Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the
uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased
father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower
court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this
case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific
mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature
the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that
between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to
her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances
then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of the
law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an
agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present
Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the
welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The insured, Florentino
Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten
years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is
the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with
his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence
this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed
the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in
question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the
defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles
320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is

worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of
the Court of First Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and
whose company he lives; ... 4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The
insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and
parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of
the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to
the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the
usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In
order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional
bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to
the total amount of P5,000.00." 5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code
provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed.
The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no
doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not one
of interpretation but of application. 6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant 7 to
blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question
of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the
welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been
worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that
there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond
required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any
evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is
further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the
deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on
Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus
"El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y
lgica de la patria potestad y de la presuncin de que nadie cuidar de los bienes de acqullos con
mas cario y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba
reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal
Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia
suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de
que trataremos mis adelante." 8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its
adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called
upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best
interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for
a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality

of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent
case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is
the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case
were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court
to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5

September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.1
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be
ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the
regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation
of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the
ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established
during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of
the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in
his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de factogovernments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day
their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied

by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration
permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions,
shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in
their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive
Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of
the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof,
was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs
and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in
Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal
courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the
instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of
Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic
principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive
and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and
judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and
customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial
change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned
during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued
a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme
authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal
and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General
MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established
as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in
the present case may be reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the
court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23,
1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he
declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that

of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the
said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said
proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing
prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those
proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the
United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the
Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of
international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be
determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the
Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of
those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal
sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the
government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war
of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.
And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in
revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds
of de facto governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called
also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is
maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters
by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions.
They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil
authority, supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government
is found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U.
S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war
with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were
cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war with the country
of which the territory so possessed was part."
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on
the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually

passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure,
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is
burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all
the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones
and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the
country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among
others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel
freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration
into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering
justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the
belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or
civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice
have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the
Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2,
p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do
not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a
government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the
rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules
are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed
by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal
laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were
later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the
Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces,
said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they
are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the
administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer
the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American
Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case
of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de
factogovernment. In that case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent
States differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its
authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less

supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are examples. . .
.
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States,
discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of
government, the same general laws for the administration of justice and protection of private rights,
which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards.
As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority,
or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and
binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of
insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime
prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the
transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware
of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching
these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to
the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or
was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments
should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in
hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war
between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the
insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away
with civil government or the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary
course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or
remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of
the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered intowith actual intent to
further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states
composing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair
the rights of citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by
Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by
the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an enemy's
territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little
consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the
same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of
war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone
determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive
Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese
nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he
retained the existing administration under the general direction of a french official (Langfrey History of
Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France, authorized the
local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an English
superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded
France in 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of
administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government

established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same
character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the
same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a
so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943,
based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the
United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the
sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its
military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a
well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of
1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer
sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of
occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9
Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme
contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the
Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It
was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at
least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who,
taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof
by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with
the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established
by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it
would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the
war of secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in
numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs.Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above
quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of
Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in
the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having
first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection
against Spain, took possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until
possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme
Court held in that case that "such government was of the class of de facto governments described in I
Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which
might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that
the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the
parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an
enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium)
in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that
well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy
comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few
cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of
his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of

municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed
by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would
be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be
contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the
disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the
occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case,
postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his
own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines
and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political
complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is
confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which
declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation
to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other
government" as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23,
1944 that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul
and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic
of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes
of court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C.
L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his
government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied
territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation demand such action. But even assuming
that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who
liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and
before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military
forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less
than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an
agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional
commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of
nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence,
applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907,
as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same
proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect and obedience
to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the international
policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of
section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an

instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great
public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have
to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and
criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be
no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed
by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that
where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be
endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought
to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear
and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who
reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings
of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure
public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of the
country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit
their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals
would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the
penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice
during the Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of
law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency
legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which
have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court
final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts
during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General
MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly
appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to
March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if
not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of
Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10,
1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the
Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is
said that an occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts
should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most
matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than
this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the
respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered
valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of
international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international
law that denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing
upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier,
such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the
belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any
other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not

General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his
intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the
proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes
of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or
not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the proclamation did
not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers
as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public
of conscience, constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake,
International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions
which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the
obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the
belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the
nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using
their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals of England in the
case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to
establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from
asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the
forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the
judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the
purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and
void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and action of the nationals of the
territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that
enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower another to undo the same.
Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States Army has
violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature,
yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from
general rules of international law and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag
flies."
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of
the forces of the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a
decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void,
and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the
same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of the
several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have looked
carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental
powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest language
would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be
so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined.
Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called
upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of
the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.
(Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp.,
161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we
hold that the order was void."
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared
that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political

complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said
judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the
reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as
those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue
now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was
restored.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War
on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion."
And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is
armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far
as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government
established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese
Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under
martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the time
being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully
their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of
the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission,
by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of courts, with the same
jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial
change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International
Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic
bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law,
p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the
Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and
continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts
of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending therein,"
is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they
enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had
become the laws and the courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of
the country occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by
adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown,
belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the
sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in
the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued
remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the
Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which
prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power,
"extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the
legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life of the occupied districts, nor
needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the courts of justice are allowed to
continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the name of
the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton,
however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the
Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon,
the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace
and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and
government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and
suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers
occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the name of the Emperor or a
compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established
continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of
sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing
Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on
Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the
law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final
disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when
changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until
repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not
necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of
the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had
legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of
Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in

force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until
they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court
be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so
change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced
therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the
proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into
the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not
cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of
the Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First
Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending
therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and
created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no
enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the
courts in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted
abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in
the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer
of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the
peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to law.
And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by
section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime
and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already
quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive Order
provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as
amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been
duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ."
In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed
prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated
in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had
theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases
coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of
Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one which had been functioning
during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese occupation, it would
have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been
dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the
proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil
rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time
of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the court, having refused to
act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is
the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the

fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many
other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO,
ALEXANDER
PADILLA
and
MARIA
ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
Peoples
Initiative
for
Reforms,
Modernization
and
Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments
or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as innovative. [3] Indeed it is, for both under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) [5] wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative,
a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he
and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that
the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
[6]

it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it
is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be
affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision
of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7
of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII, [8] and Section 8 of Article X [9] of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution [10] embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
[12]
Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is
not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle
II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the
law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law
which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the
power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in
the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would
entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers and legislators suit. [14] Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment [15] on the
petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS
INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION

OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO
REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE
LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT
IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A REEXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment [16] which
starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign
to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the
day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate
of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be
a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.

In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of
the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same
as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed
that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b)
noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by
private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul
Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the
case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political
philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change
might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibiting political dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited toamendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as
many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is
to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance.[20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may
file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20
of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a
sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. [21] He avers that R.A. No.
6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This
law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill
and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless,
he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin
Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated
under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative
which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a
constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them
is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the
Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and
supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative
to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress
or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by
the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN
to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing
or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the
Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as
the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in
due time, their separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.
[26]
The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of
Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five
days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it
practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing;
and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In
light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
inKilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). [30] That
section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.[31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments
to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS.
And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not
pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to
the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed
through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that
within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS.
Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried
out - is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body
could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths
vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a
lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection
in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede
to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover
all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative
is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account
the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the
proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE

REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO

AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.
[36]

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to
the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment
to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present
such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article
was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the
second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right.[44] This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer
the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried
out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, [47] which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and
(b) House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which
was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate [50] and by the House of Representatives.
[51]
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1
of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum
and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can
pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act,
which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms -xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both
national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative
on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
[the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the performance
of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected.[62]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to
the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress
to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sittingen
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1)
to prescribe the form of the petition; [63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; [64] (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; [65] and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter
knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors
to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should
no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should
not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and
Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate opinions.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as
members thereof, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY
OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970.
RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.
Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.
Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove,
Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and
Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.
Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No.
6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were
held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.
XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each

representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected
on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No.
2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be
composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at
least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House
of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an
implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Resolution." 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132,
implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914. 3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
I
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers
and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that
the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law.
Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad lawmaking authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to
call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session
assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional
convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all

other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as
the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the
delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of
delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all
other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and
4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the
power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or
removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such
statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are
valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for
such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps,
which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No.
4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the
President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative
body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the
Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a
resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance
with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself,
without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly
require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each
congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one
delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid
having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of
delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district,
they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the
representative districts. 5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be
apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption

is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was
presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect
the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A.
No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the
delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and
Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable
apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to
Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the population,
we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill
77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the
delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon
your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, we are
submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such
apportionment. 6 The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be overrepresented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a
population very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only
two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the
apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not
required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census
cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated
by the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis
employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4
fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.
While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted
to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation
formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is
unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially
proportional representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as
unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces
with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is
allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other
provinces with more population. The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould
of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it
directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as
nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as
may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only
approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation
with mathematical precision or exactitude.

IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected
delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or
position in any branch of the government government until after the final adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and
define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer.
Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory
inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned
inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or
vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may
endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the
disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for
concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally
adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals.
Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the
several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of
the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but
only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not extend
beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately
seven months from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision
prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to
any civil office which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased
while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged
disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as
such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to
the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of
a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from
controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire
to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the
right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise
constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to
the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. 7 The function of a delegate is
more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public
officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other

laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No
other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they
themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to
Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense
of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the
proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the
second Tuesday of November, 1970.
V
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful
assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they
are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully
abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. 8
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine
whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise
of police power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any
political party or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or
other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of
his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise,
favorable to or against his campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or
otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of
the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff

composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his
freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to
hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The right
of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as
long as such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which
may be in sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate
information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs,
policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional
rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the
aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of
the limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too
formidable in character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party,
political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public
office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an
election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately
preceding an election.
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time
during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to
render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one,
is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They
can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an
election campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned
constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving,
soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars.
(a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this
Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a
serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually
in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close
one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra,
failed to muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a)
making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of
any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;

and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major
compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a)
of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due
recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral
process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo
Taada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to
be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger
but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities
in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of
remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the
responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be
ignored or disregarded." 15
But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded
by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of
chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of
another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on
their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and
Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as
against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion,
predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both
Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the
major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate
mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or
organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the
guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal
opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in
the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that
Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita
when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support
proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. 19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution
in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political

problems besetting the country. Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress
has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the task of fashioning a
document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what is to
be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional
Convention be composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public
welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices
be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of
people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments,
eloquently stated that "the function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in interest
or set of interests, not to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage of the
candidates but to encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to
blend them into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system
means, not the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or
frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one
but to God, country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who,
because they have been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be
expected to be sufficiently representative of the people. Such delegates could very well
be the spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic interest and not of the great
majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly
subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party
or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The
discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or
professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the
debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual
candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their
machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support,
does not have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign
machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that
much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these
civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common candidates, who
advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted
by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition
as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal
Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention,
which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the
group moving and working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and
supervision over our

leaders the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they
"could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be
exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of
the campaign machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization
engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that
the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional associations usually prohibit the
association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office.
Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any
existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a
political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy
does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances.
As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate
with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their
services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Taada for the invalidation of
par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of
our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the
challenged ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4,
5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in
character and lucid in expression, has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty,
however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis for the challenge hurled against the validity
of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be
represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized
group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election: ..." 1 It is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the
decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and
civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an
individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is
embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This
particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice
Douglas, in a 1963 article, that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards
freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly and of petition "that provides [associations] with the
protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society." 3 Such
is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech." 4
Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could
elaborate further on the scope of the right of association as including "the right to express one's
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means,
Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not extremely included in
the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful." 5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the
instrument" and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty" 6 and, for Justice
Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 7
2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul
the challenged provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada, as amicus curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for
delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be represented as such of any political
party or any other organization as well as of such political party, political group, political committee,
civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in his nomination, in
the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion
inescapabe therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the
right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.
There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso
in the same section of the Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the
freedom of civic, political, religious, professional, trade organizations or organized groups of whatever
nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional
Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of
the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail the right of their
members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention." 8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be
forbidden consistently with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of
association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as
they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who
can carry out whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they
might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain as to its lack of validity is further
strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that would justify a limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections. 9 As repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is
present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as
the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would
require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal
envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and
speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original
formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is whether the words used in such
circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
" 10 The majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the
electoral process. With due respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.
The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil
of partisanship running riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then
of the national interest involved. The Convention might not be able to live up to the high hopes
entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though that what prompted
such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in
the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a Convention
truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.
To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965,
the presidency was won by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone,
that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the then minority
party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant
political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.
Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably
that the people can, if so minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere
identification with party labels would automatically insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be
assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no
such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of
whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or indirectly material or
otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or
apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to
camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see through
such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that
whatever work the Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.
For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave
concern is that to guard against such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a
flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by
unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the
amendment or revision of an existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied
the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice
Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow
of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential process one step farther
to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by
their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand.
Moreover, is it not in keeping with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the
Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making their influence felt in the task of
constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is decisive
of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.
This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable
goal. Nor can it be successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending
sympathy and understanding to such legislative determination. This is merely to stress that however
worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference. Moreover, it may not be
altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in
effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is
concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee.
There is the commendable admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the
political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to assert their influence. It could
very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate
thus favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against
the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the
articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be realized. The result
would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.
If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a
problem possibly tainted with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is
one thing to encourage a fresh and untried solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its
success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise
are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations.
Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be legitimate and
substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the
end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other
groups or associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose
their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional
standards, magnified by the probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the
statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged
provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court
inGonzales v. Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the
validity of this challenged provision. What survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the
Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political party, political committee or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days
immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days immediately
preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not
a political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although the restrictions
as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature
or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate
or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court
unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in
failing to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election
campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations,
clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a
contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly as well as the holding of political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their
unconstitutionality. What emerges clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political
parties from the choice of their candidates and thereafter working for them in effect were considered by
this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of press, of assembly and of
association.
The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any
other organization or organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress
trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to
conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was
indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what otherwise are
invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.
Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that
the Chief Justice is in agreement with the views herein expressed.
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the
validity of the provisions of Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4
and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate
opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section
8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly
and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their own candidates,

reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a
deceptive device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling
completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the
law of equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional
convention is to maintain said ban only as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and
manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members have made necessary the
imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious
disadvantage unless they are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the
elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions
intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes of voting, counting
of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less
connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right to form
other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied
considering particularly the shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.
The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect
the lives, rights and liberties of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and
permanently. The only insurance of the people against political parties which may be inclined towards
the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed strength and
effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity for change.
It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized
way, similarly as in the use of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final
adoption. Both men and issues are important, but unrelated to each other, each of them alone is
insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because the issues in this
election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the
freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who are minded
to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which
a new constitutional convention has been conceived.
Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L27833, April 18, 1969 and for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is
the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign in any election
therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or hampered, as is being done under
the statute in dispute.
It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the
majority, that as Section 8(a) stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties
is separable from that against other associations within the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act
which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons, groups or
circumstances."
I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in
character and lucid in expression, has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty,
however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis for the challenge hurled against the validity
of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be
represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized
group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election: ..." 1 It is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the
decision.
1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and
civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an
individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is
embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This
particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice
Douglas, in a 1963 article, that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards
freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly and of petition "that provides [associations] with the
protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society." 3 Such
is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech." 4
Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could
elaborate further on the scope of the right of association as including "the right to express one's
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means,
Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not extremely included in
the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful." 5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the
instrument" and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty" 6 and, for Justice
Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 7
2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul
the challenged provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada, as amicus curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for
delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be represented as such of any political
party or any other organization as well as of such political party, political group, political committee,
civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in his nomination, in
the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion
inescapabe therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the
right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso
in the same section of the Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the
freedom of civic, political, religious, professional, trade organizations or organized groups of whatever
nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional
Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of
the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail the right of their
members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention." 8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be
forbidden consistently with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of
association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as
they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who
can carry out whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they
might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain as to its lack of validity is further
strengthened and fortified.
3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that would justify a limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections. 9 As repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is
present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as
the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would
require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal
envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and
speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original
formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is whether the words used in such
circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
" 10 The majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the
electoral process. With due respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.
The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil
of partisanship running riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then
of the national interest involved. The Convention might not be able to live up to the high hopes
entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though that what prompted
such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in
the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a Convention
truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.
To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965,
the presidency was won by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone,
that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the then minority
party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant
political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.
Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably
that the people can, if so minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere

identification with party labels would automatically insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be
assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no
such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of
whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or indirectly material or
otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or
apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to
camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see through
such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that
whatever work the Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.
For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave
concern is that to guard against such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a
flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by
unconstitutional means.
4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the
amendment or revision of an existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied
the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice
Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow
of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential process one step farther
to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by
their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand.
Moreover, is it not in keeping with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the
Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making their influence felt in the task of
constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is decisive
of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.
This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable
goal. Nor can it be successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending
sympathy and understanding to such legislative determination. This is merely to stress that however
worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference. Moreover, it may not be
altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in
effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is
concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee.
There is the commendable admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the
political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to assert their influence. It could
very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate
thus favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against
the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the
articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be realized. The result
would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a
problem possibly tainted with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is
one thing to encourage a fresh and untried solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its
success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise
are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations.
Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be legitimate and
substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the
end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other
groups or associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose
their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional
standards, magnified by the probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the
statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged
provision.
5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court
inGonzales v. Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the
validity of this challenged provision. What survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the
Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political party, political committee or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days
immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days immediately
preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not
a political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although the restrictions
as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature
or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate
or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court
unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in
failing to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election
campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations,
clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a
contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly as well as the holding of political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their
unconstitutionality. What emerges clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political
parties from the choice of their candidates and thereafter working for them in effect were considered by
this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of press, of assembly and of
association.
The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any
other organization or organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress
trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to
conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was
indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what otherwise are

invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.
Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that
the Chief Justice is in agreement with the views herein expressed.
Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the
validity of the provisions of Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4
and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate
opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section
8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly
and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their own candidates,
reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a
deceptive device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling
completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the
law of equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional
convention is to maintain said ban only as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and
manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members have made necessary the
imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious
disadvantage unless they are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the
elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions
intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes of voting, counting
of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less
connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right to form
other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied
considering particularly the shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.
The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect
the lives, rights and liberties of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and
permanently. The only insurance of the people against political parties which may be inclined towards
the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed strength and
effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity for change.
It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized
way, similarly as in the use of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final
adoption. Both men and issues are important, but unrelated to each other, each of them alone is
insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because the issues in this
election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the
freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who are minded
to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which
a new constitutional convention has been conceived.
Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L27833, April 18, 1969 and for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is

the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign in any election
therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or hampered, as is being done under
the statute in dispute.
It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the
majority, that as Section 8(a) stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties
is separable from that against other associations within the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act
which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons, groups or
circumstances."
I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its
Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE
represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its
Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec.
Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity
of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO
P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA
III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299
October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures

for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition
in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due
course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their
petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's
verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement
the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold
the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement

for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one
subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving
the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to
be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before
they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
is thatthe entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every
one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which
allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must
sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts.
Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential
for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential
signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer
by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition
that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this
case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide
sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision
required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be
added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge.
Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative
void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested
parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum
on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature
sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of
Verified

Legislative District: Barangay:

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND

PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct
Number

Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.

Address

Birthdate

Signature

Verification

MM/DD/YY

10

_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)

_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

__________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the

proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to
August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When
asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his
answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition,
not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as
shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass
of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full
text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt
a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative
Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration
for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report
sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to
amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the

constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to
other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBERLEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at
the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August
2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The
proposals of the Consultative Commission24are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have
profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution,
provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction
of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the
filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC.
However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused
the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's
proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged
in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering.
Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed
to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer
who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S.
S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who
signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature
sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended
petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they
circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a
proposed changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with,
or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group's citation ofCorpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during
the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino
could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the
printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one
copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets
could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.

Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed
changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature
sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and
this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in
the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the
full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of
the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost
all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held
during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections.
However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all
local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with
the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall
be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current threeyear term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to
the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived
the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3
million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand
deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets.
The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and
the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is
voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being
voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of
the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme
Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject
rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or
less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More
importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament
has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4),
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again
the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of
the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because
the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is
no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of
office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all
the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises
all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House
of Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be
used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of
the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know
the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply
with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and
not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered
by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead
of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage
of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process
of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x

applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to
the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is
thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by
the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision
of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended
or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only
through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the
measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and
as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by
the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to
receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII,
Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs
is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to
the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII,
Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the
manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution
in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as
extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the
people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own
work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have
prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a
people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution.
One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great coequal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or
that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was
defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside
the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one,
since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The
concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not
only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the
whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the
people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit
further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which
would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to
adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and upto-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would
be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by
ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such
endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates,
while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the
people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the
people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on
the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates
are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession
or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would
constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention
had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear
and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory
espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so,
if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a
proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision
justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution
proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure
by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject
matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of
the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the
lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs
assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of
Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and
cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision
of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article
XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the
court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of
the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea
that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x
x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at
the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring farreaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to
60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-bycase, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article
VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by
stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is
not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes.
The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German,

Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the
people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but
only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the
Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the wellsettled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended
petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the
basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form
of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino
Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino
Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it
appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all
the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to
be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group,
can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will
of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will"
in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively
gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO,
ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V.
MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing
them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their
Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de
la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1,
1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S.
Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor,
the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my
duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum
ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the
Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me
personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day,
February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and
void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on
June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,
promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under
the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of
any of the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not
the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period
which ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated,
in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy
of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. 2 Similarly, the 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local
governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for
elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as
still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987
designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of
Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of
petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect
on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President
of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision
of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was
withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be
effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely
the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation
of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the
Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation
of the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who
would like to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the
last line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going
to propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment
on that proposed amendment.

The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu
thereof insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions,"
add the words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we
cannot accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" because
the committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it
includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam
President, may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the
Commission would be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE
WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee
feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be
exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a
time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam
President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that
the President shall make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we
approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President
that the Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in
accordance with the provisions in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It
would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within which she will make
that declaration. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after
the results shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be
an immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of
the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the

ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I
think, is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that
particular case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the
proclamation of the President was that the draft presented to the people said that the
amendment will be effective upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a
suspicion that was put in there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on
whether to announce the ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this
dependent on the action of the President since this will be a manifestation of the act of
the people to be done under the supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the
COMELEC who should make the announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the
Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the
part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes
were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We
present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the
votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested
amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is
supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say
that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the
effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the
results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is
immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying
"yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know
from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is

reckoned from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of
reckoning because it is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of
casting by each of the voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it
would be upon the announcement of the results of the canvass conducted by the
COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary
that there be a body which will make the formal announcement of the results of the
plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC itself upon the completion of the
canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner
Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the
casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The
announcement merely confirms the ratification even if the results are released two or
three days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law,
because an announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification. If there should be any need
for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of
the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually
done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on
the date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for
the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10
days or a month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the
approval of the Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in
favor of the Davide amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.

MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for
the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes
the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be
immaterial because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an
independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the
Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when we
say that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is
that the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that
day, because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the votes are cast
in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or
anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, which is January 17,
1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication
of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it
is precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of
ratification that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite date if we
depend upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.

Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC
or the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in
favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart
from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides
that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast,
although I would not say from the very beginning of the date of election because as of
that time it is impossible to determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the day
of election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the
new Constitution will be considered ratified and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others
because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote,
have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract,
say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the
principal, the validity does not begin on the date of ratification but it retroacts from the
date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on
his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it
will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on
the assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the
COMELEC will make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as
stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the
original committee report as Section 12.

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members
raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the
date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution
promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution
on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying
clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and
Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's
designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect.
While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within
which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and
effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution
been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for
multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year
term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President
until the convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President
on February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1)
and 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar
Council created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the
appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the
appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1,
1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the
Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city
fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were
made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter
of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the
President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive
has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly
declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.

In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect
than the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I
note that it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I
submitted that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure
under the new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on
February 25, 1987, after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for
February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with
her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that
cut-off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To
my mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed
ratified pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987,
plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have
been ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be
logically said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of
that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that
would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the
1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71
provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of

the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17,
1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now
Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article
XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided,
shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all
amendments thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the
ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The
Proclamation states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this
certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and
are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the referendumplebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification
by the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the
terms of office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and
that said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.

It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment
shall take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of
April 7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and
Declaring Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the
said amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of
the date of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2
of the Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented
these amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification
or Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and
to Appropriate Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the
result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated and
certified by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27,
1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas
Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines
shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the
amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people
for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at
the time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called
pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on
September 18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a
retroactive application.

Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11,
1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified
by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other
time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter
was ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was
said in passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987
Constitution came to life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged
dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias
B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with
"acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice
Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to
whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition
filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant,
concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of
the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things
that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco
Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the
remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with
Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of
the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the
deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those
conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa
Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to
be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case
3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children

legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene

Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging
to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of
her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining
one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and
one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half
(1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of
Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in
such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of
Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the
whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par
2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other
plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter
to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista,
14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9)
Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have
become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the
costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named
and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16,
1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A.
Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge
Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is
quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for
approval the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to
Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along
the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes
Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along
the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa ReyesBales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the
portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition
indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed
this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of
the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as abovequoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs
and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both
lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to
sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding
the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such

papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the

vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated
to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of
said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and
necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for
the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue
the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity
with the project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather onehalf thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision
was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said
project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all
surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the
trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's
court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq.
meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh.
12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an
area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion
(Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh.
F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries
Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and
the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as
"TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6,
1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one
of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article
14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of
judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the
Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance
of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on
October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case
to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971
recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first
cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be
warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and
fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant
herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235,
seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the
estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants
were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed
because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already
conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the
remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against
defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in
interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by
her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P.
Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla,
Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of
complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit
"B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for
moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for
exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal
damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN,
FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of
the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of
Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES,
ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer,
Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals
upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is
the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979],
Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E,
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none
of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no
longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16,
1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there
was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31,
1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or
more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on
July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who
declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the
secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent
two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of

partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the
subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil
Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963.
Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change
or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one
year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the
project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal
the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of
the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the
acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the
whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the
Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between
the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E,
in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing
that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in
good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of,
or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project
of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the
Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to
him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect
was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty.

Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his
client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969).
While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of
respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10,
certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the
contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I
refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a).
On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes
Macariola onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of
the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that
she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated
to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale
was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see
Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of
partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23,
1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4
thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation
of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth
share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,
it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's
mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the
one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of
partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was
for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of
her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that
Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from
which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in
civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties
adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however,
did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in

the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said
properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were
inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by
the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased
or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it
to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such
transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of
maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly
honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that
the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and
distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and
that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and
his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way
or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the
litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation
having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor
can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns
in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of
a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political
law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on
public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar,"
which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in
this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to
the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they
are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and
pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the
transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the
new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However,
such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so
declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in
time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the
case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511,
542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of
the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the
Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing
that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in
which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216
of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly
becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not
enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11
[1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in
its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation
benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was
no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation
was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on
November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein
on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting
members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law,
municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office
hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties,
cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the
finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition;
hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall
within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the
last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer
from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private
business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the
Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President
of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is
authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to
conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation
of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the
service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend
him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary."
Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service
officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the
head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89)
and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme
Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other
or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section
12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to
recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges
and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service
who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive
service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation,
and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers
and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of
discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the
aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No.
2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15
SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the
provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to
be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not
retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it
appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in

court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the
time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from
said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation
only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that
their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife
therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation
and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance
of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the
Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are
groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated
and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of
the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and
claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I
see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by
complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-atlaw to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at
Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and
any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with
respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's
child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A.
Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons
were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any
undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his
practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence,
if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador
Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as
possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in
his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship
constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial
Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be
clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not
violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER,
THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T.
DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty but
nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the
wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise
as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners
cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth,
we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and
13 respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a
comment on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly
argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the
submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted
for decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It
then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says
is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter,
as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a
positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and
Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not
only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in
point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited. 13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments
and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be
introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a
proper submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged
resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." 14One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested theInterim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of
the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 15 When,
therefore, the InterimBatasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand
E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is
clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being
assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question
of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In Occena v.
Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question
was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the
1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and
not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del
Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is
no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or
revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as
legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed
to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in
their favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the threefourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as
the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover,
even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority
was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper
submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse
before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been
called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly
informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter
should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7,
1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the
contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time,
as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the
retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so
that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining
order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October
1976 amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in
accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la
Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum exercise as to
the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am
constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments
to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of
the amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister)
as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in
Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional
amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people,
strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the
Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine ofTolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested
with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory
Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the
President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the
October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the
Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on
amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon
the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the
people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of
constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar
having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate
my stand inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority
of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official
composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by
the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully
applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical
amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the
ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner." 6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the
people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his
separate opinion inGonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted
to the people for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will is
that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained
by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be
afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of
the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects
thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment
for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter
how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the
structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge
Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober
second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in
government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining
order enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October
1976 amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in
accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la
Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum exercise as to
the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am
constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments
to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of
the amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister)
as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in
Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional
amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people,
strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the
Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine ofTolentino vs.
Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested
with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory
Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the
President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the
October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the
Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on
amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon
the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the
people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of
constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar
having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate
my stand inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority
of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official
composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by
the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully
applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical
amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the
ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner." 6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the
people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his

separate opinion inGonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted
to the people for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will is
that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained
by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be
afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of
the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects
thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment
for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter
how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the
structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge
Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober
second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in
government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83896

February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815

February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of
Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports;
FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V.
JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N.
DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local
Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as
Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of
Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A.
BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and
Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA
MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive
Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1
hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or

controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of
the Cabinet, along with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as
Annex "C" in G.R. No.
83815 3 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 4 from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284,
petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of prohibition andmandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing
public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual
or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any
salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their
questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all
amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the
aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey Ordoez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B,
rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, 5 declaring that Cabinet members, their
deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including
membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution
as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the
primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the
Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated
Executive Order No. 284. 6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order
No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another
article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each
addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers one, the President and her official
family, and the other, public servants in general allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher,
exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the
President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are
the leaders of government expected to lead by example." 7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency

or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as
further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 9 and DOJ Opinion No. 155,
series of 1988, 10being the first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of
Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same
subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his
primary position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284,
promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth
noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed
the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which,
although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but
only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position
of the public official concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the
Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government
admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the
constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided
in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the
Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being
designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy
reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or
their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason

which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in
this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned
and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the
board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of
office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In
fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit,
entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations,
Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership
in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government service
were the data contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of
twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of
twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S.
Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B.
Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo
Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Pea of ten (10) each. 13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos
regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the
people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully
unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution
during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous
practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both
elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in
question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of
the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other
offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4),
Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in
any capacity to a civilian position in the Government,including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents
provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which
states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore
all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of
the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official
family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official
family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado
Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between the
Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more
cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13,
Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the
1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render
nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure.
Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7,
par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution
as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary,
on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant
Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their
tenure.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution,
but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to
say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as
President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or
fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions
under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the
other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must
Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to
be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. 17Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. 19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in
the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the VicePresident being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary
of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise
would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair
the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986).
Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense,
Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no
reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National Manpower
and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of
which are attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his
Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.

The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by
lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A
Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible,
should be avoided. 26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions
held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of
office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done
in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue
of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. 28To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, 29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority. 30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute
(R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only be
designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the representative from the
private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the
Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is
true with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are necessary.
This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board
in addition to those already performed under their original appointments." 32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief
or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. 33 The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary
functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries
of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation
and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority 34 and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be
the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official management
functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their
deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive
offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive
Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power
vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 35 Without these

additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by their primary functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived
of the means for control and resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the
prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the
same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore,
he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General
Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his position," 36 express reference to
certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were made. 37 Responding
to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances
when although not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials
in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The
example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Industry. 38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for saying
that additional functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed
upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be
taken as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB. This
colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986.
Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed
article on General Provisions. 39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been
approved on third reading on July 22, 1986, 40 while the article on the Executive Department, containing
the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been earlier approved on third reading on August
26, 1986. 41 It was only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article
IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would serve as constitutional
guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue
and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary
functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had
the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII,
it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3
of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil
Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family is by
reason of the legal principles governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by
virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only the additional

functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may be considered
as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail 42 as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear.1wphi1Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value
as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." 43 The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof. 44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during
their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict
application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the
Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an exofficio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this
decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of
"any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices
or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It
is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If
maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be
allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices
or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too
many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the
advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at
this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo
R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other
offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have
become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that "in cases where there
is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should
benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. 47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of
actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of
the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System

Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its

strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained. 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it
by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the

bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to
lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of
the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares
and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner
has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform
the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The

fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not selfexecuting, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the
Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to
remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the
word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that
it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision
may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions
on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers
to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on

education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion
of total human liberation and development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very
terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded
the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected
by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the
1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d' etatwhere an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that theFilipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable,
but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual
Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say
that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities
or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be
read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended
by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner
Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE
STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the socalled "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the
grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen
over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical
life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative
of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court,
for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command.
That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC
a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction.
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the
subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to
enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified
for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction.
Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm
and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution
not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is
worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they
are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values.
A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride
and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a
qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a
non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain
and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU
TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN,
SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO
RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY,
JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO,
FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX
SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA
JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO
ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON
MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO,
KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.

DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROSARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE
86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG
LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government
of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics
of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today
involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses
and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues
which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the
feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible.
Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what
is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office,
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House
of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
(House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses'
House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of
the House.

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a
verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings

against such official are deemed

initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that
the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient
in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm
the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be,
by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period
of one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period
of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and

Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that
his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and
approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections
16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court
issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article
IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or
strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent
with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that
the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition,
the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,
lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition
involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment

trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEAAmari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in
ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect
the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers,
and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine
Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr.,
as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for
Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a

writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the
second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with
the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in
his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the
Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment
complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition
that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint,
were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the
Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as
professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from
trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging
that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives
does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To
Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of
the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising
therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void
and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same,
that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October
28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that
House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of

the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put
forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not
carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above,
to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,
resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf
to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,
from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even
date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante
Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of
Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them
with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed
a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no
basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal
issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not
yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No.
160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to
wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on
what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions
as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed
for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine
the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1,
Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis

supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in
the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but
as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as
they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers"
of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which
is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the
courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of
the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the
power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as
pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged
this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to
be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of

the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed
the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing
operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch
or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass
upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices
of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to
the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not
of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In
still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in
the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application
of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from
the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising
at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment
cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily
on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus,
they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it
runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only
legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate
judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try
and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a

textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the

legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse
of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers
upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in
the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform nonministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and

rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject
to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v.
Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had,
in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving

paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the
real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of
the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts
will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for
the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of
the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is
the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role
of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken,
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House
of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed
of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must
be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class, is, under theres judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether
or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R.
No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that
the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at
the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a
matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the
same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has
been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they
will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any
of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of
record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting
to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate
which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this
reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene
was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an
interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and
spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that
there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will
result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the
validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried
out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has
been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this
Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway.
He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court
to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even
assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would
such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would
only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress
before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this
Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some
cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its
power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein

issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction
over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues
involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the
purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of
God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial
law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary
during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a
number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters
related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we
have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me
to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs.
the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our

main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their
jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to
say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the
1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions
of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on
the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I
may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding
of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite
because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and
the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified
by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The
main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority
ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents
of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of
residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the
Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the
issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.

xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies
involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can
tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within
its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices
of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial
food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified
the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not
vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by
law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political
questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there
is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court
according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to
a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But
the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the
definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions
are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has
in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope
of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally
left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and nonjusticiable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to
provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate
and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is
radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental
act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this
Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court
may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication
that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court
that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far
removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution
of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the
separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that
said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not
be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the
original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the aforementioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement
which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned
Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said
second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the
Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,
they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a
resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen
files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope
of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the
basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the
instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the
petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently,
they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the
very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as
an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this

Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion
for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are
subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication
may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as
there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august
words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may
not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the
occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of
their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render
justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the
case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to
only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to
the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is
nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the
case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations
of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and
as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.
This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will
not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought
by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.

In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has
availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
"judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and
the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in
judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode
public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional
duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation,
follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not
enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy
by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, towit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that
it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3
(2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to
file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the
oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the

word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence,
or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it,
it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5,
2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting
of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to
the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in
favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that
the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed
initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is
an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive
provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several
steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the
Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval
of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears
that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and
it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The

Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
(3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page
2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings"and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution"
the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and
replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment.
As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will
mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It
is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee
on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who
was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to
set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing
in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.
xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the
first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding."
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can
bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases
of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the
Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds
the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.
If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series
of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as
they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not
abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members
of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this
Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so
absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only
two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules.
This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to
alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members
of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United
States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries
of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting,
and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business.
(House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to
the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly,
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other
body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2)
it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with
the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to
be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.
For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking
powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power
which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes
the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience

under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed
with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but what itmust do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with
timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders
of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should
not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties
alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this
Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules.
As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives
shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional
power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment
power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated,
furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3
of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the
center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for
human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice,
took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental
branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this
Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect
to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of
this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of
"lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any
move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To
reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue
whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental
law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court
can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of
powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls
under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem
head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed
the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other
two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the
discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect
a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the
Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could
be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now
be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who
is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are
rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances.
But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its
agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government
branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is
not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other
than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government.
But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of
legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only
to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph
5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993

CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the Civil Service Commission.
Domingo A. Santiago, Jr. for Philippine National Bank.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing Resolution No.
92-201 of the respondent Civil Service Commission, which upheld the petitioner's separation from the
Philippine National Bank(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department pursuant to
a reorganization under Executive Order No. 80, dated 3 December 1986.
Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank on 20 September
1972 as special assistant with the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB
President. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 Senior Vice President assigned to the
Fund Transfer Department.
Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave of absence
(due to medical reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80
(Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized the
restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund
Transfer Department was abolished and its functions transferred to the International Department.
Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service in a letter dated 30 January
1987, thus:
Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986 Revised Charter of the Bank, please be
informed that Management has approved your separation from the service effective
February 16, 1986. You shall be entitled to the regular benefits allowed under existing
law. (emphasis supplied)
Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the Bank's 1986 Revised Charter, any
officer or employee who feels aggrieved by any matter treated above may submit his

case to the Civil Service

Commission. 1
This letter was received by petitioner's secretary at the PNB head office on 16 February 1987.
Petitioner's first recorded appeal to the Civil Service Commission questioning her separation is a letter
dated 4 August 1989. Then CSC Chairman Samilo N. Barlongay upheld the validity of her separation
from the service in a letter/opinion dated 30 August 1989 (this was allegedly received by petitioner only
on 26 February 1990) stating thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It may be mentioned in this connection, that inasmuch as you did not avail of the
ERIP/Supplementary Retirement Plans adopted by the PNB in 1986, you have therefore
lost your right thereto. Moreover, since you lack the required number of years of service
to entitle you to retirement benefits under existing laws, you may be entitled to the return
of your GSIS personal contributions. Considering further that you have exhausted all
your accumulated leave credits as you went on leave of absence for the period from
April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987, there is no legal or valid basis to entitle you to
payment of terminal leave.
Finally, pursuant to Section 16, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, you may be entitled to payment of separation subject to auditing
rules and regulations. 2
In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning
Chairman Barlongay's ruling, petitioner claimed:
1. The opinion/ruling was not fully supported by the evidence on record;
2. Errors of law prejudicial to the interest of the movant have been committed. She argued:
. . . that her separation from the service was illegal and was done in bad faith
considering that her termination on February 16, 1986 was made effective prior to the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986, which law authorized the
reorganization of the PNB, and even before February 25, 1986, when President Corazon
C. Aquino came into power. She further claims that although the notice of termination
was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon her on February 16, 1987 when the
new Constitution which guarantees security of tenure to public employees was already in
effect. 3
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the bad faith in her separation from the service in 1987 was evident from the recent
restoration of the Fund Transfer Department as a separate and distinct unit from the
International Department . . . 4
Denying the motion for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission in its aforecited Resolution No.
92-201, dated 30 January, 1992, ruled:

Sec. 33 of EO 80 (1986 Revised Charter of the PNB) provides:

Sec. 33. Authority to Reorganize. In view of reduced operations contemplated under
this charter in pursuance of the national policy expressed in the "Whereas" clause
hereof, a reorganization of the Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to
achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations, including the adoption of a new
staffing pattern to suit the reduced operations envisioned. The program of reorganization
shall begin immediately after the approval of this Order, and shall be completed within
six (6) months and shall be fully implemented within eighteen (18) months thereafter."
Clearly; as aforequoted, PNB was authorized to undergo reorganization and to effect a
reduction in force to "achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations". It cannot,
be disputed that reduction in force necessitates, among others, the abolition of
positions/offices. The records show that prior to its reorganization, PNB originally had
7,537 positions which were reduced to 5,405 after the reorganization. Indeed, 2,132
positions were abolished, that is, the original positions in PNB were reduced by 28%.
This reduction in force likewise included the senior officer positions, in PNB, which were
reduced, thus:
Positions Incumbents Proposed Position
President 1 1 1
Sr. Exec. VP 1 1 0
Exec. VP 3 2 2
Senior VP 12 11 7
Vice Pres. 33 27 15
The position of movant Yap (SVP) was one among the original twelve (12) SVP
positions. It was one among the five (5) SVP positions which were abolished. In fact, the
FTD of which she was then the incumbent SVP, was merged with the International
Department to which its functions were closedly related.
It should be noted that as ruled by the Supreme Court in Dario vs. Mison (G.R. NO.
81954):
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is
carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. . . . .
. . . Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional
regime is judged from the facts of each case.
In the instant case, therefore, this Commission is inclined to believe that the
reorganization of PNB was done in good faith. For indeed, the reorganization was
pursued to achieve economy. It undertook reduction in force as a means to streamline
the numbers of the workforce. It was incidental that movant Yap's position was one
among those abolished. Movant Yap failed to substantiate her claim by clear and
convincing evidence that the abolition of her position was a result of her close

identification with the previous regime, being a sister of former First Lady Imelda
Romualdez Marcos. This being so, and pursuant to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions, the abolition of movant Yap's position should be
upheld. PNB, in the instant case, has clearly proved by substantial evidence that its act
in terminating the services of some of its employees was done in good faith. 5
Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her separation was illegal because it took effect on 16
February 1986 or even before the promulgation of EO No. 80 on 3 December 1986, the CSC noted that
the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error. PNB
submitted documents (p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting its stand that the separation actually
took effect on 16 February 1987.
On the issue of bad faith as related to the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, the subject
CSC resolution adds:
xxx xxx xxx
It may be mentioned that the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department,
actually was a merger of the Fund Transfer Group, the Foreign Remittance Development
and Coordinating Unit based on board Resolution No. 60 of March 12, 1991, or after the
lapse of over four (4) years from the date it was abolished in 1987. Moreover, the
restoration of the Fund Transfer Department and other offices in the PNB was primarily
caused by the improved financial capability and present needs of the Bank. This
improved financial condition of the PNB is evident from the 1990 Annual Report it
submitted. It may be further stated that the re-established FTD is headed by a Vice
President, a position much lower in rank than the former department headed by a Senior
Vice President.
Furthermore, it should be noted that granting arguendo that movant Yap's termination
from the service was tainted with bad faith, she however, is now barred from assailing
the same as she did not seasonably assert her right thereto. Records show that she was
separated from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 or about 2 years
thereafter when she brought this matter to this Commission. By her inaction in
questioning her termination within a period of one year, she is considered to have
acquiesced to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to the position. 6
In the present petition before the Court, the following issues are raised:
1. Existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the Philippine National Bank resulting in the separation
from the service of petitioner.
2. Erroneous application of the Dario v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB's reorganization.
3. Erroneous application of the one (1) year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in
petitioner's case.
Dario v. Mison 7 laid down the requirement of good faith in the reorganization of a government bureau
wherein offices are abolished. It says:

. . . Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that
as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith,
no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is
an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed
that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a
reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause" if by "cause" we refer to
"grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith, as a component of a
reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.
In Petitioner's case, the following instances are cited by her as indicia of bad faith:
1. The abolished department was later restored and the number of senior vice
presidents was increased.
2. PNB did not follow the prescribed sequence of separation of employees from the
service contained in Rep. Act No. 6656 which is:
Sec. 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the
following order of removal shall be followed:
(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of
government service;
(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of
government service;
(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and
(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided,
That those in the same category as enumerated above,
who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit
shall be laid off first, length of service notwithstanding.
3. Petitioner was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new
staffing pattern as mandated by Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 6656, her qualification and fitness for
new positions were never evaluated or considered in violation of Sec. 27 of P.D. 807
which was incorporated as Sec. 29 Ch. 5 Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987.
4. Lack of notice and bearing before separation from the service.
5. Petitioner was forced to take a leave of absence and prevented from reporting for
work.

6. There is a discrepancy in the date of her separation from the service and the
effectivity thereof.
7. PNB employees in the Fund Transfer Department identified with her were reassigned
or frozen.
8. She is listed as having resigned instead of being separated or dismissed which was
what actually happened.
9. The dismissal was politically motivated, she being a sister of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, wife of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to reorganize. The order was issued by
then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the powers vested in the
President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to be
done was the implementation of the reorganization. There is no doubt as to the legal basis for PNB's
reorganization. The real question is: was it done in good faith, tested by the Dario v. Mison doctrine?
To start with it is almost absurd for petitioner to insist that her termination from the service was
antedated to 16 February 1986. At that time, the reorganization of PNB had not even been conceived.
In most of PNB's pleadings, it has documented and supported its stand that the year of petitioner's
separation is 1987 not 1986. The antedating of the termination date, aside from being clearly a
typographical error, is a periphernal issue. The real issue is existence of bad faith consisting of tangible
bureaucratic/management pressures exerted to ease her out of office. Bad faith has been defined as a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self interest or ill will or
for an ulterior purpose. 8 It is the performance of an act with the knowledge that the actor is violating the
fundamental law or right, even without willful intent to injure or purposive malice to perpetrate a
damnifying harm. 9
PNB's reorganization, to repeat, was by virtue of a valid law. At the time of reorganization, due to the
critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or merged.
The abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This, to the Court's mind,
was a management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this point, a distinction
can be made in ruling on the validity of a reorganization between a government bureau or office
performing constituent functions (like the Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation
performing ministrant functions (like the PNB).
Constituent function are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature;
ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are
merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private sector,
endeavor. It is an optional function of government.
. . . The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do those things which by its very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals (Malcolm, The
Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20)

From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our
people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call governmentowned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or
one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation under the
Corporation Law. (Bacani vs. Nacoco, No, L-9657, November 29, 1956, 100 Phil. 468)
But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing constituent functions or in a
government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common test,
the test of good faith. In this connection, the philosophy behind PNB's reorganization is spelled out in
the whereas clauses of Executive Order No. 80:
WHEREAS, within the context of the general policy there nevertheless exists a clear role
for direct government-participation in the banking system, particularly in servicing the
requirements of agriculture, small and medium scale industry, export development, and
the government sector.
WHEREAS, in pursuit of this national policy there is need to restructure the government
financial institutions, particularly the Philippine National Bank, to achieve a more efficient
and effective use of available scarce resources, to improve its viability, and to avoid
unfair competition with the private sector, and
WHEREAS, the reorganization and rehabilitation of the Philippine National Bank into a
similar but stronger and more operationally viable bank is an important component of the
nationalization programs for both the financial system and the government corporation
sector; . . . .
Whether there was a hidden political agenda to persecute petitioner due to her consanguinial relation to
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the widow of former President Marcos, is not clearly shown. On the
other hand, it is entirely possible that, precisely because of such consanguinial relation, petitioner may
have been the object of deferential, if not special treatment under the Marcos regime. It is part of the
Filipino culture to extend such deferential, if not special treatment to close relatives of persons in power.
Many times this is carried to unwholesome extremes. But a discontinuance of such deferential or
special treatment in the wake of a change in government or administration is not bad faith per se. It
may be merely putting things in their proper places.
Due to the restructuring and this is empirically verifiable PNB became once more a viable banking
institution. The restoration of the FTD four years after it was abolished and its functions transferred to
the International Department, can be attributed to the bank's growth after reorganizations, thereby
negating malice or bad faith in that reorganization. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in
the validity of one's right. 10 It consists of an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another, its absence should be established by convincing evidence. 11
The records also clearly indicate that starting April 1986 to February 1987, petitioner went on leave of
absence for medical reasons. While she was not reporting to the office, the bank's reorganization got
underway. She continued, however, receiving her salaries, allowances, emoluments, honoraria and

fees up to March 1987. Employees who were affected by the reorganization had the option to avail of
the bank's Separation Benefits Plan/Early Retirement Plan (SBP/ERIP). Petitioner opted not to avail of
such plan and instead submitted to the result of the bank's ongoing reorganization and management's
discretion. If petitioner had the desire for continued employment with the bank, she could have asserted
it for management's consideration. There is no proof on record that she affirmatively expressed
willingness to be employed. Since she cannot rebut the CSC finding that her earliest appeal was made
on 4 August 1989, there is no reason for this Court to hold that she did not sleep on her rights. On the
contrary, her present argument that bad faith existed at the time of the abolition of the FTD because it
was restored four years later is a little too late. Who could have predicted in 1986 or 1987 that PNB
would be able to rise from its financial crisis and become a viable commercial bank again? The decision
to abolish the FTD at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was a business judgment made in good faith.
PNB for its part submits that its reorganization was effected in good faith
because
a) There was not only a perceptible but substantial restructuring of the PNB hierarchy
showing reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices and abolition of positions.
b) Two thousand one hundred thirty two (2,132) positions were abolished during the
period from February 16, 1986 to January 14, 1987 leaving a lean workforce of five
thousand four hundred five (5,405) as of latter date per B.R. No. 34 hereto attached as
Annex "R".
c) The number of senior officers, including Senior Vice Presidents, was accordingly
reduced.
Another issue raised by petitioner is PNB's alleged non-compliance with the mandate of Sections 2 and
4 of Rep. Act No. 6656. These Sections provide:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant
to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies
of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of
any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith
in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party.
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions
is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned
and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent, appointments shall be given
preference for appointment to the new position in the approved staffing pattern
comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable
positions, to positions next lower in rank.
No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have
been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary
qualification requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for
permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are
still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature.
In the first place, Rep. Act No. 6656 cannot be invoked by petitioner because it took effect on 15 June
1987, or after PNB's reorganization had already been implemented. But assuming, ex gratia argumenti,
that it is applicable here and petitioner must be accorded preferential right to appointment in the bank,
PNB in its rejoinder impressively asserts:
Needless to say, there were various committees that were created in the implementation
of the organizational restructuring of the Bank based on the foregoing policy guidelines.
Each personnel to be retained was evaluated in terms of relative fitness and merit along
with the other personnel of the Bank. Thus, when then SVP Federico Pascual was
chosen to head the International Department from among other officers of the Bank,
including Ms. Yap, his qualifications far exceeded those of the other candidates for the
position.
We attach hereto as Annexes "G-1" and "G-2" the service records of Mr. Federico
Pascual and Petitioner Ms. Yap, respectively, which clearly show that the qualifications
of Mr. Pascual far exceed those of Petitioner Yap. Aside from being a lawyer having
been a law graduate from the University of the Philippines, he is also a Bachelor of Arts
degree holder from Ateneo de Manila and a Master of Laws graduate o Columbia Law
School. He had studied Masteral Arts in Public Administration at the London School of
Economics and had undergone extensive seminars since 1974 at the International
Department and had been assigned in several foreign branches of the Bank. Before he
resigned from the Bank, he held the second highest position of Executive Vice President
and served as Acting President of the Bank before the incumbent president, President
Gabriel Singson assumed his position.
On the other hand, the service record of Petitioner Yap will show that she only holds a
Bachelor of Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and has
undergone only one seminar on Management and Leadersbip Training Program. She
entered the Bank service in 1972. (Rollo at pp. 312 to 313)
xxx xxx xxx
The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner's immediate reinstatement to her former position as
senior vice president and head of the Fund Transfer Department, or reappointment to a position of

comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights and pay, etc., under the bank's new
staffing pattern.
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner therein
must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. 12
An action for quo warranto should be brought within one (1) year after ouster from office; 13 the failure to
institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its
dismissal 14 since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subjected to continued
uncertainty . . . 15 An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be
attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed employee. 16
Measured by the above jurisprudence, petitioner's action may be said to be one for quo warranto,
seeking reinstatement to her former position which at present is occupied by another. She cannot
invoke De Tavera v. Phil.Tuberculosis Society, Inc., et. al. 17 and contend that there is no claim of
usurpation of office, and that quo warranto may be availed of to assert one's right to an office in the
situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Santos v. CA, et. al. 18 and Magno v. PNNC Corp. 19 are invoked by petitioner to illustrate that this
action is one for separation without just cause, hence, the prescriptive period is allegedly four (4) years
in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code. 20 We do not agree. Petitioner's separation from the
service was due to the abolition of her office in implementation of a valid reorganization. This is not the
unjustifiable cause which results in injury to the rights of a person contemplated by Article 1146. The
abolition of the office was not a whimsical, thoughtless move. It was a thoroughly evaluated action for
streamlining functions based on a rehabilitation plan. 21 At the time of the abolition of the Fund Transfer
Department in 1986, foreign exchange losses of the bank amounted to P81.1 Million. 22 The head of
office was a Senior Vice President. At the time of restoration of the department in 1991, it was headed
by a vice president (lower in rank) and showed earnings of P2,620.0 Million. 23 Other departments
abolished in 1986 were also subsequently restored.
Restoring petitioner to her previous position with backwages would be unjust enrichment to her,
considering that she had abandoned or showed lack of interest in reclaiming the same position when
the bank was not yet fully rehabilitated and she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or two (2)
years after her alleged unjustified separation.
To those who feel that their unjustified separation from the service is for a cause beyond their control,
the aforecited Magno case teaches:
. . . while We fully recognize the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws,
and social legislation accord the workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the
law on prescription to relieve him of the consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the
sleeping). His explanation that he could not have filed the complaint earlier because "he
was prevented to do so beyond his control for the simple reason that private respondent
have (sic) tried to circumvent the law by merely floating" him is very flimsy and does not
even evoke sympathetic consideration, if at all it is proper and necessary. We note that
petitioner herein is not an unlettered man; he seems to be educated and assertive of his
rights and appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed a motion for extension
of time to file the petition and the petition itself without the assistance of counsel. We

cannot believe that if indeed he had a valid grievance against PNCC he would not have
taken immediate positive steps for its redress.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the
questioned resolution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.:
In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated
March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its
modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid
decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to
this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in the
resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially
by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by
Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the
Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured
and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to
the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitionersspouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from
the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation
Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of the deceased had spent for the
hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs.
(Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasidelict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.
Petitioners allege:
1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article
2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the
award should be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in varying
amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the same, which
should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National
Irrigation Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the
subsequent failure of the National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver
to stop in order to give assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross
negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to exemplary damages under Arts.
2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had
been sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower
court upon which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and

attorney's fees was based and not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration,
contends thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent
National Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to
be reviewed. The focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals
involves the question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the
victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes necessary that
before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved, there
should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In this
regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically
contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's
Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and
G. R. No.61045) of the respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of
Appeals, is an explicit admission of said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper.
Inconsistent procedures are manifest because while petitioners question the findings of
fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of law before this Court
which posture confirms their admission of the facts.
3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the
vehicular accident involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to
the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court
has become final as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity
with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by
reason of the shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their
son. Respondent National Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held
liable for the damages because it is an agency of the State performing governmental
functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent
who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the
tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia
who should answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation
Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee, the matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia
was not its special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176
and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines;
Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned
to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions.
If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's
tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is
acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p.
347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions,
by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known
as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall
be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of

business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the
proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may
be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a
certain period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in
determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency
performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which,
under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has
failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla wasthrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was
thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the
road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force
and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the
impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation
report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city
limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away
from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This
is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described
and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as

shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling
at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution
and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation,
such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking
whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and
supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the
wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be
using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio- Herrera (Chairperson,), J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of
the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the I .assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his
present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full
text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional

amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to
the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a
plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of
the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law,
shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different
regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective
sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of
the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker
shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he
shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and
ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have
been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters
of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers,
and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections
may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people
regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they
have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced
L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to
lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to

vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of
such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement.
At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree
No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion
to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution
provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum
fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme
Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this
inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of
the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of nonpolitical impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on
the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases 12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice
Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new
Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it
partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971,
despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda,
insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply.
For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon
vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the
Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however,
substantially the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said
habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be
legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned

habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by
its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by
the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions
is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by
a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country."
Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen
the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of
the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a
matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was
rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of

the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of
February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially
convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in
the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science
a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.17 Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government
today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded
as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually
independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of
constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a
total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary
governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a
decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in
the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action,
even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one
man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet
the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important
harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be
to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded;

it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on
the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside
the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not
provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal
times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That
sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions,
thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been
elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly
to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise
their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the
exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would
be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely
important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of
executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady
increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the
Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession,
inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law
just confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the
national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown
that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency
measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the
President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume
that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of
that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its
gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the
urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For
the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant
voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like
the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about
the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72
provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of
the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of
martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan
presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a
referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under
Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with
cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16,
the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of
the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate
the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the
National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign

1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular
organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power
exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely
the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their
convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is
because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34 "The
necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be
permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a selflimiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign
power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from
the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only
into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal
vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendumplebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the
President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to
be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted
by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be
felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the
proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite
aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it
would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results.
The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the
plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of
proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one
containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the
ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years
of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above
contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately
prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely
consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted
to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the

executive power of the President. 39It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless
of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand,
involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy,
property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of
Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled
voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total
suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all
the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he
would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in
winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus,
the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views
on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is
already a settled matter. 43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service
Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates
or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of
the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago.
The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were
allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34).
The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was
published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled
plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on
Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act
No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as
well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme

court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body
or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single
endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only
when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done
contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has
relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment
may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set
up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor
a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando,
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and
Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix
V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as
to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando,
Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in
the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices
Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise
the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper
submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the

standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC
(41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion,
Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma
voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, REUEL ABRAHAM, MILAGROS ABUEG, AVELINO ACOSTA, CAROLINA ACOSTA,
MARTIN AGSALUD, JOSEFINA AGUINALDO, GLORIA ALBANO, ANTONIO ALUNING, COSME
ALVAREZ, ISABEL ALZATE, AURORA APUSEN, TOMAS ARCANGEL, LOURDES ARJONELLO,
MANUEL AROMIN, DIONISIO ASISTIN, JOSE AURE, NICASIO AZNAR, EUGENIO AZURIN,
CLARITA BACUGAN, PIO BALAGOT, HEREDIO BALMACEDA, ESTHER BANAAG, JOVENCIO
BARBERO, MONICO BARBADILLO, HERNANDO BARROZO, FILIPINA BARROZO, REMEDIO
BARTOLOME, ANGELINA BASCOS, JOSE BATALLA, ALMARIO BAUTISTA, EUGENIO
BAUTISTA, JR., HERMALO BAUTISTA, JUANITO BAUTISTA, SEVERINO BARBANO, CAPPIA
BARGONIA, ESMERALDA BERNARDEZ, RUBEN BERNARDEZ, ALFREDO BONGER, TOMAS
BOQUIREN, ANGELINA BRAVO, VIRGINIA BRINGA, ALBERTO BUNEO, SIMEON CABANAYAN,
LUCRECIA CACATIAN, LEONIDES CADAY, ANGELINA CADOTTE, IGNACIO CALAYCAY,
PACIFICO CALUB, RUFINO CALUZA, CALVIN CAMBA, ALFREDO CAMPOSENO, BAGUILITA
CANTO, ALFREDO CARRERA, PEDRO CASES, CRESCENTE CASIS, ERNESTO CASTANEDA,
HERMINIO CASTILLO, JOSE CASTRO, LEONOR CASTRO, MADEO CASTRO, MARIA PINZON
CASTRO, PABLO CATURA, RESTITUTO CESPADES, FLORA CHACON, EDMUNDO CORPUZ,
ESTHER CRUZ, CELIA CUARESMA, AQUILINO DACAYO, DIONISIA DASALLA, SOCORRO
DELFIN, ABELARDO DIAZ, ARTHUR DIAZ, CYNTHIA DIZON, MARCIA DIZON, ISABELO
DOMINGO, HONORATA DOZA, CAROLINA DUAD, JUSTINIANO EPISTOLA, ROMEO
ENCARNACION, PRIMITIVO ESCANO, ELSA ESPEJO, JUAN ESPEJO, RIZALINA ESQUILLO,
YSMAEL FARINAS, LORNA FAVIS, DAN FERNANDEZ, JAIME FERNANDEZ, ALFREDO FERRER,
MODESTO FERRER, JR., EUGENIO FLANDEZ, GUILLERMO FLORENDO, ALFREDO FLORES,
DOMINGA FLORES, ROMEO FLORES, LIGAYA FONTANILLA, MELCHOR GASMEN, LEILA
GASMENA, CONSUELO GAROLAGA, ALFONSO GOROSPE, CESAR GOROSPE, RICARDO
GOROSPE, JR., CARLITO GUZMAN, ERNESTO DE GUZMAN, THELMA DE GUZMAN, FELIX
HERNANDEZ, SOLIVEN HERNANDO, FRANCISCO HIDALGO, LEONILO INES, SIXTO JAQUIES,
TRINIDAD JAVIER, FERMIN LAGUA, GUALBERTO LAMBINO, ROMAN LANTING, OSCAR LAZO,

ROSARIO LAZO, JOSEFINA DE LARA, AMBROSIO LAZOL, NALIE LIBATIQUE, LAMBERTO

LLAMAS, ANTONIO LLANES, ROMULA LOPEZ, ADRIANO LORENZANA, ANTONIO MACARAEG,
ILDEFONSO MAGAT, CECILIO MAGHANOY, ALFONSO MAGSANOC, AVELINA MALLARE,
AUGUSTO MANALO, DOMINADOR MANASAN, BENITO MANECLANG, JR., TIRSO MANGUMAY,
EVELIA MANZANO, HONORANTE MARIANO, DOMINGO MEDINA, MARTIN MENDOZA,
PERFECTO MILANA, EMILIO MILLAN, GREGORIO MONEGAS, CONSOLACION NAVALTA, NOLI
OCAMPO, VICENTE CLEGARIO, ELPIDIO PALMONES, ARACELI PANGALANGAN, ISIDORO
PANLASIGUI, JR., ARTEMIO PARIS, JR., FEDERICO PAYUMO, JR., NELIA PAYUMO, BITUEN PAZ,
FRANCISCO PENGSON, OSCAR PERALTA, PROCORRO PERALTA, RAMON PERALTA, MINDA
PICHAY, MAURO PIMENTEL, PRUDENCIO PIMENTEL, LEOPOLDO PUNO, REYNALDO RABE,
ROLANDO REA, CONSTANTINO REA, CECILIA RICO, CECILIO RILLORAZA, AURORA ROMAN,
MERCEDES RUBIO, URSULA RUPISAN, OLIVIA SABADO, BERNARDO SACRAMENTO, LUZ
SALVADOR, JOSE SAMSON, JR., ROMULA DE LOS SANTOS, ANTONIO SAYSON, JR.,
FLORANTE SERIL, MARIO SISON, RUDY SISON, PROCEDIO TABIN, LUCENA TABISULA,
HANNIBAL TAJANO, ENRIQUE TIANGCO, JR., JUSTINIANO TOBIAS, NYMIA TOLENTINO,
CONSTANTE TOLENTINO, TEODORO TOREBIO, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOVENCINTO TRINIDAD,
LAZARO VALDEZ, LUDRALINA VALDEZ, MAXIMINA VALDEZ, FRANCISCO VELASCO, JR.,
ROSITA VELASCO, SEVERO VANTANILLA, VENANCIO VENTIGAN, FELICITAS VENUS, NIEVES
DE VERA, ELISEO VERSOZA, SILVESTRE VILA, GLORIA VILLAMOR, ALEJANDRO
VELLANUEVA, DAVID VILLANUEVA, CAROLINA VILLASENOR ORLANDO VILLASTIQUE,
MAJELLA VILORIN, ROSARIO VILORIA, MAY VIRATA, FEDERICO VIRAY, MELBA YAMBAO,
MARIO ZAMORA, AUTENOR ABUEG, SOTERO ACEDO, HONRADO ALBERTO, FELIPE ALIDO,
VICENTE ANCHUELO, LIBERTAD APEROCHO, MARIANO BALBAGO, MARIO BALMACEDA,
DAISY BICENIO, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE, RAYMUNDO GEMERINO, LAZARO CAPURAS,
ROGELIO CARUNGCONG, ZACARIAS CAYETANO, JR., LILY CHUA, ANDRES CRUZ, ARTURO
CRUZ, BIENVENIDO ESTEBAN, PABLO JARETA, MANUEL JOSE, NESTORIA KINTANAR,
CLEOPATRIA LAZEM. MELCHOR LAZO, JESUS LUNA, GASPAR MARINAS, CESAR MAULSON,
MANUEL MEDINA, JESUS PLURAD, LAKAMBINI RAZON, GLORIA IBANEZ, JOSE SANTOS,
ELEAZAR SQUI, JOSE TAMAYO, FELIPE TENORIO, SILVINO UMALI, VICENTE ZARA,
SATURNINO GARCIA, WILLIAM GARCIA, NORMA GARINGARAO, ROSARIO ANTONIO, RUBEN
BAUTISTA, QUIRINO PUESTO, NELIA M. GOMERI, OSCAR R. LANUZA, AURORA M. LINDAYA,
GREGORIO MOGSINO, JACRM B. PAPA, GREGORIO R. RIEGO, TERESITA N. ROZUL,
MAGTANGOL SAMALA, PORFIRIO AGOCOLIS, LEONARDO MONTE, HERMELINO PATI,
ALFREDO PAYOYO, PURIFICACION ROJAS, ODANO TEANO, RICARDO SANTIAGO, and
MARCELO MANGAHAS, Respondents.
Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Trial Attorneys Manuel M. Lazaro and Vicente Constantine,
Jr., for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Renato B. Kare and Simeon C. Sato for private respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent Court
of Industrial Relations is one of constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. More
specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the
then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing

Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to
the right answer. 1It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the view of a limited or negative
state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. For as noted in an earlier decision, the welfare state
concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2It is much more so under the present
Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights.3There
is manifest, to recall Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulting in "a
state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members." 4It does not necessarily
follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions,
that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the
objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
persuasive. 5We cannot then grant the reversal sought. We affirm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with
respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services
in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime
compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential
between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. 6There was an answer
filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the
special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. 7The issues were thereafter joined,
and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence. 8After the parties submitted the
case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order
sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the
date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus
what it had already paid. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en
banc denied the same. 10Hence this petition for certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for
the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.11While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its
operation is to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of
jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour
Labor Law is not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made
clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of
petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by
Republic Act No. 2265, 12its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective
merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the
industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced
production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing
conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus
reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain,
and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the
selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair
return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying,
and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people

engaged in the tobacco industry." 13The amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, 14renders even
more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It
is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the
production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both
domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to
create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming
public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured
cigarettes." 15The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the following objectives are
hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable
prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a
sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of
imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of
one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16chanrobles virtual law library
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration decision 17and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation 18if futile. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of
the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note, speaking of the
reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what
President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),such as those relating
to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights,
those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and
those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such
constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote
the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people - these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise
of which is optional on the part of the government." 19Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively:
"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities
that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice." 20Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut
Corporation, 21based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into
constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in
economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science,22the
first edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later American
President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was categorized by him as
constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest [concept
of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the very bonds of society." 23The other functions he would
minimize as ministrant or optional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the
authoritative position which at one time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm
in Rubi v. Provincial Board 24could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of
the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity." 25The 1935
Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted in Edu v. Ericta: 26"What is
more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept oflaissez-faire was
rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems
with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its
commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." 27Nor did the opinion in Edu stop
there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on
that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear
when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast
extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the
affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the
fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is
that this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and
economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there
because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the Filipino people because we
believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those
safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and
national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision
automatically imposes." 28chanrobles virtual law library
It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration
decision about which the observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935
Constitution and is even more in consonance with the expanded role of government accorded
recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were
not heeded. That path this Court is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat
rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no constitutional obstacle to a
government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the
language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh contract which [does] obtain between
the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. 29It is a response to a trend noted by Justice
Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all
component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by
the First Lady as "a compassionate society" be attained. 31chanrobles virtual law library
2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather
than proprietary functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor
dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As far back asTabora v. Montelibano, 32this Court, speaking
through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the Government to protect the people
against excessive or unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With that main
objective there is no reason why its function should not be deemed governmental. The Government
owes its very existence to that aim and purpose - to protect the people."33In a subsequent case, Naric
Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia, 34decided four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35which specified the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of employment under the EightHour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass

upon that particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were
judicial as well as administrative and executive pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was
performing governmental functions did not suffice to confer competence on the then respondent Judge
to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages, which as pointed out by the
labor union, was connected with an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive portion
of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27,
1958, are set aside, and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and
Corn Corporation's seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial
Relations." 36Then, too, in a case involving petitioner itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, 37where the point in dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first
instance that is possessed of competence in a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be thought of as pertaining to the judiciary, the
answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of
Industrial Relations." 38Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent
Court the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies by government-owned or controlled corporations
lends to support to such an approach. 39Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that
proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that
such a view was not previously bereft of plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a
Wilsonian phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40Respondent Court clearly was vested with
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41does not apply to it hardly deserves any
extended consideration. There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its
petition for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a full page to its
discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a terse and summary
treatment appears to be a reflection more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the
possession of an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very
language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation,
whether public or private ... ." 42Nor are private respondents included among the employees who are
thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It citedMarcelo v. Philippine National Red
Cross 43and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.44Certainly, the activities to which the two above
public corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by petitioner. A
reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a
ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of
the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It
need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that
one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It
would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a
reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en
banc of May 8, 1970 denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the
Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them [private respondents] is
entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized
representative, is hereby directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the
possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit his report of his
findings to the Court for further disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code,

this case is referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings conformably to
law. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Makasiar, Muoz Palma, JJ., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Teehankee J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17467

April 23, 1963

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, represented by its Agents,

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE YULO TOBIAS, defendant-appellee.
Ramon de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellant.
Vicente Hilado for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by plaintiff, National Development Company, represented by its agent, The Philippine
National Bank, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissing plaintiff's
complaint upon the ground of prescription of action, without special pronouncement as to costs.
In said complaint, filed on March 22, 1960, plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant, Jose YULO
TOBIAS, the sum of P6,905.81, plus interest and attorney's fees, under a promissory note of said
defendant, dated and issued on May 13, 1946, for the sum of P7,000.00, payable "on demand after
date" to the order of said plaintiff. Upon being summoned, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon
the ground that "the action upon which the complaint is based has prescribed long ago," more than ten
(10) years having elapsed since May 13, 1946, when said promissory note was issued and plaintiff's
action accrued. Hence, the aforementioned order of dismissal, which plaintiff assails as erroneous upon
the theory that the statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff because the same is an
instrumentality of the Government. In support of this view plaintiff cites the case of theGovernment of
the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad (35 Phil. 738).
Plaintiffs pretense is clearly devoid of merit. The case cited is not in point, it having been instituted by
the Government of the Philippine Islands. Plaintiff herein is neither the Government of the Republic nor
a branch or subdivision thereof. It is true that plaintiff is an instrumentality of such Government, but as
this Court has held in the case of Association Cooperative de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs.
Monteclaro (74 Phil. 281), "even the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, which is a government owned and
controlled corporation and which has been created to promote agriculture and industry on a larger scale
than agriculture credit cooperative associations,cannot be said to exercise a sovereign function. It is,
like all other corporation capitalized by the Government, abusiness corporation," and, as such, its
causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations. To the same effect are the cases
of Monteadora vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co. (54 O.G. 4289), Price Stabilization Corp. vs. CIR (54
O.G. 4472), GSIS vs. Castillo (52 O.G. 4269), and Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila
Hotel Co. (73 Phil. 374).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers and, hence, can not invoke the exemptions
thereof but is an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business functions,
is apparent from its Organic Act (Commonwealth Act 182, as amended by Commonwealth Act 311)
pursuant to section 3 of which it "shall be subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as
they are not inconsistent" with the provisions of said Commonwealth Act "and shall have the general
powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law, and, hence, "may engage in commercial, industrial,
mining, agricultural, and other enterprises which may be necessary or contributory to the economic
development of the country, or important in the public interest," as well as "acquire, hold, mortgage, and
alienate personal and real property in the Philippines or elsewhere . . .; make contracts of any kind and
description" and "perform any and all acts which a corporation or natural person is authorized to
perform under the laws now existing or which may be enacted hereafter."
In fact, plaintiff was sentenced to pay costs in Batongbacal v. National Development Co. (49 O.G. 229),
andNational Development Co. vs. CIR, L-13209 (September 30, 1959), despite the fact that "no costs
shall be allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by Law," pursuant to
Rule 131, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
plaintiff-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.