Saa vs.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Petitioners Claim:
Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida on
December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases against
him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.
In a resolution dated February 17, 1992, Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him.
He complied partially with the resolution at a later date.
Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment within 10 days
as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution requiring
Atty. Venida to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution.
Respondents Claim:
In his belated and partial compliance with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa did
not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt, was a mere reiteration
of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saas
adversaries.
Held:
Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with various court directives as a lawyer, he had the responsibility to
follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed
only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992
resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due
date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules
1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our May 17, 2004 resolution.
Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum, he still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he
continually ignored the courts directives for him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.
Sesbreo v. CA
Petitioners Claim:
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute Civil Cases Nos.
R-109335 and R-11214,6.
Eduardo R. Gullas (Gov. Gullas) proposed the compromise settlement of all mandamus cases then pending
against the province which included Civil Cases Nos. R-10933 and R-11214 handled by the petitioner.
On April 21, 1979, the camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu, through then Gov.
Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement.

Apparently, the camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the province
agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. This Court adopted said compromise
agreement in our decision13 dated December 18, 1979.
The camineros, through their new counsel (who substituted for the petitioner), moved for its execution. The
court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing the payment of only 45% of the amount
due them based on the computation of the provincial engineering office as audited by the authority concerned.
Petitioner anchored his claim on the provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 1919 thereof. He alleged
that by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate
their written contract for attorneys fees.20 He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement
approved by the Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the
national wage rate which, consequently, yielded a lower amount.21 Petitioner went on to say that although he
was not a party to the above contracts, by virtue of the registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and
thus, had legal standing to institute the case below.22
Petitioner clarifies that he instituted the instant case for breach of the compromise agreement and not for
violation of the agreement for attorneys fees as mistakenly concluded by the appellate court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his
dignity as an officer of the court.
Respondents Claim:
The CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court concluded that
petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced the camineros to violate the
agreement for attorneys fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to respondents
act of directly paying the camineros the amounts due them.26
Held:
The satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown either by the
attorneys conduct or by his passive omission.44 In the instant case, petitioners act in withdrawing the case
against the camineros and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. No
rule will allow a lawyer to collect from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor except,
perhaps, on a claim for a bigger amount which, as earlier discussed, is baseless.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that
yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed
with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.45
Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further that he had
settled his case as against his former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract
against the respondents, even on the basis of Articles 119146 or 1311.

Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame V. Atty. Edgar Baguio

Petitioners claim:
Complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the
services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry.
That even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil
case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's
death on 8 September 1996.
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case
against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case.
Complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they
were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they
contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.

Respondents claim:
Respondent said it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydio's
behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. Insisting that he did not betray the
confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained that he
did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the
first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place.
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing
the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the
second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather
between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of
property was at stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the
spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni
Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful acts
committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.
Held:
There is sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds
even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse
to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by
mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him
nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.41 The protection given to the
client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
Lee vs. Tambago
Petitioners Claim:
Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics
of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the
purported witnesses to its execution.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.1 Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was
dated January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a
deed of donation4 (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his
deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically
opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
Respondents Claim:
Respondent claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son
of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed
and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and

corroborated by the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee,
Jr.
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by
complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division
of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Held:
The investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial
Law. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and
constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of
the CPR.
The duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer
assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a
lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be
a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.43
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary
action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers
include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Habawel v. Court of Tax Appeals, First Division
Petitioners claim:
Surfield Development Corporation (SDC), represented by Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina, elevated a
Regional Trial Courts dismissal of their petition for refund for the excess of realty taxes paid to a City
Government, to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The case was assigned to the CTAs First Division (FD).
CTAs FD, however, denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Undeterred, Habawel and Medina sought reconsideration in behalf of SDC, insisting that the CTA
had jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act No. 9282; and arguing that the CTA FD manifested its lack of
understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe
Habawel and Medina submitted a compliance, in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified
their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness
of the error by calling a spade by spade.
Respondents Claim:

The Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over
the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
The CTA FD found the apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were
so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged
ignorance and grave abuse of discretion,and thus found them guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to
uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts.
Held:
The test for criticizing a judges decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and
does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. By the statements employed, Habawel and Medina
clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to
respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the
absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the
same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or
judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so.
Clarita Samala vs. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
Petitioners Claim:
Clarita J. Samala filed a complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the
following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly
misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Respondents Claim:
Respondent admitted that in a Civil Case, he was the lawyer for Lagmay but not for Bustamante and Bayuga.
He also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent,
however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with
estafa.
Respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that
the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything
anymore. Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only
when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while
his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom
is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent further
admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does
not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family.
He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in
Marikina.
Held:
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia is GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10, and 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case.
He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care.
Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new
title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission
of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by
presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that
"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer
for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards
immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that

"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
Reynaria Barcenas v. Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero
Petitioners Claim:
Barcenas entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a
certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield. Atty. Alvero said that
he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they
gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and
promised to return the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero
allegedly replied, "Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?" Subsequently, Barcenas
discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his
personal needs.
Despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be
disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession.
Respondents Claim:
Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know
that San Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only when the latter
went to him to borrow P60,000.00 "from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio" who entrusted to
respondent at that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it
might jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300,000.00 from San
Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action.
Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas.
Held:
Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
There is a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client.17 These, Atty. Alvero failed to do.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an
attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
De Leon v. Castelo

Petitioners Claim:
De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows:
Causing it to appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were already
dead as of that time.
Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers
in the judicial proceedings.
Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing dead persons therein
who, he falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the adverse parties.
Respondents Claim:
The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were
William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.
He prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then
still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and
would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason;
He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the
death certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial court of that fact;
Held:
We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil
Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
in making the averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?
A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were
still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu were already deceased.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings might have created any
impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent
guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners
of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his
pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made
clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected
properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners
(i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio

and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And,
lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar
Petitioners Claim:
This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P.
Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and
Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC.
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on
annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without
complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases
clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent
trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indars act of "affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he
allegedly rendered," when in fact that case does not appear in the courts records, constitutes dishonesty.
The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
Respondents Claim:
None. Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required.
Held:
Judge Indars issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any
judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his
Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge "perform official duties honestly."
Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases
underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers

oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." Such violation is also a ground for
disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-on
Petitioners Claim:
Atty. Dela Victoria alleged that, on November 12, 2005, a Saturday, he went to the Office of the City
Prosecutor, because his clients (Veranos) were being detained by virtue of a warrantless arrest and after an
inquest; that he learned that the criminal information against the Veranos, had not yet been filed with the proper
court as it still lacked the signature of the City Prosecutor; that he went to see the MTCC Executive Judge who
suggested that a motion to set bail.
Atty. Maloloy-on did not accept the cash bond because no information had yet been filed. He then added that
his clients could not avail of the remedy under Rule 114, Section 17(c) because, on Saturdays, the offices of the
City Prosecutor and the MTCC Clerk of Court are open only until 12 noon.
Atty. Dela Victoria further alleged that on Thursday, November 17, 2005, he went to see Atty. Maloloy-on to
inquire why she refused to accept the cash bond, but that instead of giving a proper explanation, Atty. Maloloyon "lectured" him.
That even as he tried to explain that he had "already made an arrangement with the Executive Judge," Atty.
Maloloy-on still insisted and tried to justify her refusal to accept the offered cash bond.
This, according to Atty. Dela Victoria, constituted gross ignorance of the law, even as he said that he would not
have filed this complaint if only Atty. Maloloy-on "apologized for her procedural lapses."
Respondents Claim:
Atty. Maloloy-on presented a different version of the incident of November 17, 2005: that Atty. Dela Victoria
barged into her office, in a demanding and high-handed manner, inquired why she refused to accept the cash
bond; that she told him she was present then and tried to explain her side, but Atty. Dela Victoria kept cutting
her short and lectured her on Rule 114, Section 17(c); that when she insisted on explaining, Atty. Dela Victoria
arrogantly told her, "You should listen to me. I am a former judge and I know the law better than you do;"
Atty. Dela Victoria stood up, shouted at her, and as he made for the door, he turned around and shouted, "What
kind of a Clerk of Court are you? You are ignorant of the law. Bullshit!"
Atty. Maloloy-on, denied any knowledge of the supposed agreement between Atty. Dela Victoria and the
MTCC Executive Judge, as she had not received any advice or instruction, verbal or written, about it.
Held:
Considering that he was a former judge and had been engaged in the practice of law for thirty (30) years,
Atty. Dela Victoria is expected to be conversant with the scope and application of Rule 114, Section 17(c) of the
Rules of Court which he invokes. He should have known that he could not insist on the acceptance of the cash
bond in favor of his clients without the necessary order from the court granting his motion to post the same. In
fact, his assertion that he had already made arrangements with the MTCC Executive Judge when there was
actually no proper court order amounts to an attempt to mislead Atty. Maloloy-on into processing the
unauthorized temporary release of his clients.

Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of
their litigation and their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel and the courts.[17]
They are duty bound to avoid improprieties, which give the appearance of influencing the court.[18] Atty. Dela
Victoria failed in this regard.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, this right must be exercised in
good faith. A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because as an officer of the court,
he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such
filing of baseless complaints is indeed contemptuous of the courts.
Ordinarily, lawyers who file unfounded complaints are disciplined by imposing upon them a fine in an
amount commensurate to the gravity of the offense to be determined by this Court as the disciplining authority.