SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P.

ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR.
MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and
JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf
and on behalf of the Class
Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL
840, United States District Court
of Hawaii, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 137, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, and the ESTATE OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through
its
court
appointed
legal
representatives in Class Action
MDL 840, United States District
Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R.
Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Our martial law experience bore strange
unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish
weeding out its bitter crop. While the
restoration of freedom and the fundamental
structures and processes of democracy have
been much lauded, according to a significant
number, the changes, however, have not
sufficiently healed the colossal damage
wrought under the oppressive conditions of
the martial law period. The cries of justice for
the tortured, the murdered, and the
desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy
in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the
dispensation of the appropriate relief due
them cannot be extended through the same
caprice or whim that characterized the illwind of martial rule. The damage done was
not merely personal but institutional, and the
proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to
involve the award of reparations due within
the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent
victims of human rights violations[1] who,
deprived of the opportunity to directly
confront the man who once held absolute
rule over this country, have chosen to do
battle
instead
with
the
earthly
representative, his estate. The clash has
been for now interrupted by a trial court
ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic,
that required the petitioners to pay a
whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred
Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00)
in order that they be able to enforce a
judgment awarded them by a foreign court.
There is an understandable temptation to

cast the struggle within the simplistic

confines of a morality tale, and to employ
short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the
desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort
to the equity principle all too often leads to a
result that may be morally correct, but legally
wrong.
Nonetheless, the application of the legal
principles involved in this case will comfort
those who maintain that our substantive and
procedural laws, for all their perceived
ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad
interpretations, are inherently fair and just.
The relief sought by the petitioners is
expressly mandated by our laws and
conforms to established legal principles. The
granting of this petition for certiorari is
warranted in order to correct the legally
infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the
respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration.
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with
the United States District Court (US District
Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate
of former Philippine President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was
brought forth by ten Filipino citizens[2] who
each alleged having suffered human rights
abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture
and rape in the hands of police or military
forces during the Marcos regime.[3] The Alien
Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US
District
Courts
jurisdiction
over
the
complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for
tortious violations of international law. [4]
These plaintiffs brought the action on their
own behalf and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, particularly
consisting of all current civilian citizens of the
Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
between 1972 and 1987 were tortured,
summarily executed or had disappeared
while in the custody of military or
paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the
class
consisted
of
approximately
ten
thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder
of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was
warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of
the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
provisions of which were invoked by the
plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court
certified the case as a class action and
created three (3) sub-classes of torture,
summary execution and disappearance
victims.[5] Trial ensued, and subsequently a
jury rendered a verdict and an award of
compensatory and exemplary damages in
favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3
February 1995, the US District Court,
presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a
Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the
plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents
($1,964,005,859.90).
The
Final
Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a

decision rendered on 17 December 1996.[6]
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners
filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment. They
alleged that they are members of the plaintiff
class in whose favor the US District Court
awarded damages.[7] They argued that since
the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for
certiorari with the US Supreme Court after
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of
the US District Court had become final and
executory, and hence should be recognized
and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then
in force.[8]
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate
filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among
others, the non-payment of the correct filing
fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid
Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket
and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that
they sought to enforce a monetary amount of
damages in the amount of over Two and a
Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion).
The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court
Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper
computation and payment of docket fees. In
response, the petitioners claimed that an
action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is not capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four
Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper,
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.[9]
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge
Santiago Javier Ranada[10] of the Makati RTC
issued the subject Order dismissing the
complaint without prejudice. Respondent
judge opined that contrary to the petitioners
submission, the subject matter of the
complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary
estimation, as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of definite sums of money, allowing
for easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a)
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
would find application, and the RTC estimated
the proper amount of filing fees was
approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos, which obviously had not been
paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada
denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From
this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin
orders of respondent judge. [11] They prayed
for the annulment of the questioned orders,
and an order directing the reinstatement of
Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of
appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation as the

subject matter of the suit is the enforcement

of a foreign judgment, and not an action for
the collection of a sum of money or recovery
of damages. They also point out that to
require the class plaintiffs to pay Four
Hundred
Seventy
Two
Million
Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate
and render inutile the liberal construction
ordained by the Rules of Court, as required
by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly the inexpensive
disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which
provides that Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty, a mandate which is
essentially
defeated
by
the
required
exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount
of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was
characterized
as
indisputably
unfair,
inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
was permitted to intervene in this case. [12] It
urged that the petition be granted and a
judgment
rendered,
ordering
the
enforcement and execution of the District
Court judgment in accordance with Section
48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred
in interpreting the action for the execution of
a foreign judgment as a new case, in
violation of the principle that once a case has
been decided between the same parties in
one country on the same issue with finality, it
can no longer be relitigated again in another
country.[13] The CHR likewise invokes the
principle of comity, and of vested rights.
The Courts disposition on the issue of
filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential
guidepost for courts confronted with actions
enforcing foreign judgments, particularly
those lodged against an estate. There is no
basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice
ruling based on the special circumstances of
the petitioners as victims of martial law, or
on the emotionally-charged allegation of
human rights abuses.
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court readily evinces that the respondent
judge ignored the clear letter of the law when
he concluded that the filing fee be computed
based on the total sum claimed or the stated
value of the property in litigation.
In
dismissing
the
complaint,
the
respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule
141 as basis for the computation of the filing
fee of over P472 Million. The provision states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial
Court.(a) For filing an action or a
permissive
counterclaim
or
money claim against an estate

not based on judgment, or for

filing with leave of court a thirdparty, fourth-party, etc., complaint,
or a complaint in intervention, and
for all clerical services in the same
time, if the total sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the started
value of the property in litigation,
is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P
800.00
but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P
1,000.00
less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but
less than P 250,000.00 - P
1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but
less than P 300,00.00 - P
1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but
not more than P 400,000.00
- P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not
more than P400,000.00 - P
2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess
of
P 400,000.00 - P 10.00
...
(E
mphas
is
suppli
ed)
Obviously, the above-quoted provision
covers, on one hand, ordinary actions,
permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc.
complaints and complaints-in-interventions,
and on the other, money claims against
estates which are not based on judgment.
Thus, the relevant question for purposes of
the present petition is whether the action
filed with the lower court is a money claim
against an estate not based on judgment.
Petitioners complaint may have been
lodged against an estate, but it is clearly
based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of
the US District Court. The provision does not
make any distinction between a local
judgment and a foreign judgment, and where
the law does not distinguish, we shall not
distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety
reveals several instances wherein the filing
fee is computed on the basis of the amount
of the relief sought, or on the value of the
property in litigation. The filing fee for
requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage is based on the amount of
indebtedness or the mortgagees claim. [14] In
special proceedings involving properties such
as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is

again based on the value of the property. [15]

The aforecited rules evidently have no
application to petitioners complaint.
Petitioners
rely
on
Section
7(b),
particularly the proviso on actions where the
value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated. The provision reads in full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial
Court.(b) For filing
1.
value

Actions

where

the

of
the
subject
matter
cannot
be
estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions
except
judicial
foreclosure which
shall be governed
by
paragraph
(a)
above --- P 600.00
3. All other actions not
involving property --P 600.00
In a real action, the assessed
value of the property, or if there is
none, the estimated value, thereof
shall be alleged by the claimant and
shall be the basis in computing the
fees.
It is worth noting that the provision also
provides that in real actions, the assessed
value or estimated value of the property shall
be alleged by the claimant and shall be the
basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this
provision does not apply in the case at bar. A
real action is one where the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of real property or an action
affecting title to or recovery of possession of
real property.[16] Neither the complaint nor the
award of damages adjudicated by the US
District Court involves any real property of
the Marcos Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and
serious error when he concluded that the
filing fees should be computed on the basis
of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the
action involved pertains to a claim against an
estate based on judgment. What provision, if
any, then should apply in determining the
filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign
judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper
understanding is required on the nature and
effects of a foreign judgment in this
jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final

judgments of foreign courts of competent

jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.[17] This
principle was prominently affirmed in the
leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot[18]
and
expressly
recognized
in
our
jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v.
Walter E. Olsen& Co.[19] The conditions
required by the Philippines for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment were
originally contained in Section 311 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken
from the California Code of Civil Procedure
which, in turn, was derived from the
California Act of March 11, 1872.[20]
Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure has remained unchanged down to
the last word in nearly a century. Section 48
states:
SEC. 48. Effect
of foreign
judgments. The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment
upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment
against
a
person,
the
judgment
is
presumptive
evidence of a right as
between the parties and their
successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or
final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a
foreign judgment in an action in rem and one
in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title
to the thing, while in an action in personam,
the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.[21] However, in both cases,
the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to
the party,[22] collusion, fraud,[23] or clear
mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party
aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled
to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy.[25]
It is clear then that it is usually necessary
for an action to be filed in order to enforce a

foreign judgment[26], even if such judgment

has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem
actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the
losing party an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, and in order for the court
to
properly
determine
its
efficacy.[27]
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.[28]
The rules are silent as to what initiatory
procedure must be undertaken in order to
enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
But there is no question that the filing of a
civil complaint is an appropriate measure for
such purpose. A civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right,[29] and clearly an action
to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a
vindication of a right prescinding either from
a conclusive judgment upon title or the
presumptive evidence of a right. [30] Absent
perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a
quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement
of judgment must be brought before the
regular courts.[31]
There are distinctions, nuanced but
discernible, between the cause of action
arising from the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and that arising from the facts or
allegations that occasioned the foreign
judgment. They may pertain to the same set
of facts, but there is an essential difference in
the right-duty correlatives that are sought to
be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for
damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of
action emanates from the violation of the
right of the complainant through the act or
omission of the respondent. On the other
hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from the
same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same
right through the same manner of action, the
cause of action derives not from the tortious
act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof
are different. Using the above example, the
complainant will have to establish before the
court the tortious act or omission committed
by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to
rebut these factual allegations or prove
extenuating
circumstances.
Extensive
litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and
from there the right to and amount of
damages are assessed. On the other hand, in
an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the
matter left for proof is the foreign judgment
itself, and not the facts from which it
prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the
actionable issues are generally restricted to a
review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the
service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or
mistake of fact or law. The limitations on
review is in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.[32]

Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion,

it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting
from
previous
litigation,
to
safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts
not be increased by never-ending litigation of
the same disputes, and in a larger sense to
promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case
of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest
and quietness.[33] If every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation. [34]
Petitioners appreciate this distinction,
and rely upon it to support the proposition
that the subject matter of the complaintthe
enforcement
of
a
foreign
judgmentis
incapable
of
pecuniary
estimation.
Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in
this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus
deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical
intents and purposes, the matter at hand is
capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the
last cent. In the assailed Order, the
respondent judge pounced upon this point
without equivocation:
The Rules use the term where the
value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated. The subject matter of the
present case is the judgment
rendered by the foreign court
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs
definite sums of money, as and for
compensatory damages. The Court
finds that the value of the foreign
judgment can be estimated; indeed,
it can even be easily determined. The
Court is not minded to distinguish
between the enforcement of a
judgment and the amount of said
judgment, and separate the two, for
purposes of determining the correct
filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff suing
on promissory note for P1 million
cannot be allowed to pay only P400
filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that
the subject matter of his suit is not
the P1 million, but the enforcement of
the promissory note, and that the
value of such enforcement cannot be
estimated.[35]
The jurisprudential standard in gauging
whether the subject matter of an action is
capable of pecuniary estimation is wellentrenched.
The
Marcos
Estate
cites
Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v.
Court of Appeals, which ruled:
[I]n determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the

claim is considered capable of

pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal
relief
sought,
this
Court
has
considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of
money,
and
are
cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
On the other hand, petitioners cite the
ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v.
Scandia,[36] from which the rule in Singsong
and Raymundo actually derives, but which
incorporates this additional nuance omitted
in the latter cases:
xxx However, where the basic
issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for
annulment of judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court
has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of
money,
and
are
cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance.
[37]

Petitioners go on to add that among the

actions the Court has recognized as being
incapable of pecuniary estimation include
legality of conveyances and money deposits,
[38]
validity of a mortgage, [39] the right to
support,[40]
validity
of
documents,[41]
[42]
rescission
of
contracts,
specific
[43]
performance,
and validity or annulment of
judgments.[44] It is urged that an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs
to the same class.
This is an intriguing argument, but
ultimately it is self-evident that while the
subject matter of the action is undoubtedly
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the
effect of a providential award would be the
adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in
theory, such an action is primarily for the
enforcement of the foreign judgment, but
there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of
argument since there is no denying that the
enforcement of the foreign judgment will
necessarily result in the award of a definite
sum of money.

But before we insist upon this conclusion

past beyond the point of reckoning, we must
examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners
raise the point that a declaration that an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment
may be capable of pecuniary estimation
might lead to an instance wherein a first level
court such as the Municipal Trial Court would
have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign
judgment. But under the statute defining the
jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such
courts are not vested with jurisdiction over
actions for the enforcement of foreign
judgments.
Sec.
33.
Jurisdiction
of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount
of the demand does not exceed One
hundred
thousand
pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila
where such personal property, estate,
or amount of the demand does not
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest
damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That
where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or
different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed

Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)

exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever
kind,
attorney's
fees,
litigation
expenses
and
costs:
Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.[45]
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances
wherein the cause of action or subject matter
pertains to an assertion of rights and
interests over property or a sum of money.
But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter
of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is
the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of
action arising from the adjudication of such
judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129
reveals that the instant complaint for
enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if
capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts, thus negating the fears of the
petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the
provision indicates that it can be relied upon
as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions
for enforcement of foreign judgments,
provided that no other court or office is
vested jurisdiction over such complaint:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the
obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation. But at the same time,
it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the
ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What
provision
then
governs
the
proper
computation of the filing fees over the instant
complaint? For this case and other similarly
situated instances, we find that it is covered
by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other
actions not involving property.
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees
by the petitioners on the premise that it was
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
corresponds to the same amount required for
other actions not involving property. The
petitioners thus paid the correct amount of
filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of
discretion for respondent judge to have
applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and
dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of
supreme relevance in this case, one which
should disabuse the notion that the doctrine

affirmed in this decision is grounded solely on

the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier
adverted
to
the
the
internationally
recognized policy of preclusion, [46] as well as
the principles of comity, utility and
convenience of nations[47] as the basis for the
evolution of the rule calling for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The US Supreme Court in Hilton
v. Guyot[48] relied heavily on the concept of
comity, as especially derived from the
landmark treatise of Justice Story in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of
1834.[49] Yet the notion of comity has since
been criticized as one of dim contours [50] or
suffering from a number of fallacies. [51] Other
conceptual bases for the recognition of
foreign judgments have evolved such as the
vested rights theory or the modern doctrine
of obligation.[52]
There have been attempts to codify
through treaties or multilateral agreements
the standards for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but these
have not borne fruition. The members of the
European Common Market accede to the
Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which
eliminates as to participating countries all of
such obstacles to recognition such as
reciprocity and rvision au fond.[53] The most
ambitious of these attempts is the
Convention
on
the
Recognition
and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966
by the Hague Conference of International
Law.[54] While it has not received the
ratifications needed to have it take effect, [55]
it is recognized as representing current
scholarly thought on the topic.[56] Neither the
Philippines nor the United States are
signatories to the Convention.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the
applicable theory behind the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments or a
universal treaty rendering it obligatory force,
there is consensus that the viability of such
recognition and enforcement is essential.
Steiner and Vagts note:
. . . The notion of unconnected
bodies of national law on private
international law, each following a
quite separate path, is not one
conducive to the growth of a
transnational community encouraging
travel and commerce among its
members. There is a contemporary
resurgence of writing stressing the
identity or similarity of the values
that systems of public and private
international law seek to further a
community interest in common, or at
least reasonable, rules on these
matters in national legal systems.
And such generic principles as
reciprocity play an important role in
both fields.[57]

Salonga, whose treatise on private

international law is of worldwide renown,
points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the
basis
for
recognizing
foreign
judgments, there can be little dispute
that the end is to protect the
reasonable
expectations
and
demands of the parties. Where the
parties have submitted a matter for
adjudication in the court of one state,
and proceedings there are not tainted
with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state
or elsewhere, to the enforcement of
the judgment issued by the court. [58]
There is also consensus as to the
requisites for recognition of a foreign
judgment and the defenses against the
enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed,
the exceptions enumerated in Section 48,
Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the
time they were adapted in this jurisdiction
from long standing American rules. The
requisites and exceptions as delineated
under Section 48 are but a restatement of
generally accepted principles of international
law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second,
Conflict of Laws, states that a valid judgment
rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial
in a contested proceeding will be recognized
in the United States, and on its face, the term
valid brings into play requirements such
notions as valid jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties.[59] Similarly, the notion
that fraud or collusion may preclude the
enforcement of a foreign judgment finds
affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and
commentators,[60] as well as the doctrine that
the foreign judgment must not constitute a
clear mistake of law or fact. [61] And finally, it
has been recognized that public policy as a
defense to the recognition of judgments
serves as an umbrella for a variety of
concerns in international practice which may
lead to a denial of recognition.[62]
The viability of the public policy defense
against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been recognized in this
jurisdiction.[63] This defense allows for the
application of local standards in reviewing the
foreign judgment, especially when such
judgment creates only a presumptive right,
as it does in cases wherein the judgment is
against a person.[64] The defense is also
recognized within the international sphere, as
many civil law nations adhere to a broad
public policy exception which may result in a
denial of recognition when the foreign court,
in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the
recognizing court, applied the wrong law to
the case.[65] The public policy defense can
safeguard against possible abuses to the
easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be
demonstrated that the original claim is
noxious to our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from

treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof.
However,
generally
accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they
do not derive from treaty obligations. [66] The
classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding
result from the combination two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it.[67]
While the definite conceptual parameters
of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively
established, the Court can assert with
certainty that such an undertaking is among
those generally accepted principles of
international law.[68] As earlier demonstrated,
there is a widespread practice among states
accepting in principle the need for such
recognition and enforcement, albeit subject
to limitations of varying degrees. The fact
that there is no binding universal treaty
governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only
a disagreement as to the imposable specific
rules governing the procedure for recognition
and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is
indubitable that the procedure for recognition
and enforcement is embodied in the rules of
law, whether statutory or jurisprudential,
adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the
Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which has existed in its current form since
the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine
legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the
viability of an action for enforcement of
foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for
such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. Again,
there may be distinctions as to the rules
adopted by each particular state, [69] but they
all prescind from the premise that there is a
rule of law obliging states to allow for,
however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare
principle, to our mind, has attained the status
of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it
acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39
derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.
Rules of procedure are promulgated by the

Supreme Court,[70] and could very well be

abrogated or revised by the high court itself.
Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all
State components, to obey the laws of the
land, including generally accepted principles
of international law which form part thereof,
such as those ensuring the qualified
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.[71]
Thus, relative to the enforcement of
foreign judgments in the Philippines, it
emerges that there is a general right
recognized within our body of laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, as well as a right to defend
against such enforcement on the grounds of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
The preclusion
of an action
for
enforcement of a foreign judgment in this
country merely due to an exhorbitant
assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in
international law. Indeed, there are grave
concerns in conditioning the amount of the
filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value
of the property subject of the foreign
decision. Such pecuniary award will almost
certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable
laws and standards of the forum. [72] The
vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative
low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date
may very well translate into an award
virtually unenforceable in this country,
despite its integral validity, if the docket fees
for the enforcement thereof were predicated
on the amount of the award sought to be
enforced. The theory adopted by respondent
judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead
to absurdities, such as if applied to an award
involving real property situated in places
such as the United States or Scandinavia
where real property values are inexorably
high. We cannot very well require that the
filing fee be computed based on the value of
the foreign property as determined by the
standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it
recognizes that the subject matter of an
action for enforcement of a foreign judgment
is the foreign judgment itself, and not the
right-duty correlatives that resulted in the
foreign
judgment.
In
this
particular
circumstance, given that the complaint is
lodged against an estate and is based on the
US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign
judgment may, for purposes of classification
under the governing procedural rule, be
deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3)
of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other
actions not involving property. Thus, only the
blanket filing fee of minimal amount is
required.

Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11,

Article III of the Constitution, which states
that [F]ree access to the courts and quasijudicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty. Since the provision is among the
guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it
certainly gives rise to a demandable right.
However, now is not the occasion to
elaborate on the parameters of this
constitutional right. Given our preceding
discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this
provision in order to grant the relief sought
by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved
by the courts if the controversy can be
settled on other grounds [73] or unless the
resolution thereof is indispensable for the
determination of the case.[74]
One more word. It bears noting that
Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the
Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but
presumptive evidence of a right of the
petitioners against the Marcos Estate.
Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded
to present evidence, if any, of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the
question of filing fees and no other, does not
render verdict on the enforceability of the
Final Judgment before the courts under the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that
matter
any
other
issue
which
may
legitimately be presented before the trial
court. Such issues are to be litigated before
the trial court, but within the confines of the
matters for proof as laid down in Section 48,
Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy
resolution of this claim by the trial court is
encouraged, and contumacious delay of the
decision on the merits will not be brooked by
this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil
Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]

[2]

Priscilla Mijares is a judge of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasay, Loretta Ann P.
Rosales an incumbent member of the
House of Representatives, and Joel
Lamangan a noted film director.
Namely Celsa Hilao, Josefina Hilao
Forcadilla, Arturo P. Revilla, Jr., Rodolfo
G. Benosa, Danila M. Fuente, Renato
Pineda, Domiciano Amparo, Chistopher
Sorio, Jose Duran, and Adora Faye De
Vera. Rollo, pp. 42-47.

[3]

Except for Celsa Hilao, who instead alleged

that her daughter, Liliosa Hilao, had
been tortured then executed by
military personnel during martial law.
Id. at 42-43.

[4]

Id. at 42.

[5]

Id. at 35.

[6]

The Opinion was authored by Circuit Judge

Betty B. Fletcher and concurred in by
Circuit Judge Harry Pragerson. Circuit
Judge Pamela Ann Rymer filed an
opinion concurring and dissenting in
part, her dissent centering on the
methodology used for computing
compensatory damages. Rollo, pp. 84132.

[7]

Under Section 58 of the US Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the judgment for
compensatory damages in a class suit
is awarded to a randomly selected.
Petitioner Joel Lamangan was among
the randomly selected claimants of the
Torture subclass awarded damages by
the US District Court. See Rollo, p. 71.

[8]

Now Section 48, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure.

[9]

Since increased to P600.00.

[10]

Now an Associate Justice of the Court of

Appeals.

[11]

Petitioners correctly note that they are

precluded from filing an appeal on
certiorari under Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which bars
an appeal taken from an order
dismissing an action without prejudice
and dictates the aggrieved party to file
an appropriate civil action under Rule
65 instead. See Rollo, p. 9

[12]

In a Resolution dated 4 December 2000.

Rollo, p. 282.

[13]

Id. at 205.

[14]

See Section 7(c), Rule 141.

[15]

See Section 7(d), id.

[16]

Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502

(2001).

[17]

Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi

Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 137378, 12
October 2000, 342 SCRA 722, 734;
citing Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore,
Manila, Philippines, 1995 Edition, p.
543.

[18]
[19]

[20]

159 U.S. 113 (1895)

47 Phil. 189 (1925). While the Philippine
Supreme Court in this case refused to
enforce the judgment of the Hongkong
Court on the ground of mistake of law
or fact, it was reversed on appeal to
the US Supreme Court.
Id. JJ. Malcolm and Avancea, dissenting.

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

See also Borthwick v. Hon. CastroBartolome, G.R. No. L-57338, 23 July

1987, 152 SCRA 129, 235; Philippine
International Shipping Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 77085, 26 April
1989, 172 SCRA 810, 819.
Ultimately, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the
service of summons or court process
upon the defendant, the authority of
counsel to appear and represent a
defendant
and
the
formal
requirements in a decision are
governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad v. Court of
Appeals, 414 Phil. 13, 29 (1991).
Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within
this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment,
must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on
facts not controverted or resolved in
the case where judgment is rendered,
or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to
defend the action to which he has a
meritorious case or defense. In fine,
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which
goes to the very existence of the cause
of action such as fraud in obtaining the
consent to a contract is deemed
already adjudged, and it, therefore,
cannot militate against the recognition
or
enforcement
of
the
foreign
judgment. Philippine Aluminum Wheels
v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., supra note
17.
See, e.g., Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela
Sugar Co., 144 Phil. 72, 77 (1970);
Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen and
Company, Inc., supra note 20.

[25]

Roeher v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, 20

June 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 503.

[26]

An action must be brought in the second

state upon the judgment recovered in
the
first.
J.
Salonga,
Private
International Law (3rd ed., 1967), at
500; citing Goodrich, 600, 601;
Chesire, 628; II Beale, 1377. But see E.
Scoles and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws
(2nd ed., 1982), at 969, which
recognizes that civil law countries
provide a procedure to give executory
force to the foreign judgment, as
distinguished from the Anglo-American
common law (but not statutory)
practice of requiring an action on the
judgment.

[27]

See Philsec Investment Corp. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June
1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.

[28]

Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 112573, 9 February
1995, 241 SCRA 192, 199.

[29]

See Section 3(a), Rule 1, Rules of Civil

Procedure.

[30]

Every ordinary civil action must be based

on a cause of action. Section 1, Rule 2,
Rules of Civil Procedure. A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.
Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of Civil
Procedure.

[31]

See Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.

v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76595. 6 May 1988,
161 SCRA 122, 133.

[32]

Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 916.

[33]

Ibid.

[34]

Salonga, supra note 27, at 514; citing

Cheshire, 803.

[35]

Rollo, p. 30. Emphasis omitted.

[36]

133 Phil. 526 (1968).

[37]

Id. at 528.

[38]

Rollo, at 326, citing Arroz v. Alojado, 19

SCRA 711 (1967).

[39]

Ibid citing Bunayog v. Tunas, 106 Phil. 715

(1959)

[40]

Id. citing Baito v. Sarmiento, 109 Phil. 148

(1960).

[41]

Id. citing De Rivera v. Halili, 9 SCRA 59

(1963).

[42]

Id. citing Bautista v. Lim, 88 SCRA 479

(1979) and De Leon v. Court of
Appeals, 287 SCRA 94 (1998).

[43]

Id. citing Amorganda v. Court of Appeals,

166 SCRA 203 (1988); Ortigas &
Company v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89
(1983).

[44]

Id. citing Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719

(1990) and Filipino Pipe Workers Union
v. Batario, Jr., 163 SCRA 789 (1988).

[45]

As amended by Rep. Act No. 7691.

[46]

Supra note 32.

[47]

Supra note 17.

[48]

Supra note 18.

[49]

H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal

Problems: Materials and Text (2nd ed.,
1976), at 775.

[50]

Ibid.

[51]

See Salonga, supra note 27, at 66.

[52]

Id. at 502-503.

[53]

Scoles & Hays, supra note 27, at 970.

[54]

Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51, at 808. A

decision rendered in one of the
Contracting States shall be entitled to

recognition
and
enforcement
in
another Contracting State under the
terms of this Convention (1) if the
decision was given by a court
considered to have jurisdiction within
the meaning of this Convention, and
(2) if it is no longer subject to ordinary
forms of review in the State of origin.
Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Chapter
II, Article 4.
[55]

To date, only Cyprus, the Netherlands,

Portugal and Kuwait have either
ratified or acceded to the Convention.

[56]

Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51.

[57]

Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51,at 776.

[58]

Salonga, supra note 51, at 502.

[59]

Steiner & Vagts, supra note 27, at 779. A

policy common to all legal systems is
to provide for the final resolution of
disputes. The policy is furthered by
each nations adoption of a view of
jurisdiction in the international sense
which recognizes the foreign courts
assertion of jurisdiction as satisfying its
own notions of due process in
circumstances in which it itself would
have asserted jurisdiction. Soles &
Hay, supra note 27, at 976; citing Hay,
International versus Interstate Conflicts
Law in the United States, 35 Rabels
Zeitschrift 429,450 n. 101 (1971) and
Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292
(D.D.C. 1964). Salonga, in affirming the
rule of want of jurisdiction, cites the
commentaries of Cheshire, Wolff,
Goodrich and Nussbaum.

[60]
[61]

internacional son base suficiente para

que nuestros tribunales decidan a
tenor de las mismas, entonces
nuestros juzgados estaran en la pobre
tessitura
de
tener
que
dictar
sentencias contrarias a nuestras leyes,
costumbres y orden pblico. Esto es
absurdo. Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil.
124, 133. (1950).
[64]

[65]

Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 979.

[66]

[It] is generally recognized that, subject to

[exceptions],
a rule
of general
customary international law is binding
on all States, whether or not they have
participated in the practice from which
it sprang. H. Thirlway, The Sources of
International Law, International Law
(ed. by M.Evans, 1st ed., 2003), at 124.

[67]

Not only must the acts concerned amount

to a settled practice, but they must
also be such, or be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief
that
this
practice
is
rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it. The need for such a
belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the
very notion of the opinion juris sive
necessitatis. North Sea Continental
Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3,
para. 77; cited in H. Thirlway, ibid.

[68]

The problems that arise in the

enforcement of foreign judgments are
generally to be solved by the principles
of international law. The Philippines by
its Constitution, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international
law. F. Gupit, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, XXIII J.
Integ. Bar. Phil. 3, at 69.

[69]

Divergent practices do not necessarily

preclude recognition of a customary
norm. In reviewing the question of the
existence
of
customary
rules
forbidding the use of force or
intervention, the International Court of
Justice pertinently held: It is not to be
expected that in the practice of States
the application of the rules in question
should have been perfect, in the sense
that States should have refrained, with
complete consistency, from the use of
force or from intervention in each
others internal affairs. The Court
does not consider that, for a rule
to be established as customary,
the corresponding practice must
be
in
absolutely
rigorous
conformity with the rule. In order to
deduce the existence of customary
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that
the conduct of States, should, in
general, be consistent with such rules,

See, e.g., Salonga, supra note 27 at 513.

Ibid; citing Henderson v. Henderson, 6
Q.B. (1844) 288; Vanquelin v. Bouard,
15 C.B. (N.S. 1863) 341; Godard v.
Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139 (1870); Vadala v.
Lawes 25 Q.B.D. (1890) 319, 316; cf.
Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609, 56
S.Ct., 80 L.Ed. 881 (1936); Cheshire,
661-664; Wolff, 268; Goodrich, 603.

[62]

Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 978.

[63]

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or

contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied. Bank of America
v. American Realty Corp., 378 Phil.
1279, 1296 (1999); citing Philippine
Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition, 1996,
Paras, page 46. Las sentencias de
tribunals
extranjeros
no
pueden
ponerse en vigor en Filipinas si son
contrarias a las leyes, costumbres y
orden pblico. Si dichas decisiones, por
la simple teora de reciprocidad,
cortesa
judicial
y
urbanidad

See Section 48, Rule 39, Rules of Civil

Procedure.

and that instances of State conduct

inconsistent with a given rule should
generally have been treated as
breaches of that rule, not as
indications of recognition of a new rule.
(emphasis supplied) Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186; citing
in H. Thirlway, supra note 66.
[70]

And other inferior courts, relative to their

jurisdictions.

[71]

Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Const., which states

The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.

[72]

Indeed, the valuation of foreign money

judgments remains a matter of debate
in international law. In the United
States,
Section
144
of
the
Restatement, Second, Conflicts of Laws
(1971) adopts the rule that the forum
would convert the currency into local
currency as of the date of the award.
However, this rule has been criticized.
In England, the judgment debtor may
now effect payment either in the
foreign currency in the amount due or
in local currency equivalent to the
foreign currency on the date of
payment. French and German law
similarly permit the expression of a
judgment in foreign currency. Soles&
Hays, supra note 27, at 973.

[73]
[74]

Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).

Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, 25
May 1994, 232 SCRA 553, 557.

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the

dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent
against petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the
following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services,
Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in
the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of
10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with
the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of
BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment
contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered
judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondents money claims.5 Upon appeal by
BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondents
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to
this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution
dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November
1998.

DECISION

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a

resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, 7
docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named
as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST,
the two corporations impleaded in the earlier
labor case. The complaint essentially
reiterated the allegations in the labor case
that BMSI verbally employed respondent to
negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid
the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project which he secured on behalf
of BMSI. The complaint also averred that
BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had
combined and functioned as one company.

Before this Court is a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of

In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that

contrary to respondents claim, it was a
foreign corporation duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and denied
entering
into
any
arrangement
with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162894
2008

February 26,

RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

TINGA, J.:

money. Petitioner also denied combining with

BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming
the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision
which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI
and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales
Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut. 10
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of failure to state a
cause of action and forum non conveniens
and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim. 11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on
Affirmative Defenses and for Summary
Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of forum non
conveniens and failure to state a cause of
action. Respondent opposed the same.
Pending the resolution of the omnibus
motion, the deposition of Walter Browning
was taken before the Philippine Consulate
General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the
RTC denied petitioners omnibus motion. The
trial court held that the factual allegations in
the complaint, assuming the same to be
admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to
render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled
that the principle of forum non conveniens
was inapplicable because the trial court could
enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16
of the order, which motion was opposed by
respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July
2001,18 the trial court denied petitioners
motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with
the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance
of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction
to set aside the twin orders of the trial court
dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001
and to enjoin the trial court from conducting
further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision21 denying the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in the assailed Resolution issued on 10 March
2004.22
The appellate court held that although the
trial court should not have confined itself to
the allegations in the complaint and should
have also considered evidence aliunde in
resolving petitioners omnibus motion, it
found the evidence presented by petitioner,
that is, the deposition of Walter Browning,
insufficient for purposes of determining
whether the complaint failed to state a cause

of action. The appellate court also stated that

it could not rule one way or the other on the
issue of whether the corporations, including
petitioner, named as defendants in the case
had indeed merged together based solely on
the evidence presented by respondent. Thus,
it held that the issue should be threshed out
during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court
deferred to the discretion of the trial court
when the latter decided not to desist from
assuming jurisdiction on the ground of the
inapplicability of the principle of forum non
conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL,
INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND
OF
FORUM
NON
CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a
comment despite repeated notices. The
Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record
for respondent, manifested that the lawyer
handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag,
had severed relations with the law firm even
before the filing of the instant petition and
that it could no longer find the whereabouts
of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite
diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20
November 2006, the Court resolved to
dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written
contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations
and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines
that renders our local courts inconvenient
forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the
Court outlined three consecutive phases
involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-oflaws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the
Court held that the local judicial machinery

was adequate to resolve controversies with a

foreign element, the following requisites had
to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently
resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have the
power to enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflictsof-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
parties and the res, it may or can proceed to
try the case even if the rules of conflict-oflaws or the convenience of the parties point
to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where
the case is filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law30 and by the
material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims
or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No.
1192-BG is an action for damages arising
from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the
amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing
of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as
party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a
stipulation that the same shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut does
not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties.33 The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when
the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not
the most "convenient" or available forum and
the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioners averments
of the foreign elements in the instant case
are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its

jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG

and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination;
hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special
circumstances
require
the
courts
35
desistance.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its
conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction
over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
elements. In the same manner, the Court
defers to the sound discretion of the lower
courts because their findings are binding on
this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a cause
of action against petitioner. Failure to state a
cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
allegation in the pleading.36 As a general rule,
the elementary test for failure to state a
cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the
relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had
combined with BMSI and RUST to function as
one company. Petitioner contends that the
deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this
allegation. On this score, the resolution of the
Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the
deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as
well as other documents produced in
the hearing shows that these evidence
aliunde are not quite sufficient for us
to mete a ruling that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are
not
substantial,
convincing
and
conclusive
proofs
that
Raytheon
Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC)
assumed the warranty obligations of
defendant Rust International in the
Makar Port Project in General Santos
City, after Rust International ceased to
exist after being absorbed by REC.
Other documents already submitted in
evidence are likewise meager to
preponderantly
conclude
that
Raytheon International, Inc., Rust
International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine
Service, Inc. have combined into one
company, so much so that Raytheon
International,
Inc.,
the
surviving
company (if at all) may be held liable
for the obligation of BMSI to

respondent
Rouzie
for
unpaid
commissions. Neither these documents
clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the question of whether petitioner,
BMSI and RUST merged together requires the
presentation of further evidence, which only
a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The Case

For review1is a dismissal2of a suit to

enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody
agreement for lack of jurisdiction.

SECOND DIVISION
The Facts

HERALD BLACK DACASIN,

No. 168785

G.R.

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner),

American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo

Petitioner,

Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married

in Manila in April 1994. They have one

Present:

daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September

1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19 th Judicial
Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

divorce decree against petitioner. 3 In its

BRION,
- versus CASTILLO,

ruling,

DEL

the

marriage
awarded

Illinois

of
to

court

dissolved

the

petitioner

and

respondent,

respondent

sole

custody

of

Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the

ABAD, and

case for enforcement purposes.

PEREZ, JJ.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and
respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement4)
SHARON
DEL
Promulgated:

MUNDO

DACASIN,

Respondent.
February 5, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Stephanie.
courts

for

The

the
parties

as exclusive

disputes

arising

joint

custody

chose

of

Philippine

forum to adjudicate

from

the

Agreement.

Respondent undertook to obtain from the

1

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005
issued by the Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60.
3
Petitioner did not contest the proceedings.
4
Denominated Compromise Agreement on Child Custody
and Support.
2

Illinois

court

an

order

relinquishing

jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch

Petitioner sought reconsideration,

raising the new argument that the divorce
decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus,
the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts
exercise of jurisdiction over the case.

60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.

Petitioner alleged that in violation of the
Agreement,

respondent

exercised

sole

custody over Stephanie.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the

complaint for, among others, lack of
jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts
retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce
decree.

In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the

trial court denied reconsideration, holding
that unlike in the case of respondent, the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner under
the laws of his nationality.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner

submits

the

following

alternative theories for the validity of the

Agreement to justify its enforcement by the

The Ruling of the Trial Court

trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the
trial court sustained respondents motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

implement
and
enforce
the
provisions of the said judgment
which
necessarily
included
guidelines for the childs custody.

The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded

from

taking

cognizance

over

the

suit

considering the Illinois courts retention of

jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce

[Petitioner] being admittedly an American,

following the nationality rule which Philippine civil
laws adhere to, the Judgment of the Illinois Court
would be binding upon him since the judicial
disposition refers to matters of status or legal
capacity of a person.

decree is binding on petitioner following the

nationality

rule

prevailing

in

this

xxxx

jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for

contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the
Civil

Code6prohibiting

compromise

agreements on jurisdiction.7
5

Under Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides: Laws

relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines,
even
though
living
abroad.
6
This provides: No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid: x x x (5) The
jurisdiction
of
courts[.]
7
The trial court held (Records, pp. 157-158):
[H]aving
expressly
recognized the validity of the Illinois
Courts judgment [petitioner] is
bound by its provisions including
the provision that the Court would
maintain
sole
jurisdiction
to

Moreover, this Court cannot act upon

[petitioners] prayer to enforce the terms of the
said Compromise Agreement the said agreement
being invalid and therefore, void, precisely
because it seeks to transfer jurisdiction over the
issue of child custody from the Illinois Court to this
Court by agreement of the parties, when the
previous Court had already effectively asserted its
authority to act upon all matters relating to the
said issue.

In this regard, Art. 2035 of the

Civil Code expressly states that no
compromise upon the questions of civil
status of persons, validity of marriage, or
legal
separation,
future
support,
jurisdiction of courts and future legitimate
shall be valid.

valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of

8

performance, such as petitioners suit to

child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; or

enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,

(2) the Agreement is independent of the

belongs to this species of actions. 10Thus,

divorce decree obtained by respondent.

jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right

court.

Indeed,

The Issue

the trial

courts refusal

to

entertain petitioners suit was grounded not

on its lack of power to do so but on its

The question is whether the trial court

thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree

jurisdiction

of

stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is

petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement

unfounded. What the Illinois court retained

on the joint custody of the parties child.

was jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of

has

to

take

cognizance

enforcing
provisions

all

and
of

sundry

[its]

Dissolution.11Petitioners

The Ruling of the Court

the

various

Judgment
suit

seeks

for
the

enforcement not of the various provisions of

the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
to

Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the

entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce

action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois

the

courts so-called retained jurisdiction.

The

trial

Agreement

court
which

has

jurisdiction

is void.

However,

factual and equity considerations militate

against the dismissal of petitioners suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the

Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action

question of Stephanies custody.

The

foregoing

notwithstanding,

the

trial court cannot enforce the Agreement

Regional Trial Courts Vested With

Jurisdiction

which is contrary to law.

to Enforce Contracts
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred
by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in
the

trial

Regional

court,
Trial

statutory
Courts

law

exclusive

vests

on

original

jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of

are free to stipulate the terms of agreement

subject to the minimum ban on stipulations
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order,

or

public

policy.12Otherwise,

the

contract is denied legal existence, deemed

pecuniary estimation.9An action for specific

8

As a corollary claim, petitioner submits that the

stipulation in the Agreement vesting exclusive
jurisdiction to Philippine courts over conflicts
arising from the Agreement, even if void for
being contrary to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the
Civil Code, is severable from and does not affect
the validity of the other terms of the Agreement
on joint custody.
Section 19, paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
provides: Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional

Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; x x x x
10
See Ortigas& Company, Limited Partnership v. Herrera,
205 Phil. 61 (1983).
11
Records, p. 17 (emphasis supplied).
12
Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides: The contracting
parties may establish such
stipulations,
clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

inexistent and void from the beginning. 13For

lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement,
these

and

other

ancillary

Philippine

substantive law serve as default parameters

to test the validity of the Agreements joint
child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the
Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven
years old (having been born on 21 September
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent
were no longer married under the laws of the
United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law15
(under the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code) is also undisputed: no child
under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x.16 (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody 17to the
mother is mandatory,18grounded on sound
policy consideration,19subject only to a
13

Article 1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides:

The following contracts are inexistent and
void
from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs,
public order or public policy; x x x x
14
It can be inferred from the terms of the Agreement that
the parties intended to be bound by
Philippine
law
on its intrinsic validity (this is evident, for instance, from
the stipulation selecting Philippine courts as exclusive
forum to settle any legal issue or dispute that may arise
from the
provisions of [the] Agreement and its
interpretation x x x (Records, p. 19; emphasis supplied).
At any rate, Philippine law has the most
substantial connection to the contract, considering its
object (custody of a Filipino-American child),
subject (Filipino-American child under seven years
of age, born of a Filipino mother, both of whom
reside in the country) and parties (Filipina mother
and alien father).
15
Including those marriages whose vinculum has been
severed (see SEMPIO-DY, HANDBOOK ON THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 67-68
[1988]).
16
The provision states: In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall
take
into
account
all
relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Emphasis
supplied)
17
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.), G.R. No.
174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320 (reversing
the
Court of Appeals ruling mandating joint custody and
awarding sole custody to the
mother).
18
Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014 (1996). For
children over seven, custody decisions are guided by
the standard of best interest of the child.
19
Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, G.R.
No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450,
471-472,

narrow exception not alleged to obtain

here.20) Clearly then, the Agreements object
to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab
initio for being contrary to law, it has also
been repudiated by the mother when she
refused to allow joint custody by the father.
The Agreement would be valid if the spouses
on the statutory genealogy and policy grounding of the
second paragraph of Article
213 is enlightening:
[A]rticle 213 takes its bearing
from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Art. 363. In all
questions on the care,
custody, education and
property of children, the
latters welfare shall be
paramount. No mother
shall be separated from
her child under seven
years of age, unless the
court finds compelling
reasons

for

such

measure.
The general rule that
children under seven years of
age shall not be separated from
their mother finds its raison detre
in the basic need of minor
children for their mothers loving
care. In explaining the rationale
for Article 363 of the Civil Code,
the Code Commission stressed
thus:
The general rule
is

recommended

in

order to avoid a tragedy

where

mother

has

seen her baby torn away

from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows
of a mother who is
deprived of her child of
tender

age.

The

exception allowed by the

rule

has

to

be

for

compelling reasons for

have not divorced or separated because the

regime under the second paragraph of Article

law provides for joint parental authority when

213.22

spouses

together. 21However,

live

upon

separation of the spouses, the mother takes

sole custody under the law if the child is
below seven years old and any agreement to
the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends
the joint custody regime for (1) children
under seven of (2) separated or divorced
spouses. Simply put, for a child within this
age

bracket

(and

for

commonsensical

reasons), the law decides for the separated

or divorced parents how best to take care of
the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated
parents cannot contract away the provision in
the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below seven years anymore than
they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict,

insane

or

afflicted

with

communicable disease will have sole custody

of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed

compelling

to

preclude

the

application of the exclusive maternal custody

It will not do to argue that the second

paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements
based on its text that No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. To limit this
provisions enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements
beyond its reach is to sanction a double
standard in custody regulation of children
under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents,
by the simple expedient of avoiding the
courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting
to the separated mother sole custody of her
children under seven years of age to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn

away

from

her.23This

ignores

the

legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the

deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age.24

the good of the child:

must

It could very well be that Article 213s

indeed be rare, if the

bias favoring one separated parent (mother)

mothers heart is not to

over the other (father) encourages paternal

be unduly hurt. If she

neglect,

presumes

parental

custody,

those

cases

has erred, as in cases of

adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the
(relative) divorce decree
will

ordinarily

be

sufficient punishment for

her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have
any effect upon the baby
who is as yet unable to
understand the situation.
(Report

of

the

Code

Commission, p. 12)
20

Sole maternal custody is denied only for compelling

reasons
such
as
neglect,
abandonment,
unemployment,
immorality,
habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).
21
Civil Code, Article 211, as amended.

incapacity
robs

the

for
parents

joint
of

custodial options, or hijacks decision-making

between the separated parents.25However,
these are objections which question the laws
22

See note 20.

See note 19.
24
Id.
25
This line of argument can be subsumed under
the rubric of unfair state intervention but this
complaint can very well be leveled against the
entire field of family law where the state injects
itself on a host of areas impinging on the
decision-making capacity and autonomy of
individuals ranging from the intensely personal
(e.g. who can marry [Article 5, Family Code],
where to marry [Article 5, Family Code], who can
celebrate the marriage [Article 5, Family Code],
and how to relate to ones spouse [Articles 6872]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125, Family
Code, on property relations of spouses and
Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to
familial (e.g. Articles 209-233, Family Code, on
parental authority).
23

wisdom

not

uniform

divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.

enforceability. The forum to air and remedy

Romillo27settled the matter by holding that an

these grievances is the legislature, not this

alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a

Court.

seeming

divorce decree obtained abroad. 28There, we

harshness or undesirability is tempered by

dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit

ancillary agreements the separated parents

for

may wish to enter such as granting the father

conjugal

visitation

These

submission that the foreign divorce (obtained

arrangements are not inconsistent with the

by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this

regime of sole maternal custody under the

jurisdiction in this wise:

At

second

any

and

its

validity

rate,

the

other

paragraph

of

or

rules

privileges.

Article

213

accounting

of

property

alleged
and

post-divorce
rejected

his

which

merely grants to the mother final authority

on the care and custody of the minor under

There
can
be
no
question as to the validity of
that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case
is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and
public policy.

seven years of age, in case of disagreements.

Further, the imposed custodial regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited
in duration, lasting only until the childs
seventh year. From the eighth year until the
childs emancipation, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the
usual contractual limitations, to agree on
custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly,
even supposing that petitioner and
respondent are not barred from entering into
the Agreement for the joint custody of
Stephanie, respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondents act effectively
brought the parties back to ambit of the
default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce

decrees alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the
divorce

decree

violated

Illinois

law,

but

because the divorce was obtained by his

Filipino spouse26- to support the Agreements
enforceability. The argument that foreigners

It is true that owing to the nationality

principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.

in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign

26

Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v.

Gonzales (58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95
Phil. 579 [1954]) and Tenchavez v. Escao (122
Phil. 752 [1965]). These cases, involving Filipino
spouses, merely applied the nationality rule (now
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code) to reject
validating foreign divorce decrees obtained by
Filipino spouses to circumvent the no-divorce
rule in this jurisdiction. They are no authority to
support petitioners submission that as to aliens,
foreign divorce decrees are void here.

xxxx

27
28

223 Phil. 357 (1985).

Id. at 361-363.Van Dornspawned the second
paragraph of Article 26 granting to Filipino
spouses of aliens who obtain foreign divorce
decrees the right to remarry. (Republic v.
Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005,
472 SCRA 114).

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. (Emphasis supplied)

efficient rendition of justice to allow the

parties to take advantage of the courts
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement

best

interest,

let

and

serving
the

trial

Stephanies
court

render

judgment. This disposition is consistent with

the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve
the childs best interest.31
WHEREFORE,

we

REVERSE

the

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v.

Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005

Ibay-Somera29to dismiss criminal complaints

of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,

for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who

Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for

obtained the foreign divorce decree) against

further

his former Filipino spouse because he no

ruling.

proceedings

consistent

with

this

longer qualified as offended spouse entitled

to

file

the

complaints

under

Philippine

SO ORDERED.

procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by

now that a foreign divorce decree carries as
much validity against the alien divorcee in

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of

Associate Justice

the aliens nationality, irrespective of who

obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of
Proceeding
Justify Remand

WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Instead of ordering the dismissal of

petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of
cause of action, we remand the case for the
trial

court

to

settle

the

question

of

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly

15 years old, thus removing the case outside

JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

of the ambit of the mandatory maternal

custody

regime

under

Article

213

and

ATTESTATION

bringing it within coverage of the default

standard on child custody proceedings the

I attest that the conclusions in the

30

best interest of the child. As the question of

custody is already before the trial court and
the

childs

parents,

by

executing

the

Agreement, initially showed inclination to

share custody, it is in the interest of swift and
29

G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November
2009.
30

31

Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involving

child custody, judicial resolutions extend beyond
the custodial right of persons exercising parental
authority over the child and reach issues on
custodial arrangements serving the childs best
interest (see Bagtas v. Santos, id., remanding a
habeas corpus petition to determine the fitness
of the legal custodians notwithstanding that the
question of illegal withholding of custody has
been mooted by the transfer of the childs
physical custody to the habeas corpus
petitioners).

above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairp
erson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the
Constitution,
and
the
Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice