Hegel and the End of Europe

Author(s): Thomas Mertens

Source: ARSP: Archiv fr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy, Vol. 89, H. 1 (2003), pp. 38-52
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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Thomas

Mertens,

Hegel

and the End of Europe

Nijmegen

in discussions
on the nature and
The issue
of Europe's
identity often arises
and in
of Europe
future of the European
Union. This paper prsents
Hegel's
conception
of
the mirror of this philosophy,
it is suggested,
Europe's
early 19th Century understanding
its place in the world. When discussing
Hegel, particular attention will be glven to the final
Abstract:

of the Philosophy
section
of Right, the often, but unjustly, neglected
para
concluding
"World History". Having outlined the structure of the rational State ear
graphe concerning
in this section,
the significance
of this state's
lier in his work Hegel,
emphasises
develop
to examine
it necessary
the way Hegel
ment. In order to understand
this fully, I consider
in his Lectures
on the Philosophy
of History. I
contrasts
and the other continents,
Europe
will pay particular
on the "Geographica!
Basis
of World History."
attention to the chapter
derives
its identity
Since
The resuit is a rather clear image of Europe's
Europe
superiority.
over other continents
and non-Europeans,
here by emphasising
its superiority
Hegel's
idea of Europe
as the 'absolute
West' can no longer be upheld.

1. Introduction
The rapid development of what, since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), is called the Euro
pean Union has been accompanied by many questions regarding the nature of Eu
rope. Within the realm of history and political sciences scholars ask to what extent the
dream of a federal Europe constituted the reason for starting the process of integra
ting European nation-states after World War II. Within the sphere of constitutional law
it is asked whether the mature institutions of the European Union require the formula
tion of a European constitution. Some have expressed doubts: the success of such an
enterprise, they argue, is dpendent on the emergence of a 'European people'. Since
no such European 'Demos' exists yet, the only legitmate units of European intgra
tion are its constituent parts, that is, the contracting states.1 The dmocratie deficit
within the Union cannot simply be overcome by extending the legislative powers of
the European Parliament, since democracy dpends on 'pluralism, internai repre
sentativity, freedom and capacity for compromise', in short, on a public sphere. And
this is precisely what is lacking at the European level. Consequently the European
Union can only exist as a Europe of the nations.2 Others, however, whilst acknowl
edging the difficults inherent in establishing a sense of belonging withinthe Europe
an Union argue that the values of autonomy and self-regulation associated with de
mocracy can no longer be upheld within the narrow bounds of the European nation
states. Within a globalising economy, the cration of regional rgimes like the Euro

Court, Judgment of October 12, 1993, 89 BvertGE 155. An illuminating

by J.H.H. Weiler, Demos, Telos, Ethos and the Maastricht Dcision, in: P. Gowan
(ed.), The Question of Europe, New York, London 1997, 265-294
Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Ques
tion of Europe, 1997, 251

German

Constitutional

comment

sgiven
and P. Anderson

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Hegel

and the End of Europe

39

pean Union, is necessarily to uphold the demands of democracy.3 Why not see itas a
task for Europeans to attempt to bring about an integrated public sphere and a com
mon political identityon a Europe-wide basis?4
Within philosophy it is asked whether it is possible to rely on some common past
or hritage when tryingto establish such a European transnational identity. However,
when addressing the question of what constitutes Europe's identity,scholars tend to
advance general and broad notions that are of limited use. In particular, they refer to
'partially shared' traditions like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institu
tions, Judeo-Christian ethics and cultural hritages such as Renaissance humanism,
rationalism and empiricism.5 For obvious reasons, however, these traditions and hr
itages are of little use when attempting to delineate Europe. Christianity has deep
roots in Georgia and Armenia, but in Europe's recent history Muslim Bosnia's capital
Sarajevo plays a much more prominent role. Furthermore, these 'partially shared'
traditions only encompass Europe's positive aspects, as if it does not have its dark
sides too. The Thirty Years War, the slave-trade, colonialism and the Holocaust, to
mention only a few examples, define Europe's history as much as Enlightenment and
liberal democracy.
Maybe forthat reason, Europe has never been a prvalent theme in philosophical
literature. It appears that European thinkers have never seriously reflected upon the
fact that they lived in the 'headland', Asia's cape.6 They were fascinated by reason
and not by the territoriallocation of the cave they were tryingto leave. How then can
I suggest here that the concept of
the issue of Europe's identity be approached?
biography might be helpful: let us have a look at a couple of biographies writtenabout
Europe. Of course, we have to take into account that individuis as well as societies
tend to 'rationalise' their lives. Biographies, including those devoted to Europe, need
to be understood with caution since they often contain a mix of self-justification, ne
glect of others and self-complacency.
Europe's oldest biography is the well-known myth according to which Europe is a
beautiful Phoenician, i.e. Asian, princess, the daughter of Agenor who originally came
from Egypt. Zeus, the suprme among the Greek Gods, feil in love with her. In order
to marry

her,

he transformed

himself

into a bull, kidnapped

her and

took

her to Crete.7

Thus, Europe originated in Asia and moved westwards by means of a divine destiny
that eradicated her from her homeland. As a consquence,
Europe now lives in close
proximityto the divine world and we Europeans are the grandchildren of this marriage
between the daughter of Asia and the suprme God. Because of this origin in Logos,
philosophy itself is the European way of being, to be contrasted with non-philosophi
cal attitudes 'abroad'. The most profound account of the contrast between these two
ways of life can be found in Hegel's understanding of world history, a prominent ex
ample of Europe's modem biography.

J. Habermas,
Reply to Grimm, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Question of Europe, 1997,
261 ; Idem, The European
Nation State. Its Achievements
and Its Limitations. On the Past and
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, Ratio Jurist (1996), 135-137
Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three
E.g. J.H.H. Weiler, The European
pean LawReview22
(1997), 150-156.
A.D. Smith, National Identity and European
tion of Europe, 1997, 334
I borrow this vocabulary
1992.

from: J. Derrida,

Unity, in: P. Gowan

The OtherHeading.

Immodest

and P. Anderson
Refiections

Histories

(ed.),

on Today's

ana

Herodote,

Proposais,

I, 2; IV, 45

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Euro

The Ques

Europe,

Indi

Thomas

40

2. Cosmopolitanism

versus

Mertens

World History

To a certain extent, it is astonishing that Hegel's thinking of Europe is as eurocentric

as it is, since he could have benefited from the doubts and hsitations expressed by
Rousseau and Kant. Of course, Kant's thinking is also eurocentric to a certain degree.
When giving an example of the categohcal imperative that one ought to develop one's
own talents Kant contrasts the European active life of self-improvement with the lifeof
South Sea Islanders who, he argues, let their talents rust and devote their lives solely
to idleness, procration and enjoyment.8 Similarly, when Kant attempts to give an
adquate description of the diffrentnations in his Anthropologie, he describes only
European nations and pays no attention to non-European nations. According to Kant,
however, this apparent superiority of the Europeans over other human beings does
not give them a privileged legal status. When dealing with law and international rela
tions, Kant not only focuses on how European states ought to behave towards one
another, but also on establishing just relations with non-European nations. Nations,
Kant suggests, ought to respect one another's autonomy and rightto self-determina
tion, this being a categorical demand, irrespective of the degree in which a nation has
civilised itself. European nations cannot, therefore, claim any rightto vilate the way
of life in non-European continents. Furthermore, all human communities, not just the
modem European ones, deserve to be respected. Kant explicitly formultes this in the
so-called third definitive article for a perpetual peace, which states: "cosmopolitan
rightshould be limited to conditions of universal hospitality".9 The negative formula
tion is due to Kant's distinction between 'the rightof a guest' and 'the rightof a visitor':
cosmopolitan rightentails the latter but not the former. Thus, on the basis of cosmo
politan rightevery human being has the right not to be treated with hostilitywhen he
arrives, either voluntarily or by accident, on the territoryof another community. Fur
thermore,

he

also

has

the

right to attempt

to enter

into peaceful

relations

with

native

inhabitants. Cosmopolitan rightdoes not, however, grant a foreigner the rightto stay
as long as he wishes. Such permit, according to Kant, would require a particular agree
ment between the foreigner and this host community. Foreigners are not entitled to
unlimited residency or citizenship. On the contrary, in Kant's view, a community has
the rightto turn down a foreigner's request to settle and can expel him from its territo
ry.10

This cosmopolitan article is famous on account of its criticism on colonialism. The

clearest example of violating cosmopolitan right is, according to Kant, the lack of
respect which Europeans often show for the life of the native non-European popula
tions. Some of the so-called civilised states of the European continent have even, in
violation of this article, conquered their territories and enslaved the resident popula
tions.1 1 The lgitimation of this violent practice is, Kant argues, built on the erroneous

8
9

I. Kant, Grundlegung
Berlin 1902, 423

zur Metaphysik

der Sitten, Akademie

Ausgabe

(=AA)

Band

IV, De Gruyter

I. Kant, Zum

ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 357 (Transi, in: Reiss, H. (ed.), Kant's Poiiticai Writings,
on the national and
1970, 105); The other two definitive articles aim at republicanism
on the international level respectively.
I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 358 (Ed. Reiss, 105-6); This right to expel a foreigner does
not have unlimited validity; he can only be turned away, if it is done without endangering
his life.

Cambridge
federalism
10

11

this restriction is known as the principie of non-refoulement, one of the key principies of
Nowadays
See: Th. Mertens, Cosmopolitanism
and Citizenship: Kant against Habermas,
Euro
refugee-law;
pean Journal of Phiiosophy 4 (1996), 328-347.
I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 358 (Ed. Reiss, 106)

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Hegel

and the End of Europe

41

argument that large parts of the world would remain almost uninhabited without the
establishment of colonies and that people living there would lack a rightfulcondi
tion.12 In contrast with this common European practice, Kant strongly dfends the
of thelr terrltories, even if they are
rights of indigenous peoples as firstpossessors
shepherds and hunters and therefore dpendent on large areas of wasteland.
At firstsight there seems to be a great deal of similarity between the approach
endorsed by Kant and the one taken by Hegel. Both seem to envisage three levels
within the concept of right. In Kant's view, relations between Citizens should be gov
emed by a republican constitution, relations between states by federalism and rela
tions between states and non-citizens by cosmopolitanism. In this way, ail possible
relations between inhabitants of this world corne to be governed by law. Hegel's Phi
3
losophy of Rig hfi also contains three levels of analysis, but, as we will see, they are
diffrent
from
the Kantian ones. Here we need to be very precise. Reference is
very
not to the three main parts of the work: Abstract Right, Morality and Ethical Life, or to
the threefold structure of Ethical Life: Family, Civil Society and State, but rather to the
threefold structure withinthe subdivision of the 'State', wherein most elements of what
normally belongs to a legal philosophy can be found. From the headings one gets the
impression that Hegel deals with constitutional law first,develops international law
next and ends with an exposition of world history. The diffrences between Kant and
Hegel would then simply concern the very end of their legal philosophies and could be
reduced to the opposition between cosmopolitanism and world history. On this view
Hegel would describe a gradually progressive movement, which Starts with the state,
develops into international law and finally answers the question of how this ethical
construction of state and international law can be institutionalised within world histo
ry.14This impression, however, is false and the diffrences between the two are fun
damental.
This becomes self-evident ifone takes seriously the fact that it is the chapter on
the State, which contains three parts. This suggests that ail three parts are to be seen
from the perspective of the State, a view which is confirmed by a literal translation of
the headings of the three (sub-)subdivisions. They are not constitutional law, interna
tional

law

and

world

history

but rather

as

follows:

The State:
A. The internal law of the state:
A I: Internai constitution for itself;
A ILThe sovereignty against outside;
B: The external law of the state;
C: World history.15

I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, 62,15; AA VI, 353, 266 (Transi, in M.J. Gregor
ofMoris, Cambridge
1991, 159, 86-7)
(ed.), /. Kant. The Metaphysics
Rfrencs
to Hegel's
Phiiosophy of Right (Rph) will be given in brackets in the text. The first
des Rechts,
Paragraph or page number will refer to: G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie
Merke (ed. by E. Molderhauer
und K.M. Michel, Frankfurt), Bd. 7, 1968. A second page number
may refer to the English translations: Knox: Hegei's Phiiosophy of Right (transi, with notes by T.M.
Knox), Oxford 1952; Elements: G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Phiiosophy of Right (ed. A. Wood;
1991.
transi. H.B. Nisbet), Cambridge
in: G.W.F. Hege/, Grundlinien der Philosophie
des
In this line: H. Ottman, Die Weltgeschichte,
Rechts (ed. L. Siep), Klassiker Auslegen Band 9, Berlin 1997, 267-286;
S. Smith, Hegei's Critique
of Liberaiism, University of Chicago Press 1989,163-4,
211-2.
Knox translates:
foreign states;

The State: A) Constitutional Law: A I) The Constitution, A II) Sovereignty vis--vis

B) International Law; C) World History. Wood translates: The State: A) Constitution

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Thomas

42

Mertens

Wheri analysing Hegel's Philosophy of Right, scholars usually pay most attention
to the largest section of the internal law of the State (A I). Here, Hegel discusses key
elements of 'his' State, namely monarchical sovereignty, executive and legislative
powers. Problems and solutions related to interstate relations are located in the rela
tively small sections A II and B. In these parts, Hegel attempts to refute the Kantian
arguments in favour of restricting state sovereignty and establishing enforceable in
ternational law. Both parts describe a diffrent aspect: section A II emphasises the
importance of war for ethical communities such as nation states and the bnficiai
effects of the possibility of war on the internai organisation of the state. The complete
absence of war is therefore considered undesirable. Section B emphasises the im
possibility of overcoming war by means of international law, as this would prsuppos
the consent of the participating states and this would only be forthcoming for as long
as international law coincided with their interests. Since each individual state is guid
ed by its own interests in international relations, the situation of permanent peace is
unattainable.16 Translating "B. Das ussere Staatsrecht" into "B. International Law" is
therefore misleading, since it suggests that international law restricts state law. He
gel, however, makes clear that international law is not powerful enough to do so.
State law, so it is argued in section C, is only restricted by world history. This final
section therefore provides us with an important understanding of the significance of
the modem state.17 Thus, rather then being a dull appendix, section C dialectically
reveis the significance of the whole of the preceding work. In my view, Hegel is
arguing here that the modem constitutional monarchy as outlined in A I is the highest
product of world history and that it can be found only in the Germanie18 part of Eu
rope.
In order to make this clear, a close examination of the transition from B to C is
needed as some scholars have drawn a rather diffrentconclusion from the fact that
Hegel ends his Philosophy of Right with a section on world history. They argue that
we are confronted with turmoil of passions, interests, ends, talents and virtues, and of
course violence when looking at world history. Within this turmoil, the existence of the
ethical whole of the state (as in A I) seems a matter of contingency. By referringto
world history, Hegel would thus affirmthe finitude of the state reminding his audience
that the state belongs to the sphere of 'objective spirit' and not to the ultmate 'abso

al Law:

A I) The

Internal Constitution,

A II) External

Sovereignty;

B) International

Law;

C) World

History.
For similar attempts see: A. Peperzak,
Hegel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The contra
dictions of International Politics, Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994), 241-263,
esp.
244-6.
An Analysis of Hegel's Philosophy
Th. Mertens, Hegel's Homage to Kant's PerpetualPeace.
The Review of Politics 57 (1995), 665-691.
321-340,
ofRlght
of Freedom (New
tend not to believe this. E.g., in his Hegel's
Some Hegel-scholars
Philosophy
Hven, London, 1999, 337) P. Franco writes: "I do not intend to gove a detailed account of this
See:

of world history here, since to do so would take us far beyond the scope of this chapter" (on
State', ThM).
as 'Germanie', instead of as 'German', with S. Avineri, Hegel's
Theory of
Translating 'Germanisch'
the Modem State, Cambridge
1972, 228; J. McCarney,
Philosophy
Hegel on /ife//j^Routledge
dialectic

'The Rational

do not agree with Avineri who includes France, Italy and Spain
Guidebook),
Routledge 2000,146.1
into 'Germanie'.
On the basis of Rph, 358: '... nordischen
Volket, I
Prinzip der germanischen
and 'Romanic'
and with
here is between
'Germanie'
that the opposition
agree with McCarney
Walsh's suggestion that 'Germanie' would mean 'Anglo-Saxon
protestantism', W.H. Walsh, Princi
pie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, in: Z.A. Pelczynski
1971, 183, 192.
ophy. Problems and Perspectives,
Cambridge

(ed.),

HegeTsPoliticalPhilos

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Hegel

and the End of Europe

43

lute spirit'. 'World history' is the acknowledgement that the spirit does not find a com
pletely satisfactory habitat in the external sphere of social and legal institutions but
demands a final progressive step into the realm of art, religion and philosophy.19 The
Encyc/opeda-ve rsio n of Hegel's legal philosophy seems to confirm this by ending
with an extensive remark on the relationship between state and religion.20 Conse
quently, the 'law' that transcends the law of individual states is not international law,
but the absolute rightof the spirit,which reigns over all the finitespirits in world history
as the world's court of justice.21 In contrast to the ultmate 'real' spirit of the world, ail
particular forms of worldly life like civil society and the spirits of nations are, according
to Hegel, 'ideal', which is 'non-real'. The movement of the spirit is to exhibit this truth.22
In my opinion, however, there is a forceful objection to the above analysis. It can
not be denied that the exposition on world history takes place withinthe general sec
tion on the state. Therefore it seems likely that world history aims at adding to the
understanding of the state itself. Hegel's remark that world history is not simply a
verdict of mere power,23 confirms this. Since reason is the spirit of the world, world
historyconsists of moments in a progressive development as the exposition and actu
alisation of the universal spirit.24 So it is suggested that world history (C) indicates the
stage of development at which the modem constitutional monarchy (A I) must be
located. Consequently, while B gives an international understanding of the state, C
adds the world-historical understanding. Like individuis, nations and states have their
own particular principies and are preoccupied by their own interests. Ultimately only
the spirit of the world, having as its objective the universal ralisation of reason, is
able to use those particular principies and interests for its own end. It intgrtes them
as instruments and organs for its own development from one stage into higher ones.
In comparison with the enormous process of the spirit in its own absolute right,l
ments of daily life, like justice and virtue, wrongdoing and violence, guilt and inno
cence, have only limited meaning and significance. (Rph, 345)
According to Hegel, this philosophical understanding of human historydiffersfrom
the two current methods of approaching history, namely the 'original' writingof histo
ry,consisting of no more than the description of deeds, events and stages of society,
and the 'reflective' writing of history which organises historical facts in accordance
with some general, but arbitrary, point of view. A philosophical approach to world
history conceives of history as a process of necessity that originates in the spirit itself.
In contrast with 'original' history, a philosophical approach accepts that events are
organised and, unlike in the 'reflective' history tradition, the organising principie is
necessary rather than arbitrary. According to this underlying principie, reason is the
sovereign of the world and world history prsents us with a rational process.25 God's
E. Weil, Hegel et l'tat,
J.N. Findlay, Hegel. A Re-examination,
London, New York 1970, 334-5;
Paris 1974, 73; A.W. Wood, Hege/'s Ethical Thought, Cambridge
He
1990, 219-21 ; A. Peperzak,
gel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The contradictions of International Pol itics, 242-3
G.W.F.

der philosophischen
Wissenschatten,
Hegel, Enzyklopdie
und K.M. Michel), Bd. 10, Frankfurt 1968, 522
Rph, 340, Hegel here quotes Schiller's poem Resignation.
G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie
der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
and Z.

Werke (ed. by E. Molderhauer

522;

See

also:

Rph, 342: "... nicht das blosse Gericht seiner Macht,..."

Or as the process by which reason is incorporated into reality (Rph, 270 Anm. 419;
294).
G.W.F.

324 Anm.

Elements,

ber die Philosophie

Werke (ed. by E. Molderhauer
der Geschichte,
Hegel, Vorlesungen
und K.M. Michel), Bd. 12, Frankfurt 1968, 20. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy ofHistory
(Transi. J. Sibree), London 1857, 9; I will follow the Sibree-translation.

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44

Thomas

Mertens

wisdom is not only displayed in plants, animais and isolated occurrences, but also in
the whole of the process of history as progress of the consciousness
of freedom.26
This is not, however, a continuous development but takes place in several successive
stages, each represented by a particular nation within its geographica! and anthropo
logical existence. (Rph, 346) Reason's governance of history is not restricted to
human actions, but it embraces all the natural and spiritual circumstances in which
they are embedded too. As we shall see, Hegel does not mention geographical l
ments accidentally here.
Within each successive stage of historical development, particular nations play a
key role and at each stage of world history, the spirit is represented by one dominant
nation. World history can therefore be presented as a sequence of 'world historical'
nations. As soon as a nation becomes the bearer of a particular epoch of the develop
ment of the world spirit, this nation has an absolute right;the spirits of other nations
are without any claims and do not count. (Rph, 347) Obviously, states do not 'act' in
any meaningful sense. Thus, interpretingworld history as a sequence of 'world histo
rical' nations ieads to the acknowledgement of the importance of the so-called 'world
historical' individuis:27 those who, in Hegel's view, act out the substantial moments
of the world spirit. These individuis do not, however, know that they are fulfillingthe
task of the world spirit. Despite following their own particular objectives and interests,
however, they bring about successive stages in world history. (Rph, 348) Reason
thus manages to use the private passions of such individuis as a means to further
the stages of historical development. As a consquence, such individuis ought not to
be valued by the ordinary standards of their contemporaries: no man is a hero to his
servant, not because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a servant.28
However, the philosophical approach to history does accept that 'world historical' indi
viduis have insight into the requirements of their epoch, even ifthey are unconscious
of the way in which such requirements relate to the spirit. Such 'heroes' must there
fore be acknowledged as having been the most clear-sighted of their time and their
deeds and words the best of their time.29 They express the substantial deeds of the
world spirit. Therefore they are, so Hegel writes, 'immediately identical' with it. (Rph,
348)
Of course, a new question now arises: what exactly do such 'spiritual' heroes do to
cause history to progress in this way? The answer is given in PhUosophy of Right's
key paragraphs 349-350, in which the thesis that reason orchestrtes history is linked
with the thesis that progress takes shape in the form of a sequence of world historical
realms. In order for a human Community to be part of history and respected by other
communities it must, according to Hegel, make the transition from the initial stage of
being merely a people, in the form of an extended family, tribe, kinship group or a
mass of human beings, to being a state. Without such 'state'-form, a people lacks the
objectivity of a universally valid existence for both itself and for others and without
such objective legality or firmlyestablished rationality,the independence of such peo
ple is merely formal and does not amount to sovereignty. Thus, a Community living in
26
27
28
29

G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

der Geschichte,
Hegel, Vorlesungen
58; G.W.F, Hegel, Lectures on
the Phitosophy of History, 16
See also: S. Avineri, Hege/'s Theory of the Modern State, 230-234.
Critical of Avineri's account:
A.W. Wood, Heget's Ethicat Thought, 226-8.
G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phitosophy of History, 33
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
the Phitosophy of History, 32

der Geschichte,

48. G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,

46. G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

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Hege!

and the End of Europe

45

a patriarchal form would not need to be recognised by peoples, which have already
attained the form of a State. The study of human history can therefore be restricted to
communities that have managed to overcome their initial lawless situation by means
of legal dterminations and objective institutions such as marriage and agriculture.
Now the answer is given to what heroic, 'world histrica!' individuis do. They have
the task of founding the State. Even if their founding acts appear to be violent and
unjust, they have an absolute rightto act in this way. (Rph, 350)
This 'world historie' preference for the State created by heroes enables Hegel to
create a hierarchy of the vast variety of human communities. Thus, civilised nations
are to be preferred to barbaran peoples. Amongst barbaran peoples, however, agri
culturist societies must be given preference over pastoral people who, in their turn,
rightlytreat hunters as barbarians. Hegel's Philosophy of Rightas a philosophy of the
State also crtes a hierarchy within the class of state-organised societies. The world
spiritOrders the historical states according to four principies, starting with the principie
of natural immediaey and ending with that of freedom. These four principies corre
spond with four 'world historical' realms, namely:
The principie of the substantial spirit embodied in the Oriental realm.
The principie of subjective knowledge of this substantial spirit withinthe Greek realm.
The principie of the abstract universality within the Roman realm and, finally:
The principie of the reconciliation of substantiality and subjectivity within the Germa
nie Realm, in which the opposition between objective state-organisations and the
subjective quest for truthand freedom has disappeared. (Rph, 353)
These four realms and their process of an ever-growing awareness of truth and
freedom must be discussed in some detail in order to determine Europe's status in
Hegel's legal philosophy. In this way, the implications of Hegel's preference for the
Germanie State become evident. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to fillin
some gaps in Hegel's reasoning. Why does Hegel not discuss or even mention hu
man societies in Africa, America or Australia, thus suggesting that these continents
and their inhabitants do not count from a 'world historical' perspective? Could this be
explained by the absence of state-organisations in these rgions of the world? Why
did such organisations develop in Asia and Europe only? The key to the answer lies,
I think, in Hegel's remark that the successive stages in the development of world
history are symbolised by one particular nation both in its anthropological and its ge
ographica!existence.
(Rph, 346) This remark can only be understood when paying
attention to an often-neglected section in Hegel's Lectures ort the Philosophy of His
tory.

3. Europe

as the 'absolute'

West

Although Hegel's so-called "Philosophy of History" is based only on student's notes,

the text has attracted considerable attention, due partlyto the fact that these lectures,
in contrast with many other parts of Hegel's oeuvre, are rather accessible. The intro
duction, known as "Reason in History", is even famous.30 Not much attention is nor
mally paid, however, to the chapter on "Geographica! Foundation of World History",

30

G.W.F.

in History: a general Introduction to the PhHosophy of History (transi., with

Hegel, Reason
an Introd. by R.S. Hartman), New York 1953. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the PhHosophy of World
in ///sto/y(trans!. H.B. Nisbet), Cambridge
1975; A general introduc
History: Introduction; Reason
tion s: J. McCarney, Hegel on History.

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Thomas

46

Mertens

situated between this introduction and the description of the four world-historic realms
already mentioned in connection with the Philosophy of Right. However, this chapter
is not unimportant as it focuses on the important geographica! and climatic precondi
tions of world history. Here too Hegel holds that the world in all its forms and stages
consists of an manation of Reason. Therefore, geography necessarily belongs to
the development of the spirit and constitutes the 'infrastructure' of political history, so
to speak. Reason acting as 'stage manager' to the heroic 'world historical' actors such
as the founders of states and firstlawgivers like Caesar or Napoleon must be consid
ered as having set the geographica! scene too. Because "God's providence governs
the world" and "the carrying out of his plan is the history of the world",31 geography is
part of that overall plan.32 World history as the appearance of the spirit manifests itself
not only in time, but also in space and in the character of the peoples as the offspring
of the soil. Such reasoning brings Hegel to his central thesis: whether a people is able
to posit itself as a world-historical people dpends on geographica! and climatic con
ditions. A people can only play a role in world history if its natural 'infrastructure' is
neither too dominant or too bnficiai. No 'world historical' people can be found
where it is either too cold or too warm, that is, where nature's power is so strong as to
keep people from developing towards free movement. History's theatre is therefore
only to be found in the moderate rgions of the world and, more specifically, in the
moderate rgions of the Northern Hemisphere. Although the Southern Hemisphere
contains moderate rgions as well, it is divided 'into many far ends', while the North
ern Hemisphere of the earth prsents itself 'in a continental form'. According to Hegel,
there is strong empirical evidence forthis: the north contains a larger variety of animal
and plant species with common characteristics, whereas in the south species often
have individual and distinctive features which contrast sharply with each other.33
Thus, Hegel's conception of geography immediately confronts us with two distinc
tions: a distinction between moderate and extreme and a distinction between the two
hemispheres. World history has a clear preference for the moderate climate of the
North. Hegel adds the furtherdistinction between the 'old' and 'new' parts of the world.
Although, geologically, the newly discovered continents of the Americas and Australia
are of the same age as the Old World, the 'newer' territories, it is argued, are both
physically and psychologically less well developed. This view is supported by 'empir
ical evidence': rivers in New-Holland, for instance, have not properly embedded them
selves; the people living there are quite small and are less powerful. As a resuit, the
indigenous people of northern America are unable to contend with the activity of the
European immigrants and are consequently driven backwards to the western territo
ries. In southern America, the indigenous people are treated even more harshly and it
will, so Hegel writes, take a long time for European immigrants to succeed in teaching
them some self-esteem. This is illustrated by an illuminating littleexample: the Jesuits
had to remind the Indians of their matrimonial duties by ringing a bell at midnight.34
Furthermore, Negroes were transported from Africa to America due both to the lazy

G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

der Geschichte,
25; G.W.F. Hegel,
Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phitosophy of History, 13
See also: "... Die Unterschiede
der Weltteile als nicht zufllige, sondern notwendige
der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
Hegel, Enzyklopdie
393 Z., 58.

Lectures

G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phitosophy of History, 84
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
the Phiiosophy of History, 85

on

...", G.W.F.

der Geschichte,

107; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,

108; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

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Hegel

and the End of Europe

47

nature of the indigenous Americans and to their being far more susceptible to Europe
an culture, even though they too live in parts of the world in which it is difficultfor the
Spirit to develop itself. IfAmerica will ever appear in the theatre of world history as the
land of the future, this will be due only to the fact of its being Europeanised.35
From a 'world historical' perspective, therefore, the description of the world's ge
ography can be restricted to the three continents of the Old World. Within the Old
World, Hegel distinguishes between Africa on the one hand and Asia and Europe on
the other. Like Australia and the Americas, the part of Africa that lay beneath the
Sahara, Africa in the strictest sense, is dominated by the highlands and isolated fromthe
rest of the world. This Africa does not particpate in world history36and need not be dealt
with at length since this 'land of childhood' is enveloped by the dark mantle of Night and
lies beyond the day of self-conscious history.37Not only is Africa's atmosphre humid and
its air poisonous fora European but the Negroes failto develop fullyconcepts like univer
sality, moralityor religion. They lack all distinctions and live without any knowledge of a
higher being. In the absence of religion they too lack respect for human beings and they
thus Ilstrate natural man in his completely wild and untamed State, lacking in any char
acteristics which reflect humanity.38 Unsurprisingly, African communities are ruled
tyrannically according to Hegel. Since Africans treat each other with brutality,their
kings completely despise their subjects. Moral sentiments are non-existent: parents
are Willingto seil their children as slaves, and vice versa. Negroes, Hegel argues, do
not consider slavery to be wrong. Indeed, when compared to their own absolute forms
of slavery, European slavery, as harsh as it may have been, is an improvement and
must be considered as a part of ducation. In Hegel's eyes, slavery is "in end of itself"
unjust and European policy should aim at abolishing slavery for it is human destiny to
be free. In the case of Africa, however, the gradual abolishment of slavery must be
considered wiser than its sudden removal.39 One might summarise Hegel's view as
follows: Africa is a static, wild, homogeneous and primitivecontinent lacking in histo
ry,development, moris, philosophy and religion.40
In leaving Africa, one enters history's real theatre, found in Asia and Europe, to
which the northern parts of Africa, the Nile delta and the Mediterranean coast belong.
These

two

continents,

however,

are

not on an

equal

footing,

for Hegel

introduces

the

furtherdistinction between East and West. Asia is the oriental quarter of the globe
where the light of reason arose and therefore history originated, while Europe consti
tues the centre and the end of the Old World. Why is Asia the absolute East and

W.H. Walsh, Principie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, 184

Africa's two remaining parts: the narrow coastal tracts along the Mediterrenean
Sea and river r
gion of the Nile, belong to Europe and Asia respectively.
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
der Geschichte,
120; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on
the Philosophy of History, 95; See also: H. Kimmerle, Hegel und Afrika, in: Idem, Die Dimension
des Interkulturellen, Amsterdam Atlanta, 1994, 85-112;
also Hegel-Studien28
(1993), 303-325.
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
der Geschichte,
124 ("keine Achtung"), 122 ("...
nichts an das Menschliche
Anklingende ..."); G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History,
97
G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

der Geschichte,
129; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on
Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Philosophy of History, 103; Hegel adds the interesting remark that Negroes consider the Eng
lish who have done most for abolishing the slave-trade,
as enemies.
Empirical findings do not
confirm Hegel's prefering European
over native slavery.
H. Kimmerle, Hegel und Afrika, 86; These remarks do not belong to the periphery of Hegel's writ
der philosophischen
393 Z.,
ings only. See e.g.: G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie
Wissenschaften,
59-60.

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Thomas

48

Mertens

Europe the absolute West?41 If we first concntrate on Asia we will, according to

Hegel, find that Asia is not homogeneous. Instead, itcan be dlvided nto three distinct
rgions. First, the hlghlands, in which people with a nomadic lifestyle are occupied
with the rearing of cattle only and where history is still relatively absent. The second
part of Asia consists of plains, in which people are occupied with agriculture. Here, the
principie of private property and that of master and servant have developed. Reflec
tion started too, since such agricultural communities require stability and demand
foresight and solicitude forthe future. Typical of Asian agricultural societies, however,
is the fact that the element of civilisation supplied by the sea is not integrated. Only
Asia's third part knows of such higher forms of reflection since it consists of a mixture
of mountains and plains and borders the sea. This rgion is referred to as the Mlddle
East and Asia Minor. This part is no longer typically Asian, but becomes orientated
towards the Mediterranean Sea, the central point of world history,42 and therefore
orientated towards Europe. Although in this remarkable part of Asia all religious and
political principies orignate, these principies do really become developed only in Eu
rope.43 Hegel's geographical journey therefore ends in Europe.
Europe is privileged since, unlike Africa and Asia, it does not demnstrate strong
geographical variations and contrasts.44 Instead, Europe's nature is mild, with smooth
transitions between mountains, plains and rivermouths. Europe consists of three parts
too: first,its southern part constituted by Greece and Italy and orientated towards the
Mediterranean. For a long period of time world spirit found its habitat here. Its second
part consists of France, Germany and England. Caesar opened Europe's 'heart' when
he conquered Gaul. From the 'world historical' perspective, Caesar was therefore
more successful than Alexander, the predecessor he so admired, because the latter
wanted in vain to intgrate the East into Greek life, whilst the former rightlyunder
stood the movement of civilisation from East to West. Finally, the third part of Europe
is located in the Northeast rgions of Europe: Roland, Russia and the Slavic coun
tries. They arrive late on the scene of historical states, while their existence is con
nected with the Asiatic continent.

4. Europe

and the four 'world historical'

realms

Hegel's explanation of the 'geographical foundation' of world history enables us to

understand the sequence of 'world historical' realms in the Philosophy of Right. The
final chapter on world historyindicates where the modem state must be located, namely
at the summit of historical development.45 Furthermore, Hegel claims that this apex
In this sense, we arrive here at the end of history. Some
can not be superseded.
comment is still necessary however.

G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phitosophy of History, 104
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
the Phitosophy of History, 92

der Geschichte,

130; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,

115; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,
ber die Philosophie
132; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on
Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phitosophy of History, 106
G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie
der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
393 Z., 58
This is confirmed in: G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie
der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
393 Z.,
"
63:
... in Europe, the State displays the development
and ralisation of freedom by means of
rational institutions".
G.W.F.

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Hegel

49

and the End of Europe

The story Hegel tells is new In terms of its vocabulary, but not in its meaning or Its
metaphors. One recognises, for instance, the myth of Europe as told by Herodote as
well as the influences of heliotrope.46 The sun rises in the east and sets in the west
and civilisation follows. Hegel adds the following reason: light is at first hand 'the
simple relation to itself. The effect of the rising of the sun is like the experience of a
blind man who, suddenly possessed
of sight, looks at the bright glimmering of the
dawn ("Morgendmmerung"): "The boundless forgetfulness of his individuality in this
pure splendour, is his firstfeeling, utter astonishment"47 No distinctions, no objects
can be perceived. Only later when the sun has risen, the admiration diminishes. From
this moment on it is possible to make out the distinction between perceiver and per
ceived, as well as the transition from inactive contemplation to activity. By the close of
the day man has constructed a house with his own inner sun. When he then contem
pltes this, he values the building of his own more highly than the original sun. While
he was overwhelmed at first,he now stands in a conscious and free relation to the
light. This image symbolises the course of history in its travel from east to west, from
the land of the morning to that of the evening. Although the world takes the physical
form of a globe, world history does not complete a fllcircle: instead, it is the process
of disciplining and educating the uncontrolled natural will into obedience to universal
ityand freedom.
In Hegel's story also other common ideas can be recognised. First, the od idea of
the translatio imperii,Athe transition of empires to a more encompassing freedom:
the Oriental world only knew and still only knows that one is free, the Greek and the
Roman world knew that some are free, but only the Germanie world knows that ail are
free. History can be seen to develop from despotism, via democracy and aristocracy
to constitutional monarchy as the ultmate achievement of the modern world, in which
the substantial idea of freedom had finallywon its subjective infiniteform. (Rph, 273
Anm.) Second, we findthe metaphor of man's individual development from childhood
into maturity as a model for the development of mankind as a whole. This was a
common image during the age of Enlightenment.49 Here is Hegel's version: humani
ty's childhood Starts in the land of the morning, in the Orient. In the oriental realm the
world-view

is 'inwardly

substantial

and

undivided'

without

a distinction

between

the

see: La mythologie
According to J. Derrida the foundational metaphor of western metaphysics,
Paris 1971,247-324,
See also: G.W. F.
blanche, in: Idem, Marges de la Philosophie,
esp. 299-300.
der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
Hegel, Enzyklopdie
392 Z.
G.W.F.

der Geschichte,
ber die Philosophie
133-4; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures
Hegel, Vorlesungen
on the Philosophy of History, 109
The origins of this idea can be traced back as far as to the Book Daniel in the Bible, with Daniel's
dream of the four empires. Hieronymus understood these empires
explanation of Nebukadnezar's
later as the empires of Babylon, Persia, Macedonia
and Rome respectively, with civilisation starting
in the fertile crescent, between the Eufrat and the Tigris, and moving to the west. Remember
also
that Christ died on the cross of Golgotha with his face to the West. Long into modem times this
scheme

remained dominant. Opinions only differ as to what should be considered

'head' of civilisa
tion. Buffon agreed very much with Hegel: nature in America is not fit to reach to the heights of
Europe's civilisation. Its climate is too wet and cold, its vgtation poorer than that of Europe and
the indigenous population physically much shorter. Bishop Berkeley, on the other hand, had high
its prophet by summarizing the heliotropy of his days in a
hopes for the new America. He became
poem: "Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way; The four first Acts already past; A fifthshall
close the Drama with the Day; Time's noblest Offspring is the last". See: J.W. Schulte Nordholt, De
mythe van het Westen, Amsterdam 1992, esp. 108, 99.
this metaphor in his discussion
with M. Mendelssohn
concerning the question
mankind is morally progressing during its development.
See e.g.: ber den Gemeinspruch,
308-9 (Transi, in: Reiss, H. (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge
1970, 88-89).
Kant used

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whether
AA VIII,

Thomas

50

Mertens

constitution and lgislation on the one hand and religion on the other. The individual
has no rights here and disappears altogether. As a resuit of the absence of any inter
nal movement, the Oriental State's orientation is outwards and its movement mani
fests itself as rage and dvastation. (Rph, 355) Therefore, Oriental states are en
gaged in endless conflicts with one other, without any real changes taking place.50
Mankind develops as a child with the Egyptians and the Phoenicians, but only reach
es boyhood with the Greeks. The Greek realm no longer excludes subjectivity, but
seeks to establish the unityof the finiteand the infinite.It is at this point that individual
spirituality develops. Thus ethical life, for the firsttime, is based on the free will of
personal individuality, but itdoes not attain its fulfilment.In Greece, the spirit is not yet
able to give itself substantial forms and ethical life is split up into a series of particular
national spirits in city-states, and into classes of lords and slaves. (Rph, 356) In this
respect, the Greek world is the exact opposite of the Orient. In the latter 'substantial
forms' exist without subjective freedom, while in Greece freedom exists in subjectivity
and individuality but without the capacity to give itselfconcrete substantial forms. The
Greek period can therefore be summarised as 'beautiful freedom'.51 Adolescence is
the next phase in human development and this corresponds with the Roman realm,
as characterised by abstract universality embodied in law and organisation. Contrary
to the Greek city-state of Athens, the Roman Empire no longer belongs to its individ
uis. Instead, it has an abstract existence and in this respect, the Roman Empire
Mediation between the universality of
seems to duplcate its Oriental predecessors.
institutions and the subjectivity of the individuis living therein is, however, only seem
ingly absent, because in Rome, unlike in Oriental states, individuis remain to a limit
ed extent recognised as such. Thus, in their individual capacity persons have private
rights.52 To summarise: in the Orient there are merely institutions without individuali
ty; in Greece individuality is emphasised, although without the substantial forms in
which

it should

be

embodied;

in Rome

the

substantial

forms

of the

Orient

re-emerge,

but without fullynegating the Greek development: in Roman law a place for individu
ality is preserved. The next stage is reached when substantial forms and individuality
become reconciled in harmonious unity.
This summit of historie development is constructed upon the ruins of the Roman
Empire, which collapsed because of the inner tension between abstract universality
and inward subjectivity. The collapse of the Roman Empire is firstfollowed by despot
ism and during this period the spirit seeks, for the time being, its refuge into the inner
realm of religious spirituality.53 In its struggle to regain Standing in the outside world,
Christianity is of dcisive importance and aims at reconciling the spiritual principie
and the barbaran world. However, ittakes Christianity eight centuries to establish this
reconciliation between substance and subjectivity in what becomes known as the
'Germanie realm'. Christianity's major accomplishment in this respect is removing the
conflict between the empire of the world or political State, and the religious empire of
the Roman-Catholic church. Protestantism's Reformation makes a dcisive step in

50
51
52
53

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phi/osophy ofHistory, 112
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
ber die Philosophie
the Philosoph y of History, 113

der Geschichte,

137; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,

137; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

G.W.F.

der Geschichte,

138; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

der Geschichte,

139; G.W.F.

Hegel,

Lectures

on

G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Philosoph y of History, 114
ber die Philosophie
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen
the Phiiosophy of History, 114-5

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Hegel

and the End of Europe

51

this respect enabling the spirit to realise Reason within the world itself.54 Thus man
kind finally reaches maturity. It now is the principie task of the North, that is, of the
Germanie peoples, to bring about the unityof the divine and the human as the telos of
human history in perfect maturity. (Rph, 359)
Hegel's analysis of the four realms and the 'spiritual' primacy of the Germanie
peoples have, of course, practical consquences.
By sketching the historical origin of
constitutional monarchy as the rational State Hegel lgitimtes claims made by mod
em European states on non-European territories and on non-Germanic European
territories. Since world history decrees that there should be states and that the mod
em State is an absolute end in itself (Rph, 258),55 a nation ('Volk') without a state, in
its initial stages, lacks moral substantiality: it exists, but without valid 'sovereignty'.56
Civilised nation-states have the rightto treat nations without a state as barbarians and
are allowed to solve their problems by finding solutions in the territories of such na
tions. (Rph 351) The main problem in the modem state is the odd combination of
poverty and wealth with which modem civil societies are confronted.57 Based on con
temporary economic theory, Hegel hoids that early capitalism is characterised by the
accumulation of wealth in combination with surplus population and relative poverty.
Therefore the modem state's economy is too poor to supply all its Citizens with their
basic goods. Here, Hegel anticiptes problems connected with what later became
known as the 'social question' or, in Marx' terms, the 'proltariat'. This problem could
not, according to Hegel, be solved by additional investments initiated by the state
because such a solution would only make the problem worse. Solutions are therefore
to be found abroad, either by finding new consumers in other countries, or by coloni
sation, or by a combination of the two. It is evident that Hegel considers colonisation
as a legitmate strategy. He fails to acknowledge Kant's principie of cosmopolitan
rightwhich limitsthe rightof entry. The modem rational society is no longer, according
to Hegel, an agricultural society with strong economic and emotional ties with the soil.
The basic element of an industrial society is the moving element of the sea. Therefore
a nation-state can solve its problems by encouraging the poor strata of its population
to emigrate forthe newly discovered territories. In those colonies, emigrants findspace
to settle

down

and

return

to the family

principie

and

agriculture.

From

this

point

on,

it

is suggested, the process of constructing a rational state can start anew. (Rph, 242
248, in combination with 349)58 Hegel here clearly takes the perspective of the
expanding European civilisation. For him, indigenous populations cannot legitimately
G.W.F.

ber die Philosophie

Hegel, Vorlesungen
on the Phitosophy ofHistory, 115-6
Observe the diffrence between Hegel's concept
and Kant's use of the human being as "Zweck
Sitten, AA IV, 428.

der Geschichte,

140-1

; G.W.F.

of "Selbstzweck"

an sich Selbst",

designating
in: Grundlegung

Hegel,

Lectures

the (rational) State

zur Metaphysik der

noch kein Staat,

seine Selbstndigkeit
ist nicht Sou
Rph 349: "Ein Volk ist zunchst
vernitt"; See also Anm.; See also: A.W. Wood, Hege/'s Ethicai Thought, 204. Unfortunately,
is descriptive instead of prescriptive, as usual, as if it is just a matter of plain fact
Hegel's language
that non-statal
tion, however,

human communities, in its initial stages, are not being recognized.

Hegel's conten
that primitive communities need not be respected,
is in clear opposition with Kant's

(prescriptive) cosmopolitanism.
P. Franco, Hegei's Phiiosophy
See e.g.: S. Avineri, Hegel's
Theory of the Modern State, 147-154;
R.-P. Horstmann, Hegels Theorie der brgerli
of Freedom, New Hven London 1999, 265-277;
in: G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie
chen Gesellschaft,
des Rechts (ed. L. Siep), Klassi
Band 9, Berlin 1997, 206-210.
why Hegel does not mention any 'international problems' when discussing
tion as a solution to the poverty problem. Neither do most of his commentators.
ker Auslegen
This explains

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colonisa

52

Thomas

Mertens

Claim to have their way of life respected. Europe is the capital of humanity and if
another nation wants to develop a communal life,which deserves respect, itwill need
to copy the 'Nordic' structures.
It is hardly surprising that some commentators have argued that human history
has found its ideological end in Hegel's conception of the rational State.59 Thus, Eu
rope's mission would consist in exporting its models of being to the rest of the world.
Once this telos is reached, Europe as a specific way of human communal life will find
its ending.

5. Conclusion
Hegel's conceptualisation of world history is a way of answering the question of Eu
rope's identity. Hegel emphasises Europe's superiority as the embodiment of identity,
modernity and rationality.60 This Stry is evidently one-sided and one of exclusion
and inclusion, of superiority and inferiority.it has determined the relationship not only
between Europe and non-European continents, but also between European nation
states in effortsto domnate the continent. Germany's war against Russia during W.W.
II is the most recent example in which itwas argued that ultimately Europe's fate was
at stake.61 As a resuit, many have radically doubted Hegel's story, like Horkheimer
and Adorno in their Dialektik der Aufklrung. More recently, Baumann challenged the
supposition that the rise of rationality will inevitably lead to morality's triumph over
barbarism. Convincingly, Bauman argues that the Holocaust cannot be understood
simply as the failure of Europe's process of civilisation, but also as one of its possible
If Europe wishes to address the issue of its identity, it should not
consquences.62
focus on officiai Hegelian biographies but on alternative stories from non-eurocentric
and

non-European

perspectives.

Fortunately,

this openness

is part of European

thought

too. The Kantian tradition according to which ail humans and human communities
deserve to be respected is the most prominent example in this respect. If Europe
wants to escape fromthe Hegelian sductions and essences, it needs to develop and
to reinforce these trulycosmopolitan ways of thinking.

Author's
6500

address:

KK Nijmegen,

Prof. Dr. Th. Mertens, Faculty of Law, University of Nijmegen,

The Netherlands.
E-mail: T.Mertens@jur.kun.nl

The well-known,

recent example

is: F. Fukuyama,

The

P.O.

Box 9040,

End of History, in: The National

/nterest,

1989,3-18.
G.W.F. Hegel,

der philosophischen
Wissenschaften,
393 2., 62-3: "Therefore, the
Enzyklopdie
of the European
Here reigns this infinite urge to
reason,
spirit is the selfconscious
knowlegde, which is not familiar to the other races." Hegel's concept of Europe is eurocentric. The
use of the concept 'race' here does however not make him a racist. The attribution of radical and
principie

elemental divisions between human groups cannot be found in Hegel. His thinking is indebted to
the eighteenth-century
belief of a common human nature: J. McCarney,
Hegel on History, 145;
W.H. Walsh, Principie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, 193. See also: D. Innerarity,
Hegels Idee von Europa, Zeitschrift frphilosophische
Forschung 46 (1992), 381-394.
W.-D. Gudopp, Stalingrad - Heidegger
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie
ZA (1983),
Marx, Deutsche
672-687
Z. Bauman,

Modernity and the Holocaust,

Polity Cambridge

1989

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