G.R. No.

158228

March 23, 2004

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its

Secretary, ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
(DECS), respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7,
2003, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage

with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. 5
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of
Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are
now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6 Then, MARO Piosa
submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who
recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the
coverage of the landholdings.
On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres
approved the recommendation, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
granted. Order is hereby issued:

In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an
aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe,
Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros
Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were
donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS
(formerly Bureau of Education).2 Consequently, titles thereto were
transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 167175.3

1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of

111.4791 hectares situated at Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros
Occidental and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares
situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental;

On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo

Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of
lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop
years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 20042005.4

3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros

Occidental and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of
Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of the
subject landholdings and the distribution of the same
qualified beneficiaries.

2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR

Provincial Office, Negros Occidental dated November 23,
1994;

SO ORDERED.7
On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be
permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a

Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. 8
Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.9
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1998 (CARL).
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable
for agriculture as possible.10 Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the
coverage of CARP. It states that the program shall:
" cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific

limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or
suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.
Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The term
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity" is also defined by the same law
as follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising
of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.11
The records of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time
until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part
of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.12 Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act,
before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said
lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of
the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.

Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the

ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with
Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and
renovations of schools in the nearby locality.
Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject
hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same
are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or
campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the
land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
We agree with the petitioner.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of
their exemption, viz:
xxxxxxxxx
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act.13
xxxxxxxxx
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt
from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is
"for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."

The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used

and found to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what
respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in
their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear
and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 14
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao
University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board,15 wherein we declared the land subject thereof exempt from
CARP coverage. However, respondent DECS reliance thereon is
misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the
case at bar.
Firstly, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and
disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by the
late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 for the
use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU). 16 In this case,
however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and
campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a
"Management and Development Agreement", the undertaking was
that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as
part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty
and students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization
program developed by the CMU for its "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Project" (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program.17Hence, the retention of the land
was found to be necessary for the present and future educational
needs of the CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were

not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses,

as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as
conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract
of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the
repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality.
Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of
CARP, we disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were
not.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual
and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657, which
states:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in
coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants
and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP.
These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and
the DAR shall provide the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and
the length of tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or
wages received.

A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the

barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public
buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the
public at all reasonable hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were
potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. 18 Further, on
November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,19 it
behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was
none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion
of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to
redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth,
and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its
benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a
decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless
farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization."20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CAG.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision
dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing
the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

an reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through

its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San
Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89
of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon.
Benjamin V. Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at
the hearing of the motion.

WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has

adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development
plan, some of the vital components of which includes
the establishment of model and pilot farm for nonfood and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil
testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15
small scale technology soap making, small scale
products of plaster of paris, marine biological and
sea farming research center,and other progressive
feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide
the necessary scientific and technology know-how to
farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to
establish a housing project for provincial government
employees;

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of

inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated
December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of
P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer
for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.

WHEREAS, the province would need additional land

to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to
implement the above program component;

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked:
(a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6,
1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the
motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They
also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from

WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent

properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site
ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property
and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions
were denied in the order dated February 1990.

enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of

injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed
that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)
and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition,
the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However,
the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for
use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend
the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines
Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the
private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the
ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the
property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned
resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the
Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the
Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the
lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural
use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation
is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power
of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof
could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the
new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists
or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong
v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum
the general welfare."

It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its

exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with
the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners
raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can
expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use
of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282
hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform
program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need
under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose
is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of
competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting
that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of
8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and
reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the
power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the
Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local
government units exercise such power only by delegation.
(Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of

eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed.
950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose
certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments
(Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct.
684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of
the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which
provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or
purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government, units must first secure the approval of the Department
of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the
Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of
five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases

to be economically feasible and sound for,

agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the
affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
authorize the reclassification or conversion of the
land and its disposition:Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it
applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program
as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k)
and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be
the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the
purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority.
While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such
authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by
the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication
(Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS
2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would

naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be

the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination
and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66
S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton,
144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how
broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124
SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its
political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers,
cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the
Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation
cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the
owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held
inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules
for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit
evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for
their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned

decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies
the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court
to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it

sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended
motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

G.R. No. 127198

May 16, 2005

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R.
CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T.
BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 dated December 6, 1996 assailing
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court3 dated July 5, 1996 which
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents
the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the
States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land
reform program.
The facts follow.
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial
court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural
lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The
petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave
of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the
registered tenants of the land.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents,
particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned
by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the
State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY
PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation
due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San
Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered
to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which
were denied by the trial court in its Order5dated July 30, 1996 for
being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of
hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not
tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the
assailedDecision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July
1996,6 citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached
to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the
failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing
was due to accident and/or mistake.7 The affidavit of Land Banks
counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed
the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that
it had no notice of hearing"8 due to his heavy workload.

The trial court, in its Order9 of November 18, 1996, denied the
petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its
own negligence.
In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of
its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work
constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for
reconsideration pro formaconsidering its allegedly meritorious
defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment
was erroneous.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the
reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private
respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when
they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation
directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court
erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228)
are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in
relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the
properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks
evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Private respondents filed a Comment10 dated February 22, 1997,
averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its
motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload,
which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not
constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission
of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and
has "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."
Land Bank filed a Reply11 dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity
considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised
in its motion for reconsideration.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.12 Both parties complied.13

The petition is unmeritorious.

At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing
constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from
judgment.
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy
of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be
excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could
not have guarded against.14
Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land
Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from
ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of
hearing, was by no means excusable.
Indeed, counsels admission that "he simply scanned and signed the
Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that
it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his arrant negligence,
and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable
negligence.

The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious
if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have
"mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading." 15
Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing
is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not
even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention
of the presiding judge.16 The trial court therefore correctly considered
the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted
for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment.
It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain
instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we
never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply
only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and
their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt,
procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and
rationalize the pursuit of justice.17
Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also
resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as
regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and the question of just compensation.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the
reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to
fix just compensation with the trial court.

The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In
fact, private respondents did write a letter18 to the DAR Secretary
objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose
of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered
prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial
court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,19 we
declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative
proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner
the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the
courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.20
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the
courts of justice.
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes
of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of
PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is
likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v.
Court of Appeals,21 we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did

not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect
on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)22 before the completion of this
process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.23
Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it
does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation,
reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers
and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering
the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228,
is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 24

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due
private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature
as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court
is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of
just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and
guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 170220

November 20, 2006

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO
A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26,
2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian
Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31,
2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26,
2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c)
the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31,
2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay
over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia,
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)3 of
the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of
the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed
under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No.

27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5 The land was
thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of
the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and
bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M.
Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land
located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT
No. T-1286 of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro,
consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares
and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of
210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No.
27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued
the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted
summary administrative proceedings for determination of just
compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the
preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682
hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161
hectares (TCT No. T-128).7
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two
separate petitions8 for judicial determination of just compensation
before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No.
R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No.
T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary
Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657
(1988)9 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP
deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.

On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order10 granting

petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP

No. 77530.14

WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation

Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby
ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section
2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the
provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and
bonds, as follows:

On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary

restraining order15 and on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary
injunction.16

1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P

51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the
Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P
21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the
amount already deposited.

On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 17 in

favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of
discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003, Resolution
dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby
AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is
hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.18

Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Manila within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to
notify this court of her compliance within such period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of
the movants.
SO ORDERED.11
LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 12 dated
May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued
an Order13 directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.
Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to
deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there
is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of
the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no
reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR
already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to
farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27,
2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended
Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the
case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification
necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought
to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED

and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in
harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of
Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian
Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation
for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the
mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in
the case of Gabatin.
SO ORDERED.20
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the
immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated
properties is improper because it was erroneously computed.
Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,21 it held that the
formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value =
2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price.
Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for
the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be
computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural
land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively
deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the
amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government
support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment,
instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at
the time of the taking in 1972.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and22

B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF SUPERVISION.23
Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should
be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of
payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value
of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D.
No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 the Court
ruled thus:
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes
of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of
PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is
likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not
take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on
the payment of just compensation.
The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the
President v. Court of Appeals25 that the expropriation of the
landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on
October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of
just compensation judicially determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals,26 we held that expropriation of landholdings

covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act
on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.
In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in
1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation
therefor.1wphi1 The parcels of land were already subdivided and
distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving
petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly
inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just
compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and
not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and
the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land
although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their
names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment
of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before
the property can be taken away from its owners.27 The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are
conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.28
Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform29 is instructive, thus:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of
tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually
issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member
of a duly recognized farmers cooperative." It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be
made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of

October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the
said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers
cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x x
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case
was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to
petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No.
6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.30
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,31 we held that:
RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR
shall acquire and distribute to the landless.1wphi1And to facilitate
the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the
Act should be adhered to.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon
by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In
determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land,

the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.32

V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager

to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and
to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the
aforementioned formula.
SO ORDERED.

Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada 33 that

the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR
through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:
Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable
Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to
date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance
with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is
important considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming
(a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering
the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just
compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May
26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for
Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., ET AL., respondents.

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak
and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent
as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen
to be on his side. 1 As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice or any justice for that matter
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in
his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in
case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt
the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the
poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the

rich simply because they are rich, for justice must

always be served, for poor and rich alike, according
to the mandate of the law. 2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the
aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion
filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered
consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:
a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990 is
declared null and void insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash
or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered
to immediately deposit not merely
"earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in
trust" with an accessible bank
designated by respondent DAR in
the names of the following
petitioners the following amounts in

cash and in government financial

instruments within the
parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA
6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano
Santiago
P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated bank is
ordered to allow the petitioners to
withdraw the above-deposited
amounts without prejudice to the
final determination of just
compensation by the proper
authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to
1) immediately conduct summary ad
ministrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation for
the lands of the petitioners giving
the petitioners 15 days from
notice within which to submit
evidence and to 2) decide the
caseswithin 30 days after they are
submitted for decision. 4
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution
dated January 18, 1995, 5 denying their motion for
reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were

acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL,
Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the
Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA
6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the
validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of their properties, and the
Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to
withdraw the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9,
1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals
for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September
1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of
petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar
of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names
of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the DAR together with a certification of
the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner
Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by

TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in

lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the
names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D")
without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of
RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and
Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the
heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a
parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an
area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F.
Santiago; that in November and December 1990,
without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank
required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers
Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to
the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent
to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24
October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an
order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner
directly or through the establishment of a trust fund
in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February
1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in
the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX
"E";Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to
the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's
Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay
rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).

The above allegations are not disputed by the

respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank
which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed
of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the
ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the
substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and
Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity)
alleges with respect to its properties located in
San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of
AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an
area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189
hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding
to determine compensation of the property covered
by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in
Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a
decision was rendered on 24 November 1992
(ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering
the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for
said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the
trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in
the decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established
on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to
petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it
is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco,
Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register
of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578
hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued
covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were

registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was

taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation
for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in
the name of AMADCOR was established in the
amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of
acquisition having been previously rejected by
AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the
respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims that petitioner failed to participate in the
DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite
due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100). 8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series
of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible
bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e)
of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR
and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite
the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9
is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of
RA 6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et
al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14,
1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of private respondents. 14Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and
is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed
decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the motion and instead
required the respondents to file their comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null
and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as
it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash
or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled
as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the
amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it
has filed for just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word
"deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the
act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust
account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a
trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared
policies of RA 6657.

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as

follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with
an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the
term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by
the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment.18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of
promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised

only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect.
The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule
that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property
because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations
cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court
therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents
are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf
pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation
of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the
deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of the
same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to
withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final
valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or
that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited
in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by
the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and

intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final

valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the
following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform". 22
The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent
domain.
xxx xxx xxx
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence the argument that the assailed measures
violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court
in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:
. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the
expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led
the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that

"payments of the just compensation is not always

required to be made fully in money" even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the
traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other" the
Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the
"recognized rule . . . that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the
"Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a
deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and
recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense
with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is
transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of
just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the
right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited
in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they
have already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The
irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more
by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case)
that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private
respondents, which the Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional

compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:
. . . within the context of the State's inherent power
of eminent domain, just compensation means not
only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of
the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to
remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the
true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving its
implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due
time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the
rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are
also entitled to protection. 26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D.
AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,
ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO
ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A.
IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO
LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L.
NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T. PATIO,
ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN,
CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO

TCT No. T-287/E

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT No. T-297/E

TCT No. T-829/E

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-913/E

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-944/E

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN

TCT No. T-302/E

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.

TCT No. T-290/E

7. EDGAR DUENAS

TCT No. T-949/E

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL

TCT No. T-952/E

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA

TCT No. T-950/E

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO

TCT No. T-928/E

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE

TCT No. T-909/E

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA

TCT No. T-288/E

TCT No. T-401/E

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ

TCT No. T-973/E

14. TERESITA NACION

TCT No. T-900/E

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR

TCT No. T-825/E

16. NELSON L. NULLAS

TCT No. T-396/E

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the Resolutions 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003,
respectively.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at
Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:

Petitioners

17. CARLITO S. OLIA

TCT No. T-910/E

18. ROBERTO T.PATIO

TCT No. T-912/E

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA

TCT No. T-914/E

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO

TCT No. T-923/E

21. PATERNO P. SAIN

TCT No. T-954/E

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and

TCT No. T-891/E

23. JOEMARIE VIBO

TCT No. T-893/E

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the
surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land
also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with
their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:

(Deceased) Registered Owners

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA

TCT No. T-920/EP N

2. RAFAEL PATIO

TCT No. T-929/EP N

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this

Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been
denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons,
occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public
lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in
their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines
through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was
issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land
with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Lot No.

Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land

Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and
Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308
hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Area
(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls 4

28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls 4

11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls 4

487.47

TOTAL

527.83

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued

mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that
527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage
of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI
allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings
so that the same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a
parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares
covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR
approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended
PMS covering the entire landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant
proceedings, including the determination of the Average Gross

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor

of petitioners, among other persons, which was registered with the
Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-30771661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308
hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and
approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs
covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking
the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No.
27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT
No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to
either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no
compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later
consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the
disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners.
HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares
under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire
landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position
Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs
and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential
Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was

based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria

Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special

circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum
shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case
at bar.

After the DARAB denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the

latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed
Resolution:

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the

Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62,
which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in
the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same.

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification

of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is
one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of
Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign
for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was

executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners,
such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby
rendering the petition fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and

necessarily DISMISSED.6
Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative
Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his CoPetitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the
following assailed Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated
on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to
be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that their
belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified
as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice x x x"
It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal
basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover,
granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed
could cure the petitions defect, the requirement of personal
knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of
the other petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had
been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are
ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their
registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.net
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification Against
Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded
by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the
filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and
agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a
situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to
resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."8 Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote,
not frustrate, justice.9 The same guidelines should still apply in
interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff
or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters
mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin
v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11 that the
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or
any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In
Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,12 we likewise held that:
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the
external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of non-forum
shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and

not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do

so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for
the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case
of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was
signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective.
Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal
party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any
action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner
Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the
certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his copetitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It
cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of
his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar
actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by
the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed
the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
(Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking
relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman charging them with
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at
the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of
jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.14 There being only five
petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain
the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-accused is immediately
apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must
show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the

certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are

farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan
del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have
to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the
absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are
located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation,
habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing
old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a
non-government organization engaged in development work) are
based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of
the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of
record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the
initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was
able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition
due to very meager resources of their farmers organization, the
Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa
Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo
was dismissed, petitioners counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried
earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the
SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named
petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some could not
be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in
other towns, while some already died because of old age. 15 Be that
as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are
not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances
recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of the rules on the
certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at
bar,16 without discussing the circumstances adduced by the
petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for
the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly
in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special
circumstances that would justify the suspension or relaxation of the
rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping,
such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission,17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a certificate
against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a
board resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate.
Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for
Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the
same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it
was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretarys
certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by
petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the
signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so
evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioners motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that
there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no
attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate,
the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is
a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are
intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a
deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to
attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is
the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and
Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336
SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of
petitioners resident manager to sign the certification against forum
shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter
dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for
Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before
the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is

generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a
petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed
the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the
certification one day after the filing of an election protest as
substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court
allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of
the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys
petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy
submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping
certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring
verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be
considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify
tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused
non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of nonforum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized
to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on
behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the

certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the
requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping.
Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a
laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the
apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the case as a special
circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case,
and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of
justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the
certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where
the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were
special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict
application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the
apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x
There were even cases where we held that there was complete noncompliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, but
we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De
Guia,20 petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of
respondents Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against
forum shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping,
substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the
appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of
respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their
claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power

of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to

do justice."
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the noncompliance was disregarded because of the principle of social
justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their
respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not
correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the
petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural
lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright
dismissal of their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on
their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and capital.
After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations
of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result
would be detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of
argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified
for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the
apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as
indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The DARAB,
however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian
reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and

cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the

Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is
not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of
title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as
certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the
instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141,
as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529,
fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is
open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless,
the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal
that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D.
1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by
the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in
accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore,
corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary
registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied
for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the
land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance
with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a
family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and

cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the

title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected
to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the
Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with
the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and
suspicion on the governments system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of
the State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of
government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the
possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest,
just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative
proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in
the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law,
regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be
construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into
the possession of his homestead after complying with the
requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law
should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by
the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in
accordance with law.23
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenantfarmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the
TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same
protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the

patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the

subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to
another person."25
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang,
Jr.26 :
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the
character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue
thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other
words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate
of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding.(Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes
Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs
are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of
title issued in registration proceedings.
The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of
title was raised for the first time on appeal with the DARAB, does not
hold water because said issue was already raised before the
RARAD.28
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the
EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the Republic Act No.
6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with
CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to

the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more

time and resources of the government.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation
more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed
of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years
after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated
by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just
compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered
under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No.
27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations
by petitioners:
(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to
oust petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;
(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property
from 1972 onwards and never protested petitioners act of
declaring the same for realty taxation;
(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares,
signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the area
of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice
and corn lands;
(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing
the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs
and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their
successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
Original Grantees

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO

TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR

TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,

TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.

TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS

TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL

TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA

TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO

TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE

TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA

TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ

TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION

TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR

TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS

TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

Chief Justice
Chairperson

17. CARLITO S. OLIA

TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIO

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO

TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
TCT No. T-914/EP No.Associate
A-037830Justice
Acting Chairman
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848

21. PATERNO P. SAIN

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
Associate Justice

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON

TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO

TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
TCT No. T-920/EP
No. A-037832
of the Courts
Division.

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA

25. RAFAEL PATIO
Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

Asscociate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN