G.R. No.

120548
October 26, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE
VILLACASTIN JR., HERNANI ALEGRE, and RODOLFO CAEDO, accused,
JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., accused-appellant.

passed by his house. [He] was still awake at that time because he was
watching over his cornfield and while doing so, he saw the two accused
remove the cyclone wire which was used as the corral for the two (2)
carabaos of Rosalina Plaza. He was able to see Jose Villacastin, Jr. cut
the cyclone wire because he was just four (4) arms length away from them
and after Jose Villacastin cut the wire, they swept it aside and untied the
two (2) carabaos. After untying the carabaos, they rode on it and
proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two (2) persons riding on the
carabao whom he identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr. together with Joselito
Escarda. He awakened Rosalina Plaza who thereafter went to Joel
Barrieses, owner of the carabaos, to inform the latter that his carabaos
were stolen.

QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, finding accused Joselito Escarda
and Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law. In its decision, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds
both accused JOSELITO ESCARDA and JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Viol. of P.D. 533" (Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law), and there being the presence of three generic
aggravating circumstances of [r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful
entry, with no mitigating circumstances to offset the same, as such,
the accused are each sentenced to suffer, considering the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (I) DAY as the minimum to RECLUSION PERPETUA
as the maximum, together with all the accessory penalties imposed by law
and to indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses, in the amount of
P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o'clock in
the morning, in the residence of Joel Barrieses, Dionesio Himaya called
her and informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when asked
who stole the carabaos, Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose
Villacastin, Jr. Before the incident of July 29, 1987, she already knew the
person of Jose Villacastin, Jr., because the latter always passed by their
house. After she was informed of the stealing of the carabaos, she
went to the corral to check whether the carabaos were there but
discovered that the beasts were no longer there and the cyclone wire
was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose Villacastin,
Jr., stole the carabaos and she went to the 334th PC Company and
reported the incident.3

The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their
preventive imprisonment as provided for under R.A. 6127.

In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed that
he was sleeping in the house of Gilda Labrador during the incident while
Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping in his house at that time.4 The
defense version of the incident was summarized by the trial court as follows:

Costs against both accused.

SO ORDERED.1

. . . Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in

this case, specifically, Jose Villacastin, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo
Cahedo. Neither did he know of somebody by the name of Dionesio
Himaya although he knew somebody by the name of Gilda Labrador. In
the early morning of July 29, 1987, he was working as cane cutter and
hauler in the hacienda of Javelosa located in Barrio Malubon, Sagay,
Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15) kilometers away from the house of
his mother where he was residing. On July 29, 1987, he started working at
8:00 o'clock in the morning and ended at 11:00. After he finished working
in the field, he went to the house of his mother where he ate lunch and
rested until 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. In the evening of July 29, 1987,
he slept at the house of Gilda Labrador starting at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening and woke up at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of July 30, 1987.
Sometime on August 29, 1987, he left alone for the dance hall located at
Hda. Ricky to attend a dance held there because there was a fiesta at that
time. While he was at the dance hall, he was arrested by the PC
elements and brought to the 334th PC Company where he was
maltreated. He was asked whether or not he stole the carabaos at Hda.
Ricky but he denied the commission of the crime and again, he was
maltreated. He suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he made
a confession before them but did not sign the same. His injuries were
not treated by a physician because the PC would not let him go out of the
jail, so, his injuries healed while he was in jail. He did not know the names
of the PC who maltreated him and forced him to admit the loss of the
carabaos at Hda. Ricky because the maltreatment happened in the
evening. Furthermore, he did not know the complainant in this case, i.e.
Joel Barrieses.

In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello Villanueva charged
accused with violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974, as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE
VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI ALEGRE (at-large) and RODOLFO
CAEDO (at-large) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No.
533, (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the first two (2) above-named accused, in company
of their two (2) other co-accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo
Caedo, who are both still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and
mutually help[ing] one another, with intent of gain, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2)
female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to JOEL BARIESES, without
the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in
the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

xxx

The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court are as
follows:

xxx

xxx

[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not
know the accused Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo
because in the early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or less 2:00 o'clock
to 3:00 o'clock, he had not gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre
and Rodolfo Caedo because he was sleeping in his house which is

[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o'clock in
the morning in [Hacienda] Ricky, Jose Villacastin, Jr. and his group
Page 1 of 25

located in Sitio Candiis. He started sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the

evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00
in the morning. On August 29, 1987 at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he
was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky and while watching the dance,
he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC Headquarters in Tan-ao,
Sagay, Negros Occidental. When they arrived at the PC Headquarters,
they were investigated about the stealing of the carabaos and the PC
elements wanted them to admit it. He denied what they were accusing
him of because he has not committed the crime. He does not know of
anybody by the name of Joel Barrieses. When he denied the
commission of the crime, he was maltreated and was forced to admit
it and to make a confession. They were detained for about a month at the
334th PC Headquarters and they were transferred to the Municipal Jail of
Sagay, Negros Occidental and there was no lawyer present during his
refusal to admit the stealing of the carabaos.5

In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the taking
away of the carabaos by the accused without the consent of the caretaker. Dionisio
Himaya testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire used as corral for the
carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two carabaos. Then, appellant rode on one
carabao while co-accused Escarda rode on the other and immediately proceeded to
the canefield.16 The taking was confirmed by Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the
carabaos, who declared that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she
went right away to the corral and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were
missing.
Appellant's assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no
serious consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya identified appellant and
Escarda as the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that time as he
was watching over his cornfield nearby, and there was enough illumination from the
moon.17 He was just four arm's length away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash
the two carabaos. He stated that appellant rode on one carabao while Escarda rode
on the other, and both immediately went away. He said he easily recognized appellant
as he knew him long before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was the
nephew of his wife and used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness positively
identified appellant as the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellant's
contention concerning lack of proper identification is, in our view, baseless and
unmeritorious.

The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, while it
disbelieved the defense of denial and alibi of accused Escarda and Villacastin. They
were found guilty as charged. However, the charge against accused Rodolfo Caedo
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Earlier, the charge against co-accused
Hernani Alegre was dismissed on motion by the prosecution, for lack of evidence.
Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of appeal. In their
assignment of error, they alleged that the trial court erred in convicting them of the
crime charged.6

Similarly, appellant's assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the
certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable .
It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the "taking"
or "killing" of large cattle or "taking" its meat or hide without the consent of the
owner. The "owner" includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of
any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in lawful
possession of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the
carabaos, did not consent to the taking away of the carabaos. She immediately
informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos were stolen and reported the
incident to the police. Note that the ownership was never put in issue during the trial in
the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally, questions
not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.18

On November 27, 1995, we required the trial court to order the commitment of
Escarda and Villacastin to the Bureau of Corrections or the nearest national penal
institution. However, Executive Judge Renato Munez requested that their commitment
to the Bureau of Corrections be deferred until the termination of the other criminal
case7 against them pending before the said trial court. Further, Captain Eduardo
Legaspi, Acting Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, also requested to hold in
abeyance the commitment of Escarda and Villacastin in view of their pending criminal
cases before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City.8 Accordingly, we granted the
aforesaid request for deferment.9 On August 12, 1998, they were eventually committed
to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.10

Appellant's alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his house at the
time the crime occurred. He slept at 8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and woke up the next
day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 A.M. As the trial court noted, it is difficult to believe
appellant's claim that he slept for eleven hours straight just like Escarda. Besides, the
rule is settled that alibi cannot prosper unless it is proven that during the
commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was
committed.19 In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was
physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time of the incident.
Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from appellant's
house.

On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to withdraw his
appeal.11 We required the Director of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm the
voluntariness of said withdrawal.12 In his certification dated July 15, 1999, Atty. Roberto
Sangalang, who personally examined Escarda, attested that Escarda executed his
urgent motion to withdraw appeal on his own free will and fully understood the
consequences of the same. On August 9, 1 999, we granted Escarda's motion to
withdraw appeal.13
Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining appellant,
Jose Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he assigns only one error:

We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
unlawful entry and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance. The prosecution,
however, failed to specify these circumstances in the charge filed before the trial court,
as now required expressly by the Code of Criminal Procedure effective December 1,
2000 but applicable retroactively for being procedural and pro reo.20

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the element of "taking away of carabaos by any means,
method or scheme without the consent of the owner" was not proven by the
prosecution. He also alleges that his identity was not established beyond
reasonable doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the prosecution failed
to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting the certificate of
ownership,14 as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.

Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision, the trial court merely
mentioned that appellant was convicted for cattle rustling under Criminal Case No.
627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the case at bar was being tried. It did not
state that said conviction was already final. Even the records did not show that
appellant admitted his previous conviction. As we had held before, there can be no
recidivism without final judgment.21 The best evidence of a prior conviction is a
certified copy of the original judgment of conviction, and such evidence is
always admissible and conclusive unless the accused himself denies his
identity with the person convicted at the former trial.22

Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the
consent of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other
domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.15
Page 2 of 25

P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under
Articles 30923 and 31024 under the Revised Penal Code. It merely modified the
penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 by
imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special circumstances.25 Under Section
826 of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling shall, irrespective of the value of
the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec.
5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and
none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of
DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages." 2

In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as the
perpetrators had to cut through the cyclone wire fence to gain entrance into the corral
and take away the two carabaos therefrom. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable on appellant is only prision mayor
in its maximum period as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum. Thus, it is proper to impose on appellant only the indefinite prison term of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years,
ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit
and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the
following wounds, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty of violating the AntiCattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten
(10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to
indemnify offended party Joel Barrieses the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.

'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from
its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

SO ORDERED.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting
[in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.

G.R. No. 135981

January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel
theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes selfdefense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on
her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a
form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and selfcontrol. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby
entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the
facts in this wise:

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of

having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their
child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.

"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc
City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a
time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl
Pierre.

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as
well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be
released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period
of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.

"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving
their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would
pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he
found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his
house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for
the masiaorunner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way
home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't

The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0,
Page 3 of 25

hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was
the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas'
rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch
long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran
inside the bedroom.

"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because
she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to
sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no
money to buy it.

"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him.
She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die
on the spot, though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)

"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus
going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in
tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting
area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no
conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to
her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree
of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had
three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to
find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did
not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed
steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying
a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked
bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body
of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs
with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and
sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada
Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both
sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop
other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with
Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived
happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights
would become violent.

"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at
the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina
Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There
was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one
corner at the side of anaparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben
was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop
valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.

"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when
Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally
when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that
in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted
for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a
week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid
again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.

"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at
Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem
examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was
'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a
depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'

"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as
the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3)
misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through
his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was
wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident
was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she
saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'

"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might
have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went
to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him
there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home
despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.

"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer allegedly only two
(2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he
went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the masiao game
because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting
for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00
in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside
their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas'
testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying
'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.'
Basobas thought they were joking.

"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a
fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing
their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light
and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her
from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she
ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon
his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the
bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be
killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was
Page 4 of 25

"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken
with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben would always
take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.

very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said
Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a
chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.'
She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she
said that when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.

"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that
they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He
had known the couple for only one (1) year.

'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November
9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These
injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.'

"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and
was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he
would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would
ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical
help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the
injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or
quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

xxx

xxx

xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by
Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reportedwas marked as Exhibit '3.'

"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to
the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.

"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient,
'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'

'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified
that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic
was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling
with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had
come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Busabos.8)

'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00
in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not
hear from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they
might have forgiven with each other.'

'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15,
1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa
house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding
with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while,
Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he
went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next
morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was
her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.

'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living
in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is
his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple
was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then
would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were
quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He
testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he
would go to our house and he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call
me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further
testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to
me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured
too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic
said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died
in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that
Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16,
1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself
a job as a field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone
that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and
that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that
in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help
to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other
places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to
sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.'
When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk
'because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the
house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the
first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every
time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she
was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were

'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that
she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she
was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was
'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw
that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation
was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified
to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel,
Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take
Page 5 of 25

charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the
autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the
medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and neighbor
around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position
with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.

"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done
at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological
assessment were done at her clinic.

xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years
with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the
National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and
a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of
the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the
secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a
member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families
involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission
doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy
Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa
case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the
first case of that nature.

"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the
skeletal area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her
examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as
to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged
her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5
and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date,
the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City,
rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime
of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus
sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases,
she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that
'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'

"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under
date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.

"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of

psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also
sexual abuse.'
xxx

"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the
entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'

"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she
submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben
Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low
opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic)
a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually
comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel
entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so
'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.'

"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then
the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of
the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.

"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the
violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in
her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.

"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for
the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered
woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith
report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and
relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the
house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,'
abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day
in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day
Page 6 of 25

out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death
on the victim.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone
is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness,
such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the
batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it
becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he
is so macho; he shows his strong faade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and
prone to act without thinking.'

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider
filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the
tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She
thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'

xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman
because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are
really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as
damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all
the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
xxx

xxx

xxx
xxx

"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed
away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic)
or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred
(sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his
mind.'

"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association.
He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private
practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he
gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for
twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the
rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of
Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons;
the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine
Association of Military Surgeons.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in
the household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest
rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx

"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine

Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978' which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had
a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the
first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of
the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

xxx

xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out
with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she
killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the
trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of
the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that
point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in
her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not
super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she
is involved.'

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind
and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged.
Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while
one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had
already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in
1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he
has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City
under Atty. Nenita Deproza.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the
public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the
records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9

"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes
confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability
of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one
episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.'

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.

"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
Page 7 of 25

Supervening Circumstances

degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing
that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect
the outcome of the case.14

On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists
to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts' testimonies.

In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible
error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged
errors of the trial court.

On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit
copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.

First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the
prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's
conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.

Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic
by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan 10 and Alfredo
Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before
finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. 12

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty"
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the
trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment.
That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15

The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's
consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.

Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant
had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract.
In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:

"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were
legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate,
however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to."

"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from
impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a
womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa
was a battered husband.

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. 17 The
defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.18Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. 19Other than merely
attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof
that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the
deceased was made through a palpable mistake.

"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of
her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her
to the ultimate penalty of death."13

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death
-- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the
Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death
is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in
self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing
of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a
drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for
which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of
self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character,
especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to
the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
Page 8 of 25

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions
are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies
the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to
present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.

oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out
of control" and leads to an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end
to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so
are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot
reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic
to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or
are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial
court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of
the case.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the
face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to
fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that
innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends.
During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand,
the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows
that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness
and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also
tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will
change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person
whom she loves.

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense
and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and
similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability
of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his wellbeing. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving
professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only
after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet,
it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete selfdefense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time."24

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's

psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each
other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it
is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable
of functioning without the other.31

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman."25

History of Abuse in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several
witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence
upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's
actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26

"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to
me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to
you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned
me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I
go to him and he said 'sorry'.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior
by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called

"cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out
of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that,
to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not
usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner
senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted
from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
Page 9 of 25

A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart" 33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr.
Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart
of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion
(R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr.
Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient.
What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So,
[pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And
she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the
month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient
pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I
think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does
not response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is
more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family
history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the
moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension
which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of
blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that
on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries
were inflicted upon her by Ben.35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to
sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home
drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy and I heard
something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and
locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to
find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they
found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling. 37 Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process
a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the
evening?
Page 10 of 25

A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office
hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I
immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he was
not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was
gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared
dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that
time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would
again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because
she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because
of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he
do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just
worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid
trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just
ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you
switch off the light when the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to
my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not
answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and
he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that
bolo?

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting
at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open
the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Page 11 of 25

A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38

that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of
all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost
she's not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical
battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced
from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x
[is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose
of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone
who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can
trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on
his Psychiatric Report,42which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic
Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially
cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness
to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic
Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the
former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was
suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional
abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager
income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The
husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will
trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the
husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband
was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry,
she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like
living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39

The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional
abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the
viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful
ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a
drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her
husband whenever he was drunk."

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly
or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:

Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and
well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her.
But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x."43

"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to
her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind
that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.

Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of
the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the
case?

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her
state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely
on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that
expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the appellant
be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a
man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring
hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife
syndrome.'"44

A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they
were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were
fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering
their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in
Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I
think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was
really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn
from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who
has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert
opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about
battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on
the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the
Page 12 of 25

killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the
violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act
decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying
then."47

stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In
other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past,
she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and selfsacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that]
they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to
them."48

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or
father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's
belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family
intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her
spouse to change.49

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse?
Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the
sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was
she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them
regard death as preferable to separation?

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
"probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to
her loss of consciousness.50

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense.
Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how
the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of
repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They
corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies
of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on
which they concluded that she had BWS.

Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in

posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x
[A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases
to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect."52

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance

must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as
manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of

Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as
"learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to
outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they
believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances." 54

BWS as Self-Defense

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the
violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and
that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety,
and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with
her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to selfdefense must face a real threaton one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:62

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish
the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the
BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense 60 -she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed
in the need to kill him in order to save her life.

"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. 63 It presupposes

actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or
safety of a person.64 In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of
Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the
death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the
cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
Page 13 of 25

the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still
have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing
is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend
her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" 65 Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. 66 Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will
manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness,
and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the
individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any
prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6)
months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious
battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you
get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress
disorder." 72

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant selfdefense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. 68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was
not completely justified under the circumstances.

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified
further:

Mitigating Circumstances Present

"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects
x x x his or her mental capacity?

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and
appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook
doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue,
including that which has not been raised by the parties.69

A Yes, your Honor.

Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant
resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance
and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or
impairment of memory."

"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that
she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were

analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance
should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as
the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having

acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. 77 To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.78

"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of
the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged
commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the
victim and another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If
nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx

xxx

xxx

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while
dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also
be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus. 79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which
was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat
to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she
felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she
and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet
drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity
of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very
severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual,
suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the
victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very
susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the
fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony 80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a

Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
Page 14 of 25

psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim

relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being
beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most
vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering."
Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances,
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented
her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as

passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

xxx

xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him
and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity
of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated
beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he
had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight
months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion
and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from
the defense that the offended party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as
treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no
place in the appreciation of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83

A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when
I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure
was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the
same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open,
depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and
when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby,
so I got that gun and I shot him.

"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?

COURT

COURT:

/to Atty. Tabucanon

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting
at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open

Q You shot him?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no
showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be
put up by the party attacked. 86 There is no showing, though, that the present appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any
risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears
that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when
she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
Page 15 of 25

she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor. 87

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our esteemed colleague Mr.
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban found that there was no factual basis to conclude that
Marivic was suffering from "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) at the time she took
the life of her husband. With due respect, I register my dissent.

Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 88 of
the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable,
considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing
the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have
attended the commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree
-- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period
of reclusion temporal.

The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is recognized in foreign

jurisprudence as a form of self-defense. It operates upon the premise that a woman
who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time develops a fearful
state of mind. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future
beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate
knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular
attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a
cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure
or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression
and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to
choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.1

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1)
day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum
period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.91

As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered Woman Syndrome" has

three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-building phase, where minor batterings in the form
of verbal or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to pacify the batterer
through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way; (2) the
acute battering incident phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and
sometimes, death. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with
him and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil
period, where the couple experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner.

Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither
easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present
case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took
great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper
resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here
and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much.
And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda,
have helped it in such learning process.

Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was able to establish the
occurrence on more than one occasion of the "tension-building phase" of the cycle.
The various testimonies of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she knew exactly
when she would once again be subjected to acute battery. Her cousin, Ecel Arano,
testified that she often asked the latter to sleep in her house as she was afraid every
time her husband came home drunk. Clearly, whenever appellant requested for
Arano's company, she was experiencing a tension-building phase. The barangay
captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant sought his help two months before
she killed her husband, again demonstrating that she was in the tension-building
phase and was attempting to prevent another incident of acute battery. Appellant
presented evidence to prove that the tension-building phase would occur whenever
her husband would go out looking for other women, would lose at cockfights or would
come home drunk. She often tried to ignore her husband's attitude or, as testified to by
some witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought off or even injured her
husband during the tension-building phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute
battery.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within
the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them.
Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do
so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases
of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not
all of these elements were duly established.

Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-building phase of the cycle
immediately prior to the death of her husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that she was
going to be killed by the deceased. She could not possibly have testified with clarity as
to prior tension-building phases in the cycle as she had never tried to kill her husband
before this time.
It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even witnesses for the prosecution
that appellant would seek shelter in her mother's or her father's house after an acute
battering incident, after which would begin the process of begging for forgiveness,
promises of change in behavior and return to the conjugal home, only for the same
cycle to begin all over again.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is

hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the deceased, as seems to be

required in the ponencia, would mean that no person would ever be able to prove selfdefense in a battered woman case. Appellant could not possibly prove whether the
deceased felt provoked into battering by any act or omission of appellant. She cannot
possibly prove that she felt herself to be the sole support of the deceased's emotional
stability and well-being. Nevertheless, appellant felt trapped and helpless in the
relationship as, in the end, she resorted to killing her husband as no one could or did
help her, whether out of fear or insensitivity, during the violent marriage she endured.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
Page 16 of 25

The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated by the severe beatings
suffered by Marivic in the hands of the deceased as well as the threats to kill her using
a bolo or a cutter.2 The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times a week in the 11
miserable years of their marriage,3 six incidents of which were documented by the
1990-1995 medical records of Marivic. They included, among others, hematoma,
contusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple contusions and trauma on the different
parts of her body even during her pregnancy in 1995. 4The tranquil period underwent
by Marivic was shown by the repeated "kiss and make-up" episodes of their
relationship. On more than 5 occasions, Marivic ran to her parents' house after violent
fights with the deceased only to forgive the latter every time he would fetch her and
promise to change.5

She also had the experience of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she .. .[felt] almost like living in purgatory or even in hell when it
was happening day in and day out.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q And what was it that triggered ... that tragedy in your opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having all those tensions, all those
anxieties, they were not enough, that the husband was even going to cockfighting x x x

All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance and forgiveness developed
a trauma in the mind of Marivic making her believe that a forthcoming attack from the
deceased would cause her death. This state of mind of Marivic was revealed in her
testimony given way back in 1998, before she was examined by experts on BWS.
Unaware of the significance of her declarations, she candidly narrated how she felt
immediately before she killed the deceased, thus -

A She was angry with him, he was angry with her and I think he dragged her and even
spun her around. She tried to fight him so there was a lot of fight and when she was
able to escape, she went to another room and she locked herself with the children.
And when the husband was for a while very angry he calms down then and then (sic).
But I remember before that the husband was looking for the gun and I think he was not
able to open the cabinet because she had the key. So during that time, I remember,
that she was very much afraid of him, so when the husband calmed down and he was
asleep, all she was concerned was to end up her misery, to save her child which she
was carrying and to save her two children. I believe that somehow she's not rational.9

ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open
the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx
xxx
xxx6

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What else happened?

PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more the facts and circumstances on
this case that the books you studied in the expertise in line and in the 77 hour contact
with appellant Mrs. Genosa, could you say that this is not ordinary self-defense but a
survival on her part?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but this [is] a need to survive, a need to
survive with her two sons and [the] child she's bringing.
Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she still be in the very short moment
with the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be the one who would be killed.10

A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like what happened before I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure has
raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.

There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the "Battered Woman
Syndrome" and that it was an apprehension of death and the instinct to defend her and
her unborn child's life that drove her to kill her husband.

xxx

The ponente further refused to sustain the self-defense proffered by Marivic because
there was allegedly no aggression or danger posed on her life by the victim at the time
she attacked the latter. Again, I beg to disagree.

xxx

xxx

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby,
so I got the gun and shot him.7

Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be appreciated, the unlawful aggression or

the attack must be imminent and actually in existence. This interpretation must,
however, be re-evaluated vis-a-vis the recognized inherent characteristic of the psyche
of a person afflicted with the "Battered Woman Syndrome." As previously discussed,
women afflicted by this syndrome live in constant fear for their life and thus respond in
self-defense. Once BWS and an impending danger based on the conduct of the
deceased in previous battering episodes are established, actual occurrence of an
assault is no longer a condition sine qua non before self defense may be
upheld. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger. As stated in theponencia, to require the battered person to await an obvious
deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to
murder by installment.

It must be stressed that the defense of "Battered Woman Syndrome" was not raised by
Marivic before the lower court but only here on automatic review. This makes the
foregoing testimony more worthy of great weight and credence considering that the
same could not have been cunningly given to suit or conform to the profile of a
battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death because of her medical
history. Dr. Dino Caing testified that he treated Marivic for hypertension due to
domestically related emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The latest one was
on November 6, 1995 when she suffered from severe hypertension and had a blood
pressure of 180/120 on the 8th month of her pregnancy.8

In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the deceased, which
culminated in the physical assaults and an attempt to shoot Marivic when she was 8
months pregnant, took the place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her to a
complete self defense even if there was no actual employment of violence by the
deceased at the time of the killing. Marivic had every reason to believe that the
deceased would kill her that night not only because the latter was verbally threatening
to kill her while attempting to get a gun from the drawer, but more importantly because
the deceased wounded her on the wrist with a bolo, and because of the deceased's
previous conduct of threatening to cut her throat with a cutter which he kept in his
wallet. Quoted hereunder are the relevant testimonies of Marivic -

Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist and an expert on BWS

who examined Marivic, assessed the effects of the repeated violence on the latter as
follows:
A What I remember ... was it was more than ten years that she was suffering from
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instance of abuses, ... emotional abuse...verbal
abuse and... physical abuse. The husband had very meager income, she was the one
who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot
of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing, being involved in
cockfighting and in going home very angry which... triggered a lot of physical abuse.
Page 17 of 25

A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual behavior.

xxx

xxx

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the drawer?

xxx

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

xxx

xxx

xxx

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me
and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open
the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

A He was nagging ... me at that time and I just ignore[d] him because I want to avoid
trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just
ignore[d] hi[s] provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, "why did you
switch off the light when the children were there." At that time I was also attending to
my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not
answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and g[o]t a bolo and cut the
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.

xxx
xxx
xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.15
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the first incident and then he left and
then two (2) hours after he came back?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the whirling happened in the first incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and on that blade
happened on the second incident (sic)?
A Ye, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT
To the witness
Q Why, what is that blade about?
A A cutter about 3 inches long.
Q Who used that?
A Ben.
Q He used that on you?
A He scared me on that (sic).
xxx
xxx
xxx

xxx
xxx
xxx
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared
and he was already holding a bolo.
Q How do you describe this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that
bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempted] to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell [on] the
bedside.11
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT
To the witness
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at that time, [was] it a bolo or a knife?
A Bolo.
Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on your body when he was holding and
trying to frighten you [with] that bolo?
A No, only here.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness pointed to her wrist).
COURT
To the witness
Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did your husband really whirl you?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q How did he whirl you?
A Whirled around.
Q Just like spinning.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom or outside?
A In our bedroom.
Q Then after the whirling what happened?
A He kicked my ass and then I screamed.12
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do...?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.13
A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, so I packed all his things then on
the following day I will leave, I was afraid and I want to make sure I would deliver my
baby safely.14
xxx
xxx
xxx
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again outside of the bedroom holding my neck.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag... you?
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backwards.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept shouting at
me that "you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.

Q But he did not hit you with that?

A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scared (sic).16
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct evidence. One of this is state
of mind. In the case at bar, there is more than sufficient physical evidence presented
by the appellant from which her mental state can be inferred. The prosecution did not
object to the presentation of these physical and testimonial pieces of evidence,
namely, the medical records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related injuries and
the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the barangay captain. Indeed, no
person would endure 23 reported instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her
spouse in the first place. The majority need not worry that women around the country
will mastermind the killings of their husbands and then use this Decision to bolster
their attempts to employ the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be allowed the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a finding
that the acts of violence and battery committed by the deceased were illegal and
unlawful and were committed immediately before appellant could recover her natural
equanimity. But what is the natural equanimity of a battered woman? Appellant was not
a normal married woman. She can never be in a state of natural equanimity as she
was in a constant state of alertness and hypersensitivity to the next phase of acute
battery. The esteemed ponente also correctly found that the appellant acted with
Page 18 of 25

diminished will-power. However, he failed to go further. In the case of People v.

Javier,17 it was held:

officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right
to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format,
the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or other
identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter's
consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him
to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside
from the testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due
to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at
the time of the killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accusedappellant, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing
evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished
his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.18

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.All hearings of cases of violence
against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the
dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy.

In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and convincing
evidence that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from
the "Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was presented and admitted to
this effect, such that the ponente ably discussed the causes and effects of the
syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence thus presented is to make
impossible the proof of mental state. Evidence as to the mental state need not be also
"beyond reasonable doubt."

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever publishes or
causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school,
business address, employer or other identifying information of the parties or an
immediate family or household member, without their consent or without authority of
the court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall suffer the penalty of one year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos.

Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in previous

violent episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to
Marivic's affliction with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The danger posed or
created in her mind by the latter's threats using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear,
where under the circumstances, the natural response of the battered woman would be
to defend herself even at the cost of taking the life of the batterer.

It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from
posting in its Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child
sexual abuse in response to a letter from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed
to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the
Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality
and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and
pleaded that her daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded
from the Web Page.2

The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of

self-defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women
who are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This would however be an
empty victory if we deliberately close our eyes to the antecedents of this case. The
facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was
defending herself when she killed her husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide
is therefore in order.

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI),
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to post
the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.

G.R. No. 167693
September 19, 2006
(Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELCHOR
CABALQUINTO, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due
requital for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to
effectuate the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as
the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our
own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.1

The position of the OSG in its Comment3 is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the
posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme
Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to
determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being invoked
falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the
person's expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy
depends on a twopart test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through
a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation
of privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed
to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case
to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such
an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules
which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information
pertaining to child abuse cases.

The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the

dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610
provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. at the instance of the offended party, his name may be
withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio
broadcasting, producer and director in the case of the movie industry, to cause undue
and sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which results in the
moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.

The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all
court documents which state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain
sexual assault, endangering the welfare and abuse and neglect cases should remain
confidential. The name of the victim shall not appear in any public record; rather,
initials or a fictitious name shall appear. The offenses covered by the law include
aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact,
criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of children, and any action alleging
an abused or neglected child. Thus, in Application of V Pub. Corp., 120 N.J. 508
(1990),and Div. of Youth & Fam. Serv. V. J.B., 120 N.J. 112 (1990), the New Jersey
Supreme Court provided guidelines in the implementation of this statute.

Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:

Sec. 44. Confidentiality.All records pertaining to cases of violence against women
and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public
Page 19 of 25

In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could
include the use of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the
full text of decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the
Court instead replace the material information, such as the name of the child-victim, in
its decisions.

Cabalquinto pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued which
resulted in his conviction and the imposition of the penalty of death. The records of the
case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review.
On December 10, 2002, the Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to submit
their respective briefs. The parties complied. Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren
Mateo,15 however, the Court issued a Resolution on September 14, 2004, transferring
the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child
abuse cases should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court
proceedings, but even after the promulgation of the decision in order to protect the
right to privacy of the child and her family and to preclude instances where undue
disclosure of information may impair the treatment and rehabilitation of the childvictim.4

The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and added an award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.16 The case
is again before us for our final disposition.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA herself, her mother ABC, and Dr. Stella
Guerrero-Manalo (Dr. Manalo) of the Child Protection Unit (CPU) of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).

The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP
informs the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the
names of children who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law. 5 The NPC,
on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media practice is to inquire whether
these individuals wish to have their names appear in the report. If they do not, media
would normally take off the names and merely provide a very general description of
the individual in recognition of the need to carefully balance the right to information
with the welfare of the parties involved.6

ABC testified that she is the common-law wife of Cabalquinto and that they have four
children, namely: BBB, CCC, the child-victim AAA, and DDD. At around 8:45 p.m. of
November 13, 1998, she was on her way home to xxx, and saw her sons BBB and
CCC outside the house, and her youngest daughter DDD playing with a cousin. As she
was approaching the house, she noticed that the door was closed although the lights
were on. Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall, she peeped
through the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping motions on
their daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her panties pulled down.
When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs ("ibuka mo"), she kicked and
pounded the door. Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood up and opened
the door. ABC entered the room and confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her
accusation. She then asked AAA what her father did to her. AAA did not say anything
but looked pale. 17

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in
cases involving violence against women and their children, in this case and
henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor 7 and shall use
fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the
victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities, as well those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be
disclosed.8

After regaining her composure, she went to her sister-in-law EEE, who lived on the
second floor of the house, and confided to the latter. At around 10:00 o'clock that night,
she went to her sister's house in xxx to seek advice. Her sister told her to report the
matter to the barangay officials. The barangay officials, in turn, told her to go to the
police which she did the following day, November 14, 1998.18

On February 18, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted
Melchor Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old
daughter, AAA. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty in both Criminal Case No. Q-98-79683 and
Criminal Case No. Q-98-79684, for Rape, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing
accused MELCHOR CABALQUINTO Y MINGO to suffer the penalty of DEATH on both
counts, pursuant to the penalty imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines as amended by RA 7659.

AAA's Salaysay was taken by the police and they were referred to the CPU of PGH.
Because there was no doctor on duty, she and AAA returned to the CPU on November
16, 1998. AAA was examined by a doctor and a medical certificate was issued. They
returned to the police station where she executed her Salaysay. They then proceeded
to the fiscal's office to lodge a complaint.19

Accused is further ordered to indemnify his daughter-victim the sum of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for damages, in each count.

ABC further testified that during the police investigation on November 14, 1998, AAA
revealed to the police that a similar incident happened to her on November 8, 1998,
the day of her friend's birthday celebration.20

SO ORDERED.9
This case was initiated by a sworn statement filed by AAA, assisted by her mother,
ABC,10 which resulted in the filing of two (2) Informations for rape, the first alleging:

AAA testified that at around 8:45 p.m. on November 13, 1998, she was inside their
house in xxx, with her father, Cabalquinto, when the latter instructed her to close the
door and windows and turn off the light. She obeyed but did not turn off the light. Her
father then told her to lie down and immediately placed himself on top of her. He then
undressed her, brought out his penis, asked her to masturbate him and to suck his
penis, inserted his penis in her private parts and licked her private parts. He told her
not to tell her ninang DDD or her mother; otherwise, he would kill them all. She felt
pain in her stomach and pelvis after the incident.21

That on or about the 8th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years old, a minor, put himself on top of
her, inside the room of their residence located at xxx, 11 this City, and thereafter have
carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12

Corroborating her mother's testimony, AAA stated that while they were at the police
station, she disclosed that she was also raped by her father on November 8, 1998.
She remembered the incident because it was the day her friend, FFF, celebrated her
birthday. According to AAA, her father had been drinking that night. When she went
home to drink water, she was called by her father, told to close the door and windows
and to turn off the lights. She obeyed but did not turn off the lights. Her father then
placed himself on top of her and told her to masturbate him.22

and the second stating:

That on or about the 13th day of November 1998, in xxx City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undress [AAA], his own daughter, 8 years of age, a minor, put himself on
top of her, inside the room of their residence located at xxx, 13 this City, and thereafter
have carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent.

AAA further testified that she was not enrolled in school because her mother had been
abroad.23

CONTRARY TO LAW.14

Page 20 of 25

It should be mentioned that in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 14, 1998,
AAA stated that her father had raped her seven (7) times since her mother left for
abroad. She said that she distinctly remembered having been raped by her father on
November 8, 1998, her friend's birthday; August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on
November 13, 1998, the day before her statement was taken. However, she said no
longer remembered the exact dates of the other incidents.24

examination, a conclusion that the hair is accused's is plausible. The idea that that hair
was purposely placed inside [AAA]'s vagina would be absurdity. Thus, when [AAA]
pointed to her father as the person who molested her, this Court can only believe
because no daughter in [AAA]'s age would accuse her own father of any wrongdoing,
if it is not for the fact that he had wronged her, and that hair (pubic or not) is
accused's.30

Dr. Manalo, who conducted the physical examination of AAA, testified that AAA had no
injury on her genitalia; that her hymen is quite large and distensible possibly because
of penile penetration; and that she recovered a strand of pubic hair inside AAA's
vaginal vault which could only have reached the area as a consequence of penile
penetration because AAA did not have pubic hair yet.25

ABC's testimony of what she witnessed regarding the act of rape corroborates AAA's
account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains
merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape
was actually committed. Whether AAA cried out or not does not discount rape.
It should be emphasized that AAA was but eight (8) years old when the rapes
happened. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the
details of her torment with exactitude. In People v. Villar,31 the accused questioned the
inconsistency between the victim's declaration in her sworn statement and her direct
testimony in court as to the exact time when she was first raped by the accused in
1993.32 The Court held that it cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim's
recollection of her harrowing experience more so because the victim was an innocent
and tender nine (9)-year old lass when she was first raped. 33 Citing People v.
Sagucio,34 we also held that errorless testimony cannot be expected especially when a
witness is recounting the details of a harrowing experience.

On cross-examination, Dr. Manalo stated that she did not find any traces of bleeding in
AAA's vagina but that injury is uncommon in incestuous rape.26
The trial court admitted the following documentary evidence formally offered by the
prosecution: (1) Referral Letter to the Office of the Prosecutor; (2) Sinumpaang
Salaysay of ABC; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA; (4) medical certificate; (5) birth
certificate of AAA; and (6) Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Stella Manalo. 27
Testifying as lone witness for his defense, Cabalquinto denied that he raped AAA on
November 8 and 13, 1998. He claimed that on November 13, 1998, he just slept in
the sala of their house with AAA and DDD, while his sons, BBB and CCC, slept in
another room. On November 8, 1998, he claimed that after cooking the food for FFF's
birthday party, he went home and slept. He averred that the cases filed against him
were the offshoot of frequent quarrels between his common-law wife, ABC, and his
brother, GGG.28

On the other hand, ABC must have also been so devastated by what she witnessed
her husband doing to their daughter that she might have perceived things differently
from AAA.
Persons who witness an event may perceive it from different points of reference,
hence they may have different accounts of how the incident took place. What is
important is that their testimonies reinforce each other on the essential facts and that
their versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a
consistent and coherent whole.35 The fact therefore that the statements of AAA and
ABC differ on some minor details does not in any way affect their credibility or detract
from the integrity and truthfulness of their declarations. The variations in their
testimonies present a believable narration of what actually happened, made more so
precisely because of their imperfections.36

We have meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the

transcripts of stenographic notes and find no cause to overturn the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We affirm Cabalquinto's
conviction.
Cabalquinto's claim that there are material inconsistencies between the testimonies of
AAA and ABC with regard to whether AAA cried out as she was being raped because
while AAA testified that she shouted twice, ABC stated that she did not see AAA
struggle nor hear her call out, is unconvincing.

Cabalquinto offers a flimsy excuse in answer to the serious accusation against him. He
claims that ABC's frequent spats with his brother motivated her to file the rape cases
against him.

AAA was firm and unwavering in her narration of her traumatic experience. During
cross examination, she remained steadfast in her assertion that her father inserted his
penis inside her genitals and raped her, even demonstrating what she understood of
the word rape by forming a circle with her fingers and moving her middle finger inside
and out indicating sexual intercourse.29

It is improbable that a victim of tender years, especially one unexposed to the ways of
the world as AAA must have been, would impute a crime as serious as rape to her own
father if it were not true. There is no doubt in our minds that AAA was impelled solely
by a desire to let justice find its way.37

Thus, the trial court gave full credence to AAA's testimony and ruled:
As regards ABC, we are convinced that she did not expose AAA to the ignominy that
rape victims must face only to get back at Cabalquinto's brother. Had that been her
motive, she would have accused Cabalquinto's brother and not Cabalquinto himself.
No mother would possibly wish to stamp her child falsely with the stigma that follows a
rape only for the purpose of punishing someone against whom she has no grudge
whatsoever.38 ABC's zeal in prosecuting this case demonstrates to us her yearning
that the law may do her daughter justice even as her own father had so depravedly
wronged her.

From the testimony of the principal witness, [AAA] alone, viz, the testimony of the
accused, there is no reason to doubt that accused has [sic] molested his daughter, and
had carnal knowledge of her, on two occasions, nighttime on November 8 and 13,
1998, when [AAA] was then only 8 years old, inside their dwelling.
The testimony of [AAA] was even more bolstered by the consistency of her declaration
under cross by the defense counsel, Atty. Torralba of the Public Attorney's Office,
whose attempt to discredit [AAA]'s accusation by making it appear that she would not
have known how to testify that she was raped by her own father, had she not been
coached by someone else to say so, miserably failed. In the following portions of
[AAA]'s cross-examination by the Defense, instead of destroying [AAA]'s credibility the
more that it was established that accused indeed raped her (sic) daughter.

Further, the contemporaneous and subsequent conduct of mother and child are
revealing of the veracity of the rape charge. It should be emphasized that upon
witnessing the outrage done to her daughter, ABC immediately confronted
Cabalquinto. Shortly afterwards, she confided to her sister-in-law and traveled all the
way to xxx to seek her own sister's advice. The following day, mother and child went to
the police to report the incident and to execute their sworn statements. ABC also took
her daughter to the CPU of PGH for the latter's medical examination.

xxxx
[AAA]'s declaration that she was raped corroborates the testimony of the doctor who
testified that a strand of hair was found inside [AAA]'s vaginal vault. The doctor's
testimony that the presence of a strand of hair inside the vaginal vault would not be
possible without sexual intercourse, bolsters the accusation of [AAA] that she had
been raped. Of course, there is no test to determine whose hair was it, but considering
[AAA]'s testimony that accused had carnal knowledge of her twice prior to

These significant circumstances cannot be ignored. We are compelled to believe,

especially in the face of Cabalquinto's plain denial, that AAA was indeed sexually
abused and raped by her own father.

Page 21 of 25

Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim,
in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death
Penalty Law.39 In this case, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and
her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter were properly alleged in the
Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of
Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.

Pajunar went to Barangay Captain Leopoldo Enumerabellon who gave him a note for
the PC. Two PC soldiers accompanied him and went with him to the house of Barrio
Councilman Leonardo Pajaron, and together they went to Ordonio's place. He also
took with him his milking cow and upon arrival at Ordonio's place, the calf ran and
approached its mother. The PC soldiers told the wife that since Ordonio was not
around, the calf had to be entrusted to the barrio official and the wife consented. The
following day, the 7th of January, 1982, they met with sub-barangay captain
Enumerabellon. When asked why he, Ordonio was claiming the cow, his answer was
that it was his brother's cow entrusted to him But Ordonio's wife told her husband thus,
"Ne, let's just give the cow to the real owner and we will pay the damages. 2

As regards the civil liability of Cabalquinto, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count and additionally award AAA P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count consistent with current
jurisprudence.40 Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are
automatically granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are
imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their
daughters.41

In his defense, the accused, Constancio Ordonio, presented a different version.

. . . Ordonio declared that on January 6, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock A.M., Santiago
Oyhoc reported to him that he saw a cow in his mongo and corn farm. Ordonio just
wanted to drive the cow out of his farm but Oyhoc suggested it be caught so that it
would not return So, with a rope he caught the cow and tied it near his house. He
claimed that he recognized the cow to be Pajunar's and even left instructions to his
wife to return it to Pajunar should he come for it. In the meantime, he went to Calanian
about 9 kilometers from his house to sell corn. When he returned in the evening, he
learned from his wife that they were accused of stealing the cow and that the two PC
soldiers who came together with Pajunar and Pajaron took the cow to place it in the
custody of Enumerabellon. That very evening too, he got a letter from Enumerabellon
instructing him to go to his place. So that on the 7th, he and as wife went to see
Enumerabellon. At Enumerabellon's house were also the complainant, Anastacio
Pajunar, barrio councilman Pajaron and Pajunar's son. An investigation was conducted
with Ordonio and his wife saying that Pajunar owned the cow, so it was given back to
Pajunar
who
brought
it
home. 3

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-98-79683 and Q-98-79684, as well as the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00260, are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Appellant MELCHOR CABALQUINTO is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases
subject of this review, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and to pay the victim, AAA (to be identified through the Informations filed with
the trial court in this case), the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91721 July 31, 1991
CONSTANCIO ORDONIO, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Leo B. Diocos for petitioner.

In a decision dated January 26, 1988, the trial court * rendered this judgment of
conviction:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the opinion of this Court and so holds that the
prosecution has proved beyond the shadow and doubt the guilt of accused and finds
said accused guilty of the clime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused
Constancio Ordonio should be punished with a penalty next lower by one (1) degree
than that provided for the crime committed and therefore accused Constancio Ordonio
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum to six (6) years as maximum of prision
correccional.

SARMIENTO, J.:p
In an information dated July 12, 1982 before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, Constancio Ordonio was indicted of the crime of cattle rustling committed as
follows:
That sometimes in the evening of Tuesday, January 5, 1982, at Bgy. Omanod, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with the intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously took, steal, and carry away one (1) male cow, color red and
white (cabang) highbreed, more or less eleven months old, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner Mr. Anastacio Pajunar.

SO ORDERED. 4
Upon motion of the accused on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and against
the vigorous objection of the prosecution, the trial court conducted a new trial. This
time, the defense presented Pastor Banquerigo, an 81-year-old barrio entertainer, who
substantially corroborated the account of Constancio Ordonio. Pastor swore that on
January 6, 1982, he saw Constancio take possession of a cow and tie it near his
house where it could be easily seen by passers-by.

That as a result thereof, the victim Anastacio Pajunar was damaged and prejudiced in
the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00), Philippine Currency, as the
estimated cost and value of the stolen cow.
With damages.
Contrary to law. 1

Unconvinced, the trial court in the Order dated August 11, 1985 5 maintained its
judgment of conviction, reasoning that upon consideration of the testimony of Pastor
Banquerigo, it found no urgent reason to disturb its decision dated January 26, 1988.
The accused took exception to the judgment of the trial court and interposed an appeal
to the Court of Appeals, imputing the following errors: 6

As found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the attendant
circumstances which precipitated this petition for review on certiorari are clear.
A study of this case showed that on January 6, 1982, Anastacio Pajunar discovered
the loss of his eleven month old cow (which he pastured 100 meters from as house on
January 5, 1982). He searched for it and asked his not too distant neighbor,
Constancio Ordonio, whether he had seen it. Ordonio allegedly denied having seen it,
and when Pajunar heard the mooing of a cow, Ordonio was quick to say that was the
cow he was tending. However, Pajunar followed the direction of the sound and
discovered that it was his own cow. Ordonio insisted that it was his brother's cow
which was entrusted to him. So Pajunar tied it near Ordonio's house and left to report
the matter to the authorities.

a) The lower court erred in presuming that the elements of the crime are obtaining in
the case at bar;
b) The Court a quo erred to bank merely on the weakness of the evidence of the
accused, while it failed, of its own evidence, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt;

Page 22 of 25

c) The lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
would affect the outcome of the case, and the decision is based on misapprehension
of facts.

5. At the Barangay Captain's residence accused still insisted that the calf belonged to
his brother, Agustin. 14
The accused-petitioner had the temerity to act thus even if the calf did not belong to
him, but to the complainant as he admitted before the trial court. But independent of
the admission by the accused, complainant ownership of the calf is further forfeited
with this one important circumstance. When complainant went to accused's house,
accompanied by barangay councilman, Pajunar, and two PC soldiers, the milking cow
was brought along. Upon arrival, the PC soldiers let loose the calf and the latter
immediately ran to the milking cow to suck on its milk. Such conduct of the calf
manifests all the signs of the young whether human or not, on finding a lost mother. 15

Unimpressed, the Court of Appeals ** affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court, 7 and subsequently denied the accused's motion for reconsideration through a
Resolution dated November 13, 1989.
The accused now comes before this Court, reiterating all the three errors he assigned
to the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The accused faults the decision of the respondent court for its misapprehension of
facts. The actual raking of the calf was not proven by the prosecution, he points out.
That the complainant found the calf tied in the appellant's upland property does not
make him a cattle rustler. Nor does his supposed failure and/or refusal to tell the
complainant where the cow was even if he (the accused) knew where it was. Actually,
the accused claims, he was at that time in Calanian nine kilometers from Sta.
Catalina how could the complainant have asked him about his calf? And the mere
stepping on the rope (granting this is true) to which the calf was tied when complainant
towed it does not constitute theft of the calf either. Because if the accused had
intended to steal it why would he tie it near his house?

Section 2(c) of P.D. 533, defines cattle rustling as follows:

Sec. 2(c). Cattle rustling is taking away by any means, methods or schemes, without
the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above mentioned animals whether or not
for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation
of any person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its
meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.
Note the phraseology of the provision "taking away by any means, methods or
schemes." Thus, intent to gain may be inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the
lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does not
belong to him. 16 In this case, the several circumstances enumerated earlier constitute
an unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which is that the accused indeed took the calf with the intent to appropriate it. 17 To
recapitulate, the stubborn insistence of the accused that the missing calf belonged to
his brother, Agustin, knowing fully well that it belonged to the complainant (as he later
admitted in his answers to questions of the trial court), in essence, is cattle rustling.

The accused asserts that the animal had gone astray and consequently destroyed his
plants. To prevent further damage to the plants he caught it and tied it near his house.
He thought it burdensome to report the matter to the Barangay Captain or bring the
calf to him. The complainant should not kick up a storm over the matter as he was able
to recover his calf anyway.
Besides, the accused alleges that the complainant pressed charges against him out of
spite as he and the complainant were litigants in a land dispute. The complainant tried
to "blackmail" him into abandoning the civil case in exchange for his dropping of this
case. But he (the accused) refused, so the complainant proceeded to file this case in
the trial court.

In discrediting the evidence of the defense, we quote with approval the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The evidence is clear that appellant twice denied knowledge of the calf when private
complainant asked him if he has seen the missing calf. And when the calf was finally
located by the private complainant, the appellant stopped the private complainant from
bringing the calf home alleging that the calf belongs to his brother Agustin which was
entrusted to his care. However, after realizing that his claim can no longer hold water
because private complainant has proved his ownership of the calf in question,
appellant now avers in as testimony that he caught the calf because it was eating and
destroying his plants and it was his intention to return the calf to the owner. Appellant
reasoned out further that he was not in his house when private complainant went there
but that it was only his wife who was at home and with whom the private complainant
talked. We are not the least convinced of appellant's stand. To US, such a posture now
being taken by the appellant is nothing but a last and desperate attempt to exculpate
himself from liability. 18

The petition must fail.

We note at the outset that in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court like this
case, review is limited only to errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. Factual
findings of the trial court which are especially confirmed by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and can no longer be reviewed. 8 Of course, there are well-defined
exceptions, for instance, misapprehension of facts 9 which the accused now posits.
The records however show that the respondent court, as well as the trial court,
committed no such misapprehension of facts.
Significantly, the lower courts did not anchor the conviction of the appellant on what he
alleges to have resulted in a misapprehension of facts. The lower courts did not
convict the appellant on the basis of the missing calf s having been found tied in the
accused's premises nor on his failure and/or refusal to tell the owner the whereabouts
of the calf, nor on the accused's stepping on the rope to which the "lost" calf was tied
when the complainant was towing it. Rather, the lower courts convicted him on the
basis of his actuations when the lost calf was found in his possession. The lower
courts noted the following:

xxx xxx xxx

[And] if it is true likewise that it was appellant's wife only with whom private
complainant talked on that day of January 6, 1982 when the latter was looking for his
missing calf because the appellant was allegedly not at home, how come that
appellant's wife was not even presented by appellant as a witness to rebut at least the
clear testimony of private complainant that it was the appellant he talked with that
day? 19

1. When complainant discovered the loss of his calf, he inquired from petitioner
whether he has seen the calf but the latter denied having seen it. 10
2. When complainant queried the whereabouts of the calf for the second time, accused
anew denied having seen it. 11

Our thorough review of the case convinces us of the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, hence the respondent court did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the decision of the trial court.

3. When complainant eventually located the calf in accused estate the latter refused to
give the calf claiming it belonged to his brother, Agustin. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated August 9,

1989, and its Resolution, dated November 13, 1989, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

4. Complainant needed the assistance of a barangay official and two PC soldiers to

dispossess accused of that calf and eventually placed it in the custody of the Barangay
Captain. 13

SO ORDERED.

Page 23 of 25

G.R. No. 168852

September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and
JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION

application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her
by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected
from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary
parties for complete resolution of the case.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution 2 dated
July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case
is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws
as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven)
were married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and
Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004."

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9 granting petitioner's prayer for
a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11 to respondents'

Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis
supplied)

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to

respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule
of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for

Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be
applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung, 19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
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In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary

imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally

or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
supplied)

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions
of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio
alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
"ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which
is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.25

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance
of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents
to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is
an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits
and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of
facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this
controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy
can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, thatalarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise
in superfluity.

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
pets of the woman or her child; and

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated

March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include

SO ORDERED.

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this
Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

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