APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 .

Is s U E 4

C o M B A T I N G T E Ro RR I ssM
M C E N T E R A TW E s T p o I N
NTT

C TC S e
eNNT I N
oB jECTIVE R
NeeL
. ELEVANT R
. IGoR o U
Uss

Contents Deining the

F E A T U R E A R T IE
CL
Punjabi
Taliban
1 Deining the Punjabi Taliban Networ k
By Hassan Abba
s

R E p o R Ts
4 The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s
Network
Terrorist Pipelin
Pipelinee By Hassan Abbas
By paul Cruickshan k
8 President Obama’s Overseas Terrorism
Challeng
Challenge e
By Tom sanderson
11 Improving India’s Counterterrorism
Policy after Mumba i
By paul staniland
14 Leveraging History in AQIM
Communication
Communications s
By Lianne Kennedy Boudal
i
17 AQAP a Rising Threat in Yeme
Yemenn
By Brian o’Neill
19 The Role of the United Nations iin
n
Defeating Al-Qa`ida and Associated
Group
Groups s
By Richard Barrett

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activit

Activityy Pakistani commandos respond to the March 30 attack on a police

academy near Lahore. - Arif Ali/AFP/Getty Images

24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contact

Contactss
n march 30, 2009, mi
 litant s support for these attacks is attributablattributable e
launched a deadly to what is often labeled the “Punjab “Punjabii
assaul
assaultt Taliban” network .3 The major faction factionss
on a police training of this network include operatives fro from
m
cente
centerr
outside Lahore, the
capita
capitall
of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Eigh Eightt Lashkar-i-
police cadets were killed killed..1 L e s s t ha n Jhangvi,
h an
Sipah-i-Sahab a
a month earlier, on March 3, gunme gunmen n Sipah-i-Sahaba
Pakistan and
in Lahore ambushed members of th thee
Jaysh-i-
visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, killin g
Muhammad—
About the CTC Sentinel a t le ast
as t eight p eople. P unja b, the m os ostt
al
alll
The Combating Terrorism Center isna populated of Pakistan’s provinces, ha hass
groups that
independent educational and researc h largely escaped the bloodshed plaguin plaguing g
were
institution based in the Department of socia
ociall the country’s troubled northwest .2 Y e ett
previously
sciences at the Unitedstates Military Academy, s inc e 2 0 0
077,, v iole nc e ha s e ssccaa la
latted
ed i n
strictl
strictlyy
West point. The CTC sentinel harnesse
s the province. The bold terrorist attack attackss
focused on
the Center’s global network of scholars an
d in Pakistan’s heartland—within Punja Punjab b
Kashmir and
practitioners to understand and confront Province and in the Pakistani capital o f
domesti
domestic c
contemporary threats posed by terrorism an d Islamabad—show that local logistica logisticall
sectarian
other forms of political violence
violence.. violence
violence..
1 Barry Newhouse, “Pakistani Taliban Claim Responsi-

The views expressed in this report are those of

Members of
bility in Lahore Police Attack,” Voice of America, March
the authors and not of the U
U..s. Military Academy, 31, 2009.
th
the s e
the Department of the Army, or any other agency 2 This consists of the Federally Administered Tribal Ar-
of the U.s. Government. eas and the North-West Frontier Province, which both
groups a rre
e
lie near the tumultuous border with Afghanistan.
increasingly
1
supporting
Taliba
Taliban n
elements from
Pakistan’s
tribal region
regionss
to conduct
attacks in
sensitive
citie
citiess

3 Although

Baitullah Mehsud,

the head of

Tehrik-i-

Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), accepted
responsibility for
the
March 30 attack on
the police academy,
there are wit-
nesses who heard
some of the
terrorists conversing
in
Seraiki—a Punjabi
dialect spoken in
southern Punjab.
This suggests that
Punjabi militants
either orchestrated
the attack, or at
least collaborated
with the TTP. See
Sa- Responsibility for Pakistan Attack,” New York Times, April 1, 2009.
brina Tavernise and Sharon Otterman, “Militants Claim
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi an andd Perhaps the best of the name began in
Lahore. Ongoing investigations int intoo explanation of th the e 2007, when Maulv
Maulvii
the Marriott Hotel bombing that rocke d Punjabi Taliban’s Nazir, a militant leader
Islamabad in September 2008, in whic which h structure came frofromm who with somsomee
d oz ens of P unja bi sus
ozens pe cts w ere ar reste
suspe rested d Tariq Pervez, the official Pakistani
interrogated,,4 demonstrate th
and interrogated thee newly appointe
appointed d support challenge
challenged d
militants..5 O n
role played by Punjabi militants nee head of Pakistan’s Uzbek foreign
investigator working on the Marriot t nascent Nationa
Nationall fighters residing i n
attack revealed that “all evidence evidencess Counterterrorism South Waziristan, was
of the terrorist bombing led to Sout South h Authority (NACTA) : hailed by somsomee
Waziristan via Jhang [a city in Punja Punjab b “ideas, logistics, cashas a leader of the
where Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has stron strong g [comes] fro
from
m Punjabi Taliban. Thi Thiss
links]. The truck that was rammed int intoo the Gulf. Arab guys, allegation arose
the hotel was also from Jhang.Jhang.”” mainly Egyptian
Egyptianss because Maulvi Nazi Nazirr
and Saudis, are on attracted many
This article attempts to define th
thee hand to provide th thee Punjabi recruits fro fromm
Punjabi Taliban network, in additio n chemistry. Veteran banned organizations
to profiling the three main factions tha
thatt Punjabi extremist
extremistss to fight Uzbe
Uzbek k
plot the attacks, fighters..1 3 The
foreign fighters
while the Pakista
Pakistan n plan worked, bubutt
Taliban provides the not without creating
martyrs. ”9 another frightenin g
m enace in the shape
The name “Punjabi of a reenergized
“Punjabi Taliban. ”
Taliban” was firs
firstt
used for ethnic Punjabis The current Punjabi
associated wit
with
h
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Taliban network ha
hass
Islam (HuJI) who , a number of key
under the leadership features. First, it lack
lackss
of Qari Saifulla
Saifullahh any organization or
Akhtar, went to command structur
structure e
support and join th the
e and o p ereraatte
ess a s a
regime of Taliban loo
lo o sse
e n
neetw
tw or k o f
leader Mullah Oma
Omarr
contribute to its ranks
ranks..

O
Who are the “Punjabi Taliban”
Taliban”?? 4 The suspects included “The purpose
The Punjabi Taliban network is a loos loosee of
conglomeration of members of banne
militant groups of Punjabi origin —
banned d
undertaking
members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
s e c ta r ian a s w ell
e ll a s th o s e ffo
o c u s ed on tthe
he operations
and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam.
conflict in Kashmir—that have develope
5 Tariq Butt, “Mastermind of under the
developed d
strong connections with Tehrik -
i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afgha
Afghan n
Marriott Bombing Es-
moniker of the
capes,” The New
News,s November 17,
Taliban and other militant group
based in the Federally Administere
groupss
Administered d
2008. ‘Punjabi
Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-Wes t
6 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Blames
Taliban’ is that
Taliban for Lahore At-
Frontier Province (NWFP) .6 T he heyy
shuttle between FATA and the rest o f tack Which Leaves 11 Dead,” they have the
Pakistan, providing logistical suppor t Guardian
Guardian,, March 31, 2009;
freedom to
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “And Now
to FATA- and Afghan-based militants t o
conduct terrorist operations deep insid inside e
There is Tehrik-e-Tali- operate
Pakistan. Between March 2005 an andd
ban Baluchistan,”
Baluchistan,”TheThe New,s March
without the
4, 2009.
March 2007 alone, for example, abou aboutt
7 Aamir Latif, “Punjabi Taliban level
2,000 militants from southern an and d
northern Punjab Province reportedl reportedly y
Rise in Waziristan,” Is-
of command
lamOnline.net, April 22, 2009.
moved to South Waziristan and starte started d
8 This information is based on and control
different businesses in an effort t o
create logistical support networks networks..7
an assessment shared by
inherent when
a senior oficial of the Ministry of
Given their knowledge about Punjab Punjabii
cities and security structure, they hav have e
Interior, Islamabad. working
proved to be valuable partners for th thee for the more
TTP as it targets cities in Punjab, suc such h
as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad Islamabad..8
established
 elements from distinct guerrilla tactic
militant outits.” militant groups
groups..
tacticss
and sabotage. The
Members from Lashkar-
Punjabi Taliban ar aree
i-Jhangvi (LeJ)(LeJ),,
increasingly using
mid-1990s..1 0 Th
in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s T he
e S ip ah-i-S ahab a P
ipah-i-S ak ista n
Pak
heavy weapons an andd
(SS P), Jays
Jaysh-h-
s e c o n d t im e t h e n
naa m e w a s u s ed w a ass operating independent
i-Muhammad (JeM)
in 2001-2003 when former Pakistan i of the TTP o r
and their variou variouss
President Pervez Musharraf banne banned d other militant groups
splinter groups are
some militant and sectarian groups tha thatt that belong t o
all considered t o
had a support base in Punjab Punjab..1 1As a result
result,, the area. In late
be part of this loose
soomm e o f th es e e lem e
enn t s b eg an m ovo v in g t o December 2008, fo forr
network. Smal Smalll
FATA to seek safe havens and establis establish h example, five Punjabi
cells unaffiliated with
new camps. These Punjabi militant militantss Taliban killed i n
any larger grou group p
also reportedly established separat separate e a drone missile attack
are also involved.
training centers in FATA, especially i n were observe
observed d
This designation
designation,,
North Waziristan .1 2 T h e m o s t re r e c en t u sse
e “patrolling the area
however, does not
[South Waziristan ]
apply to all member memberss
9 Kaustav Chakrabarti, “Taliban Spreads into Pakistan’s in pickup trucks
o f LeJ,
L eJ, S SP
SS P,, a n d Je M ; it
Heart,” Rediff.com, February 13, 2009.
mounted with heav y
o n ly ref err s t o
re fe
10 Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” The News
, Sep-
guns and had been
individuals or
tember 23, 2008.
firing at dronedroness
factions who shifte shiftedd
11 These groups include: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Mu-
wherever they spotted
to FATA or
hammad (SMP), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-
them. The vehicle
vehicless
collaborate closely
i-Jafria (TeJ), Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-i-
were camouflaged with
wit
with h
Tayyiba. When some of these groups started operating
grass.””15
mud and grass.
the TTP, Tehreek-e-
under new names—TeJ as Islami Tehrik Pakistan, SSP Nafaz-
Nafaz-e-Shariat
e-Shariat-- to Kill 12 in Pakistan,” New York
as Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and JeM as Khudamul Is- e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
lam—they were also banned in 2003. and other militan
militantt
Times, September 12,
12 Pir Zubair Shah and Salamn Masood, “U.S. Reported groups from the tribal
2008.
areas
areas..
2 13 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Letter
Second, many of these Explains Drive Against
Foreign Militants in
militants directl
directlyy Waziristan,” The News, April 5,
2007.
benefited from state
14 This patronage developed
patronag
patronage e1 4 in th
the e
because the country’s intel-
1990 0ss (a n d in so m e
ligence agencies utilized them
c as e s e v e n la te
t e rr))
for supporting the insur-
and were
gency in Kashmir against India.
professionally trained
15 “Twin Drone Strikes Kill 5
in
Punjabi Taliban,” Daily
asymmetrical warfare,
Times, December 23, 2008.
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Third, most of the groups are Sunn Sunnii Major Factions of alignment betwee between n
and Salafist in orientation. A recen recentt Punjabi Taliban Networ Network k al-Qaeda, the
International Crisis Group repor t Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Pakistani Taliban an and d
maintained that “violent Deoband Deobandii Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
groups.””2 4 Le J
sectarian groups.
networks in Punjab lie at the root o f (SSP)
w as the firs firstt
Pakistan’s militancy problem. ”1 6 T h he
e Thes e t wo a ss ocia oc ia te d
Punjab-based militant
various components of the Punjab Punjabii and banne
banned d
group to shif shiftt
Taliban owe their ideological trainintraining
g groups a re
re largely
its members to
to hardline Deobandi madrasa network
networkss Punjab-based
Punjab-based..
Afghanistan during th thee
that were nurtured and expanded i n Es t im a t es p la c e L eJ’s
Taliban era. This
Punjab during President Zia ul-Haq’ ul-Haq’ss nu m b er s a t les
lesss
allowed it to establis
establish h
y ea rs in o ffice fro m 197 7-1988. than 1,000, and the
early connections
group is almos almostt
with al-Qa`ida’
al-Qa`ida’ss
Fourth, Punjabi militants are distinc t entirely composed of
leadership in the mid-
from traditional Pashtun Taliban—i n militants. Th The e
1990s
1990s..
t er ms of la ng uag e, d re ss and o thetherr SSP, which is also a
identifiable features. The Punjabi Taliba
Taliban n political group, ha hass Many mosques and
are comparatively more educated, bette betterr been estimated to have
equipped and technologically savvie savvierr around 100,00
100,000 0 madrasas linkelinked d
counterparts..1 7 Thi
than their Pashtun counterparts Thiss active members, but
with LeJ and SSP in
is a result of their upbringing in Punja
Punjab b the number o f
Punjab operat
operate e
Province (which has better educationa
educationall active fighters is
as the networking
facilities) and urban linkages wher where e probably in the 2,000 2,000--
centers for th thee
internet access and communication
communicationss 3,000 rangerange..2 1
Punjabi Taliban .2 5 After
equipment are more readily available
available.. Although both group groupss
recent policpolice e
are anti-Shi`a in
interrogations of LeJ
Fifth, unlike TTP cadres and Afgha
Afghann essence, their member memberss
members, Karachi’
Karachi’ss
Taliban, the Punjabi Taliban ar aree have been involved
police chief
purportedly more prone to mercenar mercenary y in pursuin
pursuing g
publicly maintaine
maintained d
actions. Pakistani intelligence source sourcess other agendas vis-à-
that these militants
claim that the Punjabi Taliban can b e vis Kashmir an and d
“confessed t o
hired by domestic as well as regiona regionall Afghanistan. For
involvement in
operators to undertake f rre
eelan
elan cce
e instance, one of th thee
attacks on securit security y
operations..1 8 For instance, it is widel
operations widely y former members of the
forces and NATO
known in Punjab law enforcemen
enforcementt SSP, identified a s
suppliers in norther
northern n
circles that many in the Punjabi Taliba Taliban n “Commander Tariq,”
areas” of Pakistan
criminals..1 9 The
began their careers as criminals They y reportedly head headss
while also admittin
admitting g
originally moved to FATA (after thei theirr the local Taliban in
organizations were banned) to rais raise e Darra Adam Khel Khel,, 21 These numbers are derived
funds through drug smuggling an and d located between the
acquire weapons from the weapon weaponss Kohat area in th thee
from various reports. They
markets of Dara Adam Khel Khel..2 0 NWFP and Orakzai
Agency in FATA FATA.. 22 are only general estimates.

Finally, the Punjabi Taliban are mor

moree Tariq, who has been 22 Personal interviews, Pakistani

monitored by la laww police oficers, Punjab

likely to conduct idayi n attacks, which
which,,
in the South Asian context, implieimpliess enforcement for years, Province, March 2009.
was previousl
previously y 23 Mazhar Tufail, “New Efforts
that the attacker comes equipped wit withh
primarily engaged in Launched to Recover Re-
weapons and ammunition and is willin
willing
g
sectarian attack
attackss mains of Polish Engineer,” The
to fight until death. This is in contras
contrastt
to suicide bombings, where the death o f on the Shi`a. Lately, News, March 2, 2009.
however, he ha hass 24 “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi
the attacker is required
required..
been found involved Challenge.”
in kidnappings
kidnappings-- 25 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan
16 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant
for-ransom and Bombings Spur Hunt for New
Jihadi Challenge,” March 13, 2009.
foreigners.. al Qaeda Boss,”Globe and Mail,
attacks on foreigners
17 “Why Mehsud is Claiming Responsibility for At-
He played a central April 5, 2009.
tacks,” Daily Times, April 8, 2009.
role in the Februar
February y
18 According to this allegation, Punjabi Taliban groups
killing of a Polish
could undertake operations for radical Muslim groups,
engineer who wa wass
or even the Afghan or Indian intelligence agencies.
working in the area for
19 Personal interviews, Pakistani police oficers, Punjab
NGO..2 3
an NGO
Province, March 2009.
20 Ibid.
Similarly, LeJ is

believed to be th
thee
“lynchpin of the
that they select “prospective fighter fighterss in Kashmir. ”29 Although
from the city [Karachi] and train trainss the governmen
governmentt 26 Faraz Khan, “5 Lashkar-e-
them in Waziristan and Miranshah fo forr of Pakistan claims
combating security forces. forces.””2 6 D e
essp
p it
ite
e they do not kno knoww Jhangvi Activists Arrest-
being banned, both groups are activ active e the whereabouts of
throughout Pakistan. Although LeJ ha ed,” Daily Times, April 9, 2009.
hass JeM’s chief, Masoo
Masood d
been targeted by Pakistan’s civil an 27 HuM, largely dismantled, had
and d Azhar, it is rumored
military agencies, the SSP has largel linkages with the Kash-
largely y that he is wit
withh
m a n a g ed t o e s c a p e s u c h t a r g e ti ng mir theater as well as with al-
t ing Baitullah Mehsud in
b ec ause of its larger support base, eviden Qa`ida. Its leader, Fazlur
evidentt South Waziristan .3 0
through the fact that prior SSP candidate Rahman Khalil, was a signatory
candidatess
have won national assembly seats to Usama bin Ladin’s
seats.. Conclusion
1998 declaration of war. It
More information is
Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) largely remains committed to
needed to full fully
y
A splinter group of Harkat-ul Mujahidi n the Kashmiri cause.
understand the
(HuM) ,2 7 JeM derives its strength fro 28 These numbers are derived
fromm dynamics of the PunjabPunjabii
Punjab Province. Although banne from various reports.
banned d Taliban network, but
in 2001 and having faced interna They are only general estimates.
internall early indicator s
divisions, it is still operative an 29 Chris Brummitt, “Pakistan
andd are that it is still in
c ha nge s its nam e ev e Militants Strengthen in
hange erry
y few
fe w yea
y ea rs t o the initial stages o f
e va de sc rutiny. Ge ne Heartland,” Associated Press,
nerral
al estim a tes plac
ates placee development. It caters
its active ranks at around 5,000, wit March 23, 2009.
withh to the aspirations
aspirations,,
about 1,500-2,000 fighters .2 8 P art o f 30 A large JeM-controlled
financial needs and
t he re aso n its cad re s are not pursue madrasacum “physical activi-
pursued d worldview of thos thosee
effectively is due to the incompetenc ty center” in the heart of Masood
incompetence e militants who believe
of civilian law enforcement. Pakistan Azhar’s home city of Ba-
Pakistanii that they wer weree
analyst Amir Rana, however, allege hawalpur is still operational.
allegess ab ando ne d by the
that another factor explains why Je Azhar reportedly launched
JeM
M inte llig e nce a genc ie
iess
has retained its strength: “The militar his new book from there in early
militaryy in pursuance of
wants to keep alive its strategic option 2008.
optionss Musharraf’s directive
directivess

3
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

a ft 1..3 1 Elements from groups suc

f t er 9/ 1 1
as Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (and its associate
such
associated
h
d
The 2008 “We establishe
established d
there were contacts
group, Jama`at-ud-Da`wa), however, ar are e Belgium Cell between member
memberss
apparently not linked with the Punjab i an
andd of the terrorist
Taliban because their command an
control as well as hierarchical structur
andd FATA’s organization in Belgiu
Belgium
m
structuree and the highest levels
has remained intact over the years. I n Terrorist of Al Qaeda..
Qaeda....
comparison, LeJ and JeM splintered int into
o Pipelin
Pipelinee people in direct
smaller groups due to policy difference
differencess contact with Mr. Bi Bin
n
a m o ng lea ders and d isag re em ents ov e err By paul Cruickshank
Laden. ”5
properties and finances finances..
on december 11, 2008
2008,, 14 Based on information
It is unlikely that the Punjabi Taliba n
network will transform itself into a n individuals wer
weree drawn fro
fromm
organized group in the near future future.. arrested in Belgium interviews with senior
Instead, it will remain a loose coalitio
coalition n and two in Franc France e U.S. and Belgia
Belgian n
of members from more prominen prominentt in a major counterterrorism
terrorist organizations. The purpos
purpose e counterterrorism officials, lawyer
lawyerss
of undertaking operations under th thee operation..1
operation invo lve
lv e d in the c ase,
moniker of the “Punjabi Taliban” i s The arrests, just and
a nd so m mee ofo f th
thee
that they have the freedom to operatoperate e hours before an E U suspe
s uspe ct s them se lv e s,
es,
without the level of command an andd Summit meeting in this
t his article
ar ticle shed
shedss
control inherent when working for th the
e Brussels, mad made e new light on the
more established militant outfits
outfits.. headlines around the “terror pipeline ”
world because on onee connecting Europe and
O ther analy st
stss are
ar e les s sa ng uine
uine.. of the six charged by FATA in th the e
Pakistani security analyst Zeenia Satt Sattii Belgian authoritie
authoritiess co
c o nte xt o f tthehe a lleg e d
recently predicted that the “Punjab
“Punjabii was “al-Qa`ida living B elg
e lg ia n c e ll.
chapter of the Tahrik-e-Taliban
Tahrik-e-Taliban-e -e-- legend” Malik a
Pakistan will emerge with a ferocitferocityy el-Aroud, the widow
that may dwarf the Baitullah Mehsud
Mehsudss of the al-Qa`idal-Qa`ida a
and the Mullah Fazlullahs of NWFP. ”32 operative who 1 Nic Robertson and Paul
This development would amount to a assassinated Afgha Afghan n
significant danger to Pakistan becaus
because e Northern Alliance
Punjab is not only the most populou
populouss Commander Ahma Ahmad d
and prosperous province, but is hom home e Shah Massoud two
Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘Al Qae-
to the army headquarters and sensitiv
sensitive e days before th thee
nuclear installations. Furthermore, a Se p t em b er 11
ep 1 1 a tt a cck
ks da Cell’ Linked to 2006 Airline
major component of the Pakistan Arm Army y o n th t h e U n it e
edd plot,” CNN, February 13,
comes from the province; if civil strif
strifee a te ss..2
S tta 2009; “Terrorisme: un Franco-
or civil war were to escalate and th the e Tunisien mis en examen
army was called in to control l aw an and d Belgian authorities pour ses liens présumés avec une
order, it could cause cracks in the army’
army’ss ilière afghane,” Agence
discipline. Although this is a worst cas
casee accuse her of havin
havingg France-Presse, December 15,
scenario, it is nevertheless critical t o worked together with 2008.
enhance Pakistan’s law enforcemen
enforcementt her new husband
husband,, 2 The six individuals were
capacity and counterterrorism strateg
strategy y Moez Garsallaoui, a charged with “participation
to prevent this outcome from becomin
becoming g Tunisian militant
militant,, in a terrorist group.” For an in-
a reality
reality.. to recruit individuals depth proile of Malika el-
for training in ththe
e Aroud, see Paul Cruickshank,
Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at Harvard Federally “Love in the Time of Ter-
University’s Kennedy School of Government. Administered Tribal ror,” Marie Claire
Claire,, March 2009.
Previously, he served in the administrationsof Area
Areass 3 Robertson and Cruickshank.
Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharrafin Pakistan. (FATA) of Pakistan .3 4 Ibid.
He is also the author of Pakistan’s Drift into P olic e launc hed
launched 5 Ibid.
Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s the arrest operation
War on Terror. after three youn
young g 4
Belgian Moroccans
31 Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan’s allegedly recruite
recruited d
Network of Terror((Lahore:
Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005). by el-Aroud and
32 Zeenia Satti, “Post Mumbai Hype,” The News, March Garsallaoui returne
returned d
26, 2009. from FATA to
Belgium .4 Accordin
According g
to Glen Audenaert, the
director of ththee
Belgian Federal Police,
A europe-Wide Proble
Problem m terrorist plots, such as Warns of Threat from
Until recently, the FATA safe have haven n a plot to targe
targett Global Recession,” Daily
troubled British counterterroris m the U.S. Ramstein Air Telegraph, January 8, 2009.
officials significantly more tha
thann Base in German
Germany y 8 Senior U.S. oficials stated
their counterparts in other Europea
European n in September 2007 and that several of the airline
countries. This was a result of the Unite
United d a plot to targe
targett plotters trained in FATA. See
Kingdom’s large Pakistani diaspor diaspora a the Barcelona metro Richard Greenberg, Paul
community .6 The British intelligenc
intelligence e in January 2008
2008,, Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen,
agency MI5 recently estimated that 75 75% % have seen operatives “Inside the Terror Plot
of terrorist plots they investigate hav have e FATA..1 1
train in FATA that Rivaled 9/11,” NBC,
Pakistan..7 Those plots include
ties to Pakistan included d September 15, 2008.
a 2006 failed operation to blow up a t Alain Grignard, 9 Elaine Sciolino, “Fears of
airliners..8
least seven transatlantic airliners Iraq Becoming a Terror-
who head
dss ist Incubator Seem Overblown
Governments in continental Europ
Europee counterterrorist French Say,” New York
were more concerned about citizen citizenss operations for ththe
e Times, April 8, 2008; Karen
gaining terrorist knowledge in Iraq an andd Belgian Federal DeYoung, “Fewer Foreign-
North Africa, a function of continenta l Police, said that th
thee ers Crossing Into Iraq from Syria
Europe’s large Arab diaspora. In th the
e mountains of to Fight,” Washington
last year, however, that view has bee been n Afghanistan and Post, September 16, 2007.
changing. While travel flows to Nort Northh Pakista
Pakistann 10 Ibid.
Africa still cause serious concern, ther
theree have replaced Iraq as 11 Souad Mekhennet and Michael
has been a significant reduction in th thee the destinatio
destination
n Moss, “Europeans Get
number of European militants travelin
travelingg Terror Training Inside
to Iraq, a function of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’
Iraq’ss 6 It is estimated that there are Pakistan,” New York Times, Sep-
(AQI) waning fortunes, the extrem extreme e tember 10, 2007; Elaine
barbarism that has tarnished its brand
brand,, more than one million Sciolino, “Terror Threat from
and a crackdown on cross-bordecross-borderr Pakistan said to Expand,” New
people in the United Kingdom of
infiltration networks .9 Few plots i n York Times, February 10,
Pakistani ancestry.
Europe have been tied to returnees fro fromm 2008.
7 Duncan Gardham, “MI5 Chief
Iraq .1 0 Conversely, a growing number o f
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

of choice for aspiring jihadists fro fromm Iraq, along with a to travel to Afghanistan
Belgium and other countries on th thee section dedicated t o to fight agains
againstt
European continent. According to the s peec
pe ec hes of top al- Americans to restore
Grignard, “Not since the year befor before e ad ers..1 7
Qa `id a le aders the Taliban t o
9/11 have we seen as man nyy pe
p e o p le t ra v e
ell By the end of 2008, power. Garsallaoui
towards the Afghanistan-Pakista n the site had mor more e allegedly emphasize
emphasized d
conflict region. ”1 2 T his v ie
This ieww is echoe
echoed d than 1,400 that jihad in
b y U .S
.S.. inte llig enc e age
a ge ncie
nc ie s who
w ho ha v vee subscribers..1 8
subscribers Afghanistan was a
observed an “an influx of new Wester Western n Authoritie s religiou
religiouss
recruits into the tribal areas since mid mid-- in Belgium, however, duty and also cast the
2006. ”1 3 In February 2009, Directo r could do little t o fighting in heroi
heroic c
of National Intelligence Dennis Blai Blairr prevent el-Aroud and glamorous tonestones..2 3
warned that “the primary threat fro from m from administerin g
the sitsitee d ue tot o stro
s tro ng Garsallaoui’s
Europe
Europe-- based extremists stems from al al--
Qa`ida and Sunni affiliates who retur return n fr e e d o
omm o f ssppee e ch
protections under recruiting was no
nott
Belgian law law..1 9 restricted to Belgium.
He also recruite
recruited d
According to Grignard, two French
subscribers to Minba Minbarr
websites suc such h S O S w h o f or leg a l
as Minbar SOS r ea so n s c a n o n ly b e
function as recruitin
recruitingg identified by their
grounds for terrorist initials H.A. an and d
operatives wh who o W.O..2 4 W.O. claimed he
W.O
use them to identify was arrested b y
individuals willin g Turkish police in the
to fight jihad. “It’s a summer of 200 2008 8
good way to ge gett after he tried to return
p e op le ttoogg e the
therr a nd to Europe fro from
m
the n ese s ta b lis h a
blis
from training in Pakistan to conduc
conductt 13 J. Michael McConnell, “Annual
States.””14
attacks in Europe or the United States. Threat Assessment of
the Director of National
“Their accounts
Intelligence for the Senate Select suggest
Unlike the Iraqi insurgency, fightin g
Americans in Afghanistan does no nott Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. that jihadist
seem to have lost its luster for Europea
European n Senate Select Commit-
militants. It appears that aspirin
aspiring
g tee on Intelligence, February 5, networks in
recruits have wised up to the notionotion n 2008. FATA have
that joining AQI means leaping aboar
aboardd 14 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual
a rapidly moving conveyor belt fo forr Threat Assessment of the relatively
bombing..1 5
suicide bombing Intelligence Community for the loose
Senate Select Committee
Recruitmen t
on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate organizational
T h e r ec en
e n t B e lg ia n c a s e p ro v id e s a
window into how young Europea
es Select Committee on Intel- structures.”
European n ligence, February 12, 2009.
militants are lured to Pakistan’s triba triball 15 Personal interview, Alain
areas. Belgian police claim that el-Arou el-Aroud d Grignard, head of counter-
and her husband, Moez Garsallaoui Garsallaoui,, more secret dialogue
terrorist operations for the
acted in tandem to encourage individual individualss Belgian Federal Police, Au-
to leave Belgium to fight in Afghanistan
Afghanistan.. gust 2008.
El-Aroud, they argue, inspired radical - 16 Robertson and Cruickshank. with people tha
thatt
leaning youngsters to sign up fo forr
jihad through inflammatory posting s are interesting to the
on a website she ran called “Minba “Minbarr organization,” h e
SOS.” Garsallaoui, for his part, toure toured d explained..2 0 Belgian
explained
Brussels’ immigrant neighborhoods t o counterterroris
counterterrorism m
physically recruit peoplepeople..1 6 officials said that
monitoring he herr
During an interview for CNN thre
threee website helped identify
years ago, el-Aroud explained how sh
shee the presence o f
administered Minbar SOS, her Frenc
Frenchh a recruiting network
language website. The website include
includedd for Afghanistan .2 1
postings of attacks on U.S. troops i n
El-Aroud’s iconic status
12 Robertson and Cruickshank.
 FATA. When he was was carrying a
appears to hav
havee later interrogate
interrogated d
significantly larger susum
m
by French
a tt ra cte d H ic ha m B e ya y o , 23
icha 2 3 , o ne o f cash..2 7 Garsallaoui
in cash
authorities, he
the young Belgian Moroccans arreste arrested d set off first anandd
provide
provided d
in th e c a s e, w h o b e c am e a M inb a r SO
SOSS the others followed
an extremely detailed
site administrator before travelin traveling g two weeks laterlater..
account of hi hiss
Pakistan..2 2 Beyayo claims tha
to Pakistan thatt They eventually
journey to the tribal
Garsallaoui recruited him to fight jiha jihadd arrived in Zahedan i n
areas of Pakistan
Pakistan..
in Afghanistan. Christophe Marchand Marchand,, eastern Iran, a border
During the
Beyayo’s lawyer, said that his clien clientt town describe
described d
interrogation, W.O.
was approached by Garsallaoui in a by the French recruit
state
statedd
mosque near his home in Anderlecht Anderlecht,, W.O. as a ke keyy
that “calls to jihad” on
a tough immigrant neighborhood, an andd
Minbar SOS wer
were e
that el-Aroud’s husband persuaded hi him
m 23 Personal interview,
“incessant” and the
video propagand
propaganda a
17 Personal interviews, Malika el-Aroud and Moez
he viewed on the site Christophe Marchand, lawyer for
Garsallaoui, Guin, Switzerland, February 2006. For the
made him want t o Hicham Beyayo, Brussels,
video of Malika el-Aroud demonstrating her website, see
volunteer . February 2009.
Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “One Woman’s
24 Details of W.O.’s interrogation
War,” CNN, February 10, 2009. Travel to FAT
FATAA by French authorities
18 This igure is based on the author’s own monitoring of
In December 2007, in January and February 2009
el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. Many more individuals
Garsallaoui’
Garsallaoui’ss were made available to
presumably regularly accessed the site.
recruits gathered in the author by Christophe
19 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism ofi-
Istanbul, Turkey
Turkey.. Marchand, Hicham Beyayo’s
cials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
There were six in total. lawyer. Under Belgian law,
20 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counter-
Two from FrancFrancee defense attorneys can make
terrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, Feb-
and four from public details of the legal case
ruary 2009.
Belgium,,2 5 includin g
Belgium against their clients in the
21 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism ofi-
Beyayo and two interests of their defense.
cials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
friends who live livedd 25 This information was drawn
22 Robertson and Cruickshank.
on his square in from W.O.’s interroga-
Anderlecht, Ali el el-- tion.
Ghanouti and Y. 26 Gilbert Dupont, “Les six du
Harrizi .2 6 Garsallaoui’
Garsallaoui’ss réseau kamikaze,” La
plan was to bribe Dernière Heure, December 13,
smugglers to tak takee 2008; Personal interviews,
them illegally across Belgian counterterrorism oficials,
the Iranian an andd Brussels, January and
Pakistani borders to February 2009. Ali el-Ghanouti
FATA. Garsallaou
Garsallaouii and Y. Harrizi were also
instructed each of the charged in the case.
recruits to brinbringg 27 This information was drawn
2,000 euros for this from W.O.’s interroga-
purpose; he himsel
himselff tion.

5
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

staging point for militants traveling t o the name of “Driss” The three page form,
zone..2 8
fight in the Afghan-Pakistan war zone was their principl
principle
e which they signed
signed,,
From there, smugglers took them acros
acrosss handler .3 4 included questions on
the Pakistani border into the tribatriball their marriag
marriage e
A senior status, health, criminal
areas, which they entered on Januar
January y
10, 2008, transiting through Bannu
Bannu,, convictions, an and d
counterterrorism whether or not they
a district that borders both South anand d
North Waziristan .2 9 Beyayo later tol
toldd wanted to becom
become e
source wit
withh bombers..4 0 It
suicide bombers
his lawyer that he was amazed at th the e
lack of controls and how easy it was t o detailed knowledge of a ls o s et o u t p re
recc is
isee
e nte r the a rea.3 0
area. the investigatio
investigation n rules for their
told the author that conduct in FATA suc suchh
Beyayo’s and W.O.’s accounts of thei
theirr during Garsallaoui’
Garsallaoui’ss as the need to
time in FATA, where they stayed fo forr time in the Afghan- unquestioningly obe obey y
much of 2008, provide a rare glimpse int
intoo Pakistan borde
borderr orders. They were told
the terrorist safe haven. Their account
accountss re gion, he d ev elop ed that they woul
would d
clos e co nnec tions
nnections be punished if they
“They received both with a senior al-Qa`ida failed to adhere t o
operative whwhoo contract..4 1
the contract
religious instruction and orchestrated the 2006
airline plot in th According to the
military training from the
United Kingdom. The
e

Egyptian and Syrian source could no nott interrogation report

reveal the al-Qa`ida
instructors.” operative’s nam
name e stay,,
because of the
ongoing investigation
investigation..
suggest that jihadist networks in FAT
FATAA Separately, Belgian
counterterroris
counterterrorism m
officials believe that
Garsallaoui wawass
the main link between
the Belgian cel
celll
al-Qa`ida..3 5
and al-Qa`ida
W.O., the French
recruit, stated thathatt
“the Arab camp” was instructors.
for all intent
intentss
and purposes run by al- taught them how to
Qa`ida. He sai
saidd
that the Arab camp
was the smalles
smallestt
grouping of foreign
fighters in FAT
FATA A
with about 300 to 400 of TNT in
recruits, mostl y
from Saudi Arabia
but some fro fromm
other parts of the
Middle East an andd
North Africa .3 6
According to W.O., al al-- suicide vests. They
Qa`ida’s fighters and
zones where thethey y
have relatively loose organizationa
organizationall into the tribal areas in
structures, a view shared by America
American n early 2008, the
they y
officials..3 1
and Belgian counterterrorism officials received no such
In the 1980s and 1990s, several jihadis
jihadistt greeting. Nobod
Nobody y
groups, including al-Qa`ida, ha
hadd knew who they were were..3 2
organizational structures in place place,, Although thei
theirr
mainly centered around Peshawar, t o smuggler introduced
process arriving volunteers. Yet whewhen n them to individual
individualss
the Belgian and French recruits crosse
crossed d linked to the “Arab
report,,
W.O. stated that early
on in their stay
their group, with
the exception o f
Beyayo who had
fallen ill, complete
completed d
a two week training
course, much o f
it inside a residence.
They receive
received d
both religious
instruction and
militar y
training from
Egyptian and Syria n
Their
military traine r
assemble weapons
weapons,,
fire rocket launchers,
and how to handl handle e
e xp lo s iv es . H e e
evv en s e t
o ff a sm a ll c h ar gge
e
demonstration, telling
the
them m
that the explosive was
used to attac attack k
U.S. convoys in
Afghanistan and i n
each had to pay 40 4000
euros for the course,
which include
included d
camp” in FATA, the
they y
were initially met with
open suspicion .3 3
Eventually, however,
they were able t o
persuade their
interlocutors of thei
theirr
jihadist bona fides.
The fact that the
theyy
were reunited with Garsallaoui, thei
theirr conducted training
recruiter, on January 13, presumabl
presumably y
were spread ou outt
across North and South
“Al-Qa`ida
helped in this regard. For the nex
nextt
Waziristan foforr
propaganda
several months, a Syrian operative b y
security reasons. W.O. led
28 Ibid.
stated that al al-- him to believe
Qa`ida’s military
29 Ibid.
commander at the tim time
e that ighters
30 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels,
February 2009.
of their arrival was lived in
Abu Laith al-Libi .
31 Personal interview, Belgian intelligence oficial, De-
Abu Laith was killed by groupings of
cember 2008; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism
oficial, March 2009.
a U.S. missil
missile
e more
strike in the tribal
32 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels,
areas in late Januar
January y than 50 in an
February 2009.
33 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga-
2008 .3 7 As for Bin area; the
Ladin, the “overal
“overalll
tion.
commander,” W.O. reality was
was told by thei theirr that ighters
handler Driss that it
was “impossible tto o were grouped
approach” him .3 8
together in
According to W.O., units of 10 or
the Belgian an
andd
less.”
French recruits were
asked to fill out a
contract by their rent for the dwelling.
handlers, illustratin g
that al-Qa`ida’s
penchant for paperwor
paperwork k
This illustrate s
has remained intact
39
over the years years.. the degree of self-
motivation and self
self--
34 Ibid. organization that can
35 Personal interviews, be required i n
Belgian counterterrorism ofi- recruits traveling to
cials, Brussels, January and FATA .
February 2009.
W.O. described the
36 W.O. stated that the largest
group of foreign ighters
training as “a
“ann
in FATA was from East
Turkestan in northwest China. enrollment amongst
He also stated that there were the Taliban an andd
two Uzbek groups operat- Al Qaeda.” According
ing in FATA numbering a total of to his account
account,,
around 3,000 ighters, Pakistani Taliban
and two Kurdish groups. fighters mixed freel
freelyy
37 “U.S. Oficials: CIA Kills Top with al-Qa`ida
Al Qaeda Terrorist in operatives in FATA ,
Pakistan,” CNN, January 31, illustrating the
2008. close connection
connectionss
38 This information was drawn between the two
from W.O.’s interroga- groups. Accordin
According g
tion. to both W.O. and
39 In the years before 9/11, al- Beyayo, most o f
Qa`ida required recruits to the Belgian and
ill out copious amounts of French jihadist
jihadistss
paperwork. See Peter Bergen, never received
The Osama bin Laden I Know: An “approval” to figh fightt
Oral history of Al Qaeda’s
40 This information was drawn
Leader((Washington,
Washington, D.C.: Free
Press, 2006).
from W.O.’s interroga-
6 tion. The contract did not have
the insignia of any par-
ticular militant group.
41 Ibid.
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

in Afghanistan. During the next fe feww sending an e-mail Return to Belgiu

Belgium m
months, they moved from dwelling t o from Afghanista
Afghanistan n In the fall of 2008,
dwelling in the mountains of North an and d explaining why he was Belgian securit
security y
South Waziristan, frustrated at beinbeing g jihad..4 9
fighting jihad services were placed
kept away from the fighting over th thee on alert afte afterr
One of the e-mails
border. Garsallaoui, according to botboth h el-Ghanouti and
accounts, eventually received approva
approvall Harrizi, Beyayo’
Beyayo’ss
Garsallaoui sensentt
to fight in Afghanistan .4 2 W .O. sta te
tedd friends from
that he was surprised by the lack o f to his wife, Anderlecht, returne d
large groupings of fighters in the triba
triball intercepted by U.S U.S.. from FATA .5 4 O n
areas. Al-Qa`ida propaganda led him tto o counterterrorism De c em b e r 4 , Be y a
ec yo
ayo
believe that fighters lived in grouping
groupingss agencies in the firs firstt returned to
half of 2008, Belgium..5 5 The trigge
Belgium triggerr
contained a for the arrests was an
photograp
photograph h e-mail sent b y
of himself firing a Beyayo three days
rocket launche
launcherr later,,5 6 intercepte
later intercepted d
somewhere in the by U.S.
Afghanistan - counterterrorism
Pakistan border agencies,,5 7
agencies
50
region
region.. The picture
picture,, sugges
sugg estingting he ha d
later posted on el- rec eived the go go--
Aroud’s website, wa wass ahead for an operation
clearly useful for Belgium..5 8 “I t
in Belgium
propaganda purposes
purposes..
of more than 50 in an area; the realit
reality
y tion.
was that fighters were grouped togethe
togetherr
less..4 3
in units of 10 or less
47 Director of National
Intelligence Blair testiied in Feb-
“During his
ruary 2009 that “in the FATA Al
time in FATA,
During his time in FATA, Beyayo claim
claimss
Qaeda lost signiicant Beyayo claims
he had to move frequently to avoi avoidd parts of its command structure
being targeted by U.S. Predator dronesdrones.. since 2008 in a succes-
he had to
The strikes had a reputation in jihadis
jihadistt sion of blows as damaging to the move around
effective.””4 4
circles of being “very effective. group as any since the
Garsallaoui was almost hit by suc such
h fall of the Taliban in late 2001.”
frequently
a strike, according to an intercepte
intercepted d 48 Skype is an online to avoid being
wife..4 5 The Frenc
e-mail he sent his wife Frenchh communication website widely
and Belgian recruits were told not t o used around the world to make
targeted by
venture outside their dwellings becaus
because e telephone calls by using U.S. Predator
spies would pass on the coordinates o f Voice over Internet Protocol
Americans..4 6
suspected jihadists to the Americans (VoIP) technology.
drones. The
The accounts corroborate a recen recentt strikes had a
judgment by U.S. intelligence agencie
agenciess
that the strikes, intensified in th the
e reputation
second half of 2008, have put significan
significantt in jihadist
pressure on al-Qa`ida in FATA .4 7
circles of being
Communications with europ
europee
‘very
The case reveals that terrorist operative
operativess
in the Afghan-Pakistan border regio region n effective.’”
can maintain contact with the outsid outside e
world relatively easily. Garsallaoui, fo forr
example, was in regular e-mail contac contactt Garsallaoui, posing in
with his wife, Malika el-Aroud, fro from m
the Afghan-Pakistan border region region,,
a nd s om etim es ev e n b y S ky pe.4 8 H e a l sso
kype. o
periodically tuned in to the forums o n a “Rambo” lik
likee
his wife’s website Minbar SOS, eve even n
stance, was
glamorizing the
42 Ibid.; Personal interview, Christophe Marchand,
fighting
fighting..
Brussels, February 2009.
In June, Garsallaoui
43 Ibid.
sent el-Arou
el-Aroudd
44 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels,
an e-mail claiming to
February 2009.
have killed fiv
five e
45 Ibid.
Americans in
46 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga-
Afghanistan .5 1 Accordin
Accordingg
to W.O., Garsallaoui told him when the they y was impossible for grew frustrated with
Belgian authoritie
authoritiess
met in July in Mir Ali, North Waziristan , his handlers ’
at this stage to take
that he had killed the Americans b y repeated demands of
any risk,” said ththe
e
firing a b azoo ka on a U.S. cam p ne ar th
thee payment..6 3 B e
payment lg ia
elg ian
n
director of Belgian
border..5 2
Pakistani border authorities, however,
intelligence..5 9
intelligence
insist that th the e
On September 26, 2008, Garsallaou
Garsallaouii alleged cell was a
On Decemb
beer 1
111,, a
urged attacks in Europe in an onlin
onlinee potential nationa
nationall
statement on Minbar SOS. “The solutio
solutionn w e e k af
a f t e r B e y a y o ’’ss
my brothers and sisters is not fatwa
fatwass 54 Dupont.
return, police rounded
but boooooooms,” the posting stated
stated.. 55 Personal interview,
up the allege
alleged d
His communication demonstrated al al--
cell, including Malika Christophe Marchand, Brussels,
Qa`ida’s ability to instigate violenc
violence e February 2009.
el-Aroud. Ye Yett
in the West from the Afghan-Pakista
Afghan-Pakistan n 56 Ibid.
when police raided
region..5 3
border region 57 Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “La
16 properties i n
cible visée par le groupe
Brussels and Liège,
belge démantelé n’a pas été
they found littllittlee
identiiée,” Le Monde, Decem-
49 This information is based on the author’s own moni- evidence of an
imminent attack 60 ber 18, 2008.
attack..
toring of el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. According to 58 Personal interviews, Belgian
Beyayo’s lawyer,
private Belgian counterterrorism sources, his e-mail was counterterrorism ofi-
Marchand, said tha thatt
intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies. cials, Brussels, January and
the e-mail that
50 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism ofi-
triggered the arrestarrestss February 2009.
cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 59 Personal interview, Alain
was just “tough” talk
51 Robertson and Cruickshank. Winants, director of Bel-
sent to an impres
impresss
52 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga-
an ex-girlfriend and gium’s State Security Service,
tion. Brussels, February 2009.
disputed th thee
53 This information is based on the author’s own moni-
notion that the group 60 According to Belgian
toring of Minbar SOS. counterterrorism sources, no
may have bee been n
a “s lee per ce ll” ssent ent explosives, irearms, or attack
b ack to E urop blueprints were recov-
urope e
after deliberately being ered.
61 Personal interview,
held back frofromm
the front lines 61 Christophe Marchand, Brussels,
lines..
Beyayo told him h e February 2009.

returned to B elgium 62 Personal interview, Christophe

Marchand, New York,
b ecause he w a ass
frustrated at not being April 2009.
able to fight i n 63 During his interrogation,

Afghanistan, the W.O. said his handlers

behaved like “hustlers.” He
uncomfortable livin living g
conditions, and bouts claimed that in addition to
charging 400 euros for training,
sickness..6 2
of sickness
they charged 900 euros
W.O., for his part,
claimed that h e per person for equipment and
weapons.

7
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is
I s sU
sUE 4

security threat. All those charged den deny

y President al-Qa`ida “narrative.”
the allegations against them and ar are
e The weakenin g
set to face trial within the next yearyear..6 4
Obama’
Obama’s s of this narrative could,
Garsallaoui is still at large and believe
believed d Overseas in turn, reduc
reduce e
to be operating around the tribal area areass Terroris
Terrorismm the terrorist
of Pakistan, which is of great concern t o group’s recruitmen t
officials..6 5
Belgian counterterrorism officials
Challeng
Challengee capabilities and
By Tom sanderson capacity to garnegarnerr
Conclusion sympathy from the
The Belgian case illustrates th
thee president barack Muslim world .
continuing danger posed by al-Qa`ida’
al-Qa`ida’ss This article reviews
safe haven in FATA and the urgen urgentt obama le the landscape o f
l ea d s th
t he
e
need to tackle it. Accounts by those wh who o transnational terrorist
United States at a
traveled there do, however, sugges suggestt threats an
andd
time of heightene
heightened d
that the CIA’s increased use of PredatoPredatorr
global insecurity.
strikes have put pressure on th thee
Economic hardshihardship p
Taliban and al-Qa`ida in FATA. Whil e
is increasing the
B elgian a nd U.S. intellig e nc e ag encie
enc enciess
ranks of weak an and d
successfully tracked the Belgian cell cell,,
failing states that
the increased numbers of European Europeanss
could serve a s
traveling to FATA will require intensifie d
sanctuaries or
efforts by Western intelligence agencieagenciess
incubators for terroristerroristt
to track recruiting networks. “Th “The e
groups. Although the
b ig ta sk for
fo r se cret
cr et ser vices,” s tresse
tressed d
U.S. homelan
homeland d
Winants, is to “identify the network b y
h a s no
n o t b ee
eenn a tttta
a ck
c ke d
ed
which these people leave, where the they y
s in c e S ep tem b e err
got the logistical support to go there there,,
11, 2001, extremists
and what they intend to do when the theyy
in Europe, Nort North h
back.””6 6
come back.
Africa, the Arabian
P a u l C rru
u i c k s h a n kis a F e llo w a t t h e N Y
YUU Peninsula, an andd
South Asia remain a
C e n t e r o n L a w a n d S e c u r it ity a n d t h hee
serious threatthreat..
A ut ho r o f Al Qaeda: The Current Threat Threat..
With the election of
H i s r e p o r t i n g o n a l - Q a ` i d a h a s a p p e a r ed
President Barac Barack k
i n The Ne New w Rep ub lic, t h hee Washingto
Washington n
Oba ma , the U nited
P ost a n d o n N B C a n d C N N . In F e b r u a ry
S ta te s and th thee
2 00
0 0 9 , C N N a ir e edd “ O n e W om a n ’s W ar ,” a
world are expecting a
d o c u m e n t a r y M r . C r u i c k s h a n k p r o d u c ed
new approac
approach h
o n t h e a lllle e g e d B e l g ia n t e r r o r i s t c e ll ll,,
to countering
r e p o r t e d b y C N N S e n io i o r In t e r n a ttii o n al
terrorism .1 Almost
C o r r e s p o n d e n t N iic
c R o b e r t s.o n
thre
three e
months into his
presidency, the Obam Obama a
administration has
“repackaged” som some e
Bush administration
strategies, whil while e
at the same time
making it clear tha thatt
development,
diplomacy, and othe otherr
policies will garner
greater emphasis
emphasis..

The administration

should capitaliz
capitalizee
on a unique
opportunity to
emphasiz
emphasize e
Barack O ba m a ’s
widely admire
admired d
personal story and
interest in engagin
engaging g
the world to weaken
key elements of ththe e
a robust propaganda arm, trainintraining
g President George W.
facilities, unrelenting motivation, an
andd Bush’s deput
deputy y is both unwillin g
like-minded confederates in Nort Northh national security and unable to keep
Africa, the Middle East and beyond, i t adviser for combatin
combating g its territory fro
fromm
remains a direct threat to nation-states
nation-states.. terrorism, Juan Zarate, being used to
described thithiss launch attacks int into
o
For the past several years, the primar
primaryy conflict zone (in Afghanistan, and is
focus of terrorist activity has been IraIraqq particular Pakistan
Pakistan)) itself a target o f
and South Asia. With a phased pullou
pulloutt as “the greatest geo- extremist groups—
of U.S. and coalition forces from Ira Iraqq political proble
problem m many of whic
which h
underway, American attention ha hass confronting the Obama Islamabad had a direct
shifted to Afghanistan and Pakista
Pakistan n administratio
administration n hand in creating
creating..
as both countries descend furthe furtherr with its FATA safe- Preoccupied by the
into turmoil. With Pakistan’s lawles s haven, creepin
creeping g potential for a
Federally Administered Tribal Area Areass radicalization, nuclear fourth major war with
(FATA) serving as a terrorist saf safe e weapons, an andd its rival India— a
ha ven, the se tw o com plex stat st at e
ess accommodation of country that has
play host to even more confoundin
confounding g radicals.””2
radicals. strengthened it itss
insurgencies, elements of “al-Qa`id
“al-Qa`ida a relationship with the
central,” and criminal warlords, amon
among g Pakistan, for its part, United States, an and d
other destabilizing forces. Forme Formerr
examines the Obama administration’
administration’ss also its presence in
early counterterrorism policies
policies.. Afghanistan—thi
Afghanistan—thiss
tense situation is unlikely
A Complex and Worsening Landscap
Landscapee to change
change..
D e s p iitte
e t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a t t a c k o n U .S.S.. Given the distinct possibility
so il since S ep te temmb b er 11,
11 , 2 00 1, terroris
terrorism m that th
thee
re
remma a ins a threa t and prese nts a grea gr eatt United States and other
test for intelligence and law enforcemen enforcementt members o f
a g e n c i e s . S iin
n c e th e S e p t e m b e r1 1 a t ta c k ss,, the International Security
al-Qa`
al-Qa ` ida id a ha s bee n d am ag ageded b y effec tivtivee Assistanc
Assistance e
Western policies to reduce its fundin funding g Force (ISAF) may depart
sources, the killing or capture of ke key y Afghanista
Afghanistan n
personnel, and through its own excesse excessess without having achieved
in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains intac intactt clear victory
victory,,
and potent. With proven global reach reach,, it is possible that al-Qa`ida
would b e
revitalized for being
perceived as th the
e
group responsible for such a
defeat
defeat..

In addition to the abundance

of violen
violentt
groups in Pakistan and
Afghanistan
Afghanistan,,
there are a number of
other troubltrouble
e
s p o ts . In Ba ng la desh,
extremis
extremistt
movements, which
have alread
already y
64 Robertson and Cruickshank. 1 The anticipation for change targeted the civilian
was a result of Obama’s
65 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism ofi- leadership of Prim
Primee
early statements about the
cials, Brussels, January and February 2009.
planned closure of the deten-
66 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Bel- 2 This statement was made by
tion facility at Guantanamo Bay,
gium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009.
the closure of CIA secret
detention centers, and the Juan C. Zarate at a Cen-
repudiation of controversial
ter for Strategic and International
interrogation techniques such as
Studies roundtable on
waterboarding.
March 11, 2009.

8
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Minister Sheikh Hasina, could tak takee that Yemeni militants conditions and
advantage of a nation in turmoil that i n affiliated with al al-- threat
threatss
February 2009 witnessed a mutiny b y Qa`ida have traveled to
facing the United
guards..3 Coupled wit
its own border guards withh nearby Somali
Somalia a
States and its allies
allies,,
severe stress on the environment, hig highh to collaborate with
the Obama
levels of corruption, and a crowde
crowded d an al-Qa`ida
al-Qa`ida--
administration needs
population living in poverty an
andd affiliated group of
an
despair, Bangladesh is a dark cloud o n Islamist militant s
aggressive
the horizon
horizon.. al-Shabab..5
known as al-Shabab
counterterrorism
strategy
strategy,,
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has mad
madee De sp ite the s er io
erio us
but one that is mindful
strides in countering al-Qa`ida an and
d of other foreig
foreignn
da ma ge suffe
s uffe re
redd
its supporters since the attacks insid
insidee policy initiatives and
the kingdom began in earnest in Ma May y by al-Qa`ida, the
of the messag
message e
2003. With thousands arrested and a group continues t o
they deliver. It is to
“disengagement” program targetin
targetingg benefit from a widely
be expected tha thatt
young radicals, these developments
developments,, held perceptio
perception n
any new approach will
that the West is
be characterize
characterized d
“With a Kenyan father, a leading a “Crusade
“Crusade””
by a more nuanced
to destroy Islam and
middle name of ‘Hussein,’ to occupy an andd
attitude from th the e
White House. Much of
and a childhood education exploit traditional
Barack Obama’
Obama’ss
Muslim lands. Th The e
in Indonesia—the world’s global downturn,
popularity at home
and abroad stem
stemss
largest Muslim-majority widely blamed o n
from his pre-election
American “greed” and
country—President Obama “arrogance,” wil l
repudiation o f
certain Bush
shatters much of the serve to reinforce
administration-era
this argument an and d
negative imagery that some prove to be valuable
tactic
tacticss
and strategies against
associate with executive propaganda fo forr
terrorist groups
groups..
extremists. Usama bin
leadership and power in Ladin himsel
himselff
Given the damaged
reputation of al al--
the United States.” has reportedly used
Qa`ida—best visible
the U.S. financia
financiall
by its erosion o f
crisis as a
support in Iraq—and
propaganda tool,
according to U.S. Director of Nationa
Nationall the enthusias
enthusiasm m
claimin
claiming g
with which the world
Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “hav
“havee that “the United
has greeted th thee
rendered the kingdom a harsh operatin
operatingg States is staggerin
staggering g
new U.S.
environment for al-Qa’ida. ”4 under the attacks of
administration, there
the mujahidin an and d
is a n
The greater regional threat is on th
thee their consequences…It
opportunity to make
southern tip of the Arabian Peninsul
Peninsulaa is drowning i n
gains
gains..
in lawless Yemen, home to the larges
largestt a financial crisis, so
contingent of prisoners still detained a t much so that it i s
Guantanamo Bay. A weak state, Yeme Yemen n begging from big and
is host to extremists who operate wit with
h small countrie
countriess
relative impunity in towns and acros
acrosss alike. ”6 With global
large areas of ungoverned tribal territory
territory.. unemploymen
unemploymentt
It is from Yemen that many expertexpertss surging, and
crackdowns by
anxiou
anxiouss
leaders worsening,
this economic tur turn n
of events injects
vigor and seemin
seeming g
validity into these
arguments..7
arguments

Resetting the

Counterterrorism

Strategy
Strategy??
With these
At first glance , the Obam ma
a administration also Clinton);;9
William J. Clinton)
administration’s initial few decision s strongly stresse
stressed d the use of
might cause confusion as to wher wheree “democracy interrogation
the president stands on controversia
controversiall promotion” as the techniques
techniques,,
policies. While President Obama quickl
quicklyy long
long-- such as
ordered the closing of the detentio
detention n term antidote to “waterboarding,” that
facility at Guantanamo Bay, an
andd terrorism. The military , hav
have e
directed all U.S. intelligence officers no
nott intelligence, financial, been described as
to exceed the interrogation technique
techniquess law enforcement
enforcement,, “torture”; warrantles
warrantlesss
found in the U.S. Army Field Manual
Manual,, and diplomatic arms of surveillance of
other decisions have signaled that som some e the United State
Statess communication
Bush administration policies will b e played key roles in betwee
between n
kept in place or only altered slightly. A carrying out thesthese e terrorism suspects
review of still emerging policies reveal
revealss policies, although too and U.S. citizens citizens;;
broad objectives and continued, thougthoughh much emphasi
emphasiss the indefinite
modified, tactics
tactics.. was probably placed detention of suspect suspectss
on the militar
military y at Guantanamo Bay or
President B ush’s
us h’s 2006 Nationa l
options. Some of the in CIA secre
secrett
Strategy for Combating Terroris
Terrorismm most controversia
controversiall ov
o v e rse a s p ris ons
riso ns ; the
included four main pillars: 1) Preven Preventt tactics employed by susp
s usp e nsio n o f
attacks by terrorist networks; 2) Den Deny y the United State
Statess hab eas
ea s c or pus for fo r
WMD to rogue states and terrorist allie alliess included suspe
s uspe ct
ctss;; a nd th
and the e
who seek to use them; 3) Deny terrorist
terroristss “extraordinary designation of
the support and sanctuary of rogu rogue e renditions ” captured individuals a s
states; and 4) Deny terrorists contro controll of terrorism suspects “enemy combatants.”
o f a ny nation
nat io n they w ould use as a b asasee (a policy begu
begun n Even though som some e
terror..8 The B us
and launching pad for terror ushh under President
inside and outside of the governmen
governmentt of
o f thes
these e tac tics e nd ed
nded
anticipate future plots against the Wes
Westt befo
b efo re P resid enentt
and its Arab allies. There are also sign
signss Obama entered office
5 “Qaeda Bomber Behind
Yemen Attack Trained in So- —including th thee
3 Julikar Ali Manik and Somini Sengupta, “Army’s Bor- malia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009.
6 On January 14, 2009, a new
der Guards Rebel in Bangladesh,” New York Times, Feb- 8 George W. Bush, “National
audiotape purportedly by
ruary 25, 2009.
Usama bin Ladin appeared on
4 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the
Islamist web forums. Bin
Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee
Ladin claimed that the United Strategy for Combating
on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intel-
States is “drowning in a i- Terrorism,” White House
ligence, February 12, 2009.
nancial crisis,” partly as a result National Security Council,
of “mujahidin” attacks. September 2006.
7 Michael T. Klare, “A Planet at 9 “Fact Sheet: Extraordinary
the Brink: Will Econom- Rendition,” American Civil
ic Brushires Prove Too Virulent Liberties Union, December 6,
to Contain?” TomDis- 2005; Tim Weiner, Legacy
patch.com, February 24, 2009. of Ashes: The History of the CIA
(New York: Doubleday,
9
2007).
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is
I s sU
sUE 4

practice of waterboardin
waterboardingg1 0 an d th thee that “if we had a ticking-bomb Perhaps one of the most powerfu powerfull
prisonss1 1 — it h a
CIA’s use of secret prison ass situation
situation,, and promising developments in
been widely recognized that they and obviously, whatever was bein beingg counterterrorism is the direct challeng
challenge e
cause
causedd used I felt was not sufficient, I woul
wouldd that Ba ra ck Ob am a’s a sc e nd ancy t o
damage to the U.S. reputation abroad
abroad.. not hesitate to go to the president power and collaborative approac
approach h
of represents to al-Qa`ida’s
While President Obama is canceling the United States and request legitimacy
legitimacy..
whateve
whateverr President B us h’s controversia
controversiall
som
somee additional authority I would policies and public persona appeare
appeared d
14
Bush administration need. ” to serve as an effective recruiting
counterterroris m The new administration has als alsoo an
andd
policies, a complete scrapping is continued—if not increased—Predato
increased—Predatorr propaganda tool for Usama bin Ladi Ladinn
no
nott Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV
(UAV))
likely. The differences between the strikes, and is targeting the
tw
two o Pakistan
Pakistanii
presidents do not extend to the
cor
core e
policy of preventing attacks on most extreme interrogation tactics, Taliban, specifically the Baitulla
Baitullahh
th
thee Mehsud network .1 5 While this ma may y
hi
hiss
United States and its citizens, but
CIA Director Leon Panetta noted in hi hiss arguably complicate counterinsurgenc
counterinsurgency y
rathe
ratherr
February 6, 2009 nomination testimon testimony y efforts by inflaming public sentimen sentimentt
t o s o m e o f th e te c h
hnn iq u e s no te d ab o ve
ve,, and generating additional recruits fo forr
and to the manner with which the Taliban-affiliated militias, the Predato r
10 The last known case of waterboarding in the
Unite
United d strikes are one of the only tools
S ta te s purs ues
ue s its goals. P res iden id entt at
United
Obama and his national security America’s disposal for killing al-
team
team,, States occurred in 2003. See Renee Schoof, “CIA
Qa`id a
which includes several individual individualss Direc- and Taliban leaders and operators wh who o
administration,, tor Acknowledges Use of Water Boarding,” McClatchy are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, an
who served in the Bush administration andd
recognize the threat posed by Newspapers, February 5, 2008.
targets..1 6
Pakistani targets
al
al-- 11 Don Gonyea, “Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons
Qa`ida and other groups, especiall especially y Abroad,” National Public Radio, September 6, 2006. The Obama Administration’s early Move Moves s
those seeking WMD capabilities. Th Thee 12 This is considered by many to be either naïve or While the new administration’ s
Obama administration, for disin-
counterterrorism strategy is yet to
example
example,, genuous given the realities of interrogation practiced
be
has allowed the CIA to continue th thee by fully determined, the official Whit White e
practice of rendition to some of the United States’ more aggressive partners.
House webpage on homeland securit security y
cooperatin
cooperating g For
provides the broad outlines of it itss
third countries, but is seeking more, see Greg Miller, “Obama Preserves Renditions
approach to overseas radicalism an and d
stronger
stronger,, as
terrorism. The strategy pays particula particularr
m ore reliable
relia ble assura
a ssura nce s tha t sus pe ct ctss Counter-Terrorism Tool,” Los AngelesTim es, February 1, attention to restoring widely-
will not be tortured while in 2009.
admire d
foreig n 13 Charlie Savage, “Obama’s War on Terror May
American values and standards tha thatt
custody..1 2 Other actions reflect th
custody thee Re- many allege were eroded during the
Obama administration’s acceptance semble Bush’s in Some Areas,” New York Times, Febru- las lastt
of ary 18, 2009.
eight years of the unpopularly name named d
Bush administration views on the “global war on terrorism.” Five
global
global,, ke
keyy
borderless nature of counterterrorism
counterterrorism.. points of the strateg
strategy y1 7 a r e
e::
This is evident from comments
mad
made e 1. Find, Disrupt, and Destroy Al Al--
during the U.S. Senate Qa`ida ;
confirmatio
confirmation n 2. New Capabilities to Aggressivel Aggressivelyy
hearings for Attorney General Eri Ericc Defeat Terrorists
Terrorists;;
Holder and for U.S. Solicitor Genera Generall 3. Prepare the Military to Meet 2 1s t
Elena Kagan who both suggested that Century Threats
Threats;;
th
thee 4. Win the Battle of Ideas
Ideas;;
terrorism “battlefield” extends to 5. Restore American Influence an andd
area
areass Restore Our Values
Values..
where individuals may be arrested fo forr
providing a range of support to terroris terroristt
groups..1 3
groups
14 CIA Director Panetta did agree, however, that
Additionally, while the Obam
maa
administration has halted the use of
th
thee
 America. This was a clear attempt t o
“The Predator strikes denigrate an individual whose persona
personall
story undermines the penetrating an
water- are one of the only tools persistent al-Qa`ida narrative . and
d

boarding constituted torture. For more, see Mark at America’s disposal

Indeed, the new U.S. president is
Maz- for killing al-Qa`ida
zetti, “Pick for CIA Chief Leaves Open Idea of Harsher
Tribune,, February and Taliban leaders
an
Interrogation,” International Herald Tribune
6, and operators who are American
highest
minority who has risen to th
seat of power. With a Kenya
the
Kenyan
e
n
2009.
15 Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger, “Obama attacking U.S., NATO, father, a middle name of “Hussein,”
an
andd
Expands Afghan, and Pakistani a childhood education in Indonesia
Indonesia——
Missile Strikes Inside Pak,” New York Times, February
20, 2009. targets.” the world’s largest Muslim-majorit y
16 “Kilcullen Weighs in on U.S. Strikes in Pakistan,” country—President Obama shatter
shatterss
Weekly Standard, February 10, 2009. much of the negative imagery that
17 This information is drawn from the White House’s and the extremists who rallied som
some e
Homeland Security Agenda, available at www.white- associate with executive leadershi
leadership p
house.gov/agenda/homeland_security/. and power in the United States
States.. Hi
Hiss
personal background, combined wit withh
10 youn
youngg the traditional influence enjoyed b y
the United States, serves to multipl
multiplyy
Muslim men and women on his the power and authority typicall y
behalf
behalf.. available to a U.S. president. In fact,
President Obama was immediately an and da
crudely insulted by Ayman al-Zawahiri , 17-nation poll conducted by the
al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, upo upon n Britis
Britishh
his election victory in November 20082008.. Broadcasting Corporation on the eve
Al-Zawahiri ccalle
alle d President-elec
President-electt o f
Obam
Oba m a a “ho use
us e neg ro ,” ssug
negro,” ug ge stin
sting
g Barack Obama’s inauguration showeshowed d
that he would in fact be doing “widespread and growing optimism thathatt
th
thee his presidency will lead to improve
improved d
bidding of a presumably racist, whit white e
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

relations between the United States an

and
the rest of the world,” with 67% of pol
d
polll
There is an
unmistakable tensio
Improving
tension n
respondents expressing positive view
viewss between the West and India’
India’ss
president-elect..1 8
of the president-elect Muslim and Ara Arab b Counterterrori
worlds where a sense
This could mark a great opportunity t o of humiliatio
humiliation n
sm Polic
Policy
y
w ea ke
kenn a l-
l-QQa`ida’s
a`ida ’s a ppea l. Jus t as
a s fatawa and exploitation after Mumba i
by senior Muslim clerics around th the
e remains strong. One o f
the most important By paul staniland
world have questioned the legitimac legitimacy y
of al-Qa`ida’s actions and reduce reduced d goals of U.S. foreig foreign n
its standing among some Musli Muslim m and counterterrorism india has emerged as
populations, so too can Barack Obama’ Obama’ss policy will be t o
“communicate to the o ne o f the wo rld’
rld’ss
life story and worldwide admiration .
Muslim world tha t most consistent
the U.S. is not at war targets of Islamis Islamistt
“Pointing to the with them,” bu butt militants. Although
t he Mumba i
weaknesses and rather is interested in
attacks of November
greater partnershi
partnership p
contradictions in al- on many levels levels..2 0 2008 attracte
attracted d
the most global
Qa`ida’s message, while Achieving this goa goall
attention, they wer were e
will reduce the
dispensing with any self- ability of al-Qa`idal-Qa`ida a merely the most
recent and dramati
dramatic c
defeating U.S. policies, and similar
in a series of bloody
organizations to
will increase the chances garne
garnerr terrorist incident
incidentss
throughout urban
of success by weakening sympathy from
Muslim populations , India. On July 11 11,,
Muslim support for al- and thereby limit 2006, for example,
terrorists plante
planted d
Qa`ida.” their capacity t o
recruit new members. seven bombs on the
There is now a n Suburban Railwa
Railway y
effort to redesign U.S. of Mumbai, causing
policy, and b y the deaths o f
doing so the Obama more than 200 people.
administration ca cann The Novembe
Novemberr
maintain a strong 2008 attacks, however,
campaign agains againstt brought int into
o
terrorism while clear focus the
avoiding mistake s inability of the India Indian n
that indirectly assist security apparatus to
U.S. adversaries
adversaries.. anticipate an andd
This efficiency of appropriately respond
policy is essentiaessentiall to major terroris t
given the continued incidents. As one
advantages o f prominent analys
analystt
extremist groups and wrote, the government’s
the worsenin
worsening g responses to th the e
global environment Mumbai attacks were
that supports thei theirr “comprehensiv
“comprehensive e
arguments. It is likely failures from the point of
that the Unite United d view of India’
India’ss
States and the world security
will see an eve everr establishment.””1 While
establishment.
more enhanced and som
some e
sophisticate
sophisticated d Indian analysts and
terrorist threat, and an politicians prefe preferr
equally refinerefined d
approach to
counterterrorism
counterterrorism..
al-Qa`ida’s message, by weakening Muslim
while dispensin
dispensing g support for al al--
with any self- Qa`ida. Furthermore,
Progress in reducing al-Qa`ida’s appea
appeall defeating U.S. the bolsterin
bolstering g
began while President Bush was i n policies of America’s image
policies,,
office, and President Obama can quickl
quicklyy w ill in c rer e as e th
t he and cancellatio
cancellation n
build on that momentum. Pointing t o ch
c h a n c e s o f su c c e ss
ess or modification of
the weaknesses and contradictions i n
some controversia
controversiall t o fo cus o n Pakist an’s
T o m S a n d e r s o ns e r v e s r ole as a ha ve
venn
policies could certainly lead mormoree
a s d e p u t y d i r e c t or for a variety of
countries to cooperate with the Unite
Unitedd
a n d s e n i o r fe l l o w o f militant groups, it i s
S ta te ss..1 9
tth
h e T ra r a n s n a t i o n al clear that India needs
Conclusion Th re at P roje ct at th e to dramaticall
dramatically y
Center for Strategc i enhance its domestic
A multitude of stresses are impactin
impactingg
a n d Int In t e rn a t io n naal counterterroris
counterterrorism m
vulnerable populations around th the
e
S t u d ie s in W a s h hinin g tto o n, infrastructure.
world, leaving many open to extremis
extremistt
D .C
.C. M r. Sa n d e rso n Improvement wil l
ideologies that energize marginalize
marginalizedd
s p e c iia a lliizz e s i n require significant
people. It is clear that this trend wil
willl
cou n te rte rrorism , infusions of
continue in the current economi
economic c
in tellige n ce, and op e en n resources, policy
climate
climate..
s o u r c e in f o r m a t i o n .F o r consistency, an andd
tth
h e l a s t ffo o u r y e a r ss,, political will that are
h e h a s lle e d an e ffo rt to often lacking i n
m o d e l c o l lla a b o r a t io n India .
betw een g ov ern m en t
a n a ly
l y s ts ts a n d n on n-- This article outlines
governm ental experts
on terrorism an nd d the curren
currentt
c r im
i m e . K n o w n a s tth he structure of
T r u s tet e d In f o r m a ti t i on counterterrorism policy
N e t w o r k p r o jje ect, the in
e f f o r t h a s o r g a n i z ed I nd ia , a n d t h en a ss
s s es s e s
a n d t a p p e d e x p e r t i s eo n s om
o m e p o ss ib lle
e
t h r e a t s i n E u r o pe reforms.
a n d S o u th e a s tA s ia . H e Thoroughgoing
te a c he s a ra n g ge
e institutiona l
of co urses for the reform in India will
iin
n t e llllii g e n c ec o m m u n it i t y, be challenging
challenging..
an d ca rries ou t The country suffers
ex ten siv e field from a fragmente
fragmented d
i n t e r v i e ws and inefficient
across dozens of bureaucracy, far fewe fewerr
c o u n t r iie e s a n n u a lll l y . M rr.. resources than
S a n de rs on ho ld s developed countries
d e g r e e s f r o m W h e a t on eve
even n
C o l le g e a n d T u fftt s though it faces a
U n i v e r s i t y ( F l e tc h er higher threat level level,,
School), both in and a political elite
M a s s a c h u s e t t. s focused primaril
primarily y
on electoral politics. It
is likely only a
matter of time before
another significan
significantt
terrorist attack occurs.
Nevertheless
Nevertheless,,
focusing on a series
of substantia
substantiall
but distinct tasks,
with the suppor t
of India’s international
partners, ca can n
slowly but steadily
improve India’ s
counterterrorism
capabilities
capabilities..
18 “Global Poll Uncovers Growing Optimism that Obama
Will Improve US Relations,” BBC, January 20, 2009.
19 On the other hand, it could also cause some govern- 20 Steve Simon and Daniel
Byman et al., Restoringthe Bal-
ments to refrain from providing intelligence to a new U.S. 1 Ajai Sahni, “The Uneducable
ance: A Middle East Strategy for Indian,” Outlook, Decem-
administration that is critical of harsh tactics.
the Next President (Wash- ber 1, 2008.
ington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2008).

11
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Domestic Structure and Capabilitie Capabilities s c um b e rso m e

e.. S ta te s lacked the
India’s police and internal securit security y a nd tthe
he c entr a all manpower to
system is highly fragmented and ofte often n agencies frequently
sustai
sustainn
poorly coordinated. The country’ country’ss compete ove
overr
inc reas ed ssecec urity a
att
federal political system leaves mos mostt resources and
the
t he ho te ls.
ls . Onc
Once e
policing responsibilities to the states states,, bureaucratic
the attack occurred,
which usually possess their ow own n autonomy
autonomy,,
the securit
security y
counterterrorism and intelligence units units.. and they both do a
T h es e ffo
orr c es , e
ess p e c ia lly lo c a l p o lic e
e,, highly uneven jo job b
are often poorly trained and equipped equipped.. of cooperating with
Local personnel are frequently hired o n another..3
one another
the basis of political patronage and ar are e In addition to these
notorious for high levels of corruption corruption.. organizationa
organizationall
challenges, many of
There is also a variety of centra
centrall the securit
security y
investigative, law enforcement, an and d institutions at all
intelligence agencies. The Ministry o f levels of governmen
governmentt
Home Affairs includes the Intelligenc Intelligence e are understaffed,
B ur e a u, C entr
entraall R e s e r ve P o lic e F orrc
Fo cee,, undertrained, an and d
Indian Police Service, and new Nationa Nationall technologically
Investigation Agency, while the Researc Research h backward..4
backward
and Analysis Wing and Central Burea Bureau u
All of these pathologies
of Investigation are answerable to th the e
prime minister .2 The military—whic h
were evident i n
the failure to prevent
“Mumbai brought into or appropriatel
appropriately y
clear focus the inability respond to the Mumbai
attacks..5 The rre
attacks e
of the Indian security was in fact
apparatus to anticipate and significant
intelligenc
intelligence e
appropriately respond to suggesting a seaborne
major terrorist incidents.” terrorist attac
attack k
was likely, and even
that prominen
prominentt
sites such as the Taj
Hotel would b e
targeted. This
information, however
however,,
was ignored by several
key bureaucrati
bureaucratic c
actors—including the
Coast Guar Guardd
and the Maharashtra
state director
director--
ge
genn er a l o f po lic e —
be
becc a u s e it w a ass
deemed
unactionable..6 Othe rs,
unactionable
suc
suchh
as the Maharashtra
Anti-Terroris m
Squad, at least
attempted some kin kind
d
preparation..7 The
of preparation
differences i n
readiness highlight
the extent o f
fragmentation among
the securit
security y
apparatus. Even when
Mumbai polic police
e
tried to take
preventive action,
the
theyy
sweeping rhetorical claims, juggle juggledd One common option s
personnel at all levels, and repeatedl repeatedly y response to India’
India’ss are relatively limited.
promised better coordination at th thee counterterrorism The coerciv
coercive e
national level, but key capacity has no nott failures has been a diplomacy following
improved. Mumbai finally triggered th the e quick the December 13 13,,
resignation of Union Home Ministe Ministerr acknowledgement of 2001 attack on the
Shivraj Patil, on whose watch a serie seriess domesti
domestic c Indian Parliament
Parliament,,
of previous attacks had occurred. Ye Yett weaknesses, followed nam ed Operation
Patil’s resignation and his replacemen replacementt by a far mormore
e Parakram, di
didd
by the more competent Palaniappa Palaniappan n vocal demand to “get not prevent
Chidambaram (who worked on interna internall tough” on Pakistan
Pakistan.. Pakistan’s continue
continued d
security under Rajiv Gandhi) mark markss While Pakistan’s role patronage of
only the beginning of the necessar necessary y as a sanctuar
sanctuary
y Lashkar-i-Tayyiba an and
d
c h an g e s . IIn
ndd ia f a c e s a “ d ir e n e
eeed
d to (both voluntary and other militant
redress its numerous deficiencies in it itss involuntary) fo
forr groups operating i n
arrangements.””9
internal security arrangements. militants is Kashmir .1 0 Pakistan’s
indisputable, India’s nuclear weapo
weapon n
The Nature of the Threat: Domestic and Foreig
Foreignn
forces did not have Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the
sufficient night night--
Night,” Outlook, Decem-
vision equipment,
ber 15, 2008.
is primarily geared toward foreig foreign n heavy weaponryweaponry,,
threats, including terrorism—als
terrorism—also o or information about 12
generates intelligence with relevanc
relevance e the attack sites sites,,
to domestic terrorism, and there is a le ad ing t o a lo ng
centrally controlled National Securit
Securityy re sponse
sp onse tim e and a nd th
thee
G ua rd (NS G) that spe cializes in hosta g
gee e m e rg e n ncce of a
and terrorist attack situations . d isa
is a s t ro u
uss s ie g e.8

The combination of state and centra

centrall Previous attempts
authorities is ostensibly coordinate coordinated d
at reform an
andd
through joint committees, task forces forces,,
subsidiary intelligence bureaus, an andd improvement h
haave
a Multi-Agency Center. All of thes thesee been largel
largelyy
coordinating mechanisms aim to inadequate—politicians
harmonize the intelligence gathered b y hav e
ve madde
e
t h e se a ge n c ie s a n d to g e n e ra t e s ha re
red
d
threat perceptions and associate
associated d 3 “Securing the Home

responses, but they are often slow an andd

Front,
Front,”” India Today
Today,, January 12,
2 A critical analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs forc- 2009.
es can be found in K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence 4 On the understafing of police,
and the Police in Indi
a(New Delhi: Sage, 2007). For a brief see P. Chidambaran, “A
overview of RAW, see Jayshree Bajoria, “RAW: India’s Clear Command Structure,”
External Intelligence Agency,” Council on Foreign Rela- Outlook, January 6, 2009.
tions, November 7, 2008. 5 Vijay Oberoi, “Never Again,”
Indian Express, December
2, 2008.
6 Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar
and Dola Mitra, “The
Armies of the Night,” Outlook,
December 15, 2008.
7 The Mumbai police put extra
guard on prominent sites
and met with hotel oficials. The
extra guard was not
maintained, however, because of
the strain it put on man-
power. Praveen Swami, “Pointed
Intelligence Warnings
Preceded Attacks,” Hindu
Hindu,,
November 30, 2008.
8 “‘Rot’ at Heart of Indian
Intelligence,” BBC, December
2, 2008; Praveen Swami,
“Lethal Lapse,” Frontline
Frontline,, De-
cember 6-19, 2008; Saikat
Datta, Smruti Koppikar and
“shield” makes credible Indian coerciv
coercivee to India. Improving 2009), p. 15.
diplomacy difficult . India’s interna l 10 On Parakram and its
security apparatus aftermath, see V.K. Sood and
India’s current government has learne
learnedd
must therefore b e Pravin Sawhney, Operation
this lesson well, and instead engaged i n the primary focus of Parakram: The War Unin-
a coordinated diplomatic offensive tha thatt Indian security an
andd ished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003);
has brought at least rhetorical results
results.. P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal
Military threats against Pakista
Pakistan n Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen,
are unlikely to bear fruit, while eveeven n 9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Four Crises and a Peace
successful diplomacy will have a limite
limited d Process: American Engagement in
impact..1 1 Pakistan simply lacks th
impact thee South Asia((Washington,
Washington,
capacity, and probably the will, to engag
engage e Lessonsof M umbai (Washing- D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
in the kind of domestic policies that wil
willl 2007).
ton, D.C.: RAND Corporation,
significantly lessen the threat poseposed d 11 Rabasa et al., p. 21.
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

elites..1 2 In addition to Pakistan

political elites Pakistan,, The Path Forward: equipping them. A new
India also faces cross-border terroristerrorism m Coordination and federal agenc
agency y
Capacity
Capacity-- or set of laws will
from Bangladesh. Attacks attribute attributed d
Buildin
Building g contribute little t o
to jihadist groups such as Harkat-ulHarkat-ul--
The major domestic this fundamental task
Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) are believed t o
response to Mumba Mumbaii unless they ar are
e
have been launched from the country country..
ha s b ee n an em e m p ha sis able to sustain the
Bangladesh’s political instability an and d
on st rereamam line
linedd momentum necessarnecessary y
weak state capacity, however, make i t
coordina
coordination tion be tw ee n for years of
difficult for India to consistently shap shape e
ag encies a cros crosss unglamorous but
Bangladeshi counterterrorism policy policy..
state and federal lines, crucia cruciall
In addition to the limits of puttin g and the creatio
creation n training and
of a new National institution-building .
pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh
Bangladesh,,
Investigation Agenc Agency y Locking in lines of
a number of major attacks have bee beenn
(NIA) .1 5 The aim of budgetary approva
approvall
carried out with significant help fro
fromm
the NIA is t o over a 5-10 year
empower a federal period will be critica
criticall
agency to investigat
investigate e to avoid the effort
major crimes such as falling victim to th the
e
terrorism an andd vicissitudes of
organized crime domestic politics an and d
without having t o ele
e le ct ions
io ns..
b e a s ke
k e d to d doo so by
t h e st
s t a te s . Th
T h e rre
e Second, reform efforts
will be special courts
that can rapidl rapidly y must be properl
properly y
hear terror-related resourced. India is a
cases..1 6 The NI
cases NIA A poor country wit withh
will be filled out by many pressing
new staff draw drawn n needs, and securit security y
Indian Muslims under the aegis of th thee
Indian Mujahidin (IM). This clearl y “Once the
shows that the problem is not simpl simplyy attack intelligence and la
laww
one of containing Pakistan Pakistan..1 3 T he
The
Indian police and intelligence agencie agenciess
occurred, enforcement agencies
were forced to scramble in the wak wake e the security throughout India India..
of bombings in Jaipur, Delhi, Utta Uttarr An infusion of funding
Pradesh, and elsewhere claimed b y
forces did and personne
personnell
the IM, which revealed a significan significantt not have into the overall
indigenous capability for terrorism . security apparatus ha hass
Bolstering domestic intelligence wil willl
suficient a ls o b e en p ro m is ed ,
become increasingly central if a trend o f night- a
ann d t h e N SG
S G ha
hass
radicalization continues among small small,, been deployed
but potentially growing portions o f
vision throughout the countr country y
India’s Muslim community. Althoug h equipment, to offer a quicker
there have been pockets of radicalizatio
radicalization n response to futur future e
u nc ov e re d as
a s far
f ar so uth a s K er ala , o n
heavy attacks..1 7 T h es e s t e p s
attacks
b a la nc e it s e
eeemm s tha t u rb a n a re as o f weaponry, or r ep rre
ese nt a usefu
en ull
north and west India have been th thee beginning. These
primary recruiting grounds for Islamis t
information efforts on their own own,,
radicals..1 4
radicals about the however, will lead to
little substantiv
substantive e
Therefore, India faces threats spillin
spillingg attack sites, results unless they
out of porous borders and wea weak k leading to a have three majo majorr
governments both to the east and to th the e characteristics
characteristics..
w e s t. Th es e fo rre
eig
ig n th re
r e a t s c o a les c
ce
e
long response
with a troubled internal securit y time and the
a p p a ra
rattus
us a nd s o
omm e le ve l o f d om e sti sticc
radicalization to create a dangerou dangerouss
emergence of
situation . a disastrous
siege.”

from existing
funding reflects India’s lack of wealth wealth.. aid is unlikely, but and state-centric
Compared to the budgets of even muc much h small measure
measuress rivalries. This is a n
smaller developed countries, Indi Indiaa could make a enormous challenge for
simply does not provide sufficient mone money y significant difference
difference,, a political clas classs
fo r its se s e c urit
urityy a
agge
e ncie s o
onn a p e r c a pit
pitaa particularly if focused focused above all else
is..1 9 This causes them to undertrai
b a s is undertrain n on the cities mos
mostt on the cut-throa
cut-throatt
and understaff their personnel, leadin leading g likely to be attacked in electoral competition
to corruption and a reliance on crud crude e the future (Delh
(Delhii that characterize
characterizess
and often counterproductive policin policing g and Mumbai)
Mumbai).. Indian politics. Despite
techniques. International assistance assistance,, these challenges
challenges,,
in the form of grants for training an and d Finally, India’s political maintaining a degree
equipping police forces, could reduc reduce e of consistenc
consistency y
the impact of this reform on India’ India’ss leadership mus mustt and follow-through is
budget. In the current economi
economic c exert the will to push essential so tha thatt
environment, large-scale internationa internationall past bureaucrati
bureaucratic c
First, they will need the reform process
to be sustaine
sustained d does not stall o r
over a long period of end up wasting huge
time. Dramaticall
Dramatically y amounts of tim time e
bolstering the and money.
12 As Shishir Gupta notes, “Pakistan is only part of the
institutional capacit
capacity y Government minister ministerss
problem.” See Shishir Gupta, “Less Blame, More Action,”
of India’s must not allow
Indian Express, December 5, 2008.
counterterrorism themselves to be use usedd
13 Animesh Roul, “India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat:
apparatu
apparatuss as pawns in
A Proile of the Indian Mujahideen,” Terrorism Monitor
is a ta s k o f a t le a s t bureaucratic battles
7:4 (2009).
h a lf a d e ca d e , a nndd ove
overr
14 These are the areas of greatest Muslim demographic
probably longerlonger..1 8 turf, resources, and
presence and also of communal rioting. Although irm
The training o f responsibilities
responsibilities..
data is elusive, many experts argue that the 2002 Gujarat
new and current Spe ecc ia lized tta a s k fo rrc
c es
riots have propelled Islamist recruitment. For more, see
personnel alone i s le d b y e eleclec t e
ed
d
“India Fears that Some of its Muslims are Joining in Ter-
an enormous task, officials, and
rorism,” New York Times, August 9, 2006; “Ahmedabad
much less properl
properly y supported at the
Attacks: The Usual Suspects,” Hindu
Hindu,, August 1, 2008.
highes
highestt
15 The NIA is discussed in levels, must be given
the power t o
R.K. Raghavan, “Terror engage in oversight
over the securit security y
Trackers,” Frontline
Frontline,, January 3-
apparatus. This will
16, 2009.
involve overcomin
overcoming g
16 “Govt Tables Bill to Set Up
a traditional aversion
National Investigation
to transparenc
transparency y
Agency,” Times of India,
on the part of the police
December 16, 2008.
and intelligenc
intelligence e
17 “NSG Inks Agreements with
a g e n c i e s.
Eight Airlines,” Hindu
Hindu,,
March 1, 2009.
19 Sahni, “Uneducable Indian,”
18 See the quote by Praveen
Swami in “Will India’s Secu-
rity Overhaul Work?” BBC, argues that the police-to-

December 11, 2008. population ratio in India is

125:100,000.

13
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

G iiv
vee n the s e d e ep c ha lle nge
ng e s , the
t he India
Ind iann security forces. In long and difficult, and
lea dership
ders hip is be st a dv dvisis ed to ma m a nag
nage e addition to helpin helping g
is unlikely t o
a pair of distinct projects—first
projects—first,, to prevent and
bring any sudden
building on the short-term changes i n respond to terroris terroristt
suc
succcesse s, but it i s
esses,
coordination that can leverage existin existing g attacks, inc reas ed
ne v ertheles
er theles s e ss ential.
a s s e t s a n d c a p a b ilit ie s , a n d s e c o n dd,, professionalis
professionalism m
engaging in the much lengthier an andd might reduce the P aul Stan ilan d is a
broader task of improving trainin g resentment of th thee
and technical capacities across India’ India’ss security forces in P h . D . c a n d i d a te
security apparatus. Conflating the tw twoo parts of the India Indiann
i n p o l i t iic
cal scien ce a nd
into one grand reform agenda is likel likely y Muslim community,
m em ber of th he
e
to slow both down and undermine th the
e which perceive th thee
S e c u r it y S t u d ie s P ro g r a m
overall effort. India must pursue a police as
a t M IT . D u ri ng
ring
s e ri es o f d is c re tte
e, manage a b le t a s k s i f
ea indiscriminate and
the 200 8-09 a ca dem ic
it is to fortify itself against the threat threatss brutal..2 2
brutal
y e a r , h e i s a lls so a
flowing both from across the border an and d Small but meaningful
predo ctoralresearch
from among its own population population.. grants could als alsoo
f e l lo w ini n t h e B e llff e
err
be provided for
C e n t e r ffo or Scien ce
An American Rol
Rolee training and equippin equipping g
a n d I n t e r n a t i o n al
The United States can play a helpful rol role e po lic e for c e ss..
olic
Affairs a t H ar va rd
in bolstering India’s counterterroris m U niv e rsit
rsity y’s
’s K e nned
nnedy y
Preparing for the
capabilities..2 0 T h er e h a s a lr ea dy
capabilities dy beeenn School of G overnm ent.
extensive cooperation between the U.S U.S.. M r . S t a n i l a nd
Inevitabl
Inevitablee
Federal Bureau of Investigation an and d h a s p u b l iiss h e d i n
Indian security services in the wak wake e Even if significant
International Security,
of Mumbai, illustrating the dramati c reform and IndoIndo--
Security Studies, t h e
improvement in Indo-U.S. relations relations..2 1 U.S. cooperation
Washington Quarterly ,
There has also been increas ed
incre ased emerge, however, it i s
tw o e dite d volum e s , an d
intelligence sharing with India, most o f likely that India will
w iitt h t h e R A N ND D
it obviously related to Afghanistan an and d be hit once agai
again n
C o r p o r a t iio
o n . H i s f iei e ld
ld
Pakistan
Pakistan.. with a significant
r e s e a r c h f o c u s es
terrorist attack. On Onee
o n in s u urr ge
gent a n d
The relationship should move beyon
beyondd of the ke y ccha
ha lle nge s
llenge
p a ra m ilit a ry g ro u p s i n
investigative collaboration an
andd a fter the eve nntt
Sou utt h A s ia a n d N o rt h e rn
intelligence sharing into a broadebroaderr will be avoiding yet
Ire la nd n d..
project of training and capacity building
building.. another cycl
cycle
e
One of the traditional strengths of th thee of rhetorically
U.S. law enforcement establishment ha hass compelling but under under--
been training other countries’ polic police
e resourced, soon-
and domestic intelligence forces. IndiIndiaa forgotten institutiona
institutionall
would benefit enormously from even a reform. There will be
small, but sustained program bringin
bringingg further risks o f
Indian police to the United State Statess an Indo-Pakistan crisis 22 Somini Sengupta, “As Indian
for training, and sending America
American n spiraling out o f
trainers to India to lecture on successfu
successfull control after a
practices. This could be a small progra
program m dramatic incident
incident..
aimed at providing specialized trainin
training g
The United States
to state and federal police
police..

Even basic training would hav

havee and India’s othe
otherr
a broader effect of increasing th
thee partners can be a
professionalism of India’s domesti
domesticc constituenc
constituencyy Police Crack Down
advocating a certain
20 Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen US- degree of continuit
continuity y
to avoid disruptive After Bombings, Mistrust
India Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Heritage Founda-
policy shifts tha
thatt Grows,” International Herald
tion, December 9, 2008.
undermine imperfect Tribune
Tribune,, October 3, 2008.
21 “FBI Sends Agents to Mumbai,” Wall Street Journal,
but existin
existingg
November 28, 2008. Also see the testimony by FBI Chief 14
reform efforts, while
Intelligence Oficer Donald Van Duyn before the Senate
actively trying t o
on January 8, 2009 outlining the FBI’s investigation
reduce tensions on
in Mumbai, available at www.fbi.gov/congress/con-
the subcontinent
subcontinent..
gress09/vanduyn010809.htm.
The process of
bolstering India
Indian n
counterterrorism
capabilities will b e
Leveraging History in AQI
AQIMM the “apostate” whose militar y
Algerian government
government,, exploits in the North
Communication
Communications s yet its messages African contex
contextt
By Lianne Kennedy Boudal
i increasingly reflecreflectt re so nat e on b otth
bo h
al-Qa`ida’s lev
le v e ls o
off ana l y
yssis
is..
al-qa`ida in the Islamic Maghre
Maghrebb orientation towar d This article will explore
transnational jihadist how AQIM ha hass
(AQIM), formerly known as the Salafis Salafistt
activity, as sought to bolster its
Group for Preaching and Comba Combatt
evidenced by legitimacy throug
through h
(GSP PCC)) , is o n e o f t h e m o s t a c t iv e a ll--
frequent references repeated references to
Qa`ida affiliate organizations. Th The e
to these well- know
known n
group’s primary goal is to overthro overthrow w
the “Zionist-Crusader historical figures
figures..
the Algerian regime in favor of Shari`a Shari`a--
Alliance” an andd
b a sse
edd go ovve
e r na nc e a nd to e nd fo re ig ign n Heroic Figures in North
the need to re-
influence in North Africa. Since it itss
establish a caliphate.
declaration of allegiance to Usama bi bin n African Histor
Historyy
In
Ladin in the fall of 2006 and subsequen subsequentt
short, AQIM’s AQIM’s
name change in January 2007, AQIM ha hass
communications communications
largely maintained its prior operationa operationall
reflec
reflectt mentio
mention n
focus on the Algerian state, whil while e
both local and historical figures whose
simultaneously adopting tactics suc such h
international jihadis
jihadistt heroic action
actionss
as suicide attacks and sophisticate sophisticated d
cco
onc
nc er ns
ns.. on behalf of Islam are
roadside bombs that are reminiscent o f
known to Muslim
Muslimss
al-Qa`ida and its global affiliates
affiliates.. One of the rhetorical in North Africa and

AQIM’s communications have evolve

evolvedd elsewhere. Some o f
devices by whic whichh these figures—such as
significantly in the last two yearyearss
AQIM bridges local Tariq bin Ziyad
Ziyad,,
in both content and sophistication
sophistication,,
and internationa l Yusuf bin Tashfin, and
undoubtedly due in part to the fact tha
thatt
gr ie va n c e s is t h e u s e `Uqba bin Nafi
Nafi— —
it has developed a relationship with al
al--
o f r ef er e nce
en ess are military heroes from
Qa`ida’s al-Fajr Media Center. AQI
AQIMM
to historical figures Islam’s sevent seventh h
remains dedicated to the removal o f
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

century conquests in North Africa an andd have galloped on rulers of al-Andalu

al-Andaluss
Europe. Others are revered for thei theirr forever like Alexande
Alexanderr
asked Bin Tashfin to
role in resisting colonial influence i n the Great, upholding
bring his force forcess
the 1199t h and 2 200t h centuries; these figure figuress your faith an andd
to Spain to fight
include `Umar al-Mukhtar, who fough t fighting the
encroaching Spanis Spanish h
Italian involvement in Libya, and `Ab `Abd d unbelievers!” From
Christian armies. Bin
al-Karim al-Khattabi, who resiste resisted d AQIM’
AQIM’ss
Tashfin’s force forcess
French and Spanish involvement i n perspective, Bin Nafi is
w on a ke y b at tle at
Northern Morocco. All of these leader leaderss relevant becaus
because e
Zalaq
Zalaqa a (S ag raja ss))
agraja
are remembered for their roles i n of his role in securing
and Bin Tashfin later
c o m b a t , c o n q u e s t , a n d th
t h e d e f en s e o f North Africa a s
annexed mos mostt
Islam against occupying forces forces.. Islamic territory. AQIM
of al-Andalus to his
argues that i t
own empireempire,,
AQIM references them for a numbe
numberr is defending this same
displacing the previous
of reasons: to link successful histori
historicc territory agains
againstt
Muslim rulersrulers..
military campaigns to current terroris t infidels and apostates,
Bin Tashfin, like Bin
activity, to demonstrate a continuit
continuityy thus framing it itss
Ziyad, was Berber Berber,,
violence as an
and he enforced a strict
“All of these igures are extension of Bin Nafi’ Nafi’ss
interpretation o f
original conquest
conquest..
either military heroes Islamic law. AQIM refers
Tariq bin Ziyad was a to Bin Tashfi Tashfin n
who played a key role in bec
b ec ause he w as the
expanding the territory Berber militar
military y
rule
r ule r o f a m ig ht htyy
Islamic empire that
of the early caliphates, or commander who
included souther southern n
landed his forces i n
contemporary folk heroes Spain in 711 and
S p a in , a n d a ls o b e c a us e
h e w asa s a n a ttive
ive
honored for their role in brought the Iberia Iberian n
North African known
Peninsula ( al-Andalus)
ighting colonial European under contro
controll
for his puritanica l
zea l. H e is, the re fo re,
z eal.
forces.” of the Umayya
a perfect
pe rfe ct r ol olee
Caliphate within
model for what AQIM
severa
severall
would like t o
months..2 Bin Ziyad
months
of opposition to Western forces an
andd accomplish in North
was eventuall
eventually y
Africa today .
interests, to claim an ancestral linkag linkage e d e fe
feaate
te d in 7 3 2 a t the
to revered historical figures, and t o B a ttle o f P o itie rs
rs,, `Umar al-Mukhtar, a
demonstrate the permanent nature o f but he is re m me emm b ered
their struggle. AQIM is not alone i n as one of Is lam ’’ss Qur’anic instructo r
s e ek i ng to
t o tra d e o n the se fig ure s’ a p p ea ll:: great military heroesheroes..3
by trade, led Libyan
Tariq bin Ziyad in particular has bee been n AQIM reference
referencess
resistance to Italia Italian n
mentioned in speeches by Usama bi binn Bin Ziyad because his
c o lo n iz a t io n fro m 1 9 1 2
niz
Ladin and Hussayn bin Mahmud, th the e military conquest
conquestss
to 19 31
93 1, w h hee n he
latter of whom is a popular commentato
commentatorr remind audiences
was captured and
on jihadist web forums. A brief revie review w that Spain wa wass
executed..4 Al -
later executed
of the historical figures in question wil willl once part of ancient
Mukhtar was
illuminate AQIM’s reasons for choosin choosing g Muslim empires
empires,,
considered a master
these individuals
individuals.. implying that it is a
of
contemporary dut duty y
`Uqba bin Nafi was an Arab general o f to reclaim this lost
2 Ibid.
the Umayya Caliphate who led the initia
initiall territory .
3 The name Gibraltar comes
conquest of North Africa in 662 AD. HiHiss
Yusuf bin Tashfin from the Arabic Jebel Tariq,
forces established the city of Kairoua
Kairouan n
or Tariq’s mountain.
in Tunisia, which was the first ne neww
greatly expanded th
thee 4 John Wright, Libya: A Modern
Islamic city in North Africa .1 Accordin
Accordingg
Histor
Historyy(Baltimore, M.D.:
to Arab historians, when he reached th thee Muslim Almoravid
Johns Hopkins University Press,
Atlantic Ocean in 682, he rode his hors
horse e dynasty in Nort h
1981).
into the waters, exclaiming, “Oh God, i f Africa between 1074
the sea had not prevented me, I woul would d and 1106. HiHiss
empire eventually
1 C.R. Pennell,Morocco:From Empire to Independence(Ox- included present-da
present-day y
Morocco, Western
ford: Oneworld Publications, 2003).
Sahara, Mauritania
Mauritania,,
and parts of Algeria
and the Sahel. I n
1086, the Muslim
guerrilla desert warfare, and his nearl
nearlyy
20-year campaign against colonia coloniall
al-Wadud All of these figures are
forces made him a North African fol folk
k seeks to create
hero. AQIM includes references to hi him
m either militar
military
y
because he holds particular appeal t o
a heroes who played
Libyans (AQIM seeks to incorporat
incorporatee direct linkage a key role i n
regional jihadist factions under it itss
umbrella) and because his anti-colonia
anti-coloniall
between his expanding the
territory of the earl early
y
activity serves as an example for curren
currentt group’s caliphates, or
generations seeking to eliminate foreig
foreign n
influence in North Africa .
terrorism and contemporary
heroe
folk
heroess
the honored for their role in
`Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi was a
Moroccan Islamic judge who resiste resistedd
glories of the fighting colonia
coloniall
European forces.
French and Spanish colonial forces in th the e past.” They suit AQIM’
AQIM’ss
Rif Mountains of Morocco. He inflicted a purposes because they
humiliating defeat on a large contingen
contingentt are known fo forr
o f inv
inva ad
d ing S p a nis h fo r ce s in 1 9 21
21,, military actions in
military success
and later established an independen independentt North Africa an and
d
Islamic emirate that strictly enforce enforced d Europe against non-
Shari`a .5 Although he was defeated i n Muslim forces, a s
1 9 2 6 b y cco
omm b ine d Fre nc h a nd Sp a nis
nishh against external forces
forces,, well as for their role
forc
fo rc e s, he w as co nsid ere
er edd an ex em pla
plarr in establishin
establishingg
of resistance to colonial occupatio occupation n and his establishment
various forms of
and an early proponent of Salafis Salafismm of an independen
independentt
Islamic rule in Nort
North
h
in Morocco. Al-Khattabi’s piety, hi hiss emirate make him,
Africa .
like Bin Tashfin
Tashfin,,
“By framing AQIM’s a model for what
AQIM would like t o
actions as a continuation of achieve in North Africa
Africa.. 5 Pennell.
Islam’s past battles, `Abd
15
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Leveraging the Appeal of Historical Heroe Heroes s linkage between his Palestine..7
Palestine
Between January 2007 and January 2009 2009,, group’s terroris
terrorism m
AQIM communications have mentione mentioned d and the glories of the The p prre
e c ed in g p a s s a g e
one or more of these historical figure figuress past. The statemen
statementt
o n a t l e a s t 1 0 s e p a r a tte
e o c c a s io
i o n s . T h e sse
e implies that current c h a llen g e s lo c a all
r e f e re n c e s h a v e b e e n m a d e b byy severa all generations hav have e
Muslims to continue
different AQIM officials, includin g a duty to continue
their ancestors
ancestors’’
amir Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud (als (also o fighting what is a n
achievements. It also
known as Abdelmalek Droukdel)
Droukdel),, ongoing struggle for
frames AQIM’ AQIM’ss
Shari`a committee member Ab
Abu u Islam. Similarly
Similarly,,
violence as part of a
`Ubayda Yusuf, and media spokesma spokesman n an October 2008
multigenerationa
multigenerationall
Salah Abu Muhammad. `Abd al-Wadu d speech by Ab Abu u
effort to restore the
has mentioned Yusuf bin Tashfin si six x `Ubayda Yusuf
caliphate, a goa goall
times and referred to Tariq bin Ziya Ziyad d contained the followin
following g
more traditionally
and `Uqba bin Nafi four times each i n exhortation to North
associated with al al--
the past two years. Other AQIM official officialss African Muslims :
Qa`ida’s vision of
frequently refer to all three figures a t global jihadism. Ab Abu u
I e nd m y m e ss a ge
once, as well as other historical figure figuress `Ubayda’s reference to
such as Musa bin Nusayr, `Abd al-Hami al-Hamid d Sebta and Melill Melilla a
b y s a lut
lutiin
ngg
bin Badis, and al-Mu’iz bin Badis. Th The e (Spanish enclaves in
AQIM media committee periodicall periodically y the steadfast
Morocco), whic which h
references historical figures in its attac attack k mujahidin in th thee
some Muslims consider
claims, and several of AQIM’s katibats lands of the
to be ongoin
ongoing g
(combatant elements) are named afte afterr Islamic Maghreb
Maghreb,,
colonial occupations
historical military leaders . you the grandsons
of Morocca
Moroccan n
of Uqba, th the e
territory, links a
AQIM officials are adept at weavin
weavingg conqueror of the
current regiona l
historical references into calls fo forr Maghreb, an and d
grievance to a
greater action or commitment on th the e Musa Bin Nasir, the
historical foe in
part of contemporary Muslims, as i n conqueror o f
suppor
supportt
this September 2008 audio communiqu
communiqué é Andalusia, and
of the argument that
from AQIM amiamirr `Abd al-Wadud, whic h Tariq Ibn ZiyadZiyad,,
North Africa i s
inc lud ed a me
m e ss age dire cted to th
thee the vanquisher of
again “occupied” by
Algerian people
people:: the Romans an and d
foreign forces
forces..
the Spanish, and
Grandsons of Uqbah and Tari
Tariqq [Yusuf] Tashfin
Tashfin,, In September 2008,
and Yusuf bin Tashfin and Al Al-- the hero of Zalaqa,
Mu’iz Bin Badis and `Abd al al-- and Abd al al-- AQIM medi media a
Karim al-Khattabi and `Umar al al-- Hamid Bin Badis,
official Salah Abu
Mukhtar, rise from your inerti a the leader o f
Muhammad’s speec speech h
and put your hands in the hand handss the reforms. Today
defending AQIM against
of your brothers, the mujahidin
mujahidin,, you are th thee
accusations o f
in the al-Qa`ida Organization i n pride of the umma
killing innocent
the Lands of the Islamic Maghre
Maghreb b in a time o f
Muslims contained thi thiss
who have sacrificed their money money,, exploitation; you
fiery
fie ry p assage
assage::
their lives, and their honor fo forr are the hop hope e
the sake of protecting Islam an and d in reclaiming its B e g lad , C ru sa d ers er s
the unity and the reverence of th thee usurped hono honorr
Islamic Maghreb. Gather aroun around d in our broken an d a p os
nd o s t a t es
es,,
the jihad with which Islam starte
started d Islamic Maghre
Maghreb b
with a generation
s o it b ec o m e s t h e on ly f or cce
e and the
that love lovess
and alternative to the regime regimess appropriated
of apostasy that are ruling ou ourr Andalusia
Andalusia,, 7 Abu `Ubayda Yusuf,
countries..6
countries Cordoba, Sicily, and
Zalaqa. W e
“Congratulations on the Occa-
By framing AQIM’s actions as a will not rest and
we will not b e sion of Id to the Nation of
continuation of Islam’s past battles
battles,,
content until we Monotheism,” audio statement,
`Abd al-Wadud seeks to create a direc
directt
regain every inc inch h October 6, 2008.

6 Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud, “A Message to Our Na- of our usurped land
including th the e
tion in the Islamic Maghreb,” audio statement, Septem-
occupied Sebta and
ber 21, 2008.
Melilla, and le lett
us meet with our
beloved peopl
people e
in the land of
 death and martyrdom the wa way y
yo u lo ve life , yo u can e xp ec
love ectt th
thee
multigeneratio Maghreb is in a n
ongoing state of war
battalions of martyrdom and th thee nal effort and that AQIM’
AQIM’ss
lions who hold their fingers o n
the trigger. We will not stop th the e
to restore the sound resp onses t o
actio
a ctio ns ar e leg ally
s ound
raids until the Islamic Maghre
Maghreb b caliphate, Western aggression.
is liberated from Sarkozy an and d
Bush’s representatives. We wil willl
a goal more Abu Muhammad’
Muhammad’ss
focus on the
not stop the raids until every ope open n traditionally “Crusaders” rather
inch is conquered and liberateliberated d tha
by virtuous men such as `Uqb `Uqba a
associated thann
loc al re gim e s places
bin Nafi and Tariq bin Ziyad an and d with al- his s ta te me nntt
Yusuf bin Tashfin and until th thee squarely in line with
banner of Islam is raised hig high h Qa`ida’s al-Qa`ida’s focu
focuss
and you stop your support an and d vision of globalon the “far enemy.
enemy.””
collaboration with the Crusader
Crusaderss
and stop your corruption an and d jihadism.” Conclusion
injustice and humiliation of th thee It is difficult to assess
nation .8 the effectivenes
effectivenesss
these campaigns, Abu of any form of
Abu Muhammad reiterates the them
themee
terrorist propaganda
propaganda,,
of continuity of struggle against th thee let a lo ne me asure the
lone
West, neatly conflating AQIM’s “raids ” im p act
ac t o f thes
these e
Muhammad i s
with military campaigns orchestrate
orchestrated d particular references
by Muslim states whose legitimacy wawass attempting to frame to historica
historicall
recognized at the time. By identifyin
identifyingg AQIM’s violence a s
AQIM as a modern day extension o f legitimate acts of war 8 Salah Abu Muhammad, “Who
conducted agains
againstt
“It also frames AQIM’s enemies of Islam. In
Are the Killers of the In-
other words, h e
violence as part of a is arguing that the nocent Ones?” audio statement,
September 3, 2008.

16
 its statements with multiple layers o f
contextual meaning and support it itss
figures. Short of a verifiable arguments that its violent actions
statemen
statementt ar
are e AQAP a Rising Threat iin
n
from a terrorist that described m e re l y the la te sstt s ta g e of a n Yeme
Yemenn
th
thee ong o in ing
g
arguments that convinced him or “just” war against the enemies of By Brian o’Neil
’Neilll
he
herr Islam
Islam..
to join AQIM, the utility of AQIM’ s on march 15, 2009, a suicide bo mb e err
historical analogies will likely neveneverr L ia n n e K e n n e d yB o u d a l ic o n d u c t sr e s e a r ch attacked a group of South
be known. Nonetheless, the o n te r r o r i s m a n d in s u r g e n c y fo r th e R A N D Korea
ND Korean n
frequenc
frequency y C o r p o r a t i o n . S h e p r e v i o u s lly y s e r v e d a s a tourists in Yemen, killing four of the themm
and consistency with which thes thesee S e n iio
o r A s s o c iai a t e //A
A s s is th along with their Yemeni guide. Les
i s t a n tP r o f e s s o r w iith Lesss
references appear suggest that t h e C o m b a t in i n g T e r r o r i s m C e n t e r a t W e sstt than a week later on March 18, the
AQI
AQIM M P o in tt.. Sout
Southh
believes that historical Korean delegation sent to investigate
reference
referencess th
thee
boost their arguments. If at some attack was targeted by another
poin
pointt suicid
suicidee
in the future AQIM were to abando abandonn bomber, who detonated his
such references, it could indicate explosive
explosivess
tha
thatt convoy..1
in the middle of their convoy
the group determined that they
wer
were e These two attacks show that a
ineffective
ineffective..
rumore
rumored d
For the time being, it is clear that peace treaty between al-Qa`ida in
th
thee
AQIM’
AQIM’ss Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and th the
e
references to historical figures Yemeni government is false false..2 Mor
More e
suppor
supportt importantly, the terrorist attack s
both global and local jihadist demonstrate that this reconstitute
reconstituted d
grievances
grievances,, and renamed terrorist grougroup p3 is m o rre
e
allowing the group to leverage adaptable, tactically flexible, an
and d
historica
historicall strategically nimble than previousl
previously y
narratives to support its dual believed. Although the attacks lacke lacked d
objective
objectivess the reach of the 2008 mortar
of overthrowing local regimes an andd assaul
assaultt
participating in al-Qa`ida’s on the U.S. Embassy, they proved
visio
vision n tha
thatt
of transnational jihad against the fa farr AQAP remains a threat to both foreig foreign n
enemy. By referencing historical nationals and to the Yemeni
figure
figuress government
government..
closely associated with North Africa
Africa,, This article examines the implication
implicationss
AQIM creates a link between its action
actionss of the two attacks, and how AQAP ha hass
and those of past figures who fought evolved its propaganda to achieve
to bette
betterr
free the Maghreb from foreign resonance with the Yemeni population
population..
influenc
influence e
and establish Islamic governance. Implications of the Attack
Attackss
Th
The e Taken separately, both of the March
particular figures who are mentione
mentionedd 200
2009 9
include individuals from Morocco , suicide attacks are worrisome. Taken
Libya, and Mauritania; all areas wher
where
e as
AQIM would like to expand its reach
reach.. a set, they reveal an organization that
References to figures associated is
wit
with h both gaining strength and
Islam’s caliphates and its conquest demonstratin
demonstrating g
of a willingness to be influenced by th thee
European territory dovetail with larger jihadist movement. Al-Qa`ida i n
al
al-- Yemen had, before the destruction of
Qa`ida’s rhetorical interest in it
itss
restorin
restoring g initial cadre around 2004 ,4 b ee
eenn la rg el
ely
y
a caliphate and focusing jihadist
energ
energy y 1 There were no casualties, except for the life of
on the far enemy. In sum, AQIM’ AQIM’ss
references to historical figures
the
imbu
imbue e
bomber, in the March 18 attack. APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4 Iraq .
2 In early March, several newspapers reported that
there as idiosyncratic in tactics and ideas The March 15 bombing near the
was a potential peace treaty between the government
and iconi
iconicc
as
AQAP. The terms were rumored to be a one-year mudbrick towers of Shibam highlighte highlighted d
the country’s politics. It was willing
cessa- several important aspects of the
to
tion of terrorist activity in exchange for the release group’
group’ss
use the time-honored Yemeni cultur culture e
of strength. The first is that the
of negotiation, and abided by wha whatt
prisoners. It was never conirmed and was shown to be bomber
bomber,,
were essentially non-aggression
clearly false. identified as Abd al-Rahman Mahdi Al Alii
pact
pactss
3 Al-Qa`ida terrorists in Yemen were formerly Qasim al-`Ujayri, used his body as th the
e
with the government. Under the ne new w
known weapon. In the past, al-Qa`ida-affiliate
al-Qa`ida-affiliated d
leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi an and d
as al-Qa`ida in Yemen. In late January, it announced operatives in Yemen used vehicles o r
Qasim al-Raymi, who reorganized th the e
that boats in their suicide attacks; whil whilee
outfit following a 2006 prison escape escape,,
it was merging with the al-Qa`ida faction in Saudi effective, these attacks did not allow
it has shown an ability to weave
Ara- fo
forr
itsel
itselff
bia, and that the two groups would now be known as great a flexibility in target
into the larger jihadis t framework
under selection
selection..
whil
whilee
one name, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This change demonstrates the ability
remaining tied to Yemen’s cultura culturall
4 Gregory Johnsen and Brian O’Neill, “Yemen Faces to
norms. Their leaders have shown
Sec- draw from jihadis
jihadistt tactics used elsewhere
elsewhere,,
respec
respectt
ond Generation of Islamist Militants,” Terrorism such as in Iraq and Palestine
Palestine..
for and knowledge of Yemen’s comple complex x
Focus
tribal system and are able to use it The seco nd asp ec t invo lve s the na tur
4:27 (2007). By 2004, through a combination of se cond a spec lv e ture
e
to
arrests, of the bombing itself. AQAP said in a
their advantage. Their narrative
assassinations and negotiations, the al-Qa`ida statement that the Koreans were
withi n
franchise kille
killedd
Yemen, for example, has focused
partly in revenge for their
17 largel
largely y
government’
government’ss
on the traditional tribal distrust of
cooperation against Islamic terrorism terrorism,,5
th
thee
as well as “the role of these tourists
government in Sana`a. While Yemen Yemenii
in
nationalism exists, the tribal areas
corrupting the ideology of Muslims an andd
ar
aree
their morals.” It seems more likely tha thatt
wary of centralization, and al-Wahaysh
al-Wahayshii
this justification was developed afte afterr
and al-Raymi expend great effort
the attack. According to witnesses,
to
th
thee
pa int the m se
s e lv e s as b e ing o n the s ide
id e
bomber, rather than targeting a group
of
to
the tribesmen against the
government
government..
responsible for the bombing of the USS C olehad ceased
This narrative is a powerful one, an andd
its appeal is rooted in Yemeni triba triball
culture. In this way, AQAP is different , to
and in the long-run more be a viable organization.
dangerous
dangerous,, 5 “Al-Qaeda Claims Killing South Korean Tourists in Re-
than al-Qa`ida’s troubled franchise i n venge,” News Yem en , March 27, 2009.
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

a v e ng
n g e g rie v a n
ncce
e s , s e le c t e d t h e la rg e sstt forums, statements, the Yemeni side side..
group he could find to maximize th the e and publications
publications..
They gained a
impact; they happened to be Koreans Koreans..6 In it, AQAP has
reputation for both
The fact that al-`Ujayri was able t o developed a
skille
skilledd
s elec t his target show s an incr ea s e edd remarkabl
remarkable e
presentation and rapid
level of training and commitment, a s ability to finesse its
response tim time e
he presumably did not detonate hi hiss ideological messag
message e
well before there were
explosives prematurely and was able t o to strike resonant
even rumors o f
wait until he found a target that woul would d chords with disparat
disparate e
Saudi influence in al-
achieve the most impact impact..7 This coul could d audiences. Their
Qa`ida in Yemen
Yemen..
plausibly be tied to the training h e flagship publication
publication,,
purportedly received in Somalia Somalia..8 Sada al-Malahim ( The In the latest issue of
Echo of Battles) , i s
The second attack, although a failure iin
n frequently timed for Sada al-Malahim, Nay Nayff
terms of body count, was a psychologica
psychologicall release shortl
shortly y
Muhammad al-Qahtani,
success that demonstrated AQAP’ AQAP’ss before or after a new
a Saudi citize
citizen n
operational abilities as well as sendin sending g operation, an andd
and AQAP leader,
a m es s a g e tth
hat e
evv en o ffic ia l s ta
t a tu s d o e
ess provides justifications
discussed both th thee
not guarantee protection from its reach reach.. that are bot bothh
recently published list
There are two scenarios of how thi thiss political and
by Saudi ArabiArabia a
attack occurred. The first is that th the e theological, and
of their 85 most
attack had been planned in advance. Th The e manage
managess
wanted terrorist
terroristss
second is that the operation was bor born n and the alleged rape
quickly from a presented opportunity opportunity.. “AQAP’s goal of Muslims b y
At this time, not enough reliabl reliable e U.S. soldiers in Iraqi
information exists to determine whic which h is to prisons..1 0 Th
prisons T he
e
scenario occurred; both, however, ar are e issue demonstrates
troublesome
troublesome.. weaken and al-Qahtani’s skil skilll
bring down in linking the
If the attack had been planned in tande
tandemm
depredations of th
with the first bombing, it reflect reflectss the Yemeni West with the
the
e

that the strategists of AQAP have th thee government quisling, “heretical ”

foresight to maximize the impact o f governments of the
their assaults. The second scenario, tha thatt to create a peninsula. In doin doing g
of a rapidly-seized opportunity, woul wouldd safe haven for this, he is attempting
show that al-Wahayshi, in addition t o to tie togethe
togetherr
being able to adapt and rapidly plan a n their group.” several sources of
operation, has a pool of recruits who ar aree frustration. The nea nearr
both ready to deploy at a moments notic notice e and
a nd ffaarr e ne m ie s ar e a
and are already trained well enoug enough h to ta rg et bo th what us ual tro p e i n
to successfully conduct an operatio operation n jihadist literature, but
(successful in terms of avoiding arres arrestt the real talent o f
b efo re the m iss io
ionn is co m ple te d)
. AQAP is to not lose
the y se e as th the e
sight of what make makess
AQAP’s Dominance in the “Virtual Space
Space””
apostate regime of Ali their home terrain
All of these tactical abilities sho
showw Abdullah Sali Salihh unique
unique..
al-Qa`ida’s flexibility to adapt i n and the far devil of
t he physical environment. Whil e Islam’s Wester
Western n
impressive, the aftermath of the attack
attackss enemies. Al-
is where AQAP has demonstrated it itss Wahayshi’s 10 The latest issue of Sada al-
real power and danger—its increasin
increasing g propagand
propaganda a
strength in what analyst Andrew Exu
Exumm wing is on a steep
space.””9
describes as their “virtual space. learning curve sinc since
e
This refers to the world of jihadis
jihadistt its initial media forays
in 2007 and ha hass
6 Inal Irsan, “Qaeda Suicide Bomber Behind Yemen Sui- Malahim was released on
seemed to increase
cide Attack,” Reuters, March 17, 2009. in sophisticatio
sophistication n March 21, 2009 and is available
7 Lin Noueihed, “Qaeda Bomber Behind Suicide Attack with each message. on various jihadist web
Trained in Somalia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009. While its reac reach h forums.
8 Ibid. m a y h av e b e en
9 Andrew Exum, “No Place to Hide,” The New Republic, en h an c e
edd d ue t o t h hee 18
March 31, 2009. merger with al-Qa`ida
in Saudi Arabia
Arabia,,
its reputation for
professionalism wa wass
developed entirely on
Indeed, the statement of responsibilit
responsibility y by attempting to make are
a re aba ndonin
ndoning g
for the dual bombings, despite its after after-- claims that wil
willl all Yemeni traditions;
the-fact rationalizations, was itself a resonate with they are jus justt
minor masterpiece that revealed severa severall tribesmen, who are exchanging one
dueling but linked strategies for th the e alway
alwayss inconvenient traditio
tradition n
group. It is easy for an organizatio organization n wary of interference with the more
with broad ambitions to lose sight o f from Sana`a, AQAAQAP P appealing system o f
its dom e stic o bjec tive s, just as it is ea ssy y is he lp ing them selves
lping revenge. In utilizing
for an organization to become overl overly y establish
esta blish sa ffe
e a tit-for-ta t
concerned with settling scores at hom home e zones outside the justification, such as
and fail to carry out larger missions; th the e government’s writ writ.. the death of al al--
latter of which increase recruitment b y Q`uyati, they are tying
enhancing the organization’s reputatio reputation n This strategy is what themselves int intoo
and maintain positive morale amon among g the fabric of Yemeni
t he m ore re stless
st less fo ot so ld iers.
ie rs . Thes
These e makes AQAP a culture, as wel welll
conflicting objectives can potentiall potentially y da ng ero us fo rc e . Its as brandishing their
overwhelm even the most fervent. I t pred ec essors— a all- anti-governmen
anti-governmentt
must be noted that despite its regiona regionall Qa`ida before 2004— credentials. This is
ambitions, AQAP shrewdly has no nott were willing t o important in triba triball
abandoned parochial issues, and in it itss compromise with areas that have a strong
statement claimed that the bombing wa wass the government
government.. libertarian bent
bent..
in revenge for the government’s Augus Augustt Under the inflexible
2008 killing of al-Qa`ida leader Hamz Hamza a leadership of al al-- 11 “Al-Qaeda Claims Killing
al-Q`uyati .1 1 AQAP has a few reasons fo forr Wahayshi and al-Raymi,
making this claim. First, there is trut truth h however, ther
there e South Korean Tourists in
t o the sta
s ta te m ent.
e nt. S e co nd
nd,, it re fle ct s a is no compromise with a Revenge,” New s Yem en , March 27,
broader strategy. AQAP has frequentl frequently y “compromised
“compromised”” 2009. Al-Q`uyati was
alleged that its men have been torture tortured d government. an al-Qa`ida leader killed in a
in Yemeni prisons, and this is not a Eschewing raid by security forces in
charge that is beyond the pale. By tyin tying g negotiation
negotiationss Tarim on August 12, 2008.
in its spe cific griev a nc e s to issues hel held d do es not m ean the y
by the public at large, and specificallspecifically y
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Conclusion The Role of Nations contribute

contributess
in three ways: the
It is by accusing the government o f
torture, addressing what they se see e
the Unite
Unitedd General Assembly
Assembly,,
as s p ec ific g o ve rnm e nt m is d ee d ss,, Nations in comprising all 192
connecting with people on a triba triball Defeating Al - member-states
member-states,,
level and not losing sight of thei builds political support
global struggle that the reconstitute
theirr
reconstituted d
Qa`ida and for internationa l
al-Qa`ida has managed to outstrip it itss Associate
Associatedd action to counter
predecessors in threat potential. AQA AQAP P Group
Groups
s terrorism and provide
providess
is at the forefront of the next wave o f legitimacy by drawing
jihad. The Yemen-dominated merger o f By Richard Barrett up internationa l
the two al-Qa`ida franchises adds Saud Saudii legal agreements; the
knowledge to an outfit that has grow grown n in the 12 months prior Security Council
Council,,
in strength. It has integrated into th the e with its five permanent
bewildering morass of Yemeni politics politics,, to April 2009 , and 10 electe
elected
d
exploiting the institutional weaknesseweaknessess groups recognized
of the government, and is far-sighte far-sighted d by the Unite United d
enough to further chip away at its shak shaky y Nations Security
foundation. AQAP’s goal is to weake weaken n Council as associate
associated d
and bring down the Yemeni governmen governmentt with al-Qa`id a1 carried
to create a safe haven for their group group;; out operation
operationss
their strategy is to attack tourism an and d in, or directly
the oil industry, the two tottering pillar s affecting, 22
o f a d es p er a t e ec o n o m y. countries..2
countries
They attempted to
The suicide attacks demonstrate
demonstratedd carry out operation
operationss
that AQAP is equally skilled at bot bothh others..3 The
in 10 others
operations; their concurrent propagand
propaganda a assault on Mumbai iin n
outlined the organization’s overal
overalll November 2008,
strategy. These developments promppromptt believed to have bee been n
the need for an equally intelligen
intelligentt carried out by
counterstrategy. The framework o f Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, wa wass
this strategy would have to involve a the only attack that
deeper knowledge of the tribal syste
system m met the standard o f
in Yemen, and the ability to pla playy global coverage and
competing factions in AQAP agains
againstt visual impact tha thatt
each other to fragment what is now a the world generally
well-run and stable hierarchy. Thi Thiss associates with al al--
would have to work hand-in-hand wit with h Qa`ida, but the overall
strengthening the economic stabilit
stabilityy range of attack
attackss
of the Yemeni government, whil whilee shows that the al-
helping it to increase its legitimac
legitimacy y Qa`ida network
network,,
however loose-knit,
remains very muc much h
alive
alive..

Each country is

responsible fo
forr
its own security,
and operationa
operationall
counterterrorism
activity generall y
tak es plac
place e at a nat io nal
natio
level. Ye t, g ive
ivenn
the international nature
of the al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
network ,4 t h e re is a
c le a r ne
n e e d — a nd
universal support—for
a coordinate
coordinated d
international response.
In this respect
respect,,
the United Nations
plays an importan
importantt
role. The United
m em be rs , promotes coordinate
coordinated d have provided a legal role of the Unite United d
international action by designin
designing g framework withi within n Nations in
counterterrorist measures mandator mandatory y which to address counterterrorism; and
for all states; and the United Nation Nationss them. In Septembe
Septemberr 5)
bureaucracy provides mechanisms tha thatt 2006, the General ensuring respect for
coordinate, monitor and assist state statess Assembly adopted b y human rightrightss
with the implementation of the policie policiess consensus a broad when countering
a nd a ggrree
ee m e nt
ntss de c ide d b y t he GeG e ne ra
rall strategy to counte counterr terrorism .7 Giv e en
n
Assembly and the Security Council Council..5 terrorism and identified long-standing
This article explains these thre
three e five main area areass differences over th the
e
entities, examines which of al-Qa`ida’ al-Qa`ida’ss for action: 1) definition of terrorism,
w e ak n ess es
e s c a n be exp e xp lo ite d , an
andd addressing the the adoption o f
identifies five steps the United Nation Nationss condition
conditionss the s trateg
trategy y by all 1 92
can take to help defeat al-Qa`idaal-Qa`ida.. conducive to m em be r-state
r-statess
terrorism; 2) was a remarkable
The General Assembl
Assemblyy preventin
preventing g show of unity an andd
S ince 19 63, the U nited
nite d Na tio ns ha
tions hass and combating determination .
elaborated 13 international instrument
instrumentss terrorism; 3) raising
to counter terrorism and thre
three e th
the e The Security Counci
Councill
additional protocols..6 T h e s e h a v
protocols vee capacity of states to The Security Council
defined specific acts of terrorism an and d counter terrorism
terrorism;; focused on al al--
4) strengthening the
with its disaffected citizenry. Presently
Presently,, Qa`ida following the
however, the militants are growin growing g attacks on th thee
1 For a list of groups U.S. Embassies in
in strength while the government i s established and maintained by
being inversely weakened. If AQA AQAP
P Nairobi and Dar e s
the UN 1267 Committee as
is successful, it could bring the mos mostt Salaam in August
associated with al-Qa`ida,
important front in the struggle agains
againstt 1998. The next yea yearr
Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban
jihad from the wilds of Afghanistan an and
d it adopted resolution
and other individuals,
Pakistan home to the holy lands
lands.. 1267, from whic which h
groups, undertakings and
it developed a
entities associated with them,
B ri a n O ’N e il l, a n in d e p e n d e n t p o llit
it ic a
all worldwide sanction
sanctionss
see
a n a l y s t s p e c ia
i a llii z i n gin Y e m e n , iiss a fo rm e err regime directed
www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/
r e p o r te
t e r fof or t h he e Yem e n Obs Obse erve
rve r. Mr Mr.. against al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
consolidatedlist.
O ’ N e i l l i s t h e c o - a u t h o r o f t h e ffo o rrtt h c o m i ng and the Taliban
htm#alqaedaent.
The Last Refuge: Islam and Insurgency i n following the attack
attackss
2 These countries include:
Yemen
Yemen.. W i t h G r e g o r yJ o h n s e n ,h e r u n s t h hee o f S ep tem b er 111 1,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Aus-
w e b s i t e w w w .i . i s l a m a n d i n s u rrg
g e n c y in y e m.e n 2001. The Se c ur it
ec ity
y
tria, Canada, China, Ethiopia,
blogspot.com . Council’s role has
France, Germany, India,
been controversial
controversial,,
Iraq, Italy, Mauritania, Niger,
both because
Pakistan, the Philippines,
counterterrorism is
Somalia, Switzerland, Tunisia,
mor
more e
Turkey, the United
traditionally the
States, the United Kingdom and
preserve of the GeneraGenerall
Yemen. Israel suffered
an attack from an unlisted group
5 For a comprehensive
calling itself Al-Qa`ida
in the Levant.
3 These countries include: presentation of UN action against
Denmark, Egypt, Libya, Mo- terrorism, see
rocco, Nigeria, the Russian www.un.org/terrorism.
Federation, Saudi Arabia, 6 To view the UN Treaty
Spain, Sudan and the United Collection on terrorism, see
Arab Emirates. www.untreaty.un.org/English/T
4 This includes al-Qa`ida’s coreerrorism.asp.
leadership, its estab- 7 This is drawn from the United
lished regional afiliates, and the Nations Global Counter-
propagation of its ideas Terrorism Strategy, which was
to homegrown or self-recruited adopted on September 8,
cells. 2006. For the entire document,

19 see www.un.org/terror-
ism/strategy-counter-
terrorism.shtml.
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Assem bly, a nd b ecause its sa nctio

and nc tio n
nss picture of the
r eg im e ha s g ive
giv e n ris e to le g al c halle ng
ngeess.. international strategy
to
Sanctioned parties have challenged th the e
counter terrorism . political actio
actionn
legality of the restrictions against the them m
on the grounds that the procedure proceduress exploiting Al-Qa`ida’s Pakistan may take on
adopted by states to implement th the e its border wit withh
Security Council directives ignore thei theirr Weaknesse Afghanistan, there is
Weaknesses s
basic rights, in particular the right t o much that th thee
National and
be heard and the right to an effectiv effective e United Nations and
international action
judicial review . others can d o
ha
hass
elsewhere to
T h es e le
legg a l ch a lle n g es h
haave n
noot ye
ett reduced the influence
undermine al-Qa`ida’
al-Qa`ida’ss
of the al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
put any country in the uncomfortabl
uncomfortable e im a ge a nd ap pe al.
leadership and
position of being unable to implemen
implementt
weakened its abilit ability y Al-Qa`ida has a number
a mandatory resolution of the Securit
Security
y
to launch attacks in
Council without contravening its ow ownn
all areas excep exceptt of weaknesses
weaknesses..
laws. This may happen, howeverhowever,,
South Asia Asia..1 2 Pa
P a k is tta
ann
and it is clearly a pressing task fo forr First, it appears
ap p eeaarr s to b e
the Security Council to find a way t o that it is losin losing g
a l- Q a `id a ’s b a s e , ana nd
maintain its authority without losin g credibility with
th e s u c c eess s or
the willing support of the internationa l potential sympathizer s
failure of measures to
community .8 and supporters,
defeat it ther there e
highlighted by it itss
The United Nations Bureaucrac
Bureaucracyy will decide its long-
present failures in
term future. Ye Yett
There are four main bodies tha thatt Iraq. Furthermore
Furthermore,,
the task is
deal with counterterrorism withi n while it threatens major
exceptionally difficult,
the United Nations bureaucracy: 1 ) attacks agains
againstt
an
and d
t he Counter-Terrorism Executiv
Executive e Western targets, it
the greatest burden
Directorate (CTED) helps to monito monitorr has done nothin nothing g
by far will fall o n
the implementation of Security Counci Councill successful in the West
authorities in
R es olutio n 13 73 (20 01 )),,9 which oblige
1373 obligess since the attack
attackss
Pakistan. In parallel t o
s t a t es t o e s tta
abb lis h th e le g a l m e an anss in London in July
to take a range of counterterroris
counterterrorism m 2005. Second, i t
measures; 2) the Analytical Support an and d “The United lac ks re lev a nce
nc e . It has
Sanctions Monitoring Team helps t o m ad e no us efu efull
o ve rse e t he sa nctions
nctio ns regim e es ta blis he hed d contribution toward
by Security Council Resolution 126 1267 7
Nations can resolving any o f
(1999) against al-Qa`ida and th the e best counter the main political
Taliban; 3) the Terrorism Preventio Prevention n issues affecting th the e
Branch of the United Nations Office o n al-Qa`ida’s Muslim community
Drugs and Crime in Vienna (UNODC (UNODC)) message by that it claims t o
provides training and assistance t o defend. For instance, it
s ta te s in the legal spher e e;;1 0 an d 4 ) t hhee stressing has not helpe
helped d
Secretary-General’s Counter-Terroris
Counter-Terrorism m repeatedly the the Palestinian
Implementation Task Force (CTITF (CTITF)) people despite ofte often n
helps to implement the global strateg strategy y criminal repeating that their
adopted by the General Assembly i n
nature of its plight is a principa
principall
2006 .1 1 T Thh es e fo u r b o d ies c o o p eraer a tte
e motivation for its
closely and coordinate their work t o activity, its actions..1 3 Its principa l
actions
provide member-states with a coheren coherentt
absence of any12 More speciically, in all areas
8 For an overview of the legal challenges and a discussion real vision
of their impact, see the Al-Qaida and Taliban Analyti- for the future, other than Afghanistan
cal Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s reports, and Pakistan.
available at www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitor- and its 13 Usama bin Ladin issued an
ingteam.shtml. lack of concernaudiotape on March 14,
9 The website for the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee
can be accessed at www.un.org/sc/ctc/. that the 20
10 For more on the UNODC’s role in terrorism preven- majority of its
tion, see www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/the-role-
of-unodc-in-terrorism-prevention.html. victims are
11 See www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml. Muslims.”

whatever military and

affiliates have an equally poor tractrackk of Western broader context t o
record of achievement, having failefailedd interests..1 5 Indeed,
interests allow states to
to benefit the people of Iraq, Algeria
Algeria,, al
al-- discuss joint work o n
Saudi Arabia or Yemen. Third, it lack
lackss Qa`ida has mounted terrorism even when
legitimacy in parts of the Muslim world
world,, two direct attack
attackss they have deedeep p
even in extremist circles. It has n o against the United bilateral differences
religious authority and its self-servin
self-servingg Nations: in Baghda
Baghdad d on other issues
issues..
interpretation of Islam has come unde
underr in August 2003, and This convening
increasing attack from radicals wit with
h in Algiers i n power allows th the
e
better credentials
credentials.. December 2007 2007.. United Nations some
influence ove
overr
The United Nations provides an idea
ideall Five Steps for the United the
t he w ay that
tha t st at es
ates
forum from which to expose and exploi exploitt pla
p la n and ex e
eccut
utee
these weaknesses. In fact, the Unite United d Nation
Nationss
Nations is in many ways the natura naturall The United Nations 2009 again asserting this,
global adversary to the global terroris terrorism m can help to brin
bringg
preached by al-Qa`ida. The value valuess about the defeat of al- although admitting that al-
identified with the United Nations — Qa`ida in five mai
main n Qa`ida had done little to help the
such as democracy, individual huma human n ways. First, it must Palestinian people.
rights, the freedom of religion an and d uphold and promot
promote e 14 Usama bin Ladin’s March 14,
t he p ro m
mo otion
tion o f pe ace— ar e the ex ac actt its core values in 2009 statement criti-
values and fundamental freedoms tha thatt counterterroris
counterterrorism m cized freedom of opinion and
rejects..1 4 Not only does al
al-Qa`ida rejects al-- work. The United freedom of speech.
Qa`ida condemn the General Assembl Assembly y Nations is uniquel
uniquely y 15 For example, al-Zawahiri’s
and the Security Council as expression expressionss able to bring statement on Sudan, re-
of secularist state politics, it als also o governments togethe
togetherr leased on March 24, 2009,
criticizes the work of UN specialize specialized d to address topics of criticized the United Nations
agen c ie s a n
nc ndd p e a ce k e e p e rs — e s p e c ia ll
y global concern i n for inaction in Gaza while it
those operating in areas of conflict an and d a neutral setting. It “pretends to cry over the suf-
weak government—as unwarrante
unwarranted d can also isolat
isolatee fering of the people of Darfur.”
and unwelcome interference on behal behalff an issue from any
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

their counterterrorism strategies, an andd similarities between social conditions

conditions..
it can use this influence to promote ththee them; these will b e
argument that any sacrifice of basi basicc ready for release Finally, the United
rights in the fight against terrorism no
nott through major nationa nationall
only hands the terrorists a victory, bu
butt and regional networks Nations can attac attack k
pushes more people to support themthem.. in the second hal halff
the
t he sp r ea
re a d o f al-
a l-
of 2009. In addition,
Qa
Q a ` id a’s m e ss ag e e..
Second, the United Nations can weake
weakenn the film projec t
This is the hardest
t h e a pp
p p ea
e a l o f a l- Q a `id a ’s m es
e s sa g
ge
e will make brief clips
target of all. Al Al--
by resolving long-standing politica politicall of repentan
repentantt
Q a ` id a h a s m a n a g ed ed
disputes. Al-Qa`ida exploits the sens sense e terrorists for
t o w ea e av e a
of frustration and helplessness tha thatt distribution through
seductive narrative
exists where government is weak weak,, th
thee
that appeals to a
where conflict prevails and wher where e internet, designed to
wide audience. It
justice is arbitrary. The United Nation Nationss dissuade other otherss
offers meaning an and d
must, on the one hand, find solutions tto o from following their
action at a time when
these long-standing problems and, o n course
course..
many people fee feell
the other hand, continue to explain wh why y
Fourth, the United they lack purpose
terrorism is counterproductive as a tactic tactic.. and opportunity
opportunity..
The more progress that the internationa
internationall It preys on a wide
Nations ca
can n
community can make through discussio discussion n range of grievance
grievancess
and negotiation, the more marginalize marginalized d undermine al-Qa`ida
and knits them
al-Qa`ida will become
become.. by attackin
attacking g
together in the singl single e
the legitimacy of its
complaint that Western
This means that the United Nation
Nationss arguments. Thi Thiss
influences hav havee
should use the range of tools available
available,, should not be done
undermined the
from the imposition of sanctions t o by joining in a
political and socia sociall
t he dep
d ep lo ym ent of p ea ce kee pe rs a n
loym ndd debate, which would
values of Islam. Al-
aid workers, in a coherent manne mannerr give al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
Qa`ida has built a n
and within a strategic frameworkframework.. more standing than it
enduring myth around
This should include, for example example,, deserves, but b y
its leadershi
leadership p
reconciliation talks in Afghanistan , providing support and
as men of purity
development projects in the Federall
Federally y encouragemen
encouragementt
and conviction
conviction,,
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
Pakistan,, for rehabilitation
able to strike massive
support for the authority of Shayk Shaykh h and reintegratio n
blows agains
againstt
Sharif Shaykh Ahmad’s government i n programs that
a powerful enemy
Somalia, capacity building in the Sahe Sahell demonstrate the
and successfull
successfully y
and Yemen, and similar assistance i n falsit
falsityy
escape retribution. The
other vulnerable areas
areas.. of the arguments used
United Nation
Nationss
by al-Qa`ida an and d
can
c an bes
b es t co unte r al-
Third, the United Nations can highligh t its associates to
Qa`ida’s
Q a`ida ’s m e ss agagee
t he real
r ea l co nseq uences of a l-Qa `ida ’’ss justify their violence
violence..
by stressing
actions. It is easy enough to demonstrat demonstrate e People who leave
repeatedly the
that the victims of terrorism ar are e terrorism behind ar are
e
crimina
criminall
members of the same community fro from m likely to return to
nature of its activity,
which the terrorists themselves ar are e the environment s
its absence of an anyy
drawn, whether in terms of immediat immediate e from which they were
death and destruction or in terms of th the e recruited an and d
longer lasting economic or other indirec indirectt therefore may be
c o n s e q u e n c e s.1 6 When government
governmentss able to influenc
influence e
point this out, there may be a tendenc tendency y others with similar
for some audiences to discount th the e vulnerabilities t o
m e ssssage a ass p ro p a ga n d a ; le s s s o w h e n t h
hee th e a l- Q a` id a m es sa g e .
message is promulgated by the Unite United d Se
Sevv er a l s t a t e
ess
Nations. The CTITF has a workin working g have such programs
and other countrie
countriess
have recently asked
the United NationNationss
for help in starting
them. The Unite United d
Na tio ns can co m p ile
ex am ples o
exam off be sstt
practices and help craft
programs, whil while e
taking account of
different cultural an and
d
into still more remote areas, use o f G en eral to advise the
eneral
the internet will continue to give it a To maximize its Security Council on th the
e
wide audience. The CTITF has set up a developm entand
working group to look at terrorist us use e contribution to th thee im plem entationof a
of the internet. Its general conclusio
conclusion n defeat of al-Qa`ida, sanctions
concerning the promulgation of the al al-- the United Nation
Nationss regime aimed at
Qa`ida message is that an open interne
internett must increase the individuals and group groupss
that allows the exposure of al-Qa`ida’
al-Qa`ida’ss credibility, relevanc
relevance e associated with al-Qa`ida
m essa ge to criticis m, and e ve n t o and legitimacy of its and the Taliban.
ridicule, is more effective in limiting ititss counterterroris
counterterrorism m H e is a lso a m e m ber
also be rof the
appeal than any attempt to shut dow down n work as a contrast to Se Seccre
re ta ry -G e ne ra
ry-G sl’
ral’
forums and websites that promote it it..1 7 the irrelevance
irrelevance,, Task Force, establishedin
illegitimacy and 2005 to prom ote a
Conclusion
ineffectiveness of coherent approach to
The United Nations must work wit with h al-Qa`ida. It must counterterrorismwithin
o th
t h er s t o ex p o s e t h e g a p b e t w ee
eenn play the leadin
leading g th e U N syste
sy stem m . In h is Ta sk
the promises made by the al-Qa`id al-Qa`ida a role in coordinating Force role h e ha hass
narrative and the reality of what i t and promotin
promoting g responsibilityfor issues to
delivers. It can also help to promot promote e international action to do with radicalization
a counternarrative through th
t he
e overcome th the
e and extremism that lead to
engagement of civil society, focusin focusing g threat from global terrorism, terrorist
this work on those who are tempted t o terrorism . use of the internet, and
join al-Qa`ida, rather than those wh who o terrorist financing.
have already done so. Hardened al al-- Richard Barrett is the Before working for the
Qa`ida supporters are more likely t o United Nations he had a
retreat further into their closed group groupss coordinator of a Ne
Neww full career with the British
in the face of criticism than question th the e York-basedteam appointed Government.
basis of their beliefs
beliefs.. by the UN Secretary-
group that focuses on the victims o f real vision for the
terrorism, and has projects agreed wit
with h future, and its lack o f
three states to film repentant terrorist
terroristss concern that the
and their victims to demonstrate th thee majority of its victim
victimss
17 “Report of the Working
are Muslims
Muslims.. Group on Countering the
16 For example, the CTITF organized a symposium on Use of the Internet for Terrorist
Al-Qa`ida’s appeal will Purposes,” UN Counter-
Supporting Victims of Terrorism in September 2008.
Terrorism Implementation Task
decline if th
thee Force (CTITF), Febru-
leadership is captured ary 2009.
or killed. Shor
Shortt
of this, even if the
leadership is force
forcedd

21
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

Recent Highlights iin

n March 4, 2009
(SOMALIA): Maske d STATES): Th
Thee
Terrorist Activit
Activityy gunmen assassinated
U.S. Suprem e Court
Co urt
Shaykh Ali Afyare
Afyare,,
dism is se d a cc use
usedd
March 1, 2009 (IRAQ): The mayor o f a prominent cleric
al-Qa`ida operative
Samarra, Mahmoud al-Khalaf, wa wass affiliated with th
the e
Ali al-Marri’ s
wounded when a roadside bomb struc
struckk Sufi Ahlu-Sunna wal-
appeal, which sought
his convoy. – Reuters, March 1 Jama movement
movement..
to challeng
challenge e
He was killed in Mudug
March 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspecte his indefinite military
Suspectedd region. – Garowe
imprisonment
imprisonment..
U.S. unmanned aerial drone strike strikess Online, March 5
– Reuters, March 6
killed eight people in South WaziristaWaziristan n
Agency of the Federally Administere
Administered d March 5, 2009 (IRAQ):
March 7, 2009
Tribal Areas. At least four of the dea dead d
were believed to be foreign fighters fighters.. A pickup truc
truckk
(PAKISTAN): A suicid e
Various press reports alleged that th the e rigged with
car bomber killed
strikes targeted the forces of Tehrik Tehrik-- explosives detonated
seven officers a t
i- Ta
T a lib an lea
le a d e r B a itulla h M ehs ud
ud.. in
a roadblock
– Dallas Morning News, March 2 a crowded livestock
established to
market in Babi
Babill
March 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicid e inspec
inspectt
Province, killing 12
vehicles traveling from
bomber killed six people at a religiou religiouss people. – The Age,
Khyber Agenc
Agencyy
school for girls in Balochistan Province
Province.. March 6
to P eshaw ar. – AP, March
Pakistani press reports stated that th the
e
March 5, 2009 7
a tt ac ke r w ante d to as sa ssinat e a senio
seniorr
leader of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Faz
Ulema-i-Islam-Fazll March 7, 2009
(JUI-F), who was scheduled to spea speakk (PAKISTAN): Taliba n
at the school. The JUI-F leader was no nott militants blew up 16 (PAKISTAN): Triba l
harmed in the attack. – Bloomberg,March 3; stores selling DVDDVDss
officials in South
Daily Times, March 3 and music in Takht Bhai
Waziristan claim thathatt
town northwes
northwestt
March 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen i n Taliban militants shot
o f P es haw ar . There
The re
down a low low--
Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province
Province,, w ere no casualtie
ca sualtiess
flying unmanned aerial
attacked the visiting Sri Lankan cricke
crickett as the explosives were
drone. The U.SU.S..
team as it was being driven to the Gadaff
Gadaffii detonated durin
duringg
military denied that one
Stadium. The attack, which occurred i n the night of March 4-5.
of its unmanne
unmanned d
daylight, left at least seven Pakistani
Pakistaniss – AFP, March 4
aircraft was shot down.
dead. Six members of the Sri Lanka Lankan n
March 5, 2009 – AFP, March 7
team, along with a British coach, wer weree
injured. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and JayshJaysh-- March 7, 2009
i-Muhammad were suspected of bein beingg (PAKISTAN): Suspecte
Suspectedd
behind in the attack. – Independent,March Taliban militants blew (SOMALIA): Shayk Shaykh h
4; Reuters, March 4; UPI, March 6 up the mausoleu
mausoleum m
Hassan Yaqob,
o f 1 7t h century Sufi saint
March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): Iraqi securit y spokesman for the al al--
Abdul RahmaRahman n
Shabab factions that
forces claimed to have killed Hamz
Hamza a Mohmand, also
control Kismay
Kismayo o
Ubid Idris, also known as Abu al al-- referred to as Rahma Rahman n
and the southern
Ansar, an al-Qa`ida leader allegedl
allegedly y Baba, in Peshawar.
Jubba regions, tol told
d
responsible for directing attacks i n According to on onee
reporters that his
western Iraq. He was killed in Anba
Anbarr press report,
fighters are “no threat
threat””
Province. ––The
The Age, March 6 “Caretakers of the
to neighboring Kenya.
comple
complex x
March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide ca He said thathatt
carr said they had received
bomber killed two police officers i n a warning lette letterr
Mosul, Ninawa Province. – UPI, March 4 from purported Taliban
militants thre threee
March 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN) : days before the
Insurgents attacked Bagram Airbase Airbase.. attack threatenin
threatening g
A car
c ar b om b explod ed o
exploded utside the ba se ’’ss
outside to blow up the
mausoleum if wome women n
continued to visit it.” –
WashingtonTimes,
March 14

March 6, 2009 (UNITED

March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bombe
bomberr to fight with the cell
c ell that
t ha t p lanne
la nned d a
driving an explosives-laden motorcycl
motorcycle e Islamist militant grou p serie s erie s o f a tt ac ks
ttac ks,,
blew himself up near a police academy i n al-Shabab. One of the including a March 2008
Baghdad, killing 28 people. The Islami
Islamic
c recruits include
included d attack on th the e
State of Iraq later took credit for th the
e a 27-year-old male who U .S. .S . Em ba ss y in
bassy
operation in an online statement. – New blew himself u p Sana`a.
S ana` a. T he m en e n— —
York Times, March 8; AFP, March 11 in a suicide attack. 14 Yemenis and two
According to FB FBII Syrians—wer
Syrians—were e
March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): The Iraqi an
andd
national security arrested on separate
U.S. governments announced tha
thatt official Philip Mudd , occasions durin during g
12,000 U.S. troops will leave Iraq by th
thee however, “These folks 2007 and 2008. – AP,
end of September 2009. – AFP, March 8 aren’t going ove overr March 11
there to become part
March 10, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicid
suicidee March 12, 2009
of terrorist cells.
cells.””
bomber targeted tribal leaders in Ab Abu u Nevertheless, officials
G
Ghhura
ura y b , k illi ng a t lea s t 3 0 pe o p le
le.. could not rule ou outt (PAKISTAN): Suspecte
Suspected d
– Bloomberg, March 10 the possibility that U.S. unmanned aerial
some of the recruit
recruitss drones launche
launched d
March 10, 2009 (SOMALIA): Somalia’
Somalia’ss
could eventually return approximately four
cabinet voted to implement Shari`a la
law
w and attack th thee missiles at a
across the country. The proposal wilwilll U nite d Sta
S ta te s. – Reuters, militant camp in
now be presented to the parliament foforr March 11 Kurram Agency of th the
e
final approval. – Reuters, March 10 Federally
March 11, 2009 Administered Tribal
March 11, 2009 (UNITED STATES)
STATES)::
Areas .
Officials at the FBI and Nationa Nationall (YEMEN): Yeme Yemen n An estimated 24
Counterterrorism Ce nt er testifie
testifiedd c harg
ha rg e d 16 suspected militants wer weree
b ef
e fo r e Cong
grr e s s that “tens” of su spected
us al-Qa`id a killed in the strikes. –
Somali-Americans, primarily fro
fromm operatives with Reuters, March 13
Minneapolis, have traveled to Somali Somalia a forming an al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
gates, quickly followed by a suicid suicidee “there is ongoing
bombing. At least three people wer weree propaganda intende intended d
injured. – Guardian, March 4 to destroy the security and
order of th thee
Jubba regions.” – G arow e
O n line , M arc
arch h7

22
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is s U E 4

March 12, 2009 (THAILAND): Thailan d March 16-17, 2009 h a s “ c h a n g ed t o

announced that it will be sending 4,00 4,0000 (PHILIPPINES)
(PHILIPPINES)::
partner up with the
additional troops to the south in an effor effortt Philippine troops fired
infidel.” – RTTNews,
to quell an intensifying insurgency. Th Thee on suspecte
suspected d
March 19; CNN, March 19
Thai prime minister acknowledged tha thatt Abu Sayyaf Group
t he m is sio n in the s out h ha s sso
o fa
farr be e
enn rebels who hav have e March 19, 2009
“unsuccessful.” – TNA, March 12 been holding three
Red Cross officer officerss (AFGHANISTAN): Da d
March 14, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Jazir
Al-Jaziraa h o s t a g e s in c e Ja
J a n u a ry
Mohammad Khan, a
broadcast a new audiotape purportedl purportedly y 1 5 in t h e s o u tht h er
ernn
key anti-Taliba
anti-Taliban n
by al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin Ladin.. Philippines. A military
lawmaker from
During the recording, Bin Ladi
Ladin n spokesman said said,,
Helmand Province Province,,
a c c u s ed s o m e A r a b lle
eaa d er s o f b ein
e ing
g “Two bodies of the
was killed along with
“complicit” with Israel and the Wes Westt Abu Sayyaf wer were e
four others afte afterr
in a “Crusader-Zionist alliance agains againstt recovered by the
a bomb ripped
our people.” Bin Ladin urged a holy wa warr operating troops an and d
through their vehicl vehicle
e
to liberate the Palestinian Territorie Territoriess have been positively
in Helmand. According
and also called on jihadists to liberat liberate e identified as sub sub--
to one reportreport,,
Iraq from the U.S. military. He calle called d leader Jul Asbi
“The killing took to 10
the recent Israeli intervention in Gaza a Jalmaani and Muda Mudarr
the number o f
“holocaust.” – AFP, March 14 Hadjail, his trusted
MPs who have died in
man. Seven other otherss
attacks sinc since e
March 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A are believed wounded
they were elected in
suspected U.S. unmanned aerial dron
dronee or dead in th the e
Afghanistan’
Afghanistan’ss
strike killed two Arabs and three othe
otherr fighting.” The
first democratic
people in Bannu District of the North
North-- hostages, however,
parliamentary vote i n
West Frontier Province. – Washington ar
aree
2005.” – AFP, March 19
Post, March 16 still being held
captive. – Reuters, March March 20, 2009
March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Four Sout
Southh 16; Mindanao Examiner,
Korean tourists were killed in a suicid suicide e March 17 (AFGHANISTAN) :
bombing in Hadramawt Province. Tw Two o Taliban and police
March 18, 2009
Yemenis were also killed. The Yemen Yemenii clashed in norther
northern n
government blamed al-Qa`ida for th the e Jawzjan Province, on
(YEMEN): A suicid
suicidee
attack and claimed that the bombe bomberr the border wit
with
h
w a s t ra in e d in ne
n e ig hb
h b o r in g S o m a lia
lia.. bomber attacked a
Turkmenistan. Nine
– AP, March 15; BBC, March 15; AFP, March 16; convoy of Sout South h
Afghan policeme
policemen n
Reuters, March 17 Korean officials
and a district chief
investigating th
thee
were killed. – AFP,
March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’
Yemen’ss March 15 attack that
March 19
Interior Ministry announced that the
theyy killed four Korea
Korean n
recently captured Abdullah Abdul - tourists in Yemen. March 21, 2009
Rahman Mohammed al-Harbi, one o f The South Korea Korean n
the most wanted militants in Saud
Saudii ambassador to Yemen (AFGHANISTAN): A
Arabia. Al-Harbi was apprehended i n was in the convo
convoy y
suicide car bomber
Taiz Province. – Saba, March 15 at the time of the latest
detonated hi hiss
attack. No one i n
explosives at a
March 16, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN) : the convoy was injured.
police checkpoint i n
A suicide bomber wearing a polic policee – AP, March 18
Nangarhar Province,
uniform detonated his explosives insid
inside
e killing thre
threee
March 19, 2009
the main police building in Lashka
Lashkarr civilians and one
Gah, Helmand Province. At least thre
threee policeman. – A P P,,
(GLOBAL): A new audi audio o
policemen were killed. – AP, March 15 March 2 20
0
message purportedly
March 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicid
suicidee from al-Qa`id
al-Qa`ida a
bomber killed 14 people in the garriso
garrisonn leader Usama bin
city of Rawalpindi. The bombe
bomberr Ladin appeared o n
detonated his explosives outside a Islamist web forums.
restaurant. – AFP, March 16 Bin Ladin tell tellss
Somali fighters that
President Shayk
Shaykh h
Sharif Shaykh
Ahmad should b e
“dethroned, fought
and removed wit with h
ar m ed fo rc e” b ec au
a u s e he
March 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN) : a police station stated that he wa wass
NATO forces killed senior Taliba
Taliban
n before detonating hi hiss “not defending Umar
commander Maulawi Hassan and nin nine
e ex plo
xp lo ssiv
iv e s, b ut w a s al-Bashir or hi hiss
of his associates in Helmand Province
Province.. s to pp e d at
a t the
t he g at e.
ate. re
r eggim
im e .. .the is sue is
– AP, March 23 – Washington Post, March one
o ne o off m a k iingng
24 excuses for more
March 23, 2009 (UNITED STATES)
STATES):: foreign interference i n
Alleged al-Qa`ida terrorist Ali al-Marr i March 24, 2009 the Muslims’ countries
pleaded not guilty to conspiracy an andd in the framewor
framework k
supporting terrorism in a federal cour courtt (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`id a o f t h e c o n te tem porary
in Peoria, Illinois. U.S. District Judg
Judgee second-in-command Z i o n i s t C r u s a d e .”
Michael Mihm set a tentative trial dat datee Ayman al-Zawahir
al-Zawahirii – Bloomberg, March 24;
for May 26. Al-Marri has been in U.S U.S.. released a new CNN, March 24
c usto dy s inc e Dece
De ce mb e r 2001 . – Los videotape, in which h e
Angeles Times, March 24 urg ed the Suda ne nes se
e March 25, 2009
pe op le to p re pa rree
March 23, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicid
suicidee (GLOBAL): The U.S U.S..
for a “long guerrilla
bomber detonated explosives in a war” in light of th the e government offered
Kurdish funeral tent in Jalula, Diyal Diyala a International Criminal up to $11 millio million n
P ro v in c e , k
kiill
ll in g a t le a s t 1 5 pe
p e o p le
le.. Court’s decisio n in rewards to find or
– Independent, March 24 to charge Sudanese capture Baitulla
Baitullah h
President Umar al al-- Mehsud, Sirajuddin
March 23, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN) :
Bashir with war crimes. Haqqani, and al al--
Taliban militants ambushed a policpolice
e “The Sudanes
Sudanese e Qa`ida operative Abu
vehicle in Kandahar Province, killin
killing
g re g im e is to o w e a k to Yahya al-Libi. Al Alll
eight policemen. – AFP, March 23 d e fe nd the S ud a nn,, three
t hree m e n a re be liev ed
so you must do what to
t o be o pe ra tin
ting
g
March 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicid
suicidee was done by you yourr in the Afghanistan-
bomber detonated his explosives i n brothers in Iraq and Pakistan region region..
Islamabad, killing a policeman. I t Somalia,” al al-- – AFP, March 25
appeared the bomber wanted to ente
enterr Zawahiri said. He

23
 APRIL 200 9 . V o L 2 . Is
I s sU
sUE 4

March 25, 2009 with supplies for

(PAKISTAN): A NATO forces i n
CTC Sentinel Staff
suspected U.S. Afghanistan. The
editor-in-Chie
editor-in-Chieff unmanned aerial dron dronee fighters besiege
besieged d
strike killed Farhad terminal on
Erich Marquardt
approximately seve
sevenn the outskirts o f
senior Editor, CT
C
militants in South Peshawar, using
editorial Boar
Boardd Waziristan Agenc y rockets and petro petroll
of the Federally b om b s to d e st ro y the
CoL Michaelj. Meese, ph.D.
Administered Triba l p ar ke d v e hic le ss..
Department Hea
Head
d
Areas. Two vehicles – AFP, March 28
Department of social sciences (West point
)
were reportedl
reportedly y
CoL Cindy R.jebb, ph.D. targete d. – AFP, March 25 March
targeted. 28, 2009

Deputy Department Hea

Headd March 25, 2009 (ALGERIA): Al
Al--
Department of social sciences (West point
)
Qa`ida in the Islamic
(YEMEN): Yemen’
Yemen’ss Maghreb (AQIM )
MAj Reid sawyer
Interior Ministry demanded that 20 of
Director, CTC
released a statemen
statementt its members b e
Brian Fishman claiming it had released from detention
arrested six men foforr in Mali and otheotherr
Director of Research, CT
C
plotting attacks co unt rie s in e x cha ng
ngee
Christopher Heffelinge
Heffelingerr against foreigners i n fo r the re lea s e o f
the country. The six Western hostages.
FBI Fellow, CT
C
statement said that th
thee AQIM says tha thatt
men were recruited by it is holding two
al-Qa`ida. – AP, Canadian diplomat
diplomatss
March 25 kidnapped in Niger in
December, alon along g
March 26, 2009 with four European
tourists kidnappe d
(IRAQ): A car bom
bomb
b in Mali in January. –
exploded on a Reuters, March 28
commercial street in
a March 30, 2009
Shi`a area of Baghdad,
killing at leas
leastt (AFGHANISTAN) :
2
200 pe ople
op le . ––AP,
AP, March 26 A suicide bomber in a
police unifor
uniform
m
March 26, 2009 detonated his
explosiv
ex plosiv es insid
insidee
(AFGHANISTAN): A a government office
suicide bomber in Kandaha
Kandaharr
prematurely detonate
detonated d Province, killing at
his e xplo sive s as he least nine people
people..
w as “s a ying g oo d d-- – AP, March 30; Reuters,
March 30
b
byye
e to his a ss ooccia
ia te s”
b
beefo
fo re his m is sio nn,, (AFGHANISTAN) :
killing six militants.
Taliban militants
The inciden t
C O N T A CT attacked a polic
policee
occurred in Helmand
Combating Terrorism Center
Province. – Reuters,
U.s. Military Academy
March 26
607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hal
Halll
West point, NY 10996
March 26, 2009
phone: (845) 667-638
667-6383
3
Email: sentinel@usma.ed
sentinel@usma.eduu (AFGHANISTAN) :
Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel
www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel//
Taliban militants
* For press Inquiries: (845) 667-638
667-63833 attacked a polic
policee
convoy in Ghazni
Province, woundin
wounding g
six policemen. Four
militants wer
weree
killed. – AP, March 26

March 26, 2009

 Mehsud claimed credit
March 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Militant s for the operation
operation.. (PAKISTAN): A suicid e
attacked a police academy in Lahore
Lahore,, –R e u te rs, M arch
Re arc h 31;
31 ; A FFP,
P,car bomber rammed
Punjab Province, killing seven cadets an
andd M arc
archh 30 his vehicle into a
one civilian. Four militants were kille
killedd Pakistani military
in the eight hour gun battle with securit
securityy March 30, 2009 convoy, killing thre
threee
forces. Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitulla
Baitullahh
checkpoint in Helmand soldiers. The attack
Province, killin
killingg occurred in Bann
Bannuu
nine policemen. – AP, District of the
March 26 North-West Frontie r
Province. – AFP, March 30
SUPPOR
SUPPORTT March 26, 2009
The Combating Terrorism Center woul wouldd March 31, 2009 (IRAQ):
like to express its gratitude to its inancia
inanciall (PAKISTAN): A suicid
suicidee
supporters, for without their support an andd
b
boommb e err d eettona
ona te d his A suicide ca
carr
shared vision of the Center products like
e
exxpp lo siv es at a bomber drove his
the CTC sentine
sentinell could not be produced. If
restaurant in South explosives-lade
explosives-laden n
you are interested in learning more about
Waziristan Agency Agency,, truck into a police
how to support the Combating Terroris
Terrorism
m
killing 11 people. compound in Mosul
Mosul,,
Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma
http://www.ctc.usma..
Pakistan’s Taliba Taliban n Ninawa Province, killing
edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at
movement claimed seven people
people..
West point’s Association of Graduates at
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. – Reuters, March 31
845-446-1553 .
Voice of America, March
26 March 31, 2009

March 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i -

Taliban chief Baitullah
(AFGHANISTAN) : Mehsud vowe vowed
d
An Afghan soldier shot to “amaze everyone
and killed tw
twoo in the worldworld””
U.S. coalition with an attack on
soldiers in norther
northern n Washington, D.C D.C..
Afghanistan. The The Federal Bureau of
assailant kille
killedd Investigation
Investigation,,
himself immediately however, said Mehsud
following th
thee has made simila
similarr
incident. – AP, March 27
threats before and that they
March 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicid
suicidee had not seeseenn
bomber blew himself up inside a mosqu
mosque e any indications of an
imminent plot o n
Washington. – AP, March 31
i n Khyber Agency of the
Federall
Federally y
The views expressed in this report are those of Administered Tribal Areas,
the authors and not of the U
U..s. Military Academy, killing at leas
leastt
the Department of the Army, or any other agency 50 people. – V oice of Am e ric a,
of the U.s. Government. M arc h 27

March 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN):

Taliba n
militants destroyed 12
trucks loade
loaded
d

24