1

SORIANO V DIZON
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with
the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges
that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for
June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint
and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July
27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which
was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated
March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which
involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the
car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but
a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop
the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused
who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but
the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could
be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter
pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to
the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9]
complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance,
according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury,
which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed
an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto
Soriano.[10]

2
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter
also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
1.
He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
2.
He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;
3.
Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4.
When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5.
Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
6.
Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7.
Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to
uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the
instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated
homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only
issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was
dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the
IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved
moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

3
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's
face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it
was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his
person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character
and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the
moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit
once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic
incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In
the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact
revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy
his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that,
both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey
the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation.
And yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To
date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly
amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the

4
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is
an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the
trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with
complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it
appear that it was complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having
been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does
not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and
boxing him.
The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage.
On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly when he said
that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns
duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any
artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege
to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public
at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior
disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment
should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case,
however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty
would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining
exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.

5
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the
mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the
present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show
his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and
let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

TEVES v COMELEC
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of
violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that
petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.4 The case
was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the COMELECs First Division.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed
October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position
of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the
instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by
respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11
May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE
COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE
PETITIONERS QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.
III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE
COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS
A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD
BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

7
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS
CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively
moot the issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime
he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have
resolved instead of merely declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioners
defeat.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELECs findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010
elections because his disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five
years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the
records show that it was only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was
sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan.8 Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year
disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public
office during the May 14, 2010 elections.
Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h),
R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.lawphil.net
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general.9
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2)
he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he
either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited
from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.10

8
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from
having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.11
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Court held therein:
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit
filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in
his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said
cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership
thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with
things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he
"turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no
longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof
that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was
transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was
direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would
have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be
that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil
Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code
declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and
wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government
official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit. [Emphasis
supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which
is possession of a prohibited interest.13
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but
whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the
Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law
or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the
act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however,

9
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively
prohibited."
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or
does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes
which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation
of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioners conviction
and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELECs finding that petitioner used his official capacity
in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to
his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.
The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioners conviction involved moral turpitude,
misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral
turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any
conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of
the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by
holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later
on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But
the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of
the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent
would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of
gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but
he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he
nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent
to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and
selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly
shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen.
Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the
totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime,
as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude.15
On the contrary, the Courts ruling states:
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it
based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a
permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991,
which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license
for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of
1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor
Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan.16
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such
pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject

10
cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred
before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31
December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It
was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of
the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the
renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the
cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the
Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January
1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly
Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17
February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission
for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government
unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof
necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the
old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the
prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of
the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an
offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the
maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition.
Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition
of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)
The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as
minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that
petitioners violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his
lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to
bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our
culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the
morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It
is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to
the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function
belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.

11
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May
11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of
Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not
involve moral turpitude. SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINION BRION, J.:

I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. I add these
views to further explore the term "moral turpitude" a term that, while carrying far-reaching effects,
embodies a concept that to date has not been given much jurisprudential focus.
I. Historical Roots
The term "moral turpitude" first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws.1 Its history can
be traced back as far as the 17th century when the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the
earliest immigration resolutions excluding criminals from America, in response to the British governments
policy of sending convicts to the colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe was
deliberately exporting its human liabilities.2 In the U.S., the term "moral turpitude" first appeared in the
Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; this marked the first time the
U.S. Congress used the term "moral turpitude" in immigration laws.3 Since then, the presence of moral
turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment
of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as a
criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between
joint tortfeasors, and in deciding whether a certain language is slanderous.4
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term "moral turpitude" in Jordan v. De
George.5 The case presented only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on
distilled spirits is a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration
Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of conspiracy to
defraud the U.S. government of taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals
ordered De Georges deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision that allows the deportation
of aliens who commit multiple crimes involving moral turpitude. De George argued that he should not be
deported because his tax evasion crimes did not involve moral turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Vinzon, disagreed, finding that "under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, the crime of
conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a crime involving moral turpitude."6 Notably, the Court determined that
fraudulent conduct involved moral turpitude without exception:
Whatever the phrase "involving moral turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it
plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral
turpitude.xxx Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.xxx We therefore decide that
Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud
the United States is deportation. 7
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a "crime involving moral
turpitude." The legislative history of statutes containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that
Congress left the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and administrative agencies.8 In the absence of
legislative history as interpretative aid, American courts have resorted to the dictionary definition "the
last resort of the baffled judge."9 The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in
the early editions of Blacks Law Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow
man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and man. xxx Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of
community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished
from others. xxx The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the
community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.10

12
In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first introduced in 1901 in Act No. 190, otherwise known as
the Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings.11 The Act provided that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.12 Subsequently, the term "moral turpitude" has been employed in statutes governing
disqualifications of notaries public,13 priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages,14 registration to
military service,15 exclusion16 and naturalization of aliens,17 discharge of the accused to be a state
witness,18 admission to the bar,19 suspension and removal of elective local officials,20 and
disqualification of persons from running for any elective local position.21
In Re Basa,22 a 1920 case, provided the first instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in
the context of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with
consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by
Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in
the statutes, turned to Bouviers Law Dictionary for guidance and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can
be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character
involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct.
Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary definition,
opening the way for a case-to-case approach in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude.
II. Problems with the Definition of Moral Turpitude
Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Blacks Law Dictionary definition of
moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 This
definition is more specific than that used in In re Vinzon24 where the term moral turpitude was considered
as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."25
In the U.S., these same definitions have been highly criticized for their vagueness and ambiguity.26 In
Jordan, Justice Jackson noted that "except for the Courts [majority opinion], there appears to be a
universal recognition that we have here an undefined and undefinable standard."27 Thus, the phrase
"crimes involving moral turpitude" has been described as "vague," "nebulous," "most unfortunate," and
even "bewildering." 28
Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted. First, the current
definition of the term is broad. It can be stretched to include most kinds of wrongs in society -- a result that
the Legislature could not have intended. This Court itself concluded in IRRI v. NLRC29 that moral turpitude
"is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached" once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our caseby-case approach in determining the crimes involving moral turpitude.
Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally recognized code for socially acceptable
behavior -- the "private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general";
moral turpitude is an act violating these duties. The problem is that the definition does not state what
these duties are, or provide examples of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such as
"baseness," "vileness," and "depravity," which better describe moral reactions to an act than the act itself.
In essence, they are "conclusory but non-descriptive."30 To be sure, the use of morality as a norm cannot
be avoided, as the term "moral turpitude" contains the word "moral" and its direct connotation of right and
wrong. "Turpitude," on the other hand, directly means "depravity" which cannot be appreciated without
considering an acts degree of being right or wrong. Thus, the law, in adopting the term "moral turpitude,"
necessarily adopted a concept involving notions of morality standards that involve a good measure of

13
subjective consideration and, in terms of certainty and fixity, are far from the usual measures used in
law.31
Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of what it requires.32 It has been said
that the loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers uniformity since [i]t is hardly to be expected that
a word which baffle judges will be more easily interpreted by laymen.33 This led Justice Jackson to
conclude in Jordan that "moral turpitude offered judges no clearer guideline than their own consciences,
inviting them to condemn all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we
disapprove it."34 This trait, however, cannot be taken lightly, given that the consequences of committing a
crime involving moral turpitude can be severe.
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude35
Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,36 the Court has maintained its case-by-case categorization of
crimes on the basis of moral turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as necessarily involving moral
turpitude. The following is a list, not necessarily complete, of the crimes adjudged to involve moral
turpitude:
1. Abduction with consent37
2. Bigamy38
3. Concubinage39
4. Smuggling40
5. Rape41
6. Estafa through falsification of a document42
7. Attempted Bribery43
8. Profiteering44
9. Robbery45
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted46
11. Estafa47
12. Theft48
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker49
14. Violation of BP Bldg. 2250
15. Falsification of Document51
16. Intriguing against Honor52
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law53
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)54
19. Perjury55
20. Forgery56
21. Direct Bribery57
22. Frustrated Homicide58
Zari v. Flores59 is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral turpitude,
namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery,
criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses
against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public
document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.60
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude61
The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to categorically rule that certain crimes do not
involve moral turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)62
2. Illegal recruitment63
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)64

14
4. Indirect Contempt65
III. Approaches and Standards.
Even a cursory examination of the above lists readily reveals that while the concept of "moral turpitude"
does not have one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, the Court has been
fairly consistent in its understanding and application of the term and has not significantly deviated from
what it laid down in In re Basa. The key element, directly derived from the word "turpitude," is the standard
of depravity viewed from a scale of right and wrong.
The application of this depravity standard can be made from at least three perspectives or approaches,
namely: from the objective perspective of the act itself, irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime;
from the perspective of the crime itself, as defined through its elements; and from the subjective
perspective that takes into account the perpetrators level of depravity when he committed the crime.
The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v. Flores66 where the Court saw the involvement of
moral turpitude where an act is intrinsically immoral, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not.
The Court emphasized that moral turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must
be inherently immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be examined, divorced
from its characterization as a crime.
A ruling that exemplifies this approach is that made in the U.S. case In The Matter of G---67 where, in
considering gambling, it was held that:
Gambling has been in existence since time immemorial. Card playing for small stakes is a common
accompaniment of social life; small bets on horse racing and the "policy or numbers games" are diversions
of the masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a matter of common knowledge. Many
countries permit it under a license system. In ancient times laws were enacted to discourage people from
gambling on the theory that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later dates
antigambling laws were aimed especially at the activity as practiced by the working classes. Present-day
movements to suppress gambling are also tinged with other considerations. In urban communities in the
past few decades the purely religious opposition to gambling has tended to become less violent because
certain activities, highly reputable according to prevailing social standards, have come more and more to
resemble it. Prohibition against gambling has had something of a police rather than a truly penal character.
At all times an important fact in arousing antagonism in gambling has been the association, almost
inevitable, with sharp practice. In established societies more or less serious attempts are everywhere
made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in its more notorious forms.
It would appear that statutes permitting gambling, such as those under discussion, rest primarily on the
theory that they are in the interest of public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse, to
obviate cheating and other corrupt practices that may result if uncontrolled.
From this discussion, the Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum prohibitum that is not
intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
With the same approach, but with a different result, is Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado,68 a
case involving drug possession. Librado, a Deputy Sheriff in MTCC Iligan City was convicted of possession
of "shabu," a prohibited drug. The Office of the Court Administrator commenced an administrative case
against him and he was subsequently suspended from office. In his subsequent plea for reinstatement, the
Court strongly denounced drug possession as an "especially vicious crime, one of the most pernicious evils
that has ever crept into our society For those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of
the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law abiding members of
society." The Court, apparently drawing on what society deems important, held that the use of drugs
amounted to an act so inherently evil that no law was needed to deem it as such; it is an evil without need
for a law to call it evil69 - "an immoral act in itself regardless of whether it is punishable or not."70
In People v. Yambot,71 the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a deadly weapon does not
involve moral turpitude since the act of carrying a weapon by itself is not inherently wrong in the absence
of a law punishing it. Likewise, the Court acknowledged in Court Administrator v. San Andres72 that illegal

15
recruitment does not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself an evil act being ordinarily an act in
the ordinary course of business in the absence of the a law prohibiting it.
The second approach is to look at the act committed through its elements as a crime. In Paras v.
Vailoces,73 the Court recognized that as a "general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked
on as involving moral turpitude." This is the same conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan,
i.e., that crimes requiring fraud or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude.74
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections75 is a case in point that uses the second approach and is one case
where the Court even dispensed with the review of facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime since Dela Torre did not assail his conviction. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Comelec from
running as Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the basis of his conviction for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Dela Torre appealed to this Court to overturn his
disqualification on the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court
ruled that moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact
that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude.
To be sure, the elements of the crime can be a critical factor in determining moral turpitude if the second
approach is used in the crimes listed above as involving moral turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,76 the Court, by analyzing the elements alone of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, held
that the "presence of the second element manifest moral turpitude" in that "a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." The same
conclusion was reached by the Court in Magno v. Commission on Elections,77 when it ruled that direct
bribery involves moral turpitude, thus:
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a
promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his
office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to
the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a
crime involving moral turpitude. [Emphasis supplied]
The third approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and his acts into account in
light of the attendant circumstances of the crime: was he motivated by ill will indicating depravity? The
Court apparently used this approach in Ao Lin v. Republic,78 a 1964 case, when it held "that the use of a
meter stick without the corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in
business for a long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick, not
necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick,
but because it manifests an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from
him in respect to the measurement of the goods purchased."
In IRRI v. NLRC,79 the International Rice Research Institute terminated the employment contract of Nestor
Micosa on the ground that he has been convicted of the crime of homicide a a crime involving moral
turpitude. The Court refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude in light of the
circumstances of its commission. The Court ruled:
These facts show that Micosas intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosas character and intentions were
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics supllied].
The Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the appreciation of facts in
considering whether moral turpitude exists an unavoidable step under the third approach. Thus, the
Court explained:

16
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide
may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]
In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude, the recent
case of Soriano v. Dizon80 held that based on the circumstances, the crime of frustrated homicide
committed by the respondent involved moral turpitude. In Soriano, complainant Soriano filed a disbarment
case against respondent Atty. Manuel Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral
turpitude under the circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court after noting the factual
antecedents of IRRI held that
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as
he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by
respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant.
Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic
incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In
the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact
revenge. 81 [Emphasis supplied]
Laguitan v. Tinio,82 expressed in terms of the protection of the sanctity of marriage,83 also necessarily
looked at the subjective element because the offenders concubinage involved an assault on the basic
social institution of marriage. Another subjective element case, in terms of looking at the damage wrought
by the offenders act, is People v. Jamero84 where the Court disregarded the appellants argument that the
trial court erred in ordering the discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in order to make him
a state witness, since he has been previously convicted of the crime of malicious mischief a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Court said:
In the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of the malicious mischief committed,
We are not in a position to say whether or not the previous conviction of malicious mischief proves that
accused had displayed the baseness, the vileness and the depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And
considering that under paragraph 3 of Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, any deliberate act (not
constituting arson or other crimes involving destruction) causing damage in the property of another, may
constitute the crime of malicious mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime involves
moral turpitude without determining, at least, the value of the property destroyed and/or the
circumstances under which the act of destroying was committed.85 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, again, the need for a factual determination was considered necessary.
In sum, a survey of jurisprudence from the earliest case of In Re Basa86 to the recent case of Soriano v.
Dizon 87 shows that the Court has used varying approaches, but used the same standard or measure the
degree of attendant depravity. The safest approach to avoid being misled in ones conclusion is to apply all
three approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each of the approaches. A useful caveat in

17
the evaluation is to resolve any doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion of moral turpitude
invariably signifies a worse consequence for him or her.
IV. The Approaches Applied to TEVES
The Objective Approach
The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit) is, at its core, related to gambling an act that by contemporary community standards is not per
se immoral. Other than the ruling heretofore cited on this point,88 judicial notice can be taken of statesponsored gambling activities in the country that, although not without controversy, is generally regarded
to be within acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to the enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not
expressly prohibited. This bit of history alone is an indicator that, objectively, no essential depravity is
involved even from the standards of a holder of a public office. This reasoning led the ponencia to conclude
that "its illegality does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes such possession of interest inherently
immoral."89
From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime
Under this approach, we determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis
of the elements of the crime alone.
The essential elements of the offense of possession of prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law) for which the petitioner was convicted are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third element is the critical element. This element shows that
the holding of interest that the law covers is not a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal solely because of the prohibition that exists in law
or in the Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps up or suggests itself based on the elements of
the crime committed.
The Subjective Approach
This approach is largely the ponencias approach, as it expressly stated that "a determination of all
surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered."90 In doing this, the
ponencia firstly considered that the petitioner did not use his official capacity in connection with the
interest in the cockpit, not that he hid this interest by transferring it to his wife, as the transfer took effect
before the effectivity of the law prohibiting the possession of interest. The ponencia significantly noted,
too, that the violation was not intentionally committed in a manner contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals, but due simply to Teves lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition. This, in my view, is the
clinching argument that no moral turpitude can be involved as no depravity can be gleaned where intent is
clearly absent.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, all three approaches point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude was involved in the
crime Teves committed, with the predominant reasons being the first (or objective) and the third (or
subjective) approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one approach reinforcing another, results in clear and
easily appreciated conclusions.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

18

19

NARAG V NARAG
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a
lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her
privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against
her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early
seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in
subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the
legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms.
Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which they
managed to from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and
pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at
Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag,
her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his
family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another
letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the
allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the
respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising
from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with
one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a
Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar
discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of
Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court 11 received another letter 12
from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she
had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. 14
In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Court's
Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had
voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the

20
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss
and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live with
his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every
time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in every
conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her
"loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she repents
and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11,
1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. 18
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the IBP.
19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20
2.
Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of land,
but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes from
what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and the higher
and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3.
Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness, humility,
and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different environment. Her
value system is the very opposite.
4.
Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of
marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,
education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and
compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never
inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully
employed. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been systematically
and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has
become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED,
BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the
Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity
and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is not to be.
The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she
became more fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The
darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in
"Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is
to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .
5.
Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never
revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife.

21
This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in
sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his
wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone, everywhere,
that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and universities,
professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil,
bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other
capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become an
instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every
unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly
disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been
mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the
following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:
3.1

Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .

3.2

Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .

3.3

Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .

3.4
Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-920083. . . .
3.5

Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.

3.6
Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (.
. .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).
3.7
Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP Board of
Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).
3.8

Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.

3.9

Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I.
That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996. (. . .).
xxx

xxx

xxx

II.
That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis
College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is
having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband and wife
anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never
begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag
are false and fabricated, . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

III.
Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove respondent
Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times

22
with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to
reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home
and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. . . .
IV.
Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent and
merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured,
abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and
psychologically, . . .
V.
Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the effect
that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and
intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without
force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent
Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439,
People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

VI.
Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned,
disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to
earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical
certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also
suffering from hypertension. 23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending parties,
two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a)
Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family and
[whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
b)
Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love
letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being
allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof
to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining
wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of
jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his
sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous
relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N.
Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a
ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member
of the legal profession. 25
In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating
commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the
complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20,
1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we
find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.

23
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred. 29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards."
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina
Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie Espita, 36 Magdalena
Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and
Nieves F. Reyes. 42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainant's charge against
respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:
Q

Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?

Yes, sir.

(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)

Q

Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT

24
A
Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and
wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
xxx

xxx

xxx

During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that
his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q
that?

Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You claim

Yes, sir.

Why do you say that?

A
Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two children
and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values
don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.
Q

How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house?

Yes, si[r].

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, is it not?
A

Yes, sir.

How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?

Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters
respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the
disbarment proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q

Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?

I know him very well, sir.

Could you please tell us why do you know him?

Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.

xxx

xxx

Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?

At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.

And this is located where?

Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.

And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?

xxx

25
A

Yes, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is
it not?
A

Yes, sir. 46

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the
Narag children Randy, Bong and Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the
respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent
abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses
had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these
letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as
his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from
him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with
those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were
written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that
the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to
the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus,
when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This
he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he depicts
his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically
jealous woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of
a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he
presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he
maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing
law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned
his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on matters
which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent himself or
other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children
finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned
politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a
member of the noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and
instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also
obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.
53

26
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence
shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her
paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good
husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have
scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love.
Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his
testimony:
Q
My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so
serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A
That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I
suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a
lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened
criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A
With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this
point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered
for quite sometime.
Q
Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones
are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are
saying.
A

Sort of, sir.

Q
You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have no
more father, am I correct?
A
Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is
not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure,
sir, you did not give me love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went through:
Q
In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is maintaining
a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?
A
This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my
married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to
say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.
Q

Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?

A
Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the
people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.
Q

How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.

27
A
Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my
mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Why did your wife leave you?

The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.

In your wife's family?

In our family, sir.

And what do you mean by that?

A
What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of
scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated him
so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A
husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly
sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage."
In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he
had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared
that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As
held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished
to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO
ORDERED

UI V BONIFACIO
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on
an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with

28
whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law
of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui.
Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent
and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second
child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent
to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly,
for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had
long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to
marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent
did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his
second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally
to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila
sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On
March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if
Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married
abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all
her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided
at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a
house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively
from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well
that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with
Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:

29
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however
show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the
early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26
Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left
the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant
puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to even
prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527
San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create
probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a
conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any
better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on
the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but
the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated.
She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as
a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos
Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and
184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in
making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of
her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have
the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that
she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not
she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of
law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for
the practice of the legal profession; and

30
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and
not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this
fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her
to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much
time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to
have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her
marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to
1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of
the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that
she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken
by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further,
the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster
her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos
Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She
fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil
status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of
Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with
a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because
they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly
improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to
show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented
himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated,
or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their
very nature, single women prefer single men.

31
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left
for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did
they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can
be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation.
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream
cherished by every single girl.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution
dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is
a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good
moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

32
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct"
or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something
was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child,
a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very
open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing
her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with
what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes
her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any
normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In

33
attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity
of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

34

ROYONG V OBLENA
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the
respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person
in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying
all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the
respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her
alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged
her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help
because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had
sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist
to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after
he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As
a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8,
21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not
report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy
medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March
25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to
follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the
record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to
December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to
avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and
sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse
on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty
times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to
marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and
even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster
parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she
(Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant
claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are
convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From

35
her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the
victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after
she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him.
His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her
and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina
Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959.
The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage
which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that
he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From
childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he
is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not
difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22,
1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time
as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the
present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,
knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954,
he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath
of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by
reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should
be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena
be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in
his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong,
niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the
legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of
the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not
merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence,
the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence.
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of
seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was

36
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who
testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at
Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red
Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are
from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as
evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her
sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She
told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as
husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did
not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n.
27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was
already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25).
Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still
presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also
granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was
born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she
was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for
almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her
husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was
shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who
told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife;
that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married,
and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because
she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left
Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to
see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as
he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest
them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with
her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have
the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman'
(Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the
petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed
he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he
was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge
of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by
committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed

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gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955
to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take
the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred
or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise
continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with
the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been
convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for
which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and
that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a
necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special
statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be
exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard.
(1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled
rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain
acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate
the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general
powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than
statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office
as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity
of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of,
for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As
the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is
the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of
criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.

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The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this
Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the
case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between
court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that
an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with
his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his
acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his
paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to
later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of
the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the
law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia
Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of
cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order
to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as
he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not
be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the
legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor
General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the
Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be
exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction
to answer the same within fifteen days.

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The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against
the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954
since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality.
Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief
Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character,
or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice
law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.]
626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario,
52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral
character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles,
and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a
person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as
he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from
the roll of attorneys.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.