No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of tlje niteb States?

MARCUS ISAIAH WASHINGTON,

Petitioner,
V.

W I L L I A M MORRIS E N D E A V O R E N T E R T A I N M E N T L L C (formerly the W I L L I A M

MORRIS AGENCY), J E F F M E A D E and SARAH WINIARSKI,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

MOTION TO DISBAR M I C H A E L P. Z W E I G , CHRISTIAN CARBONE, M I C H A E L

B A R N E T T & O T H E R S AND IMPOSE E X T R E M E D I S C I P L I N A R Y AND M O N E T A R Y
SANCTIONS AGAINST L O E B & L O E B L L P F O R E N G A G I N G IN AN INTENTIONAL
" P A T T E R N " O F "FRAUD UPON T H E C O U R T " AND BAD-FAITH L I T I G A T I O N .

Mr. Marcus Isaiah Washington

Pro Se Petitioner
54 Boerum Street, Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, NY 11206
(646) 504-6497
humanrights. aream ust@gmail. com

Rule 8.3(a) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct states that any lawyer who knows that
another lawyer has "committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon
such violation." (emphasis added)
For the following reasons discussed below, I , pro se non-attorney Marcus Isaiah
Washington, submit this Motion to Disbar Attorneys Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone,
Michael Bamett & Others' And Impose Extreme Disciplinary and Monetary Sanctions Against
Loeb & Loeb LLP to seek extraordinary relief under the Supreme Court's inherent powers that
will correct an extreme "miscarriage of justice" that has allowed an "elite" law firm to go
unpunished for engaging in a "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" and "highly unethical and
criminal conducf on their client's behalf in two extremely important civil & human rights cases
and restore the public confidence in America's judicial system's ability to impartially administer
justice without regards to an individual's race, color, national origin, class or pro se litigant status.
L

Legal Standard Regarding Attorney Disqualification

A. Supreme Court Rule 8: Disbarment and Disciplinary Action

Rule 8.1 states:
Whenever a member of the Bar of this Court has...engaged in conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar of this Court, the Court will enter an order suspending that member
from practice before this Court affording the member an opportunity to show cause, within
40 days, why a disbarment order should not be entered. Upon response, or i f no response is
timely filed, the Court will enter an appropriate order, (emphasis added)

' Other attorneys that have profited from Loeb & Loeb LLP's fraudulent "representation" of William Morris in this
case are Mark Goldberg, Martin Fojas and Jessica Lee.

Rule 8.2 states:

After reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken, and after a hearing if material facts are in dispute, the Court may take any
appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who is admitted to practice before
it for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or for failure to comply with these Rules
or any Rule or order of the Court (emphasis added)

B. New York Judiciary Law 487

New York is "unusual in having a statute - Judiciary' Law Section 487 - that provides a private
cause of action, not simply the remedy of sanctions, for litigants to assert against opposing counsel
for making false statements to a court in a proceeding. This statute has spawned subsidiary
litigation about litigation."^ New York Judiciary Law 487 states:
An attorney or counselor who: 1 Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any
deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party...Is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law,
he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action, (emphasis
added)
In Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, 2014 N Y Slip Op. 02213 (April 1, 2014), the New York
Court of Appeals held that the limitations period for claims under Judiciary Law 487 is six years
- not three. And in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg. No. 01069, NY Slip Op. (Feb. 12, 2009), the New
York Court of Appeals held that an attorney who attempts to deceive the court is subject to treble
damages, despite the fact that the deceit is unsuccessful. See also, Melcher v Greenberg Traurig,
LLP. 2013 N Y Slip Op. 00256 (Jan. 17, 2013). "The treble damages and criminal element speak
to the law's intention as a deterrent for the most egregious kinds of attorney behavior."-^
C. "Fraud Upon the Court"

^ Jeffrey M . Eilender, Erik S. Groothuis, Andrew S. Harris, Bennette D. Kramer, John M . Lundin, Bradley J. Nash,
Niall D. O'Murchadha, and Elizabeth Wolstein, "Recent Developments in New York Judiciary Law Claims."
Law.com. April 7, 2014. http://www.law.com/sites/iohnmlundin/2014/04/07/recent-developments-in-new-yorkjudiciary-law-claims/?slreturn=20150603232045.
^ Andrew Strickler. "DLA Piper, Greenberg Suits Open Door For More Deceit Cases." Law 360. November 19, 2014.

The doctrine of "fraud upon the Court" has been characterized "as a scheme to interfere with the
judicial machinery performing the task of impartial adjudication, as by preventing the opposing
party from fairly presenting his case or defense." In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions. 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
Although the Second Circuit has not articulated express elements of fraud upon the Court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has set forth five elements of fraud upon
the court which consist of conduct: " 1 . On the part of an officer of the court; 2. That is directed to
the 'judicial machinery' itself; 3. That is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in
reckless disregard for the truth; 4. That is a positive avennent or is concealment when one is under
a duty to disclose; 5. That deceives the court." Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir.
1993); see also Weese v. Schukman. 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that "fraud on the
court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of
the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court") (citations omitted).
It is well established that "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a
decision at all, and never becomes final." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); see also The
People of the State of Illmois v. Fred E. Sterling. 357 111. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim
that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts
and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanlev F. Sievers. 336 111. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929)
("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of
Willowbrook. 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.") As a
result, the concept of "fraud upon the Court" "challenges the very principle upon which our judicial
system is based: finality of judgment." Herring v. United States. 424 F.3d 384 (3rd Cir. 2005).

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for "Relief from a Judgment or
Order" by motion (Part (b)) or by independent action (Part (d)). Independent actions for fraud
upon the court under Part (b) are reserved for '"injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed
sufficiently gross to demand a departure' from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res-judicata," see
U.S. V. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) {quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co..
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)), and therefore are available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice." Id. at 46-47; see Kupferman v. Consol. Research and Mfg. Corp.. 459 F.2d 1072, 1078
(2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.) (Fraud upon the court "should embrace only that species of fraud
which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court
so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual maimer its impartial task of adjudging
cases that are presented for adjudication.") (quotations omitted); Serzvsko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank. 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972); Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres. Inc.,
278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. I960) (Friendly, J.); see also Gleasonv. Jandrucko. 860 F.2d 556, 55859 (2d Cir. 1988).
Part (d) is commonly referred to as Rule 60's "savings clause" and states: "This rule does
not limit a court's power to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). If the Plaintiff seeks to maintain a new action for
"fraud upon the court" under Part (d), he must establish the elements necessary to maintain an
"independent action." As adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, the elements of a Rule 60(d)
independent action are as follows;
( I ) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be enforced; (2) a good
defense to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident,
or mistake which prevented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of his
defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of defendant; and (5) the absence of
any adequate remedy at law.

Day V. Benton, 346 F.App'x 476, 478 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpubUshed); Bankers Mortg. Co. v.
United States. 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
"A court may at anytime set aside a judgment for after discovered fraud upon the court."
Dausel v. Damsel. 195 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1952). A determination of "fraud upon the Court"
may be justified only by "the most egregious misconduct directed to the court itself," and it "must
be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence." In re Coordinated at 195. There
must be a showing "that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by
improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's
claim or defense." McMunn v. Mem. Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 191 F.Supp.2d 440, 445
(S.D.N. Y. 2002).
n.

Arguments In Support of Vitiating All Decisions Rendered In Favor Of William

Morris and Loeb & Loeb L L P Due to "Pattern" of "Fraud Upon the Court" and
"Highly Unethical and Criminal Activity."

The relationship between Hollywood's oldest talent agency - the William Morris Agency (now
known as William Morris Endeavor Entertainment) - and the "elite" law firm Loeb & Loeb LLP
spans more than a century. In 1898, William Moms was founded in New York City by a German
"Jewish" immigrant named Zelman Moses (later known as William Morris). Eleven years later,
the law firm Loeb & Loeb LLP was founded by brothers Edwin and Joseph Loeb, who also played
a major role in the development of the City of Los Angeles in the early 1900s, helping establish
historically all-white institutions such as the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences,
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and the Union Bank of California.'* The
current co-CEOs of Loeb & Loeb LLP are Michael Beck and John Frankenheimer.

These "institutions" in particular are two staples in Hollywood (the Academy and M G M ) and based on the fact that
the William Morris Agency is the oldest talent agency in the world, it's likely that Mr. Zelman Moses (a.k,a. William

Since 1998, Loeb & Loeb LLP has represented William Morris in two extremely important
racial discrimination and antitrust cases: Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc., No. 98 CV 8272, 2005 WL 22833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005), aff d, 167 F. App'x 227 (2d Cir.
2005), cert, demed, 549 U.S. 887, 127 S.Ct. 283, 166 L.Ed.2d 152 (2006) and Washington v.
William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC, 285 F.3d 721 (2nd Cir. 2015). Michael P. Zweig is
a partner at Loeb & Loeb LLP with more than 37 years' experience as a licensed attorney and is
one of the common denominators for both cases.^ Since 2006, Zweig has been named "New York
Super Lawyer" by Thomson Reuters eight times. As a current director of the Federal Bar Council
and member of the Second Circuit Courts Committee, American Bar Association and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Zweig is well respected in the legal community.
On December 22, 2010,1 filed a detailed, 80-page complaint with the Southern District of
New York, accusing William Moms of intentionally engaging in a pattem and continuing practice
of discriminating against African Americans spanning 112 years, maintaining employment
practices, policies and procedures that created a glaring disparate impact against qualified African
Americans from being hired and/or promoted to higher-status, higher-paying positions such as
Agent, Coordinator and Agent Trainee, pre and-post hiring individual disparate treatment,
retaliation and aiding & abetting claims against FIR personnel Jeff Meade and Sarah Winiarski in
violafion of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. I98I ("Section 1981"), Title
V I I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VIF'), the

Morris) did business or icnew Edwin and Joseph Loeb.; See also, Neal Gabler. An Empire o f Their Own: How The
Jews Invented Hollywood, p. 272 (1989).
' According to Loeb & Loeb LLP's website, Michael Zweig obtained his J.D. from New York University's School of
Law in 1977 and was admitted to both the Southern and Eastern District of New York in 1978. It states: "Mr. Zweig
has litigated and arbitrated cases throughout the United States, frequently through trial, and has represented numerous
clients in high profile, high-stakes litigation involving false advertising and deceptive trade practices (including
Attorney General investigations), shareholder, partnership and accounting disputes, contract, right of publicity,
defamation and a wide variety of employment-related litigation (restrictive covenant/trade secret litigation,
discrimination, harassment)." http://www.loeb.comymichael_zweig/.

New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law 290 et. seq. (the "NYSHRL")
and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York Administrative Code 8-101 et. seq. (the
"NYCHRL").
In response to my Complamt, Zweig stated in a letter to Castel that my claims were "wholly
without merit, legally and factually" February 8, 20Hand asked Judge Castel to allow Loeb to
submit a motion to compel arbitration. On February 25, 2011, Loeb attorney Christian Carbone
entered the case^ and on William Moms' behalf, Carbone filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative, Motion to Compel Arbitration which stated that my claims were "without merit,
legally and factually." In opposition, I raised a unique. Fed. R. Civ. P. Il-complaint argument,
applying antidiscrimination law to show that the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements I
signed as a condition of employment were unenforceable as a matter of law due to William Moms'
then 112 year intentional pattem and practice of excluding African Americans from its Agent,
Coordinator and Agent Trainee positions - hence the reason why there were zero African
American Agents, Coordinators or Agent Trainees employed prior to my employment in the New
York office.
On July 20, 2011, Castel issued his Stay Order and erroneously compel this case into
arbitration. I had a "gut instincf that Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attorneys were colluding behind
the scenes with Castel due to the fact that he "ignored my legal arguments, omitted pertinent facts
and intentionally misapplied the law" in violation of his Oath of Office, the Judicial Code of
Conduct and the U.S. Constitution just so that he could render a one-sided decision in William

Christian Carbone admitted to practice law in the Southern District of New York in 1996. According this his Loeb
& Loeb LLP profile, it states: "With particular expertise with advertising and marketing matters, Mr. Carbone has
extensive experience litigating claims of false advertising, deceptive or misleading trade practices, as well as unfair
competition, defamation, copyright, right of publicity and other intellectual property disputes." Nowhere on his profile
does it mention he has experience representing clients in employment & labor related matters.

Morris' favor. Everything that has transpired since Castel decided to enforce William Morris'
unconscionable pre-dispute arbitration agreements, supports that all decisions in favor of William
Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP were predetermined and have been obtained as a result of fraud and
the finder of fact's intentional flouting of our antidiscrimination nation's laws and the U.S.
Constitution to prevent the ments of this landmark employment discrimination, antitrust and
human rights case from being decided by an impartial jury.
A. Rowe Entertainment & The Conspiracy to Conceal "Exhibit 31":
a. Background Info: [In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98
CV 8272, 2005 WL 22833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005), aff d, 167 F. App'x 227 (2d Cir. 2005),
cert, denied, 549 U.S. 887,127 S.Ct. 283, 166 L.Ed.2d 152 (2006),' a class of black concert
promoters filed a $700 million dollar lawsuit against the WiUiam Morris Agency, Creative
Artists Agency ("CAA") and 32 other businesses involved in the concert promotion
industry. The crux of their claim was that "[bjecause of an all-white concert promotion
fraternity, the black concert promoters are systematically excluded from the promotion of
concerts given by white perfonners. No black promoter, including plaintiffs, has been able
to contract to promote a contemporary music concert given by a white artist, or even been
given the opportunity to bid on such promotion. In addition, plaintiffs are regularly
excluded from the promotion of concerts given by top-drawing black performers" The class
of black concert promoters were represented by Sonnenschien Nath & Rosenthal LLP
("SNR") (now known as Dentons LLP) and after more than a year of litigation, the
plaintiffs enlisted Willie Gary and the Willie Gary Law Firm as co-counsel. The William
Morris Agency was represented by Michael P. Zweig and Helen Gavaris of Loeb & Loeb

' Michael P. Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Magistrate Judge James C. Francis are repeat players.

LLP and Creative Artists Agency ("CAA") were represented by Weil Gotshal & Manges
LLP. During litigation, e-discovery was conducted exclusively by attorneys for SNR, Loeb
& Loeb LLP and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP. On January 16, 2002, Magistrate Judge
James C. Francis issued "a lengthy opimon" in Rowe which "outlined a detailed protocol
for determining which e-mails were relevant to Defendants' selections of concert promoters
and appropriate for production, and ordered the Booking Agency Defendants to produce
the computer hard drives containing those e-mails in accordance with that protocol." [Judge
Patterson FRCP 60 Order, 9.] In or around late September of 2002, Rowe was told by his
attorney, Richard Primoff, that "no derogatory terms" were discovered from Electronic
Evidence Discovery's ("EED") (now known as Documents Technology, Inc. or "DTP')
search. Rowe soon learned that he was lied to after seeing the search resuhs on the desk of
his attorney Raymond Heslin during a meeting in Heslin's New York office a few weeks
later. Rowe stated that he looked down at Heslin's desk and saw a sheet of paper with the
caption of his case at the top of the page. In columns listed down the page, he said he saw
the word "nigger" lined down the entire first page. Rowe immediately informed the Willie
Gary Law Firm, of what he saw on Heslin's desk. On October 15, 2002, "SNR New York"
faxed this document to the Willie Gary Law Firm and shortly after, SNR withdrew from
the case before WMA and CAA moved for summary judgment.^ In federal judge Robert
P. Patterson's [January 5, 2005] Final Order, he dismissed "Exhibit 31" He concluded in
the footnote of his 175 page decision, that "Exhibit 31" was an "unidentified and
unauthenticated document," and granted summary judgment in favor of WMA, CAA and
the three other remaining defendants.]

^ After "Exhibit 31" was discovered by Rowe and before moving for summary judgment, the William Morris Agency
offered the class of black concert promoters $20 million to settle, but the plaintiffs declined.

b. Rowe's F R C P 60 Motion, SNR Declarations and Patterson's Decision: [On March 2,

2012, Rowe filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 Fraud Upon the Court Motion as a pro se litigant,
requesting that his 2005 decision be vacated and set aside in the "interests of justice" due
to "fraud upon the Court [and] destruction of vital evidence." As for the six year delay, he
stated that he was "informed about one year ago that [his] case may have involved
'ineffective counsel,' and/or other certain unethical attorney actions, [and] it wasn't until
February 7, 2012 that I specifically learned that actions constituted violations of various
crimes." [Leonard Rowe FRCP 60 Motion, ^ 8 ] Since William Morris and Loeb & Loeb
LLP did not respond to the Motion, Patterson compelled Rowe's former SNR attorneys to
respond to Rowe's claims by submitting Declarations. A l l four of Rowe's former SNR
attorneys stated under "penalty of perjury" that "no derogatory terms" were found. One
attorney went as far as to say that no e-mails were even produced from this $200,000.00
search paid for by the class of black concert promoters. On the day that the last attorney
submitted his Declaration - May 15, 2012 - I went to the Southern District of New York
and retrieved "Exhibit 31" from Rowe's case files.^ See Exhibit A. Loeb & Loeb LLP did
not reply to this Motion. After their time to reply passed. Judge Patterson compelled
Leonard's former attorneys at SNR to submit Declarations in response to Rowe's claims.
Between May 14-15, Rowe's former SNR attorneys - Raymond Heslin, Richard Primoff,
Christine Lepera and Martin R. Gold - stated under 'penalty of perjury" that Rowe's
allegations were "completely untrue," the "email production Plaintiffs received from

' I explicitly raised allegations that Michael Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP were engaging in a pattem of "fraud upon
the Court" in my third appeal filed with the Second Circuit on May 3, 2012. In my fourth appeal filed on June 6, 2012,
I supported the claims with "Exhibit 31," but the Clerk of Court prevented this motion from reaching the three-panel
judges assigned to this case - Gerard E. Lynch, Peter W. Hall and Denny Chin - because it was prematurely denied
on June 12, 2012. Instead of petitioning to the Supreme Court, I decided to comply with Judge Castel's Stay Order to
prevent further harmful delay and additional irreparable harm due to my dire economic circumstances and stressrelated health problems.

10

defendants yield[ed] nothing of use in proving Plaintiffs' case against Defendant," "no
derogatory terms were located in the emails of the defendants," Rowe "certainly never
found anything to the contrary on my desk." They clearly didn't know "Exhibit 3 1 " was
included as an exhibit to the plaintiffs' opposition for summary judgment. The first time
Rowe gained actual possession of "Exhibit 31" was on May 15, 2015 and he included it in
his Reply to show that all his attorneys were committing perjury and continuing to engage
in "fraud upon the court." On November 8, 2012, Judge Patterson denied Leonard Rowe's
FRCP 60 Motion - making no mention whatsoever that all four of Leonard Rowe's former
attorneys from SNR submitted perjurious Declarations by stating that "no derogatory terms
were located in the emails of the defendant" or that the orchestrators of this corrupt
conspiracy - including William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig - remained
silent and never denied their involvement in these diabolical crimes against humanity.]
c. Arbitrator David L . Gregory's Decisions Regarding "Exhibit 31": [While writing my
third appeal to the Second Circuit in attempts to vacate Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order,
I read a CNN article titled "Corruption in Our Federal Courts"'" and learned about Leonard
Rowe and his case against William Morris. I brought this to the attention of the Second
Circuit in my third and fourth appeal and my appeals were still denied. Instead of taking
the issue regarding the enforceability of William Morris' mandatory, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements to the Supreme Court, I complied with Castel's Stay Order and filed
a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on June 15, 2012.
The AAA appointed David L. Gregory to be the arbitrator on August 1, 2012. During our
first conference call on August 24, 2012,1 accused Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP of the

LLbLibra. "Corruption In Our Federal Courts." CNN. December 20, 2011. http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC724105.

11

claims raised in this Motion. Zweig denied any and all wrongdoing. . Two days before
Patterson issued his decision on Rowe's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion, William Morris and
Loeb & Loeb LLP submitted their first formal response to the arguments raised in my
Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment. In their Motion, they continued to deny
any and all claims of wrongdoing and with regards to "Exhibit 31" and deferred to the
judgments of Robert P. Patterson. Although the parties had originally agreed to have the
case decided entirely via summary judgment motions, I sought for Arbitrator Gregory to
stay making a decision on the suiTimary judgment motions pending discovery and an oral
hearing after reading Patterson's erroneous decision. On April 18, 2013, Arbitrator David
L. Gregory stated I could stand in "political solidarity" with Rowe and did something
Patterson never have the courage to do; remain impartial and compel William Morris, Loeb
& Loeb LLP and others to produce the actual e-mails received from Electronic Evidence
Discovery (EED) (now known as Discovery Technology, Inc.) in or around September
2002. Arbitrator Gregory stated; " I am persuaded that a particular document ["Exhibtt 31"
and the underlying emails] is critically important and should be produced and truthfully
explained by both parties to the extent that they are realistically able to do so."'^ [Arbitrator
Interim Decision, 5 ] In order to comply with the Arbitrator's requests, I relied heavily on
a myriad of sources (e.g. the personal testimony of Leonard Rowe, the Declarations of his
former attorneys at SNR, Judge Patterson's November 8, 2012 decision denying Mr.

" " I ' l l state for the record that the allegations and accusations [ o f unethical and criminal conduct] are absolutely false,
scurrilous and disreputable." Regarding his involvement in the corrupt conspiracy to commit "fraud upon the Court"
in Rowe he stated: " I t appears that he claims I would note that without any personal knowledge or any knowledge
at all - that somehow, everyone conspired against the plaintiffs in that case to effectuate the result o f a summary
dismissal. Obviously, those allegations are w h o l l y false and beneath my dignity to respond t o . "
Elsewhere in the Interim Decision, Arbitrator Gregory states: " I would prefer the production o f the original
documents constituting Exhibit A " [Arbitrator Interim Decision, 1 2 ] and " I assume that Respondents are the
custodians o f the email and other communication archival records." [Arbitrator Interim Decision, 13.Jj un

12

Rowe's FRCP 60 Motion and common sense amongst other sources) to demonstrate that
"Exhibit 31" is both genume, authentic and relevant to all of my claims. I also had Leonard
Rowe submit a notarized Affidavit. See Exhibit B. In the second Interim Decision of
Arbitrator Gregory, he stated: "As to Exhibit [31] and any and all potentially forthcoming
proferred evidence, 1 continue my April 18, 2013 First Interim Decision Order in full force
and effect. Each party has the continuing duty of facilitating discovery. Pursuant to New
York law, discovery requests, and the statutory law against unlawful employment
discrimination, shall be liberally construed." See Exhibit C. During our July 30, 2013
conference call. Arbitrator Gregory also stated: " I take arbitral notice on my sense is that
Respondents, corporate Respondents, are in the norm, custodians of the record, maintain
the archives, etc. and "urge[d] the Respondents to take a final look before we go to any
other part of this proceeding to see whether or not the elements of the problematic exhibit
can be retrieved." In the third Interim Decision issued on September 25, 2013, after
admitting "Exhibit 31" "into the evidence of record," Arbitrator Gregory stated, " I ORDER
that Respondent WME cooperate with the e-discovery expert of Claimant's choice to
facilitate access to and be permitted to retrieve the emails contained on WME's 1998-1999
back up tapes." [pg. 2.]. See Exhibit D. Although Arbitrator Gregory ignored the pyramid
of documentary evidence I presented from the files in Rowe's case and asked the parties to
submit more information in his second Interim Decision, he admitted "Exhibit 31" into the
evidence of record.]
d. Leonard Rowe Is Imprisoned For Filing Commercial Liens Against William Morris,
Loeb & Loeb, Dentons L L P , Michael P. Zweig and Others:
B. Discovery Abuses and Bad-Faith Conduct During Washington Litigation:

13

Failed to Meet Heightened Burden of Production and Persuasion: Although Loeb &
Loeb LLP initially argued to P. Kevin Castel that my claims were "wholly without merit,
legally and factually," it became clear dunng arbitration that they were actually violating
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 due to the fact that they never refuted the pyramid of evidence
establishing my claims of systemic disparate treatment, disparate impact and pre-hiring
individual disparate treatment. Although they were aware of the burdens of proof, they
pretended that the pyramid of evidence I presented did not matter and was irrelevant in
establishing a prima facie case that my race, color and/or national origin played a
"motivating factor' as to why I was not hired and/or promoted to Agent. Once in arbitration,
they continued to raise frivolous arguments, including but not limited to:
i. Claims Limited to 300 Day Statute of Limitations: [Zweig argued that my
"claims are time-barred because [I] failed to file a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of when [I] knew or had
reason to know of the alleged unlawful employment action." My complaint was
filed within 300 days of me discussing my concerns of being discriminated
against because of my race with upper management (Cara Stein) and William
Moms took no investigation into my complaint. [PI. S.D.N.Y. Complaint, fTl 139155.] Even i f that were the case, they were aware that William Morris was being
sued under three additional antidiscrimination statutes, each having a statute of
limitations at a minimum of three years.]
ii. Erroneous Reliance On Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642,
109 S.Ct 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989): [During summary judgment, Loeb &
Loeb LLP tried to rely on Wards to defeat my disparate impact claims, but it is

14

well settled that twenty-four years ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended
specifically to strengthen disparate impact theory by overturning Wards]
iii. Misrepresentations Re: Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order: [On February 25,
2011, William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP sought to compel my case into
arbitration pursuant to two mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements that I
signed as a condition of employment. I raised a unique challenge to their Motion,
relying on William Morris' history of intentional racial discrimination against
blacks and segregating occupations by race, to show that the agreement I signed
was unconscionable and thus, unenforceable as a matter of law. After ignoring
my arguments, omitting pertinent facts and misapplying the law, Castel upheld
the contracts and stated per the 2009 Arbitration Agreement's "Delegation
Provision," that issues of arbitrability had to be decided by the arbitrator. While
in arbitration, I continued to raise these legal arguments supporting that as a
matter of law and public policy, arbitration was an inappropriate forum to resolve
the merits of my claims and achieve the public policy goals of our nation's
antidiscrimination and antitrust statutes. In response, Zweig misrepresented to
Arbitrator Gregory that Castel had already decided that issue of arbitrability
knowing that he had not.]
iv. Accusing Me of Being "Racist," "Anti-Semitic" and Engaging in Defamation
Although They Failed to Refute Pyramid of Evidence Establishing All
Claims: [While never refuting the historical, statistical, documentary, anecdotal,
circumstantial and other forms of evidence to establish claims of pattem and
continuing practice discrimination against African Americans spanning more

15

than century, disparate impact, pre-hiring individual disparate treatment,

violations of antitrust law, etc., Loeb & Loeb LLP argued that I was "racist" and
"anti-Semitic," which was later mentioned in the decisions of by Timothy K.
Lewis and Castel to support the false narrative that I was engaging in bad-faith
and raising "frivolous" arguments. It carmot and has not been disputed that
"Jews" of European descent invented, control and are overrepresented in position
of power in Hollywood today.
V. Other Misrepresentations:
1. False Statements Re: E E O C : [Since the inception of this case, I have
always argued that the EEOC never conduct an investigation into my claims
after filing a complaint on June 3, 2010. [PI. S.D.N.Y. Complaint, 1 8.] In
their July 30,2012 response to my Demand for Arbitration, they stated: "As
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found in closing its
investigation on this matter, there is simply no evidence proving, let alone
suggesting, that any of the Respondents violated any employment or other
law with respect to Mr. Washington." [ | 6.] In the Defendants' CrossMotion to Dismiss, they also stated at the onset of the Motion, that I was
"seeking redress for claims of alleged employment discrimination - claims
that he had previously and unsuccessfully brought before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")." [Def Rep. Summary
Judgment, 1.] In my January 31, 2013 Reply to Summary Judgment, I
addressed this lie, and asked William Morris to come forth with all

See e.g., Neal Gabler. How The Jews Invented Hollywood: An Empire Of Their Own. 1988.

16

documents submitted to the EEOC in response to my complaint. More than

five years later, no documents have been produced. William Morris and
Loeb & Loeb LLP knew that the EEOC did not conduct an investigation
into my complaint before issumg a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" letter
on September 28, 2010. [PI. S.D.N.Y. Complaint, ^ 9.] In the same way
Loeb & Loeb LLP and others have tried to create the false impression that
I "lost" my case in the federal court, they have intentionally misrepresented
the facts to deceive and create doubt in the finder of fact's mind that my
claims are "wholly without merit, legally and factually," "frivolous" and
made in "bad-faith."]
Intentional Bad Faith & Contumacious Conduct During Discovery:
i. Failure to Disclose Date Litigation Hold Was Place: [Beginning November 27,
2012,1 sent Zweig an e-mail title "Lifigation Hold" and asked him to provide me
with information on the date he placed a litigation hold on William Morris and its
employees. To this day, Zweig has never responded to my question]
ii. Failure to Disclose Information about Employment Practices Liability
Insurance (EPLI): [On December 24, 2013, I e-mailed Carbone and various
Loeb & Loeb LLP attorneys to provide me with information on William Morris'
EPLI provider. To this day, Carbone has never responded to my question."
iii. Failure to Produce Any Documents: [For six months, Loeb & Loeb LLP refused
to comply with any of my good faith discovery requests and failed to produce any
documents. The reason they never produced any of this information, is due to the
fact that their arguments are pretextual and producing the documents would

17

confirm this fact. After fiUng an Em. Motion to Compel and Request for
Sanctions on September 30,2013. See Exhibit E , On January 2,2014,1 appealed
Arbitrator Gregory's

Partial

Final Award. Arbitrator Gregory

abruptly

"suspended" discovery, cancelled the oral hearing and instructed the parties to
submit their Final Position Statements before he would render his "omnibus final
position." Although I objected to discovery being cancelled, Loeb & Loeb LLP
did not and they submitted Final Position Statement on November 20, 2013.]
c. Seeking Gregory's Disqualification After Partial Final Award Was Issued, That the
Award Was "Ripe" and "Final" For the Sake Of Judicial Review And The Federal
Court Had Jurisdiction to Disqualify And Vacate the Award: [On December 17,2013,
Arbitrator Gregory issued his Partial Final Award, concluding that

I proved by a

"preponderance of evidence" that "William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC

discriminated against [me] in violation of pertinent federal, state and local law prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of race" and indicated that during phase two of
our biftircated proceeding, I would receive the full gamut of monetary damages, including
but not limited to punitive damages, pro-se attorney's fees and "recompense for avoidable
delays." Despite prevailing on my post-hiring individual disparate treatment claims.
Arbitrator Gregory did not resolve my claims of systemic disparate treatment, disparate
impact and pre-hiring individual disparate treatment.''* 21 days after Gregory issued his
Partial Final Award, Loeb & Loeb LLP filed a second Motion to Disqualify Arbitrator
Gregory. When Gregory abruptly "suspended" discovery & oral hearing, Loeb & Loeb
LLP never raised any objections. Although Loeb & Loeb LLP intentionally refused to

Concerning my two separate conspiracy claims. Arbitrator Gregory concluded that

18

comply with any of my discovery requests for six months, failed to meet their heightened
burden of production and persuasion, did not object to Arbitrator Gregory canceling
discovery and the oral hearing before rendering his "omnibus final decision," they argued
to an anonymous group of individuals that Arbitrator Gregory violated their constitutional
right to due process.'^ On January 23, 2014, the A A A disqualified Arbitrator Gregory
without reason or explanation. Despite my objections, the A A A appointed Schnader LLP
and AAA board of director Timothy K. Lewis to the case on February 18, 2014.]
C. Loeb Attorney Christian Carbone's Failure to Disclose and Resulting Conflict of Interest
a. Learning From Third Party That Christian's Wife Was An Executive For the AAA:
[On March 10, 2014,1 learned from a third party that Loeb & Loeb LLP attorney Christian
Carbone's wife served as General Counsel for the American Arbitration Association and
was a former employee of Loeb & Loeb LLP. On that same day, I e-mailed Christian and
the AAA, asking Christian to confirm this information. I also brought this information to
Castel's attention. Upon doing research on Sasha Angelique Carbone, I discovered that she
worked closely with the replacement "arbitrator" as both were members of the AAA's
Diversity Committee.'^ Pursuant to the notarized Notice of Appointment signed by Lewis,
it states in question five: "Have you had any professional or social relationship of which
you are aware with any relative of any of the parties to this proceeding, or any relative of
counsel to this proceeding...?" (emphasis added) See Exhibit F . Lewis checked "No."
Even i f Lewis did not know, the A A A was aware of the Carbone's marriage and never

This actually constituted a violation of A A A Rule 36, which is titled "Waiver of Objection/Lack of Compliance
with These Rules." It states: "Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge that any provision or
requirement of these rules has not been complied with, and who fails to state objections thereto in writing or in a
transcribed record, shall be deemed to have waived the right to object."
Mrs. Carbone is a former employee of Loeb & Loeb LLP.

19

informed myself or Lewis [allegedly]. On May 30,2014,1 sought for the A A A to disqualify
Lewis. On June 11, 2014, the A A A refused to disqualify Lewis and provided no
explanation for its decision. Footnote about his other conflicts of interes.t]
Carbone's Misrepresentations to the Southern District of New York: [On February 28
and March 5, 2015,1 wrote a letter to Castel pursuant to his Individual Rules, informing
him of the fraud that had been taken place smce issuing his July 20, 2011 Stay Order and
letting him know that I would be filing an all-encompassing Motion addressing all issues
and concerns, including claims of "fraud upon the Court" against Zweig, Carbone and Loeb
& Loeb LLP. Castel endorsed this letter and set forth a scheduling Order. Refusing to
respond to questions about his marriage, Carbone stated in a letter to Castel dated March
7, 2014 that I should not be allowed to submit my pending Fraud Upon the Court Motion
because the parties didn't agree to bifurcating the proceeding and thus, the arbitrator's
Award was not "final." Carbone knew that I requested a bifurcated proceeding when I
submitted my proposed schedule for discovery and oral hearing in the Reply to Gregory's
Interim Decision 1 on June 13, 2013. See Exhibit G.]
Other Bad Faith Conduct Involving Loeb & Loeb L L P and Lewis:
i. Repeatedly Referring to Lewis As "Judge" In Capacity As Arbitrator:
[Throughout Lewis' involvement in the case, Loeb & Loeb LLP attorneys and
staff for the A A A would refer to Lewis as "Judge Lewis" in his fraudulent
capacity as arbitrator. My objections were ignored.]
ii. Immediately Seeking Vacatur of Arbitrator Gregory's PFA Although The
AAA Said This Would Not Happen: Stated Replacement Arbitrator Would Not
Vacate Gregory's PFA. [On February 7, 2014, Heather Santo - Director for the

20

A A A - informed both parties: "The Association does not have any authority to
change or revoke any prior ruUngs, including the Partial Final Award, rendered
by Arbitrator Gregory." During the initial conference call with Lewis, Loeb &
Loeb LLP immediately moved for Lewis to vacate Arbitrator Gregory's Award.
Although I objected and informed Lewis of what Santo stated, he set for a
schedule for Loeb & Loeb LLP to submit their Motion to Vacate Arbitrator
Gregory's Partial Final Award.]
iii. Paying Schnader L L P & Lewis Directly In Violation of AAA Employment
Rule 44: [In the section titled "Neutral Arbitrator's Compensation," it states:
"Any arrangement for the compensation of a neutral arbitrator shall be made
through the A A A and not directly between the parties and the arbitrator. Payment
of the arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be made by the AAA from the fees
and moneys collected by the AAA for this purpose." All of Lewis' invoices
directed WME to make payment directly to Schnader LLP (providing their bank
routing number, etc.). I raised objections because the A A A was not able to
provide information of when and what amounts were paid to Schnader LLP. After
Lewis dismissed my case with prejudice and on the merits on June 25,2014, AAA
Case Manager Carol Placella stated the A A A would not provide "further
response" to my inquiries.]
D. Other
a. Zweig Initially Stating That All of My Claims Are "Wholly Without Merit, Legally
and Factually" While Enlisting SAdditional Loeb Attorneys and 3 Paralegals to
"Represent" William Morris: [No further coment.]

21

AAA - informed both parties: "The Association does not have any authority to
change or revoke any prior ruHngs, including the Partial Final Award, rendered
by Arbitrator Gregory." During the initial conference call with Lewis, Loeb &
Loeb LLP immediately moved for Lewis to vacate Arbitrator Gregory's Award.
Although I objected and informed Lewis of what Santo stated, he set for a
schedule for Loeb & Loeb LLP to submit their Motion to Vacate Arbitrator
Gregory's Partial Final Award.]
iii. Paying Schnader L L P & Lewis Directly In Violation of AAA Employment
Rule 44: [In the section titled "Neutral Arbitrator's Compensation," it states:
"Any arrangement for the compensation of a neutral arbitrator shall be made
through the AAA and not directly between the parties and the arbitrator. Payment
of the arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be made by the AAA from the fees
and moneys collected by the AAA for this purpose." All of Lewis' invoices
directed WME to make payment directly to Schnader LLP (providing their bank
routing number, etc.). I raised objections because the A A A was not able to
provide information of when and what amounts were paid to Schnader LLP. After
Lewis dismissed my case with prejudice and on the merits on June 25,2014, AAA
Case Manager Carol Placella stated the A A A would not provide "further
response" to my inquiries.]
D. Other
a. Zweig Initially Stating That All of My Claims Are "Wholly Without Merit, Legally
and Factually" While Enlisting SAdditional Loeb Attorneys and 3 Paralegals to
"Represent" William Morris: [No flirther coment]

21

b. Zweig's Refusal To List Himself As Attorney of Record Before the 2nd Circuit:
[Although Michael P. Zweig has always been the lead attorney of record in this case, he
refused to submit a Notice of Appearance when I first attempted to appeal P. Kevm Castel's
July 20, 2011 Stay Order. After Castel issued his Final Order on September 5, 2014 and I
submitted a Notice of Appeal with the Second Circuit, Zweig had Carbone file the
Acknowledgement and Notice of Appearance Form while he submitted the Notice of
Appearance As Additional Counsel.]
c. Michael Barnett's Improper Withdrawal From Litigation: [Although Michael Steven
Bamett made his first appearance in this case during arbitration, he formally entered this
case in the federal court on March 3, 2014 when he submitted his Notice of Appearance.
In or around December of 2014, Michael Bamett withdrew from the case without
informing the Court or filing a Motion to Withdraw. He is now employed as an Assistant
United States Attorney for the Department of Justice.]
d. Zweig Seeking Protective Order From District Court Knowing the Second Circuit
Had Jurisdiction: [ I filed a Notice of Appeal with the Second Circuit on November 12,
2014. Five days later, Zweig submitted a letter to P. Kevin Castel seeking "leave to file a
Motion for a Protective Order" atthough the district court no longer had jurisdiction over
the case. On November 21,2014, Castel denied his request. Zweig did not seek a Protective
Order from the appellate court in his opposition to my appeal.]
e. Loeb & Loeb L L P Currently Representing Dentons In A Case Involving Claims of
Attorney Fraud In Separate Action: [In a Law360 article written by Andrew Strickler
titled "Judge Slams 'Vitriol' In Dentons Estate Malpracttce Row,"'' it states: "ANew York

Andrew Strickler. "Judge Slams 'Vitriol' In Dentons Estate Malpractice Row." Law360. February 17, 2015.
http://wwvv.la\v360.corn./articles/622180/judge-slams-vitriol-in-dentons-e.state-maJpractice-row.

22

judge overseeing a contentious dispute involving a prominent Dentons partner, dueling

claims of attorney fraud, and a multimillion-dollar settlement with the estate of a property
developer told lawyers Tuesday to tone down the "vitriol" of recent filings. In denying calls
for sanctions against attorneys for Dentons partner Martin Rosen, Judge Rita Mella of the
New York County Surrogate's Court told his counsel from Loeb & Loeb LLP, and attorney
Richard Yellen, who sought the sanctions, to refrain from further personal attacks in an
ongoing dispute over a $13 million settlement between New York real estate developer
David Marx and the estate of Marx's former business partner. Jack Schleifer." The case is
Natalie Schleifer and Martin Rosen as co-executors of the Jack P. Schleifer estate and
revocable trust, file number 3599-10, in the Surrogate's Court of the State of New York.]
in.
Using The Law To Explain Loeb & Loeb L L P ' s Conspiracy to Engage in A
"Pattern" of Bad-Faith Conduct and "Fraud Upon the Court" on William Morris' Behalf.

A. Rowe Litigation;
Although Castel allowed the AAA to improperly disqualify Arbitrator Gregory after he issued an
Award that was ripe and final with regards to the issue of arbitrability and liability, his decision
regarding "Exhibit 31" was not vacated. For various reasons, this decision supports my claims of
"fraud upon the Court."'^ Even i f Arbitrator Gregory's disqualification and the vacatur of his
Partial Final Award were lawful, William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP are collaterally estopped
from making statements that raise doubts as to this document's authenticity.
To meet the elements of a criminal conspiracy, it must be proved that: ( I ) there was an
agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime; (2) the individual voluntarily and

Arbitrator Gregory did not have jurisdiction to resolve claims of "fraud upon the Court.'

23

intentionally joined in the agreement; (3) at the time of joining the agreement, the individual knew
the purpose of the agreement; and (4) that while the agreement was in effect, one or more of the
persons did an overt act to carry out the agreement. See United States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 125
(8th Cir. 1993). Federal criminal law and the majority of state criminal laws punish a conspiracy
as a crime, separate and apart from the criminal objective of the conspiracy.'^ In other words, the
underlying crime need not be completed for the conspirators to be convicted of conspiracy.- The
essence of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement.^'
It cannot be disputed that after the search was conducted, WMA and CAA's counsel
received the e-mails first in violation of Magistrate Francis' January 16, 2002 Order concerning
the protocol for e-discovery. Although Francis' Order stated that the defendants could only receive
the e-mails first if they paid for the search, Loeb & Loeb LLP received the e-mails first although
the class of black concert promoters paid $200,000.00 to conduct the search. It also cannot be
disputed that in violation of Francis' Order, attorneys for Loeb & Loeb LLP and Weil Gotshal &
Manges LLP deleted e-mails before delivering the e-mails, compact discs (CDs) and privilege &
responsive logs to SNR.
Nearly ten years later, in response to Rowe's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 Mofion, all four of Rowe's
former SNR attorneys submitted perjurious Declarations stating more or less, that "no derogatory
terms were found." The lead attorney responsible for conduct e-discovery - Richard Primoff-

See e.g., Catherine E. Smith. The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies. 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 55, 64 (Fall 2006)
(citing Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 922 (1959); Kathleen F. Brickey, White
Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 431, 443 (1983)).
^'^ Id. "For example, two or more persons who agree to rob a bank may be convicted of the crime of conspiracy, even
i f they do not commit the robbery." United States v. Jimenez Recio. 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (explaining that the
essence of a conspiracy is "an agreement to commit an unlawful act" which is a "distinct evil" that "may... be punished
whether or not the substantive crime ensues") (quotinglmmWi v. United States. 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) and Salinas
V. United States. 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)).
^' Brickey. Supra note 19, at 431 ("As the essence of conspiracy is an agreement, conspiracy requires a plurality of
actors.").

24

stated that no e-mails at all and that EED's search wasn't intended to produce e-mails, only search
results. Prior to May 15, 2012, Rowe never had possession of "Exhibit 31." His former counsel
knew that, so they lied, thinking that it would never backfire on them. While Richard Primoff
stated in a letter to Patterson dated that no e-mails were ever produced, on August 14, 2002, he emailed the defendants' counsel, stating: "With respect to the periods being examined, plaintiffs
will restore and retrieve all email communications between and/or among these users. In addition,
plaintiffs will apply a list of search terms against these accounts, to consist of the following: [long
list of terms including "[List of racial slurs]"]." See Exhibit H.
As can be seen, there is a clear 'meeting of the minds" between all attorneys that handled
e-discovery in Rowe. The four perjurious Declarations of Mr. Rowe's former attorneys from SNR
in May 2012, the silence of the "Booking Agency Defendants" and demals of wrongdoing by the
Willie Gary Law Fmn^^ prove that this overall conspiracy to defraud the class of black concert
promoters and interfere with the civil and human rights of African Americans is still "on-going."^^
According to New York's Evidence Handbook: Rules, Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., it states:
'After a prima facie showing of conspiracy, any declaration by a conspirator made during the
course and i n furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible against a coconspirator as an
exception to the hearsay rule.' Statements admitted through this hearsay exception may be
invoked to prove either 'a conspirator's complicity in a conspiracy,' or 'to prove a
coconspirator's commission of a substantive crime for which the conspiracy was formed.'

^^^^ Leonard Rowe is presently suing the Willie Gary Law Firm, Willie Gary, Bill Campbell, Maria Sperando and
others for racketeering and other causes of action.
When Congress first enacted the conspiratorial provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (now 1985(3)), it was
created to punish individuals who engaged in collective action to deprive blacks and Republicans of their federal
rights. Today, Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies undertaken "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection under the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the laws" and provides for "an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). To prevail on a claim under 1985(3), a plaintiff
must demonstrate that defendants "(1) engaged in a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; (3) acted in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) deprived such person or class of persons the exercise o f
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." N.Y. State Nat'l Org, for Women v. Terry. 886 F.2d 1339,
1358 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge. 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971),
25

The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is based upon the substantive principles of
conspiratorial liability. Under the substantive law, each conspirator is considered an agent of
the other; the law looks at a conspiracy as a partnership in crime. This means that the acts of
one conspirator are treated as the acts of all members of the conspiracy so long as the acts are
within the course of the conspiracy and intended to further conspiratorial goals. The
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule treats conspirators' statements in the same way the statement of one conspirator is attributable to all the others so long as it was made while
the conspiracy was ongoing and was intended to further conspiratorial goals.
The individuals and/or entities that stood the most to gain from having this fraudulently
concealed evidence from seeing the light of day were the William Morris, CAA and their
respective counsel. Therefore, it is obvious that there was an "agreemenf between two or more
people to commit a crime, or to accomplish a legal end through illegal a c t i o n s . I f not, why else
would the Plaintiffs' former attorneys continue to lie on behalf of the Defendants in their May
2012 Declarations by stating that "no derogatory terms" were found during electronic discovery,
although the fax ID on "Exhibit 31" proves otherwise?
"Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an
erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of action." Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
v. Superior Court, (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1. Spoliation of evidence has been historically defined as
"[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence. "^^ Spoliation of
evidence''' "offends notions of fair play and substantial justice and therefore, the law, in one way

^^ Since the Supreme Court denied Rowe's petition for certiorari in 2006, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Dentons LLP joined
forces to prevent Leonard Rowe from filing a commercial lien against them and presently, Loeb is representing a
Dentons attorney against accusations of "attorney fraud."
^5 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
The Second Circuit has defined "spoliation" as "the destruction or deliberate alteration of evidence, or the failure
to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation." West v. The
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). The duty to preserve arises when a party knows or
should know that evidence may be relevant to litigation which it reasonably anticipates. See e.g., Silvestri v. General
Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001). While a party is not required to preserve "every shred of paper, every
email or electronic document, and every backup tape," a party is required to preserve what it "knows, or reasonably
should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, or is
reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request." Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg. LLC, 220F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) {quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines. Inc.. 142F.R.D.
68, 72 (S.D.N.Y 1991)).
26

or another, seeks to deter it."''' It has its roots in the evidentiary doctrine of "adverse presumption,"
which allows for the presumption that the destroyed evidence contained information detrimental
to the party who destroyed the evidence unless such destruction is adequately explained. Little v.
Boston Scientific Corp.. 8 So. 3d 591 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2009), writ denied, 6 So. 3d 801 (La.
2009). The intentional spoliation or destruction of evidence relevant to a case raises an inference
that the evidence would have been unfavorable. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407, 6
A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 238, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ^44836
(10th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he general rule is that bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof
of an issue at trial gives rise to an inference that production of the document would have been
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction."). This presumption or inference arises
only when the act was intentional and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth. The
presumption does not arise when the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.
The egregious and diabolical conduct of Zweig and various attorneys in Rowe showed a
blatant contempt for the Court and a fundamental disregard for the judicial process. Each attorney,
without question, engaged in fraudulent conduct with the "purpose to deceive" and involves moral
turpitude.-^^ As a result of their actions, William Morris was allowed to continue violating our

Rebecca Devlin and Jeffrey M . Pincus. "Spoliation of Evidence: When In Doubt, Don't Throw It Out."
Transportation Lawyers Association. http://www.lewisiohs.com/pdfs/Spoliation.pdf
^^ Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure authorizes a court to impose sanctions when a party "fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery." Even if a court has not issued an explicit discovery order, the court has
an "inherent power to regulate litigation, preserve and protect the integrity of proceedings before [them], and sanction
parties for abusive practices." Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines. Inc.. 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Whitney
V. JetBlue Airways Corp.. 07 CV 1397 (CBA) (E.D.N.Y., April 29, 2008), an unpublished decision, the Court
articulated three elements that a party must establish to obtain sanctions for spoliation of evidence: (1) "the party
having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed"; (2) "the records were
destroyed with a culpable state of mind"; and (3) "the evidence was relevant to the party's claim or defense such that
a reasonable tier of fact could find that it supported that claim or defense." As to the second element, however, courts
were split over whether the requisite "a culpable state of mind" element would be satisfied by a showing of (a) bad
faith, (b) intentional destrucfion, or (c) gross negligence, and the Second Circuit concluded that "a case-by-case
approach is appropriate." (c;7;>7g Farella v. City of New York, 2007 W L 193867 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
See e.g.. Jay Wilson. The Definitional Problems With "Moral Turpitude." The Journal of the Legal Profession.
1991. ("Moral turpitude is an elusive, vague, and troublesome concept in the law, incapable of precise definition; such
27

nation's antidiscrimination and civil rights laws with "malice and/or reckless indifference" to the
federally protected rights of American citizens of African descent, hence the reason there were
zero African Americans employed in the New York office when I started the company's Agent
Trainee program in September 2008. Since the hundreds of underlying e-mails containing racial
slurs have not been produced and each law firm continues to lie about what happened during ediscovery in this case, no impartial finder of fact should assume that they are being honest and
truthful.
B. Washington
During arbitration, we spent six months in discovery, Loeb & Loeb LLP never complied with any
of my good-faith discovery requests ad produced no documents, despite Arbitrator Gregory's three
Interim Decisions granting discovery. I have demonstrated that Leonard Rowe's former counsel
and counsel for the Booking Agency Defendants have a clear "meeting of the minds" with regards
to what happened during e-discovery in Rowe.
To this day, the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31" have not produced, nor have William
Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP produced any of the e-mails, compact discs (CDs) and privilege
logs that were referenced in letters to SNR attorneys during e-discovery in Rowe.^ In a "good

is evidenced by the myriad of definitions and interpretations in judicial opinions. A recurrent definition of moral
turpitude in Alabama cases is as follows; Anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Similar language is
found in the case law of other states. The New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term has defined moral turpitude as
'the quality of crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community.' Likewise, the Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio has held the test to be 'whether the act offends the generally accepted moral conduct of
mankind.' The Supreme Court of California has stated that 'criminal acts which involve intentional dishonesty for
purpose of personal gain are acts involving moral turpitude.'"). C//wg Nelson v. State. 35 Ala.App. 179, 44 So.2d 802
(1950); G.M. Moslev Contractors v. Phillips. 487 So.2d 876 (Ala.1986); People v. Ferguson. 55 Misc.2d 711, 715,
286 N.Y.S.2d 976, 981 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.l968) (c/z/o/w^Merriam-Webster'sNew Int'l Dictionary (2 ed.)); State v. Deer.
57 Ohio Op. 493, 129 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1955) {(quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1707)); In
re Hallinan. 48 Cal.2d 52, 54, 307 P.2d 1, 2 (1957).
On December 6, 2012 however - a month after submitting their Opposition - Christian Carbone decided to deny
these allegations in response to an e-mail I sent to the A A A notifying them that I would be filing an emergency motion
to compel the underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31." Amongst his numerous lies, he states that my motion "should be

28

faith" attempt to comply with Arbitrator Gregory's second Interim Decision, I e-mailed Michael
Zweig on July 27, 2013, and asked him to forward questions I received from various e-discovery
experts to William Morris' IT department, so I could obtain quotes and submit them to the
Arbitrator. Zweig never responded. Nearly two months later, on September 25,2013,1 forwarded
the same e-mail to Zweig and stated that by September 27, 2013, William Morris' IT department
needed to answer these preliminary questions. Again, I received no response. On September 27,
2013,1 e-mailed Zweig at 1:05 pm to see i f the Respondents were going to actually comply with
my request and stated: "Two months have elapsed since I initially e-mailed these questions and I
have been more than patient with you, so i f not, I will have no choice but to bring this to the
attention of the Arbitrator and ask for discovery sanctions for your contumacious behavior."
Instead of receiving a response from Zweig, he had newly added attorney Michael Bamett speak
on his behalf to tell me: "[W]e are still in the process of consulting with our client as to what
electronic data in the form of e-mails still exists from 1998-1999. We will advise you and the
Arbitrator of our findings in accordance with the deadlines that the Arbitrator has set." By refusing
to have William Morris' IT department answer these very basic questions about the company's
back-up tapes, the Respondents and their counsel prevented me from submitting "an itemized list
of the projected reasonable costs associated with this retrieval" to the Arbitrator by October 7,
2013.-'' This evidence is also important because it is believed that SNR and their co-conspirators

soundly rejected as meritless," that this would be "yet another opportunity by Mr. Washington to defame our clients
and their counsel by repeating offensive and baseless allegations," and states mostly likely without having read Judge
Patterson's November 8, 2012 decision, that I am trying to compel production of "fictitious e-mails that have never
been shown even to exist." (emphasis added) In a letter dated April 26, 2013, Carbone stated: "The document
["Exhibit 31"] itself may be bogus, given that the author of this document was never identified by the attorneys for
Mr. Rowe, who (unsuccessfully) introduced it as an exhibit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed
in 2002 in the Rowe litigation." Carbone wasn't involved in e-discovery and clearly is lying on behalf of Zweig and
the company that employs him.
^' William Morris attempted to do the same thing in Rowe. In a motion filed on November 22, 2000, counsel for the
class of black concert promoters stated:

29

violated Magistrate Francis' E-Discovery Protocol i f they never searched the nine music Agents'
e-mails that were supposed to have been search. I f not, this provides another reason why the emails from this search would have never been admitted into the evidence of the record.
Due to the fact that Loeb & Loeb LLP claim that they knew nothing about "Exhibit 31" or
the underlying e-mails, I asked them to produce the e-mails, compact discs (CDs) and privilege
logs that they allegedly received. Since this spoliated evidence was concealed and never produced,
the duty to preserve has technically never expired."" Loeb & Loeb LLP and their coconspirators
were and still are withholding crucial infonnation from the court and concealing from the court
facts that are required by law to be disclosed. "An attorney's withholding of crucial information
from a court falls within the proscription of Judiciary Law 487. Stated differently, an attorney's
concealment from a court of a fact he or she is required by law to disclose is tantamount to the
assertion of a false material fact." Melcher v Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 2013 N Y Slip Op 00256
(N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013); Matter of Shearer. 94 AD3d 128 [1st Dept 2012].

Plaintiffs bring this motion because they were left with no other acceptable course of action, after having
negotiated in good faith with defense counsel for months over discovery matters. It is now over one and a half
years since the Document Requests and Interrogatories were initially served, four months after plaintiffs wrote to
defendants' counsel demanding compliance with these requests, and three months after this Court's August 2000
conference and scheduling order, dated September 15, 2000 (the "Order") requiring the completion of defendants'
document production by December 1, 2000, and plaintiffs still have received no documents responsive to their
requests. To be sure, none of the defendants has announced an outright refusal to cooperate with plaintiffs in
discovery. Instead, defendants have attempted to convey a superficial veneer of cooperation. Once defendants'
positions are analyzed and the veneer is stripped, however, it is evidence that defendants consistently have been
unwilling to permit plaintiffs any meaningful inspection and/or copying of voluminous, yet necessary, responsive
documents.
It is well established that attorneys have an obligation to preserve evidence for 7 years after a case has been closed.
The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari on October 2, 2006, so even i f you hadn't
compelled William Morris and their counsel to produce certain documents pertaining to e-discovery in Rowe six
months ago, these documents had to be preserved until October 2, 2013. The Respondents' failure to produce any of
these documents constitutes a clear obstruction of justice because producing this spoliated evidence will immediately
prove whether or not the e-mails of the five W M A music Agents that the class of black concert promoters asked SNR
to search on their behalf, were actually searched. I f the Respondents are unable to produce emails from those five
music Agents - since the alleged they did not receive e-mails from the names that appear on "Exhibit 31" - that will
serve as further confirmation that "fraud upon the court" did in fact occur in Rowe and supports my contenfion that
by default, fraud is happening in this litigation due to Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's mere presence in
this case.

30

Counsel is supposed to periodically communicate directly with employees most likely to

have relevant mformation and monitor compliance with the litigation hold. See Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg. LLC. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574 (S.D.N.Y., July 20, 2004).On November 27, 2012,
I asked Zweig when he issued a litigation hold against William Morris and its employees." To this
day, no answer has been given. See Brick v. HSBC Bank USA. No. 04-cv-0129E(F), 2004 WL
1811430, at * 1-4 (W.D.N. Y. Aug. 11,2004) (sanctioning counsel for the failure to issue a litigation
hold, failure to supervise the search by the client's employee, failure to supervise the search by the
client's employee, misrepresentations as to production completion, failure to notify the court of
document destruction, improperly withholding documents for privilege, and failure to produce
client files in possession of counsel). Only someone who believes they are above the law or knows
in advance that nothing will happen i f they disobey your orders, can refuse to comply with simple
discovery requests like this on multiple occasions over a span of ten months.
"True discovery abuse is that conduct which hinders justice by hiding needed and relevant
evidence."-''* Since Zweig has more than 37 years' experience as an attorney and has received
numerous accolades from predominately white organizations throughout his legal career, it is clear
that he is well aware the duty to preserve that arises when a party or prospective party has notice
of litigation or the potential for litigation. One of the reasons I know Zweig's conduct during
discovery was unethical and done in extreme bad-faith, is because I discovered an article he co-

Theoretically, William Morris should have been preserving evidence when they received notice that I field a
complaint with the EEOC on or about June 9, 2010. However, on November 27, 2012 - ten months ago - I asked
Zweig to inform me of the date he issued a litigation hold against William Morris and its employees because I told
him that I would be pursuing legal action against William Morris via e-mail on October 19, 2010 during the time I
was seeking legal representation and was unaware that he and his law firm represented William Morris in Rowe.
Russell Smith. Litigating Tort Cases. "Discovery Abuse." 2013.

31

authored with another Loeb & Loeb LLP attorney on the dos and don'ts of discovery.^^ Literally
everything that he stated in this article, he did the opposite in this case.
So after getting away with this conspiracy in Rowe, one of the first things Zweig stated to
the Southern District of New York in my case, was that all of my claims were "wholly without
merit, legally and factually." Throughout this nearly five year litigation, William Morris never
refuted the pyramid of historical & statistical evidence that undeniably proves my claims of pattem
and practice discrimination, disparate impact, pre and post-individual disparate treatment,
violations of antitmst law and conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of people of African
descent. In the 2013-2015 editions of The Best Lawyers in America, he was named the "Best
Lawyer" in Labor & Employment Litigation,^^ Yet, throughout this case, Zweig and Loeb & Loeb
LLP prevailed by raising a number of frivolous and legally insufficient legal defenses.
Loeb & Loeb LLP stated on numerous occasions before the district and appellate court in
this case, that my claims of systemic and individual disparate treatment were "unfounded," "wholly
without merit, legally or factually," and that my pleadings were "filled with outrageous, selfcontradictory, and utterly unsubstantiated allegations about WME and its employees." But since
Zweig conspired to conceal smoking gun evidence of WMA employees were referring to African
Americans as "nigger" and other racially derogatory terms in 2002, he could not raise these
arguments in good faith since my complaint demonstrated that William Morris was "limit[ing],
segregate[ing], or classify[ing] [their] employees or applicants for employment" by race, color
and/or national origin in a way which would "deprive[d] or [in]tend[ed] to deprive [those]
individuals] of employment opportunities," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), and maintaining

2' Michael P. Zweig & Mark J. Goldberg, Electronic Discovery: A Brave New World, W A L L ST. LAW., July 2005.
http://www.paralegalstudy247.coni/books/handouts/The%20Electronic%20Courtroom.pdf.
According to public records, Zweig has litigated very few employment discrimination cases since 2006.

32

"employment practice[s] that cause[d] a disparate impact on the basis of race, color... or national
origm." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(lXA)."
One of the biggest indicators that Zweig is intentionally being deceptive m his
interpretations of our nation's antidiscnmmation statutes and raismg frivolous legal arguments, is
that for his own law firm, he once served as the Chairperson for the firm's Diversity Initiative
Committee.^^ In my attempts to eradicate institutional barriers to advancement that result in
racially homogenous workplaces in Hollywood and other industries in America, I have been called
"racisf and "anti-Semitic."
Even i f Loeb & Loeb LLP hadn't engaged in "fraud upon the Court" in Rowe, they have
still engaged in "fraud upon the Court" in this case. After engaging in fraud on their behalf in
Rowe, William Morris enlisted Loeb & Loeb LLP against to achieve the same resuU. Instead of
having Loeb & Loeb LLP on retainer to ensure that the company was and is complying with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Loeb & Loeb LLP and other lawyers are instructing William Morris how
to maneuver around and "unintentionally" violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil
rights laws without fully being held accountable in a court of law. It is for this reason why I have
used phrases and labels such as "kings of deception," "masterful manipulators," "habitual liars"
and "psychopaths" to describe Loeb & Loeb LLP attorneys Zweig and Carbone. The statements
that "no derogatory terms" were found during the search are clearly lies and thus, Loeb & Loeb
LLP's broad denials of all claims for nearly F I V E years, in which they have also stated that my

" This is why there were zero African American Agent Trainees, Coordinators and Agents employed in the New York
office before I started the Agent Trainee program in September of 2008.
According to Loeb, Loeb's Diversity Initiative has "three principal goals which reflect the standing directive of the
firm's managing partners: (1) to enhance the firm's efforts in recruiting diverse candidates, and in particular minority
lawyers; (2) to enhance the firm's efforts in retraining a diverse workforce of attorneys through special emphasis on
the firm's training programs, social programs and work environment; (3) to encourage all efforts that enhance the
advancement and promotion of minority and diverse lawyers." See e.g.. Vera Djordjevich and the staff of Vault.
Vault/MCCA Guide to Law Firm Diversity Programs. 2007 ed. pg. 743.

33

claims of systemic and individual disparate treatment were "unfounded," "wholly without merit,
legally or factually," and that my pleadmgs were "filled with outrageous, self-contradictory, and
utterly unsubstantiated allegations about WME and its employees" have also never been true.
IV.

Intentional Violations of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct

Michael Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's intentional spoliation of evidence, failure to issue a
litigation hold and other 'bad faith" tactics involving moral turpitude are in direct violation of the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct. Each attorney, without question, engaged in fraudulent
conduct with the "purpose to deceive" and involves moral turpitude.-'^ In complete defiance of the
New York Rules of Professional Conduct, Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attorneys Michael P. Zweig,
Christian Carbone, Michael Bamett, Jessica Lee and others have intentionally violated the
following Rules:

Attomeys engaged in behavior contains elements of "scienter, deceit, intent to mislead"

and they "knowing[ly] fail[ed] to correct [their] misrepresentations." Rule I.O (i).

A lawyer shall not "suppress evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation to
reveal," "conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to
reveal," "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence" or "knowingly engage in
other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules." Rule 3.4 (a)(1), (3), (4) and (6).

See e.g. Jay Wilson. The Definitional Problems With "Moral Turpitude." The Journal of the Legal Profession. 199L
("Moral turpitude is an elusive, vague, and troublesome concept in the law, incapable of precise definition; such is
evidenced by the myriad of definitions and interpretations in judicial opinions. A recurrent definition of moral
turpitude in Alabama cases is as follows: An^^thing done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Similar language is
found in the case law of other states. The New York Supreme Court, Criminal Term has defined moral turpitude as
'the quality of crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community.' Likewise, the Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio has held the test to be 'whether the act offends the generally accepted moral conduct of
mankind.' The Supreme Court of California has stated that 'criminal acts which involve intentional dishonesty for
purpose of personal gain are acts involving moral turpitude.'").

34

Each lawyer knowingly "engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer," "engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;" "engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;" "knowingly assist[ed] a judge or judicial officer in conduct that
IS a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;" and/or "engage[d] in any
other conduct that adversely reflect[ed] on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer." Rule 8.4 (b),
(c), (d), (f)and(h).

Although lawyers are expected to be "zealous" in the representation of their clients, they are to
comply with the various rules governing ethical attorney conduct and the law at all times. A lawyer
shall not "counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal
or fraudulent." Rule 1.2 (d). Each lawyer had the opportunity to "refuse to aid or participate in
conduct that the lawyer believe[d] to be unlawful," but chose to engage in these highly unlawful
acts anyway. Rule 1.2 (f). Even if William Moms "forced" Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig
engage in criminal activity on their behalf, a lawyer "is bound by these Rules notwithstanding that
the lawyer acted at the direction of another person." Rule 5.2 (a).
V.

Decisions of P. Kevin Castel, the Second Circuit & Others Regarding Rowe and
Washington Claims Against Loeb & Loeb L L P and Its Attorneys.

The American Arbitration Association did not have the jurisdiction to decide motions to disquahfy
opposing counsel'* or resolve my claims of "fraud upon the Court" against Loeb & Loeb LLP and

It is well settled that a motion to disqualify a law firm and/or an attorney for purported violations of professional
rules of ethics, can only be decided by the federal court, not arbitrators.'"' Bidermann Industries Licensing. Inc. v.
Avmar N.V.. 570 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1991) ("Issues of attorney disqualification ... involve interpretation and
application of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules, as well as the potential deprivation of
counsel of the client's choosing," traditionally issues for a court); See afao Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Insco Ltd.
2011 WL 4552997 (S.D. N.Y. 2011).

35

its attorney Michael P. Zweig was engaging in a "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" on William
Moms' behalf" See Rule l.O(w), 3.3.
P. Kevin Castel is an Article III federal judge who sits on the head of the Grievance
Committee for the Southem District of New York - a committee responsible for handling
complaints of attorney misconduct - yet, there is absolutely no mention of Rowe, "Exhibit 31" or
Arbitrator Gregory's decision to admit this evidence into the record in my case, my claims of
"fraud upon the Court,'"*^ the New York Rules of Professional Conduct or New York Judiciary
Law 487 in Castel's September 5, 2014 "final" decision in favor of William Morris and Loeb &
Loeb LLP.'*-' Instead, he upheld Lewis' Award in favor of William Morris, awarded William
Morris $43,707.60, then he prejudiced my appeal by stating that it would not be submitted in good
faith, revoked my in forma pauperis status and granted William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP
motion to issue a filing injunction against me to prevent me from pursuing future legal acfion
against all parties who engaged in a conspiracy to deprive me of my constitutional, statutory and
inalienable rights under the color of law, in violation of Although Castel and the Second Circuit
concluded that all of my legal arguments were "frivolous" and "lack[ed] an arguable basis either

Since the New York Rules of Professional Conduct exphcitly addresses attorney conduct in tribunals (e.g.
arbitration), the A A A and its arbitrators could have held Loeb & Loeb LLP responsible for their highly unethical and
criminal conduct. One way would have been allowing this case to proceed in the federal court.
''^ On pages 22 through 26 of my October 3, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion, I discuss the numerous reasons why
I believe Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attorneys have engaged in a pattern of "fraud upon the Court."
In Castel's Order, he stated that Carbone's marriage was "alleged," despite me asking Carbone to submit an
Affidavit confirming his marital status and explaining his relationship to Sasha Angelique Carbone. Even if he didn't,
I uncovered information online that showed they were married. Loeb & Loeb LLP's New York office employs more
than 40 attorneys. Zweig could have chosen any attorney to help him with this case, but he chose the attorney whose
wife was an executive at the forum in which they wanted to have the case compelled to. At no date during this case
has Carbone confirmed or denied this information. He has remained silent, and his attorney - P. Kevin Castel - has
zealously defended and downplayed his highly unethical actions. I f Carbone's failure to disclose is as harmless as
Castel has made it appear, then he should have no problems admitting the truth. Even if Carbone's failure to disclose
is harmless, it doesn't excuse AAA's wrongdoing, since they were aware of the Carbone's marriage and also never
disclosed this information to me at any time throughout the case.

36

in fact or in law," their conclusions are contradicted by the irrefutable evidence and decisions of
the only lawfully appointed arbitrator - David L. Gregory.
Before Arbitrator Gregory admitted "Exhibit 31" "into the evidence of record" or I knew
about Carbone's marriage, Leonard Rowe and I filed a joint complaint against Zweig, Carbone,
Heslin, Gold and others on July 19,2012.'*'* Our complaint was whitewashed, no investigation took
place, the attomeys never had to submit a response and our clauns were denied.'*^ Due to the fact
that the federal court has entered judgments in favor of William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP, I
have not filed another complaint with the DDC because deference will automatically be given to
their decisions which make no mention of "Exhibit 31" or my claims of "fraud upon the Court."
VI.

Relief

Schnader LLP attomey Timothy K. Lewis, P. Kevin Castel and the various appellate judges of the
Second Circuit have essentially acted as counsel for William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP since
their legal conclusions have mirrored the factually frivolous and legally insufficient arguments
raised by Loeb & Loeb LLP and its unethical attomeys. The reality is, all of the attomeys involved
in the conspiracy to conceal smoking gun evidence and subvert the law should have been disbarred
a decade ago for committing "fraud upon the Court" in Rowe and violating New York Judiciary
Law 487, yet they are continuing to profit from these heinous crimes that include but are not
limited to: conspiracy, obstruction of justice, perjury, bribery, comiption, tampering with evidence
in a federal case in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1506, conspiring to interfere with the human rights of

In an effort to vindicate his rights after his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, Mr.
Rowe pursued disciplinary action against attomeys Martin R. Gold and Raymond Heslin in April 6, 2010
Dentons L L P attomey Martin R. Gold serves as "Special Counsel" for the DDC.

37

people of African descent (or Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, as codified 42 U.S.C, 1985(3) and
violations of additional laws.***"
Since the inception of this case, I have pursued this case against Wilham Morris in extreme
good faith and it is only due to the "highly unethical and criminal actions" actions of Loeb & Loeb
LLP that the extremely biased and partial finders of fact have concluded the opposite while
pretending that William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP are innocent and have done no wrong.
Although I was awarded "back pay, front pay, compensatory & punitive damages, I am living
below the poverty level and still living out of the suitcases I moved to New York City with after
completing my Masters in Music Business and Entertainment Industries from the University of
Miami''^ while Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attomeys have been unjustly enriched in an amount
totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars from their fraudulent representation of William Morris
in this case. See Exhibit I.
"[Ejvery element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of
equity to set aside the fraudulently plarmed and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the
[district court and AAA,] but the Circuit Court of Appeals...the public welfare demands that the
agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims
of deception and fraud..." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.. 322 U.S. 238, 244-245
(1944). William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP cannot prevail on my claims of conspiracy,
conspiracy against rights, conspiracy to interfere with human rights of people of African descent,
fraud, fraud upon the Court, violations of New York Judiciary 487 without producing the
underlying e-mails to "Exhibit 31," as well as all e-mails, compact discs, privilege & responsive

Dentons LLP (formerly known as Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP) is now one of the biggest law firms in the
world.
Pm currently more than $100,000 in student loan debt and have been able to make the minimum monthly payments
for years.

38

logs that were obtained and/or created during e-discovery in Rowe. Under no circumstances should
Loeb & Loeb LLP have been allowed to represent William Moms m this case. As a result of the
fraud committed by Loeb & Loeb LLP, nearly five years of my life have been wasted.'*^
Since Loeb & Loeb LLP should have had absolutely no involvement in this case, all
decisions rendered in favor of William Moms and Loeb & Loeb LLP should be vitiated.'*^ In order
to correct this gross "miscarriage of justice," I am asking the Supreme Court to use its inherent
power to impose extraordinary disciplinary and monetary sanctions against Loeb & Loeb LLP,
Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone, Michael Bamett and all other officers of the court that have
been unjustly enriched from conspinng to commit "fraud upon the Court," including but not
limited to disbarring Zweig, Carbone, Bamett and other attomeys that assisted them in their
fraudulent "representation" of William Moms, granting default judgment on all claims against
William Morris and imposing monetary sanctions against Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig,
Christian Carbone, Michael Bamett, Jessica Lee.^ I also ask that the Supreme Court overtum the
decisions of Robert P. Patterson in Rowe now that he has passed away and allow for a jury trial to
decide the merits of all claims raised by the class of concert promoters. To this day, William Moms
Endeavor Entertainment Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8,1 ask that Loeb & Loeb LLP and its
attorneys Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone be given 40 days to respond to this Motion and

I have spent more than $2,600 on this case over the last five years. My parents only gave me $200 for this month
and are no longer able to support me financially. Preparing and filing this Motion to the Supreme Court is going to
cost me than $200. To someone living below the poverty level, this is like spending a million dollars.
Since Patterson, Castel and other finders of fact have tried to pretend that our claims of "fraud upon the Court" and
conspiracy to conceal smoking-gun evidence are "full of hot air and paranoid suspicions," all e-mails, compact discs
(CDs), privilege logs and other documents that were received and/or produced during e-discovery in Rowe need to be
produced. Since this spoliated evidence was paid for by Leonard Rowe, this property belongs to him and he cannot be
prevented from acquiring this evidence, especially since all involved in this conspiracy have denied Rowe's claims
and he's gone to jail trying to seek justice.
I would donate 80 percent of this amount to various non-profit organizations, etc. give 80 percent that are committed
to bettering the worid and creating a racially tolerant society. At the minimum, the monetary sanction should be no
less than the amount William Morris paid Loeb & Loeb LLP throughout this case, trebled.
39

that they be compelled to produce all relevant electronic discovery evidence in their possession,
as well as compel Loeb attomey Christian Carbone to submit an Affidavit confirming his marital
status and explaining his relationship to Sasha Angelique Carbone,^'
Vn.

Conclusion

It is axiomatic that the class of black concert promoters and I have been defrauded by William
Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attomey to prevent the merits of our human rights and antitmst
cases from being decided by an impartial jury. I f all men are tmly created equal and I am expected
to engage in "good faith," I have every right to expect the same in retum from opposing counsel
and all officers of the Court involved in administering justice for this case. Loeb & Loeb LLP and
its attomeys must be taught a lesson and used as an example to other law firms and professions
throughout the legal community that our judicial system has zero tolerance for attorneys who
engage in bad-faith, "highly unethical and criminal conduct" on their client's behalf For the
following reasons discussed above, I ask that the Supreme Court use its inherent powers to grant
the extraordinary relief requested in this Motion and my Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

" If the Supreme Court finds that Loeb & Loeb LLP have engaged in a pattern of "fraud upon the Court" on William
Morris' behalf, the granting of this motion "would dispose of the entire case [and] would affect the final judgment to
be entered." Supreme Court Rule 2L As a result I ask that I be granted an extension sixty (60) days to file my petition
for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13, i f there is still a need to submit following the Supreme
Court's determination on this Motion. No matter what the Supreme Court decides, the record is fully preserved. I f my
claims of "fraud upon the Court" are ignored by the Supreme Court, I will do everything within my power to bring
international attention to this case and I will take legal action against all parties that have committed "fi"aud upon the
Court," violated New York Judiciary Law 487, conspired to deprive me of my constitutional and statutory rights
under the color of lav*' and intentionally flouted the U.S. Constitution and our nation's antidiscrimination laws as part
of a larger conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of people of African descent. On July 3, 2015,1 e-mailed the
three Loeb attorneys who never formally entered the case but were unjustly enriched by engaging in fraud behind the
scenes on William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP's behalf - Mark Goldberg, Martin Fojas and Jessica Lee.
40

Respectfully submitted,

Marcus Isaiah Washington

Pro Se Litigant
54 Boerum St. Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, New York
(646) 504-6497
humanrights. areamust@gmail. com