UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No.

192565
PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Present:
Petitioners,
February 28, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside
the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or
proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with
perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false
affidavit.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou
v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the
long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the
high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the
execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to
in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the
criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the
city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as
the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells
solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge
against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaintaffidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but rather the
introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.[9] (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion
since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTCMakati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly,
the RTC-MakatiCity ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the
decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury
against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorioruling is more applicable to the present facts than
our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the
perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General
also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional
giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the
criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which
has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other

words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states
that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a
sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required
to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In
relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of
the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in
different fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a
false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a)

That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.

(b)

That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized
to receive and administer oath.

(c)

That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.

(d)

That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and
fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public,
were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under
oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath
which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x
x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the

Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal
or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. [17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite
her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay
City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the
division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case
that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed
in Makati Cityand Tagaytay City.
The
question
posed
was:
which
court
(Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the
verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance or
materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly
submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring
deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to
in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement
was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice[19] that, in
turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath
constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has
once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of
how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); thesecond is false testimony in a civil case
(Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the

Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on
a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their
respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the
case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other
hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937
American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present
RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation
in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the
prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No.
1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23] for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe
to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover,
thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the
Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and 5393[25] of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false
affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. [27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court
of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of representing
a false document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place
where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC [29] interestingly
explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act
No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans
Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code
and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together
with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law,
passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the
old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4
of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false
testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act
1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false
testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while
perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on false testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697
on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied;
emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on
any material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved perjured
statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to inManila and submitted to the SEC
in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place
where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue
would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an
affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury
law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately
penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with
false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making
of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the
court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply
because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions
filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled
that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these
cities where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the
[Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue. [31] To the Court, whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn inPasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement, [32] citing Caet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very
categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that
Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false
testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article
182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil
case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil
case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No.
1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only
that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other
portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in
court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the
oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the
time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section

14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly
included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases
is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients
took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of
Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the
execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s]
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the
criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate
for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavitunder Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or
her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2709 December 28, 1905
This was an action for the crime of giving false testimony.
The complaint filed in said cause was as follows:
The undersigned accuses Isidoro Aragon of the crime of false testimony in a civil cause, committed
as follows:
That on February 23 of the present year (1904), E.H. Warner filed the following complaint:
"United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the justice of the peace court of the city
Manila. Edwin H. Warner, plaintiff, vs. Claro Magcauas, defendant.
"The plaintiff appears and as a cause of action against the defendant, alleges:

"I. That the plaintiff is the plain and absolute owner of a great extension of land commonly
known by the name of Hacienda of Pasay, situated partly in Malate and Singalong, in the
jurisdiction of the city of Manila.
"II. That the defendant, as a tenant, occupied a small piece of the said hacienda located in
Singalong, in the jurisdiction of the city of Manila, which measured approximately 10,000
meters square, and for the occupation of which as a tenant he paid an annual rental of 13
pesos 3 reales and 12 cuartos.
"III. That the defendant has failed to pay and is owing to the plaintiff the rents
corresponding to the years 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903, at the annual rate of 13
pesos 3 reales and 12 cuartos, which amounts to the sum of 77 pesos 2 reales, or $_____,
notwithstanding that the payment of same has been repeatedly requested by the plaintiff.
"Wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant for the said sum of $_____,
being the rents corresponding to the said years, for the costs of this action, and for such
other and further relief as the court may deem equitable and just in the premises.
"Manila, February 23, 1904. For Sutro and Ortigas, Eusebio Orense, attorney for the
plaintiff."
That on the 4th day of March of the present year the accused was summoned as a witness to
appear before the justice of the peace court of Manila, and after having been duly sworn, testified
as follows:
"Q. Have you ever heard about the Pasay or Pineda estate? A. I have heard ... question
of lands.
"Q. Do you know the Pasay estate? A. I do not know.
"Q. What is it that you heard about the Pasay estate? A. Well, I can tell that with
reference to the Pasay estate that there has been objection to the survey, to the
assessment of that land, plenty of that, nothing more.
"Q. When was it that you say objection was made to the survey and nothing more? A.
Four years ago to-day.
"Q. Prior to that survey had you not heard any talk about the Pasay estate? A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you know if the Augustinian Fathers, during the years 1895 and 1898, brought any
action for forcible entry and detainer against Agustin Montilla, and whether in said action,
by reason of the decision ousting Mr. Montilla, the defendant, Claro Magcauas, in this case
was likewise ousted from his land as a sublessee of Mr. Montilla? A. I do not remember,
sir.
"Q. Did you knot know then Mr. Agustin Montilla as administrator of the Pasay estate?
A. I do not remember.
"Q. Were you justice of the peace for Singalong? A. Assistant.
"Q. But were you acting at the time? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In the justice of the peace court where you were acting was there not a suit brought by
Mr. Montilla for forcible entry and detainer against the tenants of the Pasay estate, among
them the defendant in this case, and for the lands in question? A. I do not remember.
"Q. Can you not assure that in your court not even a single action for forcible entry and
detainer was brought against Mr. Montilla? A. I do not remember, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that while you were justice an order was received from the judge
of the Court of First Instance calling upon you to forward a list of all the actions for forcible

entry and detainer pending in your court and brought by Don Agustin Montilla against
various tenants of the Pasay estate? A. I do not remember, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having received any order from the Court of First Instance as to
these actions for forcible entry and detainer in regard to the Pasay estate? A. I
remember having received orders, but I do not remember to what they referred.
"Q. Don't you remember that in the justice of the peace court while you were acting judge,
there was pending an action for forcible entry and detainer against Claro Magcauas,
Manuel Santajuana, Felipe Villanueva, Pedro Pascual, Escolastico Verge, Claro
Villanueva, Anastasio Ramos, Agustin Bonifacio, Arcadio Villanueva, Bernardino Isidro,
Maximo de los Santos, Severo Dineral, Florentino Gabriel, Pedro Nagomboy, Leocadio
Villareal, Leonardo Tailer, Catalino O. Santiago, Demetrio Espiritu, P. Tomaso, N. Vergel,
H. de los Reyes, Jose Carlos, Honorio Santiago, Rufino de Jesus, Victorino Delignac,
Aniceto Ordoez, Clemente Isidro, Claro Naracos, Eulogio Alcantara, Simeon A. Protasio,
Apolonio C. Santos, Gregorio R. Patricio, Alejandro Dionisio, Aniceto Severo, Pascual
Villanueva, Ignacio Pernate, Engracio Flores, Crispino Ampagan, Lino Vergel, Macario
Sergis, Dimas Dison, Modesto Protasio, Severo Vizcara, Isidro Vizcara, Petrona Vizcara,
and Bonifacio Vizcara, by Agustin J. Montilla? A. No, I do not remember.
"Q. None of those mentioned in my question? A. I do not recollect now anyone.
"Q. Did you not know Father Benito Ibaez, administrator of the Hacienda of Pasay? a.
No; neither.
"Q. Father Martin Arconada, who was administrator of the estate did you know him
personally as administrator of that estate? A. I do not remember whether he has been
administrator or not.
"Q. You do not remember whether any orders were published in Singalong by means of
the public crier, within Pasay, notifying the decision rendered in the suit in favor of Mr.
Montilla against the Augustinian Friars, and warning all the tenants of the Pasay estate to
pay thereafter Mr. Montilla as a lessee of that estate? A. If you talk about public crier I
do not remember, sir. Truly there have been notices by means of public criers, because
there in that month the revolution broke out."
All these statements are absolutely false, and are essential to the case at issue wherein they were
made, because really and truly the accused had heard about the Pasay estate prior to the four last
years, and he well knew that at that time there were brought in the justice of the peace court at
Pineda when he was filing that office many actions for forcible entry and detainer, instituted by
Agustin J. Montilla against tenants of the estate, he having received an order from the Court of
First Instance asking for a list of said actions, with a statement of the actions for forcible entry and
detainer and the answers filed by the defendants, and the accused himself signed three lists which
he forwarded to the Court of First Instance; because the accused himself received an order from
the Court of First Instance enjoining him to notify all the tenants of the Pasay estate of the decision
rendered in favor of Don Agustin J. Montilla, in the suit brought by him against the Augustinian
Friars, and the accused himself having rendered an order wherein the proper action was taken for
the compliance with such order of the Court of First Instance, and the accused himself having
taken part in various other proceedings had for the purpose of complying with such orders from the
Court of First Instance; because the accused knew that Don Agustin Montilla was the administrator
of the Pasay estate, was substituted by reason of the suit by him brought against the Augustinian
Friars by the curate of the pueblo, Father Benito Ibaez, and he, the accused, likewise knew that
Father Martin Arconada, the procurator of the convent of the Augustinian Fathers, did intervene in
the management of the Pasay estate, and because, he, the accused, likewise knew that in the
years 1895 and 1898 there was brought by the Augustinian Friars against Mr. Montilla an action for
forcible entry and detainer of the Pasay estate, the result of which was that said Mr. Montilla,
together with many other tenants of the Pasay estate, were ousted; all contrary to the form of the
statute in such cases made and provided.
This complaint was duly signed and sworn to.

At the close of the trial in the inferior court the defendant was found guilty of the crime charged in the said
complaint and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of three months of arresto mayor, with the
accessories of article 61 of the Penal Code and to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas or to suffer, in case of
insolvency, the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which should not exceed one-third part of the
period of imprisonment imposed, and to pay the costs.
From this sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
It is admitted that the defendant gave the testimony set out in the complaint, during the trial of a civil case in
the court of a justice of the peace of the city of Manila, between Edwin H. Warner, plaintiff, and Claro
Magcauas, defendant, an action brought by the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the annual rent for a
certain tract of land for the years 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903. The defendant was summoned as a
witness to appear before said justice of the peace, to give testimony upon the trial of this cause.
It is difficult to ascertain from an examination of the alleged false testimony set out in the said complaint just
how the questions and answers in said false testimony have any bearing whatever upon the issue that was
being tried before said justice of the peace. Admitting, however, that they must have had some reference to
some question presented before the court, we proceed to an examination of the question whether such
testimony was false.
Chapter VI of Title IV of the Penal Code provides the punishment for false testimony in both criminal and
civil cases, but this chapter makes no attempt to define false testimony or in any way to indicate of what
false testimony consists.
Escriche in his valuable dictionary (p. 972) defines false testimony to be: "La impostura o acusacion contra
un inocente y la deposicion que hace un testigo contra la verdad."
"Falso testimonio" under Spanish law corresponds to "false swearing" under English law. False swearing,
under the English law, is committed by a person who swears falsely before any person authorized to
administer an oath upon a matter of public concern, under such circumstances that the false swearing
would have amounted to perjury if committed in a judicial proceeding.
Bishop in his work on criminal law (Vol. 2, p. 588) says:
False swearing is the name given in the statutes of some of the States to false declarations on oath
which, while not within any common law or statutory designation of perjury, are, by such statutes,
rendered otherwise indictable.
Article 321 of the Penal Code provides that
False testimony given in a civil cause shall be punished with a penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to presidio correccional in its medium degree and a fine of from 625 to 6,250
pesetas.
If the amount of the claim should not exceed 625 pesetas, the penalties shall be those of arresto
mayorand a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
This testimony was given in a civil cause and it was the duty of the Government to prove that it was false.
Not only was it the duty of the Government to show that the testimony was false but that it was given
knowing that it was false and with malicious intent. Viada, in his valuable Commentaries on the Penal Code
(vol. 2, p. 449, 4th ed.), says:
Comete el delito de falso testimonio todo el que falta maliciosamente a la verdad en sus
declaraciones, sea negandola, sea diciendo lo contrario a ella.
During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave false
testimony he was asked certain questions with reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers
invariably were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning those facts. His
answers invariably were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning those facts.
The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to which the defendant was
questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with reference to those facts were
false. The mere fact that the defendant had had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was

not sufficient to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in December, 1904, that he had "no
recollection with reference to such facts or relations." The evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our
judgment, to show that the defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in the
complaint.
In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal Code for giving false testimony,
the following facts must be shown:
First. The testimony must be given in a civil cause.
Second. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause.
Third. The testimony must be false.
Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false.
Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in said
cause.
The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show that the defendant committed
the crime charged in the complaint. The judgment of the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said
cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-9869

March 25, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEDERICO CAET, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellant.
Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal by the United States from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Province, sustaining a demurrer to the information filed against the defendant in
the above-entitled case, for the crime of perjury, and dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
On January 9, 1914, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo Province filed the original information in
this case the defendant's demurrer to which was sustained, and the information ordered
amended, by the lower court. An amended information was filed on March 2, 1914,
which charges the crime of perjury, as follows:
That on or about September 29 of the present year, 1913, in the municipality of
Iloilo, Iloilo Province, Philippine Islands, the said defendant Federico Caet
presented to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a motion asking for annulment of
the judgment of said court, dated March 28, 1913, rendered in the civil suit
docketed as No. 1842 and entitled "Adraham Weill, as attorney for levy
Hermanos, plaintiff, vs. Federico Caet, defendant," for a sum of money; with the
further prayer that said case be reopened, and, as an integral and essential part
of said motion, the said defendant presented the affidavit signed by himself, in
which the defendant Federico Caet did knowingly, under oath, willfully,
intentionally, criminally and falsely make, sign and swear to as true, before the
notary, before the notary public J.E. Blanco, duty appointed by the Supreme

Court of these Islands as such notary and authorized by law to administer oaths,
the following affidavit as hereinafter quoted:
'PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, City of manila, ss:
Don Federico Caet, after being duly sworn, states:
1. That on January 6, 19913, Abraham Weill, as representative of Messrs. Levy
Hermanos, of Iloilo, filed in the Court of First Instance of said province a suit
against the deponent, praying for judgment for the sum of P12,700, and at the
same time secured an attachment upon all his property, as a result whereof the
sheriff attached the two automobile the price of which was the subject matter of
said suit, as well as other vehicles and furniture of the deponent, said case
having been docketed as No. 1842 of that court.
2. That, by reason of the filing of said suit and inssuance of the said attachment,
deponent went to Iloilo and, after certain negotiations with the plaintiff Weill,
executed and delivered to the latter a contract in writing for complete adjustment
of the claim which was the subject matter of the suit, and copy of this instrument
of compromise is annexed to this affidavit, marked with the letter A, as an integral
part thereof.
3. That said instrument of compromise was executed in duplicate by deponent
before the notary public Don Engracio Padilla of Iloilo, and, after being executed,
one copy was delivered to the plaintiff Weill, and the other, after being signed by
the plaintiff underneath deponent's signature, was delivered by the latter to Don
Ruperto Montinola, whom deponent had employed as his attorney on receiving
notification of the attachment; and that in consideration of the execution and
delivery of the said instrument of compromise plaintiff agreed to request
dismissal of the suit and also of the attachment issued in said orders as stated
above.
4. That the said instrument of compromise was drawn up by Don Ruperto
Montinola, attorney for deponent, and stipulated between the plaintiff Weill and
the said attorney Don Ruperto Montinola, in behalf of deponent and in his
presence that said attorney and the plaintiff would go immediately to the court
and presented said instrument of compromise and make other necessary
arrangements for securing dismissal of the suit and the attachment.
5. That on January 11, 1913, that is the next day after the execution of said
instrument of compromise, the plaintiff Weill telegraphed to the sheriff of
Occidental Negros, notifying him said case had been compromised and directing
him to raise the attachment levied upon deponent's property, and the sheriff
thereupon exhibit said telegram to deponent and in conformity therewith raised
the attachment.
6. That when the sheriff exhibits said telegram to deponent and raised the
attachment levied upon his property, deponent believed in good faith that the
agreement made in the instrument of compromise with the plaintiff had been
carried out and that suit, as well as the attachment, had been dismissed.
7. That in the months of February, March and April of the year 1913, deponent
delivered to Messrs. Lizarraga Hermanos, in conformity with the agreement in
said instrument of compromise, one thousand six hundred and thirteen (1,613)
piculs of sugar, from the sale whereof said firm turned over to the plaintiff Weill

the sum of P4,500, the net proceeds from the sale said sugar, after deduction of
the sum of P1,600 for expenses, instead of the P2,000 stipulated in said
instrument of compromise.
8. That on April 5, 1914, the plaintiff Weill wrote deponent a letter, which reads
thus:
ILOILO, April 5, 1913.
Sr. FEDERICO CAET,
Bago, Occidental Negros.
MY DEAR SIR:
The bearer hereof, master of the lorcha Emilia, is leaving for your place to pick
up the sugar you have ready.
Seor Montinola showed me your telegram and it was very difficult to find a
lorcha.
Let us know whether you have any more on hand in order to send you more
transportation.
According to Seor Montinola the firm of Lizarraga Hermanos has during this
week received from you some two hundred eighty picul of sugar but account has
not yet been rendered us.
We remain,
Your obedient servants,
FOR LEVY HERMANOS,
(Sgd.) A. WEILL.
9. That on April 11, 1913, when the last sum from the proceeds of the sale of said
sugar, amounting to P200, had been delivered to the plaintiff, deponent sent
through his son-in-law, Angel Mascua, a message to the plaintiff, requesting the
latter to please fix up his account and give him a memorandum of the balance
still due after deduction of the proceeds of the sale of the sugar, so that deponent
could execute or deliver to plaintiff a note for the balance of the debt, in
conformity with the stipulation in the instrument of compromise, but the plaintiff
Weill said to him in reply that the account could be fixed up later.
10. That on August 15, 1913, after judgment had been rendered against the
deponent by virtue of said suit and without his consent, as is hereinafter set forth,
an order of execution was issued and delivered to the sheriff, and then deponent
went to Iloilo to learn why the plaintiff had secured judgment and execution
against his property after the compact of compromise hereinbefore mentioned
had been entered into, and upon talking with the plaintiff the latter agreed, in
conformity with the stipulation in said compact of compromise, not to take any
further steps against the deponent by virtue of said judgment, and thereupon,
that is, August 15, 1913, plaintiff sent a telegram to the sheriff, notifying him that
said suit had been compromised and directing him to suspend the execution.

11. That on August 24, 1913, notwithstanding the agreement made with the
deponent, plaintiff again directed the sheriff to proceed with said execution and
the latter, on the same day, took possession of the two automobiles that had
been sold by the plaintiff to deponent for the sum of P11,000; and, on September
1, sold in the town of Bacolod, by virtue of the execution, for the sum of P4,005,
the Renault automobile for which deponent had paid plaintiff P6,500; and, on
September 12, in the city of Iloilo, the said Weill took part in the auction and
purchased for the sum of P600 the Brazier automobile for which deponent had
paid the plaintiff P4,500 and subsequently sold it to a third party for the sum of
P2,000.
12. That on Sunday, September 21, 1913, the said sheriff of Occidental Negros,
at the instance and petition of the plaintiff, went to deponent's house on his
hacienda in the town of Bago, Occidental Negros, and finding the house closed,
penetrated therein by force and levied attachment upon and seized all the
deponent's furniture and effects and took them to the town of Bago in order to
sell them, and there the said sheriff is preparing to sell and will sell such furniture
and effects at public auction.
13. That, upon going to Iloilo by reason of the notice of attachment of August 15,
deponent learned fore the first time that the suit of the defendant Weill had not
been dismissed, in conformity with said compact of compromise of January 10,
1913, but that the said Ruperto Montinola, attorney for deponent, and the plaintiff
Abraham Weill had, illegally and without deponent's knowledge, agreed to leave
said suit pending and that the said Ruperto Montinola, in conformity with the said
unlawful compact of February 27, 1913, had presented a reply, the contents
whereof deponent does not know.
14. That on March 28, 1913, Ruperto Montinola, conspiring deceitfully with the
plaintiff to defraud deponent, and without the latter's knowledge or consent, drew
up and submitted a petition asking that judgment be rendered against deponent,
as defendant in said suit, for the sum of P10,750.99, and copy of this judgment,
marked Exhibit B for it identification, is annexed to this affidavit as an integral part
thereof.
15. That on the same day, March 28, 1913 the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province rendered judgment against the deponent for the sum of P10,758.99, in
conformity with the petition mentioned that was presented by deponent's
attorney, and copy of this judgment, marked Exhibit C for its identification, is
annexed hereto as a part of this affidavit.
16. That deponent has in good faith carried out all the stipulations in the compact
of compromise of January 10, 1913, without ever having been informed or having
knowledge of the fact that the plaintiff Weill had not fulfilled his agreement to
dismiss said suit, and without knowledge that the said Weill had secured
judgment against the deponent as stated above.
17. That the said judgment was rendered against the deponent as a result of the
fraud of the said plaintiff Abraham Weill and of his own attorney Ruperto
Montinola, and by surprise and excusable negligence, on deponent's part, in
having confided implicity in said attorney Ruperto Montinola, and in not having
personally examined the orders of the Court of First Instance to determine
whether or not the plaintiff had carried out his agreement to request dismissal of
the suit.

18. That for the reason hereinbefore set forth the deponent has been the victim
of surprise and deceit, such as ordinary prudence was unable to avoid, and by
reason thereof he been greatly injured in his rights and interest; and the
judgment rendered in the said orders is completely null and void for the reason
that the plaintiff Abraham Weill lacked power or authorization sufficient in law for
exercising the action brought by him or for requesting that judgment be rendered
in his favor, as the representative of Levy Hermanos, because he was not the
real party in interest with reference to the subject matter of the action.
(Sgd.) FEDERICO CAET.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of September, 1913, by Don
Federico Caet who exhibited to me his personal cedula No. F-612224, issued at
Bago, Occidental Negros, January 7, 1913.
(Sgd.) J.E. BLANCO,
Notary Public until December 31, 1914.
(Notary's seal Doc. No. 122. Page No. 27.)
That said affidavit was presented by the defendant to the Court of First Instances
of Iloilo, when the defendant knew that the facts and statements contained in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18 of said affidavit were false and
contrary to the truth, that said statements are essential for determination of said
civil suit, and the defendant did deliberately, maliciously and criminally swear to
and present to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo the said false affidavit for the
purpose of securing a decision in his favor, to prevent execution upon and sale of
his property in the said civil suit; in violation of the law.
To this amended information the defendant interposed another demurrer based on the
following grounds; (1) That the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the
crime charged against the accused, and (2) that the crime charged was not committed,
in any case, within the jurisdiction of the court. This demurrer was overruled as to the
first ground, but sustained as to the second, and on March 24, 1914, the case was
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals from this order of
dismissal.
In disposing of this appeal we follow substantially the line of reasoning adopted in his
brief by the Attorney-General, with which we are in entire accord.
The only question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. The lower court found that
the crime charged in the amended information was completed in Manila, inasmuch as
the affidavit upon which the charge of perjury rested was subscribed and sworn to
before a notary in that city, and therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction over the offense.
Without considering or deciding whether the facts alleged sufficiently charge the
commission of the crime of perjury in the city of Manila, we hold that the complaint sets
forth facts which, if proven, are sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant
committed the crime of perjury within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, in that in a judicial proceeding pending in that court, "the defendant did
deliberately, maliciously and criminal swear to and present in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo the said false affidavit," such affidavit being known to him to be false, and being
intended by him to mislead the court, It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed
and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of
such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence material to a point at

issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province.
The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the
intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by
means of such affidavit.
Viewed in this light, the question which the case presents for determination resolves
itself into an inquiry as to whether, in this jurisdiction, it is perjury to submit under oath
false evidence upon a material point in issue in a judicial proceeding by means of an
affidavit. Section 3 of Act No. 1697, defining and penalizing the crime of perjury in the
Philippine Islands, reads as follows:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
persons, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath
to be administered that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which
he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine
of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five
years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or
of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
As was said in the case of United States vs. Estraa (16 Phil. rep., 520), "section
3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that of nearly all of the State of the
Union," and, 'by the common law, perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a
false oath, lawfully administered, in a judicial proceeding or the course of justice
in regard to a matter material to the issue or point of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399, the
cases cited therein.) And further that "this definition of perjury, as modified by
statute, may be more accurately defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion of
a falsehood, under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law, in
material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false
oaths than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings. (30 Cyc., 1400, and
cases cited.)"
Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law (11th ed. Vol. 2, sec. 1508), says: "Perjury, as the
offense, modified by statute, is now generally defined is the corrupt assertion of a
falsehood, under oath, or affirmation, and by legal authority, for the purpose of
influencing the course of law. Or, to give a definition drawn from the older common-law
authorities, it is the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge,
made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath or
in any from allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such evidence is given
in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being known to such
witness to be false, and being intended by him to mislead the court, jury, or person
holding the proceeding."
It will be seen that, according to this definition, willful assertion as to matter of fact,
opinion, belief, or knowledge made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his
evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath,
and whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such
assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by him to
mislead the court holding the proceeding, constitutes the crime of perjury.
In view of the definition of perjury, as modified by statute, which has been accepted and
followed in numerous cases, and upon the authority of the case of the United States vs.

Estraa, referred to above, we hold that it is perjury in this jurisdiction to submit false
evidence in a judicial proceeding by means of an affidavit.
The conclusion thus reached is not only founded upon the soundest principles of reason
and of law, but is even demanded by paramount consideration of public policy; for a
contrary doctrine would open the way to injustice and fraud. Our Code of Civil
Procedure provides that evidence may be given by means of an affidavit in certain
instances (sec. 348), and that such affidavit may be taken in a foreign country before
any judge of a court of record having a seal (sec. 351). It is easy to conceive of a case
where a person, interested in the outcome of a judicial proceeding pending in one of the
courts of these Islands, with the deliberate purpose of influencing the course of law in
his favor, might go to a foreign country, and there before a judge of a proper court of
record, subscribe and swear to an affidavit setting forth facts known to him to be false,
but perfectly suited for the purpose he has in view, and then cause such affidavit to be
filed with court in which the case is pending. He could thus accomplish his purpose with
absolute impunity, if it should be held that it is not perjury in this jurisdiction to submit
under oath false evidence material to a point in issue in a judicial proceeding by means
of an affidavit, such as was done by the defendant in the case at bar.
As was said in the case of Herring vs. State (199 Ga., 709; 46 S. E., 876): "The nice
and subtle technicalities with which some of the courts in the past surrounded the crime
of perjury rendered a conviction for that offense well-night impossible. It is probable that
these niceties were devised by the common-law courts, on account of the barbarous
punishment which was visited upon persons convicted of this offense. The punishment
has been humanely mitigated, and at the same time the class of persons competent to
testify in court has been greatly enlarged. As all faith in judicial proceedings rests upon
the final sanction of an oath, it is good policy, not only for this reason by for those above
indicated, to facilitate, in so far as may be consistent with law and justice, convictions for
his crime."
The order entered in the court below sustaining the demurrer should be set aside.
without special condemnation of costs in this instance. So ordered.

We sat and made a list

Of all the things that we had
Down the backs of table tops
Ticket stubs and your diaries
I read them all one day
When loneliness came and you were away
Oh they told me nothing new,
But I love to read the words you used
These are the things, the things we lost
The things we lost in the fire
Do you understand that we will never be the same again?
There's a light in the bedroom
But it's dark
Scattered around on the floor are
All my souls
This is just another night
And we've had many of them
To the morning we're cast out
Im lost
-----Theres a hole in my soul
I cant fill it, I cant fill it
Theres a hole in my soul
Can you fill it? Can you fill it?
We used to swim in your stories
and be pulled down by their tide
Choking on the water, drowning, with no air in sight
Now you've hit a wall and it's not your fault
My dear, my dear, my dear

"Laughter Lines"
You took me to your favourite place on Earth
To see the tree they cut down ten years from your birth
Our fingers traced in circles round its history
We brushed our hands right back in time through centuries.
As you held me down, you said:
"I'll see you in the future when we're older
And we are full of stories to be told
Cross my heart and hope to die
I'll see you with your laughter lines"
Changes on our hands and on our faces, oh, oh
Memories are mapped out by the lines we'll trace
As you held me down you said:
"I'll see you in the future when we're older
And we are full of stories to be told
Cross my heart and hope to die
I'll see you with your laughter lines"
Ashen faces in cold breeze
ashen faces in cold breeze
Armed with stories you will leave
Oh armed with stories you will leave
I'll see you in the future when we're older
And we are full of stories to be told
Cross my heart and hope to die I'll see you with your laughter lines
I'll see you in the future when we're old
I'll see you in the future when we're old
"Haunt"
We make our agreements about when to meet
And I'll leave you in the doorway
The cold evening aches as it leaves in it's wake
Oh the memories left by the day
Oh and questioning why as you look to the sky
That is cloudless up above our heads
And thoughts come to mind how our short little lives
Haven't left the path that they will tread
They will tread...
I'll come back to haunt you
Memories will taunt you
And I will try to love you
It's not like I'm above you
Will wisdom we learn as our minds they do burn
All the ties to naivety and youth
To adults we grow and maturity shows

Oh the terrifying rarity of truth

As you turn to your mind and youth thoughts they rewind
To old happenings and things that are done
You can't find what's past make that happiness last
Seeing from those eyes what you've become
What you've become...
I'll come back to haunt you
Memories will taunt you
And I will try to love you
It's not like I'm above you
I will see you there
Will see you there
Will see you there...
I'll come back to haunt you
Memories will taunt you
And I will try to love you
It's not like I'm above you
"Remains"
(vs. Rag N Bone Man vs. Skunk Anansie)
I came here for sanctuary, away from the winds and the sounds of the city.
I came here to get some peace, way down deep where the shadows are
heavy.
I can't help but think of you.
In these four walls my thoughts seem to wonder
To some distant century where everyone we know is six feet under.
When all of our friends are dead and just a memory
And we're side by side, it's always been just you and me for all to see.
When our lives are over and all that remains.
Are our skulls and bones let's take it to the grave.
And hold me in your arms, hold me in your arms, I'll be buried here with
you.
And I'll hold in these hands, all that remains.
I don't want to rest in peace, we can haunt each other's dreams.
We'll fight underneath this turf, bicker away in darkness.
We'll find our way to result our way from the lands of the living.
We'll find a common ground and fall in love all over again.
When all of our friends are dead and just a memory
And we're side by side, it's always been just you and me for all, all to see.
When our lives are over and all that remains.
Are our skulls and bones let's take it to the grave.
And hold me in your arms, hold me in your arms, I'll be buried here with
you.
And I'll hold in these hands, all that remains.
From dust to dawn.
The other's screams grow silent in defeat.

I know I chased a memory but you used to taste so sweet.

As you faded away I realised it's all over and nothing stays the same
From our skulls and bones and grave.
When all of our friends are dead and just a memory
And we're side by side, it's always been just you and me for all, all to see.
When our lives are over and all that remains.
Are our skulls and bones let's take it to the grave.
Hold me in your arms, hold me in your arms, I'll be buried here with you.
And I'll hold in these hands, all that remains.
"(I Just) Died In Your Arms"
(originally by Cutting Crew)
I keep on looking for something I can't get,
broken hearts lie all around me and I don't
see an easy way to get out of this.
Her diary sits on the bedside table,
the curtain's closed, the cat's in the cradle
and who would have thought that a boy like
me could come to this?
Oh oh, I, I just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been something you said,
I just died in your arms tonight.
Oh oh, I, I Just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been some kind of kiss,
I should've walked away.
I should've walked away.
Is there any just cause for feeling like this?
On the surface I'm a name on the list,
I try to be discreet, but then blow it again.
I'm lost and found, it's my final mistake,
she's love in my proxy, no give it, all take,
'cause I've been thrilled to fantasy too many times.
Oh oh, I, I just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been something you said,
I just died in your arms tonight.
Oh oh, I, I Just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been some kind of kiss,
I should've walked away.
I should've walked away.
It was a long hot night, she made it easy,
she made it feel right, but now it's over,
the moment is gone, I'm following my hands,
not my head.
I know
Oh oh, I, I just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been something you said,
I just died in your arms tonight.
Ohoh, I, I Just died in your arms tonight,
it must have been some kind of kiss,

I
I
I
I
I

should've
should've
should've
should've
should've

walked
walked
walked
walked
walked

away.
away.
away.
away.
away.

"Forever Ever"
(feat. Kate Tempest & Jay Brown)
I don't wanna talk about it [x8]
I see ahead of me a light that takes my breath
If we're only ever looking back, then how can we expect
To see each other as we are, for all that we've become
Would be friends at all if we weren't friends when we was young?
And I want to feel close to you for more than just a sake,
Of the place that we grew up in and all them times that we got baked in the
park
Look, if you take me apart, you'll find half of me is you but half of me is
asking me to start a new
You look the same but I don't recognize you, I look at you dead in the face, I
can't find you
Don't like the way we always talk in the past tense,
Can't explain the presence till you work out what the past meant
These are the days that bond us together, forever
These are the things that define us, forever, ever
All this bad blood here, won't you let it dry?
It's been cold for years, won't you let it lie?
There's a man I've known for years, and still to this day do I know him
I love him very much, it's very hard for me to show him
Back then and even now I feel there's something that I owe him
And that feeling should be going over time but no it's growing
We was kid mates, making mistakes, playing pisstake
Big hearts battling them big snakes, rattling their tails
He was like the wind in my sails, I was like the water for his keel, that was
real
It use to hurt my flesh that his worn scars were heated still
He use to hurt his flesh just to see if he could feel
He took out a long straw, he was never really the strong sort
Got in to the wrong sport, big swigs, long snorts
Caught in that spiral, saw attempts to help him sparkle
But soon he got fall down that he got on the brown, word got round
People did not like the sound, they told me to stop popping round to see him
I kept disagreeing, soon he was a different being
He got in to stealing, robbing, afterwards you'd think would open eyes were
throbbing
You could stop him freaking out, but to speak about the things that made
him weak, his doubt
And to stop his rolling sentence, faced with paper pen to write his actions
spoke dependance
Friendship became difficult to say the least, he played the beast so well
I wondered how I could ever make our peace
That's when we drifted, never argued, it just became clear
The past you been my love, so we'd slowly disappear

Those are the days that bind us together, forever

These little things define us, forever, forever
All this bad blood here, won't you let it dry?
It's been cold for years, won't you let it lie?
Ready or not, here I come, you can't hide
I'm going to find you and take it slowly
Ready or not, here I come, you can't hide
I'm going to find you and make you want me
"No Angels"
(feat. Ella)
(originally by TLC)
[Spoken (Excerpt from Psycho):]
[Norman:] Well, I run the office and tend the cabins and grounds and do the
errands for my mother. The ones she allows I might be capable of doing.
[Marion:] And do you go out with friends?
[Norman:] Well, a boy's best friend is his mother.
[Dan Smith:]
A scrub is a guy who thinks hes fly and is also known as a buster
Always talkin about what he wants and just sits on his broke ass
So, no, I dont want your number
No, I dont want to give you mine and
No, I dont want to meet you nowhere
No, dont want none of your time
No, I dont want no scrubs
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
Trying to holla at me
I dont want no scrubs
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
Trying to holla at me
Trying to holla at me at me
[Ella:]
But a scrub's checkin' me and his game is kinda weak
And I know that he cannot approach me
Cause I'm looking like class and he's looking like trash
Can't get with no dead-beat ass
So
[Dan Smith:]
No, I dont want your number
No, I dont want to give you mine and
No, I dont want to meet you nowhere
No, dont want none of your time
No

[Ella:]
I dont want no scrubs
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
Trying to holla at me
I dont want no scrub
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
Trying to holla at me
Holler at me
Holler at me
Holler at me
[Dan Smith:]
If you dont have a car and youre walking
(Oh yes son, Im talking to you)
If you live at home with your momma
[Norman:] We're all in our private traps
If you have a shorty but you dont show love
[Norman:] Clamped in them, and none of us can ever get out
Wanna get me with no money
Oh no, I dont want no
No scrubs, no scrubs
[Marion:] Sometimes we deliberately step into those traps
No scrubs,
[Norman:] I was born in mine; I don't mind it anymore
No scrubs,
[Marion:] Oh but you should, you should mind it
No scrubs,
[Norman:] Oh I do, but I say I don't
[Together:]
No, I dont want no scrubs
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
Trying to holla at me
I dont want no scrubs
A scrub is a guy that cant get no love from me
Hangin out the passenger side
Of his best friends ride
[Ella:] Trying to holler at me
Trying to holler at me
[Ella:] Holler at me
Trying to holler at me