said Flaviana Talao Perez failed to obtain
such pension or insurance benefits because it was timely discovered by the personnel
of the U.S. Veterans Administration that the application as well as its supporting
documents and affidavit were false.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The lower court also found the information defective in that there is no specific
allegation as to the contents of the affidavit in question but, as correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, in the information, there is the following allegation:
. . . the said accused filed with the Veterans Administration the corresponding claims or
applications for such compensation or pension and insurance benefits and falsely
pretended and fraudulently represented herself therein to be the foster or stepmother of
the said veteran and as such, had taken care of and supported said veteran from May
9, 1937 to November 19, 1941, and therefore, entitled to receive such benefits, and in
support of said applications or claims executed an affidavit to that effect.
from which it could be clearly gathered that the contents of the affidavit in question but,
as correctly pointed out to wit: that Flaviana Talao Perez falsely pretended to be the
foster or stepmother of Delfin Perez y Oronse and that she had taken care of and
supported the later when in fact all of these are
false.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The lower court likewise found the information in question defective because no amount
of damage is mentioned therein, but it is clearly alleged therein that Flaviana Talao
Perez has falsified the application and its supporting affidavits and filed them with the
U.S. Veterans Administration to demand payment of the pension and insurance benefits
for the death of Delfin Perez y Oronse but was not able to obtain said payment because
the fraud was discovered by the personnel of U.S. Veterans Administration on time. This
defect, however, is not so fatal that will warrant the dismissal of the case becuase it can
be cured by amendmentof the information in accordance with paragraph 2 of section 2,

Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:
If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or informatiion
which can be cured by amendment the court shall order the amendment to be made
and shall overrule the motion.
Accordingly, even granting that the information in question is defective, as pointed out
bgy the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can bu cured by amendment, the
lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the Fiscal to
amend the information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, finding the disputed order of dismissal to be erroneous, the same is hereby
reversed and the record of the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
in accordance with law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
8. People vs Dumangay
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R. No. 173483
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
MERLIE* DUMANGAY y SALE,

Appellant.
Promulgated:
September 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01700. The appellate court affirmed the Decision [2] dated October
29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Criminal Case Nos.
02-3568 and 02-3569. The trial court had convicted appellant Merlie Dumangay y Sale
of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 [3] and sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay the fine of P500,000 in Criminal
Case No. 02-3568, and imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and to pay the fine of P300,000 in Criminal Case No. 02-3569; and pay the
cost of suit.
The Informations[4] both dated December 2, 2002 that led to Merlies convictions
are as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-3568
xxxx
That on or about the 29 th day of November 2002, in the City
of Makati Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously without being authorized by law, sell, distribute and
transport zero point zero one (0.01) gram of [Methamphetamine]
hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug in consideration of two
hundred (Php 200.00) pesos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxxx
Criminal Case No. 02-3569
xxxx
That on or about the 29 th day of November 2002, in the City
of Makati Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
[her] possession zero point zero two (0.02) gram of [Methamphetamine]
hydrochloride of a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxxx
Upon arraignment on February 21, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The prosecution presented only one witness, a member of the Makati Anti-Drug
Abuse Council (MADAC), Francisco Barbosa. He testified as follows:
At 7 oclock in the evening of November 29, 2002, an informant reported to the office
of MADAC Cluster 3 that a certain Merlie, later identified as appellant, was engaged in
selling shabu at
the
corner
Sts., Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.
of
Acting
Don
on
Pedro
the
and
report,
MADAC
Enriquez
Cluster
Head, Barangay Chairman Vic Del Prado, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
with Barbosa as the poseur-buyer. Del Prado also coordinated with the Drug Enforcement
Unit (DEU) of the Makati City Police Station.[5]
Thereafter, Del Prado, DEU operative PO1 Jaime Laura, and other MADAC
members proceeded to the place where Merlie was reportedly selling shabu. They
found Merlie in
front
of
her
house
St., Barangay Poblacion, Makati City;
at
5649
and
Don
Pedro
corner
with
Enriquez
the
informant, Barbosa approached Merlie. The informant introduced Barbosa as a buyer

ofshabu, while the other members of the team watched from strategic positions. Merlie
then
asked Barbosa how
much
he
would
buy. Barbosa said,
dalawang daang piso lang, then handed Merlie the two 100-peso marked money. In
exchange,
Merlie
gave
him
small
plastic
sachet
of
white
crystalline
substance. After Barbosa pretended to examine it, he gave the pre-arranged signal to
the other members of the team and they arrested Merlie. Barbosa found the marked
money and two more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
in Merliespossession and informed Merlie the cause of her arrest and apprised her of her
constitutional rights.[6]
Thereafter, Merlie was brought to the DEU of the Makati City Police Station. The
three plastic sachets were sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
examination. The
laboratory
report
confirmed
that
the
sachets
contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Each sachet weighed 0.01 gram.[7]

The testimony of the Forensic Chemist who examined the substance and
prepared the report was dispensed with, considering the parties had stipulated that the
report was duly accomplished after the substance examined by the crime laboratory
yielded positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride.[8]
The defense presented Merlie as its sole witness. Merlie denied the allegations of
the prosecution. She testified that at the time of the alleged buy-bust operation, she
was already sleeping at home with her daughter when a man awakened her. She said
that there were two men who searched the house.
According to her, although no
illegal item was found, she was still forced to board a vehicle and was taken to the Sta.
Cruz Barangay Hall. There, a certain Minyang had taken her to a comfort room and told
her to strip, but nothing illegal was found on her person. She also said that no
uniformed policemen accompanied the arresting team and that Barbosa was not among
the men who arrested her. She did not file any complaint against the people who
arrested her because she had no relative to help her.[9]
On October 29, 2003, the trial court found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to
prove Merlies guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rendered a decision of conviction in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-3568 and 02-3569.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of the accused MERL[I]E
DUMANGAY y SALE was proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, as principal, with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, accused is hereby sentenced:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 02-3568, to suffer life imprisonment and to

pay a fine of P500,000.00;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 02-3569, to suffer imprisonment for a term

of twelve [12] years and one [1] day to twenty [20] years and to pay
a fine of P300,000.00; and
3.
To pay the costs.
Let the three [3] plastic sachets each containing zero point zero one
[0.01] gram of [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride be turned over to the
PDEA for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Merlie appealed. In view of our ruling in People v. Mateo,[11] this case was
referred to the Court of Appeals.[12]
Upon review, the Court of Appeals concluded in the Decision dated April 28,
2006 that the trial court did not err in finding Merlie guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opted not to file their
supplemental briefs. But, we find on record their briefs filed with this Court before the
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Appellant raised in her brief a single
issue:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, ARTICLE II OF
RA 9165 DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Rep. Act No. 9165.
Appellant challenges the testimony of Barbosa and claims that it was incredible and
inconsistent in regard to her identity. She avers that since there was no surveillance
conducted before the buy-bust operation and the informant was not present at the time,
there was no certainty as to the Merlie who was selling the prohibited drugs, named by
the informant.[14] According to appellant, although the testimony of Barbosa presented the
elements of the crime that would convince the trial court, it should be taken with caution,
since, Barbosa, as a MADAC agent, could make it appear that there was entrapment when
there was none.[15] She further argues that the reason for her conviction shall not be the
weakness of her defense but the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.[16]
For the State, the OSG maintains that the prosecution had proved the elements of
the crime charged: (1) the presence of the appellant at the scene of the crime; (2) the act
of selling one plastic sachet of shabu; and (3) the recovery of two plastic sachets
of shabu at the time of the entrapment. It also argues that the credibility of Barbosa,
whose testimony established the elements of the crime, was never impeached by the
defense.[17] The OSG avers that Barbosa positively identified appellant as the seller
of shabu, and such positive identification prevails over her feeble defense that she was
sleeping at their house when the entrapment took place.[18] Moreover, the OSG maintains
that the trial court imposed the proper penalty for the crime charged.[19]
The pertinent provisions of Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 provide:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions.
xxxx
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of
purity thereof:
xxxx
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of .
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
xxxx
We are convinced that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body or
substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually
committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event;
and (2) some persons criminal responsibility for the act. [20]
The straightforward testimony of Barbosa, the poseur-buyer, clearly established
that an illegal sale of shabu actually took place and that appellant was the seller, thus:
FISCAL MORENO:
Q: Mr. Witness, how did you come to know the accused in this particular
case, Merlie Dumangay?
A: Through our informant.
Q: And when did that informant go to your office?
A: November 29, 2002 at 7:00 p.m.
Q: [A]nd what was the information given to your office by the informant?
A: That [a] certain Merlie was engaged in selling prohibited drugs.
Q: And after receiving such information Mr. Witness, do you recall if your
office did [anything] to the information?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What Mr. Witness?
A: Our office called up the DEU, Makati police.
Q: Do you know the reason Mr. [W]itness why your office has to call up
the DEU office?
A: [Y]es sir.
Q: For what particular purpose Mr. Witness? Why is there a need to call
DEU Mr. Witness?
A: [S]o that we can participate in our operation sir.
Q: And what participation did the [DEU] office make in connection with the
buy bust operation?
A: He [led] our operation sir.
Q: After the coordination has been made with the [DEU], what happened
next?
A: We conducted a briefing sir.
xxxx
Q: After the briefing was conducted Mr. Witness do you recall if ever a
buy bust operation was conducted?
A: There was sir.
Q: Against whom was the buy bust operation Mr. Witness?
A: I could not recall sir.
Q: Do you know if [a] buy bust operation was in fact conducted
on November 29, 2002?
A: Yes sir, there was.
Q: Do you recall if somebody was arrested as a result of the buy
bust operation Mr. Witness?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Who is that particular person?

A: Merlie Dumangay sir.
Q: Where is that Merlie Dumangay now? Will you kindly point her
out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a woman inside the courtroom [who], when
asked, identified herself as Merlie Dumangay.
FISCAL MORENO:
Q: In connection with the arrest, which you have conducted against the
person of Merlie Dumangay, do you recall if you ever executed
a Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto?
A: Yes sir.
Q: If that Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto will be shown to you, will
you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes sir.
Q: I am showing to you Mr. Witness this Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng pagaresto consisting of two pages. Will you kindly go over this document
and tell us if that is the same Pinagsanib na Salaysay ngPagaresto which you said you executed?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
FISCAL MORENO:
Q: Have you read the contents of this Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pagaresto written in Tagalog?
A: Yes sir.
Q: [D]o you affirm and confirm as to the truthfulness of the
allegations contained in this Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto?
A: Yes sir.
FISCAL MORENO:
For purposes of expediency your Honor and to save the material time
of the Honorable Court, we would like to stipulate with the defense that
the allegations contained in this Pinagsanib na Salaysayng Pagaresto will form part of his direct testimony your Honor.
ATTY. QUIAMBAO:
We agree your Honor.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)
Barbosa, PO1 Jaime Laura, MADAC members Romeo Lazaro and Marvin
Cruz, in the sworn Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto,[22] recounted the details of
the buy-bust operation. They stated therein that acting on confidential information, a
team composed of MADAC and DEU agents proceeded to the place where Merlie was
allegedly selling shabu. The informant made the introductions and the transaction took
place. Barbosa handed the marked money to Merlie while the latter handed him one
plastic sachet of shabu. Thereafter, Merlie was immediately arrested and upon her
arrest, Barbosa found two plastic sachets in her right hand.
The laboratory examination of the crystalline substance confiscated from Merlie
and forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory yielded positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In short, the prosecution clearly and positively established that Merlie agreed to
sell shabu to
the
poseur-buyer
and
that
the
sale
was
consummated. Moreover, Barbosa identified the three plastic sachets of shabu and the
marked money in court.[23]
We disagree with appellants contention that inconsistencies in Barbosas testimony
are adequate to demolish the credibility of Barbosa. The inconsistencies alluded to by the
appellant in the testimony of Barbosa are inconsequential and minor to adversely affect
his credibility.[24] The inconsistencies do not detract from the fact that Barbosa positively
identified her in open court.[25] What is essential is that the prosecution witness positively
identified the appellant as the one who sold the shabu to the poseur-buyer. There is also
nothing on record that sufficiently casts doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witness.
[26]
More
so,
the
lack
of
prior
surveillance
does
not
cast
doubt
on Barbosas credibility. We have held that a prior surveillance is not necessary

especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during
entrapment, as in this case.[27] Contrary to appellants contention, the informant was
present during the entrapment.[28]
Note that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace

officers as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an
offense. Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[29] The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the
accused. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buybust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimony on the operation deserves faith and credit.[30]
In light of the clear and convincing evidence of the prosecution, we find no
reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. More so,
appellant failed to present evidence that Barbosa and the other members of the team
had any ill motive to falsely accuse her of a serious crime. Absent any proof of such
motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty as well as the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants selfserving and uncorroborated defenses.[31]
Lastly, considering that the buy-bust operation in this case is legitimate, the
subsequent warrantless arrest and the warrantless search and seizure are equally
valid. In People
v.
Julian-Fernandez,[32] we
against warrantless searches
and
seizures
held
that
is
not
the
interdiction
absolute
and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances such as the search incidental to a lawful arrest. This includes
a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected
with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize an arrest in flagrante delicto as
a permissible warrantless arrest.[33] In this case, we find that the appellant, having failed
to controvert the evidence that the other two plastic sachets of shabu were found in her
possession, is also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the decisions of the trial court and the
appellate court in holding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01700 finding appellant Merlie Dumangay y Sale guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3568 and 02-3569 for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
9. People vs Tuazon
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R. No. 175783

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
- versus -
BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS,

Accused-Appellant.
Promulgated:
September 3, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July
2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Bernardo
Tuazon y Nicolas, affirming the Decision[2] dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425,[3] as amended.
The Information filed against appellant alleged:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON
y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as
amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7 th day of March, 1999, in the City of
Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any
regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams,
5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of
250.74 grams of white crystalline substance, which after the
corresponding laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to
the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu a
regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not

guilty.[5]
The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3
Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the
Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a
Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411[6] would deliver an unspecified amount
of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City Chief of
Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a
surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini
car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop and opened
a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as
members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1
Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and
appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent
document relating to said firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get
down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno
saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly
admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police
station.
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that
when they frisked appellant, they discovered 2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size
plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with
one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.[7]
The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over to the crime laboratory
yielded the following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen
gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x. [8]
contains
Methylamphetamine
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led
to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as a caretaker of Curacha, a
beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and
owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six
oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of
these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He
allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner of
the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green
colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer,
Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified men, the latter purportedly
pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men
allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him
in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought to the
police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name of his
employer. After two days, he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the
owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said
vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No.
6425 for illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his
direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one charged
with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to
support a guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[9]
On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by
appellant, the records of the case having been forwarded to this Court by the
RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their respective
briefs.[10]
In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which
he questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented
against him. He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely
driving within Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and was
not about to commit any crime which could have justified his apprehension. He goes on
to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his
failure to raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the
unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant claims that
as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior
to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal
activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance and then sought a search
warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should be
excluded from evidence. [11]
On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of
Appeals conformably with our decision in People v. Mateo, which modified the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from the RTCs to this
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.[12]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a
quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is
hereby AFFIRMED.[13]
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to
be clear and unequivocal[14] and should therefore prevail over appellants defense of
denial.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he
was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has
become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[16] It also took note of appellants failure to give any credible
reason why the police singled him out considering that they were strangers to one
another prior to the date of the incident.[17]
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone
assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC
ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]
Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence
was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade school graduate, could not have
concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest. [19] He also maintains that he
was an easy target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke
bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who frequented said establishment. In
addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral
certainty required for conviction and that the trial court should not have applied the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the police
officers. [20]
Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the
factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes that the court a quos evaluation of
the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs and was utterly lacking in
substantial discussion, in contravention of this Courts edict that the decisions must
distinctly and clearly express their factual and legal bases. [21]
On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant filed a Manifestation
stating that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters for his
defense were already discussed in his previous pleadings. [22] The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief. [23]
The appeal must fail.
In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of
PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue about a witnesss credibility. In this
regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb factual
findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying.[24] Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of
pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of
respect on appeal.[25] Our careful review of the records of this case reveals that the trial
court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno
recounted their encounter with appellant as follows:
PROS. LUNA:
Thank you, your honor.
Q:
Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime

in the month of March 1999?
WITNESS:
A:
At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q:
Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
How did you come to know him?
A:
Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
Q:
A:
If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you
please point him out?
He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:

The witness is pointing to a male person inside the
courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
PROS. LUNA:
Q:
Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning

of March 7, 1999?
WITNESS:
A:
At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q:
What were you doing then at that time?
A:
We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
Q:
Who were your companions at that time?
A:
PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
Q:
While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual

incident at that time?
A:
One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone,

sir.
Q:
About what?
A:
About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of

Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q:
Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed

to deliver an undetermined amount of shabu?
A:
The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said
on the telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number
PFC 411 who will deliver at said place.
Q:
Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?
A:
We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
Q:
What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
A:
Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q:
What did you do next?
A:
We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked

vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q:
Where is this located?
A:
In Barangay
in Antipolo City.
Q:
Upon reaching that place what happened?
A:
When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate

number PFC 411, sir.
Q:
If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to

identify it?
A:
Q:
San
Roque
fronting
along
the
highway
Yes, sir.
I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1
and B-2. What relation has this to the one you mentioned?
A:
This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q:
Upon seeing the car what did you do?
A:
We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
Q:
Specifically, what did you do?
A:
We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q:
What happened after flagging down the car?
A:
When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as

police officers, sir.
Q:
What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
A:
The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as

members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
Q:
What was the reaction of the driver?
A:
When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on

his waist.
Q:
What did you do next? In your case what did you do?
A:
We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
COURT:
Q:
Did you know what Padlan did?
WITNESS:
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
What did he do?
A:
He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent

document for his gun.
Q:
What do you mean he was asked? Who was asked?
A:
The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
PROS. LUNA:
Q:
What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A:
Q:
A:
He said that the gun is not his.

Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon
what did you do as police officer?
I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q:
After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A:
I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.
Q:
Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?
A:
I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it

contained shabu, sir.
Q:
What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A:
We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the

evidence, sir.
Q:
What did you do with the shabu?
A:
We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q:
What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A:
It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine

hydrochloride sir.[26]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno
establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellants culpability. His testimony regarding the
circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 from the moment their
office received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they accosted
appellant deserved to be given significance as it came from the mouth of a law
enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their
official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or that they
were moved by ill-will.[27]
Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and
affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. It is well-settled that positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. [28] A
defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony
on affirmative matters.[29] Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be
supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[30]
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of
the physical evidence presented against him. No less than our Constitution recognizes
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in
Section 3(2) of the same article
(2)
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless
searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a
moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. [31]
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,[32] this Court had the occasion to elucidate
on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement
of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search
on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another
with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle
is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to

moving vehicles does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned
constitutional stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police
distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration
behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such
arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order to
justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.[33]
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[34] the term probable cause was explained to
mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of the case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
[35]
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless
search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off
that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead,
the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The
information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car
was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped
the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any
document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the
polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers
seat plastic sachets containing white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken
together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of the
Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against
appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence
against him on the ground that the same was obtained through a warrantless
search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search
and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the
trial court to admit said evidence. [36]
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional
requirement that (n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. [37] Again, we
disagree.
Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital
component of due process and fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more important
significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost so that he may
appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision needs to be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal.[39]
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially
complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The decision contained a summary
of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise
contained an explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the
decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards the bases
for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense
of bare denial in favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y
Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
10. People vs Cabalquinto
G.R. No. 167693
September 19, 2006
(Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR CABALQUINTO, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due
requital for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to
effectuate the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as
the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our own Rule
on Violence Against Women and their Children.1
The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the
dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610
provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. at the instance of the offended party, his name may
be withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio
broadcasting, producer and director in the case of the movie industry, to cause
undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which
results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Confidentiality.All records pertaining to cases of violence against
women and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential
and all public officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals
shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate
family member, without the latter's consent, shall be liable to the contempt power
of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.All hearings of cases of

violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner
consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their
privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever
publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address,
telephone number, school, business address, employer or other identifying
information of the parties or an immediate family or household member, without
their consent or without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of court
and shall suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than
Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from
posting in its Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual
abuse in response to a letter from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the
Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme
Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best
interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her
daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page. 2
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI),
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to post the full text
of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.
The position of the OSG in its Comment3 is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the
posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court
Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine
whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the
constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the person's
expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy depends
on a twopart test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a
parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of
privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to
have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to
the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an
expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which
reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining
to child abuse cases.
The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all
court documents which state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain
sexual assault, endangering the welfare and abuse and neglect cases should remain
confidential. The name of the victim shall not appear in any public record; rather, initials
or a fictitious name shall appear. The offenses covered by the law include aggravated
sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual
contact, endangering the welfare of children, and any action alleging an abused or
neglected child. Thus, in Application of V Pub. Corp., 120 N.J. 508 (1990),and Div. of
Youth & Fam. Serv. V. J.B., 120 N.J. 112 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court
provided guidelines in the implementation of this statute.
In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could
include the use of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full
text of decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court
instead replace the material information, such as the name of the child-victim, in its
decisions.
The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child
abuse cases should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court
proceedings, but even after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect the right
to privacy of the child and her family and to preclude instances where undue disclosure
of information may impair the treatment and rehabilitation of the child-victim. 4
The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP
informs the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the
names of children who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law.5 The NPC, on
the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media practice is to inquire whether these
individuals wish to have their names appear in the report. If they do not, media would
normally take off the names and merely provide a very general description of the
individual in recognition of the need to carefully balance the right to information with the
welfare of the parties involved.6
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in
cases involving violence against women and their children, in this case and henceforth,
the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor 7 and shall use fictitious
initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victimssurvivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as
well those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. 8
On February 18, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted
Melchor Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old
daughter, AAA. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty in both Criminal Case No. Q-98-79683 and
Criminal Case No. Q-98-79684, for Rape, judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing accused MELCHOR CABALQUINTO Y MINGO to suffer the penalty
of DEATH on both counts, pursuant to the penalty imposed under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines as amended by RA 7659.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify his daughter-victim the sum of Seventy
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for damages, in each count.
SO ORDERED.9
This case was initiated by a sworn statement filed by AAA, assisted by her mother,
ABC,10 which resulted in the filing of two (2) Informations for rape, the first alleging:
That on or about the 8th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years old, a minor,
put himself on top of her, inside the room of their residence located at xxx, 11 this
City, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with her against her will and without
her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
and the second stating:
That on or about the 13th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years of age, a
minor, put himself on top of her, inside the room of their residence located at
xxx,13 this City, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with her against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
Cabalquinto pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued which
resulted in his conviction and the imposition of the penalty of death. The records of the
case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review.
On December 10, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to submit
their respective briefs. The parties complied. Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren
Mateo,15 however, the Court issued a Resolution on September 14, 2004, transferring
the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and added an award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.16 The case
is again before us for our final disposition.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA herself, her mother ABC, and Dr. Stella
Guerrero-Manalo (Dr. Manalo) of the Child Protection Unit (CPU) of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of Cabalquinto and that they have four
children, namely: BBB, CCC, the child-victim AAA, and DDD. At around 8:45 p.m. of
November 13, 1998, she was on her way home to xxx, and saw her sons BBB and CCC
outside the house, and her youngest daughter DDD playing with a cousin. As she was
approaching the house, she noticed that the door was closed although the lights were
on. Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall, she peeped through
the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping motions on their
daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her panties pulled down. When she
heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs ("ibuka mo"), she kicked and pounded the
door. Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood up and opened the door. ABC
entered the room and confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her accusation. She
then asked AAA what her father did to her. AAA did not say anything but looked pale. 17
After regaining her composure, she went to her sister-in-law EEE, who lived on the
second floor of the house, and confided to the latter. At around 10:00 o'clock that night,
she went to her sister's house in xxx to seek advice. Her sister told her to report the
matter to the barangay officials. The barangay officials, in turn, told her to go to the
police which she did the following day, November 14, 1998. 18
AAA's Salaysay was taken by the police and they were referred to the CPU of PGH.
Because there was no doctor on duty, she and AAA returned to the CPU on November
16, 1998. AAA was examined by a doctor and a medical certificate was issued. They
returned to the police station where she executed her Salaysay. They then proceeded to
the fiscal's office to lodge a complaint. 19
ABC further testified that during the police investigation on November 14, 1998, AAA
revealed to the police that a similar incident happened to her on November 8, 1998, the
day of her friend's birthday celebration. 20
AAA testified that at around 8:45 p.m. on November 13, 1998, she was inside their
house in xxx, with her father, Cabalquinto, when the latter instructed her to close the
door and windows and turn off the light. She obeyed but did not turn off the light. Her
father then told her to lie down and immediately placed himself on top of her. He then
undressed her, brought out his penis, asked her to masturbate him and to suck his
penis, inserted his penis in her private parts and licked her private parts. He told her not
to tell her ninang DDD or her mother; otherwise, he would kill them all. She felt pain in
her stomach and pelvis after the incident. 21
Corroborating her mother's testimony, AAA stated that while they were at the police
station, she disclosed that she was also raped by her father on November 8, 1998. She
remembered the incident because it was the day her friend, FFF, celebrated her
birthday. According to AAA, her father had been drinking that night. When she went
home to drink water, she was called by her father, told to close the door and windows
and to turn off the lights. She obeyed but did not turn off the lights. Her father then
placed himself on top of her and told her to masturbate him. 22
AAA further testified that she was not enrolled in school because her mother had been
abroad.23
It should be mentioned that in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 14, 1998,
AAA stated that her father had raped her seven (7) times since her mother left for
abroad. She said that she distinctly remembered having been raped by her father on
November 8, 1998, her friend's birthday; August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on
November 13, 1998, the day before her statement was taken. However, she said no
longer remembered the exact dates of the other incidents. 24
Dr. Manalo, who conducted the physical examination of AAA, testified that AAA had no
injury on her genitalia; that her hymen is quite large and distensible possibly because of
penile penetration; and that she recovered a strand of pubic hair inside AAA's vaginal
vault which could only have reached the area as a consequence of penile penetration
because AAA did not have pubic hair yet. 25
On cross-examination, Dr. Manalo stated that she did not find any traces of bleeding in
AAA's vagina but that injury is uncommon in incestuous rape. 26
The trial court admitted the following documentary evidence formally offered by the
prosecution: (1) Referral Letter to the Office of the Prosecutor; (2) Sinumpaang
Salaysay of ABC; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA; (4) medical certificate; (5) birth
certificate of AAA; and (6) Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Stella Manalo. 27
Testifying as lone witness for his defense, Cabalquinto denied that he raped AAA on
November 8 and 13, 1998. He claimed that on November 13, 1998, he just slept in
the sala of their house with AAA and DDD, while his sons, BBB and CCC, slept in
another room. On November 8, 1998, he claimed that after cooking the food for FFF's
birthday party, he went home and slept. He averred that the cases filed against him
were the offshoot of frequent quarrels between his common-law wife, ABC, and his
brother, GGG.28
We have meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the transcripts
of stenographic notes and find no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We affirm Cabalquinto's conviction.
Cabalquinto's claim that there are material inconsistencies between the testimonies of
AAA and ABC with regard to whether AAA cried out as she was being raped because
while AAA testified that she shouted twice, ABC stated that she did not see AAA struggle
nor hear her call out, is unconvincing.
AAA was firm and unwavering in her narration of her traumatic experience. During cross
examination, she remained steadfast in her assertion that her father inserted his penis
inside her genitals and raped her, even demonstrating what she understood of the word
rape by forming a circle with her fingers and moving her middle finger inside and out
indicating sexual intercourse.29
Thus, the trial court gave full credence to AAA's testimony and ruled:
From the testimony of the principal witness, [AAA] alone, viz, the testimony of the
accused, there is no reason to doubt that accused has [sic] molested his
daughter, and had carnal knowledge of her, on two occasions, nighttime on
November 8 and 13, 1998, when [AAA] was then only 8 years old, inside their
dwelling.
The testimony of [AAA] was even more bolstered by the consistency of her
declaration under cross by the defense counsel, Atty. Torralba of the Public
Attorney's Office, whose attempt to discredit [AAA]'s accusation by making it
appear that she would not have known how to testify that she was raped by her
own father, had she not been coached by someone else to say so, miserably
failed. In the following portions of [AAA]'s cross-examination by the Defense,

instead of destroying [AAA]'s credibility the more that it was established that
accused indeed raped her (sic) daughter.
xxxx
[AAA]'s declaration that she was raped corroborates the testimony of the doctor
who testified that a strand of hair was found inside [AAA]'s vaginal vault. The
doctor's testimony that the presence of a strand of hair inside the vaginal vault
would not be possible without sexual intercourse, bolsters the accusation of
[AAA] that she had been raped. Of course, there is no test to determine whose
hair was it, but considering [AAA]'s testimony that accused had carnal knowledge
of her twice prior to examination, a conclusion that the hair is accused's is
plausible. The idea that that hair was purposely placed inside [AAA]'s vagina
would be absurdity. Thus, when [AAA] pointed to her father as the person who
molested her, this Court can only believe because no daughter in [AAA]'s age
would accuse her own father of any wrongdoing, if it is not for the fact that he had
wronged her, and that hair (pubic or not) is accused's. 30
ABC's testimony of what she witnessed regarding the act of rape corroborates AAA's
account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains
merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape
was actually committed. Whether AAA cried out or not does not discount rape.
It should be emphasized that AAA was but eight (8) years old when the rapes
happened. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the
details of her torment with exactitude. In People v. Villar,31 the accused questioned the
inconsistency between the victim's declaration in her sworn statement and her direct
testimony in court as to the exact time when she was first raped by the accused in
1993.32 The Court held that it cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim's
recollection of her harrowing experience more so because the victim was an innocent
and tender nine (9)-year old lass when she was first raped. 33 Citing People v.
Sagucio,34 we also held that errorless testimony cannot be expected especially when a
witness is recounting the details of a harrowing experience.
On the other hand, ABC must have also been so devastated by what she witnessed her
husband doing to their daughter that she might have perceived things differently from
AAA.
Persons who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference, hence
they may have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is important is
that their testimonies reinforce each other on the essential facts and that their versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and
coherent whole.35 The fact therefore that the statements of AAA and ABC differ on some
minor details does not in any way affect their credibility or detract from the integrity and
truthfulness of their declarations. The variations in their testimonies present a believable
narration of what actually happened, made more so precisely because of their
imperfections.36
Cabalquinto offers a flimsy excuse in answer to the serious accusation against him. He
claims that ABC's frequent spats with his brother motivated her to file the rape cases
against him.
It is improbable that a victim of tender years, especially one unexposed to the ways of
the world as AAA must have been, would impute a crime as serious as rape to her own
father if it were not true. There is no doubt in our minds that AAA was impelled solely by
a desire to let justice find its way.37
As regards ABC, we are convinced that she did not expose AAA to the ignominy that
rape victims must face only to get back at Cabalquinto's brother. Had that been her
motive, she would have accused Cabalquinto's brother and not Cabalquinto himself. No
mother would possibly wish to stamp her child falsely with the stigma that follows a rape
only for the purpose of punishing someone against whom she has no grudge
whatsoever.38 ABC's zeal in prosecuting this case demonstrates to us her yearning that
the law may do her daughter justice even as her own father had so depravedly wronged
her.
Further, the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of mother and child are
revealing of the veracity of the rape charge. It should be emphasized that upon
witnessing the outrage done to her daughter, ABC immediately confronted Cabalquinto.
Shortly afterwards, she confided to her sister-in-law and traveled all the way to xxx to
seek her own sister's advice. The following day, mother and child went to the police to
report the incident and to execute their sworn statements. ABC also took her daughter
to the CPU of PGH for the latter's medical examination.
These significant circumstances cannot be ignored. We are compelled to believe,
especially in the face of Cabalquinto's plain denial, that AAA was indeed sexually
abused and raped by her own father.
Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim,
in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty
Law.39 In this case, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter were properly alleged in the
Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of
Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of Cabalquinto, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count and additionally award AAA P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count consistent with current
jurisprudence.40 Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are
automatically granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are
imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their
daughters.41
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-98-79683 and Q-98-79684, as well as the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00260, are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant
MELCHOR CABALQUINTO is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases subject of this
review, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay
the victim, AAA (to be identified through the Informations filed with the trial court in this
case), the amounts ofP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
11. Mayon Hotel vs Adana

G.R. No. 157634 May 16, 2005
MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT, PACITA O. PO and/or JOSEFA PO LAM, petitioners,
vs.
ROLANDO ADANA, CHONA BUMALAY, ROGER BURCE, EDUARDO ALAMARES,
AMADO ALAMARES, EDGARDO TORREFRANCA, LOURDES CAMIGLA, TEODORO

LAURENARIA, WENEFREDO LOVERES, LUIS GUADES, AMADO MACANDOG,
PATERNO LLARENA, GREGORIO NICERIO, JOSE ATRACTIVO, MIGUEL
TORREFRANCA, and SANTOS BROOLA, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant is a single proprietor business registered
in the name of petitioner Pacita O. Po,6 whose mother, petitioner Josefa Po Lam,
manages the establishment.7 The hotel and restaurant employed about sixteen (16)
employees.
Due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the rented space
occupied by the said hotel and restaurant at Rizal Street, the hotel operations of the
business were suspended on March 31, 1997.9 The operation of the restaurant was
continued in its new location at Elizondo Street, Legazpi City, while waiting for the
construction of a new Mayon Hotel & Restaurant at Pearanda Street,
Legazpi City.10Only nine (9) of the sixteen (16) employees continued working in the
Mayon Restaurant at its new site.11
the 16 employees filed complaints for underpayment of wages and other money claims
against petitioners
Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio L. Rivera, Jr. rendered a Joint Decision in favor of the
employees. The Labor Arbiter awarded substantially all of respondents money claims,
and held that respondents Loveres, Macandog and Llarena were entitled to separation
pay, while respondents Guades, Nicerio and Alamares were entitled to their retirement
pay. The Labor Arbiter also held that based on the evidence presented, Josefa Po Lam
is the owner/proprietor of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant and the proper respondent in these
cases.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed, and all the
complaints were dismissed.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC and when this was
denied, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the NLRC decision
and the employers filed MR which was denied, hence the case before the SC.
RULING:
1. Ownership by Josefa Po Lam
notwithstanding the certificate of registration in the name of Pacita Po, it is Josefa Po
Lam who is the owner/proprietor of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, and the proper
respondent in the complaints filed by the employees.
First. It is significant that only Josefa Po Lam appeared in the proceedings with the
Labor Arbiter. Despite receipt of the Labor Arbiters notice and summons, other notices
and Orders, petitioner Pacita Po failed to appear in any of the proceedings with the
Labor Arbiter in these cases, nor file her position paper.26 It was only on appeal with the
NLRC that Pacita Po signed the pleadings.27 The apathy shown by petitioner Pacita Po
is contrary to human experience as one would think that the owner of an establishment
would naturally be concerned when all her employees file complaints against her.
Second. Mayon Hotel and Restaurant is a [business name] of an enterprise. While
[petitioner] Josefa Po Lam claims that it is her daughter, Pacita Po, who owns the hotel
and restaurant when the latter purchased the same from one Palanos in 1981, Josefa
failed to submit the document of sale from said Palanos to Pacita as allegedly the sale
was only verbal although the license to operate said hotel and restaurant is in the name
of Pacita which, despite our Order to Josefa to present the same, she failed to comply.
Third. Respondents] testified that it was Josefa who exercises all the acts and
manifestation of ownership of the hotel and restaurant like transferring employees from
the Greatwall Palace Restaurant which she and her husband Roy Po Lam previously
owned; it is Josefa to whom the employees submits (sic) reports, draws money for
payment of payables and for marketing, attending (sic) to Labor Inspectors during
ocular inspections. Except for documents whereby Pacita Po appears as the owner of
Mayon Hotel and Restaurant, nothing in the record shows any circumstance or
manifestation that Pacita Po is the owner of Mayon Hotel and Restaurant. The least that
can be said is that it is absurd for a person to purchase a hotel and restaurant in the
very heart of the City of Legazpi verbally.
Article 221 of the Labor Code is clear: technical rules are not binding, and the
application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the
demand of substantial justice. The rule of evidence prevailing in court of law or equity
shall not be controlling in labor cases and it is the spirit and intention of the Labor Code
that the Labor Arbiter shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. Labor laws mandate the speedy
administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the
fundamental requisites of due process. As to the best evidence rule raised by the
employers (certificate of registration as the best proof of ownership)
To apply the concept of judicial admissions to respondents who are but lowly
employees would be to exact compliance with technicalities of law that is contrary to
the demands of substantial justice.
Petitioners were also not denied due process, as they were given sufficient opportunity
to be heard on the issue of ownership. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is simply an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.34 And there is nothing in the
records which would suggest that petitioners had absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. Obviously, the choice not to present evidence was made by petitioners
themselves.
2. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay
First, petitioners admit that since April 1997, when hotel operations were suspended
due to the termination of the lease of the old premises, respondents Loveres,
Macandog, Llarena, Nicerio and Guades have not been permitted to work. Second,
even after six months of what should have been just a temporary lay-off, the same
respondents were still not recalled to work. As a matter of fact, the Labor Arbiter even
found that as of the time when he rendered his Joint Decision on July 2000 or more
than three (3) years after the supposed temporary lay-off, the employment of all of the
respondents with petitioners had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had
been completed and the same operated as a hotel with bar and restaurant. This is
clearly dismissal or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker
from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor.
But they made no mention of any intent to recall these respondents to work upon
completion of the new premises.
And even assuming that the closure was due to a reason beyond the control of the
employer, it still has to accord its employees some relief in the form of severance pay.
While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee
for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the
parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play.66 And in termination disputes,
the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just
or authorized cause.67 Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for
termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.
12. Seballo vs CA
13. Ong chia Vs Republic
ONGCHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having
failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that
he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants brief without
having been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the
law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance with
the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
14. Bantolinao vs Coca-cola Bottlers

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003]
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA,
ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER
GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] dated 21 December 2001 which
affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
promulgated 30 March 2001.[2]
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and
Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice
through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the
Cabo System. They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the
declaration of their regular employment status.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory
conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52)
complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera
conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining
complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent
firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their duties as
route helpers, bottle segregators, and others, they were employees of respondent
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further maintained that when respondent company
replaced them and prevented them from entering the company premises, they were
deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint
for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, there being no employer-employee
relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and that respondents
Lipercon Services, Peoples Specialist Services and Interim Services being bona
fide independent contractors, were the real employers of the complainants. [3] As regards
the corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be faulted and be held
liable for damages as they only acted in their official capacities while performing their
respective duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering

respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the
rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages
which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed
upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of
P1,810,244.00.[4]
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the
negative declarations of respondent companys witnesses who, as district sales
supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the complainants personally, the
testimonies of the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied every
detail of their employment, specifically identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their
places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was
indeed an employer-employee relationship between the complainants and respondent
company when it affirmed in toto the latters decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied for lack of merit
respondents motion for consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although
affirming the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed
between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits
of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina,
Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not
have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to
undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their
complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants
Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular employees
since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination. [5] Thus x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between
the opposing claims of the parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on position
papers and their accompanying documentary evidence as a full-blown trial was
imperative to establish the parties claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it was
necessary to give them ample opportunity to rebut each others statements through
cross-examination. In fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were
subjected to rigid cross-examination by petitioners counsel. However, the testimonies of
private respondents Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to crossexamination, as should have been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or
by the labor arbiter as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by
counsel, the latter should have taken steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But
nothing was done by their counsel to that effect. [6]
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals;
that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given
weight to respondents claim of failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike
regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties position papers
and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed
thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly
applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be crossexamined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the
Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since the other alleged
affiants were not presented in court to affirm their statements, much less to be crossexamined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the
records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. With respect to
Nestor Romero, respondent points out that he should not have been impleaded in the
instant petition since he already voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver
and Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent argues that the
instant petition should be dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners [7] to sign the
petition as well as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, in clear
violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.[8]
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value
to the affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the
test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without
precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC[9] squarely grapples a
similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation
of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that the argument that the
affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not
persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only.
In Rase v. NLRC,[10] this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled
that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by
counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and
purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make
mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC [11] succinctly states that
under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not
control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to
deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the
Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent
application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by
respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,[12] that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere
hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the
present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence
different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission,
the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided
based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant
case, we only need to follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC[13] which
outlines the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers and quitclaims Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face

the Compromise Agreement[14] and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[15] are devoid of any
palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we
glean from the records any attempt by the parties to renege on their contractual
agreements, or to disavow or disown their due execution. Consequently, the same must
be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant case
should be dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor
Romero.
We cannot likewise accommodate respondents contention that the failure of all the
petitioners to sign the petition as well as the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court will cause the
dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict observance
of the Rules, it however provides an escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the
harsh consequences of non-observance. Thus x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance of the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction (underscoring supplied).
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants, petitioners made a request
for a fifteen (15)-day extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to
file their petition for review in view of the absence of a counsel to represent them. [16] The
records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty. Arnold Cacho, through the
UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein
petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners
were not yet represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are non-lawyers could not
be faulted for the procedural lapse since they could not be expected to be conversant
with the nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable with the esoteric technicalities of
procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing of the present
petition may be overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 29 May 1998 ordering
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo
Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver
Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as regular
employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio
Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon proof of his dismissal, is
REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein petition is DENIED insofar as it
concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise
Agreement and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim with respondent company.
SO ORDERED.
15. Lagoon vs Homer

16. Dominggo vs Robles
[G.R. No. 153743. March 18, 2005]
NORMA B. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA ROBLES; and MICHAEL
MALABANAN ROBLES, MARICON MALABANAN ROBLES, MICHELLE
MALABANAN ROBLES, All Minors Represented by Their Mother, YOLANDA
ROBLES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Forgery must be proven by the party alleging it; it cannot be presumed. To prevent
a forged transfer from being registered, the Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to
registration, the production of the owners certificate of title and the instrument of
conveyance. A registered owner who places in the hands of another an executed
document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a third party that the
holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property.[1]
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging
the May 27, 2002 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 53842. The
decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [there being] no reversible error in the challenged
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto, and the instant appeal
ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the [petitioner].[4]
On the other hand, the affirmed Decision [5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 272 of Marikina, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint subject of this decision is hereby
DISMISSED.[6]
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
The historical backdrop shows that [petitioner] and her husband, Valentino Domingo,
were the registered owners of Lot 19, Block 1, subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-15706
located at Cristina Subdivision, Concepcion, Marikina and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 53412. On this lot, [Petitioner] Norma B. Domingo discontinued
the construction of her house allegedly for failure of her husband to send the necessary
financial support. So, she decided to dispose of the property.
A friend, Flor Bacani, volunteered to act as [petitioners] agent in selling the lot.
Trusting Bacani, [petitioner] delivered their owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 53412 to him (Bacani). Later, the title was said to have been lost. In the petition for
its reconstitution, [petitioner] gave Bacani all her receipts of payment for real estate
taxes. At the same time, Bacani asked [petitioner] to sign what she recalled was a
record of exhibits. Thereafter, [petitioner] waited patiently but Bacani did not show up
any more.
On November 1, 1994, [Petitioner] Norma Domingo visited the lot and was surprised to
see the [respondents] (Robles, for short) starting to build a house on the subject lot. A
verification with the Register of Deeds revealed that the reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 53412 had already been cancelled with the registration of a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 signed by Norma B. Domingo and her husband
Valentino Domingo, as sellers, and [Respondent] Yolanda Robles, for herself and
representing the other minor [respondents], as buyers. As a consequence, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 201730 was issued on June 10, 1991 in the name of
[Respondent] Robles.
Claiming not to have met any of the [respondents] nor having signed any sale over the
property in favor of anybody (her husband being abroad at the time), [petitioner]
assumed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9, 1991 is a forgery and, therefore,
could not validly transfer ownership of the lot to the [respondents]. Hence, the case for
the nullity thereof and its reconveyance.
[Respondents] Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and for value.
They narrate that the subject lot was offered to them by Flor Bacani, as the agent of the
owners; that after some time when they were already prepared to buy the lot, Bacani
introduced to them the supposed owners and agreed on the sale; then, on May 9, 1991,
Bacani and the introduced seller presented a Deed of Absolute Sale already signed by
Valentino and Norma Domingo needing only her (Robles) signature. Presented
likewise at that meeting, where she paid full purchase price, was the original of the
owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412.
Then sometime later, [Respondents] Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue in favor of
spouses Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for P250,000.00. [Respondent] Yolanda Robles
even had to secure a guardianship authority over the persons and properties of her
minor children from the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in JDRC No. 2614. When
only P20,000.00 remained unpaid of the total purchase price under the contract to sell,
payment was stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda Robles that [petitioner]
intends to sue her.
After due proceedings, the [Regional Trial Court] rendered its Decision dated May 13,
1996, dismissing the complaint.[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value.
According to its findings, (a) the sale was admittedly made through petitioners agent;
(b) as Domingos agent, Bacani brought with him the original of the owners duplicate
Certificate of Title of the property and some receipts; (c) the reconstituted title presented
to the buyers was free from any liens, encumbrances or adverse interests of other
persons; and (d) the land was unoccupied. Petitioner was not able to present, against
these established facts, any evidence to prove that respondents had prior knowledge of
any other persons right to or interest over the property in question.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
To determine whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims, the issue worthy of
consideration by the Honorable Court in the instant case is WHO IS A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH?[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Acquisition of Valid Title
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court. [10] Petitioner has given this Court no
cogent reason to deviate from this rule; on the contrary, the findings of the courts a quo
are amply supported by the evidence on record.
Petitioner claims that her signature and that of her husband were forged in the Deed
of Absolute Sale transferring the property from the Domingo spouses to respondent.
Relying on the general rule that a forged deed is void and conveys no title, [11] she
assails the validity of the sale.
It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution. [12] Clear and convincing evidence must
be presented to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed;
hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove it. [13] This, she failed to do. On this
point, the CA observed:
x x x. What surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant
Norma Domingo in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and the
signature in the verification of the complaint manifest a striking similarity to the point that
without any contrary proof, it would be safe to conclude that said signatures were
written by one and the same person. Sadly, appellant left that matter that way without
introducing counteracting evidence. x x x[14]
Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person with whom
Respondent Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino Domingo. Except for
her insistence that her husband was out of the country, petitioner failed to present any
other clear and convincing evidence that Valentino was not present at the time of the
sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. [15]
Petitioner now stresses the issue of good faith on the part of respondents. In the
absence of a finding of fraud and a consequent finding of authenticity and due execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, a discussion of whether respondents were purchasers in
good faith is wholly unnecessary. Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad
faith, a presumption of good faith in their favor stands. [16]
The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioners agent, who had
with him the original of the owners duplicate Certificate of Title to the property, free from
any liens or encumbrances. The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered
owners, appear on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners husband met with
Respondent Yolanda Robles and received payment for the property. The Torrens Act
requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the production of the owners certificate of title
and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in the hands of
another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to a
third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
17. People vs Galleno

[G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
GALLENO, accused-appellant.
vs.
JOERAL
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
What could be more compelling than deciding a case which involves the sexual
abuse of a five-year old child? Equally important is the fact that the case before us
involves the highest penalty imposable by law. Being the guardian of the most
fundamental liberties of every citizen, the Court must pass upon every intricate detail of
the case at bar to determine whether or not accused-appellant committed the gruesome
act imputed against him.
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch 14 of
the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on
the defense of denial. Since the case involves the death penalty, the matter has been
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-4629 for the crime of Statutory Rape, reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior authority and
approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the original complaint filed by the
guardian of the offended party, accuses Joeral Galleno of the crime of
STATUTORY RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994, at Brgy.
Balighot, Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused did, then and there, wilfully and feloniously, and without the permission
of anyone, enter the house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her thereby inflicting upon the latter a
vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding and her admission of five
(5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued, resulting in a judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court finds

accused JOERAL GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt under Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal warning the perverts, the misguided
elements of our society, especially their lackadaisical parents in their innate
moral obligation and responsibility in educating their children that in this corner
of the world the wheels of justice is not asleep and its unforgiving hands and
watchful eyes are as vigilant as ever.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
In flashback, let us visualize the events.
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera
who had to leave the province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband.
Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the
care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19year old Joeral Galleno, known well Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at the
Obligars' abode as he was paying court to Emetario's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at
sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all ealier
left for school. The only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew
Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola
Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars'
residence and found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the
defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence. However,
the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which result in
profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on
the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle Emetario, and the doctors who examined and
treated her. The Solicitor General summarized the same in this wise:
2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After

lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. As Evelyn was
only five-years old while appellant was fully-grown man, the penetration caused
the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp.10-11 and 18-25, tsn,
Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of
"madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left
Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn Garganera, January 10,
1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses were
laborers in a sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their house.
They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in
Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 1112, tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emetario
spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood
was oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal
medicine on Evelyns's vagina but did not stop the bleeding. (pp.12-14, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of
Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco
reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1
centimeter in diameter, in her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration,
measuring 1.0 centimeter x o.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00
o'clock position. He also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have
been by blunt instrument inserted into the vigina, that it was possible that a
human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and that
a human penis in full errection is considered a blunt intrument (pp. 4-7, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her
injuries. The child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its
insertion caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28,
1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn,
Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which continued to bleed, advised
Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further medical
treatment. (p.8, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar,
January 12, 1995)
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial
General Hospital were she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma.
Lourdes Laada. Dr. Laada, upon examining Evelyn found that "there was a 3
cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the
pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Laada
recommended that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because
the wound in her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired. Due to
financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted into the Hospital that day and
went home with Emeterio to Barangay Balighot. (pp.6-8,tsn Laada, January 4,
1995; pp. 15-16, ts, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Laada opined
that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn,
Laada, January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Laada, the vaginal laceration may
be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area
on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a
speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of blunt foreign object into the
vagina, like a finger or a penis of a man in full erection. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Laada,
January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emetario brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial
General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the
resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the
genital area. Dr. Toledo " pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and
(he) admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and blood
transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred fifty
five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics to
prevent infection. However, she was no longer operated on because the
laceration had healed. Five days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home
with medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed
that the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been
caused by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection
that was forcibly inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her
vagina to hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood
(pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994.
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August
19, Emetario and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police
Station on August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino
Durana. That same day, appellant was apprehended in a house near the
Balighot Elementary School and brought to the police station (pp17-19, tsn,
Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana, January 16,
1995).
(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)
Denial is presented as the defenses. Accused-appellant testified that when he
arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two
children, Evelyn and Eleazar (also referred to in the record as Pilfo). While seated at
the balcony, accused-appellant was approached by Evelyn, who knew him (tsn, April 5,
1995, pp.5 and 8). He cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding
the child and his left hand covering her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting up the child the
first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his
fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn
began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately
went down the house and got some bark or leaves of madre de cacao tree and applied
the sap on the child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying.
Thereafter, accused-appellant went home. (Ibid., pp.9-10).
Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at around 9 o'clock in
the morning, he was arrested. On the same day, Emeterio Obligar asked him to admit
the offense so that he could be released the next day, but accused-appellant did not do
so (Ibid., pp. 26-27).
Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was called to the witness stand and he
testified that he learned about the arrest of his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12,
1995, p.6). The following day, he went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what
happened to her. The child allegedly answered that a finger was accidentally inserted
into her genital organ, but that Penicola who was then present, butted into the
conversation and told Raul Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise
inserted (Ibid., p.8).
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, pointing out in
its decision that accused-appellant's defense of denial hinged on the argument that the
statement of Evelyn as to how she sustained her vaginal laceration was mere
concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her guardian. The trial court called this a
"desperate attempt of the defense to becloud the charge of rape."
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police Officer Paulino Durana
that during the interrogation of Evelyn which he conducted at the PNP Station of
Maayon, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Evelyn,
although, true enough, it was difficult to obtain answer from her because of her tender
age.
The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accusedappellant culpable:
1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left finger accidentally came in
contact with Evelyn's vagina, while in the process of throwing her up and down.
Besides, the prosecution was able to establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And
assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn was not wearing any pants or underwear
at that time, accused-appellant failed to explain how his finger could possibly penetrate
the victim's vagina by about one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5, 1995).
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with her 3-year old
brother, in pain and bleeding.
3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada, the physician who
examined her at the Roxas Memorial General Hospital, that it was accused-appellant's
finger which injured her, was a consequence of the victim's confusion.
4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno
militates against the cause of the defense.
Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant assigning the
following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED
TO CONCLUSIVELY AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA
THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND
DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT, WHEN HE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS
EXAMINATIUON OF THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AS UNJUSTIFIED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE PARENTS OF THE ACCUSED TO THE
OFFENDED PARTY AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT
(pp. 81-82, Rollo.)
One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim, and more
especially so for a 5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our consideration of the
matter before us, we set aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in
drawing conclusions.
Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the
three expert witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr.
Ma. Lourdes Laada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape
was committed against the offended party, is not impeccable considering that they found
that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what
caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Laada herself testified that Evelyn
told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In
addition, accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-examination, that
it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration; and that she even
disclosed this to accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno.
We are not persuaded.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions
upon the facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I. 1989 ed., pp.
889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases,
and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of
the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in
reaching a judgment. (Ibid., p.886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the
expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is
wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion
that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina (People vs. Caada, 253
SCRA 277 [1996]). In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen
but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ (People vs. Dadles, 254
SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accusedappellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding
of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really
caused the laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just
confused. This is best exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Lourdes Laada on crossexamination, as follows:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination, you were aware
that this child was only five years old?
Yes, sir.
And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may not know the
difference of distinction between fingers of the hands and a finger protruding
between the legs of a person?
Yes, sir, it is possible.
So that is possible, Doctor, that the child may have referred to a finger that is
between the legs?
WITNESS
You mean the penis?
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA
Yes.
WITNESS
It is possible.
(TSN, p.27, March 30, 1995.)
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not the outright
incredulity of the version of accused-appellant which is not in accord with ordinary
human experience. We thus can not help expressing sentiments similar of those of the
trial court when is said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his
credibility. He failed to explain how his ring finger accidentally came in contact
with the genitalia of Evelyn, while it was established by the prosecution that at
that time Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia argumente"
that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate to
the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch when she was in shorts. The
Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that)
evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by
the impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the
mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness'
testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind.
(pp.42-43, Rollo.)
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nor-existence." This
simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human
experience (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p.434). There is
no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the determination
of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court,
which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience
(Sibal and Salazar, Compendium on Evidence, 1995 ed., citing Alfred Asmore Pope
Foundation vs. New York, 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with long fingernail) of
accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an
inch. Admittedly, accused-appellant's right hand held the child while his left hand
supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would the hold the child's vagina if his
only intention was to frolic and kid around with her?
Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn (and after
applying to the wound the sap of madre de cacao), he left her in the company of an
even younger child, the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to
immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what happened. Instead, he went home
and kept mum about the incident.
Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident, before going home, he
removed Eleazar's shorts and put them on Evelyn. Assuming this to be true, this only
shows that the child was still bleeding. Why then would he leave the child considering
that there was no adult to attend her? Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the
place, when considered in the light of the other evidence, reflects his fear because of
what he had done. The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in drawing its
conclusions.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the
credibility of accused-appellant's story on which his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions finds supports in the testimony of accusedappellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Laada (who was earlier presented during the trial
as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument
and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument (TSN, pp.32-33, March 30,
1995).
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a
concocted story of what really happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an
innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto,
253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually
her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to
use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones, supra.)
Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the credibility of Evelyn
when he took the stand and testified that the child disclosed to him that is was accusedappellant's finger which was inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, this testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of the victim, to wit:
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q
You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you while you were
in the farm, can you tell in the farm, can you tell the Honorable Court which part
of your body was hurt by Joeral Galleno?
(Witness pointing to her vagina) Here.
When you said you were hurt did you bleed?
WITNESS
A
Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q
What was used by Joeral Galleno in hurting your sexual organ
His (Pitoy). Penis.
COURT
Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis. Do you agree that the translation of
Pitoy is Penis in English?
ATTY. DISTURA
Agreeable, Your Honor.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q
What did Joeral Galleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your vagina (Putay)?
It was inserted (ginsulod) to my vagina (Putay).
When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina (Putay), that was
the reason why it bleed?
Yes, sir.
And it was very painful?
Yes, Sir.
And you cried because of pain?
Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the hospital because of
that?
Yes, Sir.
(TSN, pp.10-12, January 10, 1995)
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that he was deprived
of a fair and impartial trial since the trial court showed bias by discounting his testimony,
and by actually participating in the cross-examination of accused-appellant.
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198 [1996]) that a
judge may not properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and
prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the
witness was given direct testimony cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it
should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge extensively propounds
question to the witness which will have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the
case for one of the parties. We have, however, carefully examined the record and
transcript of stenographic notes of the instant case. The trial court judge, the Honorable
Salvador S. Gubaton, did not to build the case for one of the parties. For instance,
accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the questions propounded by the trial court on
his of cajoling the child. A perusal of the line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias
on the part of the trial court, but pure clarification.
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the validity of his arrest.
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived
(People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95[1995]). An accused should question the validity of
his arrest before he enters his plea in the trial court (Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263
SCRA 222 [1996]). He is estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his
arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court
(People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995]) or if he voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea and by participating in the trial (People vs. De
Guzman, 22 4 SCRA 93 [1993); People vs. Lopez, Jr., supra).
It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised this matter before
entering his plea of "not guilty" to the charge (pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue
was not even touched during the trial.
Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues that the trial court
misinterpreted the financial assistance extended by his parents as an attempt to settle
the case. Accused-appellant even banks on the alleged close relationship between
Emeterio Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and the fact that Emeterio borrowed
forty pesos from Raul Galleno, despite the fact that Emeterio already knew that
accused-appellant caused the laceration in Evelyn's vagina.
Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents involving alleged financial
assistance extended by Raul Galleno to the spouses Emeterio and Penicola Obligar.
First, Emeterio Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is his compadre, borrowed P40.00 for
fare going Roxas City where Evelyn was confined. Decond, on August 20, 1994, Raul
Galleno and his wife and one of the brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas
Memorial General Hospital. There he gave P400.00 financial assistance to Penicola
Obligar. Raul Galleno later admitted that the sum of P440.00 was returned to him by the
spouses. Accused-appellant insists that these offers of financial assistance were not
attempts at an amicable settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire on the
part of Raul Galleno to help the offended party.
We find no merit in the above-stated argument. It may be inferred that Raul Galleno
wanted to settle the case by offering an amount to the spouses Obligar, to wit:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Now according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00) then you expected your Comareng Pening as financial assistance to
Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?
Yes, Your Honor.
How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening returned to you
the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the hospital.
It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why did you receive
the amount or the payment returned to that amount of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00)?
That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement of the case.
And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00).
(tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court, it may gleaned that
Raul Galleno no longer had any interest in aiding the victim when he found that the
Obligar spouses would still pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant, and
hence he found that his offer for settlement was unavailing. Hence, on this point we
likewise agree with the trial court when it took the financial assistance to mean an act of
settling the case. This does manifest a father's attempt to rescue his guilty son sure
incarceration.
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old Evelyn Obligar
Garganera may fortunately haunt her all her life. Justice may not be able to save from
this nightmare but it can calm and assure her that her tormentor and abuser shall
undoubtedly face retribution.
Four members of the Court - although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997) that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence
on record, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the record of the case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
18. People vs Calumpang

[G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL
OMATANG, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152, convicting appellants Rico
Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang of two counts of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay damages to
the heirs of the victims.
Appellants were charged under an Information which reads:
That on or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Pamplona
Coconut Plantation, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack ALICIA CATIPAY
and SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos, with which the said accused were then
armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon ALICIA CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the

temporal bones 4 inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital
bone and the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm
and upon SANTIAGO CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the
ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones.
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall
measuring 4 inches in depth 2 inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel
protruding the intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1 inch
in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six) inches
below the armpit 5 inches in depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring
finger.
which wounds or injuries caused the death of said ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO
CATIPAY shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. [2]
On arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr. Rogelio Kadili, and
Alexander Ebias.[3] Their testimonies constitute the version of the case according to the
prosecutions point of view.
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He
was with his neighbors, the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they
stopped at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona Coconut Plantation,
and decided to have some beer. Magno added that Santiago saw appellants
drinking tuba inside Anas store, and offered them a glass of beer, but appellants
refused. Santiago just drank the glass of beer he was offering. [4] After that, Magno and
the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning
something sinister because they followed too closely and were concealing something at
their backs. Magno cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about
appellants.[5] Magno and the spouses simply continued walking for another halfkilometer until they reached the narrow waterway that let water from the river into the
plantation. Magno removed his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses.
Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because Santiago had to remove his shoes. [6]
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait
for his companions and saw appellants attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant
Calumpang hacked Santiago on the head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time,
appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.[7]
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he
reached Alexander Ebiass house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued
walking towards Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw
the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.[8] He decided to spend the night there. [9]
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or Rolando about what
he saw at the waterway because he was afraid. Magno added that he left Rolandos
house around 6:30 the next morning to report the incident at the municipal hall in
the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning by members of the
Philippine Army on his way out of the store of Picio Yan, where he had to attend to some
personal business. Magno declared that he did not report to them that appellants killed
the spouses.[10] It was only after he was turned over to the police authorities of
Pamplona and brought to the police station that he reported what he saw the day before
at the waterway in the plantation.[11]
Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural Health Unit, Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, testified that he conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims
at around 7:00 a.m. on July 15, 1991. [12] The results of his examination showed the
wounds on Santiago and Alicia Catipay as follows:
[Santiago Catipay]
1.
Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the
ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones
2.
Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall
measuring 4 inches in depth 2 inches in width
3.
Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel

protruding the intestines
4.
Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1

inch in width
5.
Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six)
inches below the armpit 5 inches in depth, 3 inches in width
6.
Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring
finger;[13]
[Alicia Catipay]
1.
Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the

temporal bones 4 inches in length
2.
Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital
bone and the brain tissues
3.
Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4.
Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5.
Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm. [14]
Dr. Kadili likewise identified the death certificates of Santiago and Alicia Catipay
which showed the cause of death as hemorrhage shock. [15]
Alexander Ebias, who lives near the waterway at the Pamplona Coconut Plantation,
testified that around the time Santiago and Alicia were murdered, he heard noise from
the direction of the waterway, but did not do anything to investigate. Moments later, he
heard Magno calling from outside the house. Magno wanted some dried coconut
leaves to make a torch. He gave Magno what he wanted then asked about the noise
from the waterway. Magno said he did not know.[16]
For its part, the defense contradicted the version of the prosecution and presented
Analyn Andagan, Conchito Nilas, [17] Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that
appellants were nowhere near the waterway at the precise time that Santiago and Alicia
Catipay were murdered.
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending the store of her
mother, Ana Andagan, at Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m.
appellants Calumpang and Omatang arrived with one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered
a gallon of tuba and started drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and the spouses
arrived. They each had one bottle of beer and immediately left after finishing their beers.
Analyn further testified that appellants did not follow Magno, Santiago and Alicia when
the three left her mothers store. Appellant Omatang stayed until 7:00 p.m. and
continued talking with his two companions, appellant Calumpang and Conchito Nilas.
He left when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor, came to fetch him
for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her
close the store. He walked home with her and Conchito Nilas. [18]
Conchito Nilass testimony dovetailed Analyn Andagans testimony. He added that
he saw his friend appellant Calumpang go inside the latters house. [19]
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyns testimony that he fetched his uncle, appellant
Omatang, from the store around 7:00 p.m. upon the order of his mother. He added that
he and appellant Omatang slept in the same room that night. [20]
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyns testimony that he left around
7:00 p.m. with Joseph. He also claimed he had nothing to do with the killing of the
spouses and averred that he was at home in the same room with Joseph, sleeping,
when the spouses were murdered. He claimed that he learned of the murders only
upon his arrest the next day.[21]
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He declared that
Santiago and Alicia had no known enemies and were good people. He corroborated all
of Analyns testimony, and added that Magno and Santiago were arguing when the two
came into the store. Appellant Calumpang likewise averred that after helping Analyn
close the store, he went home, ate supper, and went to bed. [22]
In addition to the above witnesses, the defense presented Rolando Retada and
Visitacion Rabor. Rolando confirmed that Magno spent the night at his house on July
14, 1991, and left very early the next morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor,
on the other hand, testified that she overheard Santiago berating Magno when they
passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14, 1991. Santiago was mad at Magno
because Magno did not want to help Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as
Magno was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued calling Magno useless at
Anas store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago to go home. When Santiago and Alicia
left, Magno followed them.[23]
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his
account of the murders. Said the trial court:
The testimony of the lone eyewitness describing vividly the events prior, during and after
the killing offers a complete picture of the incident that only an eyewitness could supply.
Moreover, the actuation of witness Magno Gomez of not telling other people of the
crime he just experience[d] for fear of his life, and his coming back to town after sunrise.
Even declining Retadas offer of a cup of coffee [and] to report to the authorities the
incident that he witnessed the night before, is consistent with human behavior and
should be accorded great respect and given more weight. (sic) His conduct after the
incident added more credibility to his testimony. As to the fear he exhibited after the
killing of the spouses, the Supreme Court has this to say there is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident especially if the assailant
(assailants in this case) is physically near. No standard form of behavioral response,
quite often said, could be expected from everyone when confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful occurrence.[24]
In its judgment dated November 29, 2002, the trial court convicted appellants as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, each accused, RICO CALUMPANG and
JOVENAL OMATANG are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of the maximum
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and further ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay the amount of PhP100,000.00, and to
pay moral damages in the amount of PhP100,000.00. The bail bond posted by both
accused for their temporary liberty during the trial of this case is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant now assigns the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF MAGNO GOMEZ
SINCE HE WAS A PRINCIPAL SUSPECT HIMSELF. HIS TESTIMONY IS REPLETE
WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES, AND MANY OF HIS CLAIMS ARE CONTRARY
TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE OF
THE DEFENSE; AND
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN CONCENTRATING ON THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE
VAGUENESS AND WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS LONE EYEWITNESS.[26]
Essentially, for our resolution is the issue of whether the appellants guilt for double
murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to Magno Gomezs
testimony, which is false and unbelievable. They stress that Magnos testimony that he
never saw Santiago try to escape during the attacks contradicts his statements in his
affidavit, executed during preliminary examination, that Santiago tried to escape but was
overtaken by appellants.[27] They suspect that Magno was himself the killer, and posit
that because he was already a prime suspect, Magno accused appellants of the murder
to save himself.[28] Appellants likewise argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their
defense of alibi on the ground that it was a weak defense. [29]
Significantly, for the State, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that
reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of the appellants exist in this case. The OSG
stresses that material inconsistencies exist between Magnos testimony in court and his
affidavit, which he executed during the preliminary examination. [30] The OSG cites that
Magno testified that the spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with
appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang attacking Alicia.
However, during the preliminary examination, Magno declared that both appellants
attacked Alicia first and that Santiago was hacked because Santiago attempted to save
his wife.[31] Further, the fact that Magno was a principal suspect and that he did not
choose to exonerate himself right away when he was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army, render his credibility suspect. [32] In addition, the OSG
stresses that it was not shown in this case that appellants had any ill motive to kill
Santiago and Alicia Catipay.[33] The OSG concludes that appellants deserve acquittal on
reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court
overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded
several significant facts and circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the
testimony of the prosecutions lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a departure
from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court bind this Court. [34]
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show
that serious discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn
statement,[35] executed during the preliminary examination conducted by Judge Ananson
E. Jayme on July 15, 1991, at the 1 st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pamplona-AmlanSan Jose, Negros Oriental.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants hacked Alicia Catipay
first and that Santiago was attacked after he attempted to save his wife. Magno
declared that Santiago attempted to run away but he was chased and was overtaken
and was hacked by both accused. Magno also claimed that appellants tried to hack him
after they had hacked Santiago. Magno said,
Q
How did the hacking incident happen?

A
At first, it was Alicia who was hacked and followed by stabbing

immediately Santiago was also hacked and when he attempted to flee by
crossing the [waterway] both accused stabbed Santiago and he fell to the
river.
When Alicia Catipay was hacked was she hit?
Yes.
What part of her body was hit?
On [the] left side of her ear.
And who hacked her?
Both accused hacked her.
And who stabbed Alicia Catipay?
[Jovenal] Omatang.
Was Alicia Catipay hit?
Yes.
What part of her body was hit?
At the stomach.
Q
Bolo.
Q
What weapon did Jovenal Omatang use in hacking and stabbing Alicia
Catipay?
You said both accused hacked Alicia Catipay first, what did Santiago
Catipay do?
He attempted to save his wife and instead he was hacked.

Q
You said Santiago Catipay was hit what part of his body was hit when he
was hacked by the accused?
He was hit on his arm.
After he was hit on his arm what did he do?
He attempted to run away but he was chased.
Did Santiago Catipay succeed in escaping?
No, he was overtaken and was hacked by both accused.

Q
When [Santiago] was overtaken by the accused what part of his body
was hit when he was hacked?
I know he was hit but I do not know what part of his body was hit.
Q
When both accused hacked and stabbed Santiago Catipay while running,
what happened to Santiago Catipay?
He fell to the edge of the river.
When Santiago Catipay fell to the water, what did the accused do?
They also hacked me but I ran away.[36]
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of how the murders
happened. Magno testified at direct examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago and that Alicia was hacked only by appellant Omatang. More important, he
averred that the victims were attacked simultaneously. Magno testified:
Q
According to you, Santiago Catipay and Alicia Catipay were quarreled by

Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang. How was Santiago Catipay
quarreled?
He was hacked at the head.
Who hacked him at the head?
Rico Calumpang.
What did Rico Calumpang use in hacking Santiago Catipay?
A bolo.
How many times did Rico Calumpang hack Santiago Catipay?
Santiago Catipay was stabbed once and he was hacked also once.
Q
Head.
Q
And where was Santiago Catipay hit by the hacking of Rico Calumpang?
Will you please point to the portion where Santiago Catipay was hit by the
hacking of Rico Calumpang?
Witness pointing at the left side of his head.

Q
And according to you, he was also stabbed by Rico Calumpang, where

was Santiago Catipay hit by the stabbing?
Here witness pointing to this abdomen which is the lower part on the
right side to the breast.
. . .
You testified that Alicia was killed, how was she killed?
She [was] hacked and stabbed.
Who hacked and stabbed her?
It was Jovenal Omatang.

Q
According to you Alicia Catipay was hacked and stabbed by Jovenal

Omatang, was Alicia hit by the hacking of Jovenal Omatang?
Yes, she was hit.

. . .
Q
Was the attack of Santiago Catipay by Rico Calumpang and the attack of
Jovenal Omatang on Alicia Catipay simultaneous or they were hacking
and stabbing almost at the same time by these two accused performing
their own individual acts? (sic)
Yes, it was simultaneous.

Q
After seeing Santiago Catipay hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang

and Alicia Catipay hacked and stabbed by Jovenal Omatang, what did you
do?
I ran.
You ran after they were killed or they were still under attack?
They were still attacking when I ran away.[37]
Magno never said that appellants also tried to hack him and even claimed that they
were still hacking the victims when he ran away. Magno also never mentioned that
Santiago tried to save his wife or that Santiago was chased or even that Santiago tried
to run. In fact, during cross-examination, he averred that he never saw Santiago run
away. Magno testified,
During that hacking of Santiago Catipay, was Santiago Catipay able to

run?
I do not know whether he was able to run or not. What I saw is that
he was hacked and stabbed.
And you are very sure of that, Mr. Gomez, that you did not see Santiago
Catipay run?
That is what I can say. What I saw was he was hacked and stabbed.
After that, I ran away.
That is why you told this Honorable Court that you did not see Santiago
Catipay run when he was being hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang?
Regarding that question, what I can say is that I saw the hacking and
stabbing incident. After that, I ran away.[38]
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always

incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the
testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious
and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of
a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a
serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the
witness account.[39]
The trial court believed that Magnos accusations against appellants are true,
basing on the fact that Magno was able to testify on direct examination as to the precise
location of the hack wound on Santiagos head and the stab wound on his abdomen.
[40]
But the court failed to consider that at the preliminary examination, barely a day after
the incident, Magno was asked the same questions asked in court, but could not even
recall where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No explanation was given
how Magno was able to supply during the trial the precise location of Santiagos wounds
19 months after the incident.[41]
Similarly, several portions of Magnos testimony are unworthy of belief. There
seems to be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase
him[42] considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an
unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense
why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack
him, Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure
that appellants did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander
Ebiass house, called out to Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and made
a torch to light his path. Magnos actions were certainly not the actions of someone
seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to
Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running
from. Magnos claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw
appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even
for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the Philippine Army
arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.[43]
Finally, no convincing proof could show that appellants had any reason to kill
Santiago and Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG points out, the supposed grudge, which
Magno claimed could have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be
believed. It is highly improbable that appellants would murder the spouses because
Santiago had offered appellants a glass of beer and they refused him. [44] If anybody
should harbor a grudge from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose
offer appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge between Santiago and
the appellants, and as Magno testified, Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.
[45]
Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated
only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them
to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal
cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. [46] Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.
[47]
There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to appellants
as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152 is REVERSED. Appellants
Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. They
are ordered released from custody immediately, unless they are being lawfully held for
another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and
to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
19. Llanto vs Alzona

[G.R. No. 150730. January 31, 2005]
MILA
SALES LLANTO, YOLANDA SALES CABILLO, OSCAR SALES,

ACQUILINA[1] SALES, FRANCISCO SALES, ALBERTO SALES, GLORIA
SALES ALIPIO, EDUARDO SALES, EMERCIA-NA[2] SALES ALGIRE,
ELENITA SALES SERRANO, and CONRADO SALES, petitioners,
vs. ERNESTO
ALZONA,DOMINADOR
ALZONA, ESTELA
SALES
[3]
PELONGCO, and
the
REGISTER
OF
DEEDS
OF
CALAMBA,
LAGUNA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 19, 2001 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52951,[5] which affirmed with modification the decision dated May 30,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna (Branch 31); and the
Resolution dated October 26, 2001, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales were husband and wife. They have twelve
children, eleven of whom are the present petitioners while the remaining child, Estela
Sales Pelongco, is one of herein respondents. Maria was the registered owner of a
certain parcel of land with an area of 202 square meters and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3225 which she acquired under a free patent. [6] The
property is located at Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna. [7] Until they died, Maria and Bernardo,
together with some of their children, lived on said land and in the house which they
constructed thereon. Maria died on August 27, 1986 [8] while Bernardo died on January
1, 1997.
On January 29, 1990, a real estate mortgage contract was purportedly executed by
Maria, who was already deceased at that time, and Bernardo in favor of herein
respondent Dominador Alzona.[9] Respondent Estela Sales Pelongco signed as an
instrumental witness to the mortgage contract. [10] Respondent Ernesto Alzona admitted
that while he was a co-mortgagee of his brother, Dominador, his name does not appear
in the mortgage contract. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed for alleged failure
of Bernardo and Maria to settle their obligation secured by the said mortgage. The
property was thereafter sold in a mortgage sale conducted on December 20, 1990
wherein Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was
awarded to Ernesto on December 20, 1990, [11] and on January 22, 1992, he executed a
Consolidation of Ownership over the property.[12] Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-261853 was issued in his name while OCT No. P-3225 in the name of Maria
Sales was cancelled.[13]
On December 17, 1992, herein petitioners caused the inscription of an adverse
claim on the title to the property.[14]
On October 15, 1993, herein petitioners filed before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna
a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage and of Auction Sale, with Reconveyance of Title
and Damages.[15]Respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona and the Register of
Deeds of Calamba, Laguna filed their answers, respectively. However, respondent
Estela Sales Pelongco failed to file her answer; as a consequence of which, she was
declared in default.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants Dominador Alzona
and Ernesto Alzona and against Estela Sales dismissing plaintiffs complaint with costs
against plaintiffs, and ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants Dominador Alzona and
Ernesto Alzona the sum of P50,000 plus P1,000 per court appearance for and as
attorneys fees.
For paucity of evidence, no judgment can be rendered by this Court on the other reliefs
prayed for by defendants Dominador Alzona and Ernesto Alzona in their counterclaim
against the plaintiffs and in their crossclaim against defendant Estela Sales.
Relative to plaintiffs complaint against defendant Estela Sales, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant Estela Sales by ordering the
latter to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000 for and as attorneys fees plus P1,000
per court appearance and P200,000 for moral damages.
For paucity of evidence, no judgment can be rendered on the other reliefs prayed for by
plaintiffs in their complaint against defendant Estela Sales.
For lack of evidence, the complaint of plaintiffs against defendant Register of Deeds of
Laguna, Calamba Branch, is as it is, hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On March 19, 2001, the CA rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the RTC
but deleting the attorneys fees awarded to petitioners. [17]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals on October 26, 2001.[18]
Hence, herein petitioners filed the present petition on the following grounds:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
A. THE RULE THAT A PURCHASER OR MORTGAGEE OF LAND IS NOT
OBLIGATED TO LOOK BEYOND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE CANNOT
BE APPLIED WHERE THERE IS NO QUESTION AS TO THE TITLE OF
THE MORTGAGOR AND WHERE A DIFFERENT PERSON MORTGAGED
THE PROPERTY.
B. A MORTGAGEE, SPECIALLY ONE WHO IS IN THE LENDING BUSINESS,
IS LEGALLY REQUIRED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS
WHICH PRUDENCE WOULD DICTATE, BEFORE ENTERING INTO A
MORTGAGE CONTRACT.[19]
In the present case, since it is no longer disputed that the mortgagors were not the
owners of the property subject of the petition the question that remains is whether
Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith.
Petitioners contend that the principle regarding innocent purchasers for value
enunciated by the CA in its decision is not applicable to the present case because in the
cases cited by the CA there was no question that the mortgagors were the real owners
of the property that was mortgaged, while in the instant case, the mortgagors were
impostors who pretended as the real owners of the property.
We do not agree. The principle of innocent purchasers for value is applicable to
the present case.
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract
of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be
mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void. [20] However, an
exception to this rule is the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith. Under this doctrine,
even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract
and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
[21]
This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title. [22] This is the same rule that underlies the principle
of innocent purchasers for value cited by the CA in its decision. The prevailing
jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of
title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign
that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation.
[23]
Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title
to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to
protection.[24]
For persons, more particularly those who are engaged in real estate or financing
business like herein respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona, to be considered as
mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence requires that they should take the necessary
precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and condition of the
properties offered as collateral and to verify the identity of the persons they transact
business with, particularly those who claim to be the registered property owners. [25]
In the instant case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court that Ernesto and
Dominador are mortgagees in good faith. The trial court gave credence to Ernestos
testimony that he conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought
and the property mortgaged. It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of
credibility of witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best
position to observe their demeanor and bodily movements. [26] Further, findings of the
trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to
great respect, and even finality, unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the case.
[27]
These findings are binding on this Court especially when affirmed by the appellate
court.[28] After a re-examination of the evidence presented, we find no cogent reason to
depart from this rule.
Indeed, a perusal of the testimony of Ernesto proves that he exercised the
necessary precautions to ascertain the status of the property sought to be mortgaged
and the identity of the mortgagors. During his cross-examination he testified as follows:
q.
And according to you, you made a credit investigation of the property in

question?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And you went to the place because according to you of a sketch given to
you by Estela?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
Where in Brgy. Banlic is the property specifically located in relation to any

landmark?
Pampolina:
The question is rather vague, Your Honor.
You mentioned perhaps a place that is known that is near the place.
Court:
Witness may answer. Where in Brgy. Banlic is the property located,
Mr. Witness?
a.
It is about five (5) houses away before reaching the junction going to Brgy.
Mamatid and in the corner, there is the Rural Bank of Cabuyao, sir.
Mendoza: You were only equipped with a sketch given to you by Estela. How
were you able to see specifically the property?
a.
I inquired from the neighbors, sir.
q.
Who among the neighbors did you inquire?
a.
The first one is a male residing..
Court:
The question is who?
a.
Felix Icepel and the second one is Auring Sales, wife of Francisco Sales,
sir.
q.
When you asked these persons, did you ask where was Maria Sales?
a.
No, sir.
q.
Did this Felix Icepel pointed to you the house of Bernardo Sales and Maria
Sales?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
Did you also ask Auring Sales about the house of Maria Sales?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
Why did you ask again Auring Sales about the house of Maria Sales
considering that youve asked Felix Icepel about this.
a.
Because I would like to have two witnesses, sir.
q.
Aside from asking their houses, did you ask whether Maria Sales and
Bernardo Sales were there?
a.
I did not ask, sir.
Court:
Considering that Aurings surname is Sales and the one applying for
a loan from you is also surnamed Sales, did you ask her if she has any
relation with the Saleses?
a.
Yes, maam. She even volunteered.
q.
What was the answer?
a.
That she is the daughter-in-law of Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales, sir.
q.
You also said that Auring is the wife of Francisco Sales?
a.
Yes, maam.
q.
And Francisco Sales is one of the children of Maria Sales and Bernardo
Sales?
a.
Yes, maam.
q.
For which reason she is claiming that she is the daughter-in-law of

Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales?
a.
Yes, maam.
Court:
Continue.
Mendoza: You pointed to two persons earlier whom you said went to your
house?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And who were they when you said them?
a.
They are Estela, the couple, Yolanda, Gloria, Conrado and three other
women, sir.
q.
Where did you meet these persons?
a.
Inside the house of Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales, sir.
q.
And you were able to talk to Maria Sales at that time?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And when the couple went to you in November, 1989, they were the same
couple whom you met in the house of Bernardo Sales?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And when you saw Bernardo Sales, he can walk?
a.
He was sitting down at that time, sir.
q.
At that time you went to their house, did he stand up?
a.
Yes, sir. I think he stood up.
q.
And Maria Sales offered you a coffee at that time?
a.
No, sir.
q.
What time did you go there when you made a credit investigation?
a.
It was in the morning, sir.
q.
And for how long did you talk with the couple, Yolanda, Gloria and Estela?
a.
It lasted for 30 minutes, sir.
q.
You pointed earlier the person of Yolanda whom you said you saw on
January 26, 1990 inside the house of the Saleses?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And you also mentioned of Gloria Sales whom you said is not in court
today?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And you saw this woman when she testified in court?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
And you saw her several times before she testified in court until she
completed her testimony?
a.
Yes, sir. When she came to my house.
Mendoza: We would like to make it on record that Gloria Sales Alipio is now
present in court.
Pampolina:
But with eyeglasses, Your Honor. She was not wearing an
eyeglass when she took the witness stand.
Mendoza: I would like to manifest Your Honor that even a person is wearing
eyeglasses, if you saw her several times, you know her.
Court:
Alright. Gloria Sales is there. Continue.
Mendoza: During that meeting with the couple, Estela, Gloria, Yolanda and
Conrado in January 1990 at the house of the Saleses, were they together
inside the house?
a.
Yes, sir.
q.
Who among the group greeted you?
a.
Estela, sir.
q.
And Estela told you the property they were mortgaging?
a.
Yes, sir. Their house.
q.
And again the couple was introduced to you by Estela?
a.
No, sir. I was introduced to the brother and sisters.
q.
When you went to the place, Estela, Yolanda, Gloria, Conrado and the
couple did not know that you would go to their place on January 26, 1990?
Court:
He will be incompetent.
Mendoza: Why did you say that Yolanda, Gloria, Conrado were expecting you
when in fact you have not met them?
a.
Because Estela asked when I am going to visit their place, she even made
a sketch of their place, and I said, probably on January 26, 1990 because
that is the feast day of St. Policarp and its
Mendoza: Okay, thats it.[29]

The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court that petitioners never disputed
Ernestos claim that when he inspected the subject property on January 26, 1990, he
met petitioners Yolanda, Gloria and Conrado together with Estela and the persons
whom he knew as Bernardo and Maria Sales at the house built inside the premises of
the said property. A further reading of the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
Ernesto even went inside the house and, in the presence of the aforementioned
persons, discussed with Estela the matter regarding the loan they were seeking and the
mortgage of the subject property.[30] It was only in their motion for reconsideration filed
with the CA did petitioners dispute the foregoing claims of Ernesto. However, their
disputation merely consisted in denying that Ernesto met Gloria Sales inside the house
of Bernardo and Maria. They did not contradict Ernestos claim that he also met
Conrado and Yolanda inside the said house. On the contrary, the truth of the
abovementioned claims of Ernesto is bolstered by the testimonies of Francisco and
Gloria Sales to the effect that during the period between 1989 and 1990, Estela,
Yolanda, Gloria and Conrado were all living in the house built on the subject property.
[31]
The trial court also gave credence to Ernestos testimony that prior to the execution
of the contract of mortgage, he was even shown a copy of the OCT and the tax
declaration in the name of Maria Sales. [32]
From the foregoing, we find no error in the ruling of the CA that Ernesto sufficiently
established that he acted in good faith by exercising due diligence in ascertaining the
status of the property mortgaged and the identity of the owners and occupants of the
said property; that it was Estela and the persons who represented themselves as
Bernardo and Maria who perpetrated the fraud. Hence, Ernesto can no longer be
faulted if he was led into believing that the old man and woman whom he met in
November 1989 and January 1990 are Bernardo and Maria Sales when, in fact, they
are not.
While it was also established that petitioners Yolanda, Gloria and Conrado were
present at the time Ernesto conducted his credit investigation on January 26, 1990, no
direct and conclusive evidence was presented to show that they had sufficient
knowledge of the fraud that was perpetrated by their sister Estela and the persons
posing as Bernardo and Maria as to hold them equally guilty of such fraud.
In fine, we hold that respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona are mortgagees in
good faith and, as such, they are entitled to the protection of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52951 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
20. Quiambao vs CA
[G.R. No. 128305. March 28, 2005]
FELINO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL

APPELLATE BOARD, Represented by its CHAIRMAN FEDERICO S.
COMANDANTE and MEMBERS, ATTYS. ROBERTO T. AGAGON and
ADELAIDA T. AGUILOS of the NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, RAUL S.
IMPERIAL, Police Chief, Philippine National Police and ESPIE S / L
CATOLICO, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition assails the Resolution[1] dated 10 January 1997 of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 25 October 1993 and the Resolution[3] dated 27
December 1993 of National Appellate Board (Board), Third Division, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). The Boards ruling in turn, which likewise affirmed
the Decision[4] dated 31 October 1992 of Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy Director
General dismissing PO3 Felino Quiambao from the police service.
The operative facts of the case follow:
On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening, Espie Catolico (Catolico) was
walking along Capulong Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her
housemaid Gynalin Garais who left the house the day before. After having asked her
neighbors and bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a certain policeman
was looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the area as
directed by the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3
Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Western Police
District Command, and five (5) other persons. Quiambao and his companions forcibly
took Catolicos handbag and carried away its contents consisting of precious assorted
merchandise, jewelry and other personal items worth approximately Nine Thousand
Pesos (P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner-type jeep
and brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slapped
her on the face several times and warned her not to look anymore for her housemaid. [5]
In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement on 24 June 1991 with the
PNP Inspectorate Division, accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with robbery-holdup
and mauling committed on 22 December 1990. [6] The complaint was corroborated by
Grace Commendador who witnessed the actual incident and confirmed the statement of
Catolico.[7]
On 22 August 1991, Catolico filed another administrative complaint with the Office
of the Hearing Officer at NAPOLCOM, Western Police District, Manila, charging
petitioner with grave misconduct for the same incident which occurred on 22 December
1990.[8] An investigation was conducted on this administrative charge by the Office of
the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM. On 30 March 1993, the case was forwarded to the
City of Manilas Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) for adjudication. [9]
The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an investigation on the charges
filed. On 31 October 1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO)
recommended the dismissal of petitioner. This recommendation was approved by Acting
PNP Chief and Police Deputy Director General, Raul S. Imperial (Acting PNP Chief). [10]
Petitioner appealed the 31 October 1992 resolution to the National Appellate Board
(NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. On 25 October 1993, the Third Division of the NAB,
rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from police service. [11] The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated 27
December 1993.[12] But it was only on 23 September 1996 when petitioner received a
certified xerox copy of the Resolution of the NAB denying his petition for
reconsideration.[13]
On 7 October 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
On 10 January 1997, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for lack of
merit.
[14]
The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state all the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided by law as it failed to
state the date when petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27
December 1993, denying his motion for reconsideration of NABs decision dated 25
October 1993. It found out that NABs decision dated 25 October 1993 was received by
petitioner on 22 November 1993, and on 2 December 1993, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. The said motion, however, was denied on 27 December 1993, but
according to the appellate court, petitioner did not disclose the date when he received
such denial. The fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals started to run from such date. [15]
Further, the appellate court ruled that the issue of which administrative disciplinary
authority had jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only for the first time
before it. He did not raise it before the SDHO nor before the NAB. More importantly, it
found that the PNP Inspectorate Division had original, exclusive and summary
jurisdiction over the instant case, and that NAB did not commit any reversible error in
deciding the appealed case without a priori pronouncement as to which among the
disciplinary authorities under Republic Act No. 6975 had jurisdiction over the case. [16] It
also added that NABs not having all the records requested by petitioner after it had
rendered its decision did not necessarily mean that it did not have such documents at
the time it rendered its decision. [17] Petitioners claim was further belied by the fact that
Catolico was able to obtain certified true copies of the relevant documents which the
PNP Chief transmitted to the NAPOLCOM.
Additionally, the appellate court found that a perusal of the annexes to the comment
of Catolico would readily show that NAB resolved petitioners case based on substantial
evidence appearing on the record before it. [18] It observed that petitioners claim that his
case was decided on the basis of an incomplete record was merely an afterthought.
Said defense was not raised by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of NABs
decision dated 25 October 1993.[19] Likewise, petitioner was not denied due process as
he was afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit his evidence before
the SDHO and to appeal to NAB the decision of the Acting PNP Chief dismissing him
from the police service, the Court of Appeals ruled. [20]
On 27 January 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion
for Reconsideration followed by the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on 17
February 1997. On the same day, the appellate court issued a Resolution denying
petitioners motion for extension of time. On 5 March 1997, it issued a resolution stating
that the Motion for Reconsideration was merely NOTED, the Resolution dated 10
January 1997 being already final.[21] Hence, the instant judicial recourse.
The primordial thrust of the petition seeks the reversal of the decisions and
resolutions of Acting PNP Chief, the NAB and the Court of Appeals, all upholding the
validity of the dismissal of petitioner from police service, and his corresponding
reinstatement in the police service.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred and acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition is not
meritorious.[22] He specifically assigns the following as errors which need to be rectified,
to wit: (1) that the appellate court ruled that petition did not state the date when
petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 to
determine if it was filed within the reglementary period; [23] (2) that the appellate court
sustained the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB without first resolving
and/or giving a reason why it was the Acting PNP Chief and neither the NAPOLCOM
Hearing Officer nor the PLEB that had the power to hear and decide the case; [24] (3) that
the appellate court sustained, through misapprehension of facts and/or contrary to
evidence, the decision of NAB which was not based on the complete records of the
case;[25] (4) that the appellate court ruled that the petition was not meritorious and
sustained the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB although such findings
were arrived at without a hearing and absent substantial evidence; [26] (5) that the
appellate courts denial of the motion for reconsideration was based on purely technical
considerations;[27] and (6) that the appellate court had been passive to Catolicos
surreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary documents of which
petitioner was not furnished and to the latters prejudice. [28]
The petition is not imbued with merit.
Readily glaring upon examination of the petition filed by petitioner is its title Petition
for Review on Certiorari.[29] The title would immediately lead us to conclude that the
petition is primarily anchored on Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under this mode of appeal, only questions of law may be entertained by this Court and
factual issues raised are beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues raised by
petitioner in the petition are fundamentally factual in nature which are inappropriate for
resolution via the mode of review he availed of.
However, a perusal of issues in the petition would indicate that the petition is
actually anchored on Rule 65 as the issues principally sought to assail the resolution
rendered by the appellate court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[30]
Nonetheless, even assuming that the petition was brought under Rule 65, the
petition would still not lie as the implausibility of the grounds on which the petition rests
are convincingly manifest and the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as the core of this mode of review is strikingly wanting.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess, or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[31] In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, questions of fact are not
generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the
respondent tribunal had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion.[32] These grounds under Rule 65 are not attendant in the instant case.
Even if we take this case as so exceptional as to permit a factual review, the petition at
bar fails to persuade us to rule in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the petition was not
meritorious since the petition filed with the appellate court did not state the date when
petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 to
determine if the petition was indeed filed within the reglementary period. There is
reason basis for such contention.
The petition with the appellate court by petitioner substantially complied with
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95[33]. The pertinent portion of the circular reads,
SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues
involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of
the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in Revised Circular No. 2891. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the period fixed herein.[34]
The records reveal that the petition filed with the Court of Appeals by petitioner
provides the following,
18. On December 27, 1993, respondent National Appellate Board rendered its
Resolution denying the motion in this manner:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on this instant petition, the same is hereby denied.
A certified xerox copy thereof, duly RECEIVED BY PETITIONER ON SEPTEMBER
23, 1996 is hereto attached as ANNEX M.[35]
A reading of the foregoing allegation, however, disclosed the fact that on 27
December 1993, NAB rendered a resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous as it is unnatural that the purported
resolution was received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, we are inclined to
sustain petitioners assertion for the same is supported by the certified xerox copy of the
resolution[36] and the evidence is bereft of any showing that will warrant a contrary
conclusion. Thus, the aforecited allegation substantially complied with the requirements
under Section 6. The appellate court believed that petitioner had already been served
with a copy of the resolution prior to 23 September 1996. [37] Such a conclusion,
however, is bereft of any evidentiary basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It is
noteworthy that the date when petitioner received NABs resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration is material in determining when the fifteen (15)-day reglementary

period for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals starts to run. [38]
The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates such as the date
when the resolution or order denying a motion for reconsideration was received is a
ground for dismissal in accordance with Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule
43.[39] But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for the aforecited paragraph 18
of the petition filed with the appellate court reflected the date when petitioner actually
received the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23 September
1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied so as not to frustrate
substantial justice that this Court seeks to achieve.
Now, on substantial issues rather than on mere technicality. The pivotal questions
posed in this petition are whether the Acting Chief of the PNP had authority to conduct
summary dismissal proceedings over members of the PNP and whether the summary
dismissal of petitioner was sufficiently established by the evidence on record.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which took effect on 1 January 1991, defines the structural
components, powers and functions of the PNP as the citizens guardian of peace and
order and enforcer of the law. The statute likewise delineates the procedural framework
in pursuing administrative complaints against erring members of the police organization.
Section 41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a complaint against an erring
member of the PNP may be filed, thus;
Section 41. (a) Citizens Complaints. Any complaint by an individual person against
any member of the PNP shall be brought before the following:
(1)
Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable by

withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension
or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) days;
(2)
Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense is

punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits,
suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a
period of not less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30)
days;
(3)
Peoples Law Enforcement Board, as created under

Section 43 hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of

salary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30)
days; or by dismissal. . . . (Emphasis added)[40]
It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would warrant
dismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41 should
be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the same statute which reads, thus:
Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. The Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings,
may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the
following cases:
(a)
When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
(b)
When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the
charges; and
(c)
When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police

officer. (Emphasis ours)
Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power to
summarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissal
enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not
only the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regional
directors. This shared power is likewise evident in Section 45.
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action
imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal
from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or
dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That the regional or National Appellate
Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act
on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without
prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Emphasis ours)
Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No.
6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although other
disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section
41 explicitly declares this point.
(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member
shall be heard and decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has
acquired original jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence of
concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense; Provided, That offenses which carry
higher penalties referred to a disciplinary authority shall be referred to the appropriate
authority which has jurisdiction over the offense. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction
over administrative cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant
dismissal from service.
This Court in Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate Board, PNP,
Region VI, Iloilo City v. Torcita [41] recognized the authority of both the Summary
Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, to
act on twelve (12) administrative complaints filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, even
though the controversy occurred in 1994, after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. The
Court further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of the
PNP Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, where the respondent is
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the rules and regulations in the
conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members and defines
conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3(c), Rule II, as follows:
Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers to any behavior or action of a PNP
member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character
and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state
of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an
unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits
himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. [42]
The same Memorandum Circular also defines the phrase serious charge as a
ground for summary dismissal of PNP members. This includes charges for commission
of heinous crimes and those committed by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein
PNP members are involved, gunrunning, illegal logging, robbery, kidnapping for
ransom, white slave trade, illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drug
trafficking, falsification of land title and other government forms, large scale swindling,
film piracy, counterfeiting, and bank frauds. Clearly, the robbery-holdup and mauling
incident which occurred on 22 December 1990 fall under the summary dismissal power
of PNP Chief and regional directors.
In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct against petitioner was first
filed by Catolico before the PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991. However,
another case was filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM,
WPD, on 22 August 1991. The charges filed with the PNP Inspectorate Division were
investigated, and on 31 October 1992, the SDHO recommended the dismissal of
petitioner which was approved by the Acting PNP Chief. Petitioner appealed the case to
the NAB which affirmed the decision of the Acting PNP Chief. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Thus, in accordance with paragraph (c) of Section 41,
the PNP Inspectorate Division had acquired exclusive original jurisdiction over the
complaint of Catolico to the exclusion of other investigating body. It is as if the second
complaint filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD,
had not been filed.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB were
bereft of jurisdiction to rule on the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the earliest
opportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the PNP Inspectorate
Division nor with the NAB but only before the appellate court. [43] Despite the existence of
a jurisprudential rule[44] that jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, an equitable exceptional rule has also been laid down by this Court bars a
party from raising jurisdictional question on ground of laches or estoppel. [45]Although the
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be
estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. [46]
Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in affirming the findings of the
Acting PNP Chief and the NAB, which was arrived at without hearing and substantial
evidence. We are not persuaded.
Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of
notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments
supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting
documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing
is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is

confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained. [47]
Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was approved by the Acting PNP Chief
whose decision was affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB was also affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The unanimity in their conclusions cannot just be disregarded and
their factual determinations are conclusive upon this Court for the records show that
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his side, as he filed position
papers to substantiate his defense and arguments and even filed motions for
reconsideration to set aside adverse decisions rendered against him. This opportunity to
defend himself was more than sufficient to comply with due process requirements in
administrative proceedings
Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of
such agency. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of
evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the
authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special competence. [48]
The instant case filed by Catolico is an administrative case for grave misconduct
against petitioner for the alleged robbery-holdup and mauling incident that took place on
22 December 1990. In resolving administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is not
indispensable to dispense justice to the parties. The requirement of notice and hearing
does not connote full adversarial proceedings. [49] Submission of position papers may be
sufficient for as long as the parties thereto are given the opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. [50] This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. [51] It
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process. [52]
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion is
required.[53] Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration. [54] Thus,
factual determinations made by the SDHO and the NAB as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this Court, they being
triers of facts. The congruence in their conclusion forecloses any possibility of reversible
error or misappreciation of facts. Such being the case, we cannot but affirm their
common conclusion as petitioner failed to advance substantial and convincing evidence
and arguments that will merit the reversal of prior decisions on the case.
Finally, petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in being passive to
Catolicos surreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary documents
of which petitioner was not furnished and to the latters prejudice. Sad to say, the matter
is a factual one which is outside the ambit of this mode of review. Besides, this issue
was not even raised in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Court of
Appeals.[55]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 January 1997 AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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1.

The defense also presented Exhibit B (and submarkings), the transcript of

The appeal is partly meritorious.

He went with us voluntarily in Camp.

Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna.

Q: After arriving at Camp Vicente Lim what happened there?

We turned over him to our investigator CIS.

SPO3 Alex Malabanan, sir.

To ask him question and to investigate him.

I noticed some reporters were there.

Q: Where were the reporters at that time?

Q: What did they do when you arrived?

They keep on asking who is this fellow we have arrested.

Q: Did anyone answer them?

Its up for the investigator and Maj. Pante.[16]

At the office, sir.[17]

On the other hand, SPO3 Bitos declared:

Who authorized the media people to propound questions to Guillermo Samus

Can you tell us where?

And do you know where Guillermo Samus spent the night?

Can you tell us where?

In our stockade, sir.[19]

2. Rico vs. People

[G. R. No. 137191. November 18, 2002]

BEN B. RICO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Apr. 16, 1990

Consequently, petitioner was charged under several informations docketed as

Apr. 24, 1990

Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals,[26] while Section 2 of B.P. 22

3. People vs. Pabillo

[G.R. No. 122103. November 4, 2003]

On the other hand, the defense weaved a different tale.

Alfredo Pabillo called Francisco Ipil to go out of the house.

Q: Who actually called Francisco Ipil alias Baludo?

Q: Who is this Baludo?

Francisco Ipil maam. He was the one.

Q: Where was Alfredo when he called for Francisco Ipil?

He was in the yard of the house.

I saw that he was carrying something.

Q: What was he carrying?

Q: How was the bolo held?

He was holding the bolo with his right hand.

They were standing side by side.

Q: Did you see if Wilfredo was carrying anything also?

Q: What was he carrying?

Q: How did Francisco Ipil react when he was called by Wilfredo?

He went out of the house slowly.

Towards the front of Wilfredo Pabillo.

Q: What happened after Francisco Ipil went out of the house?

He was pushed by Wilfredo using his left hand. (witness demonstrating)

Q: To what direction was he pushed?

Towards the front.

Q: What happened to Francisco after he was pushed?

Q: Then, what happened?

He was met with a hacking thrust towards the head.

Q: What did Wilfredo Pabillo used in hacking?

Q: How long was the bolo?

39 inches, more or less to (sic) and a half feet.

Q: Was Francisco Ipil hit?

Q: Who hacked him on his left arm?

Q: Was he carrying anything at the time he was hacked?

Q: What happened after he was hit on the left arm?

Q: So you did not mind (sic) of any danger?

Q: And you know these two Pabillos?