Santiago v.

COMELEC
GR No 127325 ; 19 March 1997
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
Under Section 2of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of Initiative. Utilizing this, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of Peoples
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action or PIRMA, filed a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift the
Term Limits of Elective Officials by Peoples Initiative with COMELEC asking for an order for the initiation of the
peoples initiative. The petition aims to amend Sec. 4 & 7 of Art. VI, Sec. 4 of Art. VII and Sec. 8 of Art. X.
Intervenors filed their own oppositions with the court including petitioner Santiago herein. They argued that, as
of yet, there is no implementing law for the peoples initiative and that RA 6735 is inadequate as such.
Furthermore, the portion of COMELEC Res. No 2300 cannot rectify the said inadequacy as the commission is
not a legislative body and that the petition doesnt constitute an amendment, among others.
Issues:
1. Whether the Supreme Court can recognize the petition.
2. Whether RA 6735 is adequate to cover the commencement of a Peoples initiative.
3. Whether COMELEC Res. No. 2300 is valid in line with the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over the case for if the Constitution is threatened by
the political ambitions of one man, it is the courts place to uphold it. Thus, a writ of prohibition is
decreed.
2. No. The court ruled that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of peoples initiative for it failed to
provide essential information on its conduct.. In fact, the inclusion of the word Constitution was just a
delayed afterthought and was mentioned merely five times in the said Act. While there is a subtitle for
the conduct of national and local initiative, there is none for the peoples initiative in amending the
Constitution. This lead to the conclusion that the most important system of initiative on the Constitution
is downgraded if not totally disregarded.
3. No. COMELEC Res. No. 2300 is void for it promulgates rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution which is
delegated to the legislative body. Such delegation cannot be delegated again. This makes answering
whether the petition constitutes an amendment or revision and whether the COMELEC can recognize
the unsigned petition moot and academic.
Lambino v. COMELEC
GR No. 174153 ; 25 October 2006
Carpio, J.
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Raul Lambino of the Lambino Group filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition, signed by 6,327,592 registered voters that will shift the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of Government. COMELEC denied the petition citing
the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no enabling law governing initiative petition to amend the
constitution. For this reason, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Coart to reverse COMELECs decision and
give due course to their petition and allow RA 6735 be a temporary device to implement the system of initiative.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner complied with Sec. 2 Art XVII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1. No. Petitioner miserably failed in complying with the requirements for peoples initiative. First, because
petitioner failed to show the complete and final text of the amending provisions to each of the signatory
of the petition. Second, because the initiative on amendments on the Constitution does not cover
revisions. The petition in the case requires a change in the form of government from BicameralPresidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary. This also alters separation of powers. This kind of change
can only be coursed through a Constitutional Assembly or Commission. Third, the petition contains a

provision which tackles an entirely different subject which constitutes logrolling thereby nullifying the
whole proposition
The petition is thereby denied.
Laurel V. Misa
L-409 ; 30 January 1947
Facts:
Anastacio Laurel is prosecuted for the crime of treason by giving the enemy aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation. This is a petition for habeas corpus for petitioner claimed that he can't be prosecuted
under article 115 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of treason because the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and the allegiance of the citizens were suspended and there was a change of
sovereignty upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issues:
1. Whether the sovereignty the legitimate government and the allegiance of the Filipinos to it was
suspended.
2. Whether there is a change of sovereignty upon the creation of the Commonwealth to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Ruling:
1. No. The citizen has an absolute and permanent allegiance, not a qualified and temporary one, to his
sovereign. This is not abrogated or severed by the occupation. Neither is it transferred as a transfer of
allegiance is a complete abrogation thereto. This is likewise how it is when a citizen is naturalized in
another state, as he swore allegiance to a new state, his allegiance to his previous one is completely
obliterated. As to the sovereignty of the legitimate government, under The Hague regulation,
sovereignty is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, it is only the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation. The
allegiance of the inhabitants subsists and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
2. No and therefore the crime of treason against article 115 of the revised penal code is still binding and
can be prosecuted. Article XVIII of the constitution states that the government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of the Philippine
independence. The commonwealth of the Philippines shall there forth be known as the Philippines.
Therefore there is no change in sovereignty as the change in form of government doesn't change the
government and the people for in these thus the crime of treason is still an offense to the same
government.
Sanders vs. Veridiano II
L-46930 ; 10 June 1988
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Private Respondent Rossi and Wyers were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. In 1975, both were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent
full-time to part-time. Upon protest of the petitioners and a subsequent hearing, the hearing officer
recommended their reinstatement. Petitioner Sanders, special services director of US NAVSTA, refuted this
recommendation with a letter sent to Petitioner Moreau, commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Sanders
and Moreau are both being sued for damages by private respondents for alleged libelous contents of the letter
correspondence of petitioners which was later sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel. While respondents claimed
that petitioners were being sued in their private capacity, respondents averred that acts complained of were
performed in the discharge of their official duties and that the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued
for damages by private respondents.
Ruling:

Yes. The court ruled that petitioners are acting within their capacity as officers of the US. Sanders, as the
director of the special services department of NAVSTA, upon request of his superior Moreau, had simply written
a reply concerning more information on the case of his subordinates, private respondents. Moreaus letter to the
Chief of Naval Personnel, on the other hand, was written as Sanders immediate superior. In fact, the letter
dealt, aside from the re-designation of respondents, with the financial and budgetary departments and
contained recommendation for their solution. Therefore, an action for damages against the officer acting within
his official capacity will require an affirmative act from the US government through making an appropriation of
the amount to cover the damages. Hence, this is an action against the state without its consent. Since the US
has not waived its immunity, with respect to the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, the complaint
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Holy See v. Rosario
GR No 101949 ; 1 December 1994
Quiason, J.
Facts:
Petitioner, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, sold three parcels of land to Ramon Licup on the condition, by Php
100,000 earnest money, that the former will evict the squatters from the property. Simultaneously, Licup sold the
rights over the propert to private respondent, Starbright Sales Ent. Petitioner then failed to evict the squatters
and asked respondent to take over the eviction, returned to the latter the earnest money for the condition and
asked for the payment of the original price of the properties. Respondent sent back the earnest money to
petitioner. It was later found that petitioner and PRC sold the said lands to Tropicana. Hence, respondent
instituted a case for annulment of the sale, reconveyance of the land, performance of agreement and damages.
Petitioner invoked state immunity, however, the trial court ruled that petitioner shed its immunity by entering into
a business contract.
Issue:
1. Whether the Holy See enjoys sovereign immunity from suits.
2. Whether the Holy See waived such immunity upon entering into a contract.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Holy See, as the head of the state of Vatican, enjoys immunity vested in him through the
Lateran Treaty. The said treaty recognized Vatican City as an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. It has its own government and head. Hence, the Holy
See, and its diplomats, enjoys immunity from suit. Furthermore, the Department of Foreign affairs
established the privilege of state immunity of the petitioner through intervening and certifying that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the republic of the Philippines
exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy. This establishment of the executive arm of government is a political question that
is conclusive upon the courts.
2. No. Since the acquisition of the land is not for profit but for the construction of the official residence of
the papal nuncio and the sale was due to the impossibility of doing so due to the squatters, the act is to
be considered to be jure imperii thus is not a waiver of immunity.
The complaint against the Holy See is dismissed.
Republic v. Villasor
L-30671 ; 28 November 1973
Fernando, J.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the decision of
respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, issuing a writ of execution
against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippnes. Said funds were public funds deposited with the
Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank appropriated and allocated for the payment of the
pensions of retires, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
the AFP.
Issue:
Whether the funds of the AFP deposited in the PVB and PNB can be subject to execution.
Ruling:

No. Any suit instituted that would require the affirmative act of the state is deemed to be against the state and
therefore requires the latters consent before it can be allowed to proceed. This exemption is because of the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. However, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged because such funds were
already appropriated for a certain purpose by law. The functions and public services of the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.
The waiver of immunity doesnt equate to the acceptance of liability.
The petition is granted.
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association
L-15751 ; 28 January 1961
Gutierrez David, J.
Facts:
Respondent Union filed with the Industrial court a suit against the Petitioner Bureau of Printing for alleged unfair
labor practices. Petitioner denied such claims and moved for the dismissal of the case since the bureau has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued and that it is an agency performing governmental functions. The prayer
for dismissal was denied on the ground the the bureau is exclusively proprietary in nature.
Issue:
Whether petitioner bureau is proprietary in nature hence excluded from the States immunity from suit.
Ruling:
No. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 that
operates under the supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President. It has no corporate
existence and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. As for the claims that the
bureau is providing outside services for private entities, such tasks are merely incidental to its governmental
function though proprietary in character. This work, such as production of greeting cards for government
officials and of checks for private banks, involves the printing of the Government seal and official documentary
stamps respectively that only the bureau can undertake. Furthermore, such work is done upon the request of
the entities and is not solicited and the computation of costs for work done does not include profit. As an office
of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the bureau cannot be sued for such suit,
action or proceeding would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself. Hence, the
complaint filed was dismissed.
Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court
L-74457 ; 20 March 1987
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Burotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of EO 626-A. petitioner then assailed the
constitutionality of said Executive Order for it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef. This is
a violation of the right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process and is
an improper exercise of legislative power by the former President under Amendment 6 of the Constitution. The
lower courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of authority and presumed
validity.
Issue:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether the lower courts can take cognizance of cases on constitutionality.

Whether there is an improper exercise of the legislative power of the former President.
Whether due process is violated
Whether there is an invalid delegation of the legislative power

Ruling:
1. Yes. Lower courts can take cognizance of cases on constitutionality subject only to the review of the
highest tribunal. The Supreme Court have jurisdiction under the Constitution to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases, among others, involving constitutionality of certain measures. This
means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by the lower court.

2. Yes. The presidents exercise of legislative authority under Amendment 6 can be used whenever there
exist a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was
unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action. There is no
showing that such exigency exists. However, the court did not find it necessary to rule on this issue at
the time.
3. Yes. Due Process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and is against the doctrine of separation of powers
4. Yes. The phrase may see fit constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned in the executive order for the disposition of the confiscated property is at their utmost
discretion.
EO 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
Pelaez v. Auditor General
L- 23825 ; 24 December 1965
Concepcion, J.
Facts:
In 1964, the president issued several Executive Orders creating thirty-three municipalities. Petitioner Pelaez
alleges that said executive orders are null and void for Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370
which prohibits the creation, alterations of boundaries and change of names of Barrios except by the act itself of
by Acts of Congress. Since the President cant create a barrio, it shall, therefore, cannot create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios. Respondent averred that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios by placing old barrios under the new municipality.
Issue:
Whether Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since it was already repealed by RA 2370.
Ruling:
Yes. The creation of municipalities is essentially legislative in nature. Although, the Congress may delegate the
power to fill in the details of a law, said law must be already complete in itself that policy executed is already set
forth that the delegate only needs to implement it and that the law already has a fix standard that the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable. Under these standards, the delegate must conform in the
performance of his action. Without these standards it cannot be determined whether the delegate had acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these
standards. It does not define a policy nor give a standard to avoid the mischief it aimed to fix. Hence this
constitute undue delegation of legislative powers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc vs. Gimenez
L-17931 ; 28 February 1963
Concepcion, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Company bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid proper
margin fees. Pursuant to RA 2609 or Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, petitioner seeks to refund such
payments for it alleged that separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. However,
respondent Gimenez refused the request for he contended that under RA 2609, it is the import of urea
formaldehyde as a finished product of urea and formaldehyde that is exempted. Petitioner further contended,
however, that the bill in Congress approves states urea and formaldehyde and that it was the intent of the
members of the Congress to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately.
Issue:
Whether the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts.
Ruling:
Yes. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts for the individual statement of the members of congress
does not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate or House. The courts cannot speculate as this will
jeopardize the principle of separation of powers. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it

was certified by the officers of the congress and approved by the President, the proper remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
The decision complained of is hereby affirmed.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
GR No 115544 ; 25 August 1994
Mandoza, J.
Facts
This is a culmination of various suits for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716
which seeks to widen the tax base of the current Value Added Tax system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
H. No 11197 was a consolidation of several bills seeking to amend the NIRC relative to the VAT which was
approved by the House and was sent to the Senate. The Senate drafted its own version of the bill, S. No. 1630,
which was, upon certification of urgency of the President, approved on the third reading set on the same day of
the second reading. Both versions were then referred to a Conference Committee which proposed a reconciled
version which was later passed to become RA 7716.
It was alleged that the Act violated Art VI Sec 24 for, being a tax bill, it did not originate exclusively from the
House of Representatives and is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. Also, it was alleged that the law did not pass three readings on separate days thus violating Art VI
Sec. 26 (2).Furthermore, the Conference Committees inserted provisions that are neither found in the House
bill nor the Senate Bill. Lastly, it was alleged that the act violated Art VI Sec. 26 (1) for including the revocation
of the VAT exemption of PAL transactions.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether RA 7716 violated Art VI Sec 24 for not originating from the House of Representatives.
Whether RA 7716 violates Art VI 26 (2) for not passing three readings on separate days.
Whether the insertion of the Conference Committee of new provisions is valid.
Whether RA 7716 violated the one subject rule.

Ruling:
1. No. While it is true that the bill should originate exclusively from the House of Representatives, doesnt
mean that the law should also do so. Construing Art VI Sec 24 in such a way will deny the Senates
power to review and proposed amendments thereto to bills and thereby violating the coequality of the
legislative power from both Houses. The provision only means that the initiative for filing bills
enumerated therein should come from the House of Representatives being more sensitive to local
needs and problems. This does not, however, undermines the national perspective provided by the
Senate.
2. No. the certification of the President for the urgent passing of the bill dispenses both the requirement of
three readings done on separate days and the printing and distribution of the bills final form three days
before finally approved. The factual basis of the certification, which merely involves doing away with
procedural requirements, is not subject to judicial review.
3. Yes. The Conference Committee is tasked to reconcile differences between the two bills and is allowed,
if necessary, to insert, or delete, provisions and drafting an entirely new bill. This version of the bill
considered as an amendment through substitution, need only to have a subject germane to the House
and Senate Bills and thereafter approved or rejected by the House and the Senate. Adhering to the
enrolled bill rule, such will be conclusive upon the courts and disregard of which will disrespect the
other co-equal departments.
4. No. The amended NIRC specifically provides for the exemption of those exemption provided by special
laws. Since the transactions of PAL are exempted from VAT by PD No. 1590, RA 7716 merely
pronounces its revocation. Such step is an exapansion to the VAT system which is well within the
subject of the Act.
Since RA 7716 complied with the procedural requirements of the Constitution, as well as does not violate
substantive rights, petitions are dismissed.

Ichong v. Hernandez
L-7995 ; 31 May 1957
Labrador, J.
Facts:
RA No 1180, entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail business, is assailed for violating the one title, one subject
rule of law making, among others. Petitioners claimed that the title is deceptive and misleading for it conceals
the purpose of the act to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
Issue:
Whether RA No 1180 violated the one title, one subject rule.
Ruling:
No. What the rule prohibits is duplicity in which the titles completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public
of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. This also prevents the enactment of a law
with matters that have not received proper notice of the legislators. The general rule is to use general terms in
the title of the bill and it need not be an index of the entire contents of the law. The general term regulate
effectively covers both nationalization and prohibition which are necessary in carrying out the intent to
regulate the retail businesses in the country. Furthermore, reversing the terms will result to more excluded
provisions within the topic for the act includes other measures aside from prohibition and prohibition. Lastly,
it is clear that the legislators are well aware of the inclusion of said provisions as proven by their active
involvement in its discussion.
Contention is dismissed.
Opposa v. Factoran Jr.
GR No. 101083 ; 30 July 1993
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioners herein are minors, assisted by their parents, are praying for the prohibition of defendant from further
issuing Timber License Agreements for it is depleting the forests of the country. Petitioners alleged that
continued issuance is an infringement upon their right to balanced and healthful ecology which they associated
with the concepts of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice. The continued
deforestation will work great damage and irreplaceable injury to petitioners and their successors who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy the natural resources.
Issue:
Whether petitioners has a cause of action based on the alleged facts.
Ruling:
Yes. The complaint is grounded upon the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Constitution under Article II Sec. 16 which is supported by the right to health provided in the
preceding Section 15. This right concerns no less than the self-preservation and self-perpetuation which is a
natural right. It is included in the constitution due to the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the said
rights are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, it would be possible that present generation and
the future generations will inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. From this right comes,
therefore, the duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Denial of that right and the desistance of such
duty are sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. Anent the contention that granting the petition would be a
violation of the non-impairment clause, the court reminded that licenses are not contracts but merely a privilege
given to an entity to do an act which would otherwise be unlawful.
Petition is thereby granted and respondent department is prohibited from both issue new and renewing Timber
License Agreements.

Rodriguez, Sr. v. Gella

L-6266 ; 2 February 1953
Paras, J.
Facts:
Prior to the constitution of this case, Commonwealth Act 671, which declared a state of total emergency due to
World War II and thereby granted the President emergency powers, was declared to have ceased to be
operative when the Congress met in regular session. Therefore, all Executive Orders thereafter implemented
under it are declared null. In this petition, petitioners assail EO 545 and 546 appropriating sums of money for
urgent and essential public works and for relief for natural calamities respectively.
Issue:
Whether EO 545 and 546 are validly issued by the President.
Ruling:
No. The emergency powers of the President lasted only during the emergency from the last world war which
factually involved the Philippines when Act. 671 was passed. Delegation of powers by the Congress to the
President is authorized by law in times of war or other national emergencies. Applying this in the case at bar,
when the assailed orders were issued under the power granted of Act 671, the purpose of the issuance could
not have been contemplated by the legislators who enacted the grant of emergency powers. Furthermore, the
Congress is available to exercise its powers. As ruled in prior petition, the grant of emergency powers was
already withdrawn when the Congress was able to meet in regular session.
Hence, assailed EOs are declared void for having no legal anchorage.
Casibang v. Aquino
L-38025 ; 20 August 1979
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as Mayor of Rosales Pampanga prior to the ratification of the 1973
Constitution. His opponent, petitioner dante Casibang, contested the formers victory on various grounds with
the Court of First Instance in PAngasinan. During the pendency of the contest, the president declared martial
law followed by the ratification of the 1973 constitution. After the ratification, petitioner just finished presenting
his evidences. Respondent moved to dismiss contending that, under the new Constitution, the court lost its
jurisdiction and that respondent was granted security of tenure.
Issues:
1. Whether the court a quo lost its jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether the new Constitution granted the respondent security of tenure.
Ruling:
1. No. the court can continue taking cognizance of the case. The allegation of the respondent that the
issue has become a political question and therefore cannot be reviewed cannot be countenanced by
the court. This is provided by the new constitution itself under Section 7 of Article XVII.
2. No. the constitutional grant of the new constitution for the benefit of the incumbent officials cannot be
construed as to cover every person exercising office despite protest or contests on his position. It could
never be the intent of the framers to disregard the statutory rights of the candidate who instituted the
election protest. Furthermore, Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution made the term of the
office indefinite notwithstanding the challenge on his right to hold office. A term of office is the period
during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its
privileges and emoluments while right to hold office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the
powers and responsibilities of the office. It is the right that is being contested by the petitioner.
Therefore, the petition for dismissal is denied and the case allowed to prosper.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
GR No 119976 ; 18 September 1995
Kapunan, J.
Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Private Respondent Cirilo Montejo are both candidates for
Representative of the First District of Leyte. Montejo sought for the disqualification of Marcos on the ground that
failed to comply with the 1 year residency requirement. Marcos countered that she has been domiciled in Leyte
since birth and had not abandoned such ever since despite her establishment of other residences around the
country. Despite this, Marcos overwhelmingly won the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Petitioner was able to satisfy the residency requirement for candidacy.
2. Whether COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the case.
3. Whether the HRET can assume jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
1. Yes. For purposes of determining the qualification of a candidate, residency is considered to be
synonymous to domicile. Domicile pertains to a persons permanent home in which one intends to
remain and, despite continuous absence or change of actual residence, intends to return permanently.
This is the twin concept of animus manendi and animus revertendi. A minor follows the domicile set by
the father. This domicile could not be easily lost even if the person gets married and the husband set
another domicile for the family. To successfully change domicile, there must be an actual removal or
change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the place and acts to correspond with such
purpose. There is no clear showing that petitioner changed domicile in line with the foregoing ways,
hence, it is presumed that she had not lost her domicile.
2. No. The COMELEC shall have jurisdiction over the candidate for as long he or she is yet to assume
office.
3. No. Jurisdiction of the HRET starts only once the person becomes an official member of the House.
Petitioners prayer is granted thereby ordering the proclamation of the Petitioner.
Osmea v. Pendatun
L-17144; 28 October 1960
Bengzon, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Osmea, Jr. delivered a privileged speech imputing accusation to the current President
specifically allegations of acceptance of bribe. Due to this, the House sanctioned him to which he appealed
stating that such is an infringement on his right of immunity. Petitioner raised the constitutionality of the
sanction to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives can discipline its members.
Ruling:
Yes. The House may discipline any member of the House who exhibited disorderly conduct. What
constitutes disorderly conduct is upon the House to determine. The courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
This is grounded upon the principle of separation of powers. The House can suspend, expel and even send
to jail a member as seen fit (with compliance with the required concurrence).

Senate v. Ermita
GR No 16977 ; 20 April 2006
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
The Senate of the Philippines issued several invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to
an Inquiry regarding issues on the Northrail Project, the Gloriagate Scandal, Fertilizer Scam and the
Venable Contract. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita then sent a letter to the Senate President Drilon
requesting for the postponement of the inquiry so that invited officials can study and prepare. However,
Sen. Drilon replied that he cannot accede to the request for it was sent belatedly and the preparations had
already been in place. Thereafter, The President of the Philippines issued EO 464 that mandated executive
officials to secure consent from the President first before attending an inquiry. Hence, petitioners assailed
the constitutionality of the said order.

Issues:
Whether EO 464 is unconstitutional for it contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
Ruling:
EO 464 is declared partly unconstitutional. Specifically, the court declared Secs. 2(b) and 3
unconstitutional. The Executive Privilege embodied in EO 464 is a recognized privilege of the Executive
Department withholds information from the legislature or the public in discharge of its capacity. However,
there are limitations in invoking this privilege. First, only certain types of information are deemed covered
and, second, may only be exercised by the President and her expressly authorized officials. Furthermore, a
valid claim with justification is necessary to invoke it.
Section 2(b) is declared unconstitutional for it is an undue delegation of the privilege to officials that are not
supposed to be covered by it. This is a misuse of the doctrine. Only the President can readily invoke the
privilege. Since other Executive officials can only be covered upon express authorization of the President,
the silent approval as presented by the assailed order is an invalid claim of the privilege.
Section 3, on the other hand, constitutes an implied claim of the privilege that is only subject to the rebuttal
of the president. This is unconstitutional for the privilege should be asserted and the Senate has the right to
know whether said information is actually privileged.
Neri v. Senate
GR+ No 180643 ; 25 March 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri was invited by the Senate for inquiry on the NBN Project. Petitioner testified before
the committee for eleven hours, however, there are three questions that petitioner would not answer for the
answers contained privileged information. In a letter sent by Executive Secretary Ermita to the respondent
committee, he requested to dispense with Neris testimony invoking the doctrine of executive privilege for
such questions fall under conversations and correspondences between the President and public officials
and such information can potentially impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China. Petitioner
Neri then did not attend the next inquiry, thus, respondent committee issued a contempt order against him.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether Petitioner Neri validly invoked the doctrine of executive.
2. Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
Ruling:
1. Yes. While EO 464 was revoked in Senate v. Ermita, this does not diminish the concept of executive
privilege. The letter of Sec. Ermita constitutes a valid claim of Executive Privilege for it satisfies the
requirements that the President should authorize the claim and provide a valid reason therewith. The
Congress must not inquire further into the information sought to be protected.
2. Yes. The respondent committee committed grave abuse of discretion which is the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. First, since there is a legitimate claim
of executive privilege hence the order for contempt is an infirmity. Second, respondent committee did
not comply with the settled rule in Senate v. Ermita that invitations should contain the claim of a need in
aid of legislation and the subject and questions to be covered in the inquiry. Third, since only the
minority is present and the absent members are merely asked to sign the order, the committee cannot
issue an order of contempt. Fourth, the rules of procedure, as a requirement for conducting legislative
inquiry, is not yet published. Fifth, the order is arbitrary and precipitate for the committee did not pass
on the claim of Executive Privilege and outright dismissed it followed by an immediate issuance of the
contempt order. Furthermore and worth noting, the petitioner is not an unwilline witness.
Petition is granted and the order for contempt is nullified
Marcos v. Manglapus
GR No. 88211 ; 15 September 1989
Cortes, J.
Facts:
When Ferdinand Marcos was deposed as President and was replaced by Cory Aquino, the former still
exhibited his capacity to stir trouble through the coup d etat instituted by his loyalists and his attempt to

return to the country aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer. This manifestation, among
others, of his and his constituents to engage in violent and despotic activities made the current president
decide to bar his return to the country. Hence this petition for the issuance of travel documents to the
Marcos Family for their return in the country.
Issue:
Whether the President can prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. It must be understood the 1987 Constitutions enumeration of the powers of the President is not
exclusive thus imprisoning the executives capabilities within what is written. On the contrary, the
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President but maintains intact
the traditionally considered within the scope of executive power. Executive Power is more than the sum of
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. It can also be followed that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither judicial nor legislative is presumed to be executive. In the case at bar, the
President used her inherent power to prevent the Marcoses from going back to the Philippines to protect its
people and maintain the peace and order. In fact, this power was recognized by the legislature when it
appealed to the Presidents sense of compassion to retract her power to bar the Marcoses and allow the
man to die in his country. The decision is in full discretion of the President.
The court dismissed the petition considering that the decision of the President, backed by the real facts of
the countrys situation, is not arbitrary as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion.
Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac
GR No 93867 ; 18 December 1990
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Chairman Hilario Davide of the Comission on Elections was named Chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the 1989 coup d etat. He was replaced by Associate Commissioner Haydee B.
Yorac appointed by the President as the acting chairman. Petitioner Brillantes assailed such appointment
contending that the choice of an acting chairman of the COMELEC is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and the intrusion of the President violates their independence.
Issue:
Whether the appointment by the President of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Yes. Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly provides that the Constitutional Commissions as
independent. They are not under the President and can conduct its own proceedings under applicable
laws and its own rule and in exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only
to review on certiorari by this Court. Since the designation of an acting Chairman, as subject to arbitrary
withdrawal by the President, she will not be estopped to challenge such withdrawal. The lack of statutory
rule is not a justification for the President to fill the void for the problem sought did not call for a presidential
action. It could have been handled by the members of the COMELEC themselves in any manner they see
fit. Lastly, the members of Constitutional Commission are guaranteed a security of tenure which is not
available to an acting chairman.
Petition is granted and the appointment declared unconstitutional.
Monsanto v. Factoran
GR No 78239 ; 9 February 1989
Fernan, C.J.
Facts:
Salvacion A. Monsanto was convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents and was sentenced them to imprisonment, fine and costs to the government. Petitioner
appealed her conviction with the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, the president extended
absolute pardon to her which she subsequently accepted. She then wrote to the office of the City Treasurer
for her reinstatement as assistant city treasure as the post is still vacant. The Finance Minister granted her
reinstatement without the necessity new appointment however the costs to the government should still be

paid. Petitioner seek reconsideration of the decision for she contend that the absolute pardon obliterated
her crime which makes her eligible to retroactive reinstatement including back-pays and that she should not
be required to pay the costs to the government. The Executive Secretary held that only acquittal can be a
ground for reinstatement hence petitioner is not eligible to such.
Issue:
Whether Monsanto is eligible for reinstatement of her former post.
Ruling:
No. The contention by the petitioner that, since the absolute pardon was extended during an appeal,
judgment against her is not yet deemed final and executory is flawed. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and the judgment by the Sandiganbayan is deemed
final. Therefore, the petitioner must serve the punishment rendered by it if not for the intervention of the
absolute pardon. Furthermore, being prospective in nature, the crime of the petitioner is not deemed
obliterated and she is not deemed innocent. While it is true that the pardon relieved the petitioner of the
penalty and its effects, it cannot erase the stain of bad character that has already been fixed. From this, the
office can refuse her reinstatement for being of proven bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of pardoned conviction. The pardon has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. She must reapply for the post. As for the civil
liability, the same should still be paid for civil liability may only extinguished through payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
The resolution of Respondent Executive Secretary is affirmed.
Sarmiento v. Mison
L-79974 ; 17 December 1987
Padilla, J.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the appointment by the president of respondents Salvador Mison as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs for such appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as
provided by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs requires confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Ruling:
No. The Commissioner of Bureau of Customs is not part of those enumerated petitions that can be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation of the Commission of Appointments. From the said
provision, the officers whom the President can appoint were divided to four groups. First, the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel to naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Constitution. It was derived from the records of the framers of the constitution that those listed in the first
group are the only ones needed to be confirmed by the Commission of Appointments. All the other groups
are not. Hence, following the expressio unius rule in statutory construction, the respondents post is not
included in those needed to be confirmed. Said post is part of the third group which includes all those other
officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint under PD No. 34 Sec 601 which
amended the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. In harmonizing this with the 1987 Constitution, it
is construed that the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is appointed by the President without the
confirmation of the Commission of Appointments.
Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.
GR No. 208566 ; 19 November 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the discretionary fund of the Members of the Congress,
the Vice-President and the President. For the Members of the Congress and the Vice-President, it is the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (First used in the 2000 GAA) which each official may spend on a
project chosen from the project list, program menu or prior consultations. In the 2013 GAA PDAF Article, it

is provided that LGUs are now identified as implementing agencies and legislator are now allowed to
identify programs/projects outside his legislative district. For the President, it is the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund. Malampaya Funds is a special fund aimed for the finance of indigenous
energy sources. The Presidential Social Fund, on the other hand, is a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance
to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court may pass on the review of Constitutionality of the case at bar.
2. Whether the PDAF is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the Malampaya funds and the Presidential Social Fund is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The court ruled that the controversy at bar complied with all the legal requisites of judicial review. It
is ruled that there is actual controversy for the PDAF remains effective and is existing and operational
under the 2013 GAA. The challenge of mootness because of the proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the issue for such is not effective until the 2014 GAA. Furthermore, the annulment
of a law may only be done by the Congress or by the Court through repealing the law and declaration
of unconstitutionality respectively and not a presidential declaration. Assuming the case has become
moot, the court can still pass on the issue for there are allegations of grave violation of the Constitution,
it is matter of paramount interest since public funds are continuing to be utilized, it can serve as a
guideline on how public funds should be utilized and, as seen in the evolution of pork barrel, capable of
repeating. Also, it is clear that petitioners have standing as tax-payers who are concerned on how the
public funds are being spent.
2. Yes. The PDAF is declared unconstitutional for violating various principles of constitutional provisions
on separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, system of checks and balances and local
autonomy. It violated the separation of powers for the individual legislators were allowed into the
budget execution when their power ceased upon passing the GAA. As for the non-delegability of
legislative powers, in granting the individual legislators authority to identify projects and how much can
be allocated therewith after enactment, is an improper exercise of the power of appropriation. It also
violates the system of checks and balances for the item-veto power of the president is impaired as the
PDAF a constitute a budget within a budget that shall only be determined and thereby executed after
the enactment of the law. Lastly, it is declared unconstitutional for it impairs the local autonomy of LGUs
for the legislators are allowed to interfere in entirely local matters.
Hence the PDAF and all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional
3. Partly unconstitutional. The court ruled that the phrases and for such purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 and to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects under Section 12 of PD 1993 are invalid delegation of powers to the President
as it did not pass the sufficient standard tests.
In line of the foregoing, and with respect to the doctrine of operative fact, the pronouncement of
unconstitutionality shall have a prospective effect.
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.
GR No. 113375 ; 5 May 1994
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioners herein are suing as taxpayers, concerned citizen and members of Congress. The Kilosbayan,
specifically, is composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders. They are assailing the
constitutionality and praying for the prohibition of the operation of the online-lottery system of PCSO on account
of its immorality and illegality. Respondents then assail the petitioners locus standi in the case, among others.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have a legal standing to sue.
Ruling:
Yes. It has been ruled by the court time and time again that the requirement of a legal standing can be relaxed
when it is proven that the controversy involved is of transcendental importance and paramount interest. Even if
a petitioner is found that he has no legal standing for he will not incur injury in any way from the controversy, the
court can still conduct a judicial review considering the importance of the issue involved. For the current case, it

is deemed that the issue is of transcendental importance and of paramount public interest for its ramifications
immeasurably affects the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
GR 171396 ; 3 May 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
Due to a series of events threatening the public order in the country by certain entities and individuals who are
unsatisfied with the current administration, the President, respondent herein, issue PP 1107 declaring a state of
national emergency followed by GO No. 5 to implement the former. A few days later, the President issued PP
1021 declaring the national emergency ceased to exist. This is a culmination of seven petitions seeking to have
PP 1107 declared unconstitutional on various grounds.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic
Whether petitioners have a legal standing
Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017
Whether PP 1017 and GO 5 are unconstitutional

Ruling:
1. No. PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic for, during the eight days when
the PP 1017 was effective, police officers committed illegal acts in implementing it. However, assuming
that the controversy is rendered moot by PP 1021, the court can still pass over the review for all four
requirements of reviewing a moot case. To wit, petitioners allege that PP 1017 and GO No. 5 violates
the constitution, issue raised affect public interest for it affects peoples basic right to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of press, the Court has a duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrine, or rules, and issue is capable of repetition.
2. Yes. Initially, the legal standing of Loren Legarda and the IBP is rebutted. However. Due to the
transcendental importance of the issue thereby relaxing the standing requirements, it was deemed that
all of the petitioners have legal standing.
3. Yes. It was already ruled in previous cases that the court can review acts of the President in exercising
his discretionary powers to determine there has been a grave abuse of discretion on his part. However,
it is upon the petitioners to prove that the decision of the President is bereft of factual basis. In the
instant case, petitioners failed to do so. In fact, they did not even refute the basis presented. Hence,
judging the seriousness of the incidents, it was expected of President Arroyo to act on what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
4. Partly unconstitutional. In issuing the assailed proclamation and order, the President invoked her
Calling-out power to call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. This is not a declaration of Martial law, anent petitioners contention; for it is clear from the
proclamation that it is only the Calling-out power that is invoked. Also, when the President invoked
adherence to the all the laws and other issuances she promulgate, it is understood that she merely
invoked the take care power. Contrary to the Marcos regime, the current President cannot enact
decrees and as to the laws, she can only enforce laws to suppress lawless violence. In line with the
forgoing, provisions and construction giving the President power to issue decrees, direct the armed
forces to enforce all laws, to impose standards on media and any form of prior restraint are held to be
unconstitutional. Included also is the warrantless arrest of some petitioners.

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council

GR No 191002 ; 17 March 2010
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos compulsory retirement occurs just days after the presidential elections. This
gives rise to many dilemmas on how the President can appoint his successor given the limitation in Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that the President cannot appoint officials within two months prior the
elections. This seem to in contrast to Section 4 (1) of Article VIII that any vacancy in the Supreme Court or the
Judiciary shall be covered within 90-days.
Issues:
1. Whether Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to the Judiciary.
Ruling:
1. Yes, it does not apply. This is because had the framers intended to extend the prohibition in said
provision, it could have easily done so. Since such prohibition is not done, it means that the President
or Acting President can still appoint members of the Supreme Court within 2 months prior the election.
Additionally, the court delved into the intent of Section 15 Article VII which showed that midnight
appointments is made to prevent partisanship meant to influence the outcome of the next election. This
is clearly not applicable to the members of the judiciary. Also since Section 14, 15 and 16 are
provisions on the presidents power to appoint, with 14 and 16 being exclusively applicable to
appointments within the Department, Section 15 shall be construed to also be exclusively applicable
only to the executive department.
Hence, nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy shall proceed.
Excerpts:
Santiago v. COMELEC
The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the
words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to
amendments.
R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and
3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g)
the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins
petition
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
-- not to REVISE -- the Constitution
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be
more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation
A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To
amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths;
and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of
calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the
process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation
or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another
voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was
prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of
two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497 which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No.
17 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government
units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But
unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include,
as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Lambino v. COMELEC
The Holy See v. Del Rosario
Republic v. Villasor
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it
must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer
not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required
to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle,
could very well be imagined."
"The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had
accrued
rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may
be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it
Sanders v. Veridiano
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate,
the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to
insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in
excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but
also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that

is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right
to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that
a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did
convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor
could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized
act.
ven under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith,
which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such
public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal
laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the
fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have
overstated their case.
Bureau of Printing V. BOP Employees
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many
of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not
justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head
of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private
persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the
requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the
Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted
evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from
government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the
Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank
cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing
thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent,
and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit because it is not
allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot
be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character,
there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions.
Ichong v. Hernandez
Opposa v. Factoran
Casibang v. Aquino
Rodriguez v. Gella
Ynot v. IAC