The First Definition of Unreality

Part 1- Introduction
||shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
|| shrIviTThalaM namAmi ||
The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita. It is
MadhusUdana sarasvatI's
brilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the objections of the MAdhvas, the dualists.
Shankara states that his doctrine of brahmajnAna (brahmajnAnamapi vastutantrameva - brahma-sUtrabhAshhya 1.1.2) is a "vastu-tantra", a doctrine based on facts, as opposed to a "purushha-tantra", a
doctrine based on the knowledge of an individual. One can raise objections against individual opinions
but facts cannot be objected to; they can possibly be misunderstood.
One can possibly express ignorance of facts but not argue against them. So one may ask: how is it
possible for the mAdhvas to raise objections against advaita that is based on facts? It is not possible.
What the MAdhvas, the dvaitins, have done is to express misunderstandings, not objections. It is,
therefore, proper to answer the so-called objections of the mAdhvas by clearing their
misunderstandings of advaita. But it must also be mentioned that, in some cases at least, it appears
that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings but misunderstandings introduced on
purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then, B) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation.
Nevertheless, advaitins should remove all misunderstandings, whether they be genuine or otherwise,
and no advaitin has done this better than MadhusUdana SarasvatI, the great logician from Bengal.
I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi's great treasures, treasures that are to
be cherished for all time. In a forum like this one, it is hard, if not impossible, to do justice to such a
monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. So I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with
translation, consulting the explanations of Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA, of
BrahmAnanda in his GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi, and of
ViTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works, namely the advaitasiddhi, siddhi-vyAkhyA, GauDa-brahmAnandI, and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the
GauDa-brahmAnandI, all in the original Sanskrit, have been edited by Pandit Anantakrishna Sastri and
published by Parimal Publications, Delhi, in 1988.
A few words about the authors. MadhusUdana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft
quoted verse regarding him is:
madhusUdanasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI |
pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhusUdanasarasvatI ||
(Only) the Goddess of Learning, sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) MadhusUdana sarasvatI.
And MadhusUdana sarasvatI knows the limits of (knowledge of) Goddess sarasvatI!
He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI, vedAnta
from rAmatIrtha, and took sannyAsa dIxA from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi
which is MadhusUdana's "crest-jewel", he is said to have written numerous other works, including a
lucid commentary on the gItA called gUDhArtha-dIpikA, and a work called "advaita-ratna-laxana", a
refutation of the work "bheda-ratna" by the logician shankara mishra.
MadhusUdana demonstrates his ability as a master logician in the advaita-siddhi, which he wrote as a
response to the nyAyAmR^ita of the mAdhva exponent, vyAsatIrtha. MadhusUdana was so
accomplished in navya-nyAya (logic) techniques that the following verse is quoted about him when he
visited navadvIpa, the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra.
navadvIpe samAyAte madhusUdanavAkpatau |
chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .abhUd.h gadAdharaH ||
When MadhusUdana, the master of speech, came to navadvIpa, MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha (who was
the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trembled (with fear) and GadAdhara (another logician
of great repute) became afraid.
Balabhadra BhaTTAchArya, the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA, is said to have a been a favorite student of
MadhusUdana. BrahmAnanda, the author of gauDabrahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA), wrote the work as a
response to the nyAyAmR^ita-taraN^giNI of the dvaitin (dualist) rAmAchArya. BrahmAnanda was the
student of nArAyaNa tIrtha, a student of MadhusUdana.
Finally, ViTThalesha upAdhyAya, a brAhmaNa of the Konkan region, has also placed the followers of
advaita under his debt for writing a lucid commentary on the gaUDa-brahmAnandI.
|| shrIvishhNave namaH ||
Verse 1 of the advaita-siddhi
----------------------------mAyAkalpita-mAtR^itA-mukha-mR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayaH
satya-GYAna-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH |

mithyA-bandha-vidhUnanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM
mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vijayate vishhNur-vikalporjjhitaH ||1 ||
Translation based on siddhivyAkhyA of Balabhadra bhaTTAchArya
and GauDa-brahmAnandI (laghu-chandrikA) of BrahmAnanda
VishhNu shines supreme, He who is the substratum (basis) of
the world of duality beginning with the notion of cognizer (mAtR^i),
of duality that is false and fabricated by mAyA, He whose nature is
Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss, He who is realized by the
undifferentiated (undivided) direct experience arising from the
mahAvAkyas of vedAnta, He who by shaking off the false bonds (of
mAyA) has attained, as it were, mokshha wholly consisting of
supreme bliss, and He who becomes free from all variety,
manifoldness (vikalpa). (1)
BrahmAnanda clearly identifies VishhNu with jIva, the individual
soul, the pervader. vishhNuH vyApakaM jIvasvarUpam.h |
This individual soul (jIva) attains as it were, mokshha or liberation
and shines as VishhNu, the supreme Brahman.
What is mokshha and what is bandha (bondage)? The vArtikakAra
has said: "avidyAstamayo moxaH sA cha bandha udAhR^itaH"
Mokshha is the complete dissolution of avidyA, and bondage is that
avidyA.
BrahmAnanda interprets "mithyAbandhavidhUnanena - vikalpojjhita"
as brahmAtmaikya-aGYAnarUpabandhasya tAdR^ishhAstamayena
dR^ishyashUnyaH. Bondage is the ignorance of the identity of
Brahman and Atman (individual self). Once such ignorance is
fully removed, there is nothing "seen" (as only the seer dR^ik
remains).
Balabhadra interprets shrutishikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharaH as
vedAnta-janya-akhaNDasAxAtkAravishhaya, that thing which is
the content of the indivisible (undifferentiated) direct experience
arising from the (mahAvAkyas) of vedAnta.
viTThaleshopAdhyAya explains the whole process described in the
first verse of the advaita-siddhi as follows:
vishhNuH (jIvaH) vastutaH satyaGYAnasukhAtmako .pi san.h,
mAyAkalpitamAtR^itAmukhamR^ishhA-dvaitaprapaJNchAshrayo jAtaH,
mukto .api san.h aGYAnena baddhatvena bhrAnta ityarthaH |
tatashcha vastuto baddhasya tattvena bhrAntasya mumuxAsaMbhavAt.h
sa mumuxu san.h gurumanusR^itaH tataH tadupadishhTa-shruti-shikhottha-akhaNDadhIgocharo .abhUt.h | nishhkAmakarmopAsanAnushhThAnena shraddhaikAgrachittaH san.h AtmAnaM satyaGYAnasukharUpabrahmatvena sAxAtkR^itavAn.h | tatashcha mithyAbandhavidhUnanena
vikalpojjhitaH mithyAbandhApagamAt.h tatprayuktavikalpena duHkhena
rahitaH san.h paramAnandaikatAnAtmakamoxaM prApta iva |
avAstavasaMbandhabhramasyaiva satvAt.h moxarUpasya tatsaMbandhaabhAvAchcha iva ityuktam.h | IdR^ishaH san.h vijayate svaprakAsharUpotkarshhavAn.h ityarthaH |
VishhNu (as the jIva), even being actually of the nature of Reality,
Consciousness, and Bliss, is the substratum of the false world of
duality beginning with the notion of cognizer that is fabricated
by mAyA. Even though He (the jIva) is liberated, due to being bound
by ignorance, He is under delusion. (If) He is actually bound
and (really) deluded by reality, from that (it follows that)
desire for liberation is impossible. (But this is not so.) Being
desirous of liberation He follows a (worthy) Guru. From the vedAntic
teachings of that (Guru), He has comprehended the undivided Brahman.
By performing actions without desire for fruits thereof and by
performing upAsana (worship and meditation), being of one-pointed
mind and dedicated, He has directly realized the Self as the
Brahman which is essentially Reality, Consciousness, and Bliss.
Thereupon, by the removal of the false bonds (of mAyA), and being
freed from the associated sorrow, (He) has attained mokshha or
liberation which is wholly bliss. Because of the presence of the
illusion of being related (to duality in the state of bondage),

which is not real, and because of the absence of that relation

in mokshha, the (word) "iva", as it were, is stated. Being so
(liberated and in His real state), He (VishhNu) shines supreme
by His own brilliance.
Next, MadhusUdana pays respects to his three Gurus who
taught him mImAMsA, vedAnta, and initiated into sannyAsa.
shrIrAma-vishveshvara-mAdhavAnAmaikyena sAxAtkR^ita- mAdhavAnAm.h |
sparshena nirdhUtatamorajobhyaH pAdotthitebhyo .astu namo rajobhyaH || 2 ||
May salutations be to the dust that on contact removes
darkness (ignorance), the dust of the feet of shrI rAma,
shrI vishveshvara, and shrI mAdhava, who have directly
realized the parabrahman (mAdhava) as identical with
themselves.
The first occurrence of "mAdhava" denotes the Guru, mAdhava,
but the second stands for parabrahman, per gauDa-brahmAnandI mAdhavAnAM parabrahmaNAm.h .
bahubhirvihitA budhaiH parArthaM vijayante .amitavistR^itA nibandhAH |
mama tu shrama eshha nUnamAtmaMbharitAM bhAvayituM bhavishhyatIha || 3 ||
Many knowledgeable people have composed lengthy works that
are excellent and for the sake of (educating) others. But
this effort of mine will only be for fulfilling my own
objective.
ViTThalesha states here that MadhusUdana has expressed his lack of
conceit, garvarAhityapradarshana.
In the next verse, MadhusUdana briefly states the purpose of his
work.
shraddhAdhanena muninA madhusUdanena saN^gR^ihya shAstranichayaM
rachitAtiyatnAt.h |
bodhAya vAdivijayAya cha sattvarANAm-advaitasiddhiriyamastu
mude budhAnAm.h
|| 4 ||
This advaita-siddhi has been composed by the sage MadhusUdana, whose
sole asset is dedication, with great diligence, after collecting the
truths of the shAstras. May this advaita-siddhi be useful in imparting
(correct) understanding and in gaining victory over disputants (with
opposite views) to those who are too busy (to read lengthy works)
and may it be a (source of) joy to the learned!
Here, BrahmAnanda sees a link between "iyam.h" (this) in the current
verse and the final verse of the advaita-siddhi:
siddhInAm-ishhTa-naishhkarmya-brahmagAnAmiyaM chirAt.h |
advaitasiddhiradhunA chaturthI samajAyata ||
After a long lapse of time since the "siddhi"s of ishhTa, naishhkarmya,
and brahma, this advaita-siddhi, the fourth siddhi, has originated.
The three other siddhi's being referred to are the ishhTa-siddhi of
VimuktAtman, the naishhkarmya-siddhi of Sureshvara, and the Brahmasiddhi of maNDana mishra.
MadhusUdana :tatrAdvaitasiddherdvaitamithyAtvasiddhipUrvakatvAt.h dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyam.h |
Since the establishing of unreality of duality is the antecedent of
establishing the truth of nonduality, only the unreality of duality
is to be established first.
siddhivyAkhyAkAra (balabhadra) :nanu advaitasiddhAvadvaitasyaiva pratipadanIyatayA tadvihAyAgre dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanaM kriyamANamasaN^gatamityata Aha
tatreti | tasyAmadvaitasidhhau dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyamityarthaH | tatra hetuH advaitasiddherityAdi |
tathAcha dvaitamithyAtve upapAdite .advaitaM sUpapAdamiti
dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanamadvaitasiddhyanuguNatvAnnAsaN^gatamiti
dhyeyam.h |

An objection can be raised: In advaita-siddhi, only advaita should be

discussed. Discarding that (objective) in the beginning, the establishing
of unreality of duality that is being done is irrelevant. In reply,
(MadhusUdana) states tatra, etc. In advaita-siddhi (establishing the
truth of non-duality), the unreality of duality is to be established
first; this is the meaning. The reason being "advaitasiddheH", etc. ie.
"since the establishing of nonduality is preceded by establishing the
unreality of duality." And also, when the unreality of duality
is established, nonduality is easily established; by the establishing
of unreality of duality, the truth of nonduality follows. Therefore,
it is to be considered that (such establishing of unreality of duality)
is not irrelevant.

Part 2 - Review of navya nyAya concepts

A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we
proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic"
by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna
Matilal for more details.
Process of inference:
Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of
an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra).
An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence
noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which
the cause brings about the inference.
In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or
consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of
invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti
corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic.
In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke",
the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable
concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire",
vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.
The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is
a knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha)
where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain
possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the
form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant
of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h
In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely
by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word
representing the application of the consideration and the invariable
concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain
possesses fire because of smoke."
In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya
or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant,
and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur.
In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire
because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and
the pakshha is parvata (mountain).
In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as
follows:
pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case

For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire

because of smoke."
The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the
bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as:
vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH |
Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of
the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya.
Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration
for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable
concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not
the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However,
fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. There are things such
as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an
invariable concomitant of smoke.
A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition
of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is
called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is
superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for
"substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the example,
bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum
is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus,
and the relation is "contact", saMyoga.
Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate
between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence
exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are
always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation
between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular
instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be
occurrence exacting but sometimes not.
In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or
pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin. If a relation is
such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which
must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or
anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example,
bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin
while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin.
Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One
is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity
between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence.
Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before
it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after
it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence.
The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of
absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the
ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the
anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should
be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational
adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational
and absential adjuncts.
Some of the properties that are commonly used in
naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to
the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin
(knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya
(qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier),
etc.

The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these

are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to
each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean
"the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva
or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.
A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain
(parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato
vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of
fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA |
The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni.
Or
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA |
The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the
AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire.
The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are
"avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited).
These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or
abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to
be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said
to be limited by a limitor.
Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain
has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of
fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in
parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is
said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the
AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but
this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva
or fire-ness.
So a navya-naiyAyika would write:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatvaavachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA
parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |
The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited
by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is
described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness).
A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the
sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot",
daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with
respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally
about all sticks and pots.
So the naiyAyika writes:
daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h |
Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described
by pot.

Part 3 - The first definition of mithyAtva - objections

Earlier, MadhusUdana set forth the objective of establishing

the unreality (mithyAtva) of duality (dvaita), or in other

words the unreality of the world (jaganmithyAtva).
After a brief digression of navya-nyAya, we will now look at
the first definition of mithyAtva (unreality) that comes under
attack from the mAdhva opponent. This definition is the one
given by PadmapAdAchArya in his PanchapAdikA.
advaita-siddhi
--------------atha prathamamithyAtva-vichAraH |
The opponent criticizes the definition of mithyAtva as
follows:
nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h "mithyAshabdoanirvachanIyatAvachana" iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasadanadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatvavishishhTa-sattvAbhAvaH, uta sattvAtyantAbhAva-asattva-atyantaabhAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-abhAvavatve
sati asattva-atyanta-abhAvarUpaM vishishhTam.h |
Now, what is this unreality (mithyAtva) that (you) want to
infer (as characterizing the world)? This unreality is by no
means non-definability as defined by the statement of the
panchapAdikA that the word mithyA (unreal) is denoted by
non-definability, the non-definability being of the nature of
NOT being the substratum (adhikaraNa) of either existence or
non-existence. What is "not being the substratum of existence
or non-existence"?
Is it 1) the absence of existence qualified by non-existence
or 2) the pair of attributes of a. absolute absence of existence
and b. absolute absence of non-existence, or 3) the property of
the absolute absence of nonexistence during the absolute absence of
existence, ie. being a common substratum of the attributes the absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of
non-existence?
nAdyaH, sattvamAtrAdhAre jagatyasattvavishishhTasattva-anabhyupagamAt, vishishhTa-abhAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h |
(You) cannot (claim) the first (regarding the world) because the
world is the substratum of only existence (sattva) and existence
qualified by non-existence is not admitted. And by proving the
absence of existence as qualified by non-existence , (you commit
the flaw of) proving what is already established (siddha-sAdhana).
[Please see Note 1 below]
na dvitIyaH, sattva-asattvayorekAbhAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena
vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmakabrahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api
sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye
abAdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena bAdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya
vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaikalyAchcha |
(You) cannot (claim) the second. Because, wherever there is an
absence of one of existence and nonexistence, there the presence
of the other is necessary; this leads to a contradiction. (Also),
the world, just like the Brahman without attributes, even being
without the attributes, existence and nonexistence, by (its very)
nature of existence, is established as NOT unreal; this would
lead to (the defect of) arthAntara, proving something other than
what is to be proved. In the silver-in-nacre (example of illusion

that is often quoted by advaitins to show the ontological status

of the world), (we grant that) it (silver-nacre) is without existence
whose nature is non-sublatability (noncontradicted-ness), (but)
the absence of nonexistence, whose nature is sublatibility
(contradicted-ness), is NOT established; this leads to the
defectiveness of (your) sAdhya, what (you) seek to prove.
[Please see Note 2 below]
ata eva na tR^itIyaH, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhyavaikalyAchcha
For the very same reason(s) as before, the third (alternative
in defining mithyAtva, ie. the common substratum of the attributes,
absolute absence of existence and the absolute absence of
nonexistence) cannot (be claimed) because of the fallacies of
contradiction (violation of the law of the excluded middle),
proving something other than what is intended, and defectiveness
of the sAdhya.
MadhusUdana now begins his reply thus:
iti chet.h, maivam.h
If this is what you say, it is unjustified.

Notes
----Note 1: BrahmAnanda points out that the siddha-sAdhana allegation
made by the mAdhva in his criticism of the first alternative to
defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva is not technically accurate.
Here is why:
mAdhvamate alIkasyaiva-atyanta-abhAva-svIkAreNokta-vishishhTapratiyogika-abhAvaprasiddhAvapi matAntare tadaprasiddhirityapi
bodhyam.h |
Even though the absolute absence of an alIka (fictitious entity)
is accepted by mAdhvas and the absence of the qualified adjunct is
(accepted) as exampled, in some other system (mata) it is not exampled
(and, therefore, it is not accepted.)
ViTThalesha clarifies here that matAntare means naiyAyikAdi mate,
among naiyAyikas, etc.
The argument is this. The first alternative to sadasadanadhikaraNatva is claimed by the mAdhva as leading to sidhha-sAdhana,
establishing what is already accepted. But this is true only in
the case of mAdhva's system, not in the case of others such as
naiyAyikas who do not accept the negation of a purely fictitious entity.
For example, the sentence "a hare with horns is not in the forest"
is not accepted by the naiyAyikas because it involves the negation
of a purely fictitious entity, a hare with horns. The naiyAyikas
absolutely insist that what is being negated must be an exampled entity.
The naiyAyikas are extreme realists as much as mAdhvas are. If any
false knowledge creeps into the inference process, the naiyAyika feels
that the whole process is suspect. Therefore, he insists that any and
all terms that are used in an inference must be only exampled terms,
not unexampled terms, fictitious terms. In fact, vAtsyAyana makes it
clear in the nyAya-sUtra-bhAshhya that the conclusion that is to be
proved must be possible - saMbhavastAvat.h pratiGYa.

In any case, the naiyAyika would also object to the first alternative
in defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva, just as the mAdhva does, but for
a different reason.
Note 2: Here, the opponent argues that the world (with duality) could be
just like Brahman in that Brahman does not have existence as an attribute
but existence is Brahman. So the duality of the world can also be such
that existence is not an attribute but its very nature. If the advaitin
admits this, he would be proving something other than what he wishes
to prove.

Part 4 - MadhusUdana's reply

Brief recap: We have seen that mithyAtva (unreality) can be
defined as anirvachanIyatva (property of not being definable),
and this anirvachanIyatva can further be explained as
sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either
existence or nonexistence. The opponent lists three ways in
which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may be defined. He finds
fault with each of these definitions. MadhusUdana disagrees
and starts his counter-argument.
MadhusUdana's reply:
sattva-atyanta-abhAva-asattva-atyanta-abhAva-rUpa-dharmadvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhAbhAvAt.h | nacha vyAhatiH |
In the intended meaning of "sadasad-anadhikaraNa" (not being
the substratum of existence or nonexistence) as "the pair of
attributes, absolute absence of existence and the absolute
absence of nonexistence", there is NO defect. There is NO
contradiction too. (Why?)
sA hi sattvAsattvayoH parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA |
That (contradiction could result) only if 1) existence and
nonexistence mutually negate each other or 2) they mutually
pervade each other's absence (one's absence is the invariable
concomitant of the other), or 3) they are mutually pervaded by
each other's absence (one is the invariable concomitant of the
other's absence). (PS: Recall the definition of vyApti in the
third part of this series.)
tatra nAdyaH, tadanaN^gIkArAt.h | tathAhyatra trikAlAbAdhyatvasattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena
pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h | tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena
vivaxitaH |
There is no (presence of the) first condition, because it is
not accepted. It is so (not accepted) because the negation of
existence, that is not sublatable at any time, past, present,
or future, is NOT nonexistence, but (nonexistence means)
NOT being cognized as existing in any substratum (at any time).
The negation of that (nonexistence) is what is intended to be
(part of) what is to be proved.
[Please see note 1 and note 2 below]
tathAcha trikAlAbAdhyavilaxaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena
pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h | evaMcha sati na
shuktirUpye sAdhyavaikalyamapi | bAdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya
sAdhyApraveshAt.h | nApi vyAghAtaH, parasparaviraharUpatva-

abhAvAt.h |
The conclusion to be established is that while being different
from that which is never sublatable, it is (capable of) being
cognized as existing in some substratum. And this being so, there
is no defect of the sAdhya's (being absent) in silver-in-nacre.
(This is) because the negation of nonexistence which is sublatable
(always) does not form part of what is to be established (sAdhya).
(What does form part of the sAdhya is the negation of nonexistence
which consists in not being cognized in any locus or substratum at
any time). (Therefore,) there is no contradiction too (here) because
there is no mutual negation between (existence and nonexistence).
ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvAbhAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxitaasattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vyabhichArAt.h |
For this reason, the second condition (under which contradiction
can occur) does not hold too. (There can be no invariable
concomitance of the absence of existence or nonexistence with
the other.) (The requirement for such concomitance to hold is
not satisfied) due to deviation (vyabhichAra),
since in (illusory things such as) the silver-in-nacre,
there is the absence of existence, but the absence of the
nonexistence with the intended definition (as above) is also
cognized. (In order for the concomitance to hold, nonexistence
would have to be present when existence is absent.)
nApi tR^itIyaH tasya vyAghAta-aprayojakatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayoH
parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tadabhAvayor-ushhTrAdAvekatra
sahopalaMbhAt.h |
The third condition does not cause contradiction. (For example,)
cow-ness (the property of being a cow) and horse-ness (property
of being a horse) are invariable concomitants of each other's
absence (ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is absent
and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is absent). Even so,
the two properties (of cow-ness and horse-ness) are NOT present
in the same locus such as a camel, etc., and (the absences of
cow-ness and horse-ness are) perceived thus together (in the
same locus).
[Please see note 3 below]
Balabhadra clarifies:
tatashcha sattva-asattvayoH parasparavirahavyApyatve .api
tadabhAvayorekatra prapaJNche saMbhavAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.H|
And therefore, even though existence and nonexistence are
invariable concomitants of each other's absence, the absences
of both CAN occur in the same place, ie. the world and due
to (this) there is NO contradiction. This is to be thought of.
(To be continued)
Notes:
-----Note 1:
MadhusUdana's definition of non-existence can also be understood
in this way using Western-style logic.
Let us define a predicate S whereby S(X) means "X is sublated."
Also, let us say E(t) means the existential quantifier "there is
a t", and U(t) means the universal quantifier "for all t." Let
~ stand for the negation operator.

Then the definition of existence (sattva or simply sat) is that

thing, say X (Brahman) such that:
~ (E(t) such that S(X), for time t)

...

(A)

In other words, sattva (Brahman) is that which is NOT sublated

at any time.
Next, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of something X) NOT as
simply negating the expression (A) above which would just be
(E(t) such that S(X), for time t)
...
(B)
this would mean "X such that there is a time t when X is
sublated."
If the advaitins had defined nonexistence as (B) above, then
the mAdhva opponent would have been justified in saying that
existence and nonexistence are mutually negations of each other.
Negating existence would be nonexistence and vice versa.
But, very significantly, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of
something X) as, where C(X) means "X is cognized in a locus",:
(U(t): ~ C(X), for time t)

....

(C)

meaning "for all time t, X is not cognized in a locus."

The negation of *this* type of nonexistence is:
(E(t): C(X), for time t)

...

(D)

which means "there is some time t at which X is cognized

in a locus." And this is precisely the negation of nonexistence
that is characteristic of illusions such as silver-in-nacre,
snake-on-rope, and finally, the world-on-Brahman illusion.
The illusory thing is cognized as existing in a locus
(substratum) sometime (the period of illusion). So such
illusory entities CANNOT be said to be nonexistent in the
same way as a fictitious entity, such as a hare with horns,
which is never cognized in any locus.
Also, as MadhusUdana says, (D) is not the same as (A),
and the negation of (A) is not the same as the nonexistence (C).
So there is NO contradiction if both the negation of (A),
ie. (B), and the negation of (C), ie. (D), both hold in the
same locus. This exactly is the conclusion to be established (B) and (D) both characterize the world of duality. There is
a time (the illusion phase) when duality is cognized in a
locus (Brahman) by super-imposition (adhyAsa). This establishes
the (D) part of the conclusion. And there is a time (the dawn
of jnAna) when the world of illusion is sublated. This
establishes the (B) part of the conclusion.
Note 2: BrahmAnanda clarifies that pratIyamAnatvarUpaM means
pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h, capable of being cognized.
ViTThalesha comments:
pratIyamAnatvamityatra laDarthavartmAnatvavivaxaNe pratItishUnyatvakAle mithyAtva-anupapattestadavivaxAM sphuTayati
TIkAyAM - pratIyamAnatvayogyatvamiti |
The intended meaning of "pratIyamAnatva" that indicates
the present tense does not indicate that mithyAtva (unreality)
is not established during times when there is no cognition.

To clarify this, (BrahmAnanda writes) "pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h"

capable of being cognized, in the commentary.
Note 3:
This can be understood in this way. Suppose C(X)
means X is a cow, and H(X) means X is a horse.
Now, we have:
C(X) -> ~ H(X)
H(X) -> ~ C(X)
where "->" stands for "implies". If X is a cow then X is
not a horse. If X is a horse then X is not a cow.
So 1) C(X) is an invariable concomitant of ~H(X), the negation
of H(X). 2) H(X) is an invariable concomitant of ~C(X), the
negation of C(X). This means it not possible to have:
(C(X) AND H(X))
for the same entity X. X cannot be both a cow and horse.
Suppose M(X) means X is a camel. Then the following is tenable:
M(X) -> ~C(X) AND ~H(X)
If X is a camel, it is neither a cow nor a horse.
This is what MadhusUdana is saying here.

Part 5 - No arthAntara

After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions
of sadasadanadhikaraNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana next shows that
the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid.
MadhusUdana's reply (continued):
yachcha - nirdharmakasya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavatprapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h|
tanna |
And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lacks
existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence,
the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes
that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that
you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) arthAntara.
(We say): It is not so.
ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h
prapaJNchasya pratyekaM satsvabhAvatAkalpena mAnAbhAvAt.h,
anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha |
The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything
and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and
every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as
(pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency
would arise due to the lack of a comprehensive system (of
understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of
things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing

the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.)

MadhusUdana is making a crucial point here regarding what is technically
called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property
occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyika would search for
a common term or common concept to represent this common property and
then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property.
For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue,
the naiyAyika would make "blue-ness" a common property and say that
the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so
on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using
fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness
as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required,
in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail.
This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in
the West. If I can explain a certain number of things using some
hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses
than mine, then your explanation is better than mine.
In keeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than
heaviness, the naiyAyika-logician is always looking for anugata dharma's
or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent
says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality
in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence
real. MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim:
1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things
in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that
I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated."
2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted,
then it would take a significant number of "real" entities to explain
what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from
the defect of "gaurava" because of the lack of a common property or
anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is
superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint.
In the previous part of the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana
refutes the charge of arthAntara, ie. proving something other than
what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can be
redefined so that the opponent cannot even dream (no pun intended!)
of making the charge of arthAntara. MadhusUdana alternatively defines
mithyAtva as the absolute difference from sattva and the absolute
difference from asattva. It must be noted that this alternative
definition is not a new definition; it is entirely equivalent to the
one accepted so far, ie. the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute
absence of asattva. The alternate definition makes use of mutual
absence or anyonya-abhAva as opposed to atyanta-abhAva in the
first definition.
MadhusUdana:
satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogikabhedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h | tathAcha
ubhayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR^igbheda-asaMbhavena
tAbhyAmarthAntara-anavakAshaH |
Alternatively, (we may define) the sAdhya (the unreality of duality,
mithyAtva) to be the difference that has existence as its counterpositive AND the difference that nonexistence as its counter-positive.
(Simply put, mithyAtva is that which is different from existence AND
different from nonexistence as well.) And there is no scope for (charging
us with) arthAntara due to this because such difference from both
(existence and nonexistence) or difference from one of them is not
possible (according to our other opponents- the logicians, the Buddhists,
and the view of VAchaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA).

Explanation by BrahmAnanda and explanation of BrahmAnanda's explanation

----------------------------------------------------------------------by ViTThalesha
-------------BrahmAnanda (in his laghuchandrikA):
bhedeti AtyantikabhedetyarthaH |
By "bheda" (difference) (MadhusUdana) means "absolute difference."
ViTThalesha (in his viTThaleshopAdhyAyI):
nanu prapaJNchasya sadasadubhayarUpatAmate sadbheda-asadbhedayorapi
avachchhedakabhedena tatra sattvAt.h siddhasAdhanaM ata Aha Atyantiketi |
Now, even as per the view that the world is both real and unreal,
the difference from "sat" and difference from "asat" are present
there as limiting differences. This leads to siddha-sAdhana (doshha),
establishing what is already established (since such a view is already
held by VAchaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArttikatAtparyaTIkA.) Therefore,
(in order to refute this charge) (BrahmAnanda) says "(the difference)
is absolute."
( MadhusUdana uses the word bheda which BrahmAnanda clarifies to be
not difference used loosely but absolute and complete difference.
Otherwise, the opponent can say that as per the view that holds the world
to be both real and unreal, a partial difference from reality and a
partial difference from unreality can be said to characterize the world.
And this would lead to the objection: "You are proving what has already
been proved.")
BrahmAnanda:
ubhayAtmakatve iti|
"bhramavishhayIbhUta-alIkasaMsargavishishhTAdirUpeNa prapaJNcho .alIkaH
rUpAntareNa tu satya " iti nyAyapeTikAkAravAchaspatyuktapaxe ityarthaH |
(MadhusUdana says) "in (defining the world as having) the nature of
both (sat and asat)." This means the view of VAchaspati Mishra in
his nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkA according to which "As the world is the
object of erroneous cognition (such as silver-in-nacre), due to being
qualified by the false relation, it (the world) is false. But in its
other capacity, the world is real."
ViTThalesha explains:
"bhramavishhayIbhUta-alIkasaMsargavishishhTAdirUpeNa prapaJNcho .alIka"
iti| idaMrajatamityAdibhrameshhu satye dharmiNi satyameva hi dR^ishyaM
rajatAdikaM alIkasaMbandhena bhAsate, tatra svarUpataH satyayorapi-ida
Mrajatayor-alIkasaMsargavishishhTa-rUpeNa-asatyattvaM,
In illusions such as "this is silver" (ie. illusion of silver in nacre),
a real object such as silver appears in the real subject (but) with a
false relation. In such a case, even though "this" and silver are
real in themselves, due to being qualified by a false relation they
are unreal.
[In the illusion, "this is silver", the "this" and silver indicate
real objects of cognition. Silver in itself is a real object. So is
the thing indicated by "this". The fact that I am seeing something
which I call "this" is true. Also, it is true that I have seen
silver before. But the mistake I make is in identifying "this"
with silver when I say "this is silver." So VAchaspati Mishra holds

that in an illusion, there is a false (alIka) relation between real

things that are related by such a false relation. The relata are
real in themselves but as relata of the false relation, they are
unreal. The false relation in the illusion "this is silver" is the
relation of identity (tAdAtmya). We will see next that this view
is extended to define the world as being both real and unreal.]
etanmate brahmaNi prapaJNchasya-alIkasaMbandhena bhrama iti na
bhramitavyam.h | idami rajatasyeva tatra tattatpadArthAnAM
bhramAnAdAyaiva sarvasyApi prapaJNchasya-alIkatopapatteH |
(But) this view should not be mistaken as (holding) that there is a
case of illusion due to the false relation of the world with Brahman.
For, just as in the case of (the illusion of) "this" and silver,
the illusions of various things in the world cause the whole world
to be established as unreal.
rUpAntareNeti|
idaMtvarajatatvAdinA pramA-vishhayIbhUta-satyasaMsarga-vishishhTarUpeNa vetyarthaH|
(By) "rUpAntareNa tu satyaH" (is meant): (But) by the nature of being
relata of a real relation that is the object of right knowledge,
things denoted by "silver", "this", etc. (and the whole world) (are
real).
[pramA is right or valid knowledge and bhrama is erroneous knowledge
or illusion. In pramA, a real relation is cognized among real objects
and so far as pramA is concerned, these objects are also real. In
bhrama, a false relation appears to be existing among objects that
are real in themselves. But due to the false relation, the reality
of the relata of the false relation is also denied. Thus it is that
the world is both real and unreal, since its objects can be relata
of both real and false cognitions. This is the view of VAchaspati
in his nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkA.]
[Next, BrahmAnanda explains what MadhusUdana means when he says
"anyatarAtmakatve" ]
BrahmAnanda:
anyatarAtmakatve iti | bhramavishhayo .api saMsargo deshAntarasthatvAt.h satya iti prapaJNchaH satya eveti paxe,
As per the view (of the realists, naiyAyikas), even though the relation
(of identity, for example in "this is silver") is the content of
erroneous knowledge, it is real because it occurs (as the content of
valid knowledge, pramA) in other places. Therefore, (all things in
the world are real and) the world is real.
[The naiyAyikas who are realists-to-the-core insist that erroneous
cognition or illusion is really due some defect (doshha). "doshho
.apramAyA janakaH" says VishvanAtha in the bhAshhA-parichchheda.
When there is an illusion "this is silver" with respect to nacre,
the memory of silver color, the similarity of the color being seen
with silver, and other defects such as improper light, defective
vision, etc. cause the illusion. But when real silver is being
seen, the same cognition "this is silver" becomes a valid knowledge,
pramA. So the cognition "this is silver", though erroneous due to
defect(s) in one place, can become valid in some other place. Hence,
there is no cognition of the unreal any time. And the world is real.]
BrahmAnanda:
GYAnAtiriktarUpeNa-alIka eva prapaJNcho vikalpavishhaya iti paxe
chetyarthaH |

And, as per the view (of the vijnAnavAdi-bauddha's), the world is

only false (unreal) because it is absolutely different from
consciousness and is a figment of imagination. This is the meaning.
[Among the three views presented so far, it is obvious that absolute
difference from sattva is not possible in the case of VAchaspati
Mishra's view in his nyAya text and the view of the vijnAnavAdiBuddhists cannot admit an absolute difference from asattva. The naiyAyika
(logician) says the world is real, but then what MadhusUdana has said is
that the world is absolutely different from both the real (sattva) and the
unreal (asattva). Hence, none of the three views is identical to the
advaita view. This means that there can be no arthAntara in establishing
that the world is absolutely different from sattva and absolutely different
from asattva. BrahmAnanda next clarifies that the definition given by
MadhusUdana that includes absolute difference from sattva rules out any
arthAntara charge made against advaita in the following manner. "Since
Vachaspati's nyAya text says that the world is both real and unreal, this
is equivalent to saying that the world is different from the real and the
unreal. So your definition of the world as being different from sattva and
asattva is not going to prove mithyAtva at all. It is going to prove the
view of Vachaspati in his nyAya text which is not the view of advaita.
Hence the arthAntara." ]
BrahmAnanda:
anavakAsha iti | asattvAbhAvasya kevalaprapaJNche sattvasya
tadupahitaprapaJNche svIkAre sattvopahitaprapaJNchasya kevalaprapaJNche tAdAtmyasattvAnna tatraikAntikaH sadbheda iti bhAvaH|
The purport of (Madhusudana's saying) "anavakAsha" is: (Even by)
accepting the absence of asattva in the whole world which (also)
depends on sattva (since the world is also said to be sat as per
Vachaspati in his nyAya text), the world which thus depends on
sattva and this sattva-dependent part is identified in the whole
world, there is NO absolute difference from sat, (which is what
our definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva requires).
[Even though "both real and unreal" can be construed as "different
from real and different from unreal", this view does not entail,
for example, "absolutely different from real" which is what
MadhusUdana's definition requires. So there is no arthAntara
whatsoever].

Part 6 - No aMshataH siddhasAdhana (no partially redundant proof)

MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva

of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the
definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda.
MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be
categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be
sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the
absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.
The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition
of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of
either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections.
He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva,
namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference
from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving

something other than what is intended).

The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's
definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from
existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect
of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For
example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two,
say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial
siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be
partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit
is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana
arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas
and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference
from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So
the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference
from nonexistence is redundant.
But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split
into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We
HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence.
Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the
hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from
existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the
sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu
with the sAdhya.)
Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
Text:
nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche
siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdikaM
guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge
tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddheryathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvAnna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhikaraNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api
sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA
militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |
Translation:
(And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana
(aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting
of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the
difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already
established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality
and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND
non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the
naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference
(of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas)
say: "the quality and its possessor are different
and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be
related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no
siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference
and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even
though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved.
Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the
absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved)
is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva).
So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning).
(You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say,
no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are
terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference
and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the
conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established.

(This is your stand.)

Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of
asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent
thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence
of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva
and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for
dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of
that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.
Notes:
ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable
concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of
sadbheda and asadbheda.
dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h
The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu
in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of
difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the
absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper
term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM").
And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayojaka
in establishing dR^ishyatva:
tatprayojakatA- ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAdakatA
Discussion:
-----------Here the argument runs as follows:
mAdhva:
We may make a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the
advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence
of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with
regard to the world, that is already established by others.
advaitin:
Well, in that case, we can make the same charge against you
because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a
quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference
of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such
as the bhATTas, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the difference
of a quality from its possessor.
mAdhva:
Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference
independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of
the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality
from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhikR^itatva", which is
explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a
relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is
difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva, as being
capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor
of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH),
the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of
the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of
blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent from the pot
(although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only
different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference)
and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem.
The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayojaka)
of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the
pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the

hetu samAnAdhikR^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is

abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case
of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda
between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda
as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayojaka of the hetu.
But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that
the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the
absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference
from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility.
(What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility
is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your
view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of
sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving
the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant.
Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana.
advaitin:
What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case,
the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayojaka)
of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of
sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction
of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the
prayojaka of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why.
If we make just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a
problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious
entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But
here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never
perceived. Again, if we make just the absence of asattva the sAdhya,
then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have
absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in
Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of
sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the
sAdhya a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu. The charge of
siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made.
Notes:
1)
The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the
mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayojaka,
a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur
exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more
restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from
the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When
the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the
vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya
fire to occur without smoke, although the smoke must always be
accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the
present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the
hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly
coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda
and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti,
what the advaitin is saying is:
Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND
different from asat.
The converse also holds.
Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible
(cognizable).
Symbolically speaking, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical
conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write:

H -> S1 AND S2
S1 AND S2 -> H
where "->" means "implies"
2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from
the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example
only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view
of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to
an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some
heavy attack from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing the
bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds.
In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta
outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin,
ParakAla Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Parakala Yati points out
how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva
position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagreement between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya
position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the
vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins)
that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mokshha.
This position is also criticized by ParakAla Yati on exegetical
grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin work named
Ananda-tAratamya-khaNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the
mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration only. Any
other example would also be fine.

The Second Definition of Unreality

Part 7 - The second definition
Continuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we will next
study the second definition of mithyAtva that is defended by
MadhusUdana SarasvatI. Other articles in this series may be
retrieved by searching for "siddhi" in the subject line.
It is especially useful to be familiar with basic nyAya terminology
as explained in the third and fourth parts of the series.
Without such familiarity, the discussion below may not make
much sense at all!
advaita-siddhi text:

pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |

Alternatively, mithyAtva (unreality) of something is that which is the
counter-positive or absential adjunct (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation
(a negation for all three periods of time, past, present, and future) in
the very substratum where it (the thing) is cognized.
This is the second definition of mithyAtva that is taken up by
MadhusUdana in his defense of mithyAtva of dvaita. This alternative
definition is based on shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti
kiJNchana", as BrahmAnanda says in his gauDabrahmAnandI, "neha
nAnAstI"tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha".
The second definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman, the
author of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa.
It is important to understand this definition and the significance of
the terms involved. As in the case of the first definition of mithyAtva,
what is alIka or a fictitious entity is NOT the mithyAtva that is
used to describe the world.
The mithyAtva of the world is akin to the illusion of the snake over
a rope or silver in nacre. Upon realizing that the snake is illusory,
one exclaims "The snake is unreal. The snake was never there to begin
with, it is not there now, and it will never be there in the future!"
This is the mithyAtva (unreality) of the world that is being talked
about.
One important point to remember is that the in order for a thing to
be mithyA or unreal according to this definition, it MUST be cognized
or perceived in some susbtratum. This is a necessary condition for
something to be called mithyA. What is perceived is called mithyA.
That which can never be perceived, a chimera such as the horns of
a hare, is NOT being called mithyA. Rather it is asat. And Brahman
is sat. MithyAtva is different from these two, ie. mithyAtva is
sadasadvilaxaNa.
BrahmAnanda, in his gaUDabrahmAnandI commentary on the advaita-siddhi
therefore, defines the term pratipanna-upAdhi as follows:
pratipannaH svaprakArakadhIvisheshhyaH ya upAdhiradhikaraNaM tannishhTho
yastraikAlikanishhedho .atyanta-abhAvastatpratiyogitvamityarthaH |
pratipanna means the qualificand of the cognition that has the (thing
that is mithyA) as the qualifier. Such a qualificand that is the substratum
is "pratipanna-upAdhi". The counter-positive of the absolute negation or
the negation for all periods of time in the substratum (is called
mithyA).
This definition rules out equating what is mithyA with alIka, a
fictitious entity. Yet another type of negation is also being ruled out
in the definition. What is fictitious is not perceived anywhere. The other
extreme is the negation that is always empirically perceived. For example,
a pot is NOT perceived as existing in the threads that make a cloth.
If the advaitin means by mithyAtva the fact that a pot is negated in
the threads of a cloth, he is stating what is already established
and therefore open to the objection of "siddha-sAdhana doshha".
But this is type of negation is being ruled out by the term
"svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya". In order for the definition of mithyAtva
to apply to the negation of the pot in threads of a cloth, the pot
will have to have been perceived as existing in the threads of a
cloth. But no such cognition of a pot in threads of a cloth ever
occurs. So the definition of mithyAtva does not apply to such
obvious negations.
ViTThalesha (who comments on the gauDa-brahmAnandI) therefore remarks:

vastutastu svaprakArakatvopAdAnaM tuchchha-ativyAptivAraNAya

Actually, the mention of "having it as the qualifier" is for
the purpose of ruling out something that is trivial (fictitious entity)
and a definition that is too wide (ativyApti).
Another type of negation or absence is also being ruled out by the
insertion of the term "traikAlika" in the definition. This is to
counter an objection as follows. There is an absence of a thing
such as a pot before it comes into being, called the prAgabhAva.
After the pot is destroyed, there is another type of absence (abhAva)
called "dhvaMsa-abhAva." Does the advaitin mean by mithyAtva an
absence that is one of these types? Or does he mean the mutual
negation (mutual-absence or anyonya-abhAva or bheda) that is
perceived between things such as a pot and the pieces of the pot
after it is destroyed? In either case, the advaitin is committing
the mistake of siddha-sAdhana, proving what is already established.
In order to reject this objection, the definition of mithyAtva
has the term "traikAlika". The negation that is being described
in the definition is traikAlika, that holds for all times. In the
case of prAgabhAva, dhvaMsa-abhAva, and bheda in the above
examples, there is no absolute negation (atyanta-abhAva), that
which holds for all times.
Therefore, BrahmAnanda says:
kapAladinishhThabheda-dhvaMsAdipratiyogitvamAdAya siddha-sAdhanaM
syAdatastraikAliketi |
(The opponent may) charge us with "siddha-sAdhana" by taking the
pratiyogitva (counter-positive-ness) of the abhAva (absence) to be the
difference or posterior negation (dhvaMsa-abhAva) in things such as the
pieces of a pot. (To counter this we have added the term) "traikAlika"
in the definition.
In the next part, we will see how the opponent raises an important
objection to this definition.

Part 8 - Predicate Logic expression

The only reason why I did not attempt to formulate the definition
in terms of predicate logic is because the logical expressions
tend to get "unwieldy" quickly as the definition gets more
and more refined. The first definition of mithyAtva (please see
"advaita-siddhi - 6") is refined by the second definition. All that
the first definition really says is that mithyA is something that is
different from the absolutely real Brahman and from a fictitious entity.
As per the first definition, the thing that is mithyA should be 1)
cognized in some locus (substratum) and 2) be sublated (negated) at some
time. The second definition refines the first by saying that the thing
that is mithyA is 1) sublated in the very locus where it is cognized
and 2) and it is sublated so for ALL times.
At the risk of being unintelligible once again, I will attempt
to formulate the second definition of mithyAtva in terms of
predicate logic.
To explain the second definition in terms of Western-style
predicate logic, we need to introduce different time frames
of reference. Also, we need to consider the second definition

as a refinement of the first definition. The second definition

comes from the VivaraNa on the PanchapAdikA which contains the
first definition.
The need for different time frames arises because of the
following. In any case of illusion, there are two time frames.
The first time frame, say T_A (time frame of avidyA), is that
which holds when the illusion is in effect. During this phase,
things are interpreted in terms of the illusion. For example,
consider the illusion of the snake on the rope. When one
is under the spell of this illusion, he/she thinks there is
a snake. He/she may even interpret the movement of the rope due to
wind, etc. as a movement of the snake! Note also that the second
definition states that the thing that is mithyA is sublated in
the same locus where it is cognized (pratipanna-upAdhau) and that it
is sublated for all times (traikAlikanishhedha). Clearly, it is
absurd to say that the illusion is sublated for all times DURING
the illusion phase (avidyA) itself. This is akin to saying a dream
is sublated during the dream. The dream is sublated only upon waking
up, not while the dream is still occurring. Therefore, it is
necessary to interpret traikAlikanishhedha as the sublation for
all times in a time frame of reference that is different from the
time frame during illusion. What is this other time frame?
The other time frame is the time frame that holds AFTER the illusion
ends. Call this time frame T_J (time frame after dawn of jnAna).
Once the illusion ends, the previous time frame T_A no longer
applies. There is no snake. One exclaims "there was no snake there,
there is no snake now, and there won't be the snake in future!"
What about the events of the old time frame T_A? These get
re-interpreted or "mapped" into events in time frame T_J.
For example, the movement of the snake in the illusory phase
gets re-interpreted as "it must have been the wind that caused
the rope to move in reality." In other words, the old events in
time frame T_A that were in terms of "snake" get "mapped" into
events in time frame T_J in terms of "rope". This is because
there is NO "snake" in the time frame T_J. One may say that
"history gets re-written" in time frame T_J!
In the case of a dream-illusion, the dream events may generally
be thought of as being mapped into "non-events" or a NULL event
in the waking state.
Sometimes it IS possible to "map" dream events into waking-state
events. Have you dreamed of temple bells ringing only to wake up
and find that in reality your alarm clock is ringing?! :-)
Having defined the two time frames, the second definition of mithyAtva
can now be described symbolically almost in the same way as the
first definition. From now on, I follow the notation similar to that
in the sixth part of this series ("advaita-siddhi - 6") with
some additional notation.
(Note: Sublated and negated mean the same.)
Let us define a predicate S whereby S(X,L,t,T) means "X is sublated in
substratum L for time t in time frame T"
Also, let us say E(t) means the existential quantifier "there is
a t", and U(t) means the universal quantifier "for all t." Let
~ stand for the negation operator.
Then the definition of existence (sattva or simply sat) according
to the first definition of mithyAtva is that thing, say X (Brahman),
such that:

~ (E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for time t in some time frame T and
for some substratum L) ................................... (A)
or more concisely,
~ (E(T),E(t in T), E(L): S(X,L,t,T)) ....................... (A')
Brahman is NOT something that can be sublated for some time in
some time frame in some substratum.
Next, MadhusUdana defines nonexistence (of something X) NOT as
simply negating the expression (A) above which would just be
(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for time t in some time frame T, and for
some substratum L) ......................................... (B)
this would mean "there is a time t in some time frame when X
is sublated in substratum L"
stated more concisely as:
(E(T),E(t in T), E(L) : S(X,L,t,T)) ............................(B')
(Note: The terms locus and substratum are used interchangeably.)
Rather nonexistence (of something X) is defined as follows:
(U(t): ~ C(X,L,t,T), for time t in all time frames, and for all
loci)
...........................................
(C)
C(X,L,t,T) means "X is cognized in a locus L for time t in
time frame T." Something (X) is nonexistent if and only if
"for all time t in all time frames, X is not cognized in any
locus."
Stated more concisely,
(U(T),U(t in T ),U(L): ~ C(X,L,t,T)) ....................... (C')
The negation of *this* type of nonexistence is:
(E(t) such that C(X,L,t,T), for some time t in some time frame T, and
for some locus L) ...................................... (D)
or more concisely,
(E(T), E(t in T), E(L): C(X,L,t,T)) .........................(D')
which means "there is some time t in some time frame T during which X is
cognized in a locus." And this is the negation of nonexistence
that is characteristic of illusions such as silver-in-nacre,
snake-on-rope, and finally, the world-on-Brahman illusion.
The illusory thing is cognized as existing in a locus
(substratum) sometime (the period of illusion) and in the time
frame T_A.
The first definition of mithyAtva is : (B) AND (D).
(please see advaita-siddhi - 6)
Therefore, the first definition of mithyAtva is written:
(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T), for some time t in some time frame T, and
for some locus L)
AND
(E(t): C(X,L',t,T), for some time t in some time frame T', and for some
locus L') ............................................. (E)

or more concisely,
(E(T),E(t in T), E(L) : S(X,L,t,T))
AND
(E(T'), E(t in T'), E(L'): C(X,L',t,T')) ..................(E')
Now, what the second definition of the PanchapAdikA-vivaraNa does
is to refine the first definition, make it more precise and less
ambiguous. After all, the first definition comes from the PanchapAdikA and the second from the VivaraNa on the PanchapAdikA.
What the second definition does is 1) fix the time frames in (E)
above , 2) fix the loci in (E), and 3) make the condition in the (B)
part of the definition stronger by asserting that the sublation
holds for all times.
The second definition of mithyAtva may be written first by
fixing the time frame in (B) as the time frame T_J (time frame
after dawn of jnAna) and the time frame in (D) as the time frame
T_A (time frame during the avidyA phase).
(B with time frame T = T_J ) AND (D with time frame T = T_A)
which is
(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T_J), for some time t in time frame T_J, for some
locus L)
AND
(E(t): C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for some
locus L')
The second definition of mithyAtva may next be written by
fixing the loci L and L' to be the SAME. The definition clearly states
that the thing that is mithyA is sublated in the VERY LOCUS where
it is cognized.
This makes the definition:
(E(t) such that S(X,L,t,T_J), for some time t in time frame T_J, for
locus L)
AND
(E(t) such that C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for
locus L') AND (L = L')
Next, making the condition in the (B) part of the definition
stronger means the sublation should hold for all periods of
time in time frame T_J.
(S(X,L,t,T_J), for ALL time t in time frame T_J, for locus L)
AND
(E(t) such that C(X,L',t,T_A), for some time t in time frame T_A, and for
locus L') AND (L = L') ....................................(F)
or more concisely,
E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A))
AND (L = L') ) ................................(F')
Actually, if we wanted to be more picky and precise, we can say:
E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A))
AND (L = L') ) AND (T_J != T_A)..........................(F'')
to insist that the time frame T_A and T_J must not be the same.

"!=" means "not equals".

Introducing a predicate M(X) which means "X is mithyA", the
predicate is defined as (using "<=>" to indicate equivalence):
M(X) <=>
E(L),E(L')((U(t in T_J): S(X,L,t,T_J)) AND (E(t in T_A): C(X,L',t,T_A))
AND (L = L') ) AND (T_J != T_A)..........................(G)
We have arrived at the final form of the second definition of mithyAtva:
X is mithyA if it is sublated for ALL times in the very substratum
where it is cognized.
"pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |"
The second definition, if it has to be a refinement of the
first definition, must imply the latter. ie.
(F) -> (E)
It is easy to see that this implication holds.

Part 9 - Objections to the second definition

The objection of the opponent is based on the acceptance by advaitins
of three orders of reality as defined in, for example, the Vedaanta
paribhaashhaa of dharmaraaja adhvarin:
yadvaa trividhaM sattvaM -- paaramaarthikasattvaM brahmaNaH,
vyaavahaarikaM sattvamaakaashaadeH, praatibhaasikaM sattvaM
shuktirajataadeH |
The absolute reality of Brahman is paaramaarthika satya, the
empirical reality of the objective world, which includes space etc.,
is vyaavahaarika satya, and the illusory appearance of silver in nacre
(oyster-shell), etc. is praatibhaasika satya.
The Objection in brief:
The objection by the opponent is aimed to trap the advaitin in an
unrecoverable position by pointing out defects in any assignment
of ontological status to the negation (sublation) used in the
second definition of the mithyAtva.
advaita-siddhi text:
nanu, pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhasya tAttvikatve advaitahAniH prAtibhAsikatve siddha-sAdhanaM, vyAvahArikatve .api tasya
bAdhyatvena tAttvikasattvAvirodhitayA arthAntaraM, advaitashruteratattvAvedakatvaM cha tatpratiyoginaH prAtibhAsikasya prapaJNchasya
pAramArthikatvaM cha syAt.h,
Translation:
Objection by the opponent: Now, if the absolute negation (of a thing,
such as the world, that is being called mithyA as per the second
definition) is absolutely real (pAramArthika), then the basic principle
of advaita (non-dualism) is destroyed! (If the absolute negation) is
only illusory (prAtibhAsika), then you are proving what is already
established (ie. the reality of the world). Even (if the absolute
negation) is empirical (vyAvahArika), you will be proving something
other than what you intended because (such negation) will not be
opposed to the absolute reality (of the world). The shruti texts

that are non-dualistic will be incapable of revealing the truth. And

(if it be claimed that) the world is illusory, (that will not hold)
and (the world) would have absolute reality (pAramAthikatva).
Let us examine the opponent's objection in a little more detail.
The opponent says: You define three orders of reality - pAramArthika,
vyAvahArika, and prAtibhAsika. And you have defined mithyAtva as the
counter-positive-ness of the absolute negation (for all periods of time)
in the very substratum where the thing that is mithyA is cognized.
In essence, you would like to categorize the world as mithyA.
Now, what reality do you assign to such a negation of the world?
1) Is this negation pAramArthika (absolutely real)?
2) Is this negation prAtibhAsika (illusory) ?
3) Or, is this negation vyAvahArika (empirical) ?
Regardless of the type of reality you assign to this negation,
you run into problems.
1) The negation of the world is pAramArthika. In this case, you
have a direct contradiction with the non-dual principle of
advaita. BrahmAnanda explains the objection:
advaita-hAniH "neha nAne"tyAdishrutibodhitasya brahmaNi dR^ishyasAmAnyAbhAvasya virodhaH
(There is) damage to the principle of non-duality as known from
shruti statements such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" (there is no
manifold-ness here whatsoever) (because) of the contradiction due
to the common absence of the "perceived" (dR^ishya).
If the negation of the world is pAramArthika, then you have two
such realities - 1) Brahman, and 2) the said negation of the world.
This compromises the non-duality principle.
2) The negation of the world is prAtibhAsika, illusory. In this case,
you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha. BrahmAnanda explains:
siddha-sAdhanamiti | kapAle ghaTo nAstItyAdibhrame prAtItikasyaatyantAbhAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityarthaH |
siddha-sAdhana means that in cases of erroneous cognition or illusion
such as denying the pot in its parts, the absolute absence of the
(erroneously) cognized negation is already established (in another
system).
In other words, if you say the negation is illusory, such as the
negation of a pot in its two halves, such a position is already
admitted by another system. (A whole is said "inhere" in its parts
as per nyAya. So a whole, such as a pot, cannot be denied in its parts.
Any such denial is erroneous.)
In other words, if you say the negation of the world is illusory or
erroneous, that is already admitted by the realist schools. So you are
committing the mistake of siddha-sAdhana.
3)The negation of the world is vyAvahArika. In this case, what
you are saying is that the negation of the world will itself get
sublated upon realization of Brahman. What does this mean?
The world itself CANNOT be vyAvahArika because it is absurd
(a contradiction) to say that the world as well as its negation
get sublated upon Brahman realization. Either the world or its

negation can get sublated at the same time but not both! Therefore,
you are left with two possibilities - a. the world is pAramArthika
or absolutely real OR b. the world is prAtibhAsika or illusory.
But you deny the world is illusory, and so the world can only be
pAramArthika. This point is stated by BrahmAnanda as:
prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena pAramArthikatvameva balAtsyAditi
bhAvaH |
(Since the world) cannot possibly be illusory it is forced to be
absolutely real (pAramArthika) only. This is the purport (of the
opponent).
Again, ViTThalesha explains why the world cannot be illusory when
he comments on the term "prAtibhAsikatva-asaMbhavena" of BrahmAnanda:
brahmaGYAnAnyAbAdhyatvAditi
(The world cannot be illusory) because (it is admitted by the advaitin)
to remain un-sublated (not negated) by anything other than knowledge
of Brahman.
So what is the result of accepting the world as pAramArthika and the
negation of the world as vyAvahArika? These are the defects.
First, you will have established the world as absolutely real
which is different from what you set out to prove. This is the
defect of arthAntara. Second, the shruti texts that speak of
non-duality such as "neha nAnAsti kiJNchana" will have to be
accepted as NOT revealing the ultimate truth because they can
only reveal what is empirical ( vyAvahArika), ie. the negation of
the world.
In response to the objection of the opponent, MadhusUdana now begins
his reply:
iti chet.h? na |
If this is what you say, we say no!

Part 10 - MadhusUdana's reply

To understand MadhusUdana's reply to the objection (advaita-siddhi 12),
we need to find out what it means to negate something in the world.
Shankara states in his commentary on gItA 2.16:
sarvatra buddhidvayopalabdheH, sadbuddhiH asadbuddhiH iti | yadvishhayA
buddhiH na vyabhicharati tat.h sat.h, yadvishhayA vyabhicharati tat.h
asat.h|
There are two cognitions everywhere (in any cognition in the world) cognition of the real and cognition of the unreal. That cognition
which does not change is real (sat) and that which changes is unreal
(mithyA).
[Please note that Shankara's usage of asat corresponds to mithyA.]
In the cognition, "the pot is" (san.h ghaTaH), the permanent factor
is " is" which indicates the underlying existence. What is an illusion
is "the pot". What is cognized is just this permanent factor
but it is falsely understood to be a pot by the super-imposition (adhyAsa)
of the name-and-form on the underlying Existence (sat). In another
cognition, "the cloth is" (san.h paTaH), again the common, permanent factor
is "is." What is an illusion has to do with "the cloth." In other words,
between the cognitions "the pot is", and "the cloth is", what is
common, constant, and permanent is the factor, "is."
What we see above is a cognition where the cognizer gives a name to a

cognized object, such as a pot, cloth etc. Another type of cognition

tries to assert an adjective or attribute of an object. In the cognition,
"the blue pot is", again what is common, constant, and permanent
is the factor "is." What is illusion is "the blue pot." So what
is being denied ultimate reality is the "blueness" and "potness" of the
object but not pure existence indicated by "is".
Generalizing this to all cognitions, all objects are real as far as they
are treated as pure existence, but the moment you start associating them
with names and forms, the illusion begins. This Existence is the common,
unchanging, and permanent factor among all cognitions.
Therefore, status of anything in the world may be said to be comprised
of two components 1) a Real part and 2) an unreal part. This is somewhat
similar to the Mathematician's expression of a complex number as
(X + i* Y) where X is the real part and Y is the unreal (imaginary) part.
(Electrical engineers prefer to write X + j *Y, using j instead of i.)
But here we are not dealing with numbers, rather cognitions. So every
cognition is made of two parts - a real part, E and an unreal part, X.
Shankara assures us that the real part E remains the same for all
cognitions while the unreal part X changes.
So we come to the interesting question: what does it mean to
negate something in the world, such as a pot? It is clear that the
real component of the pot, which is Existence, can NEVER be negated.
However, the unreal name-and-form (nAma-rUpa) component of the pot can
be negated. This means only one thing. The negation of the pot also
has two components - 1) a real component, Existence (Being) and
2) an unreal component that negates only the unreal component,
name-and-form (nAma-rUpa), of the pot.
This is essentially what MadhusUdana says. The negation of the world
has two components. The real component (pAramArthika) is identical with
Brahman (sat) and the unreal component is of the same order of reality
as the world, ie. vyAvahArika. The unreal component of the negation only
negates the unreal component of the world.
We will first see how MadhusUdana explains the real component of the
negation.
advaita-siddhi text:
prapaJNchanishhedha-adhikaraNIbhUta-brahmAbhinnatvAnnishhedhasya
tAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h | na cha tAtvikAbhAvapratiyoginaH prapaJNchasya tAtvikApattiH, tAtvikAbhAvapratiyogini
shuktirajatAdau kalpite vyabhichArAt.h |
Translation:
(If we hold that) the negation (of the world) is non-different
from Brahman which is the substratum of the negation of the
world, then there is no damage done to the non-duality principle.
And the world as the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the
absolutely real (pAramArthika) negation cannot be (forced to be)
absolutely real (based on an erroneous rule that the pratiyogin
of a negation and the negation itself must necessarily belong
to the same order of reality.) An exception (to this rule which
proves the rule to be erroneous) is the silver-in-nacre that is
(illusory only) and its negation (at the end of illusion) which is real.
To understand MadhusUdana's stand more, we need to examine how
negation or absence (abhAva) is treated in different systems.
The questions are: 1) Is abhAva a category (padArtha) in itself?
in other words, do we have a cognition of abhAva? 2) Through
what means of cognition (pramANa) is abhAva cognized?

The bhATTa-mImAMsakas, for example, hold that abhAva is a separate

category and it is cognized through a separate pramANa called
anupalabdhi or non-apprehension. The naiyAyikas and MAdhvas hold
that abhAva is a separate category but they do not recognize a
separate pramANa like anupalabdhi for it, and hold that abhAva can
be known through standard pramANas such as perception, inference,
and verbal testimony. The prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that abhAva
is not a category in itself, nor is there a pramANa such as
anupalabdhi.
For example, consider the sentence "there is no pot on the
ground", - bhUtale ghaTo nAsti. Here, an absence or negation
of a pot is being asserted with respect to the ground, the substratum.
The bhATTas, naiyAyikas, and MAdhvas all accept that the absence
of pot on the ground is cognized as separate from the ground.
But the prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that the absence of the pot
is really identical to the ground, the substratum itself.
One of the greatest prAbhAkara mImAMsakas, shAlikanAtha defines
abhAva in the prakaraNa-paJNchikA :
dR^ishye pratiyogini yA tadekavishhayA buddhiH
sA tadabhAvo vyapadishyate | (prakaraNapaJNchikA)
abhAva (negation or absence) is the cognition of
the (substratum) alone while the pratiyogin (the
thing that is negated) is supposed to have been
perceived (had it been present).
When we say "there is no pot on the ground", we are really only
saying that we perceive the ground alone where a pot was supposed
to have been present. We do not perceive such a thing as "absence
of pot" on the ground. Therefore, "absence of pot" is the same as
the ground alone, the substratum. Here the pot which is supposed
to have been present but not seen is the pratiyogin.
Earlier, it was stated that the negation of the world has two
components - 1) a real component, Existence (sat) and 2) an
unreal component that is the negation of the name-and-form
aspects of the world. The real component can be identified
with Brahman, the substratum, and agrees with the PrAbhAkara
mImAMsA view of negation that equates the negation with the
substratum.
As to the objection that the negation and the thing negated
must both belong to the same order of reality, MadhusUdana
says this rule is flawed because there is an exception. In the
illusion of silver in nacre, the silver is illusory (prAtibhAsika) but
the negation of the silver (at the end of the illusion) is real
or vyAvahArika at best which is of a different order of reality.
The unreal component of the negation, which is vyAvahArika, is
discussed next by MadhusUdana.

Part 11 - prapaJNchaniShedha (negation of the world) can also be

vyAvahArika

BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition

of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10). Unreality is that
which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the

substratum where it is cognized. So the opponent asks: Now, how do you

classify this absolute negation that you speak of? Is this absolute negation
pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika? We have seen how MadhusUdana has
answered this question by pointing out that the absolute negation can be
treated as pAramArthika, identical with Brahman. In doing so, there is
no harm done to the non-duality principle. Also, the opponent cannot
insist on the rule that a negation and its counter-positive (pratiyogin)
have to have the same order of reality (sama-sattAka), because an
exception that breaks the rule is readily found in the case of an
illusion such as the silver-in-nacre illusion. The illusory silver is
prAtibhAsika but its negation is pAramArthika if the substratum of
illusion is treated as Brahman Itself or at least vyAvahArika, if
the substratum is taken to be nacre.
Having shown how the negation can be pAramArthika, MadhusUdana now shows
how the negation may also be treated as vyAvahArika. This corresponds
to the unreal part of the negation.
The basis of this approach to analyzing the negation is found in
such treatises as the dR^ig-dR^ishya-viveka which says:
asti bhAti priyaM rUpaM nAma chetyaMshapaJNchakam.h |
AdyatrayaM brahmarUpaM jagadrUpaM tato dvayam.h || 20 ||
Everything has five factors: 1) Existence, 2) Consciousness
3) Bliss, 4) Name, and 5) Form. Of these, the first three are of the
nature of Brahman and the last two (Name and Form) belong to the world.
khaMvAyvagnijalorvIshhu devatiryaN^.h narAdishhu |
abhinnAssachchidAnandAH bhidyete rUpanAmanI
|| 21 ||
In the elements, space, air, fire, water, and earth, in Gods,
animals, and humans, (and other things in the world) what is
non-different (constant, unchanging) are Existence, Consciousness,
and Bliss. What are different (among all these things) are the
Name and Form aspects.
[The first verse above also occurs in the sarasvatI-rahasya-upanishhad.]
When the world is negated, the sachchidAnanda aspect, which is
un-negatable, remains. The nAma-rUpa aspects are negated. These
were never real to begin with.
A rough analogy, that has its own limitations, may be given to illustrate the two aspects of negation.
Suppose we see a pot on the ground. Then the pot is removed. For a while after the pot has been
removed, we
"feel" the absence of the pot, although we continue to perceive the ground. During this phase, we
perceive, in some sense, the absence of the pot, as well as the ground. Subsequently, we forget all
about
the pot. At this point, we are only aware of the ground, not the pot or its absence. Both the pot and its
absence have been forgotten.
There is no memory of either having existed.
In such a case, where the negation is cognized as different from the substratum, the negation can be
taken to be the same order of reality as the thing that is negated, the pratiyogin. This is what
MadhusUdana says next.
advaita-siddhi text:
atAtvika eva vA nishhedho .ayam.h | atAtvikatve .api na prAtibhAsikaH, kiMtu vyAvahArikaH| nacha tarhi nishhedhasya bAdhyatvena tAtvikasattva-avirodhitvAdarthAntaram-iti vAchyam.h | svApnArthasya
svApnanishhedhena bAdhadarshanAt.h | nishhedhasya bAdhyatvaM pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve na
tantram.h, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA nyUnasattAkatvam.h | prakR^ite cha tulyasattAkatvAt.h kathaM
na virodhitvam.h |
Translation:

atAtvika eva - only unreal, vA - Or, nishhedho .ayam.h - this negation,

atAtvikatve .api - Even if it is unreal, na prAtibhAsikaH - it is not
illusory, kiMtu vyAvahArikaH - but empirical, nacha - And (it) cannot,
tarhi nishhedhasya - then, of the negation, bAdhyatvena - due to being
sublatable, tAtvikasattva-avirodhitvAd-arthAntaram - due to being not
opposed to the reality of (the world), there is the defect of arthAntara
(proving something other than what was intended), iti vAchyam.h - be
said thus, svApnArthasya - of the dream-object, svApnanishhedhena - by
negation in the dream, bAdhadarshanAt.h - because of experiencing the
sublation, nishhedhasya - of the negation, bAdhyatvaM - sublatability
pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve - in being not opposed to the absolute
reality, na tantram.h - is not dependent (does not imply), kiMtu
nishhedhyApexayA - but as compared to what is negated, nyUnasattAkatvam.h having a lower order of reality, prakR^ite cha - And in the point under
discussion, tulyasattAkatvAt.h - because of the equal order of reality,
kathaM na - how is there no, virodhitvam.h - opposition.
Meaning:
Or we may say that this negation (of the world) is unreal. Even though it is
unreal, it is not illusory (prAtibhAsika), but empirical (vyAvahArika).
And (you) cannot say:"Since the negation, that is itself sublatable, cannot
be in opposition to the reality (of the world), there is the defect of
proving something other than intended." (Why?) Because, of the instance of
sublation of a dream-object along with its dream-negation. There is no
dependence or implication of the non-opposition to absolute reality on
the sublatability of the negation, but on the negation's being of a lower
order of reality than the thing that is negated. In the present case, there
is equality of the order of reality (of the negation and the thing that is
negated, ie. the world). So how is there no opposition (to the reality of the
world)?
MadhusUdana says here that the negation of the world can be viewed as
vyAvahArika. This prompts an objection: If the negation of the world is
vyAvahArika, then this negation should itself be sublated. Upon sublation
of the negation of the world, the world's reality, not unreality, would
be affirmed. That means the advaitin is proving something other than what
he intended, a defect called arthAntara. To this objection, MadhusUdana
replies that it is not the case that world's reality would be affirmed upon
sublation of the negation of the world. In the example of a dream, an object
in the dream may be negated later in the same dream. And the negation itself
is negated upon waking up. This does not result in the dream-object becoming
real in the waking state! So what implies the reality of a thing is NOT
the mere fact that its negation is sublatable, but the fact that such
negation is of a lesser order of reality than that of the thing itself.
For example, if we see a rope in semi-darkness and imagine it to be a snake,
we may say "There is no rope." Here we are negating the rope. But this
negation is illusory (prAtibhAsika). Upon removal of the illusion, we
realize that the thing seen before is indeed a rope. So the rope, which
was negated before, is being affirmed (as vyAvahArika). What has
happened here is that the reality order of the negation is prAtibhAsika
which is less than the reality order of the rope, vyAvahArika.
It is only in such cases that the reality of the thing negated may be
affirmed, not otherwise. In the case under discussion, the negation of the
world being described and the world are of the same order of reality. So
the mere sublatability of the negation cannot make the world real.

Part 12 - The world is not a chimera

BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition
of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10). Unreality is that

which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the

substratum where it is cognized. Now the opponent tries to show that
the unreality of the world defined by the advaitin actually amounts
to admitting that the world is a chimera (a vastu-shUnya) or a
purely fictitious thing that is only imagined, but without a real
basis. Is the world according to advaita a vastu-shUnya, a mere nothing
or is it something with a real basis? Let us find out.
[Other articles in this series may be retrieved by searching for
"siddhi" in the subject line.]
advaita-siddhi text:
nanu evamatyanta-asattvApAtaH pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM hyanyatra-asattvena saMpratipannasya ghaTAdeH sarvatra
traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM paryavasitam.h ; anyathA teshhAM anyatra
sattvApAtAt.h, nahi teshhAmanyatra sattA saMbhavatIti tvadukteshcha ;
tathAcha kathamasadvailaxaNyam.h, nahi shashashR^iNgAderito .anyadasattvam.h|
Translation:
(Objection): Being the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolute
negation (for all three periods of time) in the very substratum where
it (the thing that is unreal, mithyA) is cognized has thus been defined
as being unreal (mithyA) (by you) and it is absolutely unreal (completely
nonexistent). From this, it follows that things of the world, such as a pot,
which are not existent in substrata other than where they are cognized, are
eternally negated in all substrata! Otherwise, they would have to be
existent in substrata other than where they are cognized. (But) you have
said that they do not exist in other substrata. Accordingly, how is it
that they (things of the world) are different from nonexistence (asat)?
This (the world) is certainly not different from purely nonexistent things
such as a hare's horn, (according to your view).
The gist of the argument here is that if the unreality of a thing
consists in its being negated absolutely (for all periods of time) in
the very substratum where it was cognized, then it must be admitted
that such a thing is negated absolutely everywhere. Otherwise, it
would mean the thing appears somewhere other than the substratum
where it was cognized. But this is denied by the advaitin. Therefore,
the unreal thing stands negated everywhere and for all times. So it
is no different than a chimera which is also absolutely absent everywhere.
advaita-siddhi text:
nacha nirupAkhyatvameva tadasattvam.h; nirupAkhyatvapadenaiva
khyAyamAnatvAt.h | nApyapratIyamAnatvamasattvam.h; asato .apratItau asadvailaxaNyaGYAnasya-asatpratItinirAsasya-asatpadaprayogasya
chAyogAt.h | nacha-aparoxatayA apratIyamAnatvaM tat.h; nityaatIndriyeshhvativyApteH
Translation:
(Objection continued:) Nonexistence (asat) cannot be undefinable
(nirupAkhya). Because, (the moment you say it is nirupAkhya), it becomes
defined by the (very) word nirupAkhya! Nor can you say asat is what
cannot be cognized. If asat were not cognized then there would be no
cognition of anything that is different from asat. And there
would be no sublation of cognition of a non-existent thing.
And it would not be possible to use the word "asat". Further,
you cannot define asat as that which is not cognized as
being directly perceived because this would make the definition
too wide (having the defect of ativyApti) due to the inclusion
of eternal but supra-sensuous things.

iti chenmaivam.h |
If this is what you say, we say no (ie. your objection is not
justified).
We will see how MadhusUdana answers this in the next part. But first,
let us see what BrahmAnanda (the GauDabrahmAnandI commentary) has to say
here. Essentially what the opponent is claiming here is that even a
chimera (alIka) that is absolutely false (fictitious such as a hare's
horns) is also the ontological status of the world as per the second
definition of mithyAtva of the advaitin. If the claim holds, then we
will have proved that the world is not sadasad-vilaxaNa, different from
sat and asat, but rather purely asat. In that case, the advaitin will
have proved something other than what he intended to in the first place,
thereby committing the fault of arthAntara.
GauDabrahmAnandI BrahmAnanda cites the Yoga sUtra of Patanjali:
shabdaGYAnAnupAtI vastushUnyo vikalpa - Yoga sUtra
Vikalpa is the chitta-vR^itti that is devoid of any real object and
that arises from the word (shabda) and cognition (GYAna).
Patanjali lists five kinds of chitta-vR^itti's or modifications of the
mind - 1) pramANa, vR^itti arising from means to right
knowledge, 2) viparyaya, vR^itti arising from misconception or illusion,
3) vikalpa, vR^itti arising from purely imaginary things, 4) nidrA,
vR^itti during sleep, and 5) smR^iti, vR^itti arising from memory.
The three factors to be considered in any cognition arising from
words are 1) shabda, the word, 2) artha, the denotation of the word,
and 3) GYAna (or vR^itti), cognition that results from the word.
What happens in the case of a vikalpa such as that associated with a
purely fictitious thing expressed by words such as "shashashR^inga" or
"hare's horn" is that we hear the word alright and there is some
cognition produced in the mind, but there is no corresponding denotation.
We cannot point out a thing in the world that represents the word
"hare's horn."
On the other hand when we hear the word "gauH" or "cow", apart from the
shabda that we hear and the cognition of the word or the vR^itti in the
mind, there is also a denotation of the word, the object which is indeed
a cow.
To be more precise, every word or shabda may have associated with it
a *representation* in the mind of the listener. Further, there may also
be a denotation of the word which represents the actual object that
corresponds to the word. In the case of a chimera (alIka), however, there
may be a word and its representation in the mind, but there is no
denotation or correspondence with an object.
This counters the objection by the opponent who says that a chimera
may be expressed by words (ie. is upAkhya), and has a cognition
(chitta-vR^itti) corresponding to it. What brahmAnanda is saying
is that surely these two aspects will be there for even a chimera
but it is vastu-shUnya, ie. devoid of any denotation, devoid of any
real basis.
ataeva "vR^ittayaH paJNchatayyaH pramANaviparyayavikalpanidrAsmR^itaya" iti vR^ittiGYAnAnAM paJNchadhA vibhAgena viparyayarUpAt.h sadrUpa-adhishhThAnavishhayakAt.h bhramAtpArthakyena
vikalpaH pAtaJNjalasUtra evoktaH |

It is precisely for this reason that Patanjali's Yoga sutra

says that the chitta-vR^ittis are of five kinds - pramANa or
right knowledge, viparyaya or misconception, vikalpa or imagination,
nidrA or sleep, and smR^iti or memory, and thus distinguishes between
viparyaya which is (the same as) bhrama (illusion) with Reality (sat)
as the basis (adhishhThAna), and vikalpa.
(viTThalesha-upAdhyAyI commentary on the gauDabrahmAnandI) nanu bhramasyApi sadavishhayakatva-avisheshhe
kathaM vikalpaH pR^ithagityata Aha sadrUpeti |
idaM rajatamiti bhrame .api shuktyavachchhinnachaitanyarUpaM
sadevedantvena bhAsata iti bhAvaH |
In order to counter the argument: bhrama (illusion) is also
without any real content and so how can vikalpa and bhrama be different?,
(BrahmAnanda) says sadrUpa, etc. (ie. that bhrama has sat as its basis but
vikalpa does not have such a real basis). Even in the illusion "this is
silver" (in regard to the illusion of silver in nacre), Sat, which is
consciousness limited by nacre, shines as "this." This is the purport.
ViTThalesha is answering another possible objection. The opponent may argue
as follows. In the illusion of silver in nacre, the nacre is no doubt
the basis of the illusory silver. But the basis nacre itself is unreal
according to the advaitin. So how can the illusory silver be any different
from an entirely fictitious thing such as a hare's horns, something that
is imagined without a real basis. In reply, ViTThalesha says that even
in the silver-in-nacre illusion, the basis nacre is not absolutely false
because the nacre is itself an illusion on the absolutely real sat
(Brahman). Therefore, a vikalpa is different from a bhrama.

Part 13 - advaita is not shUnyavAda

advaita-siddhi text:
(MadhusUdana:)
sarvatra traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM yadyapi tuchchhaanirvAchyayoH sAdhAraNam.h tathApi kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena
pratItyanarhatvaM atyantAsattvam.h tachcha shuktirUpye prapaJNche
cha bAdhAtpUrvaM nAstyeveti na tuchchhatvApattiH | na cha bAdhAt.h
pUrvaM shuktirUpyaM prapaJNcho vA sattvena na pratIyate |
etadeva sadarthakenopAdhipadena sUchitam.h |
shUnyavAdibhiH sadadhiShThAnabhrama-anaN^gIkAreNa kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvarUpa-asadvailaxaNyasya
shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha-anaN^gIkArAt.h |
sarvatra - everywhere, traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM being the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of an absence for
all periods of time, yadyapi- even though, tuchchhaanirvAchyayoH - of the trivial (absolutely non-existent, or
fictitious) and the undefinable (anirvachanIya), sAdhAraNam.hcommon, tathApi - but still, kvachidapyupAdhau - in any
substratum, sattvena - as existing ( as identified with
Existence), pratItyanarhatvaM - incapable of being cognized,
atyantAsattvam.h - absolute non-existence, tachcha shuktirUpyeand that in the silver-in-nacre, prapaJNche cha - and in the
world, bAdhAtpUrvaM - before sublation, nAstyeveti - is
not at all, and thus, na tuchchhatvApattiH - (they) cannot be
absolute non-existence, na cha bAdhAt.h pUrvaM - nor before
sublation, shuktirUpyaM prapaJNcho vA - the silver-in-nacre or
the world, sattvena na pratIyate - is not cognized as existing,
etadeva - it is exactly this, sadarthakenopAdhipadena - by the
word "upAdhi" which has Reality (sat) for its denotation,
sUchitam.h - (is) indicated,
shUnyavAdibhiH - by the shUnyavAdins, sadadhiShThAnabhramaillusion with Reality (sat) as the basis, anaN^gIkAreNa - by

not agreeing, kvachidapyupAdhau - in some substratum,

sattvena - as existing (as identified with Existence),
pratItyanarhatvarUpa - of the nature of being incapable of being
cognized, asadvailaxaNyasya - of (what is) different from
non-existence, shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha - in the silver-in-nacre
and the world, anaN^gIkArAt.h - due to not agreeing
Translation:
Although being the counter-positive of absolute negation (negation
for all times) is common between the absolutely nonexistent and
the undefinable (anirvachanIya), still, what is absolute
nonexistence is **incapability**of**being**cognized**as**
existing**in**any**substratum. And that (incapability) is NOT
either in the silver-in-nacre (the illusory silver) or in the
world **before**sublation. Thus, they (the illusory silver or
the world) cannot be absolutely nonexistent (as, for example, a
hare's horn). For, it is not the case that the silver-in-nacre
or the world is not cognized as existing (as identified with
Existence). This is precisely what is indicated by the word
"upAdhi" that has Reality (sat) for its denotation (meaning).
The shUnyavAdins (Buddhists) do not agree that the basis of (any)
illusion is the Reality (sat). So they do not agree that the
silver-in-nacre and the world are capable of being cognized as
existing in some substratum, which is what makes them (illusory
entities such as the silver-in-nacre and the world) different from
the absolutely non-existent.
Notes:
-----BrahmAnanda clarifies the advaita position vis-a-vis the Bauddha's
in his gauDabrahmAnandI (laghuchandrikA) commentary on the
advaita-siddhi.
nanu shUnyavAdino mAdhyamikasya mate sarvaM mithyeti svIkAre .api
ghaTaH sannityAdidhIH svIkriyate sarvAnubhavasiddhAyAstasyA
apalApa-asaMbhavAt.h;
(Objection:) Even in the mAdhyamika or shUnyavAda system (of the
Bauddhas) it is accepted that everything is mithyA or unreal,
but cognitions such as "the pot is", etc. are accepted because
they are established by universal experience and, as such,
cannot be denied. (So how is the advaita position different
from the mAdhyamika?)
Reply:
tatra cha-abAdhyarUpasattAdAtmyaM na bhAti, kiMtv-arthakriyAkAritvamiti taiH svIkriyate
However, in their (mAdhyamika) system, the (unreal thing) does not
appear as identified with Reality (sat). Rather, what is accepted
is that (existence of the world is the same as) the capacity
to produce effects or causal efficiency.
In the Buddhist system, existence is defined as arthakriyAkAritva
or arthakriyAshakti, the capacity to produce effects. A pot exists
simply because it produces some effects, such as cognition, in us
and its surroundings. However, in this system, this arthakriyAshakti
is universally concomitant with momentariness which means that
everything that exists is only momentary. For example, the table
I see now exists because it produces some effects in me and its
surroundings. The next moment, the effects produced by the table
are not the same as they are now. Since the table's existence is

defined by the effects it is capable of producing, the table I see

now is not the same table in the next moment. Similarly the table I
see now is not the same as the table in the previous moment. Hence,
we may understand the Bauddha position on Existence (sattva) as
xaNikatvavyAptam.h, ie. whatever exists is only momentary.
In contrast, the advaita position on sattva is trikAla-abAdhyatvasvarUpa, ie. sattva consists in not being sublatable at any time.
In any cognition such as "san.h ghaTaH", "the pot is", ( or
"san.h paTaH", "the cloth is") the advaitin holds that what is being
cognized is Existence (sat) with a super-imposed relation of identity
(tAdAtmya) between Existence and the pot (ghaTa). In other words, the
pot is being cognized as identified with an eternally unsublatable
basis (adhishhThAna) which is sat. This is what BrahmAnanda is
pointing out in his laghuchandrikA. That is why he interprets
"sattvena" in MadhusUdana's reply as "abAdhyarUpasattAdAtmyena",
"as being identified with Reality (sat) that is unsublatable."
He says further:
"san.h ghaTa" ityAdipratyayopapatterukta-abAdhyatvaM mAdhyamikena
na svIkriyate
The said unsublatability that is established in cognitions such as
"the pot is" is not accepted by mAdhyamika.
nacha bAdhAtpUrvamabAdhyatvaM prapaJNche .astyeva tanmate .apiiti vAchyam.h
Nor can (you) say that even in that system (mAdhyamika) the
unsublatability of the world IS there before its sublation.
(Why?)
trikAla-abAdhyatvasya-eva-asmAbhirniveshAt.h |
Because we have included the term trikAla-abAdhyatva ,
non-sublatability for all times.
What BrahmAnanda means here is that the world is itself
unsublatable until of course there is the bAdhakaGYAna,
GYAna that sublates the world. And until that happens the
world appears identified with the eternally unsublatable
Brahman. No such view is expressed anywhere in the
mAdhyamika system (tanmate tu na kutra .api iti).
BrahmAnanda concludes:
abAdhyavisheshhyaka-prapaJNchabhramasya svIkAre prapaJNche
apy-abAdhyatAdAtmyabhramo .avashyaM svIkAryaH, paraspara adhyAsAnurodhAt.h, anyathA tu tatra mAnAbhAva iti bhAvaH |
Upon accepting that the world is an illusion on the
unsublatable qualificand (Brahman), one must necessarily
accept also that there is the illusion of identifying the
world with the unsublatable, because of the requirement due
to the mutual superimposition (between the world and Brahman).
Else, there would be no evidence (to accept that the world
is an illusion on the unsublatable Brahman). This is the purport
(of what MadhusUdana says).
Although the advaitin says the world is an illusion on Brahman,
he is careful to point out that the illusion involves the
(erroneous) identification of the world with the unsublatable
Brahman. Until and unless there is a bAdhaka-jnAna, jnAna that
sublates the world, the illusion of the world will persist,

**independent** of time. The sublation of the world depends

**solely** on the bAdhaka-jnAna. In contrast, there is no
such requirement in the Bauddha system. Whatever exists does
so only momentarily. The sublation of whatever appears to exist
is not in any way dependent on a bAdhaka-jnAna. This is
shUnyavAda.
As the Atmatattvaviveka says:
na grAhyabhedamavadhUya dhiyo .asti vR^ittistadbAdhane
balini vedanaye jayashrIH |
nochedanityamidamIdR^ishameva vishvaM tathyaM tathAgatamatasya
tu ko .avakAshaH ||
The cognition of an object does not exist if its difference
from the object is disregarded - the powerful VedAnta has
scored a victory by defeating this view. This world of illusion
as we know it is (in essence) real. So where is the scope for
the theory of the Bauddha in this (VedAnta) ?
In fact, the characteristic of (the world's) being sublated by jnAna
(jnAna-nivartyatva) is taken to be one of the definitions of
mithyAtva itself, as we shall see later. This underscores the
paramount importance of jnAna as the destroyer of all duality. We
cannot simply wish the duality to go away without resorting to
jnAna. And what is this jnAna? It involves shravaNa, manana, and
nididhyAsana by the aspirant who has the four-fold qualifications,
sAdhana-chatuShTaya. Just saying that world of duality does not exist
or putting forth a nice theory will not be of much use.
In this connection, there is a lesson in the PanchadashI. Someone
who has mere verbal familiarity with advaita asks: Why am I still
without realization? VidyAraNya gives the example of a man who
heard that an award was being given to anyone who knew the four
Vedas. This man claimed that he knew there were four Vedas (and
probably their names) and so he was entitled to the award!
With respect to Brahman/Self, VidyAraNya asks "Do you just say
the word Brahman or do you realize its meaning?" (shabdAneva
paThasyAho teShAmarthaM cha pashyasi).

The Third Definition of Unreality

Part 14 - The third definition
advaita-siddhi - 17 - The third definition of mithyAtva
Having seen the first two definitions of mithyAtva (unreality),
we will now study the third definition of mithyAtva that
MadhusUdana deals with in the advaita-siddhi. Previous articles
on the advaita-siddhi may be retrieved from the archives by
searching for the key word "siddhi." These articles also include
the background in nyAya that is useful in making sense out of
MadhusUdana's work which is certainly one of the finest polemical
treatises in the whole of Indian philosophy.
Recall that the first definition of mithyAtva said that
what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva",
not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat
(nonexistence). And the second definition of mithyAtva said
that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the
counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation in the very

substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.

The third definition that is now taken up in the advaita-siddhi
simply says:
GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
Alternatively, unreality is the property of being sublated by
knowledge or cognition.
This is an extremely pithy definition which must only be
understood by careful analysis, not just brushed off as something
obvious and trivial. The definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya,
PrakAshAtman.
First of all, let us do a simple analysis. We know that GYAna
and aGYAna are like light and darkness. aGYAna, ignorance is
sublated, negated by GYAna. Further, what is aGYAna, ignorance,
is also unreal. If I am ignorant of something, I have erroneous
information about that thing. This erroneous information does
not represent any true state of affairs. So it is false. When
do I eliminate the erroneous information? Only when I have the
correct information, GYAna of the thing in question.
Next, let us try to analyse the definition in a deeper and
technical manner using nyAya. In any philosophical debate, any
definitions that you make must be unambiguous and must withstand
close scrutiny by the opponent. This is especially true in the
advaita-siddhi context because the opponents here happen to
be led by the mAdhva exponent VyAsa-tIrtha, who in the words of
contemporary mAdhva scholar BNK Sharma (if my memory serves me
right), subjects all theories to "microscopic scrutiny." We'd
better make sure the definition is "air-tight" with no holes
whatsoever.
A significant difficulty with the definition, when we
take a closer look, is this. The definition should apply to
ordinary cases of illusion such as the silver-in-nacre and
snake-on-rope as well as the quite extra-ordinary and fantastic
illusion of the world on Brahman. The cognition of the rope
as rope (or nacre as nacre) ends the ordinary illusion.
Now what ends the illusion of the world? Surely, Brahman cannot
be cognized in the same objective way that a piece of rope or nacre
is cognized. The cognition of an object, such as a rope, of the
form of "this is a rope" is fundamentally different from the
GYAna of Brahman or BrahmasAxAtkAra, the direct realization of
Brahman. What is it that is so fundamentally different between
the two types of GYAna? Let us investigate further with the
help of nyAya, more specifially the tarka-saMgraha of aNNaMbhaTTa.
tatra niShprakArakaM GYAnaM nirvikalpakam.h|
saprakArakaM GYAna savikalpakam.h |
An indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka-GYAna) is one with
no attribute (prakAra).
A determinate cognition (savikalpaka-GYAna) is one with
an attribute (prakAra).
Any savikalpaka-GYAna can be broken down into three components,
as per nyAya. Or more precisely, any savikalpaka-GYAna has an
objective content (viShaya) consisting of 1) a visheShya or
qualificand, 2) a visheShaNa (also prakAra), ie. a qualifier,
and 3) a saMsarga or relation between the qualificand and
qualifier. This also corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate
form of a sentence in natural language.

Consider the Sanskrit sentence "nIlo ghaTaH" (the pot is blue.)

Here the visheShya is "pot", the visheShaNa is "nIla" and the
relation between them is that of inherence of blue color in the
pot. Such a relation is called "samavAya" in nyAya.
In the language of navya-nyAya, the cognition corresponding to
the sentence (nIlo ghaTaH) is analysed as follows:
nIlatva-avachchhinnaprakAratAnirUpita-ghaTatva-avachchhinnavisheShyatAnirUpita-samavAyatva-avachchhinna-saMsargatAnirUpita-viShayitAshAli-GYAnam.h |
An awkward English translation is:
It is a cognition whose subjectness is described by the
qualificandness delimited by potness, described by the qualifierness
delimited by blue-ness, and described by the relation-ness delimited by
inherence-ness.
The naiyAyikas say that in a nirvikalpaka cognition, it is not
possible to identify the visheShya, the visheShaNa, and the
saMsarga, even though they may be present. This is where the
advaitins part company with the naiyAyikas. The advaitins hold
that in a nirvikalpaka-GYAna, only Existence (Brahman) is
presented. There is no visheShya, no visheShaNa, no saMsarga.
Finally now, we can be satisified that the definition of
mithyAtva as "GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h" applies
to ordinary illusions as well as the world-on-Brahman
illusion. When an ordinary illusion such as a snake-on-rope
is negated in an ordinary fashion, the cognition which negates
the illusion is the savikalpaka type, "this is a rope."
When the world-illusion is negated by Brahma-GYAna, this
GYAna is of the nirvikalpaka type.
In the next part, we will see how the opponent launches
a new line of attack on the definition.

Part 15 Objections
In this part, we will study the objections raised by the
opponent against the definition of mithyAtva as beingsublated by
GYAna.
advaita-siddhi text
-------------------GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
nanu - uttaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne ativyAptiH,
mudgarapAtAdinivartye cha ghaTAdAv-avyAptiH,
GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAmapyayaM doShaH, adhiShThAnasAXAtkAratvena nivartye shuktirajatAdau cha GYAnatvena
GYAnanivartyatva-abhAvAt.h sAdhyavikalatA, GYAnatvavyApyadharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAM GYAnatvavyApyena smR^ititvena GYAnanivartye saMskAre ativyAptiH Translation
----------Definition: Alternatively, unreality is the property of being
sublated by knowledge or cognition.
Objection by oppponent: This definition of mithyAtva, ie.
GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam, is too wide (ativyApti) in the
case of a cognition's being sublated by a subsequent cognition.
And in the case of a pot's being destroyed by stroke of a hammer,

the definition would be too narrow (avyApti). If the intention is

that unreality consists in being sublated by cognition as cognition,
(GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva)
even then there is the same defect, ie. of being too narrow.
Further, in the case of the illusion of silver in nacre, the
sublation of the illusory silver is due to the direct realization
of the substratum, ie. the nacre, (adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAra), and
there is no sublation due to cognition as cognition, which leads
to the defect of sAdhyavikalatA, ie. the definition is defective.
If the definition means that unreality is what is sublated by a
property concomitant with the property of being a cognition
(GYAnatva-vyApya-dharma), in the case of a memory (smR^iti) that
sublates a mental impression (saMskAra), the definition is too
wide.
As BrahmAnanda's GauDabrahmAnandI clarifies, this third definition
is based on the shruti itself.
'vidvAnnAmarUpAdvimukta' ityAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati
sAdhyAntaramAha - GYAnanivartyatvaM veti |
A different sAdhya (thing to be proved, ie definition) is (now)
stated, as per the interpretation of the shruti "The knower of
Brahman is free from names and forms."
Let us now examine the objection of the opponent point bypoint.
1) Definition is too wide
------------------------First of all, he says that the definition has the defect of
being too wide (ativyApti). How? In the case of a cognition
being replaced by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition
though "out of focus" right now is certainly not false. Suppose,
I see the sun rising in the East and next I see a cow. At that
moment when I am cognizing the cow, the cognition of the sun is
in the background or out of focus, so to speak, being displaced
by the cognition of the cow. Does it mean my cognition of the sun
is false. No. The definition is too wide because it seems to apply
to this case where a cognition is displaced or sublated in some
sense by a subsequent cognition.
2) Definition is too narrow
----------------------------Next, the opponent says that in the case of a pot being destroyed
by stroke of a hammer, thereby driving the pot into nonexistence,
the definition is too narrow. The advaitin claims that things such
as a pot are sublated by GYAna alone. Clearly, the opponent says,
the pot is not existent any more after being destroyed. So it should
be sublated. But what destroys or sublates the pot is not GYAna, but
something as simple as the stroke of a hammer! Actually, I
suspect that the dvaitin seems to be making fun of the advaitin
here - "You cannot make things such as a pot vanish by means
of what you call GYAna. If you want to make the pot vanish,
why don't you smash it with a hammer!"
Suppose a definition of a characteristic, say M, can be
expressed logically as M(X) <-> GN(X), which means X has
characteristic M if and only if X has characteristic GN.
Now, if we can find some Y such that Y has GN but not M,
then the definition is too wide and suffers from the defect
termed in nyAya as "ativyApti". In the case of a cognition C
which is sublated by another subsequent cognition, C', C has
the characteristic GN, GYAnanivartyatva, but not M, mithyAtva.
The definition here is too wide.
On the other hand, if we can find a Y such that Y has characteristic

M but not GN, then the definition is too narrow, a defect called
"avyApti". In the case of a pot, P, it is destroyed by a
stroke of a hammer and thereby has characteristic M, mithyAtva,
but not characteristic GN. It is not destroyed by any GYAna.
So the definition is too narrow in this case.
3) What if GYAnanivartyatva means GYAnatvena GYananivartyatva
-------------------------------------------------------------The opponent now seems to anticipate a move by the advaitin
to silence the charge of ativyApti. Suppose the advaitin
says "By GYAnanivartyatva, we really mean that the cognition
(GYAna) that sublates what is mithyA has to be considered
as a cognition acting as a cognition, not anything else."
BrahmAnanda clarifies this "anticipated position" of
the advaitin in the language of navya-nyAya:
GYAnatvena GYananivartyatveti | GYAnatva-avachchhinnakAraNatApratiyogika-kAryatAvan-nAsha-pratiyogitvetyarthaH |
By "GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva" is meant the characteristic
of being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of the destruction
which has an effect-ness, where the effect-ness is related
to a cause-ness delimited (determined) by cognition-ness.
The gist is that what determines the cause of destruction
of something unreal is the GYAna acting as a GYAna, ie. the
characteristic GYAnatva.
Now, suppose the anticipated position holds that cognition
of the nature of a vR^itti (a mental modification) is a quality
(dharma) of the mind (manas). The VedAnta-paribhAShA
says: "vR^itti-rUpa-GYAnasya manordharmatve cha" and cites
shruti as support for this position. Even in the nyAya system,
cognition is said to be a property (guNa) of the self.
(GYAnAdhikaraNam-AtmA - tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa). If cognition
is a quality of the mind (or self), any cognition that displaces a
previous cognition does so not in its capacity as a cognition but
in its capacity as a quality of the mind. So what happens
in this case is that one quality of the mind sublates another
quality of the self. Therefore, the definition of mithyAtva
is free from the defect of being too wide, simply because
the example of one cognition's being sublated by a subsequent
one is no longer relevant.
4) The charge of avyApti still holds
------------------------------------The opponent now says that although the advaitin has freed his
definition from this defect of being too wide, the other defect
of being too narrow still applies. The GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva clarification still does nothing to remove the defect in
the case of the stroke of the hammer which destroys the pot.
5) The definition is flawed
--------------------------Further, there is another problem with the "GYAnatvena
GYAnanivartyatva" definition. In the case of the illusion
of silver in nacre (shukti-rajata), the cause of the destruction
of the illusion is not just any cognition of nacre, rather it
is the cognition of that nacre which is the substratum of the
illusory silver. While a person mistakes a rope for a snake
in the dark, it is not sufficient to end his illusion by
holding some other rope in front of him! What does end the
illusion is his perceiving the rope which he mistook for
a snake. In such cases of illusion, the destruction of the
illusion is not by a cognition acting in its capacity as a

cognition. However, the illusory thing is admitted to be

mithyA. So even though mithyAtva is present, GYAnanivartyatva
is absent in the illusory thing. This gives rise to the defect
of sAdhya-vikalatA, ie. the definition is defective because
we see that mithyAtva is really not defined as GYAnanivartyatva
but as "adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAratva", which makes the advaitin's
attempt to prove the GYAnanivartyatva version futile!
6) What if a sub-class of GYAna is intended
-------------------------------------------The opponent now anticipates another move by the advaitin.
What if GYAnanivartyatva is taken to mean "GYAnatvavyApyadharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva", ie. what is illusory is sublated
by a sub-class of GYAna, not just GYAna in general. To understand
this definition, remember that GYanatva is a property. A property,
say P, that is concomitant with GYAnatva, say G, is a property
such that whenever P is present, G is also present. In other words,
P implies G. The property P is said to be GYAnatva-vyApya or
"pervaded by GYAnatva." So the anticipated position is that
what is illusory (mithyA) is sublated by a cognition of thetype P.
7) Still the definition is too wide
---------------------------------------There is still a problem with the definition, says the opponent.
Consider smR^iti or memory which is a sub-class of GYAna, ie.
a specific kind of GYAna. The tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa
defines smR^iti as "saMskAramAtrajanyaM GYAnaM smR^itiH", memory
or recollection is cognition caused by reminiscent impression
alone. So it is clear that recollections are a sub-class or
a specific kind of cognition. The opponent, however, contends
that whenever a recollection occurs, the corresponding
reminiscent impression (saMskAra) that caused it gets
destroyed. In this case, the saMskAra, though destroyed by the
smR^iti is not considered false. So, once again, we have a
case where the definition of mithyAtva is too wide.
This last objection by the opponent is quite shaky at the
outset. First of all, even the naiyAyikas are divided regarding
whether the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti that it gives
rise to. The older nyAya-vaisheShika school holds that the
saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti but logicians of the
newer navya-nyAya school tend to side with the advaitins in
rejecting this theory. The VedAnta-paribhAShA says: na hi smR^iteH
saMskAranAshakatva niyamaH, smR^itidhArA-darshanAt.h there is no rule that recollection destroys saMskAra because
a flow of recollection is observed. Therefore, the very premise
of the objection is questionable.
But still, the opponent might persist in challenging the advaita
position that smR^iti does not destroy saMskAra. As we shall
see, MadhusUdana's reply makes the last objection irrelevant
even if this advaita position regarding smR^iti is notadmitted.
MadhusUdana begins his reply thus (as usual):
iti chenna |
If this is what you contend, we say no (your objections are not
justified).

Part 16 - MadhusUdana's reply

|| shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)
namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine |
kamalAkAmasaudAmakaNakAmukagehine ||

Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance

resembles a fresh dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form
is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha even though he is
extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of flattened
rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that
He is the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).
nyAyAmR^ita:
shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha |
etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye
aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena
GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha |
VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction
of the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels,
"The silver (of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the
nacre" but only feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and
there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and
does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama). In other
words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.
However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna)
get destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the
ajnAna that has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this
real ajnAna is removed by jnAna. This makes the
definition suffer from the defect of being too wide (ativyApti), because
a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is removed by knowledge (in its
capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing. (Please see advaita-siddhi 18
for an explanation of GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva.)
Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:
vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate |
kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate ||
The destruction of an unreal thing due to knowledge, such as the
silver (in nacre), is not experienced. But, (the
destruction) of the real ignorance of the substratum
(the nacre) is experienced.
What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the
definition of mithyAtva - jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h.
1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the
nacre is mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction
(sublation) of this silver as being due to knowledge.
Therefore the definition is too narrow, since it does not
apply to a thing that is mithyA.
2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the
false silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that
gets destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum, nacre.
Therefore the definition is too wide, because it applies to
a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.
It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or
ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityuttarakAlInAnubhavAchchhuktirevaatyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH |
(With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience
"The false silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama
is over). It follows that the nacre itself appears as the
absolutely false silver. This is what the AchArya (madhvAchArya)
says.
This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for
example in the ViShNu-tattva-vinirNaya:
na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h |
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||
The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different
from reality and unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the
experience "the false silver appeared" (after the illusion
has ended).
Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that
the mAdhva position is different from the naiyAyika position.

nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi

shuktAvavidyamAna-deshAntarIya-rajatAtmatayA shukterbhAnAN^gIkArAdityata Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |
To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from the
naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that does not
occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere and it appears (erroneously) in the nacre.",
(the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that which
does not occur anywhere, at any time.
The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since
their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over (bhramottarakAle
shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h).
For example, there is no explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti)
based on the illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be
silver, proceed to pick it up. mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva mImAMsA, remarks,
in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be considered.
"tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi
idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h"
Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content (of the
cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of silver is not
the "this" (the object lying before the person under illusion), then there would
be no activity in this case.
The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI rAghavendra
svAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those of other realist
systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita. nyAya puts forth
what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is
present elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place
of the nacre. "sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva
sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely
false, it would not have appeared (before the observer). If it
were present right in the place where it was perceived, there
would be no sublation (of such a perception).
The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha,
says - "rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAdeva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH" - by the realization "I cognize what
is before me as silver", the cognition of one thing as another
(anyathAkhyAti) is established.
advaita-siddhi text:
GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi
GYAnanivartyatvam.h | avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa
kAraNAtmanA cha ; satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h | tathAcha
mudgarapAtena ghaTasya svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api
kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h brahmaGYAnaprayukta
eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH|
GYAnaprayukta - that which is concomitant with GYAna
of the substratum, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation
of existence in general, pratiyogitvaM - counterpositive,
hi - exactly, GYAnanivartyatvam.h - sublatability by
GYAna, avasthitishcha - and existence, dvedhA- of two
kinds, svarUpeNa - in its own form, kAraNAtmanA cha and in the form of the cause, satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h since it is admitted in accordance with the theory of
satkAryavAda, tathAcha - accordingly, mudgarapAtena by the stroke of a hammer, ghaTasya svarUpeNa - in the
form of a pot, avasthitivirahe .api - even though there
is a negation of existence, kAraNAtmanA - in the form
of its cause, avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h - due to the
absence of negation of the existence, brahmaGYAnaprayukta
eva sa - it is only by GYAna of Brahman, iti - thus,
na - no, atItaghaTAdau - in the case of things of the past
such as the pot (after destruction), avyAptiH - the defect
of being too narrow in definition.
Translation
-----------GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by
GYAna is exactly the property of being the counterpositive

of a negation of existence in general (all forms) such that

the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the negation.
And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own
form and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from
the theory of satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists
in the cause (in a causal form). Accordingly, even though there
is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke
of a hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in
its causal form (after being destroyed by a hammer, because the
pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was
originally produced). The (negation of existence in its causal
form) is only by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition
of mithyAtva is not too narrow (as you contend), in the case of
things of the past such as a pot (after being struck by a hammer).
It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by
MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI
as "adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition
of the substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of
existence in all forms). This is equivalent to saying:
Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the
negation of the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum)
in all its forms.
avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAraanyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its
saMskAra, reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance,
MadhusUdana's expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAnatatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha",
aGYAna and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross
form and that the aGYAna is concomitant with.
MadhusUdana continues:
ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA
viyadAdau brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyAarthAntaram.h; uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya svakAraNAtmanAavasthAnAdavasthitisAmAnyaviraha-anupapatteH |
ataeva - Precisely for this reason, uttaraGYAnanivartye - in
the case of the sublation due to a subsequent cognition, pUrvaGYAne
- (of) the previous cognition, na siddhasAdhanam.h - there is no
redundant proof (on our part), navA- nor, viyadAdau - in the case of
space (AkAsha), etc., brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api - even if they are
destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, tadvadeva - in the same way,
mithyAtva asiddhyA - by the fact that unreality is not established,
arthAntaram.h - proving something other than what was to be proved
uttaraGYAnena - by the subsequent cognition, lInasya - of the sublated
pUrvaGYAnasya - of the previous cognition, svakAraNAtmanA - in its causal
form, avasthAnAt.h - due to existing, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation
of existence in general, anupapatteH - due to not being established.
Translation:
For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the
case of the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition.
Nor can there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended
to be proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of
Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same
way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established). This
follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form
and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.
In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the
first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or
reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha,
or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge,
there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as
well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not established
and that there is an error of proving something other than what was intended
to be proved.