Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Thomas R. McCormick, D.Min., Senior Lecturer Emeritus, Dept. Bioethics and Humanities,
School of Medicine, University of Washington
Article
The four principles referred to here are non-hierarchical, meaning no one principle routinely
trumps another. One might argue that we are required to take all of the above principles into
account when they are applicable to the clinical case under consideration. Yet, when two or more
principles apply, we may find that they are in conflict. For example, consider a patient diagnosed
with an acutely infected appendix. Our medical goal should be to provide the greatest benefit to
the patient, an indication for immediate surgery. On the other hand, surgery and general
anesthesia carry some small degree of risk to an otherwise healthy patient, and we are under an
obligation "not to harm" the patient. Our rational calculus holds that the patient is in far greater
danger from harm from a ruptured appendix if we do not act, than from the surgical procedure
and anesthesia if we proceed quickly to surgery. Further, we are willing to put this working
hypothesis to the test of rational discourse, believing that other persons acting on a rational basis
will agree. Thus, the weighing and balancing of potential risks and benefits becomes an essential
component of the reasoning process in applying the principles.
In other words, in the face of no other competing claims, we have a duty to uphold each of these
principles (a prima facie duty). However, in the actual situation, we must balance the demands
of these principles by determining which carries more weight in the particular case. Moral
philosopher, W.D. Ross, claims that prima facie duties are always binding unless they are in
conflict with stronger or more stringent duties. A moral person's actual duty is determined by
weighing and balancing all competing prima facie duties in any particular case (Frankena, 1973).
Since principles are empty of content the application of the principle comes into focus through
understanding the unique features and facts that provide the context for the case. Therefore,
obtaining the relevant and accurate facts is an essential component of this approach to decision
making.
Case 1
In a prima facie sense, we ought always to respect the autonomy of the patient. Such respect is
not simply a matter of attitude, but a way of acting so as to recognize and even promote the
autonomous actions of the patient. The autonomous person may freely choose values, loyalties or
systems of religious belief that limit other freedoms of that person. For example, Jehovah's
Witnesses have a belief that it is wrong to accept a blood transfusion. Therefore, in a lifethreatening situation where a blood transfusion is required to save the life of the patient, the
patient must be so informed. The consequences of refusing a blood transfusion must be made
clear to the patient at risk of dying from blood loss. Desiring to "benefit" the patient, the
physician may strongly want to provide a blood transfusion, believing it to be a clear "medical
benefit." When properly and compassionately informed, the particular patient is then free to
choose whether to accept the blood transfusion in keeping with a strong desire to live, or whether
to refuse the blood transfusion in giving a greater priority to his or her religious convictions
about the wrongness of blood transfusions, even to the point of accepting death as a predictable
outcome. This communication process must be compassionate and respectful of the patients
unique values, even if they differ from the standard goals of biomedicine.
Discussion
In analyzing the above case, the physician had a prima facie duty to respect the autonomous
choice of the patient, as well as a prima facie duty to avoid harm and to provide a medical
benefit. In this case, informed by community practice and the provisions of the law for the free
exercise of one's religion, the physician gave greater priority to the respect for patient autonomy
than to other duties. However, some ethicists claim that in respecting the patients choice not to
receive blood, the principle of nonmaleficence also applies and must be interpreted in light of the
patients belief system about the nature of harms, in this case a spiritual harm. By contrast, in an
emergency, if the patient in question happens to be a ten year old child, and the parents refuse
permission for a life saving blood transfusion, in the State of Washington and other states as
well, there is legal precedence for overriding the parent's wishes by appealing to the Juvenile
Court Judge who is authorized by the state to protect the lives of its citizens, particularly minors,
until they reach the age of majority and can make such choices independently. Thus, in the case
of the vulnerable minor child, the principle of avoiding the harm of death, and the principle of
providing a medical benefit that can restore the child to health and life, would be given
precedence over the autonomy of the child's parents as surrogate decision makers (McCormick,
2008). (See Parental Decision Making)
top
2. The Principle of Nonmaleficence
The principle of nonmaleficence requires of us that we not intentionally create a harm or injury
to the patient, either through acts of commission or omission. In common language, we consider
it negligent if one imposes a careless or unreasonable risk of harm upon another. Providing a
proper standard of care that avoids or minimizes the risk of harm is supported not only by our
commonly held moral convictions, but by the laws of society as well (see Law and Medical
Ethics). This principle affirms the need for medical competence. It is clear that medical mistakes
may occur; however, this principle articulates a fundamental commitment on the part of health
care professionals to protect their patients from harm.
Case 2
In the course of caring for patients, there are situations in which some type of harm seems
inevitable, and we are usually morally bound to choose the lesser of the two evils, although the
lesser of evils may be determined by the circumstances. For example, most would be willing to
experience some pain if the procedure in question would prolong life. However, in other cases,
such as the case of a patient dying of painful intestinal carcinoma, the patient might choose to
forego CPR in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest, or the patient might choose to forego
life-sustaining technology such as dialysis or a respirator. The reason for such a choice is based
on the belief of the patient that prolonged living with a painful and debilitating condition is
worse than death, a greater harm. It is also important to note in this case that this determination
was made by the patient, who alone is the authority on the interpretation of the "greater" or
"lesser" harm for the self. (SeeWithholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment).
Discussion
There is another category of cases that is confusing since a single action may have two effects,
one that is considered a good effect, the other a bad effect. How does our duty to the principle of
nonmaleficence direct us in such cases? The formal name for the principle governing this
category of cases is usually called theprinciple of double effect. A typical example might be the
question as to how to best treat a pregnant woman newly diagnosed with cancer of the uterus.
The usual treatment, removal of the uterus is considered a life saving treatment. However, this
procedure would result in the death of the fetus. What action is morally allowable, or, what is our
duty? It is argued in this case that the woman has the right to self-defense, and the action of the
hysterectomy is aimed at defending and preserving her life. The foreseeable unintended
consequence (though undesired) is the death of the fetus. There are four conditions that usually
apply to the principle of double effect:
1. The nature of the act. The action itself must not be intrinsically wrong; it must be a good
or at least morally neutral act.
2. The agents intention. The agent intends only the good effect, not the bad effect, even
though it is foreseen.
3. The distinction between means and effects. The bad effect must not be the means of the
good effect,
4. Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good effect must
outweigh the evil that is permitted, in other words, the bad effect.
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 207)
The reader may apply these four criteria to the case above, and find that the principle of double
effect applies and the four conditions are not violated by the prescribed treatment plan.
top
It is generally held that persons who are equals should qualify for equal treatment. This is borne
out in the application of Medicare, which is available to all persons over the age of 65 years. This
category of persons is equal with respect to this one factor, their age, but the criteria chosen says
nothing about need or other noteworthy factors about the persons in this category. In fact, our
society uses a variety of factors as criteria for distributive justice, including the following:
1. To each person an equal share
2. To each person according to need
3. To each person according to effort
4. To each person according to contribution
5. To each person according to merit
6. To each person according to free-market exchanges
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 330)
John Rawls (1999) and others claim that many of the inequalities we experience are a result of a
"natural lottery" or a "social lottery" for which the affected individual is not to blame, therefore,
society ought to help even the playing field by providing resources to help overcome the
disadvantaged situation. One of the most controversial issues in modern health care is the
question pertaining to "who has the right to health care?" Or, stated another way, perhaps as a
society we want to be beneficent and fair and provide some decent minimum level of health care
for all citizens, regardless of ability to pay. Medicaid is also a program that is designed to help
fund health care for those at the poverty level. Yet, in times of recession, thousands of families
below the poverty level have been purged from the Medicaid rolls as a cost saving maneuver.
The principle of justice is a strong motivation toward the reform of our health care system so that
the needs of the entire population are taken into account. The demands of the principle of justice
must apply at the bedside of individual patients but also systemically in the laws and policies of
society that govern the access of a population to health care. Much work remains to be done in
this arena.
Summary and critique
The four principles currently operant in health care ethics had a long history in the common
morality of our society even before becoming widely popular as moral action guides in medical
ethics over the past forty-plus years through the work of ethicists such as Beauchamp and
Childress. In the face of morally ambiguous situations in health care the nuances of their usage
have been refined through countless applications. Some bioethicists, such as Bernard Gert and
colleagues (1997), argue that with the exception of nonmaleficence, the principles are flawed as
moral action guides as they are so nonspecific, appearing to simply remind the decision maker of
considerations that should be taken into account. Indeed, Beauchamp and Childress do not claim
that principlism provides a general moral theory, but rather, they affirm the usefulness of these
principles in reflecting on moral problems and in moving to an ethical resolution. Gert also
charges that principlism fails to distinguish between moral rules and moral ideals and, as
mentioned earlier, that there is no agreed upon method for resolving conflicts when two different
principles conflict about what ought to be done. He asserts that his own approach, common
morality, appealing to rational reflection and open to transparency and publicity is a more useful
approach (Gert, Culver & Clouser, 1997). Further, bioethicst Albert Jonsen and colleagues
(2010) claim in their work that in order to rigorously apply these principles in clinical situations
their applicability must start with the context of a given case. (See Bioethics Tools)..
This article is intended to be a brief introduction to the use of ethical principles in health care
ethics. Students of clinical ethics will find additional information and deeper analysis in the
suggested readings below.
References
Beauchamp T, Childress J. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th Edition. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
Frankena, WK. Ethics, 2nd Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Gert B, Culver CM, Clouser KD, Bioethics a Return to Fundamentals. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Hippocrates. The history of epidemics. Samuel Farr (trans.) London: T. Cadell, 1780.
Jonsen A, Siegler M, Winslade W. Ethics, 7th Edition.New York: McGraw-Hill Medical, 2010.
McCormick, TR. Ethical issues inherent to Jehovahs Witnesses. Perioperative Nursing
Clinics 2008;3(3): 253-259.
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Related Discussion Topics/Links
Informed Consent, Parental Decision Making, Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining
Treatment, Bioethics Tools