G.R. No.

165448

July 27, 2009

ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision2 and 24 September
2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were
to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng),
a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent
of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the
cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an
appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the
same is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which
shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of
the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and
regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of
penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon
as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first. 4
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were
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being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they
found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the
cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing
(Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab),
who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out
of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58
cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market
value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 5 (PD 705) was filed
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or
permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total
volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00
bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at
Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.6lawphil
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy
of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who
claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were
stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting
trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in
possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while
two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely
followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit
was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and
Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity
map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by
three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court

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In its 26 May 1994 Decision, 7 the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR,
MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in
the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest
charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the
costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS
are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for
their provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646,
dated February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon
proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be
cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the
permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto
Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto
Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had
the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms
of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers
Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals
rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of
Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of
Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without
permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.
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The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of
Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to which
trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 10 For
questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants. 11 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. 12
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1)
Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and

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(2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. 13
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise
the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the
pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut
trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise
be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of
the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting
trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could
have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make
petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of
PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an
officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or
collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24
September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto
Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
G.R. No. 158182

June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14
May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of
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petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68, 3 Presidential Decree No. 705
(PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied
admission of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court)
with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod
Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership. 6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner
cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo),
the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting
with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix)
who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under
a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's
wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.
When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim
to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert
the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra
trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the
Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber.
Hernandez took custody of the lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an
apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial
Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut
the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor 11 found probable cause to indict
petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and
Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the treecutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had
no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
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In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.12 The trial court
dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he
cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's
lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68
of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also
contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based
on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD
705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but
ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. 13 The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting
the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found
nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer
considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the
Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced
petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the
body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should
be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the
same penalty the trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003,
did not admit his motion for having been filed late. 15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE
CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST
PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND
CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO
IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT
THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS
MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
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[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE

CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED
WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME. 16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer,
filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it
was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated
by a complaint filed by specified individuals, 18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of
jurisdiction from trying such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other
crimes against chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint
before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD
705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in
this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of
the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer
assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating
forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official

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authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file

an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80
refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by
other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence." 22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property
but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus,
Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima
facie evidence to support the complaint or report." 23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded,
either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For
its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within
its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of
timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. 27 Petitioner
stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products
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from a private land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be
limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second
category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of
"gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case
hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without
a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR
permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented
to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with
Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We
sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him. 30 Petitioner
does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official
capacities, would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to
mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,
petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for
cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calix's authorization if, as
he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes
"timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest
product" (which circuitously includes "timber.") 31 Does the narra tree in question constitute
"timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section
68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions,
timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions 33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation
age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 35 this Court was faced with a similar task of
having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of
lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should
be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
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alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a
processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and
procesed timber. Neither should we. 36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its
common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or
joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling,
beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into "several
pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of
111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt
Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod
Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured
65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters." 40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and
converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under
the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310
in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x
x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case
may be.
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2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period, if
the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed
50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed
5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support
of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board
feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included,
the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on
Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are
his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more
than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. 42 In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or
fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. 43 In People
v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's
value consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of
corroboration was compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not
12 | P a g e

presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under
Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here,
the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years,
four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May
2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced
to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
=========================================================================
=========================================================================
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court
at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin
prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of
P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

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The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit
the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the
truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22,
1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of
July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR
pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their
letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to
the Secretary. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil
Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners
with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present petition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the
Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order
of petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents,
on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant
case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was
violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture
was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no
authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and
(b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter,
we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

14 | P a g e

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to
ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate
that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1)
when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
The letter, reads, thus:
xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the Secretary.
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the
review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of
an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law.
Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
15 | P a g e

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very
nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated
in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond
the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of
excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First,
they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter
of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989
of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit
16 | P a g e

conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as
follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,
implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
(Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents thinking
not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to
the fact that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted
herein below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
(Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the
same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government.
The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give
effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations
and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through

17 | P a g e

criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive
to present situations and realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate,
not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court
under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A
would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners
themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the
truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of
which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. :
xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the
crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a
criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. xxx
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they
stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the
owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not
eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is,
the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12,
1989, petitioners pointed out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order
No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the
cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee
or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx
18 | P a g e

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order
that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an
act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277
amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any
person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring
ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license.
-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No.
277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277
when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute
is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of
the law.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin
suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones

19 | P a g e

recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of
action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession
of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. To detain is defined as to mean to hold or
keep in custody, and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of
authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of
Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit
that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment,
or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and
the actual value of the property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a
wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the
truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the
required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by
E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as
well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession
or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally
permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705,
as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau
of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject
to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :
SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision
shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved
party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No.
19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made
permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

20 | P a g e

Rollo p. 235.
Rollo pp. 241-242.
Rollo p. 239.
Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in office by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.
Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.
Rollo pp. 251-252.
Rollo pp. 274-275.
Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices Luis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.
Rollo pp. 14-35.
Rollo pp. 117-119.
National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L -15809, August 30, 1961;
Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.
Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v.
District Engineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.
Industrial Power Sales, Inc. V. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.
Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.
De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.
Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v. Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.
Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.
Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.
Soto v. Jareno, supra.
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.
Rollo pp. 236-240.
Rollo p. 239.
Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.
G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.
G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.
Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

21 | P a g e

Ibid.
Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995.
G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.
Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.
De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.
Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.
Rollo p. 242.
Ibid.
Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p.850, footnote 57; I. Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85,
184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.
Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 Ill 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116 P 428.
Id., footnote 60 ; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

22 | P a g e