The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known

as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose

objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to
promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the
goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. [1]
Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May
1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the
NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to
the Treaty's significance.[1] A total of 191 states have joined the Treaty,
though North Korea, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but never came into
compliance, announced its withdrawal in 2003. [2] Four UN member states have
never joined the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan.
The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of
"pillars" is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless
sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among
them:
non-proliferation,
disarmament, and
the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.[3]
The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain: the NPT non-nuclearweapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclearweapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear
technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination
of their nuclear arsenals.[4]
Initially pegged at 25 years, but then stretched indefinitely after a
resolution.
Several additional measures have been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the
broader nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it difficult for states to acquire
the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of
the IAEA Additional Protocol.
Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the
motivation to acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited
progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons
states still have 22,000 warheads in their combined stockpile and have shown a
reluctance to disarm further.[dubious discuss] Several high-ranking officials within the
United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear
reactors to produce nuclear weapons. [dubious discuss][5][6]
First pillar: non-proliferation
The United States, UK, and the Soviet Union the World War II's Big Three
were the only states openly possessing such weapons among the
original ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970). These five
nations are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council. China and France

These five NWS agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS
parties to the NPT agree not to "receive," "manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear
weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons" (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not
diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices (Article III).

Second pillar: disarmament:

The wording of the NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on
all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total
disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament."[12] Under this interpretation, Article VI
does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament
treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith." [13]
Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy

The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and
materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear
energy programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their
nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon
the use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides
other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to
make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.
Article I:[25] Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any
recipient, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist
any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or
devices.
Article II: Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source,
nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or
acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their
manufacture.
India, Israel, and Pakistan[edit]
See also: India and weapons of mass destruction, Israel and weapons of mass
destruction and Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
Three statesIndia, Israel, and Pakistanhave never signed the treaty. India and
Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel has a long-standing policy of

deliberate ambiguity (see List of countries with nuclear weapons). India argues
that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear
have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states
that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical
grounds such a distinction is valid. India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab
Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: "If India did not sign the NPT, it is
not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we
consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it did not recognize the need for universal,
non-discriminatory verification and treatment." [32]
India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and
have detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having first done so in 1974 and
Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test.[33] India is
estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads.
[34]
Pakistan reportedly has between 80 and 120 warheads according to the
former head of its strategic arms division.[35] India was among the few countries
to have a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first
attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons, however
India's NSA Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to
"no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of
Golden Jubilee celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on 21
October 2010, a doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its
emphasis on minimal deterrence".[36][37]
According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at
its Dimona site in the Negev since 1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like
David Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to 200
warheads using the plutonium reprocessed from Dimona. The Israeli government
refuses to confirm or deny possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now
regarded as an open secret after Israeli low level nuclear technician Mordechai
Vanunusubsequently arrested and sentenced for treason by Israelpublished
evidence about the program to the British Sunday Times in 1986.
On 18 September 2009 the General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency called on Israel to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection
and adhere to the non-proliferation treaty as part of a resolution on "Israeli
nuclear capabilities," which passed by a narrow margin of 4945 with 16
abstentions. The chief Israeli delegate stated that "Israel will not co-operate in
any matter with this resolution."[38]
In early March 2006, India and the United States finalized an agreement, in the
face of criticism in both countries, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear
technology. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear
power plants as being for civilian use and to place them
under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the IAEA,
welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation
regime."[39]
In December 2006, United States Congress approved the United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act that was cemented during President
Bush's visit to India earlier in the year. The legislation allows for the transfer of
civilian nuclear material to India. Despite its status outside the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, India was granted these transactions on the basis of its clean

non-proliferation record, and India's need for energy fueled by its rapid
industrialization and a billion-plus population. [40]
On 1 August 2008, the IAEA approved the India Safeguards Agreement[41] and on
6 September 2008, India was granted the waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived after
overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an
unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country, which has not signed the
NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[42][43] While India could
commence nuclear trade with other willing countries. [clarification needed][44] The U.S.
Congress approved this agreement and President Bush signed it on 8 October
2008.[45]
The NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to
Pakistan and Israel, with very narrow exceptions, since neither has full-scope
IAEA safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all its nuclear activities). Attempts by
Pakistan to reach a similar agreement have been rebuffed by the United States
and other NSG members. The argument put forth is that not only does Pakistan
lack the same energy requirements but that the track record of Pakistan as a
nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear deal in
the near future.[46]
By 2010, China reportedly signed a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan claiming that
the deal was "peaceful."[47] The British government looked askance at the deal
purporting that 'the time is not yet right for a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan'. [48]
In the Pakistan-China case, the parties did not seek formal approval from
the nuclear suppliers group, and China preferred to "grandfather" the reactor. [49]
Exponents of arms control denounced the China-Pakistan deal as they did in case
of U.S.-India deal claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating
nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT. [48]
As of January 2011, Australia, a top three producer and home to worlds largest
known reserves, had continued its refusal to export Uranium to India despite
diplomatic pressure from India.[50] In November 2011 the Australian Prime
Minister announced a desire to allow exports to India, [51] a policy change which
was authorized by her party's national conference in December. [52] On 4
December 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard overturned Australia's long-standing
ban on exporting uranium to India.[53] She further said "We should take a decision
in the national interest, a decision about strengthening our strategic partnership
with India in this the Asian century," and said that any agreement to sell uranium
to India would include strict safeguards to ensure it would only be used for
civilian purposes, and not end up in nuclear weapons. [53] On Sep 5, 2014;
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott sealed a civil nuclear deal to sell uranium
to India. "We signed a nuclear cooperation agreement because Australia trusts
India to do the right thing in this area, as it has been doing in other areas,"
Abbott told reporters after he and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a
pact to sell uranium for peaceful power generation. [54]
Bilateral arms control proposals and confidence building measures
Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional nonproliferation steps to India, including:[78]

A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of

nuclear weapons, in 1978.[79]
South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978. [80]
Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in
1979.[81]
Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979. [82]
A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987. [83]
A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.[84]
India rejected all six proposals. [85][86]
However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear
issues. In 1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. [87] Since
then they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on 1 January
of each year.[88] Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where
both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests. [89] In June 2004, the
two countries signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each
other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were
deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of the seemingly unending
state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely
short response time available to them to any perceived attack. None of these
agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of either country in any way. [90]
Allegations of foreign assistance
Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been repeatedly charged
with allegedly transferring missile and related materials to Pakistan. [124] Despite
China strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, the United States alleged
China to have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic
bomb development infrastructure.[124] There are also unofficial reports in Western
media that the nuclear weapon technology and the weapon-grade enriched
uranium was transferred to Pakistan by China. [125][126] China has consistently
maintained that it has not sold any weapon parts or components to Pakistan or
anyone else.[124] On August 2001, it was reported that U.S. officials confronted
China numerous times over this issue and pointed out "rather bluntly" [124] to
Chinese officials that the evidences from intelligence sources was "powerful." [124]
But they had been rebuffed by the Chinese, who have retorted by referring to the
U.S. support for Taiwan's military build-up which Beijing says is directed against
it.[124]
U.S. security assistance
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid
Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of
the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided
helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[149]
During this period Pakistan also began to develop a modern export control
regulatory regime with U.S. assistance. It supplements the U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration Megaports program at Port Qasim, Karachi, which

deployed radiation monitors and imaging equipment monitored by a Pakistani

central alarm station.[150]
Pakistan turned down the offer of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a
sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks
and balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead
switches". But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its
own version of PAL and U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's
nuclear arsenals to be well secured.[151][152]

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the United States Department of Defense
report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT,
stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has
responded to the report by stating that the United States itself has not ratified
the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA
safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in
Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a
domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with
India's decision."

Pakistan and North Korea[edit]

North Korea ratified the treaty on 12 December 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal from the
treaty on 10 January 2003 following U.S. allegations that it had started an illegal enriched
uranium weapons program, and the U.S. subsequently stopping fuel oil shipments under
the Agreed Framework[55] which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in 1994. [56] The
withdrawal became effective 10 April 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw
from the treaty.[57] North Korea had once before announced withdrawal, on 12 March 1993, but
suspended that notice before it came into effect.[58]
On 10 February 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and
pulled out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We
had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
have manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's
evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea]," a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issue. [59] Six-party talks
resumed in July 2005.
On 19 September 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord.
Under the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear
production facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply
of light water reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program, as per
the 1994 Agreed Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussions.[60] On the next day
North Korea reiterated its known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not
dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT.[61]
On 2 October 2006, the North Korean foreign minister announced that his country was planning
to conduct a nuclear test "in the future", although it did not state when. [62] On Monday, 9 October
2006 at 01:35:28 (UTC) the United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 4.3 seismic
event 70 km (43 mi) north of Kimchaek, North Korea indicating a nuclear test.[63] The North
Korean government announced shortly afterward that they had completed a successful
underground test of a nuclear fission device.

In 2007, reports from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports stating that North Korea
was developing an enriched uranium weapons program, which led to North Korea leaving the
NPT, had overstated or misread the intelligence.[64][65][66][67] On the other hand, even apart from
these press allegationswhich some critics[by whom?] worry could have been planted in order to
justify the United States giving up trying to verify the dismantlement of Pyongyang's uranium
program in the face of North Korean intransigencethere remains some information in the public
record indicating the existence of a uranium effort. Quite apart from the fact that North Korean
First Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju at one point admitted the existence of a uranium enrichment
program, Pakistan's then-President Musharraf revealed that the A.Q. Khan proliferation network
had provided North Korea with a number of gas centrifuges designed for uranium enrichment.
Additionally, press reports have cited U.S. officials to the effect that evidence obtained in
dismantling Libya's WMD programs points toward North Korea as the source for Libya's uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) which, if true, would mean that North Korea has a uranium conversion
facility for producing feedstock for centrifuge enrichment.[68]
On February 11, 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic
disturbance,[13] reported to be a third underground nuclear test.[14] North Korea has officially
reported it as a successful nuclear test with a lighter warhead that delivers more force than
before, but has not revealed the exact yield. Multiple South Korean sources estimate the yield at
69 kilotons, while the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural
Resources estimates the yield at 40 kilotons.[15][16][17]
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was adopted unanimously by the United
Nations Security Council on October 14, 2006. The resolution, passed under Chapter VII, Article
41, of the UN Charter, imposes a series of economic and commercial sanctions on
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK, or North Korea) in the aftermath of that
nation's claimed nuclear test of October 9, 2006.[1]
The resolution's provisions include:
North Korea must "not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile", "suspend
all activities related to its ballistic missile programme" and "abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner".
The DPRK must also "return immediately to the six-party talks without precondition".
Shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons
of mass destruction or associated items (however, there is no obligation placed on member
states to perform such inspections).
A ban is placed on imports and exports of "battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile
systems", "related materiel including spare parts" and any other items identified by the sanctions
committee.
UN member states must freeze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved with
the DPRK's weapons programmes. An international travel ban is also placed on programme
employees and their families.
UN members are banned from exporting luxury goods to North Korea.[2]
8. Decides that:
(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK,
through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in their territories, of:

(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United
Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as
determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the
Committee);
(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee
has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document
S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by
the S/RES/1718 (2006) 06-57207 3 Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to
DPRKs nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destructionrelated
programmes;
(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their
territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice,
services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in
subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;
(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze
immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their
territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the
Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit
means, DPRKs nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic
missilerelated programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction,
and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being
made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the
benefit of such persons or entities;
(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through
their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being
responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the
DPRKs nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related
programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall
oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the
Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of
humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an
exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 was adopted unanimously by the United
Nations Security Council on 12 June 2009.[1] The resolution, passed under Chapter VII, Article 41,
of the UN Charter, imposes further economic and commercial sanctions on the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK, or North Korea) and encourages UN member states to
search North Korean cargo, in the aftermath of anunderground nuclear test conducted on 25
May 2009.
The provisions of the resolution include:
Authorizing member states to inspect, "in accordance with their national authorities and
legislation, and consistent with international law", North Korean cargo on land, sea, and air, and
to destroy any goods suspected of being connected to the DPRK's nuclear programme. [2]
Requiring the North Korean government to return immediately to the six-party talks and renounce
its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3]

Preventing financial services that could contribute to the nuclear or ballistic missile related
programmes.[4]
Instructing member states not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear programme,
or enter into loans with the country, except for humanitarian or developmental reasons.[4]
Extending the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from the country
and most imports, with an exception to small arms, light weapons and related material though
member states must notify the Security Council five days prior to selling the weapons. [5][6]
Demanding that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program and conduct no further nuclear or
missile tests.[5]
Asking member states to notify the Council of steps they are taking to implement the sanctions
within 45 days.[7]
Affirming the Security Council's commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the situation. [7]
9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all
arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services
or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or
materiel;
10. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all
arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services
or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for
small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and calls upon States to exercise
vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms or light
weapons, and further decides that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to
selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087, adopted unanimously on January 22, 2013,
after recalling all previous relevant resolutions on the situation concerning North Korea, including
resolutions 825 (1993),1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009), the Council
condemned the December 12, 2012 rocket launch by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.[1] North Korea cited this resolution as the cause of the 2013 Korean crisis.[citation needed]

Nuclear submarine
In response to INS Arihant, India's first nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy
pushed forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as a direct
response to the Indian nuclear submarine program. [178][179] Many military experts
believe that Pakistan has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is
ready to build such a fleet.[178] Finally in February 2012, the Navy announced it
would start work on the construction of a nuclear submarine to better meet the
Indian Navy's nuclear threat.[180] According to the Navy, the nuclear submarine is
an ambitious project, and will be designed and built indigenously. However, the
Navy stressed that "the project completion and trials would take anywhere from
between 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would
join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine." [178][180]
Criticism of NPT

Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as a
conspiracy of the nuclear 'haves' to keep the nuclear have-nots in their place.
[105]
This argument has roots in Article VI of the treaty which obligates the nuclear
weapons states to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete
disarmament. The non-nuclear states see no signs of this happening. [4][6] Some
argue that the NWS have not fully complied with their disarmament obligations
under Article VI of the NPT.[106] Some countries such as India have criticized the
NPT, because it "discriminated against states not possessing nuclear weapons on
January 1, 1967," while Iran and numerous Arab states have criticized Israel for
not signing the NPT.[107][108] There has been disappointment with the limited
progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons
states still have 22,000 warheads between them and have shown a reluctance to
disarm further.[5]
The United States responds to criticism of its disarmament record by pointing out
that since the end of the Cold War it has eliminated over 13,000 nuclear
weapons and eliminated over 80% of its deployed strategic warheads and 90% of
non-strategic warheads deployed to NATO, in the process eliminating whole
categories of warheads and delivery systems and reducing its reliance on nuclear
weapons.[citation needed] U.S. officials have also pointed out the ongoing U.S. work to
dismantle nuclear warheads. When current accelerated dismantlement efforts
ordered by President George W. Bush have been completed, the U.S. arsenal will
be less than a quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War, and smaller than it
has been at any point since the Eisenhower administration, well before the
drafting of the NPT.[110]

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with

reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials
that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving
safeguards and protection on existing materials.
During a state visit to India in November 2010, U.S. President Barack
Obama announced U.S. support for India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology
Control Regime, "in a phased manner," and to encourage the evolution of regime
participation criteria to that end, "consistent with maintaining the core principles
of these regimes."[4][5][6]
In July 2006, the United States Congress amended U.S. law to accommodate civilian
nuclear trade with India. A meeting of NSG participating governments on 2122
August 2008 on an India-specific exemption to the Guidelines[10] was inconclusive.
Several participating governments, including Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland,
and New Zealand, expressed reservations about the lack of conditions in the
proposed exemption.[11] In another meeting on September 6, 2008, the NSG
participating governments agreed to grant India a "clean waiver" from its
existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a country which has not signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSG's decision came after three days
of intense U.S. diplomacy.[12] The approval was based on a formal pledge by India
stating that it would not share sensitive nuclear technology or material with
others and will uphold its voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. The

pledge was contained in a crucial statement issued during the NSG meeting by
India outlining the country's disarmament and nonproliferation policies. [13]
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is an international treaty that defines
a framework for diplomatic relations between independent countries. It specifies the privileges of
a diplomatic mission that enable diplomats to perform their function without fear of coercion or
harassment by the host country. This forms the legal basis for diplomatic immunity. Its articles
are considered a cornerstone of modern international relations. As of April 2014, it has been
ratified by 190 states.[1]