Political Patronage in Santa Catarina, Brazil

Author(s): Cleidi Albuquerque and Dennis Werner

Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 117-120
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
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SHORTER CONTRIBUTIONS

mustcompeteforclients,who thushave greaterlibertyto opt

fordifferent
intermediaries
betweenthemselvesand the outside world.Kottak(1983) extendsthisargumentto discussions
of Northeastern
communitieslocated near urban centers.BePolitical Patronagein Santa Catarina, cause of greatereconomicopportunities,individualsin such
communities
mayalso enjoythelibertyto "choose"theirpolitBrazil'
ical patrons.Various researchershave pointedto these presumed regionaldifferences
as indicativeof possible changes
occurringin Brazilian societyas the countrybecomes more
by CLEIDI ALBUQUERQUE and DENNIS WERNER
industrialized.Most hope to see the politicalbosses, and the
Rua Gel. Bittencourt,47 (apto. 64), Florianopolis,Santa
nepotismand corruption
theyimply,disappearas soon as posCatarina 88.000, Brazil. 10 VII 84
sible. Yet, despitethe interestin regionalcomparisonsthere
Patron-client
relationsin Latin Americahave receiveda good
has been littleresearchon the role of thesepoliticalfiguresin
deal of attentionin anthropology
(e.g., Harris 1956, Wagley
Brazil's moredevelopedareas.
1963, Wolf 1966, Gross 1973, Forman 1975, Leal 1975, LomThis studyuses quantitativedata to examinethe natureof
nitz 1982, Cintra 1974). Often comparisons are made of these
politicalbosses in a fishingvillage of Santa Catarina statein
ties among diverse classes, regions,or social sectors. Some
southernBrazil. It concentrates
on theroleplayedby
primarily
researchers(e.g., Lomnitz 1982) argue thatthe ties are much
cabos eleitorais("campaignmanagers")in thesociallivesofthe
the same in vastlydifferent
situations.Probablypart of the
village's residents.By examiningthe reasons people turnto
reluctanceto considervariationsin patronagesystemslies in
thesepoliticalpatronswe hope to betterour understanding
of
thedifficulty
of verifying
differences,
whichmay be quantitawhy such patronsremain popular even in more developed
tiveratherthanqualitative.That is, patron-client
tiesmay be
areas. From thisknowledgewe hope to gain a cleareridea of
relativelymoreor less importantforgivensocial ends rather
whatis neededto replacethesetraditionalpoliticalbosseswith
thansimply"present"or "absent."In thisstudywe attemptto
viable alternatives.
illustratehow some of the questionsabout variationsin paThe studyis based on fieldworkcarriedout by the main
tronagesystemscan be given a quantitativeformthat will
authorin 1982 and 1983in a fishingvillage(fictitiously
named
permitmorereliablecomparisons.We are interested
primarily
Tainhas) locatedsome 25 kmfromthecenterofFlorianopolis,
in the role of politicalpatronsin Brazil.
thecapital of Santa Catarina. Until 1970Tainhas was accessiThe importantrole politicalbosses play in the social lifeof
ble onlyby boat or by paths not suitableforcars. Today, a
poor, especially rural, Brazilians has been noted by anpaved road bringsregularbus service into the community,
forsome time(Harris 1956,Wagley 1963, Gross
thropologists
althoughpeople still talk of distancesin termsof the time
1973, Forman 1975, Leal 1975). Traditionally, such patrons
needed to get to places by boat. A public school, offering
have dispensed governmentand otherfavors in returnfor
classesup to thefourth-grade
level,was establishedin Tainhas
votes duringelections.It is virtuallyimpossiblefor a poor
in 1969, and in 1977 it was expandedto includeclasses up to
person to survive without these bosses. Harris (1956:192-94)
the eighth-grade
level. Today it employs30 persons.In 1977
and Wagley(1963:288)emphasizethe role of politicalpatrons
thecitygovernment
placed a medicaldoctorin a newlyestabin bestowinggovernment
jobs and promotionsupon supportlishedcommunity
healthcenter.Otherinstitutions
in Tainhas
ers, and Gross (1975) underlinesthe importanceof political
includethe centerof a fishermen's
and a fishing
cooperative
patronsin providingcapital, credit,information,
and other
researchstation.
outsideservices.
Today Tainhas includessome 700 houses.WiththedevelopAt least in part, the presenceof politicalpatronsin Brazil
mentoftourismin Florianopolisduringthesummermonthsof
maybe relatedto a partystructure
thatevolvedin conjunction
Novemberto March, Tainhas has become a popularsummer
withpoorcommunication
systemsand relativelyself-sufficient
resort.Some 40% of thehousesin thecommunity
now belong
socioeconomicstructures(such as latifundia)that did not ento summertourists.The remaininghousesbelongprimarily
to
articulation.Althoughpoliticalparties
courage interregional
fishermen
or ex-fishermen
and theirfamiliesand includeapare requiredby Brazilian electionlaws to formulatebroad
proximately1,700 people. About halfof thevillage'smenstill
politicalprograms,these programshave not generallybeen
fishfora living(partlyforlargecompaniesbased in Santosand
divulgedto the public. At the local level, personalloyalties
Itajai and partlyon an individualbasis). The otherhalfwork
ratherthan partyplatformstypicallydetermineelections.In
in commercialestablishmentsfor tourists,in the village's
thishighlypersonalizedelectionsystem,politicalbossesplay a
public institutions,or in the centerof Florianopolis.Even
crucialrole, forit is theyalone who can guaranteethe votes
these men sometimescombinetheir"city"jobs with fishing
necessaryto carryan election.The votes promisedby those
tasks such as mendingnets. Over half of the men's wives do
who have receivedhelpfromthepoliticalbossesare important
lacework to sell to tourists.Some single women work as
enoughforsuch bosses to buy politicalloyaltyin returnfor
maids. Many childrenhelp in collectingcrabs, oysters,and
such rewardsas government
jobs or otherservices.
clams and in packagingor sellingfish.
While concedingthatthesebosses are commonthroughout
The researchidentifiednine cabos eleitorais(all male) in
Brazil, most researchers (e.g., Wagley 1963, Leal 1975) emTainhas. Six ofthemwerebornin thearea, and eightnow live
phasize theirgreaterimportancein Brazil's poorerNortheast.
there.Five hold regularjobs in Florianopolis,one is a local
Forman(1975) distinguishes
between"patron-dependency"
restoreowner,one is a fisherman,and two are retired.All atlationships,in which dependentshave no choice over their
temptto gathervotesfortheirpoliticalpartiesand are known
in whichsomechoice
bosses,and "patron-client"
relationships,
forthe favorstheybestow on theirsupporters.One Tainhas
is possible.Accordingto Forman,because of theirties to the
cabo eleitoral,who was bornelsewhereand is a corporalin the
land and thelimitedeconomy,poorBrazilianNortheasterners
army,attachedhimselfto thelocal churchleadership,in which
have traditionally
had feweropportunities
to "select"theirpapositionhe has promotedlocal festivalsand takentheinitiative
trons.This has given the politicalbosses autocraticcontrol
of constructinga parish house. The wives of these cabos
over theirdependents.In the moredevelopedareas of Brazil,
eleitorais
aid theirhusbandsin gainingpoliticalsupport.For
such as the South, people are moreindependentand patrons
example,one wife(also bornoutsidethe community)
tookon
thetask oforganizingthelocal womento meetperiodicallyin
1 ? 1985 by the Wenner-Gren
her home to do handicraftwork.
FoundationforAnthropological
Research,all rightsreserved0011-3204/85/2601-0007$1.00.
How much do Tainhas residentsdepend on thesepolitical
Vol. 26 * No. 1 * February1985
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117

officesto handletheiraffairs.As mentionedabove, ninecabos

eleitoraiswere identifiedin thismanner.(Copies of the questionnaireand of data codingsare available fromthemain author.)
Withthissocial mappingtechniqueit was possibleto analyzedata two ways. First,we couldexaminethetypesofproblemsforwhichdifferent
kindsofpeoplewerecited.This would
give us an idea ofthefunctionsof varioussocial ties. Here we
were interestedprimarilyin the typesof activitiesforwhich
cabos eleitoraiswould be called upon. Second, we could comparethepersonalcharacteristics
ofinformants
withthecharacteristicsof the people theycited. We wanted to know which
kindsof people dependedmoston the cabos eleitorais.
Besides the more structuredinformation
obtainedthrough
use of these interviewschedules,less formaldata were collected about communityaffairs,especiallyabout conflictsbetweenpublicinstitutions
and community
residents.These data
oftenrequiredreturning
forsecondor thirdinterviews
withthe
same persons.

bosses? How does theiruse of politicalbosses comparewith

theiruse of otherless politicizedsocial ties?And what are the
alternativesto politicalpatronage?To answerthesequestions,
morequantitativedata were gatheredon theuse people make
of politicalpatronsand othersto meettheirneeds.
PROCEDURES

To understandthe natureof the ties betweencabos eleitorais

and theresidentsof Tainhas, thisstudyuses data gatheredby
themainauthorin a studydesignedto examinethearticulation
of public institutions
withtheirclientsin Tainhas (Albuquerque 1983). For thisstudy,interviewswere conductedwithall
of the public employeesworkingin Tainhas and a random
sampleofTainhas residents.The residentsamplewas derived
a map ofthe
byfirstobtainingfromthemunicipalgovernment
area showingall ofthehouses.A randomsampleofhouseswas
drawn,and all oftheadultsin thesehouseswereinterviewed.
Summertouristhomeswereexcludedfromthesample,leaving
15 households(36 adults)to be interviewed.
The interviewconsistedofinformalchattingand theadministrationof an interviewschedule. Institutionalemployees
were asked questionsabout theircareer historiesand problems, theirties to and participationin the community,and
and clients.Residents
theirattitudestowardtheirinstitutions
wereasked abouttheirtiesto, attitudestoward,and participationin the institutions
and in public lifegenerally.The questionnaireincludedquestionsintendedto "map" theuse byresidents of various kinds of informaland formalsocial tiesincludingtheiruse of cabos eleitorais.
This mappingof social ties was done in two steps. First,
wereasked to giveup to fivenames(ofpeoplefrom
informants
different
households)in responseto each of such questionsas
"Who visitsyou most?""Whom do you seek forhelp if you
need a job?" "Whom do you seek forhelp withofficialdocuments?"and "To whom can you turnif you need to borrow
money?"The names obtained in answer to these questions
were thenenteredon anothersheetof the interviewschedule
of the people cited could be rewherevarious characteristics
corded.These characteristics
includedage, sex, income,occuand special rolessuch as
pation,kinshiptiesto theinformant,
"local institutionalemployee"or cabo eleitoral. Cabos eleiwho recogtoraiswere identifiedas such by the informants,
nizedtheroleofthesepeoplein obtainingvotesin exchangefor
hospitalbeds,
suchindividualservicesas schoolmatriculation,
or road
and jobs and such publicservicesas buses, electricity,
construction.Some of the cabos eleitoraishad set up local

POLITICAL

PATRONS AND SOCIAL LIFE

Table 1 summarizesdata fromTainhas residentson thetypes

ofpeoplecitedfordifferent
kindsofproblems.The numberof
citationsof people of a given social categoryis recordedfor
each question. Some people were cited more than once (for
different
typesofproblems)and therefore
appear severaltimes
underdifferent
headings.For example,a man may be a relativeoftheinformant
and also a neighboror a storeowner.He
will thusappear in therow foreach of thesesocial categories.
In addition,ifthisman is citedbothforloans and forvisits,he
will appear in each of thesecolumns.The table illustratesthe
contrasting
functions
servedby different
social categories.Relativesare citedmostoftenforloans. They are citedsomewhat
less forvisits. On the otherhand, neighborsand friendsare
citedless forloans and moreforvisits.These associationscan
be explainedfairlysimply.Friendsand neighborslive closerto
each otherand can visitmoreeasilythan relatives,but since
theymay come and go withtime,theymay be less willingto
lend each othermoney.In contrast,relativesare forlife,even
thoughtheymay live fartheraway and mayhave less socially
in commonwiththe personto whomtheyare lendingmoney.
Thus, loans are much moresecure. Storeownersservemuch
the same functionsas friendsand neighbors.They are cited
primarilyforvisitsand secondarilyforlendingmoney.Cabos
eleitoraisare called upon forjobs and, less often,forpolitical
advice. This association is especially marked because, al-

TABLE 1
SOCIAL

CATEGORIES

AND PERSONAL
REASON

PERSON

Loans

CITED

Relative .3
Neighbor .1
Friend . 1

Political

1
9
3

patron .0
Store owner .5
Tourist .1
Institutional
employee .0
No one .0

Visits

Advice on
Illness

.. 31
.. 19
.. 13

19
38
37

20
13

0
0

PROBLEMS

FOR CITATION

Jobs
6

Election
Advice

Documents

7
3
3

18

5
5

0
7
3

0
2
0

6
0
4

4
0
1

2
1
1

0
0

2
0

2
9

0
3

2
15

5
2

NOTE: Responsesof36 Tainhas residents.Figuresreferto thenumbersofpersonscitedbytheseresidentsin responseto

questionsabout whom theysoughtforthe specificproblemslisted(e.g., "Whom do you seek if you need to borrow
money?").The characteristics
ofthecitedpersonslistedin thefirstcolumnweredetermined
byaskingresidentsabout all
of the personstheyhad mentionedin theirearlieranswers(e.g., "Is X a tourist?").
118

CURRENT

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ANTHROPOLOGY

thoughTainhas residentsdepend heavilyon kin, neighbors,

and friendsformostthings,theydepend much less on these
people forjobs.
Dependence on political patronsforjobs has been much
discussed in studies of Brazilian society.Harris (1956) and
Wagley(1963) arguethatin largeparttheinterestofBrazilians
in partypoliticsmay resultfromthe directrelationshipbetweenpartysupportand theacquisitionofjobs and job promotions. Interviews with Tainhas institutionalemployees
confirmed
thisclose relationship.Many oftheseemployeesare
fromthe area and have close contactswiththe local political
bosses. When asked how theyhad obtainedtheirjobs, many
hesitatedbeforeansweringthat theyhad been appointedbecause the directorsfeltthatthey(and theirloyalty)"could be
dependedupon." Several attemptedto justifytheirstatusby
pointingoutthattheytookspecializedtrainingcoursesto learn
theirjobs aftertheirappointment.Institutional
employeesnot
bornin Tainhas (and lackingties to the local politicalbosses)
weresignificantly
less likelyto have receivedtheirjobs through
direct appointment(Albuquerque 1983) and more likelyto
have enteredthroughcivilserviceexams. The same holdstrue
foracquisitionof job security.All six of the Tainhas institutional employeeswith secure contractsand who were born
outsidethe area had had to pass competitiveexams,whileall
six of the Tainhas-bornemployeeswith such contractshad
obtainedthem"informally."
A conflictbetweentheTainhas schooldirectorand a doctor
fromthelocal healthcenterillustratestheimportanceofpolitical patrons,even afterjobs have alreadybeen acquired and
when thereare othersourcesof political-socialsupport.The
conflictbegan when a student,afterreceivingpunishment
of
froma teacher,was takento thelocal doctorfortreatment
head contusions.The student'smother,furiousat the treatmenther childhad receivedfromthe teacher,told the doctor
she plannedto make a formalcomplaintwiththe police. The
doctorrecommended,instead,thatshe registerthe case with
thelegal-medicalinstitute,
sincethiswould be a moreeffective
procedure. In addition to followingthis advice, the irate
motherappearedwithherchildon a local televisionprogram.
Her appearancewas followedbyan appearancebytheschooldirector,who disclaimedanyuntowardviolencetowardthechild.
A week latertheschoolcook, complainingofpains, wentto
the same doctorwho had treatedthe disciplinedchild. She
returnedlater complainingthat her pains persistedand that
Soon afthe treatment
she had receivedhad been ineffective.
terwardsrumorsbegan to circulatethat,furiousat the local
doctor'shelpingof the irate mother,the school directorwas
to removehim on chargesof "medicalneglinow attempting
gence"in thecase ofthecook. The directorrelatedhercase to
one of the cabos eleitorais.The doctor'smaid decidedto help
heremployerby amassingnames of local residentsto support
thedoctorin CityHall, and she also soughtthehelp of a local
leader. It was not long beforeanotherof Tainhas's political
patronssummonedthislocal leaderto CityHall to discussthe
questionwiththeschooldirectorand anotherpoliticalpatron.
The two political patrons disagreed about the doctor'sremoval, and the doctorcontinuedin his post.
This conflictillustratestwo importantaspects of political
patrons'rolesin the social lifeofTainhas. First,it showshow
sources
residentsattemptto gain supportfrommanydifferent
beforeturningto thepoliticalpatrons.This maybe partofthe
tie(see Lomnitz1982)
"negotiating"
aspectofthepatron-client
in whichindividualsattemptto demonstrate
theirpopularsupport to the cabos eleitorais. Second, it shows the very real
issues.
powerof the politicalpatronsto decide employment
ALTERNATIVES

TO POLITICAL

BOSSES

Whilepoliticalpatronsare extremely
important
forjob acquisition,theyare nottheonlysourcesofemployment
in Tainhas.

Table 1 shows that many people turnforjobs to relatives,

neighbors,and friends.The influxoftouristsintothearea has
suppliedyetanothersourceofemployment.
Tourists,manyof
whomown summerhousesin Tainhas, dependon residentsfor
maid serviceand for care of theirhomes duringthe winter
months.As middle-or upper-classcitizenstheyalso sometimes
have connectionswiththecityofFlorianopolisand can recommend Tainhas residentsforoutsideemployment.Local residentsappreciatetheopportunities
suppliedby thetouristsand
oftendevelop warm affectiverelationshipswith them, althoughmanylocal fishermen
complainthattouristsare hurting
the local fishcatch. Many of theseadvantagesand disadvantages to tourismhave also been pointedout forotherfishing
villagesin Brazil (Figueiredo1981).
The presenceof touristsincreasesthe choicesTainhas residents have about who theirpatronsmightbe. In Forman's
(1975) terms,this is an improvement,
since it makes forless
"patron-dependency."Even better than replacing patrondependencywith patron-clientship
would be the lesseningof
both. A fairnumberof Tainhas residentsremarkedthatthey
would seek employmentdirectlyby goingto employment
locales ratherthan depend on otherindividuals.Who are the
people who depend moston the cabos eleitoraisor otherpatrons,and what are the implications?
Table 2 showsthecorrelations
betweenthepersonalcharacteristicsof informants
and the numberof personsof different
categoriestheycited. In general,people citedthosewho were
like themselves.Men were morelikelyto citemen,olderpeople to cite olderpeople, migrantsto Tainhas to cite othermigrants,and thosewithmorerelativesin Tainhas to citethose
relatives. Interestingly,
it was those with few relativesin
Tainhas and migrantsto thearea who mostcitedstoreowners
and institutionalemployees.Apparently,these people were
citedprimarily
bythosewho had no one else to turnto forsuch
problemsas the need to borrowmoney(see table 1). It seems
theyare not so much "patrons"as resourcesof last resort.
Althoughcorrelations
wereweak, therewas sometendencyfor
men morethanwomento citetourists,probablybecause men
were morelikelyto need thejobs or information
the tourists
could provide. For much the same reasons,men cited cabos
eleitoraismore than did women. Althoughthe coefficient
is
weak, probablythe most importantcorrelationin table 2 is
thatbetweeneducationalleveland citationofpoliticalpatrons.
Apparentlythosewithmoreeducationare moreindependent
in theirsearchforjobs or handlingofofficialdocuments.That
the better-educated
depend less on politicalbosses suggests
that greaterattentionto education mightreduce the power
wieldedby the cabos eleitorais.
Perhaps the most obvious way of reducingthe power of
politicalpatronsis makingjob acquisitionmoreopen and competitive.On the face of it, this strategysounds fairlyreasonable, even thoughthe conflictdescribedabove shows that
competitiveexams to obtainjobs do not guaranteethatcabos
eleitoraiswill have no influenceon laterjob security.However, thereis anotherissue involvedas well. Many presume
thatopen competitionis the mosteffective
way of identifying
thebestpersonfora position,but data fromTainhas employees pointto an oftenoverlookedproblem.Those institutional
employeeswho had obtainedtheirpositionsthroughopencomwith the people theywere
petitionreportedmore difficulties
hiredto servethandid thosewho had obtainedtheirpositions
"informally"(r = .38, p < .05).
The basic problemhere is that competitiveexams usually
favoroutsiderswithhighereducationand moremiddle-class
oftenfavorlessbackgrounds,while"informal"appointments
educatedpeopleofmoremodestlocal originsbutwitha greater
affinity
for the people to be served. Many local people, for
example, resentedhaving theirchildrentaughtby "hippies"
fromothercommunitieswho did not properlydisciplinethe
childrenand who appeared in scantyclotheson the beach.

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119

TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS

BETWEEN

CHARACTERISTICS

OF INFORMANTS

(N = 36) AND OF THOSE

THEY

CITE

INFORMANTS

CITED
PERSONS
Wealthier ..............

Older .................
Tainhas-born...........
Male ..................
Relative ...............
Neighbor ..............
Friend .................
Store owners ...........
Institutional
employee. ............
Tourist ................
Political patron .........

More Educated

Older

Tainhas-born

Male

.01
-.14
-.26
-.02
-.26
-.37**
.18
.18

.12
-.62***
.02
- .24
-.14
-.35**
.44***
-.05

-.14
.66***
.15
.08
.19
.33**
-.48***
-.17

-.41**
.04
.62**
- .11
.44***
.01
.03
-.26

.11
.20
-.01
.46***
-.16
.18
.12
.07

-.08
-.16
-.17

.09
.10
-.22

.11
-.01
.11

-.20
.08
.07

Wealthier

.07
.25
.25

WithLocal
Relatives
-.24
-.37**
.41**
.03
.39**

.07

.18
-.31*

-.31*
-.12
.11

*p <

.10.
< .o5.
*** p < .01.
**p

They also complainedthatchildrenwastedtheirtimeon such

"irrelevantcourses"as physicaleducationand art,considered
importantby teachersfromoutside the community.In respondingto a complaintabout the schoollunchprogram,one
public employeeraised the ire of communityresidentsby
speakingdisdainfully
ofthelocal dietoffishand maniocflour.
This dilemmahighlights
what may be an inadvertentadvantage to the politicalpatronagesystemover a civil servicesystem. If we are to findsubstitutesforpoliticalpatronage,we
so that
will have to rethinkthe natureof open competitions
that
theywill favorthosewho can trulyhelp thecommunities
public institutions
are designedto serve.
Some internationalagencies (see InternationalConference
on PrimaryHealth Care 1978) have suggestedfavoringlocal
This can be accomplished
participationin public institutions.
exams
throughvariousprocedureswhichcombinecompetitive
with quota systemsfavoringlocal residents.The Tainhas
studyshowed that institutional
employeesof local origindo,
indeed,reportfewerdifficulties
withtheirclients(r = .33, p <
.05). A scale designedto measureparticipationof public employees in communitylife (Albuquerque 1983) also showed
greatercommunityparticipationon the part of locally born
employees(r = .74, p < .001). However,local originsare not
theonlyfactorthatpromotesgreatercommunity
of
integration
institutional
employees.Greaterjob securityalso encourages
more communityparticipation(r = .73, p < .001). Partial
correlations
showedthatjob securitypredictscommunity
parof origins(partialr = .42) or resiticipationindependently
dence (partial r = .46). Evidentlythe feelingthat one may
institution
spend his or herlifein a community
providespsychologicalor otherincentivesto take greaterpartin theactivitiesof one's clients.

CONCLUSIONS

There are manyvariablesthatmay affectthe natureof political patronagesystems.The factorsmentionedhere-greater

abilityto chooseamongalternativepatrons,greatereducation,
and the effectiveness
of competitivejob exams-are only a
start in our attemptsto distinguishthe causes and consequences of these importantsocial ties throughoutLatin
Americaand elsewhere.As long as people have the right(or
obligation)to vote therewill be pressureforpoliticalcandidates to mustersupportin any way possible.As longas voters
can acquire advantages in theirrelationshipswith political
bosses,thepoliticalpatronagesystemwill endure.The power
120

Viof thesebosses will not be curbedby moralexhortations.

able alternativeswill have to be made available.
systemsacrossregions,counComparisonsof patron-client
tries,or classes may be usefulin helpingus understandthe
reasonsforvariationin thesesystemsand consequentlyaid us
in suggestingpossibleavenues forchange. However,in order
to makesuchcomparisonswe willhave to providecomparable
data thatcan distinguish
"more"from"less." At themomentit
is verydifficult
to make such comparisons,since researchers
collectdata opportunistically.
We hope thatthepresentstudy
will stimulatecomparable quantitativeresearchin different
places. The social-mappingtechnique used here is easily
adaptable to othersituationsand easilycarriedout. Withbetregions,
ter comparisonsof patronage systemsin different
classes,and social strata,we will be in a farbettersituationto
draw secureconclusionsabout the benefitsand drawbacksof
thesesystems,and we will have a more secure basis forattemptingto bringabout change.

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