Constitutions, Virtue and Philosophy in Plato S Statesman and Republic

Northeastern Political Science Association
Constitutions, Virtue &Philosophy in Plato's "Statesman" &"Republic"

Author(s): Gerald Mara
Source: Polity, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring, 1981), pp. 355-382
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Constitutions,Virtue&
Philosophyin Plato's
Statesman&Republic
GeraldMara
Center for Renewable Resources
This article deals with the puzzling issue of Plato's differing classifications of constitutions in the Republic and the Statesman and of his
view of the best city. The author rejects the familiar interpretations,
which see these differences as minor variations or as the result of changes
in Plato's political philosophy in the course of time. It is his position
that the differences in the classification of regimes are attributable to
differences in their respective advocates, Socrates and the Eleatic
stranger, concerning the relationship between philosophy and politics.
His comparisons of the psychological theories and political criteria
held by the principal characters of the two dialogues reaffirmsPlato's
support of the position attributed to Socrates.
Gerald Mara is currently a policy analyst with the Center for Renewable
Resources in Washington, D.C. His article on Rousseau appeared in
the Western Political Quarterly, and his present scholarly work is on
Plato's Republic and Aristotle's analysis of moral and intellectual
virtue.
I. Introduction: Constitutions, Political Philosophy, and Human Nature

Plato's dialogues, Statesman and Republic, contain two very different
discussions of distinct kinds of constitutions or cities, which culminate in
two different accounts of the best city. The major presentations in each
work are made by different Platonic characters, Socrates in the Republic
and an unnamed stranger from Elea in the Statesman. Socrates' discourse occurs in private, outside Athens proper, in the company of some
gifted young political men and a fairly renowned teacher of rhetoric.
The stranger's discussion is relatively public, in Athens, in the company
of two gifted young mathematicians and a renowned teacher of geometry.
One of the stranger's listeners is Socrates himself, but his chief inter-

356 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

locutor is a "young"Socrateswho does not resemble"old"Socratesin
either looks or character.The Statesmanoccurs after Socrates'indictment and beforehis trialfor impietyand for corruptingthe city's youth.
The RepublicoccursbetweenSocrates'attendanceat two religiousfestivals. The Statesmancontains a justificationof Athens' case against
Socratesbut, nonetheless,prefersthe rule of scientificpolitics over the
ruleof the democracy.The Republiccontainsvarieddefensesof Socrates
but, nonetheless,illustrateswhy certainaccusationsagainsthim are in a
sense true. The Republic'sbest city ascendsfrom primalneeds to philosophy while the Statesman'sbest city descendsfrom science and inspirationto matchmakingand childrearing.One could say that the Republic considerspolitics among practicalmen in a philosophiccontext
whilethe Statesmanconsiderspoliticsamongscientificmen in a practical
context.
These elementsof time, place, and personaare importantfor understandingthe "content"of the dialogues,for the discussionsthemselves
are cosmic, yet intimate.Againstthis backdropit may seem ratheracademic, if not somewhatmyopic, to devote extensive attention to the
dialogues'differentclassificationsof constitutions.But I want to suggest
that these elements are central to our understandingof each work. In
particular,they are significantif we are to come to grips with Plato's
positionon the natureof politicalphilosophyitself, in a way the express
topic of the Statesmanand the implicitthemeof the Republic.
Past commentatorshave recognizedthe importanceof these differing
evaluationsof cities not only for the Republicand the Statesmanbut for
the Laws as well. But there is considerablecontroversyover the interpretationof their differentfeatures. At least two distinct conclusions
predominate.'Campbell2 and Shorey3contend that the various constitutionalevaluationsare relativelyminor variationson the same general
theme. They reflecta consistentrecommendationthat the highesttheoreticians,the philosophers,should rule the best city.4But Morrow5and
1. There are some notable exceptions which fall outside of these two alternatives. See, for instance, Leo Strauss's discussion of the three dialogues in Leo
Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., The History of Political Philosophy, 2nd ed.
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 7-63.
2. Lewis Campbell, "Introduction to the Statesman," The Sophistes and the
Politicus of Plato (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1867), pp. ix, xvi.
3. Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960), pp. 85-6; idem, What Plato Said, abr. ed. (Chicago: Phoenix, 1967),
pp. 266, 358-9.
4. Specifically with regard to the Statesman this same position is maintained
by Jacob Klein, Plato's Trilogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977),
p. 200; and Rosamund Kent Sprague, Plato's Philosopher-King:A Study of the

Gerald Mara
357
Taylor6 see these variations in regimes as signaling a Platonic departure

from the endorsement of philosophic kingship and its replacement with
the generalizing, experiential rule of law.
Both interpretations have implications for understanding Plato's position on the possibility of political philosophy. For Plato the possibility
of the same human being or human type engaging in politics and philosophy is raised as an explicit question.7 Since political philosophy is
not identical with political thinking, this possibility cannot be presupposed or assumed. To meet this issue we need to consider the activity
of the political philosopher in light of an overall account of human
nature.8 However, this inquiry is not simply an exercise in speculative
psychology since the justification of political activity in the Republic, the
theoretical endorsement of politics and condemnation of tyranny, depends upon the compatibility of philosophy and politics in the person of
the philosopher king. There seems to be a more or less direct line, then,
between the classifications of regimes, the justification of political philosophy, and the Platonic analysis of human nature.
In this paper I want to offer an alternative to both Campbell/Shorey
and Morrow/Taylor. I suggest that the differing classifications of constitutions reflect the differing perspectives of the characters who present
them. The most important of these differences concerns the relationship
between philosophic and political activities. Conclusions about the possibility of political philosophy represent the foundations and not merely
the consequences of these two different evaluations of cities. AccordTheoretical Background (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press,
1976), pp. 100-17.
5. Glenn Morrow, Plato's Cretan City (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1960), pp. 9-10, 153-7; idem, Plato's Epistles: A Translation With Critical Essays
and Notes (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1962), pp. 130-7; idem, "Plato and The
Rule of Law," reprinted in Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical
Essays, vol. 2 (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 144-165.
6. A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: Meridian, 1957),
p. 465. The commentary on the Statesman by J. B. Skemp also generally fits

this mold but with a slight variation. He says that the Statesman and the Laws
are more "realistic" or limited than the Republic but that Plato never deviates
in principle from the "ideal" of the philosopher-king. See Plato's Statesman: A
Translation of the Politicus
of Plato Withl Introductory Essay and Footnotes
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 54-66.

7. For example at Republic 485al-3; Hippias 281c4-dll.
8. A similar approach is recommended in ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," reprinted in W. D. Hudson, ed., The Is-Ought Problem
(London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 175-195. The application of this sort of analysis
to political philosophy is discussed by Stephen Salkever, "Virtue, Obligation and
Politics," American Political Science Review 68 (1974):
78-92.


ingly the perspectivesof Socrates and the Eleatic strangerthemselves
need to be investigated.I ultimatelysuggestthat the two differingclassificationsof regimesprovideavenuesthroughwhichthat investigationcan
begin.
Thus, both the Campbell/Shoreyand Morrow/Taylorpositionsseem
too simple to deal with these issues as they arise in the differentPlatonic analyses of cities, at least in the Statesmanand the Republic.
I suggest that Plato's different constitutionalevaluations are, contra
Campbell/Shorey,to be taken seriously as differences not, contra
Morrow/Taylor,within changingpolitical opinions but within a complex, consistent position on the relationshipbetween philosophy and
politics. Thus, my intentionis to conclude by saying somethingabout
the importanceof Plato'spoliticalphilosophyin general.Whateverbenefits this yields, it runs the risk of ignoringthe significanceof many of
the dramaticdetails. Accordingly,I concludethe essay by brieflycomparingPlato'sgeneraltreatmentof politicalphilosophywith more modern examinationsof the relationshipbetweentheoryand practice.Hopefully the questionsraised by this survey will suggest why the risk is
worthtaking.
II. Regimes:The SurfaceFeaturesof the Two Classifications
The Republic
For both Socratesand the Eleatic stranger,as well as in the dialoguesin

general,the Greek word politeiahas a more extensivemeaningthan its
It signifiesnot only the arrangeusualEnglishtranslation,"constitution."
ment of political power in a city but also, and more importantly,the
unique way of life characteristicof that city. The politeia includes the
kinds of things that the city values or rewards,the kinds of goals that
motivatethe actionsof its citizens.Thus, in the eighthand ninth books
of the Republic,Socratescomparesdifferentregimesby evaluatingthe
differentcharacteristicactivitiesencouragedin each.9Five differentre9. I will not attempt to defend or justify the conception of good politics as
that productive of human virtue here. However, it is obviously far removed from
most modern conceptions. The stranger'sdefense of this approachin the Statesman
seems insufficient since it rests upon an assumed analogy between politike and
other arts. (Although the stranger is concerned in his discussion of justice to
show how politike and other technai differ.) In general Plato (or Socrates) seems
to derive this conception of good politics from at least three premises: first, that
all kinds of regimes necessarily encourage particularways of life; second, that all
persons necessarily look to their regimes for assistance in choosing the best way
of life; and third, that different ways of life can be evaluatively compared in a
rational (demonstrable,binding) way.

Gerald Mara
359
gimes emerge. The aristocracy is, as its name implies, the regime ruled
by the best human beings (hoi aristoi), the kings who philosophize or
the philosophers who are also kings. The timocracy is ruled by the
spirited ones or those motivated by honor, principally attained through
victory in war (547c4-9). The oligarchy is ruled by the rich or those
at least rich enough to meet a relatively high property qualification
(550c7-dl). The democracy is ruled by the demos, that class in the
city devoted (not self-consciously) to freedom or the varied and individual pursuit of privately defined goals (562a8-c2). The final regime
is the tyranny, the city ruled by the person or persons most strongly
influenced by the need to gratify the most intense selfish desires
(573a4-b8).
These regimes all promote (with more or less success) the development of the person, who is characteristically motivated by the regime's
ruling principle. The aristocracy encourages the growth of the human
individual who characteristically performs the highest activities of which
the human species is capable. Socrates calls this kind of characteristic
virtue or excellence (arete). The other four cities are ranked by Socrates
according to how well they approximate the best regime's fostering of
excellence. Accordingly the tyranny is the worst regime, even a nonregime, because it promotes no part of human virtue but only human
vice.
The Statesman
Initially the Eleatic stranger's classification of regimes in the Statesman
likewise makes it clear that the best politeia is that which encourages
its citizens' virtue. In this dialogue that regime is the one ruled by
the statesman (politikos) or the person possessing political science
(politike). 1( But although the stranger defines his conception of virtue,
he does not elaborate on the imitations of virtue that grow in inferior
regimes. The stranger's principal concern is, rather, to prove that the
criterion of art or science is the standard for discovering the best regime,
superior to the more conventional criteria of wealth, consent, or the rule
of written laws (292a6-11; 292c6-10).
However, the criterion of written laws is preferable to its competitors
10. Literal translations of politikos and politike are "politically wise person"
and "political wisdom." Both words are derived from polis (city). The politikos
is not simply a citizen (any more than a doctor is simply a healthy person), but
rather a person who possesses the science of politike. The existence of the politikos is contingent upon the prior existence of politike. The terms "statesman"
and "statesmanship"are misleading because of their more modern associations
with the concepts of "sovereign state" and "leadership"or "diplomacy."


preciselybecausehumanbeings possessingpoliticalwisdomare so very
rare. The strangerpraises legal rule because laws and customs, the
resultsof long experience,generallyimitatethe statesman'ssciencebetter
than most nonscientificcities (300bl-7). For the stranger,two inferior
regimes imitate politike throughfollowing written laws. They are the
kingshipand the aristocracy(or the governmentof the rich according
to laws). These two constitutionsare closer to the best regimethan the
next two imitativeregimes,the oligarchyor the governmentof the rich
withoutlaws and the democracy.Political science is a difficultscience
which can be masteredonly by one or a few persons (297b9-c6). The
achievementof political wisdom depends upon intellectualgifts rather
than materialresources.The principleof the democracy,however, is
equality or the claim that there are no essential differencesbetween
persons.The principleof the oligarchyis wealthor the claim that essential differencesbetween persons can be measuredby their money or
property.While certainindividualdemocratsor oligarchsmay be wiser
than some kingsor aristocrats,the constitutionalformsof the monarchy
and aristocracyare moreopen to the ruleof the wise thanthe democracy
or oligarchy(311a4-10). The strangersuggeststhat the chief political
opponentsto a rule accordingto science or wisdomare the rich and the
many (298e6-10; 298el4-299a8).
But in spite of the wide variationswhich exist among these four imitativeregimes,the strangerstill distinguishesall of themcollectivelyfrom
the tyranny,which is ruledby no imitationof science but by ignorance
and desire (301c2-9). Accordingto this criterion,the tyrannyis the
worst regime,not because it fostershumanvice, but becauseit is ruled
by the two antithesesto science.
The strangerdescribesthe value of the rule of law somewhatdifferently later in the dialogue. There the imitative regimes are ordered
accordingto how well they promote a certain kind of freedom, the
freedomfrom oppressionthat all men desire (302b5-10). The measure
or standardhere is not the regimegovernedby science but the regime
allowingfreedom.In generalregimesthat are lawful (restrained)are far
less oppressivethan theirlawlesscounterparts.Accordinglythe kingship,
aristocracy,and lawful democracyare by far preferableto the lawless
democracy,the oligarchy,and the tyranny.The aristocracyand especially the kingshipare themselvespreferableto the lawful democracy
because of the latter'sinabilityto do anythinggreat (303a4-7). The
nonoppressiveregimes must be strong enough to provide securityfor
their citizens'free existences.This securityincludes freedom from the
oppressionsof the competingfactions of oligarchsand democrats.The
kingshipstandsapartfrom these competingfactionsmore than the aristocracybecause of the strongreligiousand institutionalsupportswhich

GeraldMara 361
underliethe king'srule. The king'slawfulpower also has the advantage
of being concentratedpower. There is no dilution of authority.Thus,
while the strangeris equivocalaboutthe relativeworthof the monarchy
and the aristocracyaccordingto the criterionof science, he clearlyprefers the monarchyaccordingto the criterionof freedom." The stranger
differsmarkedlyfrom the entire liberal traditionfrom Spinozaonward
by arguingthat a permissivegovernmentis not the most free government.Althoughthe praiseof the kingshippresupposesthe unattainability
of the best regime,praiseof even the lawfuldemocracypresupposesthe
lawlessnessof all otherregimes(303a8-b10). But both of the stranger's
criteriaare identicalinsofar as they identify the tyrannyas the worst
regime.It is bothirrationalandoppressive.
III. Virtue
The Republic: Philosophy
In each dialoguethe best city is praisedbecauseit fostershumanvirtue.

But beyond this formal agreementSocratesand the strangerappearto
divergesharplyover the substantivedefinitionof that virtue.Their formally similarportrayalsof the best regimealso differwith the substance
of each conceptionof virtue.
The question of virtue is introducedin the Republic at the end of
book one. Socrates says there is an essential connectionbetween the
virtue of a thing and that thing'sperformingits own appropriatefunction (ergon) well. A human being, like all other creatures,has a best
activitythat is peculiarto the species (353d4-e3). Humanvirtue,then,
is indispensablefor human beings' being human. Lacking it, the performance of the strictly human ergon is impossible.But this formal
characterizationdoes not indicate what the appropriatehuman ergon
and its facilitatingvirtue are. In book one the readeris presentedwith
a swarmof potentialhumanvirtues,includingpiety (exemplifiedin the
speeches of Cephalus), patriotismor political loyalty (Polemarchus),
and prudenceor good counsel (Thrasymachus).But by the end of book
seven our understandingof virtuemust undergoa transformation
which
is by all odds incredible.Socratessays that the best human life is not
any of these. Nor is it that life praisedby the spiritedGlaucon,nor the
one practicedby the temperateand public mindedAdeimantus.Rather
it is the life of intellection,the contemplationand understandingof the
most worthyobjects of knowledge,the forms and the idea of the good
(517a9-c6). From this perspectivetrue human virtue is that which
makes such a life possible, the human potentialfor philosophyor the
11. Statesman 297b9-c6; 301a5-b3; 302dl-3.

362
Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy
love of and search for the truth of being. Thus, although philosophy
originally appears in the dialogue as a means for attaining and preserving the best city, in the later books it becomes the very justification for that city's existence. The city's highest purpose is to produce
philosophers.
The Statesman: Courage and Moderation
Virtue is explicitly introduced into the Statesman relatively late in the
dialogue (306al-4). The stranger does not discuss virtue as such but
rather two particular parts of virtue, courage (andreia) and moderation
(sophrosyne). What is striking about the stranger's presentation here is
that it is initially neutral with regard to species. Courage is defined as
acuteness or quickness in mind, body, or voice; while moderation appears as restraint expressed in the same media (306c12-307b2). These
conceptions of courage and moderation apply to all creatures that make
sounds or have bodies, not only to human beings. There is not necessarily any human virtue in quickness or restraint. It is therefore necessary to show how human courage and moderation differ from those
analogous qualities found in other species.
The need for this discrimination has been apparent since the beginning of the dialogue. At 261c8-dl the stranger suggests that defining
the statesman's science requires defining the kind of creature whom the
statesman rules. Young Socrates believes that human beings can be
scientifically distinguished from animals by physical or physically dependent characteristics. The first methodical division of creatures extending from 264b12 to 266el 1 is a division according to physical categories.
The inadequacy of this approach is shown by the first division's concluding that statesmanship is nourishment (267dl0-12). However, many
arts claim supremacy in the care of the body (267e4-268a4). The
statesman's art, on the other hand, is shown to be the principal art that
cares for the soul. The most important differences among species are
differences among kinds of souls. Defining political wisdom in the dialogue presupposes a definition of the human soul.
However, the statesman's care is apparently confined to a certain kind
or class of human soul. In the physical terms of the first division the
statesman is concerned with herds (261el-3; 267d7-10). The stranger
cares for the souls of political human beings.l2 Quickness and restraint
12. Stanley Rosen also makes this point in "Plato's Myth of the Reversed
Cosmos," Review of Metaphysics 33 (1979): 59-85, at 63. Rosen goes too far,
though, in suggesting that one cannot speak of creating excellent citizens if one
assimilates humans to herd animals. I see no reason why this must be so for
reasons indicated in the paper. It all depends upon one's evaluation of excellent
citizenship.

Gerald Mara
363
are relevant for political virtue in the sense that they both presuppose
and govern the character of certain interrelations. Of course, the stranger
also considers quickness or sluggishness of mind as it relates to an idea
(262a6-8). But the measure used to determine the kind of quickness
or slowness desired in any context is the proper standard, what is fitting
or appropriate within the relevant circumstances (284e7-10). For the
stranger that standard for political man is a mean between extremes of
recklessness and cowardice in dealings with other cities. Excessive courage leads to a foolhardiness which endangers cities and brutalizes individuals (308a4-10). Extreme moderation is the root of cravenness
which makes one both contemptible and vulnerable (307b7-308a2).
The measure or mean of these two potentially conflicting characteristics
constitutes the virtue of the political man's soul. The stranger suggests
that the actualization of this virtue is not natural, but must be produced
by art (309bl). The statesman's art combines the spirited and gentle
elements of the soul by forging two kinds of bonds, one human, the
other divine. The human bonds are the city's marriage and childrearing
practices (310b2-5). The divine bonds are true opinions about the good
and bad, beautiful and shameful, just and unjust (309cl-d3).
True
opinion ultimately separates the human creatures for whom the statesman cares from other animals and makes them resemble the gods or
what is divine (309c9).
There is a real and pointed difference between the stranger's and
Socrates' respective portraits of the virtue that is fostered in the best
city. The stranger's virtue is not cognitive or intellectual. It is not defined
as science (episteme) or prudence (phronesis) but as the mean of
courage and moderation. So defined the virtue of political human beings
does not appear to be particularly or exclusively human. Animals are
also capable of a mean between quickness and restraint. The virtuous
product of the best city is also what may be best in animals. However,
animals are not capable of opinion. While animals may be judiciously
interbred, they cannot be taught opinions about good and bad. But in
the dialogue this exclusively human opinion remains a means to a kind
of virtue that is not similarly restricted to the human species. Opinion,
the cognitive dimension of the statesman's citizens, is valuable for its
noncognitive psychic consequences. It does not appear to be desirable
for itself. While opinion may arise in divine-like peoples, opinion is not
itself divine. Only the immaterial objects of philosophy or dialectic are
divine (285e5-286bl).
Opinion is an approximation or imitation of
knowledge. In the statesman's city the imitation of what is divine or
what approaches the divine is used to achieve what may be best in
animals.

364
The best city in the Statesman overcomes deficiencies caused by the

harmful extreme parts of virtue. The balanced virtue of the city replaces
brutality and cowardice. In the Republic the just city described in book
four overcomes the potential rapacity of the feverish city's guardians.
These just guardians in a way also reflect what is best in animals. They
are like noble dogs who are friendly to comrades and hostile to outsiders (375el-5). Of course, the citizens of the Statesman's city need
be less hostile to outsiders because the Statesman does not assume, as
the Republic does, the coexistence of many feverish cities. And the
Statesman:does not focus on the problem of the internal rapacity of its
courageous citizens, as the Republic does, because the Statesman's city
assumes, as the Republic does not, generally herded or tamed citizens.
The most important difference between these two cities, however, is
that the Republic's just city is replaced by what Glaucon calls a "still
In the Statesfiner" city, that devoted to philosophy (543c7-544al).
the
bond
man no such replacement occurs. In part
divine
of opinion
itself prevents such a replacement. In the Republic the citizens of the
best city are portrayed as being released from bonds by education in
philosophy (517a6-8).
The Republic and the Statesman appear to present two very different
conceptions of virtue'3 and two correspondingly different accounts of
the best city. It is not grossly distorting to say that Socrates praises a
city devoted to a certain kind of philosophy while the stranger endorses
a city productive of virtuous politics or practice. But in spite of these
differences both portraits of the best city, within the respective contexts
of each dialogue, generate similar implications concerning the relation
between philosophic and political activities. The regime or constitution
is the setting where the Platonic problem of philosophy and politics is
developed.
IV. Philosophy and Politics
The development of this problem in each of these dialogues requires
more detailed discussion. The Republic's best city is justified by its education of philosophers. However, this justification itself reflects badly
upon the characteristic life in the city. As it is presented in books five
13. Skemp, on the other hand, sees no essential difference between the Eleatic
and Socratic conceptions of virtue. But consider the difference between the cognitive aspects of each conception. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, pp. 222-3. Sprague
also tends to overlook the differences between the virtue produced by the philosopher-king and that produced by the statesman. Sprague, Plato's PhilosopherKing, p. 116.

GeraldMara 365
through seven, philosophy appears to be completely apolitical in its
consummateform. The flourishingof philosophywould seem to require
only the humanintellectand the knowables.At best the city can provide
only the preconditionsfor philosophy,security,and leisure.This activity
itself wouldpresumablybe carriedon far beyondthe confinesof political
concernsin what Socratesoften metaphoricallyrefersto as the Isles of
the Blessed (519b7-c7). Yet, requiringthe philosopherto rule the best
city depriveshim of that leisure which is essentialfor philosophy.This
leads directly to the interpretationmost recently put forth by Leo
Strauss and Allan Bloom, that Plato's best politics is contradictory.'4
It requiresthat the highestinjusticebe appliedto the best humanbeing.
Thus, the way of life, which is the chief justificationfor the city, apparently provides an alternativeactivity which is both incompatiblewith
politics and more choiceworthyfor (strictly speaking) human beings
(520e5-521a5).
In the Statesmanthe "balanced"virtueencouragedin the best city is
also clearly inferiorto another,better way of life, that devoted to dialectics. Assertions of the superiorityof philosophy to political virtue
occur in several portions of the dialogue. One of the most pointed of
these is in the mythof the ages of Cronosand Zeus, whichextendsfrom
268d9 to 274a4. Withinthe myth the strangerimplicitlycomparesthe
differentways of life that can be chosen by humanbeings. He suggests
that each of these mythicalages provides a pair of activitiesbetween
whichhumansmay choose. In the age of Zeus, a harsh,dangeroustime,
humanbeings must eithersubmitto the threatsposed by the beasts and
the elementsor institutecommunitiesin orderto take care of themselves
and ordertheirown lives (274d5-6). In the age of Cronos,an epoch in
which the needs of humansare satisfiedby the gods, men must either
engagein idle gossip and pleasure-seekingor practicea certainkind of
philosophy.The strangeris clear that one can determinewithin each
pair which kind of activitywould make humanbeings happier.The life
of self-orderingis happier than that of submittingto the hazards of
fortune.The life of philosophyis happierthan that of ease and gossip.
14. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 50138; Allan Bloom, trans., The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968),
p. 408. See also Stanley Rosen, "Sophrosyne and Selbstewusstsein," Review of
Metaphysics 27 (1973): 617-642; Simon Aronson, "The Happy Philosopher-A

Counter Example to Plato's Proof," Journal of the History of Philosophy (1972),
pp. 383-98. However Aronson's conclusions differ strongly from Strauss's. For a
critique of the Strauss/Bloom approach see Dale Hall, "The Republic and the
Limits of Politics," together with Bloom, "Response to Hall," Political Theory
5 (1977): 293-330.


Philosophyand politics are the praiseworthyways of life withinthe age
of Cronosand the age of Zeus, respectively.15
It is criticalto recognize
that both desirablehuman activitiesare voluntary.There is nothingin
our knowledgeof the age of Cronos that suggests humansnecessarily
philosophized.Contraryto the myth told in the Protagoras,politics is
not a gift of the gods in the age of Zeus.
However, in addition to making comparisonswithin each pair, the
strangersuggeststhat it is possible to make comparisonsacross pairs.
The perceptiveobservercan discoverthe activity that is most choiceworthyout of all possible activitiesin both ages. The strangersays that
engagingin philosophywould make the humansof Cronos'age happier
than those in the age of Zeus who must bear the burden of protecting and directing themselves (272b9ff). Of course, the stranger
makesno claim to factualknowledgeof how humanslived in the age of
Cronos.Indeedthat knowledgeis inaccessible;we are ignorantof those
peoples' desires regardingthe sciences and the uses of arguments
(272d4-5). We are unawareof the groundingsof any philosophizing
that might have occurred.There was no physical eros. The path from
the love of physical beauty to the love of the beautifulitself was apparentlyclosed. Yet even in light of this ignorance,an image of our
ignoranceof the complete course of human history, the strangercontends that the criterion for the best human life is consistent across
epochs.16 If humanbeingsphilosophizedin the mythicalage of Cronos,
they were immeasurablyhappierthan modernpoliticalmen.
comparison,humanbeings could
Accordingto this "comprehensive"
refrainfrom politics and still be human, capable of the most choiceworthy activities open to the human species. Politics is apparently
praiseworthyonly when comparedto its undesirablealternatives.The
15. Interestingly, in the myth the stranger passes over the obvious fact that
philosophy is also possible in the age of Zeus. We might say provisionally that
the myth seems to point out the differences between philosophy and politics with
a sharpnessthat borders on exaggeration.
16. Thus the presumed impossibility of philosophy in the age of Cronos, as
noted by Rosen ("Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," pp. 78-9) does nothing to diminish its desirability. Incidentally, it should also be noted that the
stranger recognizes the absence of work and eros in that age and suggests that
philosophy, if it occurred, would have to follow a much different path. The path
(conversing with animals) is a comical one, to be sure. However the stranger
is led to this path because he and young Socrates have not agreed that the capacity
for speech is what separates men from animals. The path also has its serious
side, however, indicating a possible connection between perception and philosophy,
a connection minimized by Socrates. See also Statesman 263b6 where the stranger
suggests the potential inseparabilityof eidos and meros.

Gerald Mara
367
stranger's use of the criteria of science and freedom, rather than the
criterion of virtue, in evaluating regimes is perhaps explained by his
relatively low estimation of the virtue that is fostered in the city.
While Socrates' portrait of the virtue encouraged in the best city paradoxically elevates it far above politics, the stranger's analogous conception places that virtue far below the best human life. Both positions
appear to agree that the political life is vastly inferior to the philosophic.
One is tempted to conclude that the principal difference between the
presentations is that Socrates' is ironic and implicit while the stranger's
is more or less pointed and direct. However this conclusion fails to
account for the very different portraits of the best city presented in the
two works. This failure leads us to suspect that both dialogues may be
more ambiguous than we immediately assume. It may be suggested that
this ambiguity is especially apparent in the treatment of justice (the
political virtue) in the two dialogues.
V. Justice
The Republic: The Just Man and the Just City
The importance of justice is obvious if highly problematic from the
outset. The first great question of the dialogue is "What is Justice?"
(331clff). Socrates is forced to consider the question indirectly as a
means of, or a step in, considering the question of whether justice is
desirable for itself or for its consequences (337e4ff). By the end of the
dialogue Socrates seems to conclude that justice is a certain arrangement
of the human soul (psyche) and that the person who is most just is the
philosopher. For Socrates only the philosopher's soul is ordered according to nature with the reasoning element (logistikon) controlling the
spirit (thymos) and the desires (epithymiai). Only the philosopher
does man's ergon, the work most proper to the species. But this line of
argument and particularly Socrates' notable analogy between the city
and soul begs one very important question: What is the relationship
between this psychic sort of justice and politics? If the philosopher's
being just is essentially related to the philosophic life, the possibility
of fostering human justice in politics becomes highly questionable.17
If the philosopher is politically just, just in his relationships with other
human beings, apparently this justice is simply an accidental or contin17. At least some of this difficulty can be traced to an ambiguity in the text
of the Republic and in some commentaries about the kind of political activity
open to citizens in the best city. See my suggestions in part vIr as to the kind
of activity which might be involved.


gent consequenceof a certain kind of purely individualpsychic harmony.18The soul and not the city is the place of justice.
The Statesman: Science and Justice
In the Statesmanthe role of justice is not nearly so apparent,but its

ambiguityin relationto politics and the city is equally overwhelming.
At 293d10 the strangersuggests that the statesmancan be separated
from imitativerulers by virtue of his ruling accordingto science and
justice. The first of these two criteriais familiarin the context of the
dialogueas it has developedup to this point. The stranger'sconcernhas
been explicitlyto definethe statesman'sscience. The criterionof justice
seems perplexingin this light because it impliesthat the true statesman
is not definablesolely by intellectualstandards.Justice might well be
neededto limit science in orderto guardagainstits misuse.
However, I believe that the introductionof justice here does not
amend the stranger'searlierconcentrationon science. His inclusionof
justice as a definitivecharacteristicof the statesmanimmediatelyprecedes his critique of the generalityof laws. At 294a7ff the stranger
criticizeslaws because they fail to addresshuman circumstanceswith
the proper degree of complexity.The deficienciesof generalizinglaws
are caused by the intricacyof human actions, especiallyactions of the
soul leadingto choices of betterand worse (294b2-7). The complexity
of the soul as compared with the body differentiatesthe science of
caringfor manysouls from the scienceof caringfor manybodies.While
all generalizationsleave thingsout, generalizationsaboutbodiesare more
reliablethangeneralizationsaboutsouls. It is easierto securehealththan
virtuethroughgeneralrules. This conclusionis apparentin the implied
comparisonof the statesmanwith the physicianor the trainerof groups
and the caretakerof herds.The physicianor trainercan attaina suitable
degree of public health through general physical rules or guidelines
(294dll-e3). The herdsmanis successfulin his care by adaptinghis
actions to the characteristicsof his own herd (tes autou poimnes)
(268a6-b8). A good statesman,however,must be able to guide each
individualcitizen towardvirtue. While the statesmancannot sit beside
18. Republic 443c7-444a4. The problem of the incidental or contingent character of the philosopher's political justice is left largely unconsidered in the controversy surrounding David Sach's essay, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic," reprinted in Vlastos, Plato, pp. 35-51. Both Vlastos and Charles Kahn try to show
contra Sachs that the philosopher insofar as he or she acts in politics must refrain
from pleonexia (extreme selfishness), but neither proves or attempts to prove that
the philosopher must be political. See Kahn, "The Meaning of Justice and the
Theory
of Forms," Journal of Philosophy
(1972),
pp. 567-79;
"Justiceand Happiness in the Republic,"Vlastos, Plato, pp. 68-95.

and Vlastos,
GeraldMara 369
each personand tell him what to do, he must, nonetheless,be conscious
of the particularneeds and circumstancesof individuals.Science or
generalrules must be supplementedfor the statesmanin a way that is
not necessaryfor the physicianor herdsman.Scienceor the knowledge
of what is good for the city as a whole must be supplementedby justice
or knowledge of what is good or appropriatein individual circumstances.19The statesman'sneed for both science and justice is apparent
in the discussionof the relationshipbetweenpolitikeand the otherpolitical artsin the city: rhetoric,generalship,and judging.Each of these arts
follows rules for its successfulcompletion.The general knows how to
make war, and the orator knows how to persuade.But the excellent
general qua general neither knows the proper relationshipof war to
peace nor decides when it is best to make war and when not. The
strangercontrolsthe generalpreciselybecausethe strangerknows these
two thingswhich escape the (legitimately)excellentgeneral.Knowledge
of the relationshipof war to peace is suppliedby a knowledgeof what is,
in general,good for the city. When there is any choice in the matterat
all, the city shouldnot makewar if it will make the citizensless virtuous.
But knowledgeof when makingwar would be necessaryor appropriate
for the city's good must be supplied by an understandingsensitive to
circumstances.Justicedetermineswhen war is necessaryfor the preservationof the city. Justicedecideswhichof the citizensmustbe persuaded
and which of them must be forced. In this sense the statesman'sjustice
would seem to be a cognitiveor intellectualcapacity,althoughone far
differentfrom the intellectualknowledgeof certain rules. In fact the
statesman'sintellectualjustice is not unlike that displayedby Socrates
in so manyof his conversations.Socratesalso makeswar and persuades.
But this inclusionof justiceas one characteristicqualityof the statesman is paralleledby its diminutionas a characteristicquality of the
statesman'scitizens. At 309d9-e3 the strangersuggeststhat a naturally
courageousnature temperedin the best city comes to partake of just
things.In the same way the naturallygentlenaturesbalancedby the city
come to be more prudent(309e5-9). The statesman'sown qualitiesof
science and justice seem to be only approximatedin the statesman's
citizens. Nowhereis it suggestedthat the statesman'scity is capable of
producingother statesmen.Insofar as the statesmanis just, he must
be so throughsome othermediumthanhis own city. In this sense justice
becomes in a way apolitical in that it is not an expectable psychic
consequenceof residencein even the best city.
Thus, in both dialogues the political status of justice becomes ex19. Cf. Rosen, "Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," p. 68.

370
tremely problematic. Both Socrates' elevation of philosophy above politics and the stranger's lowering of political virtue below the best human
life appear to rob the city of its most political characteristic. It becomes
questionable as to whether the best politics can exist without some
essential relation to philosophy or dialectics. The ambiguous status of
justice and the best politics is also reflected in the very personages who
lie at the heart of the political pronouncements in each work, the philosopher king and the statesman. Both Socrates and the stranger suggest
that these two figures participate to some degree in philosophy, although
the suggestions are made in very different ways. In contrast to the
separations of philosophic and political activities, Socrates' connecting
of the ruler and the philosopher is direct and explicit, while the stranger's
linking of the statesman and the dialectician is subtle and implied. In the
Statesman both the statesman and the dialectician are concerned with
things superior to the body or the senses.20 The statesman is most concerned with securing the virtue of his citizens' souls, while the dialectician is most concerned with the highest things which have no bodies
(ta asomata).
How can Plato explain or justify the philosopher king's and the
statesman's participation in these two ways of life? Must it be coerced?21
Is the philosopher's love of truth gratified by the exercise of his extraordinary intellectual gifts when ruling?22Or is such an involvement in
politics explained by some nonphilosophic principle such as patriotism?23
20. Seth Benardete points to a similar resemblance between the statesman and
the philosopher. See "Eidos and Diairesis in Plato's Statesman,"Philologus (1963),
p. 107. What is needed here is an account of what separates politike from other
arts and propels it toward philosophy. The relevant difference may be politike's
capacity to be directive toward the good (304a7-d3). For the stranger there is a
certain resemblance between what is good and what is true. See, for instance,
his description of the highest immaterial things (ta as6mata) as the fairest things
(ta kallista onta) at 286a6-7. Rosen ("Plato's Myth of the Reversed Cosmos")
discusses the similarities and differences between the two ways of life in the most
detail and on the whole very convincingly. Klein makes, but does not defend, the
claim that "The Statesman cannot help being a 'Philosopher'" (Plato's Trilogy,
p. 177). Sprague hints at an ambiguous relationship between the dialectician and
the statesman but does not pursue it (Plato's Philosopher-King,p. 106).
21. Cf. Aronson, "The Happy Philosopher,"p. 394; Strauss, The City and the
Man, pp. 124-5.
22. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little Brown, 1960), p. 44.
See also Rosen's case for philosophic hybris in politics in "The Role of Eros in
Plato's Republic," Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965): 452-475 at 459.
23. In other words for the philosopher politics may be only affectively or psychologically defensible. The strongest support for this alternative is probably
Apology 30a4-5. See Thomas G. West, Plato's Apology of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 171.

Gerald Mara
371
These represent some of the more frequently suggested answers to this

question of philosophic involvement in politics.24 But selecting any one
of them implies that politics can be praised as a purely instrumental or,
at best, relatively desirable way of life. The point is not simply that most
persons are incapable of philosophy. The great distance between politics
and the best way of life renders the political or practical way of life
pointless or self-contradictory, a condition epitomized by the denial of
justice to the city. According to this view, it may be impossible to draw
any theoretical or principled distinction between the best citizen or
statesman and the worst tyrant since both are confined to an existence
that is not theoretically defensible.25This perspective questions the sense
or appropriateness of searching for a serious Platonic moral or political
philosophy. The immense superiority of the apolitical philosophic life
seems to render comparisons between moral and immoral acts or just
and unjust societies trivial or, at best, nagging necessities for the most
truly human being. However unpleasant these consequences might be,
their acceptance seems unavoidable unless we can suggest an alternative
explanation of the Platonic relationship between philosophy and politics
from the perspective of the best way of life.
VI. Common Virtue and Private Virtue

But what other Platonic alternative is available? To deal with this question we need to consider the more general philosophical psychology
that is presented throughout the dialogues. But is this search even possible? Does it not presuppose that Plato is a systematic philosopher?
And is this not to presuppose far too much? To be sure, Plato does not
present his readers with either an explicit or implicit "ethical system."
But his dialogues are images of human beings speaking and acting in
human situations. The dialogues reveal varieties of human activity. It is
not implausible to seek a general or comprehensive Platonic picture
of human activity as it emerges "between" dialogues, through certain
examples or models of human activity. Perhaps the strongest internal
evidence that justifies such a project is found in the last three books of
the Republic where Socrates presents a general political teaching by
24. A case for each of these alternatives is made in different dialogues. However, all of them (compulsion, hybris, and affection) relate essentially to feelings
which Socrates dismisses as not having any determinative or binding importance
in the identificationof the good life at Republic 581c7-582a6.
25. Cf. Salkever, "Virtue,"p. 83.

372
means of an analysis of certain modal human types or certain hypothetical individuals.26

In the Republic and in the dialogues as a whole Plato presents at least
three distinct types of human activity represented by three types of
individuals. There is, first, the activity devoted to serving the self,27
to securing material and psychic rewards. This is the activity praised in
its extreme form by Thrasymachus in book one and presupposed by
Glaucon in his telling of the Gyges story in book two. Other particular
characters in the dialogues who praise or exemplify this sort of activity
include Alcibiades,28Callicles,29, Critias,3"and Meno.31 The second type
of action is political or public action, individual activity guided by consideration of the common good (however defined). Such Platonic figures
who characteristically act in this way include Adeimantus,32, Chaerophon,33 and perhaps Theaetetus.34 The third kind of activity is philosophy, the way of life of the person in love with truth or being, the way
of life embodied perhaps by Parmenides.35
In the Republic and elsewhere Socrates is firm in his praise of the
latter two kinds of life insofar as they sublimate or control the first kind.
Both the city and being require a certain kind of forgetting of the body
or the ego. But both the Republic and the Statesman raise serious questions about the psychological compatibility of the two kinds of sublimation. Apparently the human propensity for selfishness (or vice) can
26. Presentationsin this or a similar form are frequent throughoutthe dialogues.
Besides the instances in the Republic, see Socrates' discussion of virtuous and
vicious ways of living in the myth of the Gorgias 523al-527a4 and his ordering
of kinds of human beings in the story of the souls, Phaedrus 248c2-e3. This
Socratic use of personal types is not confined to hypothetical or unnamed persons. See his employment of historical Athenian statesmen in Gorgias 515b7517bl and Meno 93a6-94e3. On the general importance of drama and images
for assessing the dialogues see John Sallis, Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic
Dialogue (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975), pp. 21-2.

27. This is selfishness broadly understood. There are many important differences between the Platonic characters who act in this way. For instance the
Gorgias' Callicles seems more concerned with personal safety than with the accumulation of power. Compare Callicles' speeches at 510a6-e3, 511b7-c5; 522c46, and 525e3-5 with Polus' praise of Archelaus at 470d7ff. and with Republic
573b.
28. Gorgias 519a7-b2; Symposium 216a2-5.
29. Gorgias 484c5-486c3.

30. Charmides 162c1-163c10.
31. Meno 78b13-c13.
32. Cf. Adeimantus' eagerness to censure the lasciviousness of the poets for the
city's sake in Republic, bk. 3.
33. Gorgias 447a7-bl; Apology 20e10-21a5.
34. Theaetetus 142aff.
35. Theaetetus 183e3-184a2; Sophist 216al-5, 237a3-b4.

GeraldMara 373
be subordinatedto one of two other human potentials, to common
action which cannot exist withouta politicalcommunityor to the most
privatehumancapacity,philosophy,whichrequiresonly a humanmind,
the forms and the idea of the good. The problem raised by the two
dialoguesthereforeis the problemof reconcilingthe common with the
(most) private activity of human beings, the problem of saying what
kinds of humancapacitiesare subsumedwithinindividualhumanarete.
The importanceof reconcilingthese two human capacities is suggested at severalpointsin the Republic.On severaloccasionsthat reconciliationis emphaticallyrejectedas impossible.This is done, first,in the
speeches of Thrasymachus.Much later the same position serves as the
implicit theoreticalbasis of Adeimantus'attack upon the philosophers
in the name of the city (487a10-d7). Does Socrates challenge this
theoreticalbasis to show a possible compatibilitybetween private and
common human dimensions?One passage hinting this is an exchange
between Socratesand Adeimantusin book six. Socrates says that the
true philosopherought to avoid involvementin the affairs of corrupt
cities. Bloom's translationrendersthe exchangein the following way:
Socrates:
Ratherjust like a humanbeing who has fallen in with wild beasts
and is neitherwilling to join them in doing injusticenor sufficient
as one man to resist all the savage animals-one would perish
beforehe has been of any use to city or friendsand be of no profit
to himselfor others.Takingall this into calculationhe keeps quiet
and minds his own business-as a man in a storm when dust and
rain are blown about by the wind, stands aside under a little wall.
Seeing others filled full of lawlessness,he is content if somehow
he himselfcan live his life here pure of injusticeand unholydeeds,
and takes his leave from it graciouslyand cheerfullywith fair hope.
Adeimantus:
Well... he wouldleave havingaccomplishednot the least of things.
Socrates:
But not the greatest either ... if he didn't come upon a suitable
regime.For in a suitableone he himself will grow more and save

the common things along with the private.36
36. Republic 496dl-497a4. See also Socrates' (emphatic) remark that in the
best city the philosopher will also mind the political things. Sallis (Being and
Logos, pp. 453-4) suggests that this is purely the founding of a city within oneself. To a certain extent this is surely true. But I also suggest that the interaction
between Socrates and Glaucon (which Sallis also emphasizes) is itself a political
relationship, illustrating the kind of politics that could occur in the best city.


A completeinquiryinto Plato'streatmentof this issue in the Republic
would requirea painstakinganalysis of the later books, and this task
does not fit withinthe scope of this essay. But I shall attemptto present
one portion of the analysis, implicitlyarguingfor the reasonabilityof
the larger project. Socrates'classificationof regimes is ideal for this
purpose,and its use allowsa comparisonwith the very differentperspective on the same questionwhich seems to hold sway in the Statesman.
VII. Regimesand HumanNature
The Republic: Virtuous Regimes
I suggest that the classificationsof regimes in the Republic and the

Statesmanpresent two differentinterpretationson the relationshipbetween the common (political) and most private (philosophical)dimensions of humannature.Let us firstconsiderSocrates'presentation.The
five regimes of the Republic are ranked accordingto their different
abilitiesto encouragehumanvirtue.The firstand best regimeis capable
of producingphilosophers.As noted earlier,philosophyappearsto be
the most privateof human acts. However it is importantto recognize
thatphilosophyas generatedin the best city has certaincommonaspects,
visible in the educationthat is providedto potentialphilosophers.For
example,it is not unreasonableto suspectthat such an educationoften
requiresa certain kind of compulsion,forcing a student along a path
that is good for him. A certaindegreeof inequalityalso seems unavoidable since not all potentialphilosophersare of equal intelligence.Different stages of this education require differentkinds of common virtue
althoughin uncommonguises. Studentsmust be courageousenough to
keep questioningand moderateenough to proceed only as far along
as is appropriate.Respondingto these differingneeds requiresa certain
kind of classical political justice, the unequal dispensingof unequal
benefitsto unequalrecipients.
These very brief considerationssuggestthat the virtueencouragedin
Socrates'best city necessarilyincludescertaincommonhumancapacities,
those whichrequirethe continuedpresenceof the city for theirdevelopment and exercise.This has specialimportancefor the subsequentevaluations of the inferiorcities. They can be ordered accordingto their
abilitiesto encouragecertaincommonhumanvirtues.
Consider the relationshipamong the timocracy,the oligarchy, and
the democracy.Socratessuggeststhat, far from encouragingphilosophy,
the timocracyand the oligarchystifle it. Insteadthe timocracydevelops
a certainkind of couragein its citizens owing to its devotionto honor.
This is most obviouslythe courageof the warriorin combat. But it is

Gerald Mara
375
also courage more broadly understood, preserving opinions about the

just and the unjust in the face of pleasure and pain (429b6-e6). Likewise Socrates says that the oligarchy rewards a certain kind of moderation, the austere frugalness which satisfies only the necessary desires
(554c7-e2). Very significantly, Socrates argues that both of these regimes are superior to the democracy, the regime which permits philosophy.37 If suitability for the exercise of philosophy were the sole criterion
for praising cities, the democracy would be the closest approximation to
the best city. Of course, the philosophy that occurs in the democracy
does not exist because of the conscious design of the city. And, on at
least one occasion, Socrates implies that it is inferior to the kind of
philosophy that would be generated in the best regime (520bl-c7).
Nonetheless, if we take Socrates' praise of the timocracy seriously, we
are forced to admit that there may be an essential resemblance between
that city and the best regime, a closer resemblance than that which
connects the best city and the "philosophic" democracy.
There is not adequate space here to discuss this resemblance in detail.
However, I believe it relates to the way in which each city encourages
a certain kind of moderation. In the best city philosophers subordinate
their bodily and egoistic desires to the cognitive desire to know being.
In the timocracy the best citizens sublimate their bodies and their egos
to the city's good. It is true that this sublimation is done for the sake of
honor and that it is very often warlike. But in several places in the
dialogue Socrates suggests that warlike behavior can be corrected in such
a way as to preserve its positive benefits. One notable example of this
is his redefinition of political courage in book four. What had been
helping friends and harming enemies in war becomes preserving opinions
about the just and the unjust in the face of pleasure and pain. The best
political courage is praiseworthy because of its resemblance to moderation. And Socrates' description of the good man's characteristic actions
in the last pages of book nine (591a3ff.) describe the actions not of a
philosopher, but of a moderate (nonwarlike) gentleman, a "tamed"
citizen of the timocracy.
One word of caution, however. This ordering of cities which places
the timocracy next to the best city is not a suggestion that the common
dimension of human virtue is more important than the private (philosophic). It is a suggestion, however, that philosophy is approximated
with less difficulty outside of suitable regimes than are the nonphilosophic dimensions of the best citizen's virtue. At Republic 496a10-c4
37. Republic 557c2-el. The praise of democracy here may be only partially
serious. cf. Strauss, The City and the Man, p. 133.


Socrates mentions five separate circumstanceswhich could protect a
philosophicnaturefrom corruption.But at Meno 99e4-8 he says that
a personwho is politicallyvirtuousin Athensis so becauseof divinefate
(theia moira).
Let us summarize.Socrates'classificationof cities in the Republic

suggests that human virtue encompassesboth private and common
capacitiesof human beings, those capacitieswhich require,as well as
those whichtranscend,the city. This perspectiveallowsPlato or Socrates
to make a theoreticaldistinctionbetweenthe life of politicalvirtue and
the kind of existencepraisedby Thrasymachus.Politics or the city can
be recommendedbecause they approximatethe common dimensionof
the best life for humanbeings.
The Statesman: Science and Free Regimes
The stranger'sclassificationof cities in the Statesman,on the otherhand,

seems to deny the possibilityof a compatibilitybetween common and
privatehumancapacities.Accordingto the stranger'scriterionof science,
virtueis primarilyof interestbecauseit is the definitiveproductor sign
of the scientificallyruled city. The life of virtue in the city does not
itself seem to be an essentialdimensionof the best humanlife. The best
humanlife is a divineconcernto know the properobjectsof knowledge.
The most divine conditionof peoples or cities is, on the other hand,
opinion (309c6-9). The best life for man is lived away from cities.38
The most humanbeingbecomes,like his advocate,a stranger.
The stranger'scriterionof freedomis likewise distancedfrom a criterion of politicalvirtue. This can be illustratedby a comparisonwith
Socrates'treatmentof freedom in his evaluationof the democracyin
the Republic. For the strangerfreedom is principallythe freedom to
inquire. This is not confined to the freedom to inquire into political
things, which constitutea small and relativelyinsignificantportion of
thingsin the universe(285d5-7). To be sure, the strangersays that all
inferiorregimes ought to allow political philosophy.But his ordering
of the free inferiorregimesdoes not give priorityto those most favorable to political philosophy.The best inferiorregime accordingto the
criterionof freedomis the lawful monarchy.The lawful monarchydoes
not, like the democracy,contain a storehouseof regimesthat can serve
as a suitable base for political inquiry.Furthermore,the lawful monarchyconstrainspoliticalinquiryin a way that the democracydoes not.
38. Both Benardete and Campbell see the stranger articulating the superiority
of philosophy to politics in terms of the superiority of a certain kind of private
life over the common or public. Statesman 308cl-8, 311b7-c8. Benardete,"Eidos,"
pp. 205, 215, 219-20; Campbell, The Sophistes, p. 190, n. 9.

GeraldMara 377
The monarchypresupposesthe strengthof ancestralreligious institutions. But political philosophydemandsthat the political relevanceof
the gods be proven or justified.Of course, the lawful monarchythus
constrainsnot only political philosophy but also philosophy as such;
but philosophyas such can be practicedin private,whilepoliticalphilosophy alwaysbecomes public or visible.
However,the lawful monarchyis also necessaryto temperor control
those whose freedomextends beyond philosophicalinquiry.The lawful
monarchyis the most effectiverestraintof politicalfactions.Philosophers
and other privatemen need the securitythat the lawful monarchyprovides to engage in their free activities.But aside from their need for
security,these privatepeople can differsignificantlyamong themselves.
The stranger'scriterionof freedom is neutral with regardto the particularkinds of peacefulprivateactivitiesthat can be practicedby free
persons. Thus the strangerand young Socratescan join in the search
for the free regimeeven thoughyoung Socratesvalues freedomfor the
sake of the useful arts and their productsrather than for philosophy
(299d6-300al). Freedomis not politicalin this sense in that its pursuit
does not requirecommonvaluesor characters.
This perspectiveon freedomis in sharp contrastto that of Socrates
who, in his classificationof regimes,praisesfreedomas the freedomto
talk about virtue and politics in the storehouseof cities (557d3-el).
Of course, Socrates'subordinationof the democracyconsequentlysubordinateshis praiseof freedom.But in the Republicthe freedomto talk
about virtueis in a sense subordinatedto virtueitself. In the Statesman
the freedom to talk about virtue is subordinatedto the freedom to
inquire into the whole of things in the universe, apparentlya more
worthyobject of attentionthan the virtueof the city.
Ways of Life: Socrates and the Stranger
In the Statesman,then, the stranger'scriteria for classifying regimes

seem to be those of a privateman or a humanbeing whose completed
activitieslie beyond the city. This essentialprivatenessseems reflected
in the stranger'smethod of inquiryin the Sophist and the Statesman.
In the Sophistthe strangerimpliesthat his methodas a methodhas no
political or moral purpose. He prefers to make long speeches unless
an interlocutoris docile (Sophist 217c9-dl). He contrasts his own
procedureof separatinglike from like with that of the well-bornsophist
who separatesgood from bad and must of necessityemploy the method
of question and answer.39Implicitlythe strangerdraws a fundamental
39. Kenneth Sayre argues that this difference is indicative of the key difference
between Socrates and the stranger. For Sayre this difference emphasizes Plato's

378
distinction between philosophers and moralists and a corresponding

distinction between the most private and common forms of human
discourse. The stranger's guiding of young Socrates through the search
for the statesman may require young Socrates to exercise a certain discipline. Good dialectics require a tempering of hastiness (262a10-c ).40
But this guiding appears to be a guiding to the theoretical ability to
separate like from like, apart from any obvious moral purpose.41
Contrast this with the famous Socratic method. In his characteristic
way of proceeding, Socrates at different times claims to pursue a theoretical goal, a moral goal, or one that somehow incorporates both. In
the Phaedo he claims to seek primarily the causes of things; 42 in the
Apology he says that his investigations are intended for the moral improvement of those who join him in question and answer; 43 and in the
Theaetetus his method appears to aim at both purposes.44
adoption of an analytic approach to replace the Socratic or elenctic. For reasons
that I set out in the text this view seems questionable. See Sayre, Plato's Analytic
Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 150-4. Sallis (Being
and Logos, pp. 477-8) argues that this search for the sophist ironically or comically discovers the philosopher in the person of the well-born sophist. But this
seems difficult to square with the stranger's explicit portraits of the philosopher
in both the Statesman and the Sophist. It presupposes an acceptance of Socrates'
complex way of life as essentially philosophic.
40. There is no suggestion that young Socrates' interactions with the stranger
will make him morally better. Theaetetus, after conversing with Socrates in the
Statesman's companion Socratic dialogue, will be less harsh with his fellows
(Theaetetus 210b12-c4). But young Socrates' harshness is emphasized at the end
of the Statesman (309a8).
41. See especially Statesman 285d5-7, where the stranger indicates that the
discussion is for the sake of making him and young Socrates better dialecticians.
The philosopher's concern with being or truth is mentioned at 286d8ff. in explicit
connection with the ability to divide by classes. By contrast see the claim at
284c2-5 that the statesman's knowledge of the fitting is confined to practical
affairs. At 284b8-c2, the stranger analogizes the statesman's concern with the
fitting (to metrion) with the sophist'sconcern with not being.
42. Phaedo 96a5-d7.
43. Apology 29e3-30b5. West says that Socrates must ultimately fail in this
attempt because he does not know what virtue is. (West, Plato's Apology of Socrates, p. 220). But this seems too blunt in light of the action in many of the
pedagogical dialogues, including Socrates' humiliation of Protagorasand his more
than matching wits with the likes of Euthydemus and Gorgias. Most importantly,
at Meno 98bl-6, Socrates says that he knows there is a difference between
knowledge and opinion. This knowledge is not inconsiderable for an educator.
Socrates' "failure" may be that he cannot extend his influence over the few to
influence over the many. But Socrates himself seems aware of this (Apology
3 1e5-32a3).
44. Theaetetus 150b7-151d7, 210b12-c9.

Gerald Mara
379
Of course, the primary question as to the relationship between these

two dimensions of the Socratic method remains. Are they interdependent? If so, what sort of interdependence is involved? Or is their copresence simply a coincidence which is neither explicable or replicable?
Although the importance of these questions can scarcely be overemphasized, I must avoid considering them in any detail here. I believe
that it is demonstrably foolish, however, to ignore Socrates' ambivalent
or ambiguous character in considering Plato's treatment of philosophy
and politics.
Thus, Socrates' classification of cities reveals a political as well as a
theoretical dimension. The description of the degeneration of the timocracy into the oligarchy seems in part directed toward Adeimantus who,
much more than Glaucon,45 resembles the timocratic man, the open
praiser of honor and the secret lover of money. This combined with the
rejection of the basis of Adeimantus' attack on philosophy in the name
of the city seems designed to persuade Adeimantus to re-evaluate his
opinion regarding the relative value of philosophy among different ways
of life. Likewise, Socrates' praise of philosophical happiness and contempt for tyrannical misery is intended to convince Glaucon, the erotic
man and thus the potential tyrant, of the incompatibility of the highest
human happiness with the most vicious injustice. Socrates' classification
of regimes reveals a kind of justice not obviously identical with the
Socratic description of purely philosophic justice.46 It is the multidimentionality of Socratic justice which may explain the perplexingly
ambiguous discussion of the relation of philosophy to politics in the
Republic. A certain kind of justice requires that Socrates make philosophy appear incompatible with politics for Glaucon. Given his disposition and his training, factors outside of Socrates' control, he will not
refrain from meddling in the affairs of Athens,47 the city on earth, unless
he believes that the best life is to be found in the city within himself,
an image of the city in heaven.
Socrates' characteristic activity reinforces the suspicion that for Plato
the most common or political activity is a certain kind of education.48
45. Cf. Republic 548d13-549a9.
46. Cf. Strauss, The City and Man, p. 132.
47. Republic 592b4-5; Seventh Letter 338bff. Strauss discusses Socrates' failure
to dissuade Glaucon from the life of tyranny in The City and Man, p. 63. This
failure is partially mitigated because Socrates does not enter into the discussion
of the Republic willingly (327bl-c12).
48. The clearest statements of this can perhaps be found in Socrates' descriptions of himself at Apology 29dl-30b5;
Theaetetus 150b7-151d7; and particularly
Gorgias 521d6-el; and his corresponding criticisms of the Athenian statesmen at


It is their educationwhich in part differentiatesthe philosophersof the
best city from those that come from no regime (520bl-c2). And this
same dimensionpartially distinguishesSocrates from the stranger,at
least in terms of their methods of inquiring.The complex nature of
Socrates'way of life shouldmake us reluctantto accept too uncritically
the Strauss/Bloomclaim about the incompatibilityof philosophy and
politicsfor Plato. The stranger'spresentationin the Statesmanprovides
a clear argumentfor the superiorityof philosophyto political things
based on the tensionbetweenthe most privateand most commonhuman
virtues.However,Socrates'way of life or methodor natureprovidesa
clear counterexampleto the stranger'sconclusions,an example of an
essentialrelationshipbetweenphilosophyand politicsin the activitiesof
one humanbeing. Indeed,given the dramaticsettingand the characters,
one might speculatethat the stranger'simplicitcriticismof the democracy is an imageof a kind of criticismthat mightbe toleratedin Athens.
His theoretical"distance"from the regime and his audienceof mathematicians stand in marked contrast to the immediatelyrelevant and
necessarilyinsultingfeatures of "citizen"Socrates'criticismsthat are
announcedto partisansor lovers of the democracylike Anytus and
Callicles.One mightgo furtherand hypothesizethat the strangerhimself,
in his scientificand apparentlydispassionedencounterwith the democracy and with cities in general, is a kind of image of a Socrateswho
might be able to both survive and converse in Athens but who would
do so at the cost of his peculiarpublic/privateharmony.49
VIII. Conclusion:Politics and Philosophyand Theoryand Practice
The many importantdifferencesbetween the classificationsof cities in
these two dialoguesneed not be explainedby an historicaldevelopment
within Plato's philosophy but may be accountedfor by the differing
perspectiveson philosophy and politics of Socrates and the Eleatic
Gorgias 516d8-elO; and Meno 99e4-100a9. The model of politics which these
descriptions generate differs extensively from that suggested by Gregory Vlastos'
interpretation of Socratic political justice as the avoidance of pleonexia. Compare Vlastos, Plato, pp. 70-7, 92, with Socrates' description of the true ergon of
the good citizen (agathou politou) at Gorgias 517b2-c2.
49. Among other things, this speculation accounts for Socrates' almost total
silence throughout both the Statesman and the Sophist. It also lends tinges of
both irony and hybris to Socrates' characterizationof the stranger as an elenctic
god at Sophist 216b7. This elenctic god uses refutation to expose lazy arguments,
not to improve the virtue of the speakers as Socrates claims to do in the Apology.
This kind of god is also said to observe or look down upon (kathoran) human
actions, implying detachment.

GeraldMara 381
stranger.The Campbell/Shoreyinterpretationof these differencesseems
altogethertoo simple to account for their complexity.And the suggestions of Morrowand Taylorseem to preventany seriouscomparisonof
the meritsof these competingperspectives.As I have triedto arguehere,
however, such a project of comparisonis both necessaryand possible
if we are to begin to clarifyPlato'streatmentof the relationshipbetween
politics and philosophyand, thus, of the possibilityof political philosophy itself.
In suggestingthat Socrates'classificationof regimesin the Republic
and his own way of life show a compatibilityof philosophyand politics,
I have not soughtto give an accountof the theoreticalstructureof that
compatibility.I have simply tried to suggest that there are sufficient
reasonsfor exploringthe topic furtherin the relevanttexts. The bulk of
this work remainsto be done. But a useful conclusionto this introductory essay may be to indicatehow that structurediffersappreciablyfrom
more familiartreatmentsof the problemof philosophyand politics or,
in more contemporaryterms,theoryand practicein politicalphilosophy.
First, Plato clearly differsfrom Hobbes50and Spinoza51by denying
that humanpracticeis subsumablewithin geometricalor mathematical
theory. The discussionsof humanaction in both the Statesmanand the
Republicportraypracticeas being far too fluidor individualto be converted to the rigorous truth of mathematics.However, neither does
Plato endorse Edmund Burke's counterclaimthat politics is immune
to any scientificor theoreticalinvestigationand only accessibleto historicalexperience.52Plato'spolitikeis, instead,a kind of science that is
particularlysuitedto the studyof changinghumanthings.Politikeis not
equivalentto either dianoia or pistis on the Republic's divided line.
Less metaphorically,Plato rejectsboth the claim that practiceis totally
accessibleto theoryand the positionthat practiceis totallyimpenetrable
to any kindof scientificinquiry.
Second, Socrates'discussionof the private and common human dimensions in the Republic challenges claims like Nietzsche's that the
theoreticallife is radicallyopposed or hostile to practice.53For Plato,
a choice apparentlyneed not be made between sound philosophyand
some form of virtuouspolitics. At the same time, he would also deny
the completenessof attemptslike HannahArendt'sto evaluatepolitics
strictly on its own terms without referenceto a philosophicalor con50. De Corpore, pt. I, chap. 6, cap. 6.
51. Ethics, pt. 3 (beginning).

52. Reflections on the Revolution in France (Garden City: Doubleday,
1961),
p. 74.
53. Adrian Collins, tr., The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1957), p. 11.

382
templative alternative.54The private (philosophical) human dimension

may surely stand alone more easily than the common (political). For
this as well as for other reasons, there is a tremendous temptation to
leave philosophy out of political analysis. But in the passage at 496dlff.
in the Republic Socrates implies that neither theory nor practice is fully
complete and, thus, understandable without the other.55
However Plato's attempts to relate philosophy and politics emphatically do not mirror phenomenological or historicist methods, which
ultimately seek to collapse or overcome differences between the two
ways of life. Plato does not follow Heidegger's path of delving to a
primordial condition that is the source or basis of all varieties of human
action.56 In the Republic intense eros can be recognized as a basic
psychological component of both philosophy and tyranny (573b7-8).
And all kinds of cities have their conceptual as well as their historical
roots in identical physical needs (369b5-7). But Plato is clear that the
differences among completed activities and cities are much more important than these genetic similarities. Nor does the Platonic position
involve an Hegelian dialectical emergence of a way of life that encompasses both theory and practice within a complex web of identities and
differences.57Philosophy and politics are not snapshots of a single human
activity at different stages of its historical development. Different ways
of life and different regimes make up the discrete and fundamental units
of analysis (or premises) of Plato's political philosophy. Clarifying their
interrelations with a view to choosing those that are best constitutes the
project that is first for us, one that is neither avoidable nor easily
completed.
54. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), pp. 324-5.
55. It could be suggested that this constitutes one important difference between
Plato and Aristotle. Although Aristotle differs vastly from Arendt, he clearly
favors a more autonomous or self contained evaluation of politics than Plato.
See Politics 3.3.
56. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Maquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 238, 347-8.
57. In "Sophrosyneand Selbstbewusstsein,"Rosen clearly indicates that Hegel's
Absolute Spirit successfully reconciles theory and practice in a way that is impossible for Plato. This may be true. But what dialectical transformationsof philosophy and politics need to occur before that reconciliation? The activities of
Hegel's best citizen and his possessor of Absolute Knowledge are enormously
different from Plato's political and philosophic ways of life. It is far from obvious
that the former pair is preferable as a set of human activities. Nor is it clear that
there are no convincing Platonic or classical objections to the dialectical logic of
Hegel's Science of Wisdom.


Constitutions, Virtue and Philosophy in Plato S Statesman and Republic

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Constitutions, Virtue and Philosophy in Plato S Statesman and Republic

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Northeastern Political Science Association

Constitutions, Virtue &Philosophy in Plato's "Statesman" &"Republic"

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I. Introduction: Constitutions, Political Philosophy, and Human Nature

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356 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

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Taylor6 see these variations in regimes as signaling a Platonic departure

p. 465. The commentary on the Statesman by J. B. Skemp also generally fits

of Plato Withl Introductory Essay and Footnotes

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 54-66.

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358 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

For both Socratesand the Eleatic stranger,as well as in the dialoguesin

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360 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

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In each dialoguethe best city is praisedbecauseit fostershumanvirtue.

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Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy

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Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy

The best city in the Statesman overcomes deficiencies caused by the

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Metaphysics 27 (1973): 617-642; Simon Aronson, "The Happy Philosopher-A

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366 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

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368 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

In the Statesmanthe role of justice is not nearly so apparent,but its

of Forms," Journal of Philosophy

"Justiceand Happiness in the Republic,"Vlastos, Plato, pp. 68-95.

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Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy

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These represent some of the more frequently suggested answers to this

VI. Common Virtue and Private Virtue

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Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy

means of an analysis of certain modal human types or certain hypothetical individuals.26

Dialogue (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975), pp. 21-2.

29. Gorgias 484c5-486c3.

35. Theaetetus 183e3-184a2; Sophist 216al-5, 237a3-b4.

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regime.For in a suitableone he himself will grow more and save

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374 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

I suggest that the classificationsof regimes in the Republic and the

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also courage more broadly understood, preserving opinions about the

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376 Constitutions,Virtue& Philosophy

Let us summarize.Socrates'classificationof cities in the Republic

The stranger'sclassificationof cities in the Statesman,on the otherhand,

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In the Statesman,then, the stranger'scriteria for classifying regimes

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Constitutions, Virtue & Philosophy

distinction between philosophers and moralists and a corresponding