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People v. Pugal (215 SCRA 247 [1994]) RENDAL

G.R. No. 96037 October 29, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRUDENCIO PUGAL, ANTONIO SORIANO and RICARDO ADDUCA, accused, PRUDENCIO
PUGAL, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Accused Prudencio Pugal, Antonio Soriano, Ricardo Adduca and one Artemio Panagan were charged with the
crime of "Robbery with Homicide with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm.
Around 9:00 P.M., Erlinda Salamanca, together with her son Hizon and daughter-in-law Lolita, was resting inside
their house. Her husband, Jacinto Salamanca, had just started to eat supper when the dogs started barking and
they heard and recognized the voice of Prudencio Pugal call "Apo" three times. 6 Jacinto, who was followed by
Erlinda, went to the sala and asked, "Who are you?" Somebody answered, "Dakami," meaning "We are the
ones." When Jacinto again called out, "Who are you," the person outside replied, "We are the ones, we came
from Dagupan." Jacinto and Erlinda peeped through the jalousie window and they saw Prudencio Pugal and
Ricardo Adduca standing near the door. The place was then lighted by a 20-watt flourescent lamp.
Erlinda told Jacinto to open the door. Once it was opened, however, Pugal pulled Jacinto out of the house, and
then three masked men rushed inside the house. One of the men who had a long armalite rifle stood guard at
the door, while the other two, one of whom had a short firearm, entered the house. Adduca, one of the two men
who came inside, demanded money and an armalite rifle from the occupants of the house, and when the latter
failed to produce any, Adduca ransacked the house. Erlinda was thus compelled to give her earnings for the day
amounting to P1,000.00 and, in addition, she gave the ring of her daughter-in-law. They were then ordered and
forced to lie on the floor face down. Subsequently, Erlinda and Hizon heard the clapping of hands from outside
the house. Sensing that nobody was guarding them anymore, Erlinda and Hizon crawled towards the window.
From there, they saw the men drag Jacinto and tie him to a coconut tree with a rope. Erlinda also saw Pugal slap
and kick Jacinto. Then, the man with an armalite rifle pointed his gun upwards and fired it several times.
Afterwards, he moved backward, pointed the gun at Jacinto, and shot the latter several times.
The malefactors thereafter fled towards the north and when they reached the "canto" leading to Cabaruan,
another gunshot was heard. Upon seeing that the culprits were already far away, Erlinda and Hizon rushed to
where Jacinto was, only to find his already lifeless body. Erlinda then sent Hizon to call for assistance and, in no
time, the barangay people and the police arrived at the scene of the crime. When Jacinto's body was brought to
their house, Hizon noticed that his father's false teeth were missing. Efforts to look for the same at and near the
place where Jacinto was killed proved futile.
Two days after Jacinto died, Pugal went to the house of the Salamancas and handed over to Hizon the missing
artificial dentures of Jacinto which he allegedly found near the place where the victim was killed. Pugal stayed in
the house of the Salamancas for the entire duration of the wake until the ninth day of prayer.
The trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PRUDENCIO PUGAL, RICARDO
ADDUCA and ANTONIO SORIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM.
Appellant Prudencio Pugal, the lone accused who appealed to us from said decision, assigns the following errors
allegedly committed by the court a quo:
ISSUES:
1. The trial court grievously erred in holding that the killing of the victim was positively witnessed
by prosecution witnesses Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca;
2. The lower court grievously erred in giving full evidentiary weight and credence to the
testimonies of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca who are biased and whose testimonies are pregnant
with serious and material inconsistencies, improbabilities and shaky;
3. The lower court erred in finding that appellant Prudencio Pugal was the one who pulled the
deceased from inside the house, brought him outside and tied him to a coconut tree;
4. The lower court erred in disregarding the plea of alibi by appellant Prudencio Pugal;
5. The lower court committed grave error in not acquitting Prudencio Pugal on ground of
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
I. Appellant Pugal asserts that the trial court erred in relying on the testimonies of Erlinda and Hizon Salamanca
which are allegedly replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
First, he contends that Hizon testified that the two men who entered the house wore masks, whereas Erlinda
testified that their faces were not covered. This inconsistency, he claims, cannot be considered trivial.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant was obviously confused. Hizon's testimony was in
answer to the question when the robbers were already inside the house, while Erlinda's was with respect to the
first time she saw appellant and his co-accused who were then calling from outside the house.

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Second, appellant theorizes that it is hard to believe that a person who will kill someone who is well known in
the community will not hide his face, this being contrary to human nature and common experience. Appellant
premises this postulation on his presence at the house of the victim during the wake until the ninth day of
prayer, which fact supposedly negated any and all indicia of guilt on his part.
This, at best, is a mere conjectural pose which cannot stand against the positive identification of the accused.
Appellant's pretended innocence is clearly non sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact that there
is no case law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the argument does not hold weight in
the light of the positive identification of the appellant. The material factor here is that there is positive
identification of the accused as the author or, more accurately, co-author of the crime. 26
Generally, the decision of an accused not to flee despite an opportunity to do so is hardly characteristic of a
guilty person seeking to escape retribution for his crime. 27 But this is not without exceptions. In a number of
cases, we have had the occasion to rule that the fact that accused did not flee from the scene of the crime is
not a sufficient ground to exculpate them from the proven criminal liability.
Third, appellant asseverates that the failure of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca to immediately give their
statements to the police (which they gave only after the lapse of 67 days after the incident took place) affects
their credibility.
As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had witnessed
cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about
getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of
judicial notice, and the fear of eyewitnesses when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime is
understandable for they may provoke retaliation from the accused. The delay, when adequately explained, does
not impair the credibility of the witness; neither will it render his testimony biased nor destroy its probative
value.32
In the case at bar, the two principal witnesses for the prosecution gave more than adequate reason for their
initial reluctance in giving their sworn statements to the police, that is, fear for their safety and their lives. As a
matter of fact, after the ninth day of prayer for the deceased, the Salamancas had to leave their house and
transfer to another place in apprehension of possible reprisals from the culprits.
Fourth, appellant claims that Hizon and Erlinda are biased as witnesses considering that they are related and
very close to the deceased, hence they have the tendency to exaggerate or give false color to their testimonies.
This Court has repeatedly held that mere relationship of the witnesses to the victim does not render their clear
and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the
latter would thereby gain immunity. 34 Hence, the closeness of their relationship to the deceased should not,
contrary to appellant's view, be deemed erosive of their credibility as witnesses. That they are the wife and son
of the victim does not make them incompetent as witnesses, nor should it serve to detract from the credit
otherwise due them. 35
Besides, there is no iota of evidence to show that the family of the victim was actuated by improper motives to
testify falsely against the accused. It is a jurisprudentially embedded and conceded rule that the mere fact that
the witness is a relative is not a valid or sufficient ground to disregard the former's testimony nor does it render
the same less worthy of credit, in the absence of any ill motive. 36 Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses are
not merely relatives of the deceased; they are likewise victims of the robbery committed by the accused.
II. Appellant's defense hinges primarily on alibi. He claims though that while alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the question
of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the defense of alibi assumes importance.
Time and again we have stressed, virtually to the point of repletion were it not for its pertinency, that alibi is one
of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke 37 because it is easy of fabrication. 38 It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of prosecution witnesses. 39 To be given credence, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 40
In the case at bar, appellant was positively identified by Hizon and Erlinda. The pretension that appellant was
allegedly at his house at the time of the incident cannot stand against the clear and positive identification by
the prosecution witnesses. Also, the Solicitor General correctly concluded that considering the proximity in the
distance between the two houses, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis and
then return to his house shortly afterwards.
People v. Reanzares (344 SCRA 624 [2000]) RENDAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as
ARMANDO RIANZARES, accused-appellant.*
DECISION
FACTS:
The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses Gregorio Tactacan
and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari. Around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and left
for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was

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maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board.
His wife Lilia immediately asked them where they were going and they answered that they were bound for the
town proper. When Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2)
said they would just get off at the nearest intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the
hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and
ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused
Armando Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and
his companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the
vehicle. They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took his Seiko wristwatch
worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo na."[3]
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several minutes, he felt the
vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife kept
uttering, "Maawa kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after the
last time she uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her
but could not do anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone tell
him,"Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and
blindfold and jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He ran to San Roque East
shouting for help.[4]
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the drivers seat. There he
saw his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag
containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to the C. P. Reyes Hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival.[5]
Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does in
relation to the incident.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed to him
with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened.[8]His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose claimed
that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say that he
actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination.[9] To bolster the alibi of the accused, his brother
Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May 1994, the day
before the incident. Romeo maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and even
helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not categorically state where and when the
accused alighted or that he in fact reached Bicol.[10]
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of the accused
could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a
quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE
The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous
as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private complainant
Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He maintains that
Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was questioned he stated that he did not know any of
the culprits. He also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's Tonight, Gregorio even
asked the readers to help him identify the malefactors.
RULING:
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster his
alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. [12]
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he presented his
father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi. While his
father testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a daughter, he
could not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the claim of Romeo, brother of the
accused, that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May 1994 and even helped him with his things,
seeing the accused off is not the same as seeing him actually get off at his destination. Given the circumstances
of this case, it is possible for the accused to have alighted from the bus before reaching Bicol, perpetrated the
crime in the evening of 10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on 12 May 2000 for his daughters
baptism.
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was positively
identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.
Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532
was erroneous. As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused
were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. [13] There is no proof in the instant case that the
accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is there proof that they
attempted to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On the other hand,
what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the particular persons of the Tactacan

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spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to
deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility
of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 [14] as the allegations in the Information are enough
to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is the description of the offense
charged and not merely its designation.[15]
SO ORDERED.
People v. kulais (292 SCRA 551) RENDAL
[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @
Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID
SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE
KULAIS,
SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA,
HADJIRUL
PLASIN y ALIH,
JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE
MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and threeinformations for kidnapping were
filed before the RTC of Zamboanga City againstCarlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais, JalinaHassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, ImamTaruk
Alah, Freddie Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set
forth identical allegations save for the names of thevictims. The three informations for kidnapping, also under
Article 267 of the RevisedPenal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of
thevictims. Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended.The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of
five counts of kidnapping for ransom andone count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses
it imposed uponhim six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight
illegaldetention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais,
Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan deKulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of Appeal. In
a letter dated February 6,1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of
their application for amnesty. In a Resolution dated March 19, 1997, it granted the motion.Hence, only the
appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court is faulted with the following errors:
a. In taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.Melquiades Feliciano
b. On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of
Held:
Wherefore, the conviction of appellant Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three
counts of kidnapping is affirmed, but the penaltyimposed is
modified. As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented inother
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especiallytrue in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront andcross-examine the witnesses against him.Having said that, we note, however,
that even if the court a quo did take judicial noticeof the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such
testimony in deciding thecases against the appellant. Hence, appellant Kulais was not denied due process.
Hisconviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnapvictims.The elements
of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the RevisedPenal Code, having been sufficiently proven,
and the appellant, a private individual,having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus
affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in
three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is
sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom;
and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return
the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to
pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171 [1998])
People v. Taneo (218 SCRA 494 [1993]) RENDAL
G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. POTENCIANO TANEO, defendantappellant.

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Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte.
A fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were
Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her
in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after
which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant died five days later as a
result of her wound. Also, the fetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
Information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over
a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when
he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant
states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held
his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As
his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a
man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special
circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking
into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be
inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit
the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination
and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of
the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not
clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting
his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined
in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his
liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116372, prom. January 18, 2001) RENDAL
[G.R. No. 116372. January 18, 2001]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Lot 10739 of the cadastral survey of Oas, Albay is one of the parcels of land subject of these cadastral
proceedings. When this case was called for initial hearing, nobody offered any opposition. Whereupon, an order
of general default against the whole world was issued. Claimant was allowed to present his evidence.
Lot 10739 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of riceland situated at Maramba, Oas, Albay. Originally,
the land was owned by Marcial Listana who began possession and occupying the same in the concept of owner,
openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939. He planted palay and harvested about
60 cavans of palay every harvest season. He declared the land in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1987. On May

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21, 1973, claimant acquired ownership of the land by means of deed of absolute sale. He caused the same to
be declared in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1442.There was another reassessment under Tax Dec. No. 35. He
continued planting on the land and all the products are used for the benefit of his family.
There are no liens or encumbrances and neither are there persons claiming adverse ownership and possession
of the land. The lot does not infringe the public road, river or stream. It is not part of a military reservation,
public park, watershed or the governments forest zone. The lot has not been utilized as a bond in civil or
criminal cases or as a collateral for a loan in any banking institution. There is no pending petition for its
registration under Act 496 known as the Land Registration Act or an application for the issuance of free patent
with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). Claimant is not legally disqualified
from owning disposable property of the public domain.[3]
Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has satisfactorily possessed and
occupied this land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since
1939 very much earlier to June 12, 1945, the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10739 in
the name of the Spouses Romeo Divinaflor and Nenita Radan.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the trial court that
claimant-appellee and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10739 since 1939 is not sufficiently
supported by the evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by
claimant took effect only in 1980 and the certificate of real estate tax payment is dated 1990. It was further
contended that the testimony of Romeo Divinaflor was largely self-serving, he being the applicant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment appealed from. It ruled:
To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations and tax receipts of the land
in question. All that the law mandates is proof of open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession which
appellee has convincingly established. Repeatedly, the fact of possession is hammered into the record by
appellees testimony on cross-examination by appellant. Thus:
While it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts, may be considered as evidence of a claim of ownership,
and when taken in connection with possession, it may be valuable in support of ones title by
prescription. Nevertheless, the mere payment of taxes does not confer nor prove it. (Viernes, et al.vs. Agpaoa,
41 Phil. 286. See also Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701).
The omission to declare the land in question for taxation purposes at the inception of the tax system in 1901 of
this country does not destroy the continuous and adverse possession under claim of ownership of applicants
predecessors in interest. Fontanilla vs. Director of Lands, et al., CA-G.R.No. 8371-R, Aug. 4, 1952.
Finally, appellant asseverates that the testimony of appellee is insufficient to prove possession for being selfserving, he being one of the applicants. We remind appellant on this score that self-serving evidence comes
into play only when such is made by the party out of court and excludes testimony which a party gives as a
witness at the trial. (See N.D.C. vs. Workmens Compensation, et al., 19 SCRA 861; 31 C.J.S. 952). [5]
Motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision having been denied, the Director of Lands has
brought the instant petition raising the sole issue of WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Petitioner Director of Lands assails the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the law, as
presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier,
for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioner argues that Divinaflor
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 for the
following reasons: (1) Divinaflor failed to present sufficient proof that his predecessor-in-interest Marcial
Listana has possessed the lot since 1939; and (2) Divinaflor is incompetent to testify on his predecessors
possession since 1939 considering he was born only in 1941, and in 1945, he was only 4 years old.
We find no reversible error in the assailed judgment. Denial of the instant petition is proper in light of the
well-entrenched doctrine upholding the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
[6]
It is likewise very basic that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is the very rule relied upon by petitioner. [7]
While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that follow in support
thereof pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence presented in the courts a quo in complete disregard of the well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. This Court is not
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. [8] Indeed,
it is not the function of the Supreme Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and
evidentiary, adduced by the parties particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
on the matter coincide.[9]
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [10] that, originally, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942[11] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide

7
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting the above-quoted provision, the Court stated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals [12] that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is an alienable and disposable tract of public land. Since claimant
Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of Lot 10739 from Marcial Listana by deed of absolute sale dated May 21,
1973,[13] the pivotal issue is whether his predecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership.
The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact [14] which was resolved
affirmatively by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Such factual finding will not be reversed on appeal
except for the most compelling reasons. None has been adduced in the case at bar.
Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana
for the period required by law. The issue of credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a
better position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.[15] Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts
appreciation of the witness testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect. [16]
Further, it is axiomatic that a witness interest in the outcome of a case shall not be a ground for
disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution in considering
the witness testimony, does not of itself operate to reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on
its own merits, and if ** (it) is otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it
may be relied upon.[17] In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Divinaflors
testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the premises, this Court will not and cannot take issue.
In the same vein, the issue of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of his predecessor-ininterest since 1939 is likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objection was never made by
petitioner on the ground of incompetency of Divinaflor to testify on this matter at any stage of the
proceedings. It is an elementary rule in evidence that:
when a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his
examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is
incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before
he has given any testimony; if the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it
becomes apparent.[18]
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is
offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will
be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
evidence.[19] The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflors
testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from
raising said issue on appeal.
Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the
occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known. [20] True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet,
but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his
testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The
fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to
testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he
can perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating
truthfully facts for which he is examined. [21] The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a)
capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. [22] There is no showing
that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge
of the fact during childhood, that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up
until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioners claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to
testify regarding Listanas possession since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas,
Albay, and had occasion to see Listana possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property for tax purposes
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required
by law since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented took effect only
in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of
cases[23] that tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not
necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession,
especially in the instant case where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.

8
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court resolves to AFFIRM the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 which sustained the JUDGMENT of the
Regional Trial Court rendered on July 27, 1990 granting the registration of title to herein private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Ordoo v. Daquigan (62 SCRA 270 [1975]) RENDAL
G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975
AVELINO ORDOO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and
CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner.
Conrado V. Posadas for and in behalf of other respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Avelino Ordoo was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter,
Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty four
year old victim (Criminal Case No. 104).
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife,
respectively) if they reported the crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter,
Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoo said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoo against Leonora was mentioned during the
investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoo for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoo. Catalina's statement on
this point is as follows:
Q Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the incident involving
Leonora Ordoo?
A We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's Office and also when I
testified in court in the case of my daughter Rosa Ordoo but then my daughter Leonora Ordoo
was still in Manila, sir.
During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she was
no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoo because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoo.
The case against Avelino Ordoo, where Leonora Ordoo was the complainant, was elevated to the Court of First
Instance of La Union, San Fernando, Branch (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented
Catalina Ordoo as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the
defense counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other;
xxx xxx xxx
Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against
him.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoo's motion for the reconsideration of the
adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.
ISSUE:
The issue is whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him
against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
RULING:
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other" be restricted to crimes
committed by one spouse against the other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or
should it be given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring to any offense causing marital discord?
There is a dictum that "where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home" (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704).

9
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs. State, 35
ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by)
one against the other.
Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of
evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife
(the victim's mother). *
That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the
daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always ready to render her
counsel and assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical
pain, she usually utters the word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord.
Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoo, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of
October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and, on
hearing that word, Avelino desisted.
That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous
implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much
elucidation.
The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina Ordoo could testify against her husband, Avelino Ordoo, in
the case where he is being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals (203 SCRA 760 [1991]) RENDAL
G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 96715 November 19, 1991
RUBY VERA-NERI, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Efren C. Carag for Eduardo C. Arroyo, Jr.
Singson, Valdes & Associates for Ruby Vera Neri.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:p
FACTS:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court (against his wife, Ruby
Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio.
Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of
adultery as defined under Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri
also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband,
private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later contraded marriage with another woman
with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96602) dated 8 February 1991 which this court denied in a
Resolution dated 24 April 1991.
In the meantime, petitioner Neri filed a separate Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96715) dated 19 February 1991.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration dated 1 May 1991 and a motion dated 23 May 1991 for
consolidation o G.R. No. 96602 with G.R. No. 96715.
On 3 June 1991, G.R. No. 96715 was consolidated with G.R No. 96602 in the Third Division in accordance with
long-stand ing practice of the Court.
On 29 July 1991, the Third Division deliberated upon the case which was then assigned to the ponente for the
writing of the Court's Resolution. 2
On 26 August 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, dated 14 May 1991, 3 praying that the case against
petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity. 4
Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the
case claiming a basis for their motions Dr. Neri's manifestation.
ISSUES:
The issues in the consolidated cases may be summarized as follows:
RULING:

Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been violated;

10
It has been our constant holding that:
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well itsconclusions on
credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before the court being limited to questions of
law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given
considerable weight, since said court is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
witnesses at the trial. (Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987]; emphasis supplied)
Thus, the claim that Dr. Neri's testimony is incredible is unavailing at this stage. Besides, the Court does not
believe that such an admission by an unfaithful wife was inherently improbable or impossible. 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court, in the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise ruled on the claim that Mrs. Neri's constitutional
right against self-incrimination had been disregarded when her admission to her husband in the privacy of their
conjugal home that she had indeed lain with petitioner Arroyo was taken into account by the trial court, to wit:
Dr. Jorge Neri was also presented as a witness and he testified that sometime in December of 1982, he surprised
his wife while she was looking at some photographs in their bedroom in their house in Dasmarias Village,
Makati. Accused Ruby Vera Neri then turned pale and started for the door. Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr.
Neri started looking around the dressing room and he came upon a Kodak envelope with film negatives inside.
He took the negatives for printing and a few days later, armed with the photographs which showed his wife in
intimate bedroom poses with another man, confronted Ruby Vera Neri. It was at this point that Ruby Vera Neri
admitted to her husband that Eduardo Arroyo was her lover and that they went to bed in Baguio on 2 and 3
November 1982.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when theinvestigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.(emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial
interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs. Neri's admission should have been rejected.
In the case of Aballe v. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), the Court held:
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence
against him.
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify
as to substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally
admitted having slain the victim.
We also note that the husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in
criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other (Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court).
In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a
competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an
offense."
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and this
denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby similarly DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
Let a copy of this Resolution and of Dr. Neri's Manifestation and Motion subscribed on 23 August 1991 be
forwarded to the Department of Justice for inquiry into the possible liability of Dr. Neri for perjury.
US v. Antipolo (G.R. 13109, March 6, 1918) RENDAL
G.R. No. L-13109
March 6, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, defendant-appellant.
Irureta Goyena and Recto for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with the
murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was
appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the
widow of the man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the
defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The witness was called to the stand and having stated
that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this question
the fiscal objected upon the following ground:
I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the widow of the deceased,
Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the rules and
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is
dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from testifying in this
case in which her husband is the injured party.

11
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal
evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is
called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the accused;
that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she
is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
These propositions were rejected by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to the testimony of the
woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove by the
excluded witness the facts which he expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is
sufficient at this time to say that some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a degree that if
proven to the satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they purported
to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being
that his injuries were due to fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither
husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding
to which one or both shall be parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work on Criminal Evidence (second edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a competent witness for or against the other in any
judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the other was a party. . . . If either were recognized as a
competent witness against the other who was accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury would be done
to the harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the confidence which should exist between
them.
In Greenleaf's classical work on evidence, in section 337 [vol. I], the author says, in stating the reasons for the
rule at common law:
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law
upon all confidential communications between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the
knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be
afterwards divulged in testimony even though the other party be no longer living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section
58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation,
and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the
obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of
death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received
those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is
made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
The same theory as that upon which section 58 of General Orders No. 58 is based, underlies section 383,
paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, which reads as follows:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent
of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage; but this
exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action
or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other.
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision relates to the meaning of the words "during the
marriage or afterwards," and this doubt can arise only by a consideration of this phrase separately from the rest
of the paragraph. Construed as a whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which the testimony of a
spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the other is a party. The use of the word
"afterwards" in the phrase "during the marriage or afterwards" was intended to cover cases in which a marriage
has been dissolved otherwise than by death of one of the spouses as, for instance, by decree of annulment or
divorce.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the
circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing the
declarant. Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as against him. It has been
expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding
his dying declarations.
On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made
by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in
extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who
heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to
her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential
communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express
purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Susana
Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his essential rights. That
being the case, a new trial must be granted.

12
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and a new trial is granted at which
the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, together with any additional evidence which
may be offered on the part of the prosecution or the defense. At the new trial granted the accused, the
testimony taken at the former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this appeal shall be de officio. So
ordered.
Alvarez v. Ramirez (473 SCRA 72) RENDAL
MAXIMO ALVAREZ,
G.R. No. 143439
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

SUSAN RAMIREZ,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated May
31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled SUSAN RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR.,
as JUDGE RTC, MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for
arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez,
herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled
emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion [5] to disqualify Esperanza from testifying
against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from
further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. [7] The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. [8]
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN, to
file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.[10]
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders
issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN
RULING:
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22.
Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1.
There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2.
If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3.
The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4.
Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.[11]

13
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the
rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.[12]
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is
too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that,when an
offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it
comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against
the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against
the other.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between
him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all
the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring
the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is
no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such
a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost
six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the
marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so
that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony
of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco[14]), it
was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72,
Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case
No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Agcaoilo v. Molina (AM 94-979, October 25, 1995) RENDAL
A.M. No. MTJ-94-979 October 25, 1995
JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, RTC-BRANCH 10, APARRI, CAGAYAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ADOLFO B. MOLINA, MCTC, GONZAGA-STA. TERESITA, CAGAYAN, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In the aforecited order, complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation
of criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused,
Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal
knowledge of the commission of the offense charged.
Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must personally determine the existence of
probable cause from an examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses." 2
Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must
be something more concrete.

14
Consequently, in the same order, complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest and the order directing its
issuance and directed the National Bureau of Investigation, through Regional Office No. 2, Ilagan, Isabela, to
conduct an investigation in order to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice.
Close perusal of the records disclosed that the complaining witnesses do not have personal
knowledge of the facts which became the basis of the filing of the crime charged and of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. From the affidavits of the affiants alone (Rollo, pp. 6-7), it is very
clear that they learned the killing of victim Virgilio Capa from a certain Wilma Anama. Respondent
Judge, however, on the basis of the said affidavits, issued an Order dated October 8, 1992
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the temporary confinement of the accused.
Thereafter, the warrant of arrest was issued on the same day.
Respondent Judge in issuing the warrant of arrest failed to observe the elementary requirement
that the complainant and his witnesses should have personal knowledge of the commission of the
offense charged. Just like in the issuance of search warrants, mere hearsay evidence, cannot,
standing alone, justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (See Quintero vs. National Bureau of
Investigation, G.R. 35149, June 23, 1988, Padilla J). Respondent Judge should be reminded that
under Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence, "A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, . . .
(309)".
We concur with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued
only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in
writing in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This
is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. 7
In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. 8
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in determining
probable cause, an elementary legal principle must not be compromised hearsay evidence cannot be the
basis of probable cause. The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. 9 Hearsay evidence,
therefore, has no probative value whatsoever. 10 Yet, in the case at bench, respondent judge found probable
cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the basis of the testimonies of Mencelacion Padamada and Rosita
Castillo which were obviously hearsay.
xxx xxx xxx
We are as perplexed as complainant judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently witnessed the alleged
crime or has personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by respondent for investigation. She could have
been the key to determining whether or not Rolando Anama was the probable perpetrator of the grisly killing.
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and
the judge alone makes this determination. 12
Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of which must be in strict
conformity with the procedure laid down by law. It is, therefore, this constant reminder which compels us to
remain ever vigilant.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with the pertinent rules on the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in his record.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Quidato (297 SCRA 1 [1998]) RENDAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
FACTS:
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a
widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen
hectares of coconut land in the area.
Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused-appellant, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and
Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita
brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo and accused-appellant went back to Sitio Libod that same
day.[2]

15
According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were
drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-laws house to get money
from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before
10:00 p.m.[3] Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidatos testimony on the ground that the same was
prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[4] The judge,
acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule, allowed said testimony only against accused-appellants
co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.
As adverted to earlier, the Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime, executing affidavits
detailing how Bernardo was killed. Their version shows that Eddie had been living with accused-appellant for
the past four years. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 17, 1988, accused-appellant asked Reynaldo to come to
the formers house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldos arrival at accused-appellants house, he
saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that it
was at this juncture that accused-appellant proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardos
house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house,
accused-appellant knocked on the door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie
rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Accusedappellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardos aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the three of
them left.
The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellants son, who had gone there to call
his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardos death certificate was hypovolemic shock
secondary to fatal hacking wound on the posterior neck area. [5]
On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that
Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardos death. The two were promptly arrested by
the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested accused-appellant.
On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian
Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they
signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given
in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to
sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with
their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. [6]
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their
constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita
brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie
affix their signatures on the affidavits.[7]
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers. He claimed that the Malita
brothers were not at his house on the evening of September 17, 1988. They, however, passed by his house at
around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to come with them to his fathers house, threatening him with harm if he
refused. Out of fear, he led the way to Bernardos house and even knocked on the latters door until Bernardo
opened the same. In the ensuing commotion, he scampered away, but in his confusion, reached his house only
at around 11:00 p.m., although the same was only about one hundred fifty meters away from Bernardos
house. He did not call for help. Eddie arrived a while later. Accused-appellant claimed not to have seen the
actual killing, having run away earlier. He, however, admitted finding a bolo, encrusted with blood, at his
house. He turned the same over to his brother, who, in turn, surrendered the same to the police. Accusedappellant did not feel uneasy having Eddie around even if he knew of the latters participation in the crime. [8]
After due trial, the court a quo rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused, Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the
Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, is hereby sentenced by
this court to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, in accordance with current case
doctrines of the Supreme Court, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
From the aforesaid judgment of conviction, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following
errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF REYNALDO
MALITA (EXH. C) AND EDDIE MALITA (EXH. D) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING (THE) EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.

16
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE RAISED BY THE ACCUSED AND
DISREGARDING (ANY) ILL-MOTIVE OF REYNALDO AND EDDIE MALITA IN KILLING THE VICTIM.
Accused-appellant must be acquitted.
In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and
Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial
confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook
doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits,
the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. [10] The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the
latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. [11]
The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita brothers, cites
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that [t]he act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The inapplicability of this provision is
clearly apparent. The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of
the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during
the conspiracys existence.
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in
evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence.[12] It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence
of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidatos testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddies
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accusedappellant. Admittedly, accused-appellants defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the
demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his fathers house on the strength of the latters verbal
threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home immediately,
his failure to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the
incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as the culprits, all
suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no matter how strong, should
not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense
to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of
the accused.[15] This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in
Criminal Case No. 89-9 dated March 2, 1994, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bernardo
Quidato, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately
released from his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for any other legal or valid
cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People v. De Joya (203 SCRA 343 [1991]) RENDAL
G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.

FACTS
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin
Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag,
Bulacan. Both spouses are teachers by profession.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia
Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia

17
Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the
television set. Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his
classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the
spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's
house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house.
She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. When Alvin
reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood.
He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what
happened?".. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let
go of Alvin's hand and passed away. Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because
she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia SalacValencia to inform her of what happened.
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood."
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his
bicycle. When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in
front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing
out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the
tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which
caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given
by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead
immediately left. Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right
earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00. That same afternoon,
Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were
taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed. When she went
upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms thereat in disarray.
She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto. Later, Herminia went to Dr.
Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her mother could be embalmed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room
downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. Herminia was able to recognize
the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo
but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the
old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter.
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia
saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house.
(TSN, Id.).

RULING:

We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his
grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui"
is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do
not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to designate
either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the
subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the
object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not:
"Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"

18
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself
does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the
following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must
not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far
it goes.But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the
statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an
interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less
than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable,
because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from
that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no
objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he
wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from
making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which
constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words,
the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The
trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person
who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did
not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not
interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as
the doer of the bloody deed.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these
circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the
conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto
de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
It is so ordered.
People v. Sison (G.R. No. 109617, August 11, 1997) RENDAL
G.R. No. 109617 August 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR," JOHNNY JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX SION @ "ELLET," and FEDERICO
DISU @ MIGUEL," accused.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR" and FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL," accused-appellants.
FACTS:
On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of his house situated in
Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel when all of a
sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and
Johnny Juguilon. On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why
Ronnie, you are making trouble again." The latter answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was
inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me. Seconds later, Felipe
Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing
stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even you Andong, you are interfering, you will
also have your day, vulva of your mother, you Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance was directed
against Fernando Abaoag whose nickname is Andong.

19
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside his house lying
down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his brother Fernando. He went out to
see who were throwing stones (14, TSN, id.). When already near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw
his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group
of stone throwers, hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his
back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his direction. On
the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger,
stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right
side of the neck below the jaw.
Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which landed on his right side
below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions saying, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar
desisted in helping brother. Instead, he ran to his brother's house and informed Felicitas, the wife, about the
helpless condition of Fernando. Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by Carlos Abaoag, went to the place
of the incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the ground
very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in
English means "I was hit". Fernando told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion,
Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion.
The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DYING DECLARATION OF DECEASED IS ADMISSIBLE
RULING:
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the declaration made by the
victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly characterized this as a "dying declaration," 38 having
been made under the consciousness of impending death. The victim was already weak his wife saw him and he
knew that he would not survive the injuries he sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to
the hospital. 39 When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries
and that he did not expect to live.
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying declaration under
Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that
fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the
declaration relates to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant
would have been competent to testify had he survived. 41 Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's
death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally
satisfactory proof of the crime; andtrustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced
by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. 42 We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to
fabricate the declarations of her husband.
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution witnesses were biased due to their
relation to the victim's family. Plainly, witnesses Imuslan (the barangay captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related
to the victim, while the relationship of witnesses Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas Abaoag to the victim, as brother
and wife, respectively, neither disqualified them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It
is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge
the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A witness'
relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the same more credible as
it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the
real culprit. 44
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial
Region in Criminal Case No. D-10796 is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants FELIFE SION, alias"JUNIOR" or FELIFE
RODRIGUEZ, JR., and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
former entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prison
mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal as maximum,
and an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provision of Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code. Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged judgment stands.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
People v. tiozon (198 SCRA 236 [1991]) RENDAL
G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991

20
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Lorenzo G. Parungao for accused-appellant.

FACTS:

That at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 24, 1989, while she and her husband were sleeping
inside their house, they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the door and
they saw that the person who was knocking was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the
accused, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down
and the two (accused and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her
husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a
few steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the accused
was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she had heard two successive
gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally
shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya" she got scared by the appearance
of the accused who was full of bloodstains so she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her
sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the
victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when she still felt some warmth on his body, she
sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying
the victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim;
accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's
help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them
lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused; she spent about
P100,000.00 in connection with burial and wake of her husband.
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence
because the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting
incident. It considered the following circumstances which it deemed sufficient to convict the accused-appellant
pursuant to Rule 133, Section 5, of the Revised Rules of Court:
The following are among the circumstances which points to the culpability of the accused.
1) That the widow of the victim saw the accused holding a gun immediately before shooting incident happened;
2) That accused was the last person seen in the company of the victim immediately before the latter was shot
to death;
3) That it was the accused who purposely went to the house of the victim on that fatal evening; The testimony
of the accused that he was merely passing in front of the house of the victim when the latter who was standing
at the window of his house called him up is less credible than the testimony of the widow of the victim, that they
were already aslept (sic) inside their house when or the aforesaid time accused knocked at their door.
4) That it was the accused who guided the policemen as to the place where the fatal gun was recovered. Here
the Court believes that the gun was purposely hid at the grassy area at the back portion of accused's house.
The story of the accused that he picked the gun for the purpose of bringing it to the widow of the victim but for
fear that the policemen might see him holding the gun, he then decided to throw it to the place where it was
recovered, was too flimsy to merit belief. Firstly, what is his reason for bringing it to the widow of the victim
when he surely knew fully well that it will be the policemen who will investigate the case. Secondly, he knew for

21
a fact, that the said gun could lead as to the identity of the assailant of the victim, why then he threw it at the
grassy area when he could easily leave the same to the place where he picked it up.
5) The testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive gunshots, accused went back to her house and
informed there (sic) that he accidentally shot her husband deserves merit, Besides, the Court sees no reason for
the wife to concoct such story that would point to the accused as the culprit specially so that had not the
accused became (sic) the prime suspect in this case, he would be the best person to be used as a prosecution
witness, with more reason that from the evidence presented, it appears that the widow of the victim harbours
no ill-feeling towards the accused otherwise, she would have prevented accused accused's entry in her house
on that fatal evening.
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place admitted to her
having accidentally shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since this is
covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may
be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, as
amended).
7) The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but (sic) the accused (sic) who owns
the same and in fact the latter even tucked it in his waistline immediately before the shooting incident
happened is improbable, for, how come then that the assailant was able to drew (sic) the gun from the waistline
of the victim and fired (sic) the same towards the back portion of the victim's body. Is it not that the natural
reaction of a person was to face the person who suddenly and without permission drew something from one's
waistline. (sic)
While there is no eyewitness who testified to having seen accused shoot (sic) the victim, yet all the foregoing
circumstances meet the criteria set by Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, and
therefore points (sic) to the accused as the person who unlawfully owns the fatal gun as well as the same
person who shoot (sic) to death the victim. "Circumstantial (sic) evidence is admissible in the absence of an
eyewitness to the commission of the crime" (People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 125 [1983]).
The Court does not give credence to the denial of the accused that he was not the one who shoot (sic) the
victim as he was some distance away from the victim answering the call of nature when the victim was killed.
Instead, the Court gives credence to the testimony of the widow that it was the accused whom he saw in
possession of the gun, that it was the accused who was the last person seen in the company of the victim
shortly before the latter died and it was the same accused who lead (sic) the policemen in retrieving the fatal
gun.

The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else,
shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in
respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim
immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae.
This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or
his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. 17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness
as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay
evidence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact
hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as
part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal
act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of theres gestae.

22
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on
what the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The
accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it
were not true, which he did in this case.
In the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented. Absent the
quantum of evidence required to prove it, treachery cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the trial court, and as Modified,
FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Leonardo
Bolima, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY of prision mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN
YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY of reclusion temporal as Maximum, with the accessory penalties therefor,
to INDEMNIFY the heirs of Leonardo Bolima in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to REIMBURSE said heirs in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial of Leonardo Bolima.
Accused-appellant shall be given full credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Manuel v. NC Construction Supply (G.R. No. 127553, September 20, 1996) RENDAL
G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA, petitioners,
vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(SECOND DIVISION), respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were employed as drivers at N.C.
Construction Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim (a.k.a. Lao Ching Eng) and Anita Sy.
Security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper
("pahinante"), taking out from the company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without
authority. Calso was brought to the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named
seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a series of thefts at respondent company, among them
petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea. 2
On June 5, 1995, petitioners received separate notices from respondent company informing them that they were
positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as perpetrators of the series of thefts committed at
respondent company. They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their alleged
involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding
petitioners' involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in the
series of thefts committed at respondent company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being
positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the
withdrawal of any criminal charge against them. 3 Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters
while petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally.
On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners
alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute
the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in
the theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private respondents' lawyer by
means of threat and intimidation.
Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. He held that
private respondents failed to show a just cause for the termination of petitioners' services. He declared that
petitioners' admission regarding their involvement in the theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken
without the assistance of counsel, in violation of Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 6 He also held
that petitioners were not afforded due process before their services were terminated. Hence, Labor Arbiter
Caday ordered private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former position without loss of seniority

23
rights and to pay them full backwages. He also ordered private respondents to pay petitioners their service
incentive leave benefits plus attorney's fees. 7
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a just
cause. It held that petitioners failed to adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of their admission
regarding their participation in the theft. It further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence
because Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings but not to
administrative proceedings. The NLRC, however, agreed with the Labor Arbiter that petitioners were denied due
process.
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT:
1. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the dismissal
legal;
2. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the
admission of petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was obtained in a hostile environment
and without the presence or assistance of counsel;
3. The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondents
N.C. Construction Supply et al. are right in withdrawing their trust and confidence with petitioners without any
valid and legal basis. 9
RULING:
We affirm the decision of the NLRC.
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that such admission was obtained by means of threat or
intimidation as such allegation is couched in general terms and is unsupported by evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section
12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to
counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. 14 Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admission made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted by
private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their employment.
Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a
crime. The investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal
investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by
petitioners during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Raquel (265 SCRA 248 [1996]) RENDAL
[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and
AMADO PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
DECISION
FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much
to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a man took her
husbands gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran
away. (p. 9, ibid.)

24
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came
and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house.
He was identified as Amado Ponce. Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police
station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them
there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident.
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. [6]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime
charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

RULING:
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence
convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito
Gambalan.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as
the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his
co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in
court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter,
unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his coaccused on the latters extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused.[14] That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while
in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. [15]
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. [16]
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

25
SO ORDERED
People v. Cepeda (G.R. No. 124832, February 1, 2000) RENDAL
[G.R. No. 124832. February 1, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accusedappellant.
DECISION
FACTS:
Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station of Magallanes to complain that she was raped by Dante Cepeda.
She claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda went to her house at
Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to massage (hilot) his wife who was
suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to go with her.
Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house. He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was
Muslim, would get angry if there were many people in their home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina
had to leave. Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure
covered by a blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that instance, accused immediately placed his
left arm around her shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not
make any noise, otherwise I will kill you." She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three times but
Cepeda covered her mouth then carried her to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself free from his grasp, she
hit her left shin at the edge of the floor of the bedroom. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and
ordered her to remove her panty and lie on the bed. Afraid, she did as ordered and the accused also removed
his pants and brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs, inserted his penis inside her
vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at the same time embracing and kissing her. After he was through,
she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her.
On the basis of the foregoing factual summation, the trial court rendered judgment against accused Dante
Cepeda as stated at the outset.
Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant claims in his defense that he and private complainant were
carrying on an adulterous love affair. According to him, his request to private complainant that the latter
massage his allegedly ill wife "is a pre-arranged lie between the accused-appellant and private complainant in
order to mislead Regina Carba" the truth being that accused-appellant "purposely went to the house of private
complainant to invite her to his house, their place of rendezvous for their passionate affair." [6] He asserts that
the charge of rape was "a contrivance or an afterthought rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual
wrong"[7] because private complainant "feeling guilty of such an adulterous affair and out of fear that Regina
might have suspected something between her and the accused-appellant, thought of accusing her paramour of
rape in anticipation of the possible retribution by her husband should he later on discover their relationships.
RULING:
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to deserve serious consideration
and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the 'illicit love affair'
angle appears as a fabrication by accused- appellant. As an affirmative defense, the alleged 'love affair' needs
convincing proof.[10] Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant several times,
[11]
accused-appellant bears the burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence. [12] The record shows that
other than his self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and
private complainant were in love.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married and are living together with
their respective spouses.[13] In this case, other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other
evidence like love letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with
private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If
accused-appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not have gone to the extent of
bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of
her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is allegedly her lover, as the
perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule
not to mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were it not the truth.
[14]

Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in itself such as
one that the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.[15] The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women
by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their
reputation remains untainted.[16] Such circumspection must have prompted the victim to request Regina Carba
to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused- appellant's house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away
by accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to having too many people in
their house.

26
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that accused- appellant and private complainant were indeed sweethearts
as he claims, this fact alone will not extricate him from his predicament. The mere assertion of a 'love
relationship' would not necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate the crime.
With regard to the civil liability, however, the trial court's award of damages should be modified. Under
controlling case law, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape.[37] This is exclusive of the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) without need of further proof.[38] The victims' injury is now recognized as inherently concomitant
with and necessarily proceeds from the appalling crime of rape which per se, warrants an award for moral
damages.[39]
WHEREFORE, with the sole MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo pay complainant
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity consistent with controlling case law, aside
from the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, the decision of the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 6246 finding accused Dante Cepeda y Sapotalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED
People v. Buemio (G.R. No. 114011-22, December 16, 1996) RENDAL
G.R. Nos. 114011-22 December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VEVINA BUEMIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Cecilia Baas, a clerical employee at the Villamor Air Base in Pasay City, learned from Catalina Asis that Vevina
Buemio could send job applicants abroad for employment. Catalina, an officemate of Vevina's husband at the
same air base, arranged a meeting between Cecilia and Vevina at the office of the latter's husband. When the
two met for the second time at the residence of Vevina , Vevina promised to provide Cecilia with a job as a
factory worker in japan with a minimum salary of 10,000 yen a day. Vevina also promised to provide Cecilia with
all the necessary travel documents. For her part, Cecilia would give Vevina P60,000.00 as placement fee and for
the expenses in the processing of travel documents. Cecilia believed Vevina because the latter was the wife of
an official at the Villamor Air Base.
Cecilia, together with her husband and one Rafael Andres, went to the office of Vevina's husband and paid
P30,000.00 representing half of the fees agreed upon. Cecilia paid the second half of the fees at Vevina's
residence. In both instances, Vevina issued receipts acknowledging Cecilia's payments.
At the airport on the day when Cecilia, Marilou Gonzales, Rafael Andres and Armando Garcia were supposed to
leave for Japan, Vevina handed them their passports and tickets. To their surprise, they found out that they were
bound for Korea, not Japan. Vevina explained to them that she would be following them in Korea where they
would be getting their plane tickets for Japan. When Cecilia noticed that the name appearing on the passport
given her was that of "Pacita Garcia," Vevina told her that she could use other names in her passport like other
people do. Convinced by Vevina's explanations, the group took off for Korea.
In Korea, they checked in at the Naiagara Hotel but they just stayed inside their hotel rooms. They only left their
rooms twice after Vevina's arrival when she took them on a tour. Vevina also got their pocket money purportedly
to buy their food.
Vevina informed them later that the plane tickets to Japan were expensive in Korea. She proposed that she
herself would proceed to Japan where she would buy their tickets. She left for Japan with Lito Camora and Sergio
Andres who had "complete tickets." However, Vevina, came back to Korea without the group's tickets. Instead,
she advised them to go back to the Philippines using their round-trip tickets. Believing Vevina's promise that she
could still send them to Japan without any expense on their part, the group left for the Philippines with Vevina
staying behind in Korea.
Since Vevina's arrival in the Philippines, the group frequented Vevina's residence, inquiring about their trip to
Japan. As Vevina's promises remained unfulfilled, the group, showing their displeasure, demanded that their
money be given back to them. Vevina promised to return their money but when she failed to do so, they fled
their respective complaints before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 2
Trial court rendered the aforementioned decision convicting appellant of illegal recruitment. Vevina filed a
motion for its reconsideration but this was denied by the court on February 3, 1994. 18Hence, this appeal
questioning the trial court's giving weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and
alleging denial of due process to the appellant.
On the merits of the appeal, appellant contends in the main that the testimonies are contrary to ordinary human
experience. Thus, they could not have been enticed to work in factories in Japan as there was no mention of any
contacts of appellant in that country who could provide them employment, nor were their specific work and
workplaces as well as the peso equivalent of their supposed salary ever pointed out by the appellant. Neither
was it proven that appellant enticed them with convincing benefits in working in Japan which would be enough
for them to part with their money just so they could be "TNTs" 29 in Japan.
Appellant's contentions boil down to the issue of credibility.

27
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANTS ARE CREDIBLE
RULING:
As a rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court on said issue unless certain facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 30 No negative circumstances attend this case as to
warrant departure from the general rule.
In fact, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are credible. Taken as a whole and even under the crucible test of examination by the
defense, said testimonies are not only consistent on all material respects but also replete with minutiae of the
questioned transactions with the appellant. 31 Inasmuch as the trial court found the positive declarations of the
complainants more credible than the sole testimony of the appellant denying said transactions, there must be a
well-founded reason in order to deny great weight to the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies. 32 The defense has failed to provide that reason as it has failed to prove any ill-motive on the part
of the complainant-witnesses in so imputing to appellant such a serious crime as illegal recruitment.
The rule, therefore, that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can prove
as probable under the circumstances, 35 finds meaning in this case. Upon the evidence presented and on record,
there is therefore no reason to disturb the trial court's conclusion that appellant violated the law against illegal
recruitment in large scale.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Vevina Buemio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Arts. 38 and 39 of the Labor Code and imposing on her the
penalty of life imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P100,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that she shall refund the amounts she had unlawfully collected while committing the acts
constituting illegal recruitment to Cecilia Baas, Eliseo Principe, Ramon Villanueva and Eduardo Gutierrez. Costs
against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Condemna (23 SCRA 910 [1968]) RENDAL
People v. Cedon (233 SCRA 187 [1994]) RENDAL
G.R. No. 101117 June 15, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO CEDON, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Felimon Gerona, Sr. (Gerona), was having lunch at his house in Sitio Bito-on, Barangay Bulo-an, Sierra Island,
Catbalogan, Samar, several armed men arrived. Two of them ordered him to go down the house. Once on the
ground, his hands were bound. He recognized, as among the group, Teofilo Bulan and Ruben Bolito, who
belonged to a gang of robbers called "Sabarra." He also noticed appellant, standing on the concrete pavement
near the beach (TSN, November 15, 1990, pp. 4-7).
Bulan accused Gerona of being an intelligence agent, which he denied. He was then taken on board a motorboat
to Aripuyok Island, known as "the killing fields," which is half a kilometer away from Barangay Bulo-an.
In the island, Geronas captors tried to force him to admit that he was an intelligence agent but he stuck to his
denial of the charge. Bulan finally told him that he needed funds to buy certain equipment for the use of his
band. After Gerona agreed to give P5,000.00, he was taken back to Barangay Bulo-an, with his left hand tied to
the mast of the motorboat. The band, with Gerona in tow, arrived in Barangay Bulo-an at around 4:00 P.M.
Gerona again saw appellant, who was sitting on the concrete fence near the beach. Thereafter, Bulan asked
Gerona for money to buy gasoline. The latter obliged by getting P100.00 from a portion of the roof of his house.
When Geronas wife returned home, Bulan said, "Auntie, we took uncle." Scared, Geronas wife remained silent.
After 4:00 P.M., the culprits, including appellant, left. The next day, Gerona withdrew P5,000.00 from a bank in
Catbalogan. His wife delivered the money to Bulan. Gerona did not immediately report the incident to the police
authorities. It was only on May 4, 1987, after the townspeople organized the "alsa masa" as a counter
insurgency movement, did he inform the authorities of the extortion. He also enlisted with the CAFGU as a
means to retaliate against the extortionists. In 1990, Gerona together with some members of the CAFGU,
arrested appellant and another suspect, Danny Alvarez.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE
RULING:

28
The records showed that appellant was not a socius criminis of Bulan but was merely forced to join his group at
gun point.
A careful perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses against appellant, casts doubt as to whether
he was really an active participant in the criminal enterprise.
The case for the prosecution pivots on the testimony of Pedro Comeque. The testimony of the latter was
contradicted on vital points by Gerona himself. While Comeque testified that appellant was with the group of
Bulan that returned from Aripuyok Island, Gerona categorically stated that appellant was left in Sitio Bito-on
when he (Gerona) was brought to Aripuyok Island and, as a matter of fact, he saw appellant again in the same
place upon his return in the afternoon. While Comeque testified that he saw from his window how Gerona was
kidnapped, the latter said that Comeque was with him when he was kidnapped. Comeque admitted that his
testimony that appellant was a member of the group of Bulan was based on hearsay. The testimony of
prosecution witness, Rudito Basilan, supports appellants protestation of innocence. If appellants culpability
was based on the sole fact that he was seen near the house of Gerona when the latter was kidnapped, then
Basilan should likewise have been indicted because he was also in the crime scene.
Time and again, the Court has held that conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The reason is
obvious. Under the law, a conspirator, even though how minimal his participation in the crime, is as guilty as the
principal perpetrator of the crime. We do not find, however, that appellant is a conspirator. His was a passive
presence in the scene of the crime. Mere presence of the accused at the scene of the crime does not imply
conspiracy (People v. Campos, 202 SCRA 387 [1991]).
Moreover, the prosecution has failed to prove any overt act on the part of appellant, showing that he joined
Bulans gang to perpetrate the criminal act. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent an active participation in the commission of the
crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (People v. Bragaes, 203 SCRA 555
[1991]; Taer v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 598 [1990]; Orodio v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 316 [1988]).
The quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution to support a conviction has not been satisfied with regard
to appellants participation in the kidnapping for ransom of Gerona, Sr. The oft-repeated truism that the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution
(People v. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 601 [1991]) applies in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Navoa (143 SCRA 512 [1996]) RENDAL
People v. Salazar (266 SCRA 607 [1997]) RENDAL

[G R. No. 99355. August 11, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA alias INGGO,
MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA, alias MONCHING and JOHN DOE, accused, DOMINGO
SALAZAR ySEROMA
alias
INGGO
and
MONCHITO
GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA
alias
MONCHING, accused-appellants.

FACTS:
Vicente Miranda, Jr. and his friend Nestor Arriola were standing in the corner of Road 1 and Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City, about 12 meters from Lindas Supermarket. At about the same time, Pedro Soriano, who was
himself waiting for a ride, was standing in front of the Kambingan Restaurant along Visayas Avenue and beside
Lindas Supermarket. Moments later, they saw appellants Domingo Salazar and Monchito Gotangugan together
with an unidentified companion approach the security guard of Lindas Supermarket. Salazar, Gotangugan and
their companion talked to the security guard, who was later identified as Crispin Gatmen. Thereafter, Miranda
saw Salazar pull out a 9-10 inches long dagger from his pocket, and pass the same to Gotangugan. Armed with
the dagger, Gotangugan suddenly started stabbing Gatmen.
At that precise moment, Pedro Soriano, who was only about 10 to 15 meters from Lindas Supermarket heard
moans coming from the guardhouse in front of Lindas Supermarket. He turned his head towards the place
where the moans were coming from and saw Gatmen inside the guardhouse being repeatedly stabbed by
Gotangugan.
Both Miranda and Soriano were able to witness and identify the malefactors because the place where the
incident happened was well-lighted.

29
While Gotangugan was stabbing Gatmen, Salazar stood close to Gotangugan, while their unidentified
companion acted as a lookout.
Out of fear, Miranda and Arriola ran towards Tandang Sora. While running, however, they saw Salazar and
Gotangugan get the revolver of Gatmen. Soriano, on the other hand, left slowly but saw Salazar get the gun of
Gatmen.
After getting the gun, Salazar, Gotangugan, and their unidentified companion left the scene of the crime.
Evidence for the Defense
Appellants, testifying for themselves, set up the defense of alibi.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court brushed aside the alibi interposed by appellants, branding it as an inherently weak
defense. It gave full credence to the accounts of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution as no evidence was
adduced to refute them or to show why said eyewitnesses would testify falsely against appellants. Quite the
contrary, the prosecution evidence (was) clear and convincing. The bare allegation of the defense that they
were assets and informants of the apprehending policemen was disbelieved. Thus, it rendered the
aforementioned six-page Judgment of conviction.
Hence, this appeal direct to this Court, the penalty being reclusin perpetua.
ISSUE:
In their Brief,[7] appellants attack the prosecution evidence for its lack of probative value to outweigh their alibi
and to sustain their conviction. They allege that the eyewitnesses testimonies suffer from material
inconsistencies and contradictions that cast serious doubt on their credibility.
RULING:
Eyewitnesses Accounts Are Consistent with Each Other
The defense claims that the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses materially contradicted each other in two
ways. First, Miranda allegedly said that the security guard was standing when he was stabbed while Soriano
stated that he was sitting down. Second, Miranda testified that one of the culprits produced the dagger and the
other stabbed the victim with it. Soriano, on the other hand, said that only one person produced the dagger and
thereafter stabbed the victim.
We have examined the Appellants Brief and the records of this case and we have found no factual basis for
the strained inferences of the defense. From Mirandas sworn statement, the defense deduced that the security
guard was standing outside the outpost. But this deduction is not supported by said sworn statement or by the
witness testimony in court. Miranda never said that the victim was standing up or was outside the guardhouse
when he was stabbed.
Both witnesses agreed that the person who stabbed the victim was Gotangugan. Both eyewitnesses
corroborated each other in identifying Salazar as the one who drew the dagger from his jacket and then handed
it to Gotangugan. With the dagger, Gotangugan stabbed the security guard. The insistence of the defense on
this supposed contradiction simply has no basis.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their stories is well-nigh conclusive on appeal, provided it is not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. [19] In this case, the defense has tried but failed to establish
any material inconsistency or contradiction which would justify a departure from this rule.
Compared with the evidence submitted by the prosecution, appellants denial and alibi cannot possibly be
given more probative weight than the clear and positive identification provided by no less than two credible
eyewitnesses.[20]
Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these eyewitness
accounts with constitutional infirmity as fruits of the poisonous tree. Considering that their conviction could
be secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court which are not inadmissible in
evidence, the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter.
It is scarcely necessary to point out that there was conspiracy between appellants, because they clearly
acted in concert and with a unified criminal design. [33] The eyewitness accounts tell us that one of the assailants
touched the other appellants behind to signal the start of the attack against the security guard. Salazar then
pulled out the dagger which Gotangugan used to stab the victim.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

30
(1) Appellants are hereby found GUILTY of the separate offense of homicide and SENTENCED to the
indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day of prisin mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusin temporal, as maximum.
(2) The indemnity ex delicto imposed by the trial court is INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[34]
(3) Appellants are found also GUILTY of the separate offense of theft in accordance with Article 309 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code and SENTENCED to the indeterminate penalty of six months and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years and two months and one day also of prision
correccional, as maximum.
(4) Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Macam (G.R. No. 91011-12, November 24, 1994) RENDAL
G.R. Nos. L-91011-12 November 24, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO MACAM y LONTOC, EUGENIO CAWILAN, JR. y BELEN, ANTONIO CEDRO y SANTOS, ERNESTO
ROQUE y MARIANO AND DANILO ROQUE y MARIANO, accused. DANILO ROQUE and ERNESTO
ROQUE,accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Conde and Associates for accused-appellants.
FACTS:
Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of
Benito Macam located at 43 Fema Road, Quezon City, and that upon arrival at said place, Eduardo Macam, a
nephew of Benito Macam, entered the house and talked to Benito Macam. Benito then offered lunch to Eduardo,
who told him that he had companions waiting outside. Benito then told his maid, Salvacion Enrera, to call the
said companions of Eduardo and ask them to enter the house and have their lunch. Salvacion went outside and
called the persons waiting in a tricycle who, she positively identified, were Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr.,
Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque. Salvacion Enrera testified that only Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and
Danilo Roque entered the house and that Ernesto Roque remained in the tricycle. After Antonio Cedro, Eugenio
Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam suddenly grabbed the clutch bag of Benito
Macam and pulled out Benito's gun and after they announced a hold-up, they started ransacking the place and
looking for valuables. After tying up the members of Benito Macam's household, namely, Leticia Macam, Nilo
Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and the children of Benito Macam, the same persons brought them to a room
upstairs. After a while, Leticia Macam, Nilo Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and Benito Macam were taken out of the
room and brought to another room where Leticia Macam was killed and Benito Macam, Nilo Alcantara, and
Salvacion Enrera were stabbed. The prosecution presented as Exhibit "C" a list of the items taken by the said
persons with a total value of P536,700.00. Nilo Alcantara testified that while he was being brought downstairs
by Antonio Cedro, he saw Leticia Macam being held by Danilo Roque inside the comfort room and that Danilo
Roque told Antonio Cedro that "pare doon mo na upakan yan." Nilo then testified that he was brought back to a
room upstairs where he suddenly heard a very loud scream from Leticia Macam, after which, he was suddenly
stabbed by Antonio Cedro.S alvacion Enrera testified that she was brought to another room by Antonio Cedro
where she saw Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara bloodied from stab wounds and that she heard a loud scream
from Mrs. Leticia Macam prior to her being stabbed by Danilo Roque.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants identification at the police line-up is admissible
RULING:
We held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused.
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as
the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor."
However, as a result of the changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert
adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel
guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered
a "critical" stage of the proceedings. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an

31
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench
where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were
such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification.
Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the police line-up.
Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an
uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of
appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not
object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the
prosecution need not show that said identifications were of independent origin.
The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped
from questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this
Court. They have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any
irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Appellants further contend that
their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, conspiracy not having been established by positive
and conclusive evidence (Rollo, p. 131).
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the civil damages awarded in favor of
the heirs of Leticia Macam are increased to P50,000.00; and (2) that the word "each" before "to indemnify the
heirs" in the dispositive portion of the decision is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Lim v. Court of Appeals (214 SCRA 273 [1992]) RENDAL
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of
RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.
Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other. Private respondent filed with Branch 53 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits
ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on
his own behalf. Private respondents counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of
the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes
in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr.
Acampado to testify. Petitioners counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be
elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and
had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT DR. ACAMPADOS TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE
RULING:
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampados testimony, We find no declaration that touched (sic)
or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended
her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and interviewed the patient, she
did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient.
Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history
and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a
patients ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely
on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical
question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician
does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity
while attending to the patient.
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the

32
fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin.
Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be implied
according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of
the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts
necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information given." 4
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x
x
x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two (2)
modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of
the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26,
Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which would
tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision.
Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the
patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the information
would blacken such character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was
relaxed once more by the substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction
between these two concepts." Character is what a man is, and reputation is what he is supposed to be in
what people say he is.Character depends on attributes possessed, and reputation on attributes which others
believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at
present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure
by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may
form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy
and is for the general interest of the community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the
physicians testimony. 13
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege
against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be

33
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to agree with the
respondent Courts observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did
not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner;
moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no
showing that Dr. Acampados answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem
were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physicianpatient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot
then be excluded.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed alone. Said
interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party. There is authority to the effect that
information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the privilege.
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances
the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioners sweeping claim that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado brings
disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and the
public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia which caused, and
continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 which is
based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information
obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the formers "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never
disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latters ailment and the treatment
recommended therefor.chanrobles.com
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Soliman (101 SCRA 767) RENDAL
G.R. No. L-9723
June 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y
PAZ alias POLONIO,defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
Cipriano Azada and Buenaventura Evangelista for appellants.
FACTS:
In the morning of April 29, 1955, at about 2 o'clock, while Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart placed along
the sidewalk of Sto. Cristo Street near the southeast corner of that street and Azcarraga, Manila, and Ernesto
Balaktaw was also sleeping on a box situated near the pushcart, with their heads opposite each other, Balaktaw
was awakened when someone kicked his hand. Upon awakening, Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin proceed toward
the head of Ernesto Basa and hold the latter by the shoulder at which moment his companion Geronimo,
Soliman approached Ernesto Basa and stabbed him many times with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants ran
away.
Balaktaw took Basa to a calesa and proceeded to a police outpost at the corner of Azcarraga and Elcano Streets
and reported the incident to Patrolman Tolentino. The patrolman boarded the calesa and directed the driver to
proceed to Mary Johnston Hospital. From there, the three transferred to an ambulance and proceeded to the
North General Hospital where Basa was treated, but he expired in the morning of the same day.
ISSUE:
WHETHEOR OR NOT BALAKTAWS TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE

34
RULING:
The two appellants are charged with a very serious crime as in fact they were sentenced to the extreme penalty
of death. It is therefore important that we scrutinize carefully the evidence on which the conviction is made to
depend. In this case, we notice that the conviction is mainly predicated on the testimony of one eyewitness
supported by some circumstantial evidence. This witness is Ernesto Balaktaw. Whether this witness has told the
truth or not in narrating the aggression which led to the death of the victim, much depends upon the degree of
his credibility. As usual, this is the function of the trial court. Because of its opportunity to observe the conduct,
demeanor and manner of testifying of the witness, the trial court is in a better position to pass upon and gauge
their credibility.
In this respect, we notice that the trial court has been most careful in taking notice not only of the conduct of
the witness during the trial, but of other extraneous matters that may help in reaching a correct conclusion. The
Court found the testimony of Balaktaw worthy of credence not only because it is in part corroborated by the
testimony of appellant Soliman himself who admitted having inflicted the wounds that caused the death of the
victim, (although by way of self-defense) but also because it is supported by the nature of the wounds as found
by Dr. Lara in his autopsy. Thus, in brushing aside the defense of appellant Soliman because the same runs
counter to the nature and character of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, the court said:
The contention of the defense that the wounds were inflicted while the deceased Ernesto Basa was struggling or
grappling with Geronimo is believed by the testimony of the medical examiner and by the nature and character
of the wounds on the body of the deceased, as may be seen in Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3. An examination of
the pictures of the deceased as appears in Exhibits D-1 and D-2, especially the wound that appears a little
above the duodenum, shows clearly that the wounds were inflicted when the deceased was in a lying position
as testified to by witness for the prosecution, Ernesto Balaktaw. The wounds that may be seen under the left
armpit of the deceased could not have been possibly inflicted if the deceased was in lying position with his hand
extended upwards in self-defense.
On the other hand, the trial court made also careful observation of the conduct and demeanor of the two
accused during the trial and in this respect made the following observation:
During the course of the hearing, in order to give every iota of evidence its proper probatory value, the
Court had paid special attention to the manner in which the accused and the witnesses testified, as well
as their general appearance. The accused Soliman is a well-built man, robust and apparently strong. The
accused Palin is a little bigger than the other accused and of stronger physique. The deceased, as it
appears from the pictures, while he may be slightly higher in stature than the accused Soliman, has a
thinner constitution and much smaller than the accused Palin. Judging these two accused from the
manner they testified in court, their apparent indifference to all the court proceedings in spite of the
seriousness of the crime charged against them, and the manner of testifying in short, curt and confused
manner, convinced this Court that they gave little importance to the case against them and to the
proceeding in court.
The defense, however, claims that the testimony of Ernesto Balaktaw should not be given credit because it is
self-contradictory and inconsistent with the testimony of Pat. Tolentino and Det. Senen. But, aside from the fact
that the alleged contradictions refer to unimportant details or circumstances, they can be explained and
reconciled. This was done by the Solicitor General in his brief. After going over the explanation and reconciliation
made by this official, we are satisfied that the alleged contradictions or inconsistencies cannot destroy the
credibility of the witness.
An important flaw pointed out by the defense refers to the manner the witness identified the two defendants. It
is claimed that when this witness was made to identify accused Soliman he pointed to accused Palin and when
he was asked to identify the latter, he pointed to the former. And he also committed a mistake in designating
the nicknames of the two accused.
While it is true that at the start of his testimony this witness was confused in identifying the accused by their
names, however, when he was asked by the court immediately thereafter to put his hands on each of them, he
was able to identify them correctly. The court then made the following observation:
Witness identified both accused. At the time when he pointed to the accused he apparently made a
mistake may be due to the fact that the accused were both seated together and when he pointed to the
accused he might have been out of big sense of direction.
The defense also claims that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence which consists of the criminal record of prosecution witness Ernesto Balaktaw. This claim is
untenable. In the first place, the criminal record of Balaktaw cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence
because the same was available to the defense much prior to the trial of this Case. It appears that said record
can be obtained from the Criminal Identification Section of the Manila Police Department for, with the exception
of one conviction rendered on September 1, 1955, all the other convictions and charges date as far back as
January 19, 1955, months prior to the trial of the instant case. In the second place, the fact that a person has
been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to
be a truthful one..
The claim that the trial court also erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased had a violent,
quarrelsome or provocative character cannot also deserved consideration. While good or bad character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15,
Rule 123), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery
premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced
a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt

35
defensive action was necessary." (Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed, Vol. 3, 126.) This rule does
not apply to cases of murder.
While the Court is the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to convict both appellants of the crime charged,
some members however expressed doubt as to propriety of imposing the extreme penalty and so, for lack of the
necessary number of votes, the Court has resolved to impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense of imposing upon appellants merely the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, affirming the decisions in all other respects, with costs.